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241
123
Lecture Notes of the Institute
for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics
and Telecommunications Engineering 241
Editorial Board
Ozgur Akan
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
Paolo Bellavista
University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Jiannong Cao
Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Geoffrey Coulson
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
Falko Dressler
University of Erlangen, Erlangen, Germany
Domenico Ferrari
Università Cattolica Piacenza, Piacenza, Italy
Mario Gerla
UCLA, Los Angeles, USA
Hisashi Kobayashi
Princeton University, Princeton, USA
Sergio Palazzo
University of Catania, Catania, Italy
Sartaj Sahni
University of Florida, Florida, USA
Xuemin Sherman Shen
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
Mircea Stan
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA
Jia Xiaohua
City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Albert Y. Zomaya
University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8197
Octavian Fratu Nicolae Militaru
•
123
Editors
Octavian Fratu Simona Halunga
Politehnica University of Bucharest University Polytechnica of Bucharest
Bucharest Bucharest
Romania Romania
Nicolae Militaru
University Polytechnica of Bucharest
Bucharest
Romania
© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018
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Preface
After the prestigious EAI scientific events in Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia, and in
Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, the Third EAI International Conference on Future Access
Enablers of Ubiquitous and Intelligent Infrastructures (Fabulous 2017) was held in
Bucharest, Romania, hosted by the Politehnica University of Bucharest. The confer-
ence succeeded in providing an excellent international platform for prominent
researchers from academia and industry, innovators and entrepreneurs, to share their
knowledge and their latest results in the broad areas of future wireless networks,
ambient and assisted living, and smart infrastructures.
The main topics of Fabulous 2017 included future access networks, the Internet of
Things and smart city/smart environment applications, communications and computing
infrastructures, security aspects in communications and data processing, and signal
processing and multimedia. Three special sessions – “Computational Modeling and
Invited Papers,” “Multimedia Security and Forensics,” and “Optoelectronic Devices
and Applications Thereof in the Communications Domain” – completed the technical
program. With two invited papers, six keynote speeches, and 39 regular papers, Fab-
ulous 2017 hosted high-quality technical presentations from young researchers and,
also, from well-known specialists from academia and industry who have shaped the
field of wireless communications.
The two invited papers were presented by two young female researchers, Elena
Diana Șandru and Ana Neacșu, PhD and MSc students, respectively, from the Poli-
tehnica University of Bucharest.
The six keynote speeches were presented by Prof. Ramjee Prasad (Aalborg
University, Denmark), Prof. Nenad Filipovic (University of Kragujevac, Serbia), Dr.
Marius Iordache (Orange, Romania), Prof. Hana Bogucka (Poznan University of
Technology, Poland), Dr. Onoriu Brădeanu (Vodafone, Romania), and Thomas Wrede
(SES, Luxembourg).
Fabulous 2017 was co-sponsored by Orange Romania and SES Luxembourg. The
latter company also sponsored the participation of young researchers in the conference,
based on the reviewers’ evaluation. The “Innovative Cybersecurity Public Private
Partnership” round table, chaired by Prof. Iulian Martin from the National Defense
University Carol I and sponsored by Safetech Innovation SRL and Beia Consult
International SRL, were received by participants with great interest. The Best Paper
Award of the conference was granted to the paper “Prediction of Coronary Plaque
Progression Using a Data-Driven the Approach” having as first author Bojana And-
jelkovic Cirkovic, a young researcher from University of Kragujevac, Serbia.
We would like to show our appreciation for the effort, constant support, and
guidance of the Fabulous 2017 conference manager, Katarina Antalova (EAI) and
of the Steering Committee members, Imrich Chlamtac, Liljana Gavrilovska, and
Alberto Leon-Garcia. Our thanks also go to the Organizing Committee, and especially
to the Technical Program Committee, led by Prof. Simona Halunga, whose effort
VI Preface
Steering Committee
Imrich Chlamtac EAI/Create-Net and University of Trento, Italy
Liljana Gavrilovska Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Macedonia
Alberto Leon-Garcia University of Toronto, Canada
Organizing Committee
General Chairs
Octavian Fratu Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Liljana Gavrilovska Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia
Web Chair
Alexandru Vulpe Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Workshop Chairs
Corneliu Burileanu Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Pavlos Lazaridis University of Huddersfield, UK
Publications Chair
Nicolae Militaru Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Local Chairs
Carmen Voicu Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Ioana Manuela Marcu Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Secretariat
Madalina Berceanu Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Ana-Maria Claudia Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania
Dragulinescu
Conference Manager
Katarina Antalova European Alliance for Innovation
Abstract. The need for insertion of technology in everyday tasks has brought
an increase in new methodologies and concepts used to accomplish such
objectives. By trying to make technology an enabler for an increasing number of
personal or work-related activities, we allow devices to collect data about our
way of being, that, if not properly protected and used, can prove a vulnerability
for our personal security. This is why new means of securing information, even
by the tiniest or low-resource devices, need to be implemented and, in many
cases, they take the form of cryptographic algorithms, classic or lightweight.
Assessing these algorithms can sometimes become difficult, depending on the
targeted system or on the environment where the device will be deployed. To
address this issue and help developers, in this paper we present a hybrid testbed,
comprised of three hardware architectures, that will ensure a general environ-
ment in which users can test their security solutions, in order to have an idea of
what changes need to be made to provide optimal performances.
1 Introduction
Ever since the industrial revolution, humanity has been searching for methods of
creating better technologies that can improve the way humans not only interact with the
environment, but also how they make use of the resources provided. Recent years have
brought a new technological revolution, in terms of miniaturization of devices and their
embedment in all layers of society. Earlier proposed concepts, such as Internet of
Things [1, 2], Cloud Computing [3, 4] or Deep Learning [5, 6], have become today’s
trending technologies, being in a continuous process of development [7] and integra-
tion [8–10]. Yet, this fast pace that is characteristic to any recent offer-demand pair in
nowadays’ economy [11, 12] introduces also some vulnerabilities regarding mainly the
security aspects [13, 14]. Focusing on the Internet of Things (IoT) concept [15, 16], the
embedment of sensors or smart devices in the environment [17] surrounding us sets
new thresholds that need to be passed before any data is captured, processed and/or
transmitted to a sink device or to a Cloud service.
© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018
O. Fratu et al. (Eds.): FABULOUS 2017, LNICST 241, pp. 3–8, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92213-3_1
4 Ș.-C. Arseni et al.
In scientific literature, multiple papers, [22–26], have presented the benefits given by
the hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms as compared to the software
counterparts. By integrating in our testbed an SDSoC (Software Defined
System-On-a-Chip) that contains also a number of logical gates that can be pro-
grammed, we enable users to test their implementation in this type of environment also.
The other two hardware architectures of the testbed allow only a software imple-
mentation of an algorithm.
In order for users to interact with these hardware architectures, they need to interact
with the middleware layer of the testbed. This layer is composed of two sub- layers:
one consisting of the drivers or APIs (Application Programming Interface), required to
communicate with the hardware layer, and one consisting of the integrator APIs which
developers will use and integrate in their implementations.
The main architecture of the testbed, with an emphasis on the hardware layer, was
presented in papers [21, 27] and Fig. 1 depicts its high-level design. The current paper
continues the description through an initial validation of the middleware layer,
A Hybrid Testbed for Secure Internet-of-Things 5
emphasizing on the connection of it with the hardware layer and the means that users
can access its functions.
As described in [27], the main challenge is to create a unified access point for all three
hardware systems, while maintaining control over the operating characteristics that
represent criteria when assessing an algorithm. In order to achieve this point of inte-
gration the platforms were customized to support a self-contained operating environ-
ment, either under the form of an operating system or a scheduler-service, as will be
described in the remaining part of the section.
Each one of the hardware architectures presents its own methods of interaction that
are made available to a user or developer. Figure 2 presents an overview of forming
and receiving, by the corresponding architecture, the API and driver calls, shown in
Fig. 1. The UI (User Interface) is the component that sends calls to the middleware and
customizes the task sent to each one of the hardware elements, as follows:
• For the standard x64 processor that can run also x86 applications, a simple task
dispatcher is implemented as a service that waits for the user to send a task to be
executed. The task represents an algorithm implementation that is done by the user
and sent through the testbed UI. After the completion of the task, collected metrics
are parsed and sent to the UI to give the user a performance view of its imple-
mentation or algorithm.
• The SDSoC architecture is comprised of two hardware elements that can be used
either separately or as a whole. In our proposed testbed, these elements are used as
one, by establishing the required communication bridge between them. The FPGA
(Field Programmable Gate Array) element contains some defined cryptographic
functions, such as permutation, standard AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) S-
Boxes or substitutions, which can increase the performance of an algorithm. The
implementation in FPGA was taken into consideration given a few performance
tests made between a hardware and software implementation of the same algorithm,
6 Ș.-C. Arseni et al.
tests that were briefly presented in [27]. The second element, the processor, is the
point in which the dispatcher service resides and the task is mainly being executed.
After the successful completion of the task, results are parsed and transmitted to the
UI.
• The third hardware element takes advantage of the possibility of dynamically
writing an application into the Flash memory that can be executed afterwards.
Implemented as a bootloader, the scheduling-service waits for a task to be deployed
through the UI. After receiving a task, the service writes it into the Flash at a
separate address and launches it into execution. In this case, the service will return
in the waiting state, but will not have the functionality of parsing and sending the
results. This functionality will reside in the task itself and will be attached to the
user code at deployment.
After terminating all the deployed tasks, the UI will act also as a collector of data
from the underlying dispatcher-services, by formatting and grouping the data and
presenting it to the user as performance metrics.
A Hybrid Testbed for Secure Internet-of-Things 7
4 Conclusions
The paper introduces a part of the elements that the proposed hybrid testbed contains,
with a focus on the software layer and on method of interaction between users and it.
Given that this testbed will enable simultaneous testing on three different hardware
architectures, it can prove to be an important factor in the process of large-scale
integration of the IoT concept. An initial validation of the proposed testbed has been
made with high-level tests, through which observations were made on how the testbed
can be completely integrated and how multiple functionalities can be developed for
users.
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Applications, 01 November 2015, Seoul, South Korea (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/
2820975.2820980
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10. Ma, X., Yu, H., Wang, Y., Wang, Y.: Large-scale transportation network congestion
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doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0119044
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Considerations on Estimating the Minimal
Level of Attenuation in TEMPEST Filtering
for IT Equipments
1 Introduction
© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018
O. Fratu et al. (Eds.): FABULOUS 2017, LNICST 241, pp. 9–15, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92213-3_2
10 M. Popescu et al.
the importance of the domain. In [1–3] the authors concentrated on evaluating and
reducing the compromising radiations of LCD/TV sets, while in [4] a number of
TEMPEST security testing models and countermeasures are illustrated. In [5] the
authors presented the results obtained in reconstruction of laser printer information
based on the leakages in the media of electromagnetic radiation, power and signal lines.
A model and testing procedures for critical systems to severe electro-magnetic threats
are given in [6] while in [7] the authors show a number of results related to efficiency of
shielding for communication equipment under TEMPEST evaluation.
In this paper we estimate a minimum level of attenuation of an electrical filter
installed on the supply line of commercial computer equipment, so that at the exit of the
controllable zone the compromising signals generated by the equipment cannot be
detected and intercepted by a hostile receiver. Based on the developed testbed the
estimated value is then verified under worst case scenario.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 sets the theoretical basis for estimating
the minimum attenuation value of an electric filter for TEMPEST protection of com-
mercial computer; Sect. 3 illustrates by relevant laboratory tests the theoretical con-
siderations presented in Sects. 2 and 4 contains the main conclusions drawn from tests
in Sect. 3.
To establish the minimum level of attenuation of the filter installed on the power line to
ensure TEMPEST protection of an IT system, we assume the following: the target
computer equipment is commercial type (COTS) and meets the electromagnetic dis-
turbance requirements specified in European Standard EN 55022 [8]; the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) received on the power line in the controllable space is limited to 1 (or
0 dB) to reduce the probability of detecting compromising emissions generated by
computer equipment; the attacker has the ability to connect sensitive receivers directly
to the building’s power supply, communication cables or other metal structures near the
target device as well as to receive and process compromising signals with low levels
comparable to electrical noise; the electrical noise received by the interceptor on the
power line is specific to the residential environment; the interceptor searches for
broadband pulses in a quiet zone of the spectrum, with as little external interference as
possible; it uses “notch” filters to suppress strong emissions from narrowband radio
stations as well as strong signal processing techniques to extract the information carrier
from the unwanted background noise.
The minimum filter attenuation level installed on the power line to reduce the
probability of detecting and intercepting compromising emissions by a hostile receiver
at the limit of controllable space can be determined by [1]
UB Gp
AF : ð1Þ
Un;B Ac fr SNR
Considerations on Estimating the Minimal Level 11
pffiffiffiffi
Gp ¼ N or ½Gp ¼ 10 lgN ðdBÞ: ð3Þ
Assuming that the attacker applies signal processing techniques by mediating the
received signal on N = 10 frames, the resulting processing gain is approximately
10 dB. The noise on the power supply is expected to be at least 30 dB above the
thermal noise level [1, 9] which is 0 dBlV at B = 5 MHz. Therefore [Un,5] = 30
dBlV might be a plausible value of the electrical noise received on the power line at
B = 5 MHz. From experimental measurements the attenuation between two outlets in a
building for the frequency range 1 60 MHz can be, on average, around 10 dB if the
sockets are in the same circuit, and 40 dB if they are located in different circuits [1, 9].
From (3) there can be determined the minimum attenuation value, [AF], for a low- pass
filter in the HF/VHF frequency range installed on the power supply line of the com-
puter system, so, at the building boundary, the compromising signals accidentally
emissions transmitted on the power circuit from a COTS computer system cannot be
detected by an attacker, is given by
Thus we can conclude that a low-pass electrical filter with attenuation equal to
70 dB, evaluated for HF/VHF frequency range, provides adequate TEMPEST pro-
tections if all the COTS informatics equipment operated indoor comply with EN55022
limits.
Compromising emissions
(1)
(2)
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) The comparative spectral analysis of the secondary emissions in power line by a
computer using an image displayed on the monitor (trace 1) and no image displayed on the
monitor (trace 2), and (b) recovered image processed from secondary emissions by a computer,
from power line. (Color figure online)
Fig. 2. (a) Test setup for validation of evaluation the minimum level of filter attenuation (b) the
waveform of reference electrical signal
4 Conclusions
Based on the evaluations and tests performed we can conclude that, for commercial
computer system installed in a residential environment, an electrical filter with an
attenuation of 70 dB in the HF/VHF frequency range for conducted emissions, provide
adequate TEMPEST protection against leakage of compromising emissions if the
electrical equipment it complies to the EN 55022 limits. This value was achieved in the
worst case scenario in which the IT equipment is of a commercial type, without
TEMPEST protection measures (shielding, interconnection filtering, etc.), the distance
between the source of the compromising emission and the hostile receiver was only
10 m, the electrical noise on the power line was only generated by the computer
equipment because the entire test system was isolated by LISN from the power supply
and the tests were carried out in the shielded room.
Whereas the technical measures to prevent information leakage through compro-
mising emissions are generally expensive, this study is applicable in practice by the fact
that recommends minimum technical requirements for security of emissions that can be
implemented at low cost and with commercial resources.
Open issues that can be addressed in the future are oriented towards the study of the
minimum attenuation for the electrical filters installed on the interconnection circuits of
the information systems (data network, voice communications, etc.), as well as ana-
lyzing the compromising emissions conducted in the grounding circuit of a computer.
Acknowledgments. This work was supported by a grant of the Ministry of Innovation and
Research, UEFISCDI, project number 5 Sol/2017 within PNCDI III.
Considerations on Estimating the Minimal Level 15
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Innovative Platform for Resource
Allocation in 5G M2M Systems
1 Introduction