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Central Banking in Turbulent Times
Central Banking in
Turbulent Times
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
This is a classic central banking book. It is written by two authors who have
been senior and highly experienced central bankers. Francesco Papadia was
Director General for Market Operations at the European Central Bank (ECB)
during the critical years of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), and played a
central role in managing the ECB's response to it. Tuomas Valimaki is Chief
Economist at the Bank of Finland and a member of the ECB's Monetary Policy
Committee.
The book is about central banking in recent decades, primarily about the
roles and actions of the two main central banks, the ECB and the Federal
Reserve System of the USA (the Fed). Chapter 1 recounts how the consensus
view on the appropriate role of such central banks developed during the
course of the Great Moderation (1992-2007), that is, that central banks should
use a single instrument, the official short-term interest rate, to control a single
objective, price stability, defined as an inflation target. In this process it was,
incorrectly, assumed that the achievement of overall macroeconomic stabil-
ity, and the self-interest of those involved in banking and financial markets,
would quasi-automatically help to ensure financial stability also. So the finan-
cial stability aspects of central banking became diminished.
When the crisis first erupted in 2007 /2008, central banks also found that
their ability to achieve their primary task of maintaining price stability via
changes in the official short rate became compromised. As money markets
became dysfunctional, and everyone, including bankers, began to hoard
liquidity, the standard means of controlling the overnight interest rate
became less reliable, spreads between official rates and market rates widened
abruptly, and soon, by early 2008, official short-term rates began to hit the
zero lower bound (ZLB). Chapter 2, the main segment of the book, is about
the onset of such problems, and how the two key central banks, the ECB and
the Fed, responded to, and eventually overcame, such problems and difficul-
ties, largely by the use of balance sheet adjustments and quantitative easing
(QE). This provides a truly authoritative account of the main actions of these
two central banks during the GFC, as might be expected since Papadia played
such a central role in this exercise at the ECB. This key, and lengthy, chapter
Foreword
will be a precious source about central bank actions in the GFC for scholars
for decades to come.
The experience of the GFC means that central banks are now saddled with
two objectives: financial stability as well as price stability. The third, final,
and shortest chapter, Chapter 3, is primarily about how to handle this role
expansion. The authors briefly consider whether financial stability could be
delegated to another authority, but, rightly, dismiss this, given the centrality
of central bank liquidity provision in crises.
If one has two objectives, ideally one should have two instruments, in order
to hit such objectives exactly, as in the Tinbergen principle. Chapter 3 is largely
about the question whether the new concept of using macro-prudential meas-
ures can provide such a second instrument. The authors are doubtful, since
such macro-prudential measures are relatively new, not fully tried, and uncer-
tain in effect. If they do not work well enough, the central bank could be left
with a dilemma, a potential trade-off. In such cases, could the central bank seek
political guidance? But would that be consistent with central bank independ-
ence? Perhaps fortunately, we do not know what the future will bring, so we,
and central bankers, are left with more than enough unanswered questions.
This is a book by central bank experts, about central bank policy actions,
and it will be eagerly read by members of the central bank fraternity around
the world. But the audience of those who will profit by, and enjoy, reading this
book goes much wider. It will include all those interested in the causes,
conduct, and consequences of the GFC; those studying money and banking;
those in financial markets and institutions caught up in the GFC; and those
who want to make sense of recent financial developments.
Charles Goodhart
vi
Preface
This book has been written by two central bank insiders. Indeed, we have spent
practically all our professional lives in a central bank. Nevertheless, when writing
this book, we have tried to move beyond our insider perspective. Or, rather, we
have endeavoured to look again at the information we have accumulated over
our long years in central banks from a new perspective, seeking to exploit our
depth of knowledge, whilst avoiding the limitations implicit in any specific
professional experience. In order to achieve this new perspective, we make
selective use of the available economic literature. References to this literature
are used only as long as they help to better understand the economic develop-
ments with which we deal in this book: the analytical apparatus serves our
narrative, not vice versa.
During the Great Recession, which started in August 2007 and entered its
most acute phase in September 2008 with the failure of Lehman Brothers, we
worked at the border between top decision-makers and markets. Our job was
to provide options to policymakers, to design the various programmes, and to
carry them out in the trenches. This put us at the centre of it all, close to
decisions, but also on the front line, implementing actions, often taken in
emergency situations, and monitoring how they affected financial markets
and, most importantly, the real economy.
This experience has been in many ways exhilarating: we found ourselves
in the middle of historic events, in institutions that were at the forefront of
understanding the unfolding crisis and limiting its damages. The ensuing
choices had critical repercussions, beyond the mere economic sphere, on the
welfare of hundreds of millions of individuals. The catastrophic experience of
the 1930s-when central banks failed to adequately fight the Great Depres-
sion and the debt crisis-forced central banks to be bold and act swiftly. They
were compelled to look beyond the well-trodden paths they had followed
before the crisis. There were also reasons, however, to be afraid, or at least
conscious, of the risk of making serious mistakes. Critical decisions, not written
in any monetary policy textbook, were swiftly made. In fact, many central
Preface
banks pursued actions that would have been unthinkable before the crisis but
would eventually find their ways into textbooks. 1
Numerous actions taken by central banks would have previously been
considered extreme and even potentially dangerous. There were no orienta-
tion tools available, no maps to guide us: we were in terra incognita. Blanchard
(in Blanchard et al. 2016, p. 8) summarized what happened in an apt way:
'Central banks have experimented with and researchers have explored mon-
etary policy, often in that order.' At the same time, we felt that society was
placing an outsized burden on our institutions. Problems were dealt with as
they arose, day by day, sometimes hour by hour. Still, we sensed we were
working in the tradition of institutions adapting to historical developments,
asked to serve society by using, in the best possible ways, the important tools
and resources entrusted to them.
Frequent, rapid, and frank contacts and exchanges with market participants
and central bankers in other jurisdictions were critical. These information
channels helped us, and the institutions in which we served, to make deci-
sions and to avoid being paralyzed by doubt. Market participants presented
us with problems that went beyond their capacity to solve. In return, they
helped us understand what was happening and find new solutions for vari-
ous emergencies. With central bankers in other jurisdictions, we shared
experiences about the problems facing us and, together, we looked for solu-
tions, often requiring joint actions. The relationship was particularly close
with the Fed, which had a much longer experience than the ECB as a central
bank with a global influence. This, together with the fact that the Great
Recession developed in two phases-the first with an epicentre in the United
States and the second with an epicentre in the euro-area-explains why this
book is concentrated on the experience of these two central banks. However,
at times, we extend our analyses to include central banks in other advanced
economies. Although this book does not look at the experience of emerging
economies, a relevant observation is that the tools that appeared totally
unconventional for central banks in advanced economies were instead famil-
iar in the experience of emerging economies. This is not surprising, because
the disturbed functioning of markets in advanced countries during the Great
1 The sense of being surprised by one's own actions in central banks during the Great Recession
was analogous to that described in 1831 by the Bank of England Member Jeremiah Harman in the
Lords' Committee, quoted by Bindseil (2004): 'We lent ... by every possible means, and in modes
that we never had adopted before, we took in stock of security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we
made advances on Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on
deposits of bills to an immense amount; in short by every possible means consistent with the safety
of the Bank; seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered every assistance in our
power.' The same sense of having to go well beyond normal practices is well presented in
chapter 18 in the memoirs of Ben Bemanke (2015a) 'For much of the panic, the Fed alone, with
its chewing gum and bailing wire, bore the burden of battling the crisis. This included preventing
the failure of systematically important institutions.'
viii
Preface
Recession had some similarities with the functioning of less mature markets
in emerging economies.
Our book is not an historical account of the Great Recession, or of any time
before it for that matter. A number of very good books cover this area.2 Our
purpose is to show how the concepts and practicalities of central banks
changed with the Great Recession and what conjectures we can make about
their future developments.
2 See, among others, Pisani-Ferry (2014); Brunnerrneier, James, and Landau (2016); Bastasin
(2015).
ix
Acknowledgements
We warmly thank the many people who helped us with the preparation
of this book. 3
For the part of the book written by Francesco Papadia, Alessandra Marcelletti,
Madalina Norocea, Piero Esposito, and Pia Hilttl efficiently prepared the vast
empirical material presented. Christophe Beuve and Deborah Perelmuter gave
useful advice on some issues relating to the Federal Reserve of the United States
(Fed), with which he was less familiar than the European Central Bank (ECB).
Ariana Gilbert-Mongelli revised the English and provided numerous sugges-
tions regarding presentation. Carina Worner revised the typographical layout
and checked the references. For the part written by Tuomas Valimaki, Jarmo
Kontulainen provided several useful comments, and Gregory Moore revised the
English as well as contributing to the presentation.
Claudio Borio, Fabrizio Cacciafesta, Andrea Enria, Ivo Maes, Giangiacomo
Nardozzi, and Andre Sapir were very generous with their comments. Patricia
Mosser, Klaus Regling, Rolf Strauch, Guntram Wolff, Zsolt Darvas, Marcello
Messori, and Franco Passacantando commented on various versions of the
book. The Directorate General for Financial Stability of the ECB, led by Sergio
Nicoletti Altirnari, allowed us to use data published in the Financial Stability
Review (FSR) of the ECB.
Presentations at the School of European Political Economy at Libera Univer-
sita Internazionale degli Studi Sociali (LUISS), the National Bank of Belgium, the
Bruegel Institute, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Waseda University in
Tokyo, and the ECB helped in developing the reasoning presented in the book,
in some cases identifying weak spots in its development. Lectures at Politecnico
di Milano, Scuola Sant'Anna of the University of Pisa, the Goethe University in
Frankfurt, and LUISS in Rome allowed both substance and form to be honed.
3 Tuomas Valimaki wrote Section 2.1.4. Francesco Papadia wrote the rest of the main text. The
authors of the boxes and appendices are indicated in the boxes and appendices. The different
authors are exclusively responsible for the content of their writings.
Contents
List ofFigures xv
List of Tables xxi
List of Boxes xxiii
List of Contributors xxv
Introduction 1
1. Central Banking before the Great Recession 9
1.1 Changing Nature and Objectives of Central Banks 9
1.2 Dominant Central Bank Model before the Crisis 21
1.2.1 Inflation Targeting 33
1.2.2 The Neo-Wicksellian Approach 40
1.2.3 Central Bank Reaction Functions and the Taylor Rule 52
1.2.4 The Corridor Approach 56
1.3 The Unsettled Issue of Financial Stability 64
1.4 Planting the Seeds of the Great Recession: Macroeconomic,
Regulatory, Supervisory, and Intellectual Failings 76
1.4.1 The Great Moderation 76
1.4.2 Macroeconomic Failings 83
1.4.3 Regulatory and Supervisory Failings 102
1.4.4 Intellectual Failings 105
xiv
List of Figures
1.1 Consumer Price Levels in Italy, the UK, Germany, and the USA
(1861-2016) 14
1.2 Size of the Central Bank Balance Sheets, as Percentage of each Country's
GDP (1900-2012) 15
1.3 Long-Term Interest Rates in Italy, the UK, Germany, and the USA
(1861-2016) 16
1.4 Multi-Secular Behaviour of Long-Term Interest Rates: France and the
Netherlands (c.1798-2015) 17
1.5 Multi-Secular Behaviour of Long-Term Interest Rates in the UK
and the USA (c.1790-2015) 18
1.6 Nominal Interest Rates, Millennia Perspective (c.3000 Bc-1700 AD) 19
1.7 Share of Countries with Systemic Banking Crises (1920-2007) 21
1.8 Inflation-Unemployment Trade-Off in the UK (1956-2014) 25
1.9 Distribution of Inflation Rates and Growth Per Capita (1980-2014) 28
1.10 Components of the Money Multiplier in the Euro-Area,
Index 2007=100 (2007-2015) 49
1.11 Components of the Money Multiplier in the USA, Index 2007=100
(2007-2016) so
1.12 Wicksell-Richter Diagram 52
1.13 Variability of Aggregate Per Capita Income and Real Interest Rates:
Average of USA, Italy, UK, and Germany (1870-1915 and 1945-2000) 54
1.14 The ECB Corridor of Interest Rates (1999-2015) 56
1.15 Liquidity and Overnight Interest Rate in the Euro-Area before the Great
Recession (11 July 2007-6 August 2007) 58
1.16 Spread between EONIA and the Rate on ECB Deposits and Excess
Liquidity (2000-2007 and 2008-2015) 60
1.17 Fixation of Interest Rates in the USA 61
1.18 Diagram of Central Bank Dilemma between Inflation
and Financial Stability/Risk Appetite 74
1.19 Inflation and Real GDP Growth in the USA (1948-2016) 77
List of Figures
xvi
List of Figures
xvii
List of Figures
xviii
List of Figures
xix
List of Tables
1.1 Average of Short- and Long-Term Interest Rates between the Tum of
the Eighteenth Century and 2015 20
1.2 Average Ten-Year Government Bond Yield, Average Inflation
Expectations, and Average Real Interest Rates 93
2.1 Change in Euro Money Market Turnover and Increase in Eurosystem
Balance Sheet (2008-2011) 141
3.1 Correlation coefficient between actual and one year ahead expected
inflation (c.1986-2017) 263
3.2 Summary of the hits to the pre-crisis central banking model and
proposed amendments 284
B.15.1 Swap Agreement Operations between the ECB and the Fed
(2007-2014) 156
List of Boxes
1 Comparing the Fed Dual Approach and the ECB Dominant Price Stability
Objective (Christophe Beuve) 10
2 Changes in the Phillips Curve (Tuomas Valimaki) 22
3 Overcoming Inflationary Bias through Central Bank Independence
(Tuomas Vfilimaki) 26
4 The Long-Run Effect of Inflation on GDP Growth (Piero Esposito) 29
5 The 'Snake-EMS-ERM' Experience and Deutsche Bundesbank Leadership
(Francesco Papadia) 34
6 Different Variants of Inflation Targeting (Tuomas Valimaki) 38
7 Quantifying the Inflation Target (Tuomas Valimaki) 41
8 Empirical Evidence for Money Multipliers (Piero Esposito) 47
9 Financial Stability, Banking Supervision, and Macro-Prudential Policy:
An Intricate Relationship (Francesco Papadia) 68
10 Characteristics of the Great Moderation (Piero Esposito) 78
11 Multiple Equilibria and the Great Recession (Francesco Papadia) 99
12 Early Experiences with Negative Rates (Tuomas Vfilimaki) 118
13 Fed and ECB Actions during the Great Recession (Christophe Beuve) 133
14 Target Balances (Philippine Cour-Thimann) 148
15 An Example of Diamond-Dybvig Pricing: Central Bank Swaps during
the Great Recession (Alessandra Marcelletti) 155
16 The European Banking Union (Ariana Gilbert-Mongelli) 234
List of Contributors
Christophe Beuve is currently the Head of Bond Markets and International Operations
Division in the Directorate General of Market Operations at the ECB. He joined the ECB
in 1998 and has occupied various positions in the asset management and monetary
policy implementation areas. Prior to joining the ECB, Christophe worked in the
money and foreign exchange markets departments at the Banque de France. He also
worked at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for two years and at the Fed for
18 months.
Philippine Cour-Thimann teaches monetary economics at HEC and at the Paris
Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po). She is Principal Economist at the ECB where
she has been working since 1999 in the areas of monetary, fiscal, and financial analysis.
Between 2007 and 2014 she contributed to the design and implementation of monetary
policy decisions in the global financial crisis. Prior to joining the ECB, she
worked at CEPII, the French centre for international economics. Her current research
interests are in the fields of monetary policy, and money and banking. She holds
graduate degrees in engineering and economics.
Piero Esposito has been a researcher at the School of European Political Economy
since September 2014. He has a PhD in economics from Sapienza University of Rome.
Between 2011 and 2014, he was a post-doctoral researcher at Sant'Anna School of
Advanced Studies in Pisa, and a researcher at Centro Europa Ricerche (CER) in Rome.
Between 2009 and 2010, he was a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Economic
Studies and Analyses (ISAE, now merged with !STAT). His research focuses mainly on
European economic policy, competitiveness, international trade, and applied
econometrics.
Ariana Gilbert-Mongelli has a Master's degree in Public Policy from the University
of Chicago. Previously she worked as a Research Associate at the Washington, DC,
Office of Vanderbilt University's Institute for Public Policy Studies, among various
other positions. Currently she resides in Frankfurt, where she is a freelance editor
and writer.
Pia Hiittl is an Affiliate Fellow at Bruegel. Prior to this, Pia worked as a trainee in the
Monetary Policy Stance Division of the ECB, and as a trainee in the Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission. She holds a Master's
degree in International Economics from the University of Rome Tor Vergata and a
Master's degree in European Political Economy from the London School of Economics.
Currently, she is a PhD candidate at the Berlin Doctoral Programme in Economics and
List of Contributors
xxvi
Introduction
Fundamental questions about the optimal set-up for central banks are examined
in this book. In particular, we ask whether the model of an independent central
bank devoted to price stability, 1 which affirmed itself in most advanced econ-
omies at the turn of the last century, is the final resting point of a long and
complex development that started centuries ago. We dissect the hypothesis
that the Great Recession has prompted a reassessment and a possible revision
of that model. 2 The most important factors raising this issue number four.
First, a renewed emphasis on financial stability as an explicit key objective to
be pursued by a central bank has emerged, possibly vying for the first rank
with price stability and causing potential dilemmas for the central bank,
which would have to arbitrage between two different objectives. The dilemma
arises because the implicit assumption that the pursuit of price stability would
always coincide with that of financial stability was not verified during the
Great Recession. Second, central bank action moved closer to fiscal policy,
both in the United States (USA) and in Europe. Third, forceful central bank
action, while needed to avoid even graver economic consequences, engendered
moral hazard. Fourth, and connected to the previous point, in the euro-area,
more general responsibilities, such as avoiding the demise of the euro, were
thrown upon the central bank. Ultimately, we ask whether the traditional
model has been irrevocably altered, as central banks have been required to
take on new responsibilities. Are we entering, as Goodhart (2010) has hypothe-
sized, the 'fourth epoch' of central banking?
This book is organized into three main chapters. Chapter 1 examines
how central banks have evolved over the decades, showing that, historically,
four objectives have vied for dominance in the central bank ranking of
1 The issue of the so-called dual mandate of the Fed is examined in Box 1 (see Chapter 1).
2 Claudio Borio (2014b) also examines this hypothesis and reaches a quite trenchant conclusion:
'Central banking will never be quite the same after the global financial crisis' (p. 191).
Central Banking in Turbulent Times
objectives: price stability, financial stability, economic growth, and the fund-
ing of the government. The prevalence of the price stability objective eventu-
ally resulted from the poor inflation control delivered by the monetary policy
technology that substituted the gold standard, until monetary control was
entrusted to an independent central bank devoted to price stability. The
implementation of the principle of central bank independence was somewhat
different between the USA and the euro-area, partly by design, partly by
necessity. In fact, in Europe, the memory of the ravages of inflation and the
absence of a strong partner for the central bank, such as the US Treasury, led to
a stronger version of central bank independence. In institutional terms, this
can be seen in the fact that in the euro-area, unlike in the USA, central bank
independence has constitutional relevance.
The conceptual and empirical basis for the dominant central banking
model before the Great Recession are herein illustrated. In essence, economic
theory and actual economic developments showed that there is no permanent
trade-off between inflation and growth: indeed, stable prices foster growth in
the long run. This finding was the basis for the generalized prevalence of
central banks dedicated to price stability and endowed with the independent,
technical discretion to pursue this objective. In Europe, the long quest for
monetary union eventually succeeded when, based on the example of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, it was agreed that the basis of the monetary union
should be price stability rather than the intrinsically flawed attempt to stabil-
ize exchange rates.
The main components of the central bank model prevailing before the
Great Recession are also presented in this chapter. The approach that
Wicksell developed in the 1920s, in which the interest rate rather than any
monetary quantity plays the critical role, is a fundamental component of that
model. Inflation targeting, giving up the attempt to identify intermediate
targets, is the way in which the predominant objective of price stability was
operationalized. The Taylor rule (1993) moved Wicksell's main analytical
point closer to an approach that can be used for practical policymaking.
Finally, the corridor approach was developed as an effective and parsimonious
way to control the interest rate. The validation of that model during the Great
Moderation is also discussed. It is stressed, however, that financial stability
did not fit easily within the then prevailing paradigm. This feature matched
the illusion that advanced economies had graduated from financial and
banking crises, but was also favoured by the complexity of the concept of
financial stability and its intricate relationship with banking supervision and
macro-prudential policy. The possibility of dilemmas between the pursuits of
financial or price stability is also presented, stressing that such dilemmas
were hidden as long as financial stability was the overlooked field in the action
of central banks.
2
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Advice to a
wife and mother in two parts
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States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
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Language: English
ADVICE TO A WIFE,
AND
ADVICE TO A MOTHER.
BY
PYE HENRY CHAVASSE.
SEVENTEENTH EDITION.
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
1881.
ADVICE TO A WIFE
ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF HER OWN HEALTH,
AND ON THE
TREATMENT OF SOME OF THE COMPLAINTS
INCIDENTAL TO
PREGNANCY, LABOR, AND SUCKLING;
WITH AN
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER ESPECIALLY ADDRESSED TO A YOUNG
WIFE.
BY
“Thy wife shall be as the fruitful vine upon the walls of thine house.”
SEVENTEENTH EDITION.
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
1881.
TO
MY BIRMINGHAM PATIENTS,
MANY OF WHOM I HAVE ATTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF
UPWARDS OF THIRTY YEARS; SOME OF WHOM, HAVING
USHERED INTO THE WORLD, I AFTERWARD ATTENDED IN
THEIR OWN CONFINEMENTS; AND FROM ALL OF WHOM I
HAVE RECEIVED SO MUCH CONFIDENCE, COURTESY, AND
KINDNESS,
PAGES
Dedication iii
Preface to Eighth Edition v–x
Introductory Chapter 13–102
PART I.
On Menstruation 103–116
PART II.
On Pregnancy 117–198
PART III.
On Labor 199–254
PART IV.
On Suckling 255–300
Index 301–309
Advice to a Wife.
A good wife is Heaven’s last, best gift to man—his angel and minister of graces
innumerable—his gem of many virtues—his casket of jewels. Her voice is sweet
music, her smiles his brightest day, her kiss the guardian of his innocence, her
arms the pale of his safety, the balm of his health, the balsam of his life; her
industry his surest wealth, her economy his safest steward, her lips his faithful
counselors, her bosom the softest pillow of his cares, and her prayers the ablest
advocate of Heaven’s blessings on his head.—Jeremy Taylor.