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 Security, Conflict and Cooperation
in the Contemporary World

Britain, France,
West Germany and
the People’s Republic
of China, 1969-1982
M ARTIN A LBERS
Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the
Contemporary World

Series Editors
Effie G.H. Pedaliu
LSE Ideas
London, United Kingdom

John W. Young
University of Nottingham
Nottingham, United Kingdom
The Palgrave Macmillan series, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the
Contemporary World aims to make a significant contribution to academic
and policy debates on cooperation, conflict and security since 1900. It
evolved from the series Global Conflict and Security edited by Professor
Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that offer inno-
vative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and promoting an
empirical understanding of economic and political cooperation, conflict
and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nation-­
building, intelligence, terrorism, the influence of ideology and religion on
international relations, as well as the work of international organisations
and non-governmental organisations.

More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/14489
 Martin Albers

Britain, France, West

Germany and the
People’s Republic of
China, 1969–1982
The European Dimension of China’s Great
Transition
Martin Albers
Administration of the Free and
Hanseatic City of Hamburg
Hamburg, Germany

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

ISBN 978-1-137-56566-2    ISBN 978-1-137-56567-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56567-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016959496

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
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The registered company address is The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW,
United Kingdom
To my family
 Note on Spelling and Translations

For Chinese words I have generally used Hanyu Pinyin romanisation as

the system most widely in use and officially employed by the People’s
Republic of China. The only exceptions are names that are very familiar in
English in a different spelling, in particular the name of Chiang Kai-shek.
I have translated all quotations originally in languages other than
English in order to facilitate reading.

vii
 Acknowledgements

I would not have been able to write this book without very generous help
and support from many people and institutions, only some of whom I can
thank here.
As this book is based on a doctoral dissertation, I am first and foremost
indebted to my thesis supervisor David Reynolds, on whose advice and
near inexhaustible knowledge I could always rely. I simply could not imag-
ine a better supervisor.
Without the very generous financial support from numerous sides I
could not have undertaken this project and I am therefore indebted to the
Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes, the DAAD, the Sara Norton Fund,
the Members’ History Fund Cambridge, the German Historical Institute
in Paris, the Levy Plumb Fund, the Prince Consort and Thirwall Fund,
the Ellen MacArthur Fund, the Sir John Plumb Charitable Trust, and the
German Historical Society. I also greatly benefited from being a student
of Christ’s College, which provides an excellent and very stimulating envi-
ronment for studying and living. For their support and expertise I would
also like to thank the archivists at the Bundesarchiv, Politisches Archiv
des Auswärtigen Amts, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung,
Archiv Helmut Schmidt, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv,
Hamburger Staatsarchiv, DIN Archiv, UK National Archives, Churchill
College Archival Centre, University Library Cambridge, Archives natio-
nales (France), Archives de Paris, Centre des archives économiques et
financières, Archives diplomatiques, Archives nationales du monde du tra-
vail, Foreign Ministry Archives of China, Shanghai Municipal Archives,
US National Archives, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Gerald R. Ford

ix
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Presidential Library, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, and Ronald

Reagan Presidential Library. In particular, I would like to thank Monsieur
Grégoire Eldin at the Archives diplomatiques and Ms Lemke at the Archiv
Helmut Schmidt in Hamburg.
I am also grateful to my interview partners in Britain and Germany.
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Baroness Shirley Williams, Lord David Owen,
Sir Christopher Hum, Hugh Davies, the late Helmut Schmidt, the late
Henning Voscherau, Dr Hans-Christian Ueberschaer and Kurt Leonberger
granted me their time, patience and interest to bring history alive, and
provided me with insights that could not be found in the archives.
Among the particular pleasures of working on this project was to meet
many great scholars of whom I can only mention a few. Arne Westad,
Kristina Spohr and Jon Connolly read earlier versions of the text, pro-
vided me with crucial feedback, and helped me to correct numerous
errors. For their comments, support and time I also have to thank Eric
Bussière, Chen Jian, Enrico Fardella, Barbara Koenczoel, Chi-kwan Mark,
Bernd Schaefer, Maurice Vaisse, Hans van de Ven, Christian Ostermann
and Christian Wenkel. Similarly, I am very grateful to fellow students and
friends, including Zhong Zhong Chen, Martin Deuerlein, Almuth Ebke,
Steven Eichenberger, Mathias Haeussler, Charles Kraus, Evelin Harten,
Delia Leitner, Mark Miller, Nina Schwarz, Richard Siegert and Marcel
Will. Jessica Gienow-Hecht gave me the opportunity to teach a class on
Sino-German relations at Cologne University, which allowed me to test
some of my ideas in front of a very well-informed and critical public.
Professor Gienow-Hecht also gave me crucial comments on my work and
has supported me very kindly and helpfully. Professor Niu Jun in Beijing
helped me to come a bit closer to understanding contemporary Chinese
history, and his references gave me access to the Waijiaobu archives for
which I am very grateful.
Similarly, I am grateful to the staff at Palgrave for their very efficient
and constructive support as well as to three anonymous reviewers who
provided many valuable comments and suggestions. Apart from the finan-
cial support mentioned above, my research trips were made possible by
the hospitality of family and friends in many places. I would therefore
like to thank Jana Woltermann, Lumilla Rougeot and Selma Boulaouad
in Paris, Ann and David Mackie in Haywards Heath/London, Wolfgang
Mille, Markus Doering, and especially the Krüger Family in Berlin, the
Dolderer Family in Kempten/Munich, Lena Biehl in Cologne, Chai Ming
and her family in Beijing, Xi Xiaoche and Chen Jianhua in Shandong,
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xi

and Sean Kennedy, Stefan Niemann, and Annika Granholm Törnquist and
family in the USA.
Above all I would like to thank my family in Hamburg, Heide, and Bad
Gandersheim, and of course my wife Chen Mengyu, for all their love and
support. It is to them that this book is dedicated.
All remaining errors and shortcomings are exclusively my own
responsibility.
 Contents

1 Introduction   1

2 Historical Background to Sino-European Rapprochement

in the 1970s  13

3 Western Europe and Détente in East Asia, 1969–72  35

4 Promotion of European Exports to China and the Role

of Economic Diplomacy, 1969–72  61

5 The Diplomacy of High-Level Visits During the Twilight

of Maoism, 1973–77  87

6 Widening and Deepening the Relationship with China

Before the Reforms, 1973–77 113

7 The ‘Alliance Era’ and Strategic Cooperation with China,

1978–82 143

8 Promoting Transnational Exchange with China

in the Age of Reform, 1978–82 171

9 Conclusion 201

xiii
xiv Contents

Endnotes219

Appendix299

Bibliography303

Index327
 Abbreviations

AUMA Ausstellungs- und Messe-Ausschuss der Deutschen

Wirtschaft
BCPIT British Council for the Promotion of International Trade
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
BOT Board of Trade
CAAC Civil Aviation Administration of China
CBI Confederation of British Industries
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCPIT China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
CDS Chief of Defence Staff
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CFCE Centre Français du Commerce Extérieur
CHINCOM China Committee within CoCom
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CNPF Conseil National du Patronat Français
CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
CoCom Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports
Controls
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPGB Communist Party of Great Britain
CPIFA Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern
DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung

xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS

DM Deutsche Mark
EC European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
ENA Ecole Nationale de l’Administration
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FF French francs
FO Foreign Office
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GBCC Great Britain China Centre (formerly Committee)
GBP Pound sterling
GDR German Democratic Republic
GMD Guomindang
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
IMF International Monetary Fund
KPD German Communist Party
KGB Soviet Committee for State Security
MI5 Security Services, Military Intelligence, Section 5
MOD Ministry of Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIOG Nationalised Industries Overseas Group
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
SACU Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding
SBTC Sino-British Trade Council
SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SFIO Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière
SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
For the sake of convenience ‘Germany’ refers to West
Germany, ‘Europe’ to Western Europe, and ‘China’ to the
People’s Republic of China, unless otherwise specified.
 List of Figures

Fig. 8.1    Western trade with China, 1969–82 in million US$ 173

xvii
 List of Tables

Table 4.1    Chinese trade with Europe as part of total

Chinese imports and exports 63
Table 4.2    European trade with China as part of total
European imports and exports 64
Table 4.3    European trade with China in million US$, 1969–72 67
Table 4.4    West German trade with the main socialist countries
in 1975 in million DM 82
Table 6.1    European trade with China in million US$, 1973–77 124
Table 6.2    Structure of German trade with China in million DM,
before and after the Technogerma exhibition 138
Table 8.1    European trade with China, 1978–82 in million US$ 185
Table A.1   Western trade with China in million US$, 1969–1982 300

xix
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

My wife was born in the nineteenth century. Or at least the living condi-
tions in which she grew up resembled in many ways those one finds in
accounts from the time before the advent of mass consumer society in
Europe, the USA and other developed countries. Her family would grow
vegetables and keep chickens in the backyard not as a sign of postmod-
ernist, degrowth lifestyle but as an essential compliment to their normal
diet. Eating meat was a luxury. There was only one room in the house she
shared with her parents, and everybody in the neighbourhood had to use
communal showers to wash. Transport was basically still dependent on
muscular force and a bicycle was a highly valued piece of household equip-
ment. This was the early 1990s in a small provincial town in Shandong
province.
Yet change had started to set in, even in a corner that seemed centu-
ries away from the already bustling megacities of Shanghai and Shenzhen.
When she was six years old, the combustion engine entered her family’s
life as her father bought his first motorcycle, much admired by relatives
and neighbours alike. By the time the family bought its first car a few years
later, their living standards had essentially reached Western levels with a
three-bedroom flat, and all electric household appliances from freezer to
TV—including the obligatory rice cooker. Less then ten years later, the
young Chinese student from a country town travelled to Europe for the
first time, to begin her studies at Cologne University. Though her grades
were good, the main reason for her being able to study alongside peers

© The Author(s) 2016 1

M. Albers, Britain, France, West Germany and the People’s Republic
of China, 1969–1982, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56567-9_1
2 M. ALBERS

who had grown up under entirely different conditions was not so much
a particular talent, gift or extraordinary hard work. Rather, it reflected in
one individual story the effects of three decades of breakneck economic
growth and increasing international connections at nearly all social levels.
In other words, in less than 20 years she had experienced a social pro-
gression that took several generations, about a century earlier, in Europe
and the USA. This story of China’s radical transition and opening has
been told many times.1 Yet it remains one of the most unlikely and incredi-
ble processes of the recent past, essential for making sense of today’s world
and for grasping the future scenarios that seem possible.
Understanding it takes us back to a wholly different story, to 3
November 1839. On that day three British ships attacked a Chinese fleet
off the coast of Kowloon and fired the first shots of the conflict known
as the First Opium War.2 This conflict forced China to confront the West
and worked as a catalyst for the long political and economic decline of the
Middle Kingdom that was only stopped in 1949 or perhaps even in 1976.
In between lay a period when China was unable or unwilling to show seri-
ous initiative in the international system.3 It was only in the 1970s that
a unified and independent China chose to appear on the stage of world
politics to peacefully interact with the Western world on equal terms.
As it had from the 1840s–1860s, China began opening up again to
Western influences. And if the West’s economic and political interaction
with China in the nineteenth century had taken place in the context of the
‘first globalisation’, the transformation of the largest nation on earth into
the workshop of the world a long century later became one of the icons
of the ‘second globalisation’.4 The circumstances of China’s second open-
ing to the West, however, were fundamentally different from the first. In
the period after 1969 it was the leadership of the People’s Republic that
largely decided the terms on which it would deal with the outside world.
Though still economically poor, the country could freely determine the
speed and scope of the process of reintegration into an increasingly inter-
dependent world.
It is the aim of this book to study certain international aspects of this
process, the consequences of which we feel every day when we go shop-
ping, switch on the news or look at the stock market. Put differently, I
try to show how we got from diplomatic decisions of war and peace to
students from Shandong province studying sociology in Cologne. More
specifically, I look at one chapter of this story that has, surprisingly, been
 INTRODUCTION 3

left almost blank until today—the role of Western Europe in facilitating

China’s great transition.
When dealing with the period in focus, 1969–82, it is impossible not to
have in mind a better known story, which is the relations between China
and the two superpowers, notably the USA.5 But my main concern is to
go beyond this triangle and see China through the eyes of three Western
European countries: France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG). All three had a long tradition of interacting with China
and they all shared with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the fate of
territories under direct threat of conventional as well as nuclear warfare.
Similarly, London, Paris and Bonn were all implicated in the Helsinki
process and the general developments of détente that seemed to loosen
the bloc structures and give the medium powers more room for manoeu-
vre.6 Though their approaches to European integration were different and
changed over the course of the period studied, Bonn, Paris and London
were also key players in the European Community (EC), which was of
critical importance to the Chinese leadership in its search for ways to bal-
ance Soviet power. Finally, France, Britain, and the FRG were still dwarf-
ing China’s gross domestic product (GDP) and were among the first
to expand their commercial relations with the PRC after the end of the
Cultural Revolution’s most radical phase in 1969. Even more importantly,
the three countries shared the bulk of Sino-European trade, as they do
today. This has become one of the key factors in the global economy, with
China being the EU’s second largest trading partner and the EU even
taking first place among the PRC’s suppliers and customers.7 There are
therefore many reasons why the European perspective on developments
in China is crucial, and why analysing the three countries’ bilateral rela-
tions with the PRC seems relevant. Yet, despite their evident importance
for today’s world, surprisingly little has been written about how current
Sino-European relations came about, especially if compared to the librar-
ies filled with studies on the ups and downs of ties between Washington
and Beijing.8
Earlier periods of Sino-European relations have been studied to some
extent, and over the past decades a few scholars have begun to look at
bilateral relations between Britain, France and Germany on the one hand
and China on the other, often from the perspective of political science.9
But with very few exceptions, no historical research has been undertaken
to analyse Sino-European relations in a wider context during the 1970s
4 M. ALBERS

and 1980s, the crucial period when the foundations for China’s economic
and political rise were laid.10
Overall, this neglect of the relations between Western Europe and
China in the 1970s is related to the fact that China policy often took a less
prominent place in public debates than other international issues. But it is
the purpose of this book, firstly, to challenge the notion that China only
played a marginal role in British, French and German policies during these
years; and, secondly, to look at the origins of China’s rise as a global power
during the decade in question.
The aim of this book is threefold. In the following chapters I will first
of all look for the main factors guiding European China policies and, sec-
ondly, discuss the impact these policies arguably had on the PRC and the
international scene, asking, finally, how far this helps us to understand
interactions between Western democracies and authoritarian states on a
more general level.
Though periodisations in history can always be challenged, the years
1969–82 seem appropriate for studying a number of major transitions.
In 1969 the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution ended in China and
the country started taking a new interest in developing relations with
the outside world.11 Thirteen years later, in September 1982, the 12th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) marked the
full integration of Deng Xiaoping’s reform programme into the ideo-
logical canon.12 Between these important dates lay the political open-
ing towards the West under Mao, followed by the economic opening
under Deng. In other words, the years between 1969 and 1982 laid the
foundation for current economic and political ties between Europe and
China.13
As mentioned above, this is a self-consciously Eurocentric study, adopt-
ing the perspective of three Western countries. The main reason for such
an approach is that public records in China are not nearly as accessible as
in Europe. This not only means the effective impossibility of analysing
the two sides of bilateral relations to the same degree. It has also led to
the absence of a comparative body of secondary literature to place the
PRC’s international relations in a wider context. There are some recent
studies of Beijing’s foreign policy. Interestingly, however, they mostly
leave out the foreign policy of the 1970s and early 1980s, dealing either
with foreign strategy under Mao or with the time after 1978 when the
reforms had started.14 The time span between 1972 and 1978 is largely
neglected even though many key figures (most notably Deng Xiaoping)
 INTRODUCTION 5

were continuously active.15 Most books on Chinese foreign policy during

the Cultural Revolution end well before the late 1970s, and understand-
ably concentrate on the radical phase between 1966 and 1969 and on
the rapprochement with Washington.16 China’s early UN policy, its impli-
cation in Third World conflicts and its perception of European détente
therefore do not receive much attention. Chen Jian is a rare exception
in this regard. He makes a compelling case for the links between Mao’s
domestic programmes and China’s role in the Cold War.17 Chen’s work
provides an excellent guide to the PRC’s foreign policy in general, and is
therefore highly important for my research. Many of Chen’s findings on
Beijing’s relations with the two superpowers are also directly relevant to
Sino-European relations.
In other words, there exist a number of publications that somehow
touch upon the topic that this book is covering. But hardly any original
research has been done to address some of the key questions regarding
European China policy. It is therefore clear that the existing literature
leaves a gap to be filled. Given the importance of Europe’s current rela-
tions with the PRC, we simply do not know enough about how govern-
ments in Bonn, Paris and London set about developing these in their
crucial early period after 1969.

Dimensions of Sino-European Exchange

In order to study this period, one main challenge lies in positioning this
book’s approach with regard to recent developments in international
and comparative history. While classical diplomatic history remains very
much alive, the field has been greatly enriched by a number of innovative
approaches. These include the focus on cultural phenomena, the rise of
transnational history and the transition from world history to global his-
tory.18 At the same time it cannot be denied that in terms of their heuristic
motives and their objects of study, transnational history, global history
and diplomatic history have much in common.19 They all concentrate on
modern history with a focus on the very recent past, and they all acknowl-
edge the importance of developments that involve exchange across bor-
ders.20 Most studies of the mentioned fields also attribute a pivotal role to
the state as the most powerful form of human organisation in the recent
past.21 Put differently, the study of foreign policy has been transformed
over recent decades but it still seems highly relevant even for many propo-
nents of transnational and global history.
6 M. ALBERS

Following these assumptions I mainly concentrate on the national

governments of the three European states studied, putting the following
study in the realm of classical international history. Yet it is an international
history very much aware of the developments in the field. The traditional
concentration of diplomatic historians on issues of military strategy and
defence obviously plays a role because the framework of the Cold War,
with its ideological and strategic imperatives, bound all Western European
countries. But since Sino-European relations rarely directly touched on
vital issues of security on either side, my interest goes much further than
the question of war and peace.
At the time of writing, China’s power and influence on Europe are not
only felt in terms of military might or diplomatic leverage. China’s contin-
uously rising defence budgets certainly contribute to its increasing weight
in global affairs.22 But equally, if not more salient, is its importance as a
global consumer of Western goods, as a large-scale producer of everything
from toys to real-estate bubbles, and as the biggest creditor the world has
ever seen. And China’s rise is also about perceptions of the country as a
potential threat to many things the West claims to cherish, from intel-
lectual property, secure jobs and human rights to the vision of sustainable
development in Africa and Latin America.23 Finally, China’s post-1976
development is increasingly affecting Western and global culture, be it
in sports, movies, or through the hundreds of thousands of students it
exports.24 If one attempts to go back to the origins of China’s rise and
the Western European role therein, it therefore seems futile to concen-
trate solely on matters of professional diplomacy and summit-level politics.
What is needed instead is a multi-dimensional analysis of Sino-European
encounters. That means combining diplomatic history with approaches
from other subdisciplines such as transnational and global history.
To meet this challenge from an economic perspective, this book seeks
to uncover the state’s role in the development of transnational economic
exchange between Europe and the PRC. In so doing, it points up a clear
overlap with the research interests of many transnational historians as
well as researchers working on the origins of the globalisation we cur-
rently experience.25 While being aware of the pitfalls when using theoreti-
cal approaches from other disciplines, I also take some inspiration from
recent concepts of political economy. The relatively open and empirical
approaches by Peter Hall and David Soskice are particularly useful for my
work. Though in my case it does not seem appropriate to apply all of their
models and theories, they provide a comparative analytical framework to
 INTRODUCTION 7

study the interactions between the state and private actors in market soci-
eties, highlighting how different sets of institutions influence economic
outcomes as well as politics in capitalist societies.26
With these arguments in mind, it is important to understand how
Western European governments sought to facilitate market entry into
China for their national industries. This issue plays an important role, for
example, in Chaps. 4 and 6, where the role of economic associations is
discussed, using sources from these organisations where available. Here I
argue that while governments tried to influence such associations and their
China policies in various ways, they all had to face business and organisa-
tional structures that had deeper roots in the respective political econ-
omy and could therefore not be altered at will. The making of economic
exchange thus depended on government leaders as well as on opposition
politicians and business representatives, who had direct contacts with
China, making this a truly transnational field of study.
In addition to the economic perspective, cultural diplomacy and issues
of perception play an important role in this study. Perhaps surprisingly,
this does not concern Western Maoism, which had next to no impact on
actual Sino-European relations.27
But there was a crucial cultural dimension of classical interstate con-
tacts with important political and economic implications for this book’s
topic. Unlike in the nineteenth century, European countries could not
force their way into China by means of military intervention. Instead they
had to seek cooperation with the PRC on an equal footing if they wanted
to improve bilateral relations. Areas where such cooperation seemed most
promising were science and education, in other words classical fields of
cultural transfer and cultural diplomacy.28 This was closely linked to the
expectation of political decisionmakers that cultural exchange with the
PRC would influence the way the Chinese elite thought and acted with
regard to Europe. Though there is not enough room for a detailed exami-
nation of these expectations and what they say about Western identities,
cultural transfers figure prominently in this study. These too were often
connected to government policies but not totally dependent on them.
In many instances private actors were important agents of cultural and
economic transfer, and these private contacts created both opportunities
and challenges for the respective governments. Individuals like Joseph
Needham from Britain or the German Otto Wolff von Amerongen, for
example, had a very high reputation in the PRC long before their coun-
tries sent ambassadors to China. The economic and cultural associations
8 M. ALBERS

they were active in thus marked a dimension of transnational exchange in

their own right, as well as a factor to be dealt with by professional diplo-
mats from London and Bonn.
Finally, the global context of European China policy plays a crucial role
for this study. This obviously concerns the framework of the Cold War in
Europe and Asia, but it goes much further than that. European integra-
tion, the end of the Bretton Woods system, the oil crises, and the increas-
ing challenges to Keynesian interventionism in the West were all factors
that affected China policies, at least indirectly. The French attempts to
sell nuclear technology to the PRC, for example, can only be understood
against the background of national and international debates on energy
policy. Likewise, the dream of German businessmen to help build China’s
heavy industries in exchange for non-ferrous metals reflected their percep-
tions of ongoing changes in the global economy. To really understand
how European governments dealt with China one therefore has to take
cultural and economic factors into account and see China policy in the
context of both the Cold War and accelerating globalisation.
Pursuing this kind of international history requires adopting a relatively
wide definition of China policies as the main object of study. Not all of
the fields and topics mentioned can be researched to the same degree in
a single monograph. Instead I have chosen a pragmatic approach that
concentrates on national governments while also trying to take cultural
and economic factors into account wherever they seem relevant. This leads
to the definition of ‘China policy’ as the sum of strategies and actions by
representatives of the state that aim to influence political, economic or
cultural relations between the respective country and China, or to use
these relations for other political ends. Consequently, the main actors in
the book are professional politicians and diplomats. But businessmen, sci-
entists and cultural representatives also played active roles in China policy.
It was thus that the incarceration of a British journalist by the Chinese, the
transfer of technical norms from Germany to the PRC, and even the gift
of panda bears to European visitors had an impact on intergovernmental
relations as well as on perceptions and wider societal exchange between
China and Europe.

Comparing Britain, France and West Germany

Transnational and comparative history are closely related conceptually.29
At the same time it is striking that comparative history in the field of
international affairs is not yet very developed when it comes to relations
 INTRODUCTION 9

between Asia and the West. One reason for this is certainly that studies of
international or global history involve, by definition, two or more coun-
tries with all the complexity and challenges regarding access to sources
that this implies. Bringing in additional case studies therefore increases the
workload for the historian almost exponentially. Despite this challenge,
the comparison in the case of European China policies brings a number of
advantages, which apply to most comparative studies. On a general level,
the comparative approach, as a tool traditionally used in social history,
helps to place national diplomatic processes in a wider social and eco-
nomic context. This makes it possible to balance the focus on individual
actors with a consideration of the historical structures and constraints that
shaped their lives.30
As Hannes Siegrist points out, ‘it is the aim of the comparison in social
and cultural history to grasp, understand, and explain the general and the
particular nature, meaning, and function of a phenomenon in space and
time’.31 This also holds true for this book. By adopting a comparative per-
spective I aim to achieve three things. First of all, I try to identify common
developments with regard to China to see to what extent one can talk of
a ‘European’ or ‘West European’ China policy. In so doing I also try to
position Western Europe in a context of accelerating globalisation after
the end of the postwar boom.32
Secondly, the identification of common traits contrasts with the discus-
sion of national particularities. Looking at what set the three countries
apart enables us to differentiate between developments that were induced
by European and global structures and forces on the one hand, and those
that had their origins in particular national or even regional combinations
of historical factors. This is connected with a discussion of possible alter-
native reactions to similar situations. In 1978, for example, the Chinese
asked all three countries for support in setting up a French, a German,
and a British university in China. The three governments responded very
differently to this invitation and the university projects developed conse-
quently in distinct ways. In cases like this the comparison is about as close
to a controlled experiment as a historian can get.
Thirdly, the comparative approach also reveals something about China’s
policies towards Europe. By seeing how differently the Chinese treated
the Europeans in similar situations, it becomes clear that they pursued par-
ticular strategies in their relations with Europe and that they differentiated
between its main countries. One example is the treatment of the Taiwan
question in bilateral negotiations. In the communiqués establishing dip-
lomatic relations between the PRC on the one hand and Britain, France
10 M. ALBERS

and West Germany on the other, the Chinese demanded of the Europeans
very different formulas, even though the status of these communiqués in
international law is very similar. By comparing the three countries I there-
fore not only reveal more about Western Europe but also about China.
Britain, France and West Germany seem the most appropriate case stud-
ies for this kind of approach. Of course the focus on these three countries
leaves out many important facets of Sino-European relations. As Henry
Kissinger once famously complained, Europe did not have a single tele-
phone number in the 1970s and in light of the complexities of the dif-
ferent countries’ bilateral relations with China and the important role of
organisations like the EC, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and
the Western European Union, it is impossible to speak of one common
history regarding Europe and China.33 At the same time, Britain, France
and West Germany cover a remarkable range of experiences in Europe’s
political encounters with China, and thus allow for a very interesting com-
parison. They all recognised the People’s Republic at different times, with
Britain leading the first batch of Western states to establish relations with
Beijing in the early 1950s, France spectacularly courting Mao in 1964 and
the FRG following only in the wake of Nixon’s visit to China, thus display-
ing the different options and constraints of European policymakers at the
time. Together, the three countries also accounted for most of Europe’s
trade with the PRC and they shared very similar levels of economic and
social development, comparable political systems, and were broadly similar
in terms of demographics and economic potential. At the same time there
were a number of very different and interesting factors affecting their
national China policies. Most prominent among those was the British
imperial heritage including the colony of Hong Kong, the French policy
aim of independence and national grandeur established by de Gaulle, and
the German division with its implications for German sovereignty. Finally,
they also frequently served as reference points for one another in formulat-
ing policies towards China, a fact which makes comparing these policies
even more plausible.
Though a comparison promises to be fruitful, it also brings the chal-
lenge of selecting sources in order to study objects that are actually simi-
lar in nature. As Jürgen Kocka has pointed out, ‘to compare always also
means to abstract’ because in order to compare one has to compromise
on the amount of detail one can include in each individual analysis.34 I
therefore try to follow Kocka’s dictum and use ‘as much abstraction as
necessary, as much concretion and reference to the context as possible’.35
 INTRODUCTION 11

In this case this means that government records are used to a roughly simi-
lar degree, concentrating on the executive in all three countries in order to
have a good foundation for the comparison.
In addition to institutional records of the three governments I have
made use of several other sources of non-state actors and institutions.
These include most notably the papers and records of business associations
active in Sino-European relations. These records of private or semi-private
organisations, however, are often not complete and not similarly accessible
for all three countries, which is why they only serve as complementary
evidence to the main theses developed in the text.
Because of the complexity of the subject the book follows a simple
chronological structure. It opens with a background chapter that presents
a bird’s-eye view of how China policies developed between the nineteenth
century and the 1960s. This is followed by three main parts, each subdi-
vided into two thematic chapters. These parts are mainly based on events
in the PRC that affected the European countries in similar ways.
The first part looks at the period between 1969 and 1972 when the
Chinese leadership undertook its dramatic turn from near-complete iso-
lation to the political opening towards the West. Against the backdrop
of détente in Europe this enabled the European countries to normalise
diplomatic ties with the PRC and tentatively expand bilateral trade, build-
ing on the semi-official relations that had started to unfold in the 1950s.
While the three countries’ relations with China were very different at the
start of this period, they had all reached a comparable level of exchange
by 1972, reflecting a process of conversion within Europe with regard to
Cold War politics.
This is followed by the second part, covering the years 1973–77. This
last spell of Maoism was marked by a further improvement of relations
in some areas and stagnation in others as the PRC oscillated between a
relapse into the Cultural Revolution and the first tentative steps towards
economic reform. The latter eventually prevailed and is hence the domi-
nating theme of the last part that looks at the years 1978–82. This period
saw the beginning of a ground-breaking transformation of Chinese poli-
tics and the advent of new opportunities and challenges for the makers of
European China policies, related both to bilateral ties with China and to
a changing set of global political and economic structures. Within each of
the three parts, the first chapter looks at how the three governments set
about developing political relations in the classical sense in the context of
the Cold War. The following chapter in each section then discusses state
12 M. ALBERS

strategies to increase exchange in the fields of trade and culture, with the
latter mainly consisting of educational and scientific cooperation.
While each of the subperiods studied saw crucial political shifts in
the PRC as well as important turns in domestic and international poli-
tics affecting the three European governments, a number of interrelated
themes run through the entire book. These are namely the imperative
for politicians in Britain, France and Germany to deal with the ongoing
decline of European power and influence in Asia, the determination of the
Chinese communists to restore what they regarded as China’s legitimate
place in international relations, the changing role of the nation state and
its government in an environment of accelerating globalisation, and the
Cold War as the overarching strategic framework motivating and limit-
ing policy choices. These topics are often only indirectly addressed but
together they create the setting in which French, British and West German
China policies are studied in the following seven chapters.
The conclusion of the book then returns to the three questions
mentioned at the beginning, and reflects on the main driving forces of
European China policies, the historical significance of Sino-European rela-
tions, and possible implications for the future.
 CHAPTER 2

Historical Background to Sino-European

Rapprochement in the 1970s

Most experts agree that the main driving force behind most if not all of
Chinese politics in the twentieth century was the will to leave behind the
legacy of European and Japanese imperialism.1 Because of the importance
this experience of confrontation with Europe had for the Chinese, it seems
therefore necessary to point out several crucial differences regarding the
long-term background of the respective bilateral relations since the nine-
teenth century. This constitutes the first part of the chapter. Then follows
a summary of the main developments in bilateral relations between 1949
and 1969, providing the immediate historical backdrop to the core of the
comparison between the three countries’ China policies in the 1970s and
early 1980s.

The Legacies of Imperialism

In the nineteenth century all three European countries acted as imperialist
powers in China. Especially in the period between 1895 and 1914 their
policies showed some similarities, and the three were key members of the
Eight-Nation Alliance during the Boxer War of 1900. Yet for this study
the differences in the colonial histories matter more than the common
traits. These differences explain many of the particularities of European
China policies during the 1970s.
Britain stands out in this regard for two reasons. First of all, until the
1930s no other foreign power had a comparable influence on the course

© The Author(s) 2016 13

M. Albers, Britain, France, West Germany and the People’s Republic
of China, 1969–1982, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56567-9_2
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 COMMON TOMATA SAUCE.

Tomatas are so juicy when ripe that they require little or no liquid
to reduce them to a proper consistence for sauce; and they vary so
exceedingly in size and quality that it is difficult to give precise
directions for the exact quantity which in their unripe state is needed
for them. Take off the stalks, halve the tomatas, and gently squeeze
out the seeds and watery pulp; then stew them softly with a few
spoonsful of gravy or of strong broth until they are quite melted.
Press the whole through a hair-sieve, and heat it afresh with a little
additional gravy should it be too thick, and some cayenne, and salt.
Serve it very hot.
Fine ripe tomatas, 6 or 8; gravy or strong broth, 4 tablespoonsful:
1/2 to 3/4 hour, or longer if needed. Salt and cayenne sufficient to
season the sauce, and two or three spoonsful more of gravy if
required.
Obs.—For a large tureen of this sauce, increase the proportions;
and should it be at first too liquid, reduce it by quick boiling. When
neither gravy nor broth is at hand, the tomatas may be stewed
perfectly tender, but very gently, in a couple of ounces of butter, with
some cayenne and salt only, or with the addition of a very little finely
minced onion; then rubbed through a sieve, and heated, and served
without any addition, or with only that of a teaspoonful of chili
vinegar; or, when the colour is not a principal consideration, with a
few spoonsful of rich cream, smoothly mixed with a little flour to
prevent its curdling. The sauce must be stirred without ceasing
should the last be added, and boiled for four or five minutes.
 A FINER TOMATA SAUCE.

Stew very gently a dozen fine red tomatas, prepared as for the
preceding receipt, with two or three sliced eschalots, four or five
chilies or a capsicum or two (or in lieu of either, with a quarter of a
teaspoonful of cayenne pepper), a few small dice of lean ham, and
half a cupful of rich gravy. Stir these often, and when the tomatas are
reduced quite to a smooth pulp, rub them through a sieve; put them
into a clean saucepan, with a few spoonsful more of rich gravy, or
Espagnole, add salt if needed, boil the sauce stirring it well for ten
minutes, and serve it very hot. When the gravy is exceedingly good
and highly flavoured, the ham may be omitted: a dozen small
mushrooms nicely cleaned may also be sliced and stewed with the
tomatas, instead of the eschalots, when their flavour is preferred, or
they may be added with them. The exact proportion of liquid used is
immaterial, for should the sauce be too thin it may be reduced by
rapid boiling, and diluted with more gravy if too thick.
 BOILED APPLE SAUCE.

Apples of a fine cooking sort require but a very small portion of

liquid to boil down well and smoothly for sauce, if placed over a
gentle fire in a close-shutting saucepan, and simmered as softly as
possible until they are well broken; and their flavour is injured by the
common mode of adding so much to them, that the greater part must
be drained off again before they are sent to table. Pare the fruit
quickly, quarter it, and be careful entirely to remove the cores; put
one tablespoonful of water into a saucepan before the apples are
thrown in, and proceed, as we have directed, to simmer them until
they are nearly ready to serve: finish the sauce by the receipt which
follows.
Apples, 1/2 lb.; water, 1 tablespoonful; stewed very softly: 30 to 60
minutes.
Obs.—These proportions are sufficient only for a small tureen of
the sauce, and should be doubled for a large one.
For this, and all other preparations, apples will be whiter if just
dipped into fresh water the instant before they are put into the
stewpan. They should be quickly lifted from it, and will stew down
easily to sauce with only the moisture which hangs about them. They
should be watched and often gently stirred, that they may be equally
done.
 BAKED APPLE SAUCE.

(Good.)
Put a tablespoonful of water into a quart basin, and fill it with good
boiling apples, pared, quartered, and carefully cored: put a plate
over, and set them into a moderate oven for about an hour, or until
they are reduced quite to a pulp; beat them smooth with a clean
wooden spoon, adding to them a little sugar and a morsel of fresh
butter, when these are liked, though they will scarcely be required.
The sauce made thus is far superior to that which is boiled. When
no other oven is at hand, a Dutch or an American one would
probably answer for it; but we cannot assert this on our own
experience.
Good boiling apples, 1 quart: baked 1 hour (more or less
according to the quality of the fruit, and temperature of the oven);
sugar, 1 oz.; butter, 1/2 oz.
 BROWN APPLE SAUCE.

Stew gently down to a thick and perfectly smooth marmalade, a

pound of pearmains, or of any other well-flavoured boiling apples, in
about the third of a pint of rich brown gravy: season the sauce rather
highly with black pepper or cayenne, and serve it very hot. Curry
sauce will make an excellent substitute for the gravy when a very
piquant accompaniment is wanted for pork or other rich meat.
Apples pared and cored, 1 lb.; good brown gravy, third of pint 3/4
to 1-1/4 hour. Pepper or cayenne as needed.
 WHITE ONION SAUCE.

Strip the skin from some large white onions, and after having
taken off the tops and roots cut them in two, throw them into cold
water as they are done, cover them plentifully with more water, and
boil them very tender; lift them out, drain, and then press the water
thoroughly from them; chop them small, rub them through a sieve or
strainer, put them into a little rich melted butter mixed with a spoonful
or two of cream or milk, and a seasoning of salt, give the sauce a
boil, and serve it very hot. Portugal onions are superior to any
others, both for this and for most other purposes of cookery.
For the finest kind of onion sauce, see Soubise, page 126, which
follows.
 BROWN ONION SAUCE.

Cut off both ends of the onions, and slice them into a saucepan in
which two ounces of butter have been dissolved; keep them stewing
gently over a clear fire until they are lightly coloured; then pour to
them half a pint of brown gravy, and when they have boiled until they
are perfectly tender, work the sauce altogether through a strainer,
season it with a little cayenne, and serve it very hot.
 ANOTHER BROWN ONION SAUCE.

Mince the onions, stew them in butter until they are well coloured,
stir in a dessertspoonful of flour, shake the stewpan over the fire for
three or four minutes, pour in only as much broth or gravy as will
leave the sauce tolerably thick, season, and serve it.
 SOUBISE.

(English Receipt.)

Skin, slice, and mince quickly two pounds’ weight of the white part
only of some fine mild onions, and stew them in from two to three
ounces of good butter over a very gentle fire until they are reduced
to a pulp, then pour to them three-quarters of a pint of rich veal
gravy; add a seasoning of salt and cayenne, if needed; skim off the
fat entirely, press the sauce through a sieve, heat it in a clean
stewpan, mix it with a quarter of a pint of rich boiling cream, and
serve it directly.
Onions, 2 lbs.; butter, 2 to 3 oz.: 30 minutes to 1 hour. Veal gravy,
3/4 pint; salt, cayenne: 5 minutes. Cream, 1/4 pint.
 SOUBISE.

(French Receipt.)

Peel some fine white onions, and trim away all tough and
discoloured parts; mince them small, and throw them into plenty of
boiling water; when they have boiled quickly for five minutes drain
them well in a sieve, then stew them very softly indeed in an ounce
or two of fresh butter until they are dry and perfectly tender; stir to
them as much béchamel as will bring them to the consistence of very
thick pea-soup, pass the whole through a strainer, pressing the onion
strongly that none may remain behind, and heat the sauce afresh,
without allowing it to boil. A small half-teaspoonful of pounded sugar
is sometimes added to this soubise.
White part of onions, 2 lbs.: blanched 5 minutes. Butter, 2 oz.: 30
to 50 minutes. Béchamel, 3/4 to 1 pint, or more.
Obs.—These sauces are served more frequently with lamb or
mutton cutlets than with any other dishes; but they would probably
find many approvers if sent to table with roast mutton, or boiled veal.
Half the quantity given above will be sufficient for a moderate-sized
dish.
 MILD RAGOUT OF GARLIC, OR, L’AIL À LA BORDELAISE.

Divide some fine cloves of garlic, strip off the skin, and when all
are ready throw them into plenty of boiling water slightly salted; in
five minutes drain this from them, and pour in as much more, which
should also be quite boiling; continue to change it every five or six
minutes until the garlic is quite tender: throw in a moderate
proportion of salt the last time to give it the proper flavour. Drain it
thoroughly, and serve it in the dish with roast mutton, or put it into
good brown gravy or white sauce for table. By changing very
frequently the water in which it is boiled, the root will be deprived of
its naturally pungent flavour and smell, and rendered extremely mild:
when it is not wished to be quite so much so, change the water every
ten minutes only.
Garlic, 1 pint: 15 to 25 minutes, or more. Water to be changed
every 5 or 6 minutes; or every 10 minutes when not wished so very
mild. Gravy or sauce, 1 pint.
 MILD ESCHALOT SAUCE.

Prepare and boil from half to a whole pint of eschalots by the

preceding receipt; unless very large, they will be tender in about
fifteen minutes, sometimes in less, in which case the water must be
poured from them shortly after it has been changed for the second
time. When grown in a suitable soil, and cultivated with care, the
eschalots are sometimes treble the size that they are under other
circumstances; and this difference must be allowed for in boiling
them. Drain them well, and mix them with white sauce or gravy, or
with good melted butter, and serve them very hot.
 A FINE SAUCE, OR PURÉE OF VEGETABLE MARROW.

Pare one or two half-grown marrows and cut out all the seeds;
take a pound of the vegetable, and slice it, with one ounce of mild
onion, into a pint of strong veal broth or of pale gravy; stew them
very softly for nearly or quite an hour; add salt and cayenne, or white
pepper, when they are nearly done; press the whole through a fine
and delicately clean hair-sieve; heat it afresh, and stir to it when it
boils about the third of a pint of rich cream. Serve it with boiled
chickens, stewed or boiled veal, lamb cutlets, or any other delicate
meat. When to be served as a purée, an additional half-pound of the
vegetable must be used; and it should be dished with small fried
sippets round it. For a maigre dish, stew the marrow and onion quite
tender in butter, and dilute them with half boiling water and half
cream.
Vegetable marrow, 1 lb.; mild onion, 1 oz.; strong broth or pale
gravy, 1 pint: nearly or quite 1 hour. Pepper or cayenne, and salt as
needed; good cream, from 1/4 to 3/4 of pint. For purée, 1/2 lb. more
of marrow.
 EXCELLENT TURNIP, OR ARTICHOKE SAUCE FOR BOILED
MEAT.

Pare, slice, and boil quite tender, some finely-grained mild turnips,
press the water from them thoroughly, and pass them through a
sieve. Dissolve a slice of butter in a clean saucepan, and stir to it a
large teaspoonful of flour, or mix them smoothly together before they
are put in, and shake the saucepan round until they boil: pour to
them very gradually nearly a pint of thin cream (or of good milk
mixed with a portion of cream), add the turnips with a half-
teaspoonful or more of salt, and when the whole is well mixed and
very hot, pour it over boiled mutton, veal, lamb, or poultry. There
should be sufficient of the sauce to cover the meat entirely;[58] and
when properly made it improves greatly the appearance of a joint. A
little cayenne tied in a muslin may be boiled in the milk before it is
mixed with the turnips. Jerusalem artichokes make a more delicate
sauce of this kind even than turnips; the weight of both vegetables
must be taken after they are pared.
58. The objection to masking a joint with this or any other sauce is, that it
speedily becomes cold when spread over its surface: a portion of it at least
should be served very hot in a tureen.

Pared turnips or artichokes, 1 lb.; fresh butter, 1-1/2 oz.; flour, 1

large teaspoonful (twice as much if all milk be used); salt, 1/2
teaspoonful or more; cream, or cream and milk mixed, from 3/4 to 1
pint.
 OLIVE SAUCE.

Remove the stones from some fine French or Italian olives by

paring the fruit close to them, round and round in the form of a
corkscrew: they will then resume their original shape when done.
Weigh six ounces thus prepared, throw them into boiling water, let
them blanch for five minutes; then drain, and throw them into cold
water, and leave them in it from half an hour to an hour,
proportioning the time to their saltness; drain them well, and stew
them gently from fifteen to twenty-five minutes in a pint of very rich
brown gravy or Espagnole (see Chapter IV.); add the juice of half a
lemon, and serve the sauce very hot. Half this quantity will be
sufficient for a small party.
Olives, stoned, 6 oz.; rich gravy, 1 pint: 15 to 25 minutes. Juice,
1/2 lemon.
Obs.—In France this sauce is served very commonly with ducks,
and sometimes with beef-steaks, and with stewed fowl.
 CELERY SAUCE.

Slice the white part of from three to five heads of young tender
celery; peel it if not very young, and boil it in salt and water for twenty
minutes. If for white sauce put the celery, after it has been well
drained, into half a pint of veal broth or gravy, and let it stew until it is
quite soft; then add an ounce and a half of butter, mixed with a
dessertspoonful of flour, and a quarter of a pint of thick cream or the
yolks of three eggs. The French, after boiling the celery, which they
cut very small, for about twenty minutes, drain and chop it; then put it
with a slice of butter into a stewpan, and season it with pepper, salt,
and nutmeg; they keep these stirred over the fire for two or three
minutes, and then dredge in a dessertspoonful of flour: when this
has lost its raw taste, they pour in a sufficient quantity of white gravy
to moisten the celery, and to allow for twenty minutes’ longer boiling.
A very good common celery sauce is made by simply stewing the
celery cut into inch-lengths in butter, until it begins to be tender; and
then adding a spoonful of flour, which must be allowed to brown a
little, and half a pint of good broth or beef gravy, with a seasoning of
pepper or cayenne.
Celery, 3 to 5 heads: 20 minutes. Veal broth, or gravy, 1/2 pint; 20
to 40 minutes. Butter, 1-1/2 oz.; flour, 1 dessertspoonful; cream, 1/4
pint, or three yolks of eggs.
 WHITE CHESTNUT SAUCE.

Strip the outer rind from six ounces of sound sweet chestnuts,
then throw them into boiling water, and let them simmer for two or
three minutes, when the second skin will easily peel off. Add to them
three quarters of a pint of good cold veal gravy, and a few strips of
lemon rind, and let them stew gently for an hour and a quarter. Press
them, with the gravy, through a hair-sieve reversed and placed over
a deep dish or pan, as they are much more easily rubbed through
thus than in the usual way: a wooden spoon should be used in
preference to any other for the process. Add a little cayenne and
mace, some salt if needed, and about six tablespoonsful of rich
cream. Keep the sauce stirred until it boils, and serve it immediately.
Chestnuts without their rinds, 6 oz.; veal gravy, 1 pint; rind of 1/2
lemon: 1-1/4 hour. Salt; spice; cream, 6 tablespoonsful.
Obs.—This sauce may be served with turkey, with fowls, or with
stewed veal cutlets.
 BROWN CHESTNUT SAUCE.

Substitute rich brown gravy for the veal stock, omit the lemon-rind
and cream, heighten the seasonings, and mix the chestnuts with a
few spoonsful of Espagnole or highly flavoured gravy, after they have
been passed through the sieve.
 PARSLEY-GREEN, FOR COLOURING SAUCES.

Gather a quantity of young parsley, strip it from the stalks, wash it

very clean, shake it as dry as possible in a cloth, pound it in a mortar,
press all the juice closely from it through a hair-sieve reversed, and
put it into a clean jar; set it into a pan of boiling water, and in about
three minutes, if gently simmered, the juice will be poached
sufficiently; lay it then upon a clean sieve to drain, and it will be
ready for use.
Spinach-green, for which particular directions will be found at the
commencement of Chapter XXIV., is prepared in the same manner.
The juice of various herbs pounded together may be pressed from
them through a sieve and added to cold sauces.
 TO CRISP PARSLEY.

Wash some branches of young parsley well, drain them from the
water, and swing them in a clean cloth until they are quite dry; place
them on a sheet of writing paper in a Dutch oven, before a brisk fire,
and keep them frequently turned until they are quite crisp. They will
become so in from six to eight minutes.