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Advances in Japanese Business and Economics 16
Shinji Yamashige
Economic
Analysis of
Families and
Society
The Transformation of Japanese Society
and Public Policies
Advances in Japanese Business and Economics
Volume 16
Editor in Chief
RYUZO SATO
C.V. Starr Professor Emeritus of Economics, Stern School of Business,
New York University
Senior Editor
KAZUO MINO
Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University
Managing Editor
HAJIME HORI
Professor Emeritus, Tohoku University
HIROSHI YOSHIKAWA
Professor, Rissho University; Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo
KUNIO ITO
Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University
Editorial Board Members
TAKAHIRO FUJIMOTO
Professor, The University of Tokyo
YUZO HONDA
Professor Emeritus, Osaka University; Professor, Kansai University
TOSHIHIRO IHORI
Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo; Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
(GRIPS)
TAKENORI INOKI
Professor Emeritus, Osaka University; Special University Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
JOTA ISHIKAWA
Professor, Hitotsubashi University
KATSUHITO IWAI
Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo; Visiting Professor, International Christian University
MASAHIRO MATSUSHITA
Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University
TAKASHI NEGISHI
Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo; Fellow, The Japan Academy
KIYOHIKO NISHIMURA
Professor, The University of Tokyo
TETSUJI OKAZAKI
Professor, The University of Tokyo
YOSHIYASU ONO
Professor, Osaka University
JUNJIRO SHINTAKU
Professor, The University of Tokyo
KOTARO SUZUMURA
Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University; Fellow, The Japan Academy
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Economic Analysis
of Families and Society
The Transformation of Japanese Society
and Public Policies
123
Shinji Yamashige
School of International and Public Policy
Hitotsubashi University
Kunitachi, Tokyo
Japan
The Work was first published in 2013 by University of Tokyo Press with the following title: Kazoku to
Shakai no Keizai Bunseki
In 2011, the tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake swallowed rural
towns in the north-east coast of Japan and took the lives of about 15,000 people. It
also caused the meltdown of the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plants. Japan has been recovering from the damages caused by the earth-
quake and tsunami, but has to live with the aftermath of the nuclear meltdown for a
long time. It will take at least 30 years and U20 trillion to deal with the nuclear
disaster.
Furthermore, two big earthquakes are expected to hit two urban areas of Japan in
the near future. An inland earthquake in the metropolitan Tokyo area and one in the
Nankai Trough in the Pacific Ocean are estimated to occur with 70% probability
within the next 30 years, respectively (Fig. 1). As the two earthquakes are going to
hit big cities, the damages caused by them and the resulting tsunami are estimated
to be far more than those of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The earthquake in the
Tokyo area can have a death total of 23,000 and cost around U95 trillion in
damages, whereas the earthquake in the Nankai Trough, which has a very high risk
of causing tsunami, is estimated to kill as many as 320,000 (Cabinet Office (2016)
Disaster Management in Japan (http://www.bousai.go.jp/1info/pdf/saigaipanf_e.
pdf)).
Given such a high probability of the earthquakes and tsunamis, the Japanese
government should have a good recovery plan to cope with these disasters.
However, the Japanese government has already accumulated a huge public debt.
The debt-to-GDP ratio now exceeds 200%, the highest among the OECD countries.
When an earthquake hits Japan, how can the Japanese government, with further
losses in tax revenues, finance the recovery? Japan seems to have been enjoying the
prosperity but its prosperity is built on very fragile grounds.
Although the land of Japan will not be sinking, the Japanese society is sinking
especially with regard to its population. The Great East Japan Earthquake hit the
country just after its population peaked in 2008 (c.f. Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1). The
population has been declining since then. Further, the elderly ratio, which is the
vii
viii Preface
Fig. 1 The Anticipated Big Earthquakes. Source: Cabinet Office of Japan (2016) Disaster
Management in Japan, and Wikipedia for a map at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Regions_and_Prefectures_of_Japan_2.svg
ratio of elderly people above 65 years of age to the total population, is increasing
rapidly because the number of the elderly people is projected to be increasing until
around 2040. The elderly ratio is estimated to reach around 38% in 2050 and
stagnate there throughout the rest of this century. This is the future of Japanese
demography that has been forecasted by the Japanese government.
Japan has a generous social security system and has maintained it so far by
accumulating public debt. The decline in younger generations, increase in the
number of elderly people, and large accumulation of public debt all suggest that
Japan will not be able to sustain the current social security system. In the near
future, the Japanese government will face a financial collapse and need to downsize
the social security system to a large extent. When one of the two big earthquakes
Preface ix
hits Japan, it will suffer from a further loss of resources and will face more serious
difficulties.
The lack of tax revenues and an inability to borrow money with the huge public
debt will push the country into big troubles (e.g., hyperinflation under the mone-
tization of public debt and/or many tragedies under the forced cuts of the gov-
ernment expenditure). The government may also face difficulty in finding young
people to rebuild the country because almost 40% of the Japanese would already be
over 65 years of age by then. Japan will have to accept a large number of foreign
workers. A sudden increase in foreign workers will also create disorders in the
Japanese society.
Based on various facts and scientific data, we expect that the prosperity enjoyed
by Japan in the past 50 years will decay in the near future unless some unimag-
inable events (e.g., big increase in tax burden, big cuts in social security benefits, or
sudden decrease in the elderly ratio due to, for example, pandemics) or miracles
(e.g., findings of oil/gas fields in Japan or sudden increase in the fertility rate)
happen. The collapse may occur within the next several years and will certainly
occur within the next few decades.
From a scientific point of view, an interesting research question is why Japan has
come to face these problems and has not been able to implement policies to mitigate
them. It was 1979 that Ezra Vogel published a book titled Japan as Number One,
which praised the success of the Japanese economy. However, Japan is falling now.
In this book, we try to analyze the rise and fall of Japan before it really expe-
riences the ultimate fall. There are two goals of writing such a book. First, we hope
that the book can make some contributions to minimizing the damages of the
collapse and increasing the possibility of its recovery from it. Second, even if it fails
in achieving the first goal, we hope that this book contributes to the formulation of
better policies in other countries by analyzing how and why Japan failed to
implement public policies to make its society sustainable. The Japanese experience
will be especially useful for developing countries that have not yet fully developed
their social security system.
In this book, we pay attention to the roles of families and communities in
sustaining the society as they form the basis of our society. The most fundamental
and important viewpoint of this book is that public policies can transform families
and communities. As public policies need to respond to changes in families and
communities, there exists a cyclical relationship between public policies and fam-
ilies and communities. Recognizing this relationship is really important because it
suggests that we need to formulate policies considering their side effects on families
and communities. In a sense, this is a casebook that illustrates such a claim based on
the Japanese experience. We hope the case will be beneficial for other countries that
are facing or may face similar problems.
To analyze the impacts of public policies on families and communities, we will
heavily rely on the economics of families and communities. Although they are
relatively new areas of economics, the economics of families has been growing
fairly rapidly since the seminal works of Gary Becker who received the Nobel prize
in economics in 1992. There are also many important economic analyses on
x Preface
In reading the book, readers who are not interested in theoretical analyses can
skip theoretical chapters, from Chap. 3 to 7, and read the rest of the book. In the
discussion on public policies in chapters from Chap. 8 to 11, we provide intuitive
explanations for theoretical results to justify our analysis and proposals. It should be
possible for the readers to understand the essential arguments presented in this book
without having to read the theoretical chapters.
On the other hand, if readers are interested in how economics can be used to
analyze social transformation and public policies, we encourage them to read the
theoretical chapters. We hope that they can help students and researchers to see how
economics can be useful in the analysis of various social problems and contribute to
the further development of economics.
In this book, we consider a family as a form of communities at times, and try to
understand the relationship among markets, communities (including families), and
the government, for instance, in Part I. However, we often differentiate families
from other types of communities and analyze them separately, for instance, in
Part II. Families are very special forms of communities in most societies.
Boundaries and roles of family members are usually defined clearly in legal terms,
while other types of communities do not have such clear definitions.
The title of this book “Economics of Families and Society” indicates our
emphasis on “families”. Other types of communities are included in the term
“society” which also includes the market system and the government (c.f. Fig. 11.3).
From an academic perspective, our economic analyses and discussions on “com-
munities” are something that can rarely be found in other books; and thus they can be
considered as the special characteristics of this book. Although there are some
economic analyses on communities, as we have argued above, the research in this
field is still limited. As families and communities are very important elements in the
discussion of public policies, we hope that our book contributes to enriching the
economic framework for analyzing public policies.
We wish that our analysis on the Japanese experiences will contribute to a better
understanding on public policies that have strong powers to change and determine
the future of our society.
The original version of this book was first published in Japanese in 2013. As the
original book was intended for the Japanese readers, I have modified the contents to
enable readers who are not familiar with Japanese society and fiscal system. This
version will also help those who would like to learn from the Japanese experience.
I would like to express my gratitude to the several reviewers who have provided
careful and constructive comments on my proposal for the English edition.
As the author of this book, I am now extremely proud and delighted to be able to
publish this English edition. I am grateful to all of the people who are involved in
publishing this version. Especially, Dr. Ryuzo Sato, the chief editor in charge of the
Advances in Japanese Business and Economics Series, encouraged me to write this
book. Ms. Juno Kawakami, the editor at Springer Japan, assisted me at various
stages and Mr. Mitsuharu Soshi, editor at University of Tokyo Press, supported me
in publishing both the original Japanese and English editions. Finally, I would like
to express my sincere gratitude to all those who have greatly contributed to my
research endeavor.
xiii
Contents
xv
xvi Contents
xix
Part I
Understanding Social Transformation
Chapter 1
Transformation of the Japanese Society
in the 20th Century
The more you know about the past, the better prepared you are
for the future.
Theodore Roosevelt
1.1 Introduction
To understand the basic nature of the Japanese society in the 20th century, it would
be most useful to study the long-run trends of the Japanese population in Fig. 1.1. In
the 20th century, the population was almost tripled, from about 44 million in 1900 to
about 127 million in 2000. However, such a rapid increase will be almost completely
offset by the decline in the 21st century. It is estimated that the population will be
less than 60 million in 2100.1
Furthermore, Fig. 1.1 indicates that the elderly ratio, which is the ratio of people
above 65 years of age to the total population, increased slowly in the 20th century and
picked up its pace in the 21st century. It is estimated to reach about 38% by 2050. This
big demographic transition has been mainly caused by the change in fertility rates
in Japan in the 20th century, reflecting the transformation of the Japanese society
during this period.
1 The population estimation referred to in this book is the one estimated in 2016 (the middle case
for fertility and mortality) by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research,
NIPSSR hereafter.
Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) served as the 26th President of the U.S. from 1901 to 1909.
After having served as the President, he formed the “Progressive Party” and advocated the
adoption of social insurance in the U.S., which had already been adopted by many European
countries, to protect workers and prevent the spread of socialism. The party won 27% of the
popular vote, the highest third-party vote in American history. Theodore Roosevelt’s vision was
realized by his cousin, Franklin Roosevelt, in 1935 when the Social Security Act was passed
by the Congress as a part of the “New Deal” policies against the Great Depression.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1.2 Trend of the real GNP. Source: Ohkawa et al. (1974), Economic Planning Agency (2000),
National Account (2015)
2 The data from 1999 represent real GNI (Gross National Income), which is equivalent to the real
GNP in the old National Account System.
3 See, for example, Flath (2000) for a good introduction to the development of Japanese economy.
1.1 Introduction 5
Fig. 1.3 Trends of the public debt. Source: Hayashi et al. (2001) and the government statistics
Japanese society, it is necessary to focus on the year 1973, known as the “first year
of the welfare state” in Japan. It was the year when the government declared Japan
as a welfare state. Furthermore, it was the year when the first oil shock hit the world
economy and ended the rapid growth of the Japanese economy (c.f. Fig. 1.24 ).
After 1975, the Japanese government had to rely on deficit financing to tackle
the problems of the oil shock, slower economic growth, and the expansion of social
security payments. As a result of its rapid economic growth, the level of Japan’s
government bonds was low at that time. Hence, the Japanese government was able to
issue a large amount of these bonds. The increase in government expenditure offset
the decline in the private demand caused by the tight monetary policy for restraining
the high inflation rate after the oil shock.
The successful policy mix of the Japanese government and the private companies’
efforts for technological improvement allowed its economy to stand out in the world.
Most of other developed countries suffered from the slow recovery of the first oil
shock in 1973 and the second oil shock in 1979. The book Japan as Number One
(Vogel 1979) nicely summarizes how the world witnessed the success of the Japanese
economy during this period. Although the Japanese economy was enjoying good
fortune in the 1980s, the domestic markets were actually sustained by deficit financing
of public expenditure. After the bubble economy, which grew in the late 1980s, burst
in 1989, the Japanese economy suddenly exposed its weakness. Despite the big
increase in the public deficit, the Japanese economy could not recover from the long
recession in the 1990s and the 2000s.
Figure 1.3 indicates that in the last quarter of the 20th century, there was a huge
accumulation of public debts under government policies. Even today, as of 2016, the
public debt is issued to finance more than a third of the national government’s budget,
and the general government’s long-term debt has exceeded 200% of the GDP.5
4 In Fig. 1.2, the slope of the curve labelled as “log GNP” represents the economic growth rate. It is
kinked around 1973, which implies that the economic growth rate has fallen since then.
5 Thedata in Fig. 1.3 only accounts for the national and local public debts.
6 1 Transformation of the Japanese Society in the 20th Century
The high level of public debt will become a big burden for the Japanese gov-
ernment. The social security payment for the elderly is expected to grow further.
Furthermore, the metropolitan Tokyo area and the Pacific Ocean area are expected
to be hit by two big earthquakes, each of which has a 70% probability of occurring
within the next 30 years. Moreover, the decline in the population of young people,
who are the main contributors to the government budget, is estimated to continue
(c.f. Fig. 1.1b). If it does not stop, a population crisis as well as a fiscal crisis is
inevitable.
Needless to say, these problems did not occur in one day. The Japanese government
could have avoided them if it had implemented policies to balance the budget and
slow down population ageing. To identify public policies for overcoming such crises,
we need to ask what forces initiated them and why the Japanese government failed
to mitigate them.
In the rest of this chapter, we look into the socio-economic changes that occurred
mainly in the 20th century to consider the transformation of the Japanese society
and its public policies. In Sect. 1.2, we first discuss the social changes in families
and local communities from the viewpoint of population, households, and mutual
aids. Then, in Sect. 1.3, we provide an overview of the economic changes in Japan,
which have a close relationship with its social changes, that is, regional disparity and
income inequality. Section 1.4 concludes the chapter.
To understand the transformation of the Japanese society, the most important changes
to be considered are the ones that occurred in families and local communities. They
are closely related with the economic changes that we discuss in the next section.
As Fig. 1.1a indicates, the population in Japan was very small in the old days. Hence,
Japan’s going back to a small country again may not be seen as a big problem.
However, the process of shrinking and ageing of the population leads to many social,
economic, and fiscal problems. To overcome such problems, it is important to identify
the reasons behind the demographic change.
The fundamental reason for the demographic change is the decline in fertility rate
in Japan. Figure 1.4 depicts the trend of the total fertility rate, the average number
of children that a woman will have in her lifetime.
In Fig. 1.4, the actual total fertility rate (hereafter TFR) is depicted by the real
curve. It indicates a steady decline after 1973, “the first year of the welfare state” in
Japan. Each broken curve represents a government’s estimate for the future fertility
rates in Japan published every five years. These broken curves indicate that until
1.2 Transformation of Families and Communities 7
Fig. 1.4 Trend in total fertility rate. Source: Data published by NIPSSR
2001, the government had optimistic forecasts about the future fertility rates. Such
systematic forecast errors suggest that the models to estimate future demography
have serious defects.6
It is well recognized that one of the reasons for the steady decline in Japan’s TFR
after 1973 is the decline in the marriage rate.7 As Fig. 1.5 indicates, the marriage
rate started to decline rapidly after 1973, which remains low until today.
Figure 1.5 indicates that the divorce rate has been gradually increasing since the
1960s. It is estimated that one third of the married couples will eventually get divorced
(Raymo et al. 2004). The figures suggest that the desire for family formation has
been declining, especially, after 1973, when the government declared the expansion
of social security due to the rapid economic growth in the 1960s.
In this book, we define “community” as a network of the people who are not motivated
to seek profits. In such a community, we observe activities in which various resources
are exchanged with reciprocity. We call such an activity mutual aid. One of the
prominent features of the Japanese society is considered to be the strength of mutual
6 These forecasts have been used to determine the contribution rates for the “pay-as-you-go” type
public pension in Japan. The optimistic forecasts played an important role in delaying the increase in
the pension contribution rate. In 2004, the Japanese government recognized that the public pension
fund was heavily indebted, and thus made a big pension reform.
7 Another reason is the increase in late marriages. The average age of the first marriage of Japanese
Fig. 1.5 Trends in marriage and divorce rates. Source: Data published by NIPSSR
Fig. 1.6 Decline in the share of the elderly people living with children. Source: National census
aid among family members, people in the local communities, and even workers in
private companies.8
Let us first consider mutual aid among members of a family, which is the most
important community in human society. From the viewpoint of mutual aid, children’s
support for the elderly is very important. It is known that the share of people above
65 years of age living with their children was over 80% in the old days, which is much
higher than that of other developed countries (c.f. Fig. 2.2). Figure 1.6 indicates that
8 Miyajima (1992) is an important work in which social security policies are discussed based on the
Fig. 1.7 Relationship between three-generation households and dual-earner households. Source:
Yamashige (2002)
the ratio has been rapidly declining since the 1960s and the ratio of the households
with single elderly members or elderly couples has been increasing.9
The high ratio of elderly people living with their children suggests that ties of
families had been strong under the social norm of children taking care of their parents.
From the viewpoint of public policies, it is important to recognize that the norm
allowed the government to save the amount for expenditure on healthcare and long-
term care of elderly people. Furthermore, it is also important to realize that young
couples living with their parents usually means that they can get nursery services for
their children from their parents (i.e., grandparents of the children). Therefore, the
young couples can raise their children and work outside their homes without using
daycare centers. Such a custom has allowed the government to save the amount for
expenditure on childcare.
Yamashige (1998), using the data of 47 prefectures in Japan for the period 1992-
1993, demonstrated that the per-capita national health expenditure had a positive
correlation with the elderly ratio but a negative correlation with the ratio of elderly
people living with their children. The result suggested that a fair amount of the
healthcare expenditure was saved because of children living with their elderly parents.
Using the data of 47 prefectures in 1995, Yamashige (2002) also showed that the
ratio of the three-generation household (elderly living with their children’s family)
[Three Generation Households] has a positive correlation with the ratio of households
of working couples [Dual Earner Households], as in the following equation and Fig.
1.7.10
9 See,for example, Traphagan and Knight (2003) for more analyses and discussion of Japanese
families under demographic changes.
10 The value in each parenthesis is t-value and R̄ 2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination.
10 1 Transformation of the Japanese Society in the 20th Century
The result suggests that elderly parents allow their children and their spouses to
work, by providing nursery care for the grandchildren. Such private provisions of
nursery services should allow the government to save on such expenditure.
The mutual aid within families has been changing recently. The ratio of elderly
people living with the children has been declining since the 1960s. The weakening
ties within families can be the cause of poverty and loneliness of the elderly, declining
fertility rates, and the expansion of social security payment.
Now, we move on to the analysis of the mutual aid within local communities known
as chounaikai (neighborhood association) and jichikai (self-governing association).
These local communities are neither tied by blood nor religion, but by the area where
people live. Although they may originally have been organized voluntarily by the
people, they were artificially organized by the government during wartime to control
resource allocations in local areas.
Even after the Second World War, they remained as voluntary associations. A
study by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1980 found that there are 274,738 neigh-
borhood associations in Japan. The neighborhood association systems covered 100%
of the area in 87% of cities and towns, and they covered more than 90% of the area
in 96.1% of cities and towns (c.f. Isomura and Hoshino 1990).
They played some important roles in the local communities by organizing activi-
ties to maintain the natural and social environment, improve the welfare of children
and elderly people, and encourage collaboration among community members (c.f.
Table 1.1).
According to the study, 86.2% of neighborhood associations collected contribu-
tions from inhabitants, and 35.5% received some kind of subsidy (consisting of 6.8%
of the revenue for an average neighborhood association). Furthermore, 70.3% were
asked to carry out certain tasks by local governments (in return for subsidies), that
is, to act as agencies.11
The functions of such neighborhood associations can be fruitfully discussed using
the framework of social capital, which has recently received a fair amount of attention
in economics. Social capital is the network of people that can be viewed as the
infrastructure to support our lives in society, just like physical public capital in our
economy. Enriching such social capital is expected to increase social welfare. We
discuss social capital in more detail in Chap. 7.
A study by Cabinet Office of Japan (2003), one of the seminal researches on social
capital in Japan, estimated the social capital index in each prefecture and found that
it has a negative relationship with crime rates (c.f. Fig. 1.8). In areas where the local
communities have strong ties, the social capital, in general, is rich; and the mutual-aid
type activities (e.g., crime prevention) have positive effects on reducing crime rates.
11 Japanese local governments have regarded neighborhood associations as useful entities for imple-
menting their policies. Even to this day in Tokyo, large subsidies are given to neighborhood asso-
ciations.
1.2 Transformation of Families and Communities 11
Fig. 1.8 Social capital indicies, crime rates and TFR. Source: Data in Cabinet Office (2003)
However, the ties of local communities have been rapidly weakening in Japan.
Many people, especially young people, now prefer participating in activities in vol-
untary associations (e.g., NPOs and NGOs) whose values and interests can be shared
among the participants, which is in contrast with the neighborhood associations,
where participation is partially compulsory. However, it is important to recognize
that as long as participation in the activities of these associations is voluntary, the level
12 1 Transformation of the Japanese Society in the 20th Century
of mutual aid will be lower than that realized in partially compulsory neighborhood
associations, as we will see in Chap. 6.12
Concerning mutual aid in Japan, many scholars (e.g., Miyajima 1992) have
claimed that Japanese companies played the role of communities. To maintain the
flexible Japanese production system with high total quality management, workers
needed close cooperation based on mutual trust. By providing long-term employment
and a seniority payment system, the Japanese companies created circumstances sim-
ilar to the communities to support the workers’ cooperative activities. Such employ-
ment systems were rational when the Japanese economy was growing with the growth
in population.
When the domestic markets stagnated and the competition got harsh due to global-
ization, innovation and effective use of capitals and inexpensive labor in foreign coun-
tries became more important than the cooperation among Japanese workers. Under
such changes in business environment and strategies, many Japanese companies
reduced the weight of long-term employment and seniority payment. The Japanese
companies became more contract-based than relation-based (as in the communities).
Now, Japanese companies provide neither employment security nor income security
to workers. Thus, the government is required to provide such securities to the people.
In the last section, we saw that against the backdrop of changes in families and
local communities, there were economic changes. In this section, we identify those
economic changes that are closely related to social transformation in Japan.
The economic growth in the late 20th century leads to regional disparity. One of
the main reasons for such a change is the outflow of young workers from rural to
urban areas.13 Such labor mobility can be easily increased in the process of economic
growth. In the case of Japan, it was intentionally encouraged.
That is, after the Second World War, intensive public investments were made in
the three largest urban areas (i.e., Tokyo, Osaka, and Aichi). Many private companies,
12 Inareas where neighborhood associations are not working well, such as urban areas, the estab-
lishment and activities of the voluntary associations will have positive effects on the communities,
because they are playing a role in sustaining the activities that neighborhood associations tradition-
ally conducted.
13 The inflow of the young people increased the attractiveness of the urban areas and acceler-
ated the inflow of the young people to urban areas, which created further regional disparities (c.f.
Sect. 10.2.1).
1.3 Economic Transformation in Japan 13
Fig. 1.9 Trends of public investment per person. Sources: Local Policy Office in MOHA (1972,
1998), Statistics Bureau (1997)
ministries of the central government, universities, and research centers were rebuilt
in those urban areas; and people, especially young people flowed into these urban
areas from rural areas.
This is an understandable growth policy to rebuild the country destructed by
war. By assembling resources and people from all over Japan in the urban areas, the
Japanese government tried to create a rapid recovery and economic growth. Figure 1.9
compares trends of the ratio of public investment per person for selected prefectures
to the general average of Japan. It indicates that, until early 1970s, higher public
investment had been made in the three largest urban areas.
Figure 1.10 indicates big net inflows of population to the three largest urban
areas until the early 1970s. To generate rapid recovery and growth under the limited
resources in Japan, such a strategic growth policy must have worked well.
However, there were negative side effects of such growth policy. The most serious
ones include overpopulation in urban areas and depopulation in rural areas. A series
of Comprehensive National Development Plan by the government recognized these
problems and proposed to accelerate regional development after the 1970s. Such a
change in development policy can be seen in the increase in public investment in
Aomori, the representative rural prefecture, in Fig. 1.9.
Responding to such a change, the net inflows of the population to urban areas
reduced in the 1970s (c.f. Fig. 1.10). In the 1980s, changes occurred in public invest-
ment and migration. Public investment in the Tokyo region started to increase again
in the 1980s and the population migration to this area started again. Such changes did
not occur in the Osaka and Nagoya regions. This inflow of population to the Tokyo
region stopped after the economic bubble burst in 1989, but restarted since 1996.
The process of unipolar concentration in Tokyo is still underway.
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Language: Finnish
Kirj.
ELINA VAARA
SISÄLLYS:
Kallio ja meri.
I.
Maaliskuu.
Esikevät.
Sinulle.
Sininen taika.
Kevätesikot.
Alli.
Mennyt.
Itkevä lintu.
III.
Myrsky.
Danse macabre.
Berberis.
Lokakuu.
Laulu syksyisestä ikävästä.
Rococo.
Hiilipiirros.
Vieras.
Suohauta.
IV.
Keväthymni.
Onni.
Me kaksi valkoista lintua.
Helluntaikellot.
Valkea päivä.
Vihreä humala kukkii.
Pilvinen päivä.
Orjanruusu.
Schumannin »Träumerei».
Dolce far niente.
V.
Oceania.
Fantasia.
Myrkkyliljat.
Mustanpunainen melankolia.
Odaliski.
Loti Aziyadelle.
Keväiset arot.
Laulu kitaran säestyksellä.
Rakkaus.
Yö.
Kohtalo.
Virta.
Kuu.
KALLIO JA MERI.
I.
MA VALKOPORTISTA KÄYN
KIRKKOMAALLE…
Yön kaiken kuohut ne soi. Kuin veri kuumotti koi. Kun katsoi
prinsessa ikkunastaan, veet viskas uhrinsa rantaa vastaan.
Hän tornikammiossaan vain itki kohtaloaan. Niin silmät
himmeni ihanaiset — hän häit' ei saanut, vaan hautajaiset.
LAULU KAUNIISTA HUOVISTA JA
HERTTUAN TYTTÄRESTÄ.
Suli kyyneliksi
tytär herttuankin.
Huoviansa hän turhaan
toivoi takaisin
rannalla Adrian meren.