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C O G N I T I V E S C I E N C E A N D T H E N E W T E S T A M EN T
Cognitive Science and
the New Testament
A New Approach to Early Christian Research

ISTVÁN CZACHESZ

1
 3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© István Czachesz 2017
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2017
Impression: 1
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a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
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and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 Preface

This book invites a cross-disciplinary journey through three academic worlds:

the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. As it appears, many if not
most academics are intrigued by the idea of cooperating with colleagues from
other disciplines. In my experience, however, cooperation between substan-
tially different fields often hits almost impenetrable walls. It is not only the lack
of shared language and familiarity with each other’s methodology that chal-
lenges even the most dedicated academic adventurers. There are different
styles of thinking, different expectations as to what it means to “know”
something, and indeed, often there are completely different identities shaped
by decades of different cultural exposure. It is quite possible that my colleagues
in physics and I spent our formative years undertaking different kinds of
intellectual exercises, reading different books, and being excited about differ-
ent movies. Competition and political struggles in academia often exacerbate
such divides. In this study, I would like to convince the reader that learning
about the New Testament through the lens of cognitive science is rewarding
because it leads us to new solutions for old problems and prompts us to ask
new questions about our textual and material evidence.
In the second half of the 1990s, cognitive psychologists at Eötvös Loránt
University in Budapest were kind enough to take my interest in cognitive
science seriously, feed me with readings, and invite me to contribute to a
workshop on collective memory, held at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the
Hungarian Psychological Society. I am especially thankful to Csaba Pléh and
Anikó Kónya. The next important influence came from the School of Behav-
ioral and Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Groningen, where
during the early 2000s, while holding a postdoctoral grant of the Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research, I was able to attend various workshops
and activities, including seminars on the philosophy of mind, memory,
epigenetic inheritance, neuroimaging technologies, and other fascinating
subjects. My pursuits of a cognitive approach to early Christianity were
fundamentally shaped by a third group of academics, who pioneered the
field that is known as the Cognitive Science of Religion. It was a pleasant
surprise to meet a group of like-minded scholars of religion, and discover that
some issues I was tackling in the context of the New Testament and early
Christianity had already been studied in the context of other religious and
cultural traditions. I would like to thank especially Pascal Boyer, Joseph
Bulbulia, Stewart Guthrie, E. Thomas Lawson, Luther Martin, Robert
N. McCauley, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, Harvey Whitehouse, and Don Wiebe.
 vi Preface

Finally, I have been thankful to find a number of colleagues in Biblical

Studies over the years who shared my interests in the cognitive approach, and
whose company and intellectual stimulus has been of great importance to me.
With Risto Uro I have spent countless hours and exchanged thousands of
emails discussing our shared research interests as well as planning and man-
aging a number of joint projects. I thank him for many inspiring conversa-
tions. The preparation of the manuscript of this book benefitted from Risto’s
comments on several chapters. Gerd Theissen has been a wonderful conver-
sation partner and kindly agreed to co-teach seminars with me at the Univer-
sity of Heidelberg, as well as kept urging me to work on this book. When
starting to write about cognitive science and biblical materials, I was lucky to
have Tamás Biró as a friend and colleague, with whom I could talk about
language, computer models, rituals, history, system theory, Hebrew Studies,
and many other topics that are treated on the following pages. Over the years
I had the pleasure to meet other scholars who were interested in bringing
cognitive approaches to Biblical Studies, among whom I would like to thank
especially Anne Katrina de Hemmer Gudme, Jutta Jokiranta, Thomas Kazen,
Anders Klostergaard Petersen, Hugo Lundhaug, Petri Luomanen, Ronit
Nikolsky, Rikard Roitto, and Colleen Shantz.
The beginnings of this project reach back to a seminar on the “Cognitive
and Evolutionary Foundations of Religion” that I taught at the University of
Groningen in 2004, followed by a series of courses at the University of Helsinki
and the University of Heidelberg on different cognitive subjects in the context
of religion, early Christianity, and the New Testament. I thank my students for
their interest in what might have seemed at times like exotic seminar topics.
I learned a lot from those courses. I owe thanks to my colleagues at the
Theological Faculties of Heidelberg and Helsinki for providing me with
inspiring academic environments. The Heisenberg Fellowship of the German
Research Foundation and the visiting fellowship of the Käte Hamburger Kol-
leg “Dynamics in the History of Religions” at the University of Bochum,
directed by Volkhard Krech, provided me with valuable research time to finish
the book project. At Oxford University Press, I am thankful to Tom Perridge,
Karen Raith, Nishantini Amir, and my copy-editor, Elizabeth Stone.
My wife, Gyöngyi, and my daughter, Éva, watched me working on this book
for too long and I am grateful for their love, patience, and support.
István Czachesz
Heidelberg
April 2016
 Contents

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi

Introduction 1
1. A Cognitive Turn 8
2. Evolution 24
3. The Human Brain: A Guided Tour 49
4. Memory and Transmission 62
5. Ritual 88
6. Magic and Miracle 122
7. Religious Experience 141
8. Morality 166
9. Social Networks and Computer Models 187
10. Hermeneutical Reflections 206

Bibliography 221
General Index 259
Index of Modern Authors 265
 List of Figures

3.1. The neuron 52

Source: <https://pixabay.com/en/neuron-acon-dendrite-cell-nucleus-305772/>
(public domain, adapted)
3.2. The cerebral cortex of the human brain: main divisions (capitals)
and selected regions (of the left hemisphere) 55
Source: <https://pixabay.com/en/brain-lobes-neurology-human-body-
1007686/> (public domain, adapted)
3.3. The limbic system of the human brain 56
Source: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/labguest/3497647067> (created by
Zachary Veach, modified and used with the permission of the author)
4.1. Ancient literary composition as distributed cognition (“A” and “S”
indicate author’s and slave’s cognitive processes, respectively) 85
7.1. Religious experience in context 147
Source: I. Czachesz, “Religious Experience in Mediterranean Antiquity:
Introduction to the Special Issue,” Journal of Cognitive Historiography
2/1 (2015), 5–13, page 8. Used by permission of Equinox Publishing Ltd 2015
8.1. The trolley problem. Is it justified to throw the switch? 167
Source: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/jholbo/5022382134> (created
by John Holbo, used with the permission of the author)
9.1. The interface of the “Mission” model 193
9.2. The growth of the Christian movement in the “Mission” model 196
9.3. The logistic growth function 198
9.4. The NetLogo code of the “Mission” model 203
10.1. How cognition, culture, and life history shape individuals 209
10.2. Using cognitive models to study cultures and individuals
behind the text 209
10.3. Using cognitive models to study cultures and individuals
in front of the text 215
 List of Tables

2.1. Natural selection and cognitive theories of religion 32

Source: I. Czachesz, “How Can Evolutionary Theory Contritute to
Biblical Studies?” In D. J. Chalcraft, F. Uhlenbruch, & R. Watson (Eds.),
New Directions in Biblical Studies: Social Scientific and Cultural
Approaches (pp. 16–38). Sheffield: Phoenix Press, 2014, page 23.
Used with the publisher’s permission.
5.1. Whitehouse’s modes of religiosity (Whitehouse, 2004, p. 74) 109
Source: H. Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of
Religious Transmission. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 2004, page 74.
Used with the publisher’s permission.
5.2. The representation of ritual as action 115
7.1. Comparing McNamara’s and Marsh’s models 163
Source: I. Czachesz, “Tours of Heaven in Light of the Neuroscientific
Study of Religious Experience,” Journal of Cognitive Historiography 2/1
(2015), 34–54, page 47. Used by permission of Equinox Publishing
Ltd 2015.
9.1. Number of days needed until all households are converted at different
conversion rates, with and without apostles 199
9.2. Number of days needed until ten percent of the households is
converted at different conversion rates, with and without apostles 201
10.1. The Bible as replicator 218
 Introduction

Have you ever wondered what happens in your head when you marvel at a
beautiful landscape? How electric and chemical signals generated in the
receptor cells of your eyes travel to the back of your head, and further to the
front, while specialized teams of cells extract information about the shape,
position, color, motion, depth, and other details from the stream of signals?
How you can still “see” the full picture, complete with shapes and shades and
forms and motion, instead of a myriad of fragmented details? How the things
you see call up other things in your memory, making associations and
generating meaning? How the sight is combined further with smells and
sounds and information from other modalities of perception? How subjective
experience is attached to what you see, experience that is only yours and feels
different from place to place and from time to time? How memories of your
perceptions and emotions are stored, preserved, and retrieved? How your
perceptions of the present and memories of the past create your sense of
“self ”? Over the last few decades, our knowledge of how the human mind and
brain works increased dramatically. The field of cognitive science explores
answers to these kinds of question and it also enables us to understand
religious traditions, rituals, and visionary experiences in novel ways. This
has implications, in turn, for the study of the New Testament and early
Christianity. How people in the ancient Mediterranean world remembered
sayings and stories, what they experienced when participating in rituals, how
they thought about magic and miracle, and how they felt and reasoned about
moral questions—all these can be now better understood with the help of
insights from cognitive science. In this book, I will argue that the field of New
Testament Studies witnesses the beginning of a cognitive turn.
Cognitive science developed in the 1950s as a reaction to the then fashion-
able behaviorist approach in psychology and gradually made its way into
many academic disciplines, transforming them as well as being enriched and
enhanced by the very same fields it permeated. The “cognitive turn,” as it is
usually called, has brought about fundamental shifts in disciplines such
as linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and ethology, but it
has also shaped literary studies, musicology, anthropology, sociology, and
2 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

historiography. In religious studies, a new field called Cognitive Science of

Religion emerged from the 1990s. This book makes a case for a corresponding
cognitive turn in New Testament Studies (and by extension in the field
of Biblical Studies), both surveying relevant developments in the Cognitive
Science of Religion and digging into the field of cognitive and behavioral
sciences in search of opportunities of gaining new insights about biblical
materials.
Why should biblical scholars bother with learning about the cognitive
approach? After all, hermeneutical trends come and go, and it is not unusual
for biblical scholars to cooperate only with small groups of like-minded
colleagues without learning much about other approaches. As I will argue in
the final chapter of this book (Chapter 10), the cognitive approach is unlike
other methodologies insofar as it is neither an additional step of interpretation
to be performed after we are done with all traditional methods nor a new
technique that replaces one or another traditional method in the exegetical
toolkit. On the contrary, the cognitive approach is not a new method at all: the
cognitive turn has the potential of shedding new light on many, if not all,
traditional questions of the methodology of biblical interpretation. Nothing
we have done before has to be given up but much can be potentially gained by
taking the cognitive stance in virtually every question. The full repertoire of
cognitive methods in textual and historical studies still remains to be crafted.
The chapters of this book present some methodological tools and initial steps
for, together with a large number of examples of, applying the cognitive
approach to the New Testament and related ancient literature.
The beginnings of the use of cognitive science in the study of the New
Testament reach back to first decade of the twenty-first century. In an article
entitled “The Gospels and Cognitive Science” (Czachesz, 2003, pp. 35–6),
I identified four areas in which cognitive science can enhance our knowledge
of the New Testament: (a) the question of the forms and genres of early
Christian literature; (b) the interaction of orality and literacy; (c) bilingualism
(such as combinations of Greek, Aramaic, Latin, and Coptic in early Christian
populations); and (d) the connection of early Christian thought to the social
and ritual components of the movement. Meanwhile, Luther H. Martin
pioneered the use of the theories and models of the Cognitive Science of
Religion in the study ancient religions (Martin, 2003) and early Christianity
(Martin, 2007). In another study (Czachesz, 2007e), I proposed a naturalistic
approach to Christian origins that combined cognitive science with system
theory, network science, and computer modeling, addressing the domains of
beliefs, religious experience, rituals, artifacts, and social networks. Other
publications applied cognitive theories in specific areas of biblical literature
(cf. Czachesz, 2008a), such as rituals (Uro, 2007, 2010, 2011a), textual trans-
mission (Czachesz, 2007g, 2009b), magic (Czachesz, 2007d, 2011a), religious
experience (Shantz, 2009), social organization (Czachesz, 2008b, 2011c), and
 Introduction 3

theological change (Czachesz, 2007b, 2007c; Theissen, 2007b, 2011a). Taken

together, these contributions set the stage for the cognitive turn in New
Testament Studies.
The emergence of the cognitive approach to the New Testament has been
facilitated by collaborative projects as well as an ongoing exchange of ideas
across disciplinary borders. Most importantly, a number of exploratory work-
shops experimented with the use of Cognitive Science of Religion in historical
studies (University of Vermont in 2002, Queen’s University of Belfast in 2007),
the application of cognitive and social scientific methods to explaining
Christian origins and early Judaism (University of Helsinki in 2005), the use
of cognitive science to study religious change and continuity (University of
Groningen in 2006), and the application of cognitive science to textual inter-
pretation (University of Groningen in 2010). The “Mind, Society and Tradition
in the Biblical World” program unit in the Society of Biblical Literature, which
started work in 2007, has been an important venue for developing the cognitive
approach. Several volumes of studies have been edited from the papers of
the above-mentioned meetings (Whitehouse & Martin, 2004; Luomanen et al.,
2007; Czachesz & Biró, 2011; Martin & Sørensen, 2011; Czachesz & Uro,
2013; Nikolsky et al., 2016), which included contributions on both general
topics of cognitive historiography as well as specific aspects of biblical litera-
ture. More recently, a series of workshops was organized at various Nordic
universities in the framework of the research project “Socio-Cognitive Per-
spectives on Early Judaism and Early Christianity” (2010–13). At the Univer-
sity of Heidelberg, Gerd Theissen initiated collaborative efforts, which resulted
in the publication of a special issue of the journal Evangelische Theologie
(Theissen & Feldtkeller, 2011), with contributions on the spread of early
Christianity (Czachesz, 2011b), on rituals (Uro, 2011b), morality (Kazen,
2011), and Christology (Theissen, 2011b). In the area of Hebrew Bible Studies,
Thomas Kazen (2012) applied cognitive and evolutionary models to under-
stand the moral emotions underlying biblical law. Gabriel Levy (2012)
examined the interface of writing and cognition in the history of Judaism.
Articles and book chapters also addressed cognitive aspects of Jewish rituals,
ranging from the Hebrew Bible (Gudme, 2013) to the Dead Sea Scrolls
(Jokiranta, 2013) and rabbinical sources (Biró, 2013). Other studies used
conceptual blending theory, which originated in the field of cognitive linguis-
tics and has gained currency in cognitive approaches to religion (Slingerland,
2003; Sørensen, 2007) and biblical literature (Lundhaug, 2010; Tappenden,
2015).
Recent contributions to the cognitive study of the New Testament and early
Christianity include Rikard Roitto’s studies of pro-sociality in early Christian
groups (Roitto, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016; see also Shantz, 2013), Uro’s mono-
graph on “Ritual and Christian Origins” (2016), and a co-authored book on
the theme of counterintuitiveness and paradoxicality in the New Testament
4 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

(Theissen et al., 2016). Another new trend to be mentioned is the use of

computer models that address cognitive theories and hypotheses, such as the
spread of Christianity (Czachesz & Lisdorf, 2013; cf. Czachesz, 2007e), altru-
ism (Roitto, 2016), and the semantic analysis of texts (Czachesz, 2016a). At
Masaryk University in Brno, the “Generative Historiography of Religion
Project” (GEHIR) uses computer models to study the religions of the ancient
Roman world, including the growth of early Christianity (Chalupa, 2015).
I return to this research area in Chapter 9 below.
The plan of the book is as follows. In Chapter 1, entitled “A Cognitive
Turn,” I provide an introduction to the field of cognitive science and outline
the program of a cognitive turn in New Testament Studies. In this chapter, we
look at the cognitive turn in psychology and other disciplines, as well as
discuss some basic research questions concerning the human mind. We ask
how the human mind manages so many cognitive tasks efficiently, and make
acquaintance with the theories of modularity and different accounts of situ-
ated cognition. Following a brief outline of the Cognitive Science of Religion,
we will ask what the program of a cognitive turn in New Testament Studies
can promise. In Chapter 2, I survey the field of evolutionary theory as we
move toward a deeper understanding of cognitive approaches to culture and
religion. Particular notions of evolution are at the core of many cognitive
theories of religion. After outlining the general concept of evolution, we review
some recent developments in evolutionary theory, including group selection
and cultural evolution. In the remaining part of the chapter, we ask how
evolutionary processes of various kinds can contribute to religious thought
and behavior and show how these questions are relevant to the study of
biblical traditions. In Chapter 3, we embark on a tour of the human brain.
Although such an introduction might seem a tedious exercise, contemporary
cognitive science as well as cognitive theorizing about religion increasingly
relies on neuroscience research. Basic knowledge of the brain is presupposed
in later chapters. After a survey of philosophical issues, we turn to a quick
overview of the most important facts of brain anatomy and functioning. The
first three chapters together provide an introduction to the contemporary
study of religion in the framework on evolution, culture, and cognition and
lay the foundations for discussing various aspects of the New Testament and
early Christianity in the remaining part of the book.
In Chapter 4, I turn to the problem of memory and transmission. What do
we remember and how is knowledge organized in the brain? What does this
imply for the formation of early Christian traditions in general, and the
origins of the writings of the New Testament, in particular? Insights from
memory studies have been used in New Testament scholarship before, includ-
ing the concept of collective memory, originally constructed by Maurice
Halbwachs (1992) half a century ago. More recently, biblical scholars dis-
cussed so-called “flashbulb memories” in the context of the gospel tradition.
 Introduction 5

This chapter starts with a brief survey of the basics of memory studies and
proceeds toward more complex phenomena. We discuss how the cognitive
mechanisms of storage and retrieval of information shaped the gospel trad-
ition and what makes some ideas and stories more memorable than others.
Our examples include miracles, sayings, and stories of divine call. We also
examine the process of literary composition and production in the cultural
context of ancient literacy and consider how memory studies shed light on the
writing of the New Testament.
Chapter 5 focuses on cognitive theories of ritual. In the Cognitive Science of
Religion, considerable efforts have been invested into understanding the
origins, structure, and functions of rituals. In spite of the long-standing
interest in rituals in religious studies, however, there is no shared understand-
ing of what rituals are. For the purposes of this chapter, I consider five
perspectives on rituals, based on ritual studies and cognitive studies of rituals.
First, I consider rituals as actions without a practical purpose, a view that goes
back to Sigmund Freud and has been embraced by anthropologists and
cognitive theorists recently. The Corinthian meals as reflected in Paul’s
account of 1 Corinthians 11, as well as prayer practices in Matthew 5–6 will
be our main examples in this section. Second, I discuss rituals as the founda-
tion of human societies, a view famously defended by Émile Durkheim and
adopted by cognitive theories, particularly in the form of “costly” or “honest”
signaling as a basis of human cooperation. After taking a new look at the
Lord’s Supper and prayer, we will discuss the somewhat neglected question of
ritual singing and dances in early Christianity. Third, we will examine rituals
as tools of cultural transmission, focusing on Harvey Whitehouse’s theory of
the modes of religiosity. This will provide an opportunity to extend our
discussion of the Corinthian church beyond the question of meal practices,
as well as consider the role of emotions in a range of rituals mentioned in the
New Testament. Fourth, I turn to rituals that bring about changes in the state
of affairs, taking E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley’s Ritual Form
Theory as a starting point. This theory allows us to look at the Lord’s Supper
from yet another perspective, in addition to analyzing baptism and initiation
in the New Testament. Fifth, some theories of ritual, such as in Mircea Eliade’
work, point to the experience of the Holy as the goal of rituals. I return to a
more detailed discussion of this perspective in Chapter 7.
In Chapter 6, I deal with magic, arguing that this much-debated concept can
elucidate important aspects of early Christian practices. In particular, I suggest
that magic is connected to the efficacy of rituals (although not all magic
necessarily appears as ritual and not all rituals with an efficacious aspect
count as magic); magic involves putative mechanisms and results; and the
putative mechanisms and results of magic are (often) falsifiable by modern
scientific methods. Next, I discuss how magic is rooted in involuntary
behavioral tendencies, and argue that this connection explains practices of
6 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

rain-making (well attested in Antiquity, including early Christianity) as well as

miracles related to earthquake. Concerning the explanatory strategies sur-
rounding magic, I argue that implicit cognitive mechanisms supporting
magic (such as intuitions of contagion and agency) tend to be the cross-
culturally invariable, whereas explicit concepts (such as specific ideas of divine
helpers) are more varied across cultures. Turning to miracle stories, we will
draw on cognitive theories to understand why they are attractive and wide-
spread, what difference cultural patterns make in the reception of miracle
stories, as well as argue that magical practice and miracle stories form a
symbiotic pair in religious traditions. Finally, we apply the theoretical insights
of this chapter to Paul’s activity in Ephesus as narrated in Acts 17, analyzing
the role of contagion, magical helpers, and magical competition in the text.
In Chapter 7, I discuss subjective religious experience, including both
“extreme” and “moderate” forms of it. I first inquire about the phenomen-
ology of subjective experience, which will take us to the concept of religious
experience in cognitive research. In the next part of the chapter, we consider
the contextual factors that generate and influence religious experience, includ-
ing beliefs, textual traditions, neuroanatomy, and practices. I then outline
the lobes theory of religious experience, which connects social, theological,
and ritual variables to cognitive patterns. The lobes theory is used to continue
our discussion of the situation in the Corinthian church, with particular
attention to different types of religious experience pursued by the different
factions. In the final part of the chapter, I deal with ancient tours of heaven,
using neuroscientific evidence to make sense of their overall structure and
particular details. The neuroscientific approach outlined is applied to the tour
of heaven in the Ascension of Isaiah, followed by a brief discussion of other
early Jewish and Christian apocalypses.
In Chapter 8 I deal with the cognitive and evolutionary foundations of
morality in the New Testament. While theologians usually focus on explicit
moral instructions and philosophical traditions, this chapter inquires about
the evolved cognitive structures that influence moral judgments, behaviors,
and motivations. First, we look at the connection between empathy and
morality. A complex model of empathy will guide our discussion of selected
passages from Jesus’ teaching and the Pentateuchal law. Second, we explore a
range of evolved intuitions that govern moral behavior, such as guilt, cheater
detection, and costly punishment; we also consider how different cognitive
systems handle particular social situations and examine how Jesus’ teaching
manipulates those systems. Third, we turn to the question of whether religion
in fact causes moral behavior, including recent debates on the significance of
so-called “big gods”; we take Deuteronomical historiography and Hebrew
Bible scholarship as examples. Fourth, I argue that social arrangements of
exploitation are based on evolved moral judgment and examine the question
of slavery in selected early Christian sources from such a perspective. Fifth, we
 Introduction 7

discuss the cultural transmission of moral teachings and examples, paying

attention to ancient biographical patterns as well as Jewish and Christian
instructions to imitate moral examples.
In Chapter 9, I examine the interface of cognitive and social factors in the
spread of early Christianity. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss how early
Christian preferences for itinerancy, the inclusion of women and the practice
of charity shaped the social networks of the movement and how the new
network structures influenced the spread of ideas. In the second part of the
chapter, I discuss the philosophy of computer modeling and introduce
the programming language NetLogo. In the final part of the chapter,
I present a simple computer model of the growth of Christianity, and show
how experimentation with the model leads to interesting insights about the
spread of the Christian movement, including the role of itinerancy and the
significance of learning strategies.
In Chapter 10, I offer hermeneutical reflections on the cognitive approach
presented in the book. I discuss, in particular, the significance of the cognitive
approach in connection with three possible uses of the biblical texts, that is, the
text as window, mirror, and image, respectively. I show how the cognitive
approach offers fresh insights for each hermeneutical perspective, and
consider the ramifications of the cognitive approach for historical, reader
oriented, and text-centered biblical interpretation.
There are different ways to read this book. If you are particularly impatient,
you can read Chapters 1, 2, and 10 to get the gist of the argument. If you are
interested only in some particular aspect of the cognitive approach, reading
Chapters 1 through 3 provides a good foundation before proceeding to any
other chapter or selection of chapters. Note, however, that the order of the
chapters has been selected for a reason, so it is a good idea to stick to it if you
plan to read the entire book anyway.
 1

A Cognitive Turn

Students call him the “Neanderthal Jesus.” He has dark and woolly hair and
beard, strong eyebrows, full lips, his skin is sunburnt and wrinkled, and his
round, brown eyes look at you with a somewhat naïve and startled expression.
When I teach about the historical Jesus, I like to show this image alongside a
victorious, blond, and beautiful Northern European Jesus, standing in front of
the empty tomb, as depicted by the Danish painter Carl Christian Hansen
(1804–80). The image of the “Neanderthal Jesus,” however, was not born of
artistic imagination. This picture, which was first shown in the BBC series
entitled “Son of God” (2001), has been created with the help of forensic facial
reconstruction methods, based on skulls found in the neighborhood of ancient
Jerusalem. Granted, the image does not show the face of the historical Jesus: it
shows what Jesus could look like if his face was sufficiently similar to the
average appearance of his Judean contemporaries. Thus the picture also
informs us about the probable appearance of Jesus’ disciples, and that of
John the Baptist.
If science enables the creation of three-dimensional portraits of long-dead
people based on archeological finds, could we go beyond outward appearance
and use scientific methods to say something about the inner world of the
members of the Jesus movement? Can we draw the psychological portrait of
the ancient people who created, transmitted, and used the traditions of
the New Testament and other early Christian sources? Inspired by recent
advances in a number of relevant fields of research, the purpose of this book is
to explore how cognitive science can help us achieve that goal. The influence of
cognitive science on psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and other academ-
ic disciplines is often called the “cognitive turn.” The central argument of this
book is that a cognitive turn in the study of New Testament and early
Christian literature is underway and opens new perspectives for the under-
standing of the history, texts, and religion of the Christ followers as well as
offering fresh insights about classical problems of Biblical Studies.
What is cognitive science? A short, textbook definition tells us that cognitive
science is the “scientific interdisciplinary study of the mind” (Friedenberg &
Silverman, 2006, p. 2). The beginnings of cognitive science reach back to the
 A Cognitive Turn 9

1950s, and the disciplines that traditionally participated in this inquiry include
philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics,
and anthropology (Thagard, 2005, p. ix). More recently, evolutionary theory
played an important role in cognitive science. Shortly we will return to the
origins as well as some interesting, new developments in the field. Before we
do so, however, two questions have to be cleared urgently: what is the “mind”
that cognitive scientists study, and how can such an enterprise help us say
something about ancient people? For the time being, I would like to answer the
first question by giving a minimalistic definition: a mind is something that
performs thinking and feeling. As we will see below (especially in sections 1.2
and 3.1), such a minimalistic definition of the mind allows for a host of
interpretations and applications. The second question concerning the rele-
vance of cognitive science to the study of ancient culture is fundamental and
the answer to it will be spelled out in detail in various parts of this book. When
studying the human mind, cognitive scientists only have access to people
living in our time. How can the insights gained from this research shed light
on the thoughts and feelings of people living in the ancient world?
Let us consider two ways to address this problem. First, we have to realize
that any approach to the ancient world faces the challenge of using modern
methods and assumptions to understand the historical past. Whether we apply
economic theory, sociology, philosophy, or theology to make sense of ancient
history and the New Testament, our knowledge and models used in the
process are not those of the ancient people whom we study. Making such
assumptions and models explicit is the key to gaining meaningful new know-
ledge about the past. Second, and this is what makes cognitive science special,
we can make the assumption that the basic mental architecture of ancient
people was very close to ours. As we will see in subsequent chapters, evolution
does not change the human brain and body substantially in the course of two
millennia. To use an often-cited analogy, ancient people had the same “hard-
ware” as we do, only the “software” running on it differed from ours. Since we
share the anatomy of our brains and bodies with ancients, we can understand
their thoughts and feelings by studying how brain, body, thoughts, and
feelings are related in general. Let us push the analogy of the computer
somewhat further. Your smartphone, desktop computer, and play station all
use the same technology and basic electronic setup. However, each of these
machines can behave very differently from the others. Moreover, the appear-
ance and behavior of the programs on your computer can differ from the
appearance and behavior of the programs on your friend’s computer. By
understanding how the common architecture of those machines functions,
you can understand how they are capable of performing varying tasks and
displaying divergent behaviors. While we often think and feel differently than
ancient people did, especially when it comes to particular concepts, experi-
ences, and situations, cognitive science gives us tools to study such cultural
10 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

differences systematically in terms of shared underlying brain structures,

behaviors, and emotions.

1.1 OPENING THE BLACK BOX

The cognitive turn in psychology started in the 1950s, when the ruling
paradigm of psychological research was behaviorism. According to the behav-
iorist approach (Skinner, 1974; Watson, 1994) all psychologists can study
is an organism’s reactions (responses) to external impulses (stimuli). Behav-
iorists were especially dissatisfied with the speculative nature of Freudian
psychoanalysis and Jungian depth-psychology and deemed the scientific
study of mental processes impossible or impractical. The foundations of
behaviorism were laid by the development of experimental methods in the
late nineteenth century, exemplified by Ivan Pavlov’s work with dogs. Pavlov’s
discovery of classical conditioning is a text-book example of the methods of
the behaviorist school. In a series of sessions, Pavlov’s dog learned to associate
a tone (conditioned stimulus) with the presentation of food (unconditioned
stimulus), thus salivating (conditioned response) whenever the tone was
presented. Another form of conditioning, known as operant conditioning,
will be discussed in Chapter 6.
The cognitive turn meant a rejection of the behaviorists’ agnosticism
concerning mental states and brought new approaches to the study of
mental states and mental representations. One of the impulses for the study
of mental structures came from early computer science (Bechtel et al., 2001;
Eysenck & Keane, 2005, pp. 1–30). Based on the kinds of internal operations
that computers could perform on the data stored in their memory, scholars
started to theorize about the structure and functioning of the human mind.
For example, scholars built tree-like databases, the structure of which was
believed to resemble how the human mind stores information, and the distances
on the tree were compared to the speed at which human participants made
associations between the same items that were stored in the computer’s
database (e.g., Scott & Nicholson, 1991, pp. 18–36). Models of how the mind
represents and manipulates knowledge were a central concern for cognitive
scientists in the beginning.
Another impulse for the scientific study of the human mind came from
developments in neuroscience. Neuroimaging technologies allow researchers
to observe brain activity (Dolan, 2008; Aguirre, 2014). The electro-encephalograph
(EEG) is based on a similar principle as the more familiar electro-cardiograph,
but instead of measuring electrical impulses in the heart it picks up electric
signals emitted by the cells of the brain (neurons). Other neuroimaging tools
measure the energy consumption of brain cells, by measuring either blood
 A Cognitive Turn 11

flow or sugar consumption, thus allowing us to see how activation in certain

parts of the brain changes as people perform some task. Studies performed
with the help of such tools allowed scientists to make inferences about the
contribution of various parts of the brain to cognitive functions. These
studies contributed to knowledge about the brain gained by other means,
such as from the study of patients with brain lesions (damage to the brain
caused by illness or trauma). Scholars also speak of “wet models” of cogni-
tion (Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992) that take into account actual neural structures
instead of (or in addition to) what we can learn from building artificial minds
in computers.
The relationship between mind and brain has been one of the central themes
in the philosophy of mind (Clark, 2001, pp. 7–42; Daugman, 2001; Smart, 2014).
Are mental states identical with brain states (identity theory)? Is cognition
necessarily bound to the human brain? In Chapter 3 we will examine these
questions in more detail. For the time being, the case of computer models can
provide us with some insight. If the human mind can be modeled in a computer
successfully (multiple realizability), then it can be argued that cognition can
exist independently of the human brain and a mental state cannot be identical
with a brain state. It has also been suggested that cognition requires having a
body or that the mind extends into the environment. Let us make acquaintance
with some of the important hypotheses and debates concerning the boundaries
and structure of the human mind.

1.2 THE H UMAN MIND: BASIC QUESTIONS

The human mind takes in a staggering amount of information and performs a

huge number of tasks. As you sit on a bench in the park, you notice the color,
shape, smell, and texture of plants and objects, see and hear people walking
and talking, ponder some problem from your work, all at the same time.
Beyond what you notice consciously, your mind deals with subtle cues such as
the temperature of your environment, various processes in your body, and
memories that shape your ongoing experience even without you taking notice
of them. These processes and much more are handled by a brain apparatus
that consists of nearly a hundred billion neurons (in addition to other tissue).
Thanks to neuroimaging studies, we understand many details of how those
cells are organized in the brain and what different brain areas do (see
Chapter 3). But our ever-growing knowledge of brain structures has not yet
yielded an understanding of the big picture of human cognition. How does the
mind manage to deal with the tasks just mentioned and much more? What
kind of mental organization is capable of such performance? How does the
12 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

human mind work, where are its boundaries, and how important is the
evolutionary past for the study of cognition?
One of the answers to the astounding versatility and efficiency of the human
mind is the theory of the modularity of mind. We have to mention at least
three important versions of the modularity hypothesis.
(1) Jerry Fodor (1983) suggested that the mind includes a number of
modules that deal with different kinds of information. The modules
are loosely related to the senses. They are domain-specific, that is, they
deal with some aspect of the world and process only information that is
relevant to that aspect. Some modules are dedicated to elementary
tasks, such as recognizing shapes or rhythms. Others perform more
abstract tasks, such as recognizing faces or processing language. Thus in
our example, some module would process all kinds of shapes and colors
around you, but a specific module would be activated as soon as that
information appears to be related to a human face rather than to the
vegetation in the park or when you realize that some sound is not just a
dog’s barking but human speech. Fodor also thought that the modules
broadly correspond to brain regions, that is, a particular region in the
brain performs the task of a particular module. In Fodor’s theory there
are also central systems in the mind, which operate in a domain-general
way, enabling us to integrate information related to different aspects of
the environment.
(2) A different theory of modularity has been put forward by evolutionary
psychologists. Evolutionary psychologists study the human mind from
the perspective of evolution, theorizing about the kinds of minds that
helped the survival of our ancestors (see Chapter 2). John Tooby and
Leda Cosmides (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides,
2000) reasoned that evolution created specialized cognitive systems in
the human mind that coped with specific cognitive tasks in the envir-
onment of our ancestors. The modules they proposed deal with specific
problems such as food, sexual attraction, parenting, kinship, incest
avoidance, coalitions, disease avoidance, friendship, predators, provo-
cations, snakes, spiders, and so on (Tooby & Cosmides, 2016, p. 55). If
we now return to our example of sitting on a bench in the park, we can
say that a different module in your mind will be triggered when you
notice a spider on the bench, hear the voice of a friend, or sense a foul
taste as you bite on your sandwich. This version of modularity is called
massive modularity, or the “Swiss army knife” model of the brain.
(3) Specialized cognitive modules are useful for dealing with specific
tasks efficiently, but make it very difficult to learn new things, innovate,
or develop a unified sense of self and consciousness that humans
have. Steven Mithen (1996, pp. 65–78) addressed this problem by
 A Cognitive Turn 13

suggesting a three-phase evolution of the mind: a general-intelligence

mind capable of learning and decision-making; a mind of specialized
intelligences (a simpler version of the Swiss army knife model) that
deal with different domains efficiently; and a mind with flow of
knowledge and ideas (cognitive fluidity) between domains. He com-
pared the mind to a cathedral that has many chapels (specialized
modules) but also a central nave (general intelligence), doors con-
necting the chapels (flow of information between domains), and
perhaps a “superchapel,” a module specialized in combining know-
ledge derived from other modules.
Other discussions of the nature of the human mind concern the boundaries
of the mind. Making a shopping list or taking notes at a meeting is daily
routine for most of us. Now recall what happened when you forgot to take
your list or displaced your notes. In modern life, most of us use such external
memory stores routinely, without even noticing how much we depend on them
for performing cognitive tasks. Merlin Donald (1991, pp. 314–19) created the
concept of exogram to denote external traces that carry information outside
the brain.1 Exograms are attested in all human cultures, including body
markings, grave decorations, notations, paintings, and writing systems.
Some cognitive operations involve tight and very complex interactions
with external objects, such as performing multiplication with the help of
pen and paper, jotting sketches to solve spatial problems (will this couch fit
into the living room?), or using drawings and diagrams to reason about
abstract problems. According to Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998),
humans and their thinking tools form coupled systems so that it is justified
to speak of an extended mind in many cases. Since the time Clark and
Chalmers formulated the concept of the extended mind, computers of all
shapes and sizes (smartphones, tablets, but also computers in cars and
household appliances) became integrated into many cognitive tasks we per-
form daily. Data available on the web is dynamically changing (through tiny
contributions by each of its users) and the changes also modify our percep-
tion and beliefs.
Notice that the last example, using the world wide web to perform a
cognitive task, involves the active contribution of other people, who also
use and change the web. Such interaction in performing cognitive tasks is,
however, not a novel phenomenon. Edwin Hutchins (1995) described how
navigating a ship involves complex interactions between crew members as
well as between people and instruments. Hutchins called this type of
cognitive performance distributed cognition, suggesting that cognition does

1
In neuroscience, the term engram denotes the (hypothetical) physical trace of a memory in
the brain.
14 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

not take place in any individual part of the system (consisting of the ship
and its crew in the above example) but emerges from the interaction of the
parts. While “extended mind” and “distributed cognition” are often seen as
interchangeable labels referring the same approach, Hutchins (2014)
identified two important differences. In the extended mind view, Hutchins
argued, the involvement of external parts is optional and cognition can take
place without extended elements. Further, the extended mind view still iden-
tifies a central element in the cognitive process, that is, the brain of the
individual. In the distributed cognition paradigm, all instances of cognition
are distributed; only the limits of the system are chosen differently. The
cognition of an entire ship would be an example of a fairly large cognitive
system. The brain itself, however, is also a distributed system, where cognition
emerges from interactions of a very large number of neurons. The modular
mind, Hutchins notes (p. 37), would be an example of a distributed cognitive
system, as well, in which the modules constitute the interacting parts of the
system.
The relation between mind and body has been also the subject of intense
debates, especially since the mid-1990s. Let us consider a simple example from
a recent study. It goes without saying that the work of a judge involves
complex and demanding cognitive functioning. But who thought that the
variable whether the judge is hungry or satiated could play a significant role
in his or her decision? In an empirical study (Danziger et al., 2011), judges
granted parole in 65 percent of the cases after breakfast and lunch but in
almost no case before lunch. Proponents of embodied cognition suggest that
we think with our bodies as much as with our brains. Theories of embodied
cognition come in many flavors.

(1) Scholars defending embodied views of cognition often contrast their

approach with computational models of the mind. A computational
model implies that the mind carries out operations on symbols that are
stored in memory, much like a modern computer functions. The main
activity of an embodied mind, in contrast, consists of connecting
perception with action. As we move through the environment, we
perceive new opportunities for action (Varela et al., 1991); actions,
in turn, lead to new perceptions, creating what is called the perception-
action loop. For example, you would seldom use abstract search
operations on a memorized list of items and their positions in your
fridge when you get hungry during the day; rather, you would walk to
the fridge, open the door, browse its contents, and assess items as
candidates for lunch as you glimpse them. Important arguments for
such models of cognition are their efficiency and low cost. For example,
one could perform abstract geometrical calculations to follow the short-
est path toward an object in sight, but keeping the image of the object
 A Cognitive Turn 15

always sharp in one’s field of view while walking toward it is a simple

and effective solution (Shapiro, 2011, p. 63).
(2) Another issue in embodied theories of cognition is the nature of mental
representations. In a broad sense, a mental representation means some-
thing in the mind that stands for something external (Mandik, 2001). In
classical cognitive science, mental representations are symbolic and
abstract: for example, the same representation “table” is used to mean
different kinds of table. They are also amodal in that the same repre-
sentation can be employed when “table” is written or spoken about
(Wilson & Foglia, 2011). In embodied cognition, either the entire
existence of mental representations or at least their symbolic and
amodal character is denied. For example, the embodied accounts of
navigating your environment mentioned above do not require mental
representations (at least in a classical sense).
(3) Some embodied approaches retain the concept of mental representa-
tions but fill it with new content. In their theory of conceptual meta-
phors, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) argued that abstract
thought is inherently dependent on bodily experience. We learn basic
concepts from direct physical experience (by virtue of our embodi-
ment) and build all other concepts by metaphorical extensions of basic
concepts. For example, directions such as “front” and “back” are basic
concepts that can be used for conceptualizing trajectories, and ultim-
ately to create abstract concepts such as life as a journey. Larry Barsalou
(1999, 2008) developed a model of perceptual symbols, emphasizing
that concepts retain the modes of perception. Thus the mental repre-
sentation of an apple is not an abstract symbol with attributes of color,
shape, smell, and taste attached to it. The representation of an apple
rather consists of a combination of the color, shape, smell, and taste
that we perceive. Barsalou (2003; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005)
also suggested ways to build representations of more complex concepts
and beliefs based on the combination of perceptual symbols.
What are the consequences of theories of embodiment for the study
of the human mind? First, let us note that on a practical level, embodied
perspectives often imply a shift of emphasis rather than a complete
revolution in cognitive science. Perception, dynamical adjustments to
the environment, and interactive behavior have been considered in
many cognitive models. Second, as Clark (2001, pp. 135–8) noted,
embodied theories can be strong when it comes to understanding
some aspects of cognition but less consequential when addressing
others. Human cognition could be revolutionary precisely because it
uses a new kind of cognitive machinery that understands the world in
conceptual terms. Third, extended, distributed, and embodied theories
16 Cognitive Science and the New Testament

often imply a different choice of the boundaries of the system. Thus it

could be meaningful to study the mind in the context of the brain for
some purpose and consider perceptual information (including mes-
sages to and from parts of the body) as external inputs and outputs. At
the other end of the spectrum, a group of humans and objects (and
artifacts) can be studied as a single system if this yields new insights.

1.3 COG NITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

During the last two and a half decades, insights from cognitive science
appeared in the study of religion. Starting with a handful of pioneering studies,
a new interdisciplinary research area emerged gradually that became known as
the Cognitive Science of Religion. In this section, I offer a short introduction to
the field, discussing some of its foundational studies and theories. More
detailed presentations of the relevant theories will follow across various
chapters of this book.
Anthropologist Stewart Guthrie (1980, 1993) has to be credited with the first
attempt to formulate a cognitive theory of religion. Guthrie developed the
argument that religion is rooted in an anthropomorphic interpretation of our
environment. By far the most important factor in the human environment,
Guthrie argued, is other human beings. The benefits of recognizing humans and
human activity in the environment are great and the risk of ignoring them is
huge. As a result, we prefer to use cognitive models that evolved for interacting
with humans to make sense of a wide range of perceptions: we interpret noises,
shapes, and other information as traces of human presence and activity. The
most important human-like feature of the gods is the use of symbolic commu-
nication. Although the gods do not necessarily have human-like forms, they
interact with humans through language or some allied system of symbols. In
sum, according to Guthrie (1993, p. 178), “God or gods consist of seeing the
world as humanlike.”
In their monographs entitled Rethinking Religion (Lawson & McCauley,
1990) and Brining Ritual to Mind (McCauley & Lawson, 2002), E. Thomas
Lawson and Robert N. McCauley asked how the human mind represents
rituals and what this implies for their structure. They answered these ques-
tions by putting forward the Ritual Form Theory. According to Lawson and
McCauley, the human mind represents actions in terms of an agent acting on a
patient with the help of an instrument. For example, John (agent) hits (action)
the ball (patient) with a bat (instrument). Unlike in ordinary actions, however,
in a ritual one of these components is connected to a superhuman agent (god).
For example, in baptism a priest (connected to God by ordination) baptizes an
infant (or adult in certain denominations) with the help of water. This is an
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she was buried near the door of the same church, and a tomb was
erected over her sepulchre, from whence this record is taken.

XVIII.

The following account of reanimation is extracted

from the first volume of the Causes Célebres, and
was the subject of a serious law suit in Paris.
Two men in trade, who lived in the street, St. Honoré, in Paris,
nearly equal in circumstances, both following the same profession,
and united in the closest friendship, had each of them a child, much
about the same age. These children were brought up together, and
conceived a mutual attachment, which ripening with years into a
stronger and more lively sentiment, was approved by the parents on
both sides. This young couple was upon the point of being made
happy, by a more solid union, when a rich financier, conceiving a
passion for the young maiden, unfortunately crossed their
inclinations, by demanding her in marriage. The allurements of a
more brilliant fortune, seduced her father and mother,
notwithstanding their daughter’s repugnance to consent to the
change. To their entreaties, however, she was obliged to yield, and
sacrificed her affections, by becoming the wife of the financier. Like a
woman of virtue, she forbad her earlier lover the house. A fit of
melancholy, the consequence of this violence done to her
inclinations, by entering into an engagement of interest, brought on
her a malady, which so far benumbed her faculties, that she was
thought by all her friends to be dead, and was accordingly consigned
to the grave. The former lover conceiving, and hoping what he had
heard of her death, might only prove a syncope, or fit of lethargy, (as
she had been before subject to those complaints) bribed the grave-
digger, to convey the body to his house in the night time. He then
used every means recommended for restoring suspended animation;
and at length was overjoyed at finding his efforts prove effectual.
 It is not easy to conceive the surprise the young woman was in on
her resuscitation, when she found herself in a strange house, and as
it were in the arms of her lover, who informed her of what had taken
place, and the risk he had run on her account. She then
comprehended the extent of her obligation to her deliverer, and love,
more pathetic than all his persuasions to unite their destinies,
determined her, on her recovery to escape with him into England:
where they lived for some years in the closest union.
At the end of ten years, they conceived the natural wish of
revisiting their own country, and at length returned to Paris, where
they took no precaution whatever, of concealing themselves, being
persuaded that no suspicion would attend their arrival. It happened
however by chance, that the financier met his wife in one of the
public walks. The sight of her, made so strong an impression on him,
that the persuasion of her death could not efface it. He contrived it so
as to join her, and notwithstanding, the language which she used to
impose upon him, he left her with the conviction that he was not
deceived.
The strangeness of this event, gave more charms to the woman in
the eyes of her former husband, than she had for him before. He
acted with such address, that he discovered her abode,
notwithstanding all her precautions, and reclaimed her with all the
regular formalities of justice.
It was in vain that the lover maintained the right which his cares for
his mistress gave him to the possession of her: that he represented
her inevitable death, but for him: that he ought even to be accused of
homicide, for want of having taken proper precautions to assure
himself of her death, and a thousand other ingenious reasons which
love suggested to him, but without the desired effect. He found that
the judicial ear was against him, and not thinking it expedient to wait
the result of a definitive judgment, he fled with his mistress into a
foreign country, where they passed the remainder of their days,
without further molestation.
We have before observed that several persons reputed dead, had
exhibited signs of life under the blade of the Anatomist, and had
consequently deceived the judgment of the surgeon who regarded
them as defunct. Hence it follows, that apparent death often carries
with it the exterior characters of real death; that men of the faculty
may be deceived, and much more so those who are less instructed;
hence it follows likewise that for the good of humanity it is
indispensible that a regulation should be adopted, which would save
us from the dreadful horrors of so cruel an event.

XIX.
It is well known what happened to the celebrated Vesabe,
successive physician to Charles V. and to Philip II. of Spain, his son.
Being persuaded that a Spanish Nobleman whom he attended was
really dead, he asked the permission of opening him, which was
granted. But he had scarcely plunged the instrument into the body of
the unfortunate man, when he remarked some signs of returning life.
In effect, he found, on opening his bosom, the heart still palpitating.
The relations of the deceased, informed of the accident, were not
satisfied with pursuing him as a murderer; they dragged him, as a
man guilty of sacrilege, before the tribunal of the Inquisition.
As the fault was notorious, the judges of this tribunal were for
condemning him to the punishment attached to the impiety. But
fortunately for him, the King of Spain, by his authority and entreaties,
delivered him from this certain danger, on condition of his expiating
his crime by a voyage to the holy-land. But the unfortunate Vesabe
did not long enjoy the pardon which he thus obtained. The Venetian
senate having sent for him to fill the place of Falloppe, a violent
tempest overtook him on his passage, and cast him on the island of
Zante, where after wandering about for several days in the deserts,
and suffering all the rigours of hunger, he ended his life deplorably in
1564, at the age of fifty eight.

XX.
 We are informed in a treatise by Terilli, that a lady of distinction in
Spain, being attacked with hysteric suffocations, was regarded as
dead. Her relations applied to a celebrated Anatomist to open her,
and acquaint himself more particularly with the cause of her death.
At the second stroke of his knife she revived, and gave evident signs
of life, by the cries that were forced from her by this fatal instrument.
The dreadful spectacle excited such astonishment and horror in
those present, that this physician, who had hitherto enjoyed the
fairest reputation, abhorred now, and detested by every one, was
compelled to quit not only the city, where this tragedy was acted, but
even the very province itself, in order to withdraw himself from the
effects of public indignation.

XXI.
Acilius Aviola was (according to Pliny) concluded dead, both by his
domestics and physicians; he was accordingly laid out upon the
ground for some time, and then carried forth to his funeral pile: but
as soon as the flames began to catch his body, he cried out that he
was alive, imploring the assistance of his schoolmaster, who was the
only person that had tarried by him: but it was too late; for
encompassed with flames, he was dead before he could be
succoured.

XXII.
Plato tells us of Erus Armenius being slain in battle, among many
others; when they came to take up the dead bodies upon the tenth
day after, they found, that though all the other carcases were putrid,
this of his was entire and uncorrupted; they therefore carried it home,
that it might have the just and due funeral rites performed to it. Two
days they kept it at home in that state, and on the twelfth day, he
was carried out to the funeral pile; and being ready to be laid upon it,
he returned to life, to the admiration of all that were present. He
declared several strange and prodigious things, which he had seen
and known, during all that time that he had remained in the state of
the dead.

XXIII.
One of the noble family of the Tatoreidi, being seized with the
plague in Burgundy, was supposed to die thereof, and was put into a
coffin to be carried to the sepulchres of his ancestor, which were
distant from that place some four German miles. Night coming on,
the corpse was disposed in a barn, and there attended by some
rustics. These perceived a great quantity of fresh blood to drain
through the chinks of the coffin; whereupon they opened it, and
found that the body was wounded by a nail that was driven into the
shoulder through the coffin; and that the wound was much torn by
the jogging of the chariot he was carried in; but withal, they
discovered that the natural heat had not left his breast. They took
him out, and laid him before the fire: he recovered as out of a deep
sleep, ignorant of all that had passed. He afterwards married a wife,
by whom he had a daughter; married afterwards to Huldericus a
Psirt; from his daughter came Sigismundus a Psirt, chief Pastor of
St. Mary’s Church in Basil.

XXIV.
In the year 1650 Anne Green was tried at Oxford, before Serjeant
Umpton Croke, for the murder of her bastard child, and by him
sentenced to be hanged; which sentence was accordingly executed
on the fourteenth day of December, in the Castle-Yard, Oxford,
where she hung about half an hour, being pulled by the legs, and,
after all, had several strokes given her on the stomach with the butt
end of a musket. Being cut down, she was put into a coffin, and
carried to a house to be dissected; where when they opened the
coffin, notwithstanding the rope remained fast jammed round her
neck, they perceived her breast to rise: whereupon one Mason, a
tailor, intending an act of humanity, stamped on her breast and belly;
and one Oran, a soldier, struck her with the butt end of his musket.
After all this, when Sir William Patty, Dr. Willis, and Mr. Clarke, came
to prepare the body for dissection, they perceived some small rattling
in her throat, which induced them to desist from their original design,
and began to use means for her recovery; in which they were so
successful, that within fourteen hours she began to speak, and the
next day talked and prayed very heartily. Nor did the humanity of the
Doctors stop, till by obtaining a pardon for her, they secured that life,
which their skill had restored. She was afterwards married, had three
children, lived in good repute among her neighbours, at Steeple-
Barton, and died in 1659. What was very remarkable, and
distinguished the hand of Providence in her recovery, she was found
to be innocent of the crime for which she suffered; and it appeared
the child had never been alive, but came from her spontaneously,
four months after conception.

XXV.
In the year 1658, Elizabeth, the servant of one Mrs. Cope, of
Magdalen parish, Oxford, was convicted of killing her bastard child,
and was according hanged at Green-ditch, where she hung so long,
that one of the by-standers said, if she was not dead, he would be
hanged for her. When cut down, the gallows being very high, she fell
with such violence to the ground, that seemed sufficient of itself to
have killed her. After this, she was put in a coffin, and carried to the
George Inn, in Magdalen parish; where signs of life being observed
in her, she was blooded, and put to bed to a young woman; by which
means she came to herself, and, to all appearance, might have lived
many years: but the next night, she was, by the order of one Mallony,
a bailiff of the city, barbarously dragged to Gloucester Green, and
there was hanged upon a tree, till she was dead.

XXVI.
In the year 1797, a fine boy, about nine years old, son of Mr.
Baldock, Surgeon and Apothecary, at Burwash, in Sussex, had the
misfortune to fall into a pond of water, about twenty roods from his
father’s house, wherein he soon sunk to the bottom, and there
remained at least a quarter of an hour, before any one went to his
assistance. By the time he was taken out, the father had arrived at
the spot, where he found his son to all appearance dead, his face
having turned quite black, and his pulsation totally left him; he,
however, took up the body, and carried it home, losing no time in
stripping off the wet cloaths, and getting it into a warm bed. He next
proceeded to wipe the skin quite dry with napkins, and afterwards to
rub the body well with hot cloths. Mr. and Mrs. B. continued the
stimulating process for a full hour, without the smallest prospect of
success; they nevertheless persevered, and soon afterwards had the
happiness to discover some small symptoms of returning life, from
the emission of a very feeble groan. This encouraged them to
redouble their exertions; and though they proved wholly ineffectual
for more than another hour; during which time the body appeared as
a corpse before them, they did not relax in their efforts; and, at the
expiration of two hours and an half, they brought the vital functions
into more visible action, which first appeared by a sort of convulsive
motion in one hand. The next favourable symptoms discovered,
were a little motion in one foot, an inward crying, and a very languid
pulse. The return of animation was now more rapid, and apparently
very painful; for the poor boy first cried low, and presently after very
loud; his eyes, which were naturally prominent, on a sudden burst
wide open, and appeared very red and full of terror. After this, he
was taken out of bed, and put breast high, into water blood warm, in
which situation he appeared calm for about ten minutes, when he
again cried, but not so strong as before. Being taken out of the bath,
(where the friction was still kept up with the hand) wiped dry, and put
again into a warm bed, he was soon after perceived to breathe,
though very quick and feeble. Having in some degree recovered his
senses, he spoke a few words imperfectly; but his speech soon
became more perfect; and having swallowed a trifling potion his
father administered to him, he complained of great pain in his
stomach and bowels, which was soon relieved by an embrocation,
volatile, oily, and anodyne. The next night he got rest by the help of a
cordial anodyne; but it was a fortnight before he wholly recovered.
 We have been particular in stating the above facts, from an idea
that the knowledge of them may prove useful in similar accidents,
and indeed in all cases of suspended animation.

XXVII.
Doctor Tissot mentions an instance of a girl who was restored to
life, after she had been taken out of the water, swelled, bloated, and
to all appearance dead, by laying her naked body upon hot ashes,
covering her with others equally hot, putting a bonnet round her
head, and a stocking round her neck, stuffed with the same, and
heaping coverings over all. After she had remained half an hour in
this situation, her pulse returned, she recovered her speech, and
cried out, I freeze, I freeze; a little cherry brandy was given her, and
she remained buried, as it were, under the ashes for eight hours.
Afterwards she was taken out, without any other complaint, except
that of lassitude or weariness, which went off in a few days. The
Doctor mentions likewise an instance of a man who was restored to
life, after he had remained six hours under water, by the heat of a
dung-hill.

XXVIII.
Doctor Alexander mentions an instance of a man, who was to all
appearance killed by a blow on the breast, but recovered on being
immersed for some time in warm water. These, and many other
instances of a similar nature, amount to a full proof of this fact, that
many of those unhappy persons who lose their lives, by falls, blows,
and other accidents, might be saved by the use of proper means
duly persisted in.

XXIX.
Mr. Tossach, Surgeon at Alloa, relates the case of a man
suffocated by the steam of burning coal, who he recovered by
blowing his breath into the patient’s mouth, bleeding him in the arm,
and causing him to be well rubbed and tossed about.
And Doctor Frewen, of Sussex, mentions the case of a young man
who was stupified by the smoke of sea coal, but was recovered by
being plunged into cold water, and afterwards laid in a warm bed.

XXX.
Even in old age, when life seems to have been gradually drawing
to a close, the appearances of death are often fallacious.
A Lady in Cornwall, more than eighty years of age, who had been
a considerable time declining, took to her bed, and in a few days
seemingly expired in the morning. As she had often desired not to be
buried till she had been two days dead, her request was to have
been regularly complied with by her relations. All that saw her looked
upon her as dead, and the report was current through the whole
place; nay, a gentleman of the town actually wrote to his friend in the
island of Scilly, that she was deceased. But one of those who were
paying the last kind office of humanity to her remains, perceived
some warmth about the middle of the back; and acquainting her
friends with it, they applied a mirror to her mouth; but, after repeated
trials, could not observe it in the least stained; her under jaw was
likewise fallen, as the common phrase is; and, in short, she had the
appearance of a dead person. All this time she had not been
stripped or dressed; but the windows were opened as is usual in the
chambers of the deceased. In the evening the heat seemed to
increase, and at length she was perceived to breathe.

XXXI.
Monsieur Janin, of the Royal College of Surgery at Paris, relates,
that a Nurse having had the misfortune to overlay a child, he was
called in, and found the infant without any signs of life; no pulsation
in the arteries, no respiration, the face livid, the eyes open, dull, and
tarnished, the nose full of snivel, the mouth gaping, in short, it was
almost cold. Whilst some linen clothes and a parcel of ashes were
warming, he had the boy unswathed, and laid him in a warm bed,
and on the right side. He was there rubbed all over with fine linen, for
fear of fretting his tender and delicate skin. As soon as the ashes
had received their due degree of heat, Mr. Janin buried him in them,
except the face, placed him on the side opposite to that on which he
had been at first laid, and covered him with a blanket. He had a
bottle of Eau de luce in his pocket, which he presented to his nose
from time to time; and between whiles some puffs of tobacco were
blown up his nostrils: to these succeeded the blowing into his mouth,
and squeezing tight his nose. Animal heat began thus to be excited
gradually: the pulsations of the temporal artery were soon felt, the
breathing became more frequent and free, and the eyes closed and
opened alternately. At length the child fetched some cries expressive
of his want of the breast, which being applied to his mouth, he
catched at it with avidity, and sucked, as if nothing had happened to
him. Though the pulsations of the arteries were by this time very well
re-established, and it was hot weather, yet Monsieur Janin thought it
adviseable to leave his little patient three quarters of an hour longer
under the ashes. He was afterwards taken out, cleaned and dressed
as usual; to which a gentle sleep succeeded, and he continued
perfectly well.

XXXII.
Mr. Glover, Surgeon in Doctor’s Commons, London, relates the
case of a person who was restored to life after twenty nine minutes
hanging, and continued in good health for many years after.
The principal means used to restore this man to life were opening
the temporal artery and the external jugular; rubbing the back,
mouth, and neck, with a quantity of volatile spirits and oil;
administering the tobacco clyster by means of lighted pipes, and
strong frictions of the legs and arms. This course had been
continued for about four hours, when an incission was made into the
wind pipe, and air blown strongly through a canula into the lungs.
About twenty minutes after this the blood at the artery began to run
down the face, and a slow pulse was just perceptible at the wrist.
The frictions were continued for some time longer; his pulse became
more frequent, and his mouth and nose being irritated with spirit of
salammoniac, he opened his eyes. Warm cordials were then
administered to him, and in two days he was so well as to be able to
walk eight miles.

XXXIII.
In the parish of St. Clements in Colchester, a child of six months
old, lying upon its mother’s lap, having had the breast, was seized
with a strong convulsion fit, which lasted so long, and ended with so
total a privation of motion in the body, lungs, and pulse, that it was
deemed absolutely dead. It was accordingly stripped, laid out, the
passing bell, ordered to be tolled, and a coffin to be made; but a
neighbouring gentlewoman who used to admire the child, hearing of
its sudden death, hastened to the house, and upon examining the
child, found it not cold, its joints limber, and fancied that a glass she
held to its mouth and nose was a little damped with the breath; upon
which, she took the child in her lap, sat down before the fire, rubbed
it, and kept it in gentle agitation. In a quarter of an hour she felt the
heart begin to beat faintly; she then put a little of the mother’s milk
into its mouth, continued to rub its palms and soles; found the child
begin to move, and the milk was swallowed; and in another quarter
of an hour, she had the satisfaction of restoring to its disconsolate
mother the babe quite recovered, eager to lay hold of the breast, and
able to suck again. The child throve, had no more fits, is grown up,
and at present alive, i. e. 1803.
These means, which are certainly in the power of every person,
were sufficient to restore to life an infant to all appearance dead, and
who in all probability, but for the use of these simple endeavours
would have remained so. There are however, many other things
which might be done in case the above should not succeed; as
rubbing the body with strong spirits, covering it with warm ashes or
salt, blowing air into the lungs, throwing up warm stimulating
clysters, or the smoke of tobacco into the intestines, and such like.
 When children are dead born, or expire soon after the birth, the
same means ought to be used for their recovery, as if they had
expired in circumstances similar to those mentioned above.
These directions may likewise be extended to adults, attention
being always paid to the age and other circumstances.

The foregoing cases and observations afford sufficient proof of the

success which may attend the endeavours of persons totally
ignorant of medicine, in assisting those who are suddenly deprived
of life by any accident or disease. Many facts of a similar nature
might be adduced, were it necessary, but these, it is hoped, will be
sufficient to call up the attention of the public, and to excite the
humane and benevolent to exert their utmost endeavour for the
preservation of their fellow creatures.
In short, not only the ordinary signs are very uncertain, but we may
say the same of the stiffness of the limbs, which may be convulsive;
of the dilation of the pupil of the eye, which may proceed from the
same cause; of putrefaction, which may equally attack some parts of
a living body, and of several others. Haller, convinced of the
uncertainty of all these signs, proposes a new one, which he
considers as infallible.—“If the person (says he) be still in life, the
mouth will immediately shut of itself, because the contraction of the
muscles of the jaw will awaken their irritability.” The jaw however,
may be deprived of its irritability though a man may not be dead. Life
is preserved a long time in the passage of the intestines. The sign
pointed out by Dr. Fothergill appears to deserve more attention.—“If
the air blown into the mouth, (says this physician) passes freely
through all the alimentary channels, it affords a strong presumption,
that the irritability of the internal sphincters is destroyed, and
consequently that life is at an end.”—These signs, which deserve to
be confirmed by new experiments, are doubtless not known to
Undertakers.
 The difficulty of distinguishing a person apparently dead from one
who is really so, has, in all countries where bodies have been
interred too precipitately, rendered it necessary for the law to assist
humanity. Of several regulations made on this subject, we shall
quote only a few of the most recent; such as those of Arras, in 1772;
of Mantua, in 1774; of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, in 1775; of the
Senuhausée of Sivrai, in Poitore, in 1777; and of the Parliament of
Metz in the same year. To give an idea of the rest, it will be sufficient
to relate only that of Tuscany. By this edict, the Grand Duke forbids
the precipitate interment of persons who dies suddenly. He orders
the magistrates of health to be informed, that physicians and
surgeons may examine the body; that they may use every
endeavour to recal it to life, if possible, or to discover the cause of its
death; and that they shall make a report of their procedure to a
certain tribunal. On this occasion, the magistrate of health orders the
dead not to be covered until the moment they are about to be buried,
except so far as decency requires; observing always, that the body
be not closely confined, and that nothing may compress the jugular
veins and the carotid arteries. He forbids people to be interred
according to the ancient method; and requires that the arms, and the
hands, should be left extended, and that they should not be folded or
placed cross-wise upon the breast. He forbids, above all, to press
the jaws one against the other; or to fill the mouth and nostrils with
cotton, or other stuffing. And lastly, he recommends not to cover the
visage with any kind of cloth, until the body is deposited in its coffin.
We shall conclude this article by subjoining, from Dr. Hawes’s
Address to the Public on this subject, a few of the cases in which this
fallacious appearance of death is most likely to happen, together
with the respective modes of treatment which he recommends.
In apoplectic and fainting fits, and in those arising from any violent
agitation of mind, and also when opium or spirituous liquors have
been taken in too great a quantity, there is reason to believe that the
appearance of death has been frequently mistaken for the reality. In
these cases, the means recommended by the Humane Society for
the recovery of drowned persons, should be persevered in for
several hours; and bleeding, which in similar circumstances has
sometimes proved pernicious, should be used with great caution. In
the two latter instances, it will be highly expedient, with a view of
counteracting the soporific effects of opium and spirits, to convey
into the stomach, by a proper tube, a solution of tartar emetic, and by
various other means, to excite vomiting.
From the number of children carried off by convulsions, and the
certainty arising from undoubted facts, that some who have in
appearance died from that cause have been recovered; there is the
greatest reason for concluding, that many, in consequence of this
disease, have been prematurely numbered among the dead; and
that the fond parent, by neglecting the means of recalling life, has
often been the guiltless executioner of her own offspring. To prevent
the commission of such dreadful mistakes, no child, whose life has
been apparently extinguished by convulsions, should be consigned
to the grave, till the means of recovery above recommended in
apoplexies, &c. have been tried; and, if possible, under the direction
of some skilful practitioner of medicine, who may vary them as
circumstances shall require.
When fevers arise in weak habits, or when the cure of them has
been principally attempted by means of depletion, the consequent
debility is often very great, and the patient sometimes, sinks into a
state which bears so close an affinity to that of death, that there is
reason to suspect it has too often deceived the by-standers, and
induced them to send for the undertaker, when they should have had
recourse to medicine. In such cases, volatiles, eau de luce for
example, should be applied to the nose, rubbed on the temples, and
sprinkled often about the bed; hot flannels, moistened with a strong
solution of camphorated spirit may likewise be applied over the
breast, and renewed every quarter of an hour; and as soon as the
patient is able to swallow, a tea spoonful of the strongest cordial
should be given every five minutes.
The same methods may also be used with propriety, in the small
pox, when the pustules sink, and death apparently ensues; and
likewise in any other acute disease, when the vital functions are
suspended from a similar cause.
 ACCOUNT
Of the various
MODES OF BURYING THE DEAD,
ADOPTED BY DIFFERENT NATIONS.

The primitive Christians buried their dead after the manner of the
Jews. They first washed, then embalmed them, spending, (says
Tertullian,) more perfumes, and aromatic gums, upon such
occasions, than the heathens did in their sacrifices. They wrapt the
corpse in fine linen, or silk, and sometimes put them on rich habits.
They then laid them forth for the space of three days, during which
they constantly attended the dead body, and passed the time in
watching and praying by it. Then they carried it to the grave, with
torches and flambeaus, singing psalms and hymns to the praise of
God, and in testimony of their hopes of the resurrection. They
recommended the dead likewise in their prayers, received the
communion, and made their Agapæ, or love feasts, with the
distribution of other charities for the poor.
At the end of the year, they made a fresh commemoration for
them, and so from year to year; beside the standing commemoration
for the dead, always joined with the eucharist, they frequently put
into the grave several things, as marks of honour to the deceased, or
to preserve his memory; such as the badges of his dignity, the
instruments and acts of his martyrdom, an epitaph, or at least his
name: and sometimes they threw in medals, laurel leaves, some
crosses, and the gospel. And whereas the heathens, built stately
tombs for their dead, either by the sides of great roads, or in the
open fields; the Christians, on the contrary, disposed of their
deceased, either after the common way of interment, or laying them
in vaults under ground; such were the catacombs near Rome.—They
had anciently, a religious ambition to be buried near the bodies of
martyrs, and this is that which, at last, brought so many graves and
tombs into the churches; which were frequently erected over the
graves of martyrs: this was the occasion of burying in churches; for a
long time it was the custom to bury the dead no where but without
the walls of cities.
As to the old Greeks, after they had closed the eyes of the
deceased, they used to make a great noise with a sort of bell, done
as it is supposed either to scare away the furies and hobgoblins, or
else to wake the person, in case he was only in a lethargy or
apoplectic fit. Afterwards they put a piece of money into his mouth, to
pay his passage over the Styx, giving him likewise a piece of meat to
put Cerberus in good humour: they then put a bandage, or little scarf
over his eyes, and his face was covered to his chin with cloth. This
office was to be performed by the nearest relations, who were
likewise obliged to wash the body with warm water and anoint it. This
was properly the business of women. The corpse was likewise wrapt
in fresh linen, or new cloth, made into a sort of straight gown. The
body was afterwards crowned with chaplets, to intimate the
deceased had conquered the misfortunes of this life. They likewise
put some sweetmeats into his mouth, which was part of the
entertainment of the Olympionces. The funeral being thus far
prepared, they placed the corpse at the gate of the house, which
was a sort of laying in state.
The day after, before sun-rise, the Greeks used to carry the corpse
to the funeral pile. The expence upon this occasion, though
moderate at first, grew afterwards to a great excess; therefore Solon
made a sumptuary law, to oblige the Athenians to frugality. The
relations used to attend the corpse to the funeral pile; women under
three score years of age, unless pretty near related, were not
permitted to come into the house where the corpse lay; however all
of that sex were allowed to accompany the body to the place of
sepulchre: at the latter end of the solemnity the company had a treat
at the expence of the relations, at which time, if the deceased had
done any thing remarkable, it was set forth in a speech; which
privilege was afterwards granted to none but those who died in the
field, for their country, or such as were buried at the charge of the
state, which in such cases was done in the Ceramicus.
It was a custom among the Greeks, to bury persons of the best
quality in raised grounds, till, at last, there were two public burying
places appointed by the state, called Ceramici, one within, and the
other without the wall. In the first of which, those who died in the
field, were buried. If any person happened to die on their travels, or
in another country, their way was to anoint the corpse with honey, to
preserve it from putrefaction, till they could bring it home. And
sometimes they wrapt them alive, in cerecloth for the same purpose.
The Egyptians of which we shall speak more fully hereafter, used
to embalm their dead with a composition made of wine and
odoriferous drugs, such as myrrh, cinnamon, cedar, &c. This
embalming was a whole month in finishing, it being necessary to
repeat the aromatic gums under the corpse a great many times.
Herodotus observes, that the Egyptians used to dress the corpse in
the same habit that the person wore, and put it into a transparent
glass coffin.
The Romans paid the last offices to the dead, in the following
manner: after they had closed the eyes of the dead, they called out
to him several times, to see if he was not fallen into a swoon, or
lethargical distemper.—After this, they washed the corpse with warm
water, and rubbed it with perfumes. This being done, they put a sort
of white gown upon him, and brought him to the door with his feet to
the street, then they stuck branches of cypress before the house.
This ceremony continued seven days, and upon the eighth they
carried the corpse to the place where it was to be burnt: amongst
people of fortune, the bier, or coffin, was generally carried by
relations: and at the funerals of Emperors and Consuls; the
Senators, and Magistrates of the Republic did this office; but the
common people were carried by Vespillones, or common bearers.
When persons of high blood, or who were eminent for posts in
government, or remarkable actions, were brought to the pile, the
distinctions of their quality were carried before the coffin, as the
consular fasces, the sword and mace, their ancestors in wax work,
the plunder they had gained upon the enemy, the civic, mural, &c.
crowns which they had deserved, and every thing else that might
add to their figure. Servius observes, that in the beginning of the
Republic, they buried their dead in their houses: but by a law of the
twelve tables, it was forbidden either to bury, or burn any corpse
within the city of Rome; but afterwards, the vestal virgins, and
Emperors had a privilege of exception; as for other people they were
either interred in the highways, or in their ground, out of the town. At
the burning of the corpse, they laid it fast upon a pile of wood, of
pines, yew, and other resembling trees, which lay one upon another
in the figure of an altar. The corpse being dressed, and sprinkled
with rich liquors, lay in a coffin, made on purpose, with his face
upwards, and a piece of silver in his mouth to pay Charon for his
fare. The pile was surrounded with cypress, an embalm of grief and
death; after this some of the nearest relations, turning their back to
the pile, set fire to it with a torch, which they held behind them; and
the fire being lighted, they threw in the clothes, arms, and other rich
goods, which the deceased person had the greatest fancy for. When
the corpse was burnt, they wetted the bones and the ashes with milk
and wine, and then put them into an urn, which they buried in a
sepulchre for that purpose. Before this urn, they set a little altar,
where they burnt perfumes.
Their mourning lasted ten months, which was Romulus’s year; but
it was possible to shorten this term by some public success of the
state, or any extraordinary good fortune, which happened to a
private family.

Account of the opening of the Tomb of King

Edward I. in Westminster Abbey, 467 years after
its Interment.
The following interesting account of the effect produced by the
mode of preservation, which, for many centuries, has been made
use of upon the bodies of royal personages, will it is presumed, be
found not unacceptable to our readers. It is extracted from Sir
Joseph Ayloffe’s account of the opening of the Tomb of Edward the
First, in Westminster Abbey 467 years after its interment. After
describing the manner of opening the tomb and coffin, which was
done with the utmost care, in the presence of the Reverend Doctor
Thomas, then Dean of Westminster, two of the prebends, and the
President of the Antiquarian Society, the writer says,
“On lifting up the lid, the royal corpse was found wrapped up within
a large square mantle of strong, course, and thick linen cloth,
diapered, of a dull, pale, yellowish brown colour, and waxed on its
under side.”
The head and face were entirely covered with a sudarium, or face
cloth, of crimson sarsenet, the substance whereof was so much
perished, as to have a cobweb-like face, and the appearance of fine
lint. The sudarium was formed into three folds. When the folds of the
external wrapper were thrown back, and the sudarium removed, the
corpse was discovered, richly habited, adorned with ensigns of
royalty, and almost entire, notwithstanding the length of time that it
had been entombed. Its innermost covering seemed to have been a
very fine linen cerecloth, dressed close to every part of the body, and
superinduced with such accuracy and exactness, that the fingers
and thumbs of both the hands had each of them a separate and
distinct envelope of that material. The face, which had a similar
covering, closely fitted thereto, retained its exact form, although part
of the flesh appeared to be somewhat wasted. It was of a dark
brown, or chocolate colour, approaching to black, as were the hands
and fingers. The chin and lips were entire, but without any beard;
and a sinking or dip, between the chin and underlip, was very
conspicuous. Both the lips were prominent, the nose short, as if
shrunk; but the apertures of the nostrils were visible. There was an
unusual fall, or cavity, on that part of the bridge of the nose which
separates the orbits of the eyes; and some globular substance,
possibly the fleshy part of the eye-balls, was moveable in their
sockets, under the envelope. Below the chin, and under jaw, was
lodged a quantity of black dust, which had neither smell nor
coherence; but, whether the same had been flesh or spices, could
not be ascertained. One of the joints of the middle finger of the right
hand was loose, but those of the left hand were quite perfect. The
corpse, from the waist downward, was covered with a large piece of
rich figured cloth of gold, which was loose over the lower part of the
tunic, thighs, legs and feet, and tucked down behind the soles of the
latter. There did not remain any appearance of gloves; but, on the
back of each hand, and just below the knuckle of the middle finger,
lay a quatre-soil, of the same metal as those in the stole (i.e. of
fillagree work, in metal gilt, elegantly chased in figure.) The feet, with
their toes, soles, and heels, seemed to be perfectly entire; but,
whether they have sandals on them, or not, is uncertain, as the cloth
tucked over them was not removed. On measuring the body by a
rod, quadrated into inches, divided into quarters, it appeared to be
exactly six feet and two inches in length.

The following remarkable fact is translated from

the Imperial Gazette of Petersburg, dated
December 17th, 1798.
“In 1796, a coffin was found at the Convent of Sumovin, in the city
of Trotma, in the eparchy of Volgoda, containing a corpse, in the
habit of a Monk. It had been interred in 1568, yet was in a state of
perfect preservation, as were also the garments. From the letters
embroidered on them, it was found to be the body of the most
memorable Feodose Sumovin, founder and superior of the Convent,
and who had been acknowledged as a saint during his life, for the
miracles he had performed.”
The Emperor Paul, on hearing this report caused the following
proclamation to be issued.
“We Paul, &c. having been certified by a special report of the most
holy synod, of the discovery that has been made in the Convent of