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International Political Economy Series

China’s Challenge
to US Supremacy

Economic Superpower versus Rising Star

John G. Glenn
International Political Economy Series

Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw
Visiting Professor
University of Massachusetts Boston, USA
and Emeritus Professor
University of London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
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has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South increas-
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 John G. Glenn

China’s Challenge to
US Supremacy
Economic Superpower versus Rising Star
John G. Glenn
Department of Politics and International Relations
Southampton University
United Kingdom

International Political Economy Series

ISBN 978-1-349-95156-7    ISBN 978-1-349-95157-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95157-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016962707

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

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 Contents

1 China’s Challenge to US Supremacy   1

Introduction   1
The USA and International Order    3
US Power at the International Level    8
The USA and the Rise of China   16
Book Structure  19

2 The USA as Global Architect  25

Introduction  25
In the Aftermath of the Second World War   29
East Asia  36
The ‘Collapse’ of the Bretton Woods System   40
Conclusion  46

3 The Global Architecture Reconfigured: Implications

for East Asia  53
Introduction  53
Finance in the Aftermath of the 1971 Crisis   55
Reconfiguring the IMF and World Bank   57
The Emergence of the WTO   63
Placing Balanced Trade on the Agenda   68
The Global Transformation of Production Networks   72
Conclusion  78

v
vi Contents

4 China Opens  83
Introduction  83
China’s Growth  84
China and the East Asian Developmental State Model   92
China’s Divergence from the Developmental State Model   96
China’s Trading Partners  101
Conclusion 105

5 China Integrates 111
Introduction 111
WTO Accession  114
The Loopholes in the Global Architecture  118
Overseas Production in China  120
Multinationals and Intellectual Property  123
The Outlook for China  126
Conclusion 132

6 The Current Balance 139

Introduction 139
The Measuring Debate  140
The World Out of Balance  146
Internal Challenges Confronting China  150
External Challenges Confronting China  163
Conclusion 169

7 Future Scenarios 175
Introduction 175
The Military Balance  176
China’s Military Power  180
The International Arena: From Norm-Taker
to Norm-Maker 187
Future Scenarios  191
Conclusion 205
 Contents  vii

8 Conclusion 213
Introduction 213
The Near Future  218

Postscript 225

Bibliography 227

Index 253
 Abbreviations

ABC Agricultural Bank of China

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT ASEAN Plus Three
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BOC Bank of China
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CCB China Construction Bank
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralised
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIE Foreign Invested Enterprises
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP Gross Domestic Product
G7 Group of Seven
G8 Group of Eight
G20 Group of Twenty
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ix
x Abbreviations

ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

IFI International Financial Institutions
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITO International Trade Organisation
MFN Most Favoured Nation
MNC Multinational Corporation
MOSS Market Oriented Sector Selective talks
NAFTA North American Free Trade Association
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD Organization of Cooperation and Development
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PBOC People’s Bank of China
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRC People’s Republic of China
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ROK Republic of Korea
SAP Structural Adjustment Policy
SEATO South-East Asian Treaty Organisation
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SOE State Owned Enterprises
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRIMS Trade Related Investment Measures
TRIPS Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TVE Township and Village Enterprises
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
VER Voluntary Export Restraint
VIE Voluntary Import Expansion
WTO World Trade Organisation
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Imports to the USA 1945–1970 41

Fig. 2.2 The fall in the rate of profit for the USA 43
Fig. 2.3 Inflation and annual GDP growth percentages after
the two oil crises  44
Fig. 3.1 GDP of selected countries $US current (1970–2013) 55
Fig. 3.2 US budget deficit as percentage of GDP (1969–2013)  58
Fig. 3.3 US employment by sector 66
Fig. 3.4 US trade deficit in goods and services US$ billions 72
Fig. 3.5 US value added by sector (% GDP) 74
Fig. 4.1 China’s GDP growth 1971–2014 85
Fig. 4.2 Mainland China’s trade balance in goods and services
($Billions) 102
Fig. 6.1 GDP of selected countries ($US trillions—current) 141
Fig. 6.2 GDP of selected countries ($purchasing power
parity—trillions) 142
Fig. 6.3 GDP per capita—China and the USA ($US current) 144
Fig. 6.4 GDP per capita—China and the USA ($purchasing
power parity) 145
Fig. 6.5 China’s foreign exchange reserves 147
Fig. 6.6 Pre-tax return on capital in China 152
Fig. 6.7 China’s population by age and sex 156
Fig. 6.8 US and China high technology value added ($millions) 161
Fig. 6.9 Value added of commercial knowledge intensive services
($millions)162
Fig. 7.1 Japanese growth rates (annual percentage GDP growth) 191

xi
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Marshall plan & US government net foreign assistance to

selected East Asian countries ($ millions) 33
Table 2.2 Trade balance between the USA, Japan, and Germany
(millions of dollars) 41
Table 3.1 FDI inflows into China by country (percentage share) 76
Table 4.1 China’s population and employment 88
Table 4.2 Shares of gross industrial output 90
Table 4.3 Ownership composition of industrial output (percentage) 91
Table 4.4 China’s employment by industrial sector (per cent) 92
Table 4.5 Structure of the economies of India and China
(percentage of GDP) 93
Table 4.6 Ownership and profits of large- and medium-sized
industries (2005) 97
Table 4.7 Average annual export rates (percentage change in
export values) 98
Table 4.8 Export shares of FIEs as percentage of total exports in
each sector 100
Table 4.9 Pattern of merchandise trade between Mainland China
and selected countries (billions of US dollars) 2010 103
Table 5.1 China’s changing import tariffs  115
Table 6.1 Regional shares of China’s exports (percent) 159
Table 6.2 Dollar-Yuan exchange rate 2005–2014  165
Table 7.1 Top ten military spenders 177

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

China’s Challenge to US Supremacy

Introduction
This book takes as its starting point the most discernible pattern in inter-
national relations that has been observed throughout the millennia—the
rise and fall of great powers. The question that presents itself today is
whether we are witnessing the demise of American preponderance and a
return to a competitive bipolar system with the USA and China as the two
main protagonists? As far back as the fifth century B.C., Herodotus had
noticed this waxing and waning of wealth and power, such that ‘the cities
that were formerly great, have most of them become insignificant; and
such as are at present powerful, were weak in olden time’.1 But more than
this, the strongest state in the system will seek to establish an international
environment that favours itself and its allies, but such arrangements have,
thus far, never been permanent in nature. The growth in strength of a
hitherto less powerful state, it is argued, will lead to that state challenging
the prevailing international conditions that favour others at the expense
of its own ambitions. At some point, the status quo will be challenged by
the rising power. This usually occurs when the costs of confronting the
status quo powers and disrupting the international order are outweighed
by the benefits of reconfiguring such international arrangements—‘those
actors who benefit most from a change in the social system and who gain
the power to effect such change will seek to alter the system in ways that
favour their interests’.2

© The Author(s) 2016 1

J.G. Glenn, China’s Challenge to US Supremacy,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95157-4_1
2 J.G. GLENN

The problem for great powers alluded to by Edward Gibbon in his

The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire formed the basis of Arnold
Toynbee’s argument that hegemons confront two major problems, ‘the
threat of decay from within and the ever-present danger of overextension
abroad’.3 Similar arguments can be found in the general literature, such as,
Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and his warning that
the USA was in danger of overextending itself. But, what also lies behind
the rise and fall of great powers is the uneven and combined develop-
ment of these states. Those that are less economically developed—trailing
states—struggle to catch up with those that lead. When endeavouring to
do so, they have one important advantage for, in the lead state(s), they see
not only the reflection of their future but also the means through which
they can attain such status. By emulating the technology of the lead state,
they may leap–frog several intermediate stages of development and close
the economic gap that exists between themselves and the vanguard.
The challenge for the vanguard state, on the other hand, is how to
maintain its economic lead in an international environment in which oth-
ers can short circuit the path of development by emulating its very suc-
cess. Although this has been one of the few constants throughout history
(the copying of Carthaginian ship designs by the Romans during the First
Punic War to the detriment of Carthage, is one of the more pertinent
historical examples in the military sphere), it has been greatly exacerbated
by the nature of the modern capitalist system. Inter-capitalist competition,
overcapacity and declines in the rate of profit impel the industrialist to
look overseas for new markets leading to greater trade and/or the estab-
lishment of production units in other markets. The latter may occur for
two reasons. Overseas production may be used as a substitute for trade,
enabling companies to tap overseas markets. At the same time, cheaper
labour and land (and possibly energy) lower costs of production overseas
not only helping to restore rates of profits but also enabling companies
to temporarily overcome the problem of market saturation. The paradox
of power for the USA is therefore that the very economic system that has
propelled it on to the world stage also contains within it the potential
seeds of its own destruction. Of course, trade acts as a conduit for techno-
logical transfer, but more fundamentally the construction of production
sites in the pursuit of lower costs provide others ample opportunity to
catch up through technological leapfrogging.
Yet, what marks the period of US dominance from previous historical
epochs is the conscious design of an international economic architecture
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 3

that is now worldwide in its nature, the objective of which is the facilitation
of a global free market. Whether the USA can use the global institutions
and rules created at its instigation to prevent the rapid rise of a challenger
is the key question that this book sets itself. In so doing, the book traces
the post-war economic recovery arguing that the USA was rather
successful at preventing the rise of a new challenger amongst its allies, but
whether it can repeat this success in relation to China is yet to be seen.

The USA and International Order

At the close of the Second World War, America set about establishing
a global economic order based on multilateralism and a truly interna-
tional system of sovereign states using its structural power to frame these
arrangements. With its commitment to the independence of hitherto
colonial states, the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 agreed by Roosevelt
and Churchill at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, augured in the handing
over of world leadership from Britain to the USA. But it also heralded
a new international order, with its commitment (in principle at least)
to ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live’ and to ‘see sovereign rights and self gov-
ernment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them’.4
For the USA, the dissolution of former empires into newly independent
sovereign states had the added benefit of ensuring that, outside of the
Communist Bloc, its new form of hegemony would be effective through-
out the world. According to one author on the subject, this disman-
tling of former empires represented ‘the most important single change
in world politics in recent centuries. The dominant nation-state-empires
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were overthrown. With
them went the core of the inter-state system—which lay in inter-imperial
relations rather than in Westphalian ideas of sovereignty—and the classic
meaning of the nation-state’.5
In addition, the USA established a set of multilateral institutions/
regimes based upon an open world economy that provided for the inclu-
sion of any state that wished to join. This, it is argued, was quite inten-
tional. After two World Wars in the first half of the twentieth century, the
USA attempted ‘to build a system that could at least potentially put an
end to thousands of years of great power conflicts’.6 The result was the
creation of a multilateral order that brought great benefits to its allies
in the core industrialised states, spinning an economic web that ‘attracts
4 J.G. GLENN

others’ and ‘makes it hard for them to leave’ thus promoting ever greater
economic integration.7
Certainly, throughout the period since the Second World War, the
USA has been highly interventionist in terms of relatively short-term
military campaigns—a trait that has only strengthened in recent decades.
Moreover, as Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter’s excellent analysis high-
lights, when it deems it in its interest, the USA often plays fast and loose
with regard to the very international norms and agreements that it was
instrumental in establishing.8 Yet, the form of American Empire is mark-
edly different because it is not an empire of territory, but an empire of
capital.9 The objective is to create an international order based on the free
flow of goods and capital. Rather than seeking to achieve long-term
possession of others’ territory (at least after its initial expansionist phase),
the objective has been to promote unfettered access to goods, resources
and labour through the market, providing equal access for both ‘national’
and international capital.
Although the open economic system that the USA established certainly
helped prevent antagonistic blocs within its sphere of influence, it was
also very much in its interest to develop an open economic order because
at the time it possessed a competitive advantage in almost every eco-
nomic sphere. The position of the USA was therefore akin to that of the
UK’s during its period of hegemonic dominance which, at the time, had
reduced its tariffs on imported manufactures to zero, despite tariffs being
retained by the other major powers.10 Similarly, the UK endeavoured to
establish a degree of multilateralism into its trading arrangements when,
in 1860, it signed the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty based on the principle of
most favoured nation status (MFN), that is, if either country agreed to
tariff reductions with a third party, these concessions would automatically
be granted to the signatories of the treaty.11
Yet, this principle was not applied extensively, and by the inter-war years,
the international economic order had dissolved into a series of economic
blocs based upon bilateral or regional trade agreements. After the Second
World War, the USA set about establishing financial, trade and security
regimes based on multilateralism. It is this unique combination of this
principle of multilateralism embodied in a set of global institutions and
absence of long-term territorial acquisition that sets the American hege-
monic order apart from all others. Although Britain promoted an order
based upon free trade, it did not purposefully set out to establish a set of
institutions that were global in scope and based on a foundational code
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 5

that applied agreements to all member states. Multilateralism, ‘coordinates

behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles
of conduct’, something that neither a simple free trade system nor a set
of bilateral agreements possess.12 For example, the most-favoured-nation
rule under which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
operated meant that once an agreement to reduce tariffs on imports was
made between two states it must apply to all member states.
Of course, despite many arrangements being multilateral and having
‘generalized principles of conduct’, these are not always upheld in prac-
tice. The form that these agreements take often favour certain countries
over others (for example, GATT’s introduction of the 1974 Multifibre
Arrangement’s quota system for imports of textiles and garments from
industrially developing countries).13 Greater power, more often than not,
yields greater influence—particularly in relation to the IMF and World
Bank where voting power depends on size of economy and the degree
of financial contribution. In addition, bilateral agreements and aid have
focused on some countries more than others.
Indeed, it is clear that Europe and East Asia, partly because of their
strategic importance, have benefitted to a far greater degree from integrat-
ing into the US hegemonic order than most other countries. Churchill’s
‘Iron Curtain’ speech is remembered mostly for it pointing out his con-
cerns regarding the communist threat in Europe, but it also talked of
the threat in East Asia. Mirroring these concerns, Dean Acheson, Under
Secretary of State, argued for the construction of a ‘great crescent’ stretch-
ing from ‘the Kurile Islands to the borders of Iran and Afghanistan’ that
would serve as a bulwark against communism in the East.14 It was envis-
aged that this ‘great crescent’ would involve ‘the development of an inter-
dependent and integrated counter-force to Stalinism in this quarter of the
world’.15 By May 1947, Acheson was publicly stating the need to ensure
the economic revival of the allies’ former enemies, arguing for the ‘recon-
struction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany
and Japan—upon which the ultimate recovery of the two continents so
largely depends’.16 A more appropriate metaphor to that of Churchill’s
iron curtain would therefore be a ‘ring of steel’ established to encase both
the Soviet bloc and the newly established PRC in order to contain com-
munism. Although Latin America and Africa would become the site of
proxy wars between the two sides later on, the greatest importance was
placed on containing communism within the territories that they possessed
at the time through the establishment of this ring of steel.
6 J.G. GLENN

Although America’s strategy was successful in containing communism,

in recent decades, the tensions between inter-state competition and inter-­
capitalist dynamics (contradictions of capitalism) have become even more
pronounced. This book therefore explores the tensions and contradictions
existing between the economic world order established and maintained
by the USA since the Second World War and the security imperatives of
the USA as the most powerful state in the international system. On the
one hand, since the overcapacity and decline in the rate of profit, higher
labour and raw material costs in the 1970s, the USA has sought to liber-
alise other economies in the financial, investment, and trade spheres. In
so doing, it has provided new investment opportunities for accumulated
capital and new consumer markets for both its national and multinational
corporations. At the same time, it has created the conditions necessary for
its companies to take advantage of lower material and labour costs by pro-
moting the free movement of goods and capital, thus partially overcoming
the economic crisis that led to recession in the seventies and eighties. This
emphasis on unfettered flows of capital and goods was instrumental in the
rapid economic rise of China and its commensurate military growth.
The policy of trying to ensure the continuation of US dominance in
an increasingly open and competitive international economic environ-
ment, has been implemented through the various international insti-
tutions it was instrumental in setting up—particularly the IMF, World
Bank, and the World Trade Organisation/General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (WTO/GATT). Given the relative decline in its trading posi-
tion in industrialised goods as a result of its European allies’ economic
recovery and the rise of the East Asian economies, the USA has sought
to prevent further decline in its merchandise sector while maintaining its
position with regard to the tertiary sector. At the same time, it has moved
negotiations into wholly new spheres concerning investment ((Trade
Related Investment Measures - TRIMS), services (General Agreement on
Trade in Services - GATS) and intellectual property rights (Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights - TRIPS). The former supports the policies
of the World Bank and IMF, ensuring that foreign direct investment by
multinational companies is unhindered by various conditions that were
previously attached by states in permitting such investment. The General
Agreement on Trade in Services seeks to open other countries’ service
sectors to outside competition. Most of the OECD countries now have
a 25/75 economic profile where industrial production has declined to
approximately 25 %of economic activity whereas services have grown to
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 7

approximately 75 %. One of the most important objectives of the Uruguay

Trade Round (1986–1994) was to prise open the service sector in foreign
markets, because it was in this sector that the OECD countries now pos-
sessed their greatest competitive advantage. It also endeavoured to ensure
the economic dominance of both the USA and other OECD countries
by guaranteeing that profits associated with innovations in all spheres of
economics (i.e. rents) are obtained.
The USA and the EU also sought to stem the tide of imports in those
domestic industrial sectors that were especially vulnerable to international
competition. They hoped to achieve this through bilateral agreements with
East Asian countries in which they would voluntarily limit their exports to
the West while at the same time agreeing to import more from the West. As
will be demonstrated later, this had a rather perverse result. These countries
shifted much of their production sites to China so that they could get around
these export constraints. Such a move had two obvious benefits. The factors of
production were much cheaper (particularly labour and land) and, secondly,
these exports would show up on China’s trade balance rather than their own.
High levels of international debt and trade deficits have often provided the
political leverage for the USA to ensure a relatively high degree of compliance
with structural adjustment policies amongst many industrially developing
states. With regard to middle-ranking powers that have not been so encum-
bered, such as China, the USA has struggled to influence both the manner
in which they have liberalised their markets and the development policies
that they have adopted. To be sure, China’s relatively positive experience of
integration into the international economic system also has much to do with
the Cold War context at the time. In association with Kissinger’s efforts to
attract China away from the Soviet sphere of influence, UN recognition of
the People’s Republic of China as China’s representative opened the door
to IMF and World Bank membership, which was eventually acted upon in
1980. However, because of the relatively low levels of debt at that stage, these
international institutions possessed little political leverage (although China
later became the ‘second largest recipient of outstanding or newly approved
loans’ since the bank was created).17 It is also worth remembering that China
was first granted the much sought after (MFN) status with the USA during
the end game of the Cold War in April 1980 by the Carter Administration.18
Initially, the USA used the fact that China’s MFN status had to be
renewed on an annual basis as ‘a centrepiece of its engagement strategy
toward that country’.19 However, since China’s accession to the WTO
in 2001, that particular card can no longer be played. Instead, the USA
8 J.G. GLENN

must rely upon the regulations of the WTO to influence China’s eco-
nomic behaviour. If WTO regulations were successfully applied, the rise
of a challenger might be contained or arrested. But the application of
these regulations also presents some difficulties. Companies/states have
been somewhat reluctant to take cases because of their desire to maintain
good relations with a country that has such cheap labour sources and such
a promising domestic market. Certain legal aspects of WTO regulations
are inherently weak, for example, concerning intellectual property rights,
foreign companies have to initially make a case in the domestic courts of
the country concerned. Finally, the main sanction available to member
states under WTO regulations is the imposition of punitive tariff rates.
But increasing levels of vertical FDI and the slicing up of the production
chain by MNCs has made this sanction more difficult to implement. For
example, foreign invested companies now account for more than half of
China’s exports. If such sanctions have the effect of injuring the economic
activity of the MNCs themselves, the regulations become self-defeating.
It is therefore argued that, at times, the conflicting demands arising from
the economic imperative and security imperative of the USA create cer-
tain tensions within policy-making. Indeed the major industrialised states
have assiduously promoted the development of China as a platform for their
lower-end production processes and a new market for goods and investment.
From the mid-eighties, the World Bank and individual OECD countries
have provided $200 billion in loans in order to help build the infrastructure
to support such an industrial transformation.20 Moreover, it is now a main
destination for foreign direct investment. Yet, at the same time, the USA is
shoring up its alliances with China’s neighbours and concentrating its strate-
gic focus on the region through its pivot to Asia. The tensions outlined may
be managed if the USA assiduously uses the institutions, norms and regula-
tions it has established through its structural power to manage China’s rise,
the subject of which is addressed in this book.

US Power at the International Level

These two features of the capitalist international system, inter-state and
inter-capitalist dynamics, bear some family resemblance to Giovanni
Arrighi’s central thesis in Adam Smith in Beijing. In this magisterial work,
Arrighi identifies two main phases within each cycle of accumulation
that is said to have occurred under four hegemonies (Genovese, Dutch,
British, the USA). The first phase is characterised by reinvestment in trade
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 9

and production within a newly dominant power, which at some stage

­confronts the problem of capital over-accumulation—‘an ever-growing
mass of profits in trade and production inevitably leads to the accumula-
tion of capital over and above what can be reinvested in the purchase and
sale of commodities without drastically reducing profit margins’.21 It is
argued that, the second phase is one in which finance becomes predomi-
nant and this has important implications for hegemonic decline because
it heralds the intensification of outflows to other states in search of bet-
ter returns. A spatial reorientation of capital or, as David Harvey puts it,
a spatio-­temporal fix ensues involving a ‘transfer of surplus capital from
incumbent to emerging centers of capitalist development’.22 This inevita-
bly leads to the rise of a state or states seeking to challenge and take over
the hegemon’s role. Indeed, similar arguments can be found in Robert
Gilpin’s War and Change. He also argues that initially a world economy
tends to concentrate wealth in the ‘more advanced and more efficient
economy’, but in the long run, ‘trade, foreign investment, and the transfer
of technology, wealth and economic activities tend to diffuse from the old
centers to new centers of economic growth’ until at some point these new
centres overtake the old.23
Although this book identifies similar processes, its parameters of
enquiry are limited to post-1945 events and US hegemony. In so doing, it
identifies, for the purposes of this book, inter-state competition and inter-­
capitalist competition as the two core inextricably intertwined dynam-
ics operating within the international system. This differs from Arrighi’s
two logics of power that posit a territorial logic in which ‘rulers identify
power with the extent and populousness of their domains, and conceive
of wealth/capital as a means or a by-product of the pursuit of territorial
expansion’.24 Harvey also uses the idea of two dominant logics of power
at the international level, but his use of the term ‘territorial logic’ is not
always clear and varies from meaning the ‘accumulation of control over
territory as an end in itself’25 to the more encompassing definition of
‘political, diplomatic, economic and military strategies deployed by the
state apparatus in its own interest’.26
Indeed, for both of these writers, the issue is that they seek to define
these terms to cover very different historical epochs in which different
forms of hegemony are present. One can see this most clearly in Harvey’s
Enigma of Capital, when, on the very same page, he endeavours to cover
the territorial expansion associated with empires and colonialism and
US foreign policy.27 As a result, some authors have concluded that the
10 J.G. GLENN

‘two logics’ approach (here presented as the two central dynamics) is not
an appropriate framework for analysing US hegemony because it constitutes
‘a distinctly new form of political rule. Instead of aiming for territorial
expansion along the lines of the old empires, US military interventions
abroad were primarily aimed at preventing the closure of particular places
or whole regions of the globe to capital accumulation’.28 This description
of US hegemony chimes with the one set out in this book; however, one
should not throw the baby out with the bath water. Although the long-­
term possession (rather than indirect control/influence) of other territo-
rial spaces as an aspect of power acquisition has by and large subsided, the
inter-state competition and the drive to sustain or increase relative power
(rather than territory per se) in an anarchic environment has not.
In the contemporary era, inter-state competition manifests itself in
terms of relative power rather than long-term territorial acquisition. Of
course, this focus on the two main dynamics does not imply that other
social phenomena do not have an impact upon international relations.
The competition between class fractions was very significant during the
Bretton Woods crisis with many of the solutions favouring the American
financiers over industrialists. Similarly, inter-class relations are of impor-
tance; for example, Arrighi’s point that capital-labour relations were an
important aspect in the economic crisis of the seventies—strong unions
initially (until outflows of capital significantly weakened organised labour)
impeded attempts by companies to overcome a decline in their rate of
profit in their usual manner (i.e. cutting labour costs)—is very valid. In
addition, contingent factors can play a major part in conjunctural events
(‘a space of time within which a particular combination … of causes exer-
cises a predominant [causal and imaginative] influence over the course of
events and the production of ideas’) such as during the economic crisis
of the seventies.29 For example, the Yom Kippur war and the subsequent
hike in oil prices certainly exacerbated the economic problems during
that period.
With regard to the inter-capitalist dynamic, this arises from the hori-
zontal antagonism between various capitals.30 Inter-firm competition
produces a tendency for the rate of return on investment to decline
despite the tendency for each firm to pursue a maximisation of its profits.
The appearance of a new competitor with the newest technology and/
or the replacement of outdated fixed capital by an established firm allow
them to lower their prices as a result of these cost-reducing technologies.
In mature market conditions, other firms respond to the ability of the
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 11

more efficient company by matching its lower prices in order to preserve

their market share. But, in so doing, they experience a decline in their
rate of profit in relation to their previous investment—‘The outcome in
aggregate is … to prevent firms with higher-cost methods of produc-
tion frozen in their already-existing plant, equipment, and software from
realizing their fixed capital investments’.31
Because of their prior commitments—sunk costs in the industrial pro-
cess—most companies will either accept the decline in the rate of return on
investment, push for further wage reductions or invest further to match,
if not outperform, the previously more efficient firm. As Robert Brenner
argues, those firms that have experienced this ‘unforeseen cost-cutting,
they will have every reason to defend their markets and counterattack by
speeding up the process of innovation through investment in additional
fixed capital, a strategy on the part of the firms originally caught with high
costs will tend to provoke the original cost-reducing innovators to accelerate
technical change themselves’.32
Despite the decline in the rate of return, companies often choose to
remain in a given line of production, rather than exit. This is so for two
additional reasons (other than sunk costs). In a mature market, similar
conditions pertain in other lines of production, and so, similar challenges
would confront them if they did switch and concentrate on other prod-
ucts. Second, these companies have accrued valuable intangible propri-
etary assets as well as the tangible fixed capital through years of experience
concentrating in their particular production line. This acquired ‘informa-
tion about markets, relationships with suppliers and customers, and above
all technical knowledge’ produces not only a reluctance to exit the indus-
try they have worked in but it also produces a barrier when attempting to
switch to a new production line.33
Thus, inter-firm competition forces, ‘individual capitals to cut costs in
order to survive by introducing fixed capital embodying ever more effi-
cient technology, but to do so not only without reference to the repro-
ductive requirements of other capitals, but by threatening their profits
and indeed their existence’.34 As soon as one company engages in the
latter, the competitive process repeats itself. This represents just one cycle
in an infinite iterative loop producing overcapacity and a tendency for
the rate of profit to fall. The corollary of such productive overcapacity
is capital over-accumulation in which the market is marked by a dearth
of worthwhile investment avenues for previously accumulated surplus.
Investors therefore struggle to find profitable avenues for the surplus
12 J.G. GLENN

capital they have accrued over time thus producing the twin conditions of
over-­accumulation and overcapacity.
The responses of firms to such conditions vary, but they often include
extracting greater profit from cost-cutting with regard to circulating capi-
tal: increases in labour productivity; wage reductions; and cheaper raw
materials and intermediate goods. But it may also involve innovation
in new consumer products and the opening up of new investment and
consumer markets overseas. In Harvey’s felicitous phrase, the latter geo-
graphical displacement provides a spatio-temporal fix for capital.35 The
opening of new markets can temporarily overcome the problem of over-
capacity and the tendency for the overall rate of profit to fall—investment
in new production sites not only provides an outlet for surplus capital,
the overseas sites become sources of über-cheap labour and land, but also
embeds production in potentially new consumer markets for the goods
produced.36
This spatio-temporal fix to the crisis of capitalism in the seventies tended
to involve an outflow of goods and capital to other countries, providing
an opportunity of technological catch-up through this uneven and com-
bined development. This ‘fix’ therefore confronts vanguard states with
the possibility of future challenges as the economic development of other
countries provides these rising states with the economic and technologi-
cal wherewithal to improve their military base. This has the potential of
supercharging inter-state competition, which in itself may induce states
to further intensify their economic development. In order to manage this
dynamic, the USA has attempted to use its structural power to develop
an international architecture that integrates states into a global economic
system while at the same time making it difficult for a challenger to arise
by defending its pre-eminence across several spheres of economic activity.
Such spatio-temporal fixes provide less economically developed states
with an opportunity—states that produce the right domestic conditions
to harness these capital outflows from the core may be able to take advan-
tage of their economic backwardness through technological leapfrogging.
Using the scientific knowledge and technology of the vanguard states,
peripheral states may be able to either pass through various stages of tech-
nological development with a rapidity hitherto unseen or actually bypass
stages altogether. These late interlopers can thus combine the ‘privilege
of historic backwardness’ with the advantages of cheap land and labour,
thereby greatly exacerbating the aforementioned tendencies.37 Spatio-­
temporal fixes may spur the economic growth of a relatively weaker
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 13

economy, but this is often combined with policies of the recipient state
that are targeted towards increasing its relative power economically and
militarily.38 The ‘whip of external necessity’ may therefore induce industri-
ally developing states to create highly conducive economic conditions for
their industries, providing subsidies, cheap credit, protected markets (in
specific production lines), research and development and, last but by no
means least, an undervalued currency.39 Moreover, inter-state and inter-­
capitalist dynamics also combine to exacerbate tensions at the interna-
tional level. The solution for capitalism turns out to be a problem for the
vanguard states. The overseas investment alongside technology transfer
and domestic developmental policies leads to the economic and military
rise of these previously peripheral states and possibly a new round of inter-­
state competition.
With regard to this inter-state competition, Realists and Neo-Realists alike
argue that one of the primary functions of the state is to protect itself from
the potential predation of others. The lack of any supranational authority
leads to an ‘unresolvable uncertainty’ with regard to the long-­term inten-
tions of other states and there is no legal assurance that states will be bound
by their international commitments.40 Under such conditions of anarchy,
‘the dominant goal of states is security, since to pursue whatever other goals
they may have, they first must survive’.41 Moreover, it is argued that states
must therefore be sensitive to the long-term effect of economic coopera-
tion on their relative power in relation to all other states. They should not
therefore normally enter into arrangements that could lead to a long-term
decline in their economic standing vis-à-vis other states.
Although territorial acquisition may be less important in the contem-
porary world, significant benefits accrue from being the architect of an
international order that favours one’s own state, and as Robert Gilpin
has pointed out, ‘those actors who benefit most from a change in the
social system and who gain the power to effect such change will seek to
alter the system in ways that favour their interests’.42 The growth in a
state’s capabilities may therefore mean that the balance between the costs
of challenging the lead state and the benefits accruing from changing the
international architecture alter to such a degree that it calculates that such
actions are worthwhile. Thus far, the USA has successfully managed the
rise of other states through its global architecture to ensure that no such
challenger has arisen.
After the Second World War, America became the main security guaran-
tor not only for NATO members but also to a raft of other states through
14 J.G. GLENN

bilateral security agreements. Over time, these relations have become

normalised to such a degree that it is difficult to imagine any conflict
breaking out between these states and America. Such a situation emerged
out of the unique position the USA found itself in after the Second World
War. It was the only state capable of providing such an encompassing secu-
rity umbrella. Although much is made of America’s current level of mili-
tary spending of around $610 billion (just under 3.5 % GDP), it is worth
remembering that US military spending ‘between 1950 and 1974 was 9
per cent’ per annum.43 Its sheer preponderance of power therefore made
it extremely unlikely that any country would challenge it in direct conflict.
The one state that attempted to match it was the former Soviet Union,
which eventually collapsed as a result. There are therefore two aspects of
American power at work here—its role of security provider/co-operator
with key allies and the power of dissuasion through its sheer preponder-
ance. Of course, states continue to direct certain resources towards their
security, but balancing against the USA by its key allies is unthinkable for
the foreseeable future.
In assessing how best the USA could shape and influence world affairs
after the end of the Cold War, the Harvard Professor Joseph Nye famously
divided US power into two major forms. The first he names hard power, or
as Walter Russell Mead puts it, ‘sharp power’—so called because if you ‘try
to resist it you will feel the sharp points of bayonets pushing and prodding
you in the direction you are supposed to go’.44 Soft power, on the other
hand, is said to involve co-optation rather than coercion by getting ‘others
to want what you want’.45 Such soft power is a measure of the extent that
a county can ‘structure a situation so that other countries develop prefer-
ences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own’.46 Naturally,
this form of power is rather nebulous and hard to define. But, for Nye, it
principally involves the culture and conduct of the country in question.47
Hard power enables the USA to directly coerce other states through the
threat or application of military force. But the USA also uses inducements
in the form of loans; aid; and access to markets, technology and arms in
order to influence behaviour. This relational power is often referred to as
the first dimension of power—‘the power of A to get B to do something
they would not otherwise do’.48 At the same time, the so called second
dimension of power is certainly also operationalised by the USA—that
of agenda setting—whereby ‘a person or group—consciously or uncon-
sciously—creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy con-
flicts’.49 Soft power, on the other hand, may be understood as forming one
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 15

element of the so-called third dimension—‘to prevent people, to whatever

degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions
and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing
order of things’.50
However, these three dimensions do not fully encompass the power
of political framing, which should be considered to be somewhat distinct
from agenda setting and the shaping of preferences—because it is the abil-
ity to actually establish the order of things. This is best encapsulated by
Susan Strange’s concept of structural power, which ‘confers the power to
decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within
which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate
enterprises’. In short, the power to determine ‘the surrounding structure
of the relationship’.51
Concentrating on just the three dimensions of power fails to take into
account one of the fundamental elements of hegemony—the fourth dimen-
sion of structural power—the ability to frame and reframe the economic
and political order at the international level while using the institutions and
regimes that emerge from this international order to mediate power on a
quotidian basis.52 Using this structural power, the USA established gen-
eral political and economic principles that would serve as the foundational
elements of a new international order in the areas of production, finance,
trade, security, and knowledge.53 In so doing, it sought to manage the two
central dynamics within the international system—that of inter-state and
inter-capitalist competition.
It is therefore important to stress that the inter-state and inter-capitalist
dynamics identified here are general tendencies rather than linear causes.
As mentioned previously, the effects of inter-capitalist competition may
be somewhat mitigated by various investment strategies and the dynamic
itself can be affected by successful branding strategies and intellectual prop-
erty rights. Inter-state behaviour is affected by the US-led international
order that provides the most favourable conditions for the continuation of
capitalism on a global scale. As Panitch and Gindin point out, the prime
goal of US hegemony was to ‘alter the character of the capitalist core’ by
promoting the ‘interpenetration of capitals’ through an open investment
regime, thus diminishing the probability of overt conflict arising from
competition over accumulation rights in any given region.54 There is less
reason for states to engage in territorial expansion when their corporations
and financiers can set up subsidiaries or acquire assets/resources and sell
products in most parts of the world.
16 J.G. GLENN

The USA and the Rise of China

The book therefore provides an update to Rosemary Foot’s work that
also employs Strange’s analysis.55 But it also argues that the international
order the USA developed has, to a certain degree, managed the tensions
that arise from this combination of inter-state and inter-capitalist dynam-
ics. Since the end of the Second World War, it established general political
and economic principles that would serve as the foundational elements of
a new international order in the areas of production, finance, trade, secu-
rity and knowledge.56 Although not all of these elements were present in
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, what has eventually
emerged is an open world system where goods and capital can flow more
or less freely and intellectual property rights are protected (as a result of
both US security and the liberal economic framework it established), thus
mitigating both inter-state competition and providing temporary solutions
to declines in the rate of profit. It also distinguishes itself by arguing that
the USA’s response to its relative decline prompted a change in economic
strategy by East Asia (and other highly industrialised countries including
the USA itself)—one that provided a benign environment for China’s rise.
The USA’s role as international architect is the key aspect missing
from Arrighi Giovanni’s thesis which leads him to prematurely predict the
demise of the USA and the rise of China, as capital flows to this emerg-
ing power. Such dynamics occur within a global architecture bearing the
USA’s hallmark. Moreover, these economic and security arrangements are
flexible—policies hitherto dormant can be exercised (e.g. IMF monitoring
of currency values) and, to some extent, the various international institu-
tions themselves are open to reform (the emergence of the WTO from
GATT in 1995 or the IMF’s Articles of Agreement recognising floating
exchange rates in 1976). It would therefore be wrong to present the sys-
tem that the USA established as somehow static and inflexible. Rather,
since the Second World War, the USA has proven to be a reflexive power,
adapting and evolving according to how issues develop.
The book argues that, as a result of the economic crisis of the seventies,
brought about in part by inter-capitalist competition, overcapacity, and a
decline in the rate of profit, the USA once again applied various aspects of
its power, particularly its structural power which was used to reconfigure
the global economic architecture that it had originally set up. In so doing,
it endeavoured to alter global economic relations so that they worked
more in its favour. Yet, these changes did not affect other states in a uniform
 CHINA’S CHALLENGE TO US SUPREMACY 17

manner nor were the policies always directly coercive. However, it did
create an environment in which the domestic economic policy making
of other states was highly restricted. Indeed, in hindsight, it is now clear
that the effect of US policy was to create a status quo situation with other
highly industrialised states, that is, relative economic gains vis-à-vis the
USA were effectively curbed. On the other hand, weaker developing states
found that their high levels of debt were used as political leverage to open
them up to exports and capital from the core industrialised countries.
Although the above description of the USA as a reflexive hegemon
implies an unparalleled degree of knowledge acquisition through surveil-
lance and continual policy evolution, it does not imply complete omni-
science or omnipotence. Despite the enormous structural power of the
USA, much depends upon how well it plays the international game of
producing economic opportunities for its companies while ensuring its
relative economic standing does not dwindle to such an extent that a chal-
lenger emerges. China has proved quite adept at avoiding certain aspects
of US agenda setting; for example, it has been able to forestall signing
the WTO agreement on government procurement. In many cases, it has
also been able to counter US power in relation to trade, investment, and
intellectual property rights because so many foreign companies have a
vested interest in ensuring China remains open for business. Moreover,
although the USA continually employs its power alongside a huge array
of surveillance techniques, this does not automatically imply that it always
has a clear blueprint or coherent plan for the future—much depends on
the nature and speed of events that unfold. Compare for example the
quite deliberate (yet negotiated) future plans for international order in
1944/45 to the rapidly evolving events of 1971–5.
Most importantly, changes in the nature of hegemony may ramify out
across the international system, provoke different responses, and have
unintended consequences. The book distinguishes itself by arguing that
one of the most important aspects for China’s growth was the reaction
of East Asia to the USA’s new economic foreign policy. This book argues
that recognition of this is key to understanding the rapid rise of China.
In response to industrial overcapacity and a decline in the rate of profit the
highly industrialised states began to slice up the production chain and in
so doing sought out new production sites particularly for labour-­intensive
low-tech production and assembly. In East Asia this trend became super-
charged as a result of the trading restraints placed upon them by the
USA followed by Europe. In order to avoid the quantitative restrictions
Another random document with
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 PLATE LXIV

PINK LADY’S SLIPPER.—C. acaule.

——— ———
Calopogon pulchellus. Orchis Family (p. 17).

Scape.—Rising about one foot from a small solid bulb. Leaf.—Linear, grass-
like. Flowers.—Two to six on each scape, purple-pink, about one inch broad, the lip
as if hinged at its insertion, bearded toward the summit with white, yellow, and
purple hairs. The peculiarity of this orchid is that the ovary is not twisted, and
consequently the lip is on the upper instead of the lower side of the flower.
One may hope to find these bright flowers growing side by side
with the glistening sundew in the rich bogs of early summer. Mr.
Baldwin assigns still another constant companion to the Calopogon,
an orchid which staggers under the terrifying title of Pogonia
ophioglossoides. The generic name of Calopogon is from two Greek
words signifying beautiful beard and has reference to the delicately
bearded lip.

Pink Azalea. Wild Honeysuckle. Pinxter Flower.

Swamp Pink.
Rhododendron nudiflorum. Heath Family.

A shrub from two to six feet high. Leaves.—Narrowly oblong, downy

underneath, usually appearing somewhat later than the flowers. Flowers.—Pink,
clustered. Calyx.—Minute. Corolla.—Funnel-shaped, with five long recurved lobes.
Stamens.—Five or ten, long, protruding noticeably. Pistil.—One, long, protruding.
Our May swamps and moist woods are made rosy by masses of
the pink azalea which is often known as the wild honeysuckle,
although not even a member of the Honeysuckle family. It is in the
height of its beauty before the blooming of the laurel, and heralds the
still lovelier pageant which is even then in rapid course of
preparation.
 PLATE LXV

PINK AZALEA.—R. nudiflorum.

In the last century the name of Mayflower was given to the

shrub by the Swedes in the neighborhood of Philadelphia. Peter
Kalm, the pupil of Linnæus, after whom our laurel, Kalmia, is
named, writes the following description of the shrub in his “Travels,”
which were published in English in 1771, and which explain the
origin of one of its titles: “Some of the Swedes and Dutch call them
Pinxter-bloem (Whitsunday-flower) as they really are in bloom about
Whitsuntide; and at a distance they have some similarity to the
Honeysuckle or ‘Lonicera.’... Its flowers were now open and added a
new ornament to the woods.... They sit in a circle round the stem’s
extremity and have either a dark red or a lively red color; but by
standing for some time the sun bleaches them, and at last they get to
a whitish hue.... They have some smell, but I cannot say it is very
pleasant. However, the beauty of the flower entitles them to a place
in every flower-garden.” While our pink azalea could hardly be called
“dark red” under any circumstances, it varies greatly in the color of
its flowers.
The azalea is the national flower of Flanders.

——— ———
Rhododendron Rhodora. Heath Family.

A shrub from one to two feet high. Leaves.—Oblong, pale. Flowers.—Purplish-

pink. Calyx.—Small. Corolla.—Two-lipped, almost without any tube. Stamens.—
Ten, not protruding. Pistil.—One, not protruding.

In May, when sea-winds pierced our solitudes,

I found the fresh Rhodora in the woods,
Spreading its leafless blooms in a damp nook,
To please the desert and the sluggish brook.
The purple petals, fallen in the pool,
Made the black water with their beauty gay;
Here might the red-bird come his plumes to cool,
And court the flower that cheapens his array.
Rhodora! if the sages ask thee why
This charm is wasted on the earth and sky,
Tell them, dear, that if eyes were made for seeing,
Then Beauty is its own excuse for being;
Why thou wert there, O rival of the rose!
I never thought to ask, I never knew;
But in my simple ignorance, suppose
The self-same Power that brought me there, brought you.[6]

Sheep Laurel. Lambkill.

Kalmia angustifolia. Heath Family.

A shrub from one to three feet high. Leaves.—Narrowly oblong, light green.
Flowers.—Deep pink, in lateral clusters. Calyx.—Five-parted. Corolla.—Five-lobed,
between wheel and bell-shaped, with stamens caught in its depressions as in the
mountain laurel. Stamens.—Ten. Pistil.—One.
 This low shrub grows abundantly with the mountain laurel,
bearing smaller deep pink flowers at the same season, and narrower,
paler leaves. It is said to be the most poisonous of the genus, and to
be especially deadly to sheep, while deer are supposed to feed upon
its leaves with impunity.

American Cranberry.
Vaccinium macrocarpon. Heath Family.

Stems.—Slender, trailing, one to four feet long. Leaves.—Oblong, obtuse.

Flowers.—Pale pink, nodding. Calyx.—With short teeth. Corolla.—Four-parted.
Stamens.—Eight or ten, protruding. Fruit.—A large, acid, red berry.
In the peat-bogs of our Northeastern States we may look in June
for the pink nodding flowers, and in late summer for the large red
berries of this well-known plant.

Adder’s Mouth.
Pogonia ophioglossoides. Orchis Family (p. 17).

Stem.—Six to nine inches high, from a fibrous root. Leaves.—An oval or lance-
oblong one near the middle of the stem, and a smaller or bract-like one near the
terminal flower, occasionally one or two others, with a flower in their axils. Flower.
—Pale pink, sometimes white, sweet-scented, one inch long, lip bearded and
fringed.
Mr. Baldwin maintains that there is no wild flower of as pure a
pink as this unless it be the Sabbatia. Its color has also been
described as a “peach-blossom red.” As already mentioned, the plant
is found blossoming in bogs during the early summer in company
with the Calopogons and sundews. Its violet-like fragrance greatly
enhances its charm.

Common Milkwort.
Polygala sanguinea. Milkwort Family.

Stem.—Six inches to a foot high, sparingly branched above, leafy to the top.
Leaves.—Oblong-linear. Flowers.—Growing in round or oblong heads which are
somewhat clover-like in appearance, bright pink or almost red, occasionally paler.
Calyx.—Of five sepals, three of which are small and often greenish, while the two
inner ones are much larger and colored like the petals. Corolla.—Of three petals
connected with each other, the lower one keel-shaped. Stamens.—Six or eight.
Pistil.—One. (Flowers too difficult to be analyzed by the non-botanist.)
This pretty little plant abounds in moist and also sandy places,
growing on mountain heights as well as in the salt meadows which
skirt the sea. In late summer its bright flower-heads gleam vividly
through the grasses, and from their form and color might almost be
mistaken for pink clover. Occasionally they are comparatively pale
and inconspicuous.

——— ———
Polygala polygama. Milkwort Family.

Stems.—Very leafy, six to nine inches high, with cleistogamous flowers on

underground runners. Leaves.—Lance-shaped or oblong. Flowers.—Purple-pink,
loosely clustered in a terminal raceme. Keel of Corolla.—Crested. Stamens.—Eight.
Pistil.—One.
Like its more attractive sister, the fringed polygala, this little
plant hides its most useful, albeit unattractive, blossoms in the
ground, where they can fulfil their destiny of perpetuating the
species without danger of molestation by thievish insects or any of
the distractions incidental to a more worldly career. Exactly what
purpose the little above-ground flowers, which appear so plentifully
in sandy soil in July, are intended to serve, it is difficult to
understand.

Fringed Polygala.
Polygala paucifolia. Milkwort Family.

Flowering stems.—Three or four inches high, from long, prostrate or

underground shoots which also bear cleistogamous flowers. Leaves.—The lower,
small and scale-like, scattered, the upper, ovate, and crowded at the summit.
Flowers.—Purple-pink, rarely white, rather large. Keel of Corolla.—Conspicuously
fringed and crested. Stamens.—Six. Pistil.—One.
 PLATE LXVI

MILKWORT.

“I must not forget to mention that delicate and lovely flower of

May, the fringed polygala. You gather it when you go for the fragrant
showy orchis—that is, if you are lucky enough to find it. It is rather a
shy flower, and is not found in every wood. One day we went up and
down through the woods looking for it—woods of mingled oak,
chestnut, pine, and hemlock,—and were about giving it up when
suddenly we came upon a gay company of them beside an old wood-
road. It was as if a flock of small rose-purple butterflies had alighted
there on the ground before us. The whole plant has a singularly fresh
and tender aspect. Its foliage is of a slightly purple tinge and of very
delicate texture. Not the least interesting feature about the plant is
the concealed fertile flower which it bears on a subterranean stem,
keeping, as it were, one flower for beauty and one for use.”
It seems unnecessary to tempt “odorous comparisons” by
endeavoring to supplement the above description of Mr. Burroughs.

Moss Polygala.
Polygala cruciata. Milkwort Family.

Stems.—Three to ten inches high, almost winged at the angles, with spreading
opposite leaves and branches. Leaves.—Linear, nearly all whorled in fours.
Flowers.—Greenish or purplish-pink, growing in short, thick spikes which
terminate the branches.
There is something very moss-like in the appearance of this little
plant which blossoms in late summer. It is found near moist places
and salt marshes along the coast, being very common in parts of New
England.

Spreading Dogbane. Indian Hemp.

Apocynum androsæmifolium. Dogbane Family.

Stems.—Erect, branching, two or three feet high. Leaves.—Opposite, oval.

Flowers.—Rose-color veined with deep pink, loosely clustered. Calyx.—Five-
parted. Corolla.—Small, bell-shaped, five-cleft. Stamens.—Five, slightly adherent
to the pistil. Pistil.—Two ovaries surmounted by a large, two-lobed stigma. Fruit.—
Two long and slender pods.
 PLATE LXVII

SPREADING DOGBANE.—A.
androsæmifolium.

The flowers of the dogbane, though small and inconspicuous are

very beautiful if closely examined. The deep pink veining of the
corolla suggests nectar, and the insect-visitor is not misled, for at its
base are five nectar-bearing glands. The two long, slender seed-pods
which result from a single blossom seem inappropriately large, often
appearing while the plant is still in flower. Rafinesque states that
from the stems may be obtained a thread similar to hemp which can
be woven into cloth, from the pods, cotton, and from the blossoms,
sugar. Its generic and one of its English titles arose from the belief,
which formerly prevailed, that it was poisonous to dogs. The plant is
constantly found growing in roadside thickets, with bright, pretty
foliage, and blossoms that appear in early summer.
 Hedge Bindweed.
Convolvulus Americanus. Convolvulus Family.

Stem.—Twining or trailing. Leaves.—Somewhat arrow-shaped. Flowers.—

Pink. Calyx.—Of five sepals enclosed in two broad leafy bracts. Corolla.—Five-
lobed, bell-shaped. Stamens.—Five. Pistil.—One, with two stigmas.
Many an unsightly heap of rubbish left by the roadside is hidden
by the delicate pink bells of the hedge bindweed, which again will
clamber over the thickets that line the streams and about the
tumbled stone-wall that marks the limit of the pasture. The pretty
flowers at once suggest the morning-glory, to which they are closely
allied.
The common European bindweed, C. arvensis, has white or
pinkish flowers, without bracts beneath the calyx, and a low
procumbent or twining stem. It has taken possession of many of our
old fields where it spreads extensively and proves troublesome to
farmers.

Purple-flowering Raspberry.
Rubus odoratus. Rose Family.

Stem.—Shrubby, three to five feet high; branching, branches bristly and

glandular. Leaves.—Three to five-lobed, the middle lobe prolonged. Flowers.—
Purplish-pink, large and showy, two inches broad. Calyx.—Five-parted. Corolla.—
Of five rounded petals. Stamens and Pistils.—Numerous. Fruit.—Reddish,
resembling the garden raspberry.
 PLATE LXVIII

PURPLE-FLOWERING RASPBERRY.—
R. odoratus.

This flower betrays its relationship to the wild rose, and might
easily be mistaken for it, although a glance at the undivided leaves
would at once correct such an error. The plant is a decorative one
when covered with its showy blossoms, constantly arresting our
attention along the wooded roadsides in June and July.

Pale Corydalis.
Corydalis glauca. Fumitory Family.

Stem.—Six inches to two feet high. Leaves.—Pale, divided into delicate leaflets.
Flowers.—Pink and yellow, in loose clusters. Calyx.—Of two small, scale-like
sepals. Corolla.—Pink, tipped with yellow; closed and flattened, of four petals, with
a short spur at the base of the upper petal. Stamens.—Six, maturing before the
pistil, thus avoiding self-fertilization. Pistil.—One.
From the rocky clefts in the summer woods springs the pale
corydalis, its graceful foliage dim with a whitish bloom, and its
delicate rosy, yellow-tipped flowers betraying by their odd flat
corollas their kinship with the Dutchman’s breeches and squirrel
corn of the early year, as well as with the bleeding hearts of the
garden. Thoreau assigns them to the middle of May, and says they
are “rarely met with,” which statement does not coincide with the
experience of those who find the rocky woodlands each summer
abundantly decorated with their fragile clusters.
The generic name, Corydalis, is the ancient Greek title for the
crested lark, and said to refer to the crested seeds of this genus. The
specific title, glauca, refers to the pallor of leaves and stem.
The golden corydalis, C. aurea, is found on rocky banks
somewhat westward.

Common Milkweed.
Asclepias Cornuti. Milkweed Family.

Stem.—Tall, stout, downy, with a milky juice. Leaves.—Generally opposite or

whorled, the upper sometimes scattered, large, oblong, pale, minutely downy
underneath. Flowers.—Dull, purplish-pink, clustered at the summit and along the
sides of the stem. (These flowers are too difficult to be successfully analyzed by the
non-botanist.) Calyx.—Five-parted, the divisions small and reflexed. Corolla.—
Deeply five-parted, the divisions reflexed; above them a crown of five hooded
nectaries, each containing an incurved horn. Stamens.—Five, inserted on the base
of the corolla, united with each other and enclosing the pistils. Pistils.—Properly
two, enclosed by the stamens, surmounted by a large five-angled disk. Fruit.—Two
pods, one of which is large and full of silky-tufted seeds, the other often stunted.
This is probably the commonest representative of this striking
and beautiful native family. The tall, stout stems, large, pale leaves,
dull pink clustered flowers which appear in July, and later the puffy
pods filled with the silky-tufted seeds beloved of imaginative
children, are familiar to nearly everyone who spends a portion of the
year in the country. The young sprouts are said to make an excellent
pot-herb; the silky hairs of the seed-pods have been used for the
stuffing of pillows and mattresses, and can be mixed with flax or
wool and woven to advantage; while paper has been manufactured
from the stout stalks.
The four-leaved milkweed, A. quadrifolia, is the most delicate
member of the family, with fragrant rose-tinged flowers which
appear on the dry wooded hill-sides quite early in June, and slender
stems which are usually leafless below, and with one or two whorls
and one or two pairs of oval, taper-pointed leaves above.
The swamp milkweed, A. incarnata, grows commonly in moist
places. Its very leafy stems are two or three feet high, with narrowly
oblong, pointed leaves. Its intense purple-pink flowers gleam from
the wet meadows nearly all summer. They are smaller than those of
the purple milkweed, A. purpurascens, which abounds in dry
ground, and which may be classed among the deep pink or purple
flowers according to the eye of the beholder.

Herb Robert.
Geranium Robertianum. Geranium Family.

Stem.—Forking, slightly hairy. Leaves.—Three, divided, the divisions again

dissected. Flowers.—Purple-pink, small. Calyx.—Of five sepals. Corolla.—Of five
petals. Stamens.—Ten. Pistil.—One, with five styles which split apart in fruit.
From June until October many of our shaded woods and glens
are abundantly decorated by the bright blossoms of the herb Robert.
The reddish stalks of the plant have won it the name of “red-shanks”
in the Scotch Highlands. Its strong scent is caused by a resinous
secretion which exists in several of the geraniums. In some species
this resin is so abundant that the stems will burn like torches,
yielding a powerful and pleasant perfume. The common name is said
to have been given the plant on account of its supposed virtue in a
disease which was known as “Robert’s plague,” after Robert, Duke of
Normandy. In some of the early writers it is alluded to as the “holy
herb of Robert.”
In fruit the styles of this plant split apart with an elasticity which
serves to project the seeds to a distance, it is said, of twenty-five feet.
 Bush Clover.
Lespedeza procumbens. Pulse Family (p. 16).

Stems.—Slender, trailing, and prostrate. Leaves.—Divided into three clover-

like leaflets. Flowers.—Papilionaceous, purplish-pink, veiny. Pod.—Small,
rounded, flat, one-seeded.
The flowers of this plant often have the appearance of springing
directly from the earth amid a mass of clover leaves. They are
common in dry soil in the late summer and autumn, as are the other
members of the same genus.
L. reticulata is an erect, very leafy species with similar blossoms,
which are chiefly clustered near the upper part of the stem. The bush
clovers betray at once their kinship with the tick-trefoils, but are
usually found in more sandy, open places.
L. polystachya has upright wand-like stems from two to four
feet high. Its flowers grow in oblong spikes on elongated stalks.
Those of L. capitata are clustered in globular heads.

Tick-trefoil.
Desmodium Canadense. Pulse Family (p. 16).

Stem.—Hairy, three to six feet high. Leaves.—Divided into three somewhat

oblong leaflets. Flowers.—Papilionaceous, dull purplish-pink, growing in densely
flowered racemes. Pod.—Flat, deeply lobed on the lower margin, from one to three
inches long, roughened with minute hooked hairs by means of which they adhere
to animals and clothing.
Great masses of color are made by these flowers in the bogs and
rich woods of midsummer. They are effective when seen in the
distance, but rather disappointing on closer examination, and will
hardly bear gathering or transportation. They are by far the largest
and most showy of the genus.
 PLATE LXIX

HERB ROBERT.—G. Robertianum.

Tick-Trefoil.
Desmodium nudiflorum. Pulse Family (p. 16).

Scape.—About two feet long. Leaves.—Divided into three broad leaflets,

crowded at the summit of the flowerless stems. Flowers.—Papilionaceous,
purplish-pink, small, growing in an elongated raceme on a mostly leafless scape.
This is a smaller, less noticeable plant than D. Canadense. It
flourishes abundantly in dry woods, where it often takes possession
in late summer to the exclusion of nearly all other flowers.
 The flowers of D. acuminatum grow in an elongated raceme
from a stem about whose summit the leaves, divided into very large
leaflets, are crowded; otherwise it resembles D. nudiflorum.
D. Dillenii grows to a height of from two to five feet, with erect
leafy stems and medium-sized flowers. It is found commonly in open
woods.
Many of us who do not know these plants by name have uttered
various imprecations against their roughened pods. Thoreau writes:
“Though you were running for your life, they would have time to
catch and cling to your clothes.... These almost invisible nets, as it
were, are spread for us, and whole coveys of desmodium and bidens
seeds steal transportation out of us. I have found myself often
covered, as it were, with an imbricated coat of the brown desmodium
seeds or a bristling chevaux-de-frise of beggar-ticks, and had to
spend a quarter of an hour or more picking them off in some
convenient spot; and so they get just what they wanted—deposited in
another place.”

Bouncing Bet. Soapwort.

Saponaria officinalis. Pink Family.

Stem.—Rather stout, swollen at the joints. Leaves.—Oval, opposite. Flowers.—

Pink or white, clustered. Calyx.—Of five united sepals. Corolla.—Of five pinkish,
long-clawed petals (frequently the flowers are double). Stamens.—Ten. Pistil.—
One, with two styles.
A cheery pretty plant is this with large, rose-tinged flowers
which are especially effective when double.
 PLATE LXX

BOUNCING BET.—S. officinalis.

Bouncing Bet is of a sociable turn and is seldom found far from

civilization, delighting in the proximity of farm-houses and their
belongings, in the shape of children, chickens, and cattle. She comes
to us from England, and her “feminine comeliness and bounce”
suggest to Mr. Burroughs a Yorkshire housemaid. The generic name
is from sapo—soap, and refers to the lather which the juice forms
with water, and which is said to have been used as a substitute for
soap.
 Steeple-bush. Hardhack.
Spiræa tomentosa. Rose Family.

Stems.—Very woolly. Leaves.—Alternate, oval, toothed. Flowers.—Small, pink,

in pyramidal clusters. Calyx.—Five-cleft. Corolla.—Of five rounded petals.
Stamens.—Numerous. Pistils.—Five to eight.
The pink spires of this shrub justify its rather unpoetic name of
steeple-bush. It is closely allied to the meadow-sweet (Pl. XXVI.),
blossoming with it in low grounds during the summer. It differs from
that plant in the color of its flowers and in the woolliness of its stems
and the lower surface of its leaves.

Deptford Pink.
Dianthus Armeria. Pink Family.

One or two feet high. Leaves.—Opposite, long and narrow, hairy. Flowers.—
Pink, with white dots, clustered. Calyx.—Five-toothed, cylindrical, with awl-shaped
bracts beneath. Corolla.—Of five small petals. Stamens.—Ten. Pistil.—One, with
two styles.
In July and August we find these little flowers in our eastern
fields. The generic name, which signifies Jove’s own flower, hardly
applies to these inconspicuous blossoms. Perhaps it was originally
bestowed upon D. caryophyllus, a large and fragrant English
member of the genus, which was the origin of our garden carnation.

Purple Loosestrife.
Lythrum Salicaria. Loosestrife Family.

Stem.—Tall and slender. Leaves.—Lance-shaped, with a heart-shaped base,

sometimes whorled in threes. Flowers.—Deep purple-pink, crowded and whorled
in an interrupted spike. Calyx.—Five to seven-toothed, with little processes
between the teeth. Corolla.—Of five or six somewhat wrinkled petals. Stamens.—
Usually twelve, in two sets, six longer and six shorter. Pistil.—One, varying in size
in the different blossoms, being of three different lengths.
 PLATE LXXI

PURPLE LOOSESTRIFE.—L. Salicaria.

One who has seen an inland marsh in August aglow with this
beautiful plant, is almost ready to forgive the Old Country some of
the many pests she has shipped to our shores in view of this radiant
acquisition. The botany locates it anywhere between Nova Scotia and
Delaware. It may be seen in the perfection of its beauty along the
marshy shores of the Hudson and in the swamps of the Wallkill
Valley.
When we learn that these flowers are called “long purples,” by
the English country people, the scene of Ophelia’s tragic death rises
before us:
 There is a willow grows aslant a brook,
That shows his hoar leaves in the glassy stream,
There with fantastic garlands did she come,
Of crow-flowers, nettles, daisies, and long purples
That liberal shepherds give a grosser name,
But our cold maids do dead men’s fingers call them.

Dr. Prior, however, says that it is supposed that Shakespeare

intended to designate the purple-flowering orchis, O. mascula, which
is said to closely resemble the showy orchis (Pl. LXII.) of our spring
woods.
The flowers of the purple loosestrife are especially interesting to
botanists on account of their trimorphism, which word signifies
occurring in three forms, and refers to the stamens and pistils,
which vary in size in the different blossoms, being of three different
lengths, the pollen from any given set of stamens being especially
fitted to fertilize a pistil of corresponding length.

Meadow-beauty. Deer-grass.
Rhexia Virginica. Melastoma Family.

Stem.—Square, with wing-like angles. Leaves.—Opposite, narrowly oval.

Flowers.—Purplish-pink, clustered. Calyx-tube.—Urn-shaped, four-cleft at the
apex. Corolla.—Of four large rounded petals. Stamens.—Eight, with long curved
anthers. Pistil.—One.
It is always a pleasant surprise to happen upon a bright patch of
these delicate deep-hued flowers along the marshes or in the sandy
fields of midsummer. Their fragile beauty is of that order which
causes it to seem natural that they should belong to a genus which is
the sole northern representative of a tropical family. In parts of New
England they grow in profusion, while in Arkansas the plant is said
to be a great favorite with the deer, hence one of its common names.
The flower has been likened to a scarlet evening primrose, and there
is certainly a suggestion of the evening primrose in the four rounded,
slightly heart-shaped petals. The protruding stamens, with their long
yellow anthers, are conspicuous.