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Artful Virtue: The Interplay
of the Beautiful and the Good in
the Scottish Enlightenment
For Bob
Artful Virtue: The Interplay
of the Beautiful and the Good in
the Scottish Enlightenment
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Leslie Ellen Brown has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, to be identified as the author of this work.
Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company
Wey Court East 110 Cherry Street
Union Road Suite 3-1
Farnham Burlington, VT 05401-3818
Surrey, GU9 7PT USA
England
www.ashgate.com
Introduction 1
1 The Senses 9
2 Virtue 31
Virtue as “Lovely Form” 31
Civic Virtue 35
Virtue into Art 38
Providence 45
3 Beauty 53
Beauty Defined and Dissected 53
Sublimity 64
Beauty and Truth 70
Beauty and Pleasure 76
4 Sentiment 87
Passions and Affections 87
Imitation 97
Expression 105
Imitation and Expression in Music 108
5 Taste 119
Sense of Taste, Delicacy of Taste, Standard of Taste 119
Judgment and Criticism 131
Imagination and Genius 137
Custom and Fashion 142
British Taste, the Scotch Taste, and the Genuine Scots Taste 144
6 Experience 151
Analogy and Induction 151
Association of Ideas 158
vi Artful Virtue
7 Cultivation 169
Utility and the Useful 170
Improvement and Progress 178
Education 187
8 Traditions 197
The Antique 197
Recovering History 205
Primitive Voices 215
Afterword 227
Select Bibliography 229
Index 239
List of Plates
I began conceptualizing this book and harvesting information a long, long time
ago, as I imagined bringing together the four beloved areas of inquiry which
have fascinated and inspired me since a young person and throughout my
professional career: the arts, the eighteenth century, Scotland, and ethics. To
that end, many persons and institutions over the decades are deserving of my
thanks and appreciation.
Funding for research came from numerous sources: the National Endowment
for the Humanities, Louisiana State University, the Southern Regional
Education Board, The Pennsylvania State University Institute for the Arts and
Humanities, and Ripon College’s Board of Trustees.
The expert staffs of various research libraries have been extremely helpful,
without which I could never have accessed the reams of material that I’ve
surveyed and used. These are: the Library of Congress, the Folger Shakespeare
Library, the National Library of Scotland, Glasgow’s Mitchell Library, and the
libraries at the University of Edinburgh, the University of Wisconsin, and Penn
State. These last two proved especially valuable in allowing me access to that
phenomenal database which all researchers of eighteenth-century documents
have come to know and love, Eighteenth Century Collections Online (ECCO).
I wish to thank certain individuals for their contributions: Charles Stewart-
Robertson for sharing Reid manuscripts from the Birkwood Collection,
and Kathleen Holcomb for providing lists of discourses for the Aberdeen
Philosophical and Glasgow Literary Societies, as well as a document proving
the connections between John Holden and Thomas Reid; the readers of various
chapters of my book who provided many helpful comments and corrections,
Samuel Fleischacker, Henry Fulton, Paul Jeffries, Douglas Northrop, and
Rachel Zuckert; and especially Simon Grote, who read and critiqued the
entire manuscript. I also wish to thank the very able editorial staff at Ashgate
Publishing, in addition to the anonymous readers whose comments proved
quite valuable.
-
L.E.B.
Spring Mills, Pennsylvania
November 2014
This page has been left blank intentionally
Introduction
He only, is the wise and able Man, who with a slight regard to these Things, applies
himself to cultivate another Soil, builds in a different Matter from that of Stone or
Marble; and having righter Models in his Eye, becomes in truth the Architect of his
own Life and Fortune; by laying within himself the lasting and sure Foundations of
Order, Peace, and Concord.1
– Lord Shaftesbury
1
Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times (1711; 3 vols, ed. Douglas Den Uyl, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 2: 238.
2
Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate
Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), 8-9, takes into account this
time frame, anchored on one end by Francis Hutcheson and on the other by Dugald Stewart.
2 Artful Virtue
ethical judgments emerge as the sources of evidence. All of these things dealt
with perceptual consciousness as a moral subject, which invited the Scots to ask:
What holds us together as a society? Why do we associate with one another?
What stimulates us to develop institutions? Ultimately moral philosophy was
about duty to and conduct in society, that is, what we call “ethics” or “morals”
(which is how I usually approach these terms in the following pages).3
It is no surprise that the Scots then applied the vast landscape of moral
philosophy to the specific territories of beauty—in nature and in the fine arts,
that is, aesthetics (though they did not at first use the term), and in character,
or ethics. They held forth about these subjects enthusiastically—in treatises,
academic lectures, essays, institutional records, personal correspondence, and
public discourses and debates. For the most part, these enthusiasts were the
Scots literati, a professional class of men of letters and learning who were civically
and humanely engaged and fascinated with the Enlightenment ideals that were
in play in Britain, Europe, and North America.4 Most of their biographies
and major writings are well known to today’s scholars of eighteenth-century
Scotland. They were by no means solely academics, and they excelled in a wide
range of disciplines and professions. The vast landscape of human endeavor
and understanding excited them, for they sought to demystify the unity of
cumulative knowledge. Their writings go beyond formal texts, the scholarly
discourses intended for university students and other moral philosophers. They
wrote about these various endeavors and disseminated their ideas in ways that
an educated, middle-class, general populace could access and appreciate—in
newspapers and magazines, encyclopedias, pamphlets, and method books.
Additionally many persons engaged with the ideas of aesthetic theory were
connoisseurs of the arts and artists themselves, so it is hardly surprising that
theories of beauty and virtue are echoed in the creative accomplishments of
the age, mostly in painting, architecture, and poetry, but not only within those
realms. This approach is what Hume recommended: the study of polite letters
is a glimpse into human affairs, and an artist is the best qualified to provide that
window.5 In our time, Richard Sher has invited investigation in just this way,
opposing a definition of the Scottish Enlightenment based on formal academic
texts alone.6 Thus here marks the purpose of my study: to reveal within the
landscape of human affairs the interdependency of aesthetics and ethics in a
3
I highly recommend as a starting place the Moral Philosophy article in Encyclopaedia
Britannica, or a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature, 3rd ed., 18 vols
(Edinburgh, 1787-97), 12: 272-318.
4
I depend on the definition provided by Sher, Church and University, 8.
5
David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the
Principles of Morals (rpt 1777 ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge; 3rd ed., P.H. Nidditch, Oxford:
Clarendon, 1975), 9-10.
6
Sher, Church and University, 7.
Introduction 3
We shou’d then see Beauty and Decorum here, as well as elsewhere in Nature;
and the Order of the Moral World wou’d equal that of the Natural. By this the
Beauty of VIRTUE wou’d appear; and hence, as has been shewn, the Supreme and
Sovereign BEAUTY, the Original of all which is Good or Amiable.12
The same qualities that enhance beauty also enhance morality. In the third of
the “Miscellaneous Reflections” we find a fine taste for beauty joining a relish
of what is decent, just, and agreeable, sources for the improvement of a person’s
character.13 Such is part of the larger issue of art and ethics shaping character,
and character itself validating a just taste and admirable morals. Order in the
universe is understood in part through moral actions (virtue) and through
the senses (beauty), thus beauty and virtue become forms of order. Improving
taste would improve the manners and ultimately the happiness of Shaftesbury’s
countrymen, for instance.14 Obviously he is aware that taste’s yardstick is a
matter of being a good person in polite company, of relishing artistic beauty, and
supporting what is an expectation of excellence in behaviors. Because a moral
sentiment is not a simple reflex but involves reflective judgment, he is a strong
supporter of criticism as necessary for developing a just taste.
But Shaftesbury goes far beyond a love of order and the support for a standard
of taste in explaining the relationship between the good and the beautiful. For
that reason it is important to understand the intensity of his ideas on self-interest.
In opposition to selfish egoism, rather, he favors an attitude of disinterest: the
intrinsic good existing for its own sake. The good and the beautiful, in an object
perhaps, happily coexist and need not serve anything beyond that. The true good
is in the enjoyment of beauty, yet no true enjoyment of beauty exists beyond
what is good.15 Shaftesbury’s way of thinking is integrative: when he considers
disinterestedness, he accepts both individual and public good. Certainly
persons are motivated to seek happiness for themselves through the sense of
pleasure. Nevertheless, the good of others, the general good, is the ultimate
10
Cooper, Characteristicks, 1: 207-8, 217-18.
11
Ibid., 2: 165.
12
Ibid., 2: 166.
13
Ibid., 3: 99-100.
14
Ibid., 3: 103.
15
Ibid., 2: 235.
Introduction 5
goal, in which the individual can play a part. In “The Moralists,” for instance, he
demonstrates that the natural state of humankind is social.16 Through the affairs
of disinterestedness Shaftesbury affirms that art has everything do to with moral
truth: the pleasure from beauty is linked strongly to the pleasure from virtue and
intrinsically so.
Last, take note that it was Shaftesbury who convincingly extended to the
philosophical discourse of the Scottish Enlightenment the importance of beauty
or deformity in both sensible and moral objects: the senses and the reflected
senses are the natural conduits for the beautiful and the good respectively.17
From “An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit,” it becomes clear that objects of
affection operate on the mind in similar fashion to objects of sense. Shaftesbury
compares the former to the latter, making special note of the active nature of
both:
The Case is the same in mental or moral Subjects, as in ordinary Bodys, or the
common Subjects of Sense. The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions
of these latter being presented to our Eye; there necessarily results a Beauty or
Deformity, according to the different Measure, Arrangement and Disposition
of their several Parts. So in Behaviour and Actions, when presented to our
Understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference,
according to the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects . . . Now as in the
sensible kind of Objects, the Species or Images of Bodys, Colours, and Sounds,
are perpetually moving before our Eyes, and acting on our Senses, even when we
sleep; so in the moral and intellectual kind, the Forms and Images of Things are
no less active and incumbent on the Mind, at all Seasons, and even when the real
Objects themselves are absent.18
Here within these parallel faculties lies Shaftesbury’s idea of harmony, that is,
harmony as “interior numbers” or moral perception. It is innate, meaning it is
instinctive and not taught or learned. It is the core of both virtue and beauty,
key to both ethics and aesthetics, as described in “Soliloquy, or Advice to an
Author”:
16
Ibid., 2: 176-7.
17
Ibid., 2: 16.
18
Ibid., 2: 16-17.
6 Artful Virtue
Harmony, and Proportion will have place in MORALS; and are discoverable in
the Characters and Affections of Mankind.19
19
Ibid., 1: 17-18.
Introduction 7
blurring the lines between high and popular cultures. I looked at everything I
could find before making my selections for more detailed inspection, based not
only on the prominence of seminal statements but for the broad acceptance
of core ideas. I don’t wish to imply that all were of equal weight, and in the
following pages I do attend more fully to the ideas of George Turnbull and
Alexander Gerard, for instance, than to those of an Alexander Campbell. But in
recognition that eighteenth-century Scottish society was relatively participatory,
my choice of materials depicts a wide acceptance of and broad enthusiasm for a
big idea. Almost all of the discussions of art and virtue are contextual, and many
are layered within the larger currents of philosophical discourse. Philosophical
analysis is not what is at the forefront in my study, however, and I don’t pretend
to approach it as a philosopher. Rather, I sketch general attitudes and frames as a
way of gaining insight into the phenomenon of time and place. To that end, that
is how I have approached them, as significant common threads played out again
and again and in various ways. These are: the senses, virtue, beauty, sentiment,
taste, experience, cultivation, and traditions. My manner of working, which
avoids organizing by individual philosopher or school, provides a historical
phenomenology that shows how virtue and beauty became an interwoven theme
in all aspects of the Scottish Enlightenment. Indeed it became the commonality
of discourse.
Some years ago when I first became intrigued with eighteenth-century
Scotland’s arts and culture, primarily with its writings on music, I consulted
the music division of one of Scotland’s most significant collections of primary
holdings. In response to my inquiry about eighteenth-century music theory
and criticism, I was told, “Those sources simply don’t exist. They never existed,
there was no culture for it. Why, it certainly was a good thing that Beethoven
hadn’t been born in Scotland!” The librarian I spoke with was incorrect; the
sources are abundant, varied, and approachable. However, they are not found as
writings on music in their own right but as pieces of evidence of a much larger
issue. One simply needs to know where to look and to position them within the
surrounding circumstances of enlightened Scotland.
This page has been left blank intentionally
Chapter 1
The Senses
For there are many sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us as necessarily
as material Objects do when they operate on our Organs of Sense . . . These
Determinations to be pleas’d with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our
Observation, the Author [Hutcheson] chuses to call Senses; distinguishing
them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power
of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an Internal Sense; and
that Determination to be pleas’d with the Contemplation of those Affections,
Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the
name of Moral Sense.1
The act of perception, then, marks the internal sense. The moral sense is but one
such operation for the perception of pleasure and pain, as is the aesthetic sense
which allows us to receive pleasant perceptions from that which we consider
1
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, in
Two Treatises (1725; ed. Wolfgang Leidhold, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 8-9.
10 Artful Virtue
2
Ibid., 9.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 7.
5
Ibid., 8.
6
Ibid., 10.
The Senses 11
concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design” as the first treatise of the Inquiry.
Hutcheson disavows any reference to the natural constitution of the intellect or
the idea of innateness, to him a “principle of knowledge,” but rather, sees both
internal and external senses as “natural power[s] of perception,” which is the
ability of the mind to obtain ideas from the presence of objects. The aesthetic
sense, for instance, is the passive power of expressly receiving ideas of beauty from
those objects that emit “uniformity amidst variety,”7 a description about which
I will say much more in a later chapter. Unlike the external senses, however, the
superior senses of beauty and virtue must be cultivated, although it is easy to
see how positive moral sentiments give rise to pleasure as readily as something
sensual, such as taste or sound.8
Though Hutcheson’s second treatise, entitled “An Inquiry Concerning
Moral Good and Evil,” is ostensibly about the ethical sense, he nevertheless does
not neglect the aesthetic in this portion of An Inquiry into the Original Ideas of
Beauty and Virtue; rather, he reinforces it. This time the tie between aesthetics
and ethics is driven by the sense of morals. He explains its connection: “We
shall find this [moral] Sense to be the Foundation also of the chief Pleasures of
Poetry. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the
Numbers, Measures, Metaphors, Similitudes.”9 Though to a lesser degree than
moral objects, art is more powerful than natural beauty in affecting us towards
virtue. In poetry one of the chief foundations of pleasure derives from the
moral sense, in that the passions are linked to how characters are represented.
For instance characters appearing in dramatic and epic poetry represent quite
vividly either good or evil, and these are what stimulate the feelings of the
spectator.10 In addition the depiction of a moral idea is more powerful than
the mere narration of it, and thereby the epic and tragic drama give greater
pleasure than philosophical writings whose intent is to advise in favor of virtue.
Natural and lively representations have the effect of making us admire what is
good and abhor what is vile. It is our moral sense which accomplishes this, not
any proposed intentions of the dramatist.11 Poetic imagery as well is rooted in
the moral sense, as moral language is a way of enhancing beauty. Arguing on
behalf of the moral epithet as a way of enlivening poetry, Hutcheson regards
moral qualities joined with natural objects as a way to “increase their Beauty or
7
Ibid., 67. Another view of innateness does enter into Hutcheson’s theory of the
senses when he acknowledges that pleasure comes from within and for its own sake and is
not tied to principles of utilitarianism; to perceive a work for mere enjoyment is to have an
innate knowledge of that sense. See Peter Kivy, The Seventh Sense: Francis Hutcheson and
Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), 36-7.
8
Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas, 10.
9
Ibid., 174.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12 Artful Virtue
Deformity; and we affect the Hearer in a more lively manner with the Affections
describ’d, by representing them as Persons.”12
Hutcheson’s “An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil” expands the
notion of pleasure, namely that pleasures through the senses are a first cause and
a foundation to behaviors. The pleasure acquired from the sensible perceptions
of all kinds creates initial ideas in us of natural good or happiness, and thereby
the objects that incite the pleasures, including artistic works, are perceived
by our senses to be good.13 Thus sense perception can establish social value.
Nevertheless, Hutcheson does separate the sorts of good that derive from the
external senses from those of the moral sense: the former is unable to promote
any public good or the happiness of others and is thereby lacking.14 He does
commend pleasures from beautiful objects, yet even here insists that they require
moral pleasures to really move us. The pleasures of beauty, order, and harmony
are weakened if they should be deficient of friendship, love, and beneficence.15
Aesthetic pleasures, then, are capable of changing behavior by affecting one’s
moral disposition. To that end, aesthetic pleasures are expected to influence
temperaments, even before they serve as sources of delight. “The internal
Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony,” he specifies, “contribute greatly indeed
toward soothing the mind into a forgetfulness of Wrath, Malice or Revenge; and
they must do so, before we can have tolerable Delight or Enjoyment.”16 One’s
mood cannot be tempered at the same time that it is awash with distress.
Hutcheson does recognize the moral effects of various external beauties,
associating the physical attributes of a person with admirable character. Our
minds are greatly affected by what we perceive as a lovely face, for instance,
because it seems to bear qualities that please. He identifies the source as moral:
It is our tendency to conflate beauty of face with beauty of character, but there
is indeed a great deal more beyond the physical. Whereas beauty may presume
favorable moral disposition, genuine love of aesthetic and natural beauties
12
Ibid., 175.
13
Ibid., 86.
14
Ibid., 91.
15
Ibid., 164.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 167-8.
The Senses 13
Temperance never spoiled a good Palate, whatever Luxury may have done; a
generous affectionate publick spirit, reflecting on itself with delight, never
vitiated any Organ of external Pleasure, nor weakened their Perceptions. Now all
18
Ibid., 171.
19
Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections,
with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728; ed. Aaron Garrett, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2002), 55.
14 Artful Virtue
virtuous Men have given Virtue this Testimony, that its Pleasures are superior to
any other, nay to all others jointly; that a friendly generous Action gives a Delight
superior to any other; that other Enjoyments, when compared with the Delights
of Integrity, Faith, Kindness, Generosity, and publick Spirit, are but trifles scarce
worth any regard.20
20
Ibid., 89.
21
Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1755), 1: 4-5.
22
Ibid., 1: 144.
23
Ibid., 1: 18-19.
24
Ibid., 1: 128.
The Senses 15
From this passage alone, it is obvious that Turnbull’s notion of sense as inherent
does not split the ethical from the aesthetic. It would seem that he is arguing for
Hutcheson’s two internal senses as one in the same.
Close consideration and reflection of the human condition, accordingly,
reveal that the moral sense is so deeply ingrained in our natures that meaningful
gratification or pleasure from the external senses answer to this principle. Any
worthy principles derived from the senses, Turnbull argues, provide evidence
that our moral being is tender and human.27 This concept serves as the basis
for Turnbull’s oft-reiterated theme that the greatest satisfaction and pleasure
attained from artistic manifestations depend on what is sociable, sympathetic,
and generous.
25
George Turnbull, Principles of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols (London, 1740), 1: 40n.
26
George Turnbull, A Treatise on Ancient Painting (1740; rpt without plates, intro.
Vincent M. Bevilacqua, Munich: W. Fink, 1971), 135.
27
Ibid., 141.
16 Artful Virtue
Besides all those qualities, which render a person lovely or valuable, there is also
a certain je-ne-sçai-quoi of agreeable and handsome, that concurs to the same
effect. In this case, as well as that of wit and eloquence, we must have recourse to
a certain sense, which acts without reflexion, and regards not the tendencies of
qualities and characters. Some moralists account for all the sentiments of virtue
by this sense. Their hypothesis is very plausible.29
28
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740; rpt, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge,
Oxford: Clarendon, [1967]), 84.
29
Ibid., 611–12.
30
Hume, Enquiries, 172-3.
31
Kivy, Seventh Sense, 143.
32
Hume, Treatise, 299.
The Senses 17
for the other. Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of.”33 We
are able to possess a sense of virtue, for instance, because we feel that a deed or a
person is virtuous. After many years of working through this idea, Hume affirms
sentiment as that which determines morality and establishes virtue.34
In short, for Hume, approval of moral qualities comes about in two ways: from
a “moral taste” (the moral sense) and from consideration of feelings of delight or
disgust, pleasure and pain, that arise from our awareness of particular qualities
or characteristics.35 Like Hutcheson and in a similar context of discussing in
tandem the ethical attributes of love and esteem, Hume illustrates the second of
these ideas by relying on the role of the fine arts. His explanation is very simple:
“A very play or romance may afford us instances of this pleasure, which virtue
conveys to us; and pain, which arises from vice.”36 The pairing of pleasure with
virtue and pain with vice plays out in a major way in his discussions of beauty
and sentiments.
But Hume adds one more idea. He relies liberally on a quality that does not
seem to be part of Hutcheson’s initial vocabulary of sense theory: sympathy, the
chief source of moral distinction in Hume’s scheme of ethics. Moral sentiment
is accounted for by way of extensive sympathy among humankind. Moreover,
sympathy carries considerable weight in regarding the beauty of external objects,
as it does in judging morals; it has a profound influence on the aesthetic sense.37
It also creates an inviolable general standard for determining endorsements in
oratory, theater, and education.38 And it represents another way of considering
the relationship between the beautiful and the good, one which I will explore in
later chapters.
Moralist and political economist Adam Smith’s (1723-90) remarks on
aesthetics in the profoundly influential The Theory of Moral Sentiments owe
some things to Hume, as they also cover how sentiments entwine with the moral
sense. But he also recognizes Hutcheson, with whom he studied in Glasgow and
where he later assumed the moral philosophy chair after first having delivered a
series of public lectures in Edinburgh. Like Hutcheson, Smith identifies several
different types of sentiments and behaviors through the internal senses, such as
a sense of duty, a sense of merit, and a sense of propriety, and it is key that he
accepts Hutcheson’s interpretation of internal faculties of sense that determine
beauty or deformity and virtue or vice.39 It is also key that such works its way into
33
Ibid., 470.
34
Hume, Enquiries, 289.
35
Hume, Treatise, 581.
36
Ibid., 470-71.
37
Ibid., 618.
38
Hume, Enquiries, 229.
39
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; ed. D.D. Raphael and
A.L. Macfie, Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 9, 67, 109. Smith, however, does not recognize the
18 Artful Virtue
Who ever thought of calling the sense of seeing black or white, the sense of
hearing loud or low, or the sense of tasting sweet or bitter? And, according to
him, it is equally absurd to call our moral faculties virtuous or vicious, morally
good or evil. These qualities belong to the objects of those faculties, not to the
faculties themselves. 43
Belladonna and ergot are remedies that have had many advocates,
Trousseau being the most pronounced champion of the former. Their
use in the lighter attacks is attended sometimes by the most happy
results, but they cannot be said to have any permanent effect. The
first is advantageous because of its power to diminish reflex
excitement, and in those undeveloped infantile convulsions which
are often grouped under the head of eclampsia its virtues are
decided. Belladonna or its alkaloid may be given in combination with
the bromides. Ergot or ergotin, in spite of its undeservedly bad
reputation, may be given in large doses, one to two drachms of the
tincture thrice daily, or five grains of the aqueous extract in the
course of the day. Of chloral there is not much to be said. At one
time it was thought to possess great virtues, especially in
combination with the bromides, but subsequent experience has
taught me that its use has many drawbacks, and only in exceptional
cases is it to be recommended—viz. in those in which there is a
disposition to excitement—either as a substitute for the attack or as
a sequel.
Of setons I have very little to say. At best, they are a barbarous and
painful mode of treatment, and, although cures have been effected, I
have never been much encouraged by their so-called influence.
Certain intractable cases are helped by surgical procedure, and
trephining has sometimes resulted in a cure. I know of one brilliant
result obtained by Leo of this city in an old epileptic, in which the use
of the instrument over the occipital region resulted in a complete
removal of the disease. It is especially recommended in cases in
which the form of the attacks bears some relation to the probable
disturbance of the cortical motor-centres; and even in such cases
there must be constancy in the method of expression of the
convulsion. So often do we find meningeal thickening of an extensive
district that it is manifest that trephining would do little or no good.
The statistics of the operation are unsatisfactory, for in the large
mass of testimony there is great want of exactness as to the
pathological suggestions of the attack, and a great deal about the
method of procedure and recovery from the operation itself, and very
little about the phenomena of the disease.
The diet of the epileptic should be of the most simple kind. Merson,49
whose carefully-prepared paper is full of valuable statistics, is
strongly in favor of vegetable diet, and his results are encouraging. I
am convinced that many children never would have become
hysterical or epileptic but for injudicious indulgence in animal food.
Whenever possible, I confine my patient to a diet of fish, poultry, and
fresh vegetables, with fruit. As an exciting cause the overloading of
the stomach has so often precipitated attacks as to lead Paget and
others to invent the term gastric epilepsy for this form of the disease.
The greatest care must be paid not only to diet, but to the general
habits of the patient—over-exercise, especially after eating, the
avoidance of hot places and high altitudes. A residence by the
seashore is preferable to mountainous places; and excitement, over-
study, and all agencies favoring cerebral congestion are to be
avoided.
49 West Riding Reports, vol. v. p. 1.
THE NEURAL DISORDERS OF WRITERS AND
ARTISANS.
Most of the articles upon this subject have been written during the
last fifteen or twenty years.
From a study of what has been written it will be seen that there are
two classes of muscular actions concerned: 1st, the steady
contraction of the muscles that poise the hand and hold the pen; and
2d, the intermittent contractions of the muscles concerned in moving
the pen: both of these classes are equally important in the etiology of
writers' cramp.
Chronic fatigue of the muscles is undoubtedly, in some cases, a
precursor, if not a cause, of copodyscinesia, and, according to
Poore,4 is occasionally the expression of hyperæmia or mild
inflammation of a motor nerve. Acute local fatigue has symptoms
which are well known to us all after having taken violent exercise,
cramp and pain being the two most prominent ones.
4 “Writers' Cramp and Impaired Writing-Power,” Medico-Chirurgical Transactions, vol.
lxi.
Any student who has dissected much has experienced the intense
feeling of fatigue in the muscles required to hold the dissecting
forceps, particularly when the spring is a little too strong. Much the
same thing is noticed when one who has not been accustomed to
write much is for some cause compelled to do so; he will probably
notice that in a few hours he is exerting a greater amount of
muscular force in pen-prehension than usual, and may even find that
he is producing a disagreeable feeling in the distal phalanges by the
pressure he is using; he will also probably be aware of a burning
sensation between the shoulder-blades.
The idea that these troubles of writers were due to using steel pens,
as once thought, is manifestly without foundation, as the affection
was recognized before the time of the introduction of steel pens,
which was from 1800 to 1820.
8 Thomas Weymss Fulton, “Telegraphists' Cramp,” Edinburgh Clin. and Path. Journ.,
Feb. 2, 1884.
The extensors of the wrist and fingers have a double duty to perform,
for, besides assisting in recovering from the downward stroke, they
have to support the hand during the whole act of telegraphing, in
order to prevent the weight from resting on the key, which would
prevent quickness in making and breaking the circuit.
FIG. 28.
13 F. T. Mills, M.D., “On Two Cases of Neuritis of the Ulnar Nerve,” Maryland Med.
Journ., vol. viii. p. 193, 1881.
Onimus18 states that women are more frequently affected than men
with telegraphers' cramp. Erb19 states that writers' spasm is met with
more frequently in men, much more rarely in women, and that
pianoforte-players' spasm occurs more frequently in women, and
particularly in neuropathic persons who belong to nervous families.
Hasse20 and Romberg21 consider that writers' cramp especially
occurs in men, women being affected very rarely. Of the 75 cases of
impaired writing-power reported by Poore,22 only 17 were women,
while of the 31 cases of undoubted writers' cramp included in the 75,
all were men.
18 Loc. cit.
19 “Writers' Cramp and Allied Affections,” Ziemssen's Cycl., Amer. ed., vol. xi.
20 Loc. cit.
22 Loc. cit.
It may be seen that the male sex has been employed far more
frequently than the female in most of the occupations previously
mentioned, so that a larger percentage of men would naturally be
affected; but now that women are being employed more generally a
larger number of the female sex may be expected to suffer in this
way.