ANSVANS-8.1-2014 ANSVANS-8.1-2014 nuclear criticality safety in operations with fissionable materials outside reactors REAFFIRMED Tones orien Te nese ts oem oi sing the version ofthe standards arc documents referenced here. is the November 29, 2018 soba uence cern = ‘whether the use of the original references or more recent versions iS ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 (R2018) |) entcscinnssaniucenalst oad aw creed This standard does not nesesseriy reflect rcentindusty initiatives for rk informed desscrsmaking ot a graded aporcech to qualty surance. Users should consider the use of these industy intatvas inthe appiicaton o this slandare.ANSUANS-8.1-2014 American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors Secretariat American Nuclear Society Prepared by the American Nuclear Society Standards Committee Working Group ANS-8.1 Published by the American Nuclear Society 555 North Kensington Avenue La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA Approved April 15, 2014 by the American National Standards Institute, Ine.American National Standard Designation of this document as an American National Standard attests thet the principles of opennass and due process have bean followed in the approval procedure and thet a consensus of those directly and materially affected by the Standard has been achieved This standard was developed under the procedures of the Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society; these procedures are accredited by the American National Standards Institute, Ine., as meeting the criteria for American National Standards, The consensus committee that approved the standard was balanced to ensure that competent, concerned, and varied interests have had an opportunity to participate ‘An American National Standard is intended to sid industry, consumers, governmental agencies, and general interest groups. 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Kensington Avenue La Grange Park, IL 60526 or standards@ans.orgForeword (his Foreword is not a part of American National Standard “Nuclear Criticality Safety Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors,” ANSUANS-8.1-2014.) This standard provides guidance for the prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing, and transportation of fissionable material. Tt was first approved as American Standard N6.1-1964. A substantial revision that included the specification of suberitical limita applicable to process variables was approved as American National Standard N16.1-1969 and was affirmed, with minor revisions, as American National Standard N16.1-1975/ANS-8.1. [twas subsequently supplemented by American National Siandard for Validation of Calculational Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety, ANSI N16.9-1075/ANS-8.11. The two standards were consolidated in 1983. ‘Tho cuberitical limits given in the standard make no allowanco for operating contingencies (e.g., double batching) or for inaccurate knowledge of process variables (e.g., concentrations, masses, and dimensions) and are “maximum subcritical limits” for the stated conditions. That is, under the stated conditions, the limits are close enough to critical to provide little incentive for attempting to justify slightly largor values, but concomitantly, they are confidently expected actually to be subcritical. The stated conditions (infinitely long eylinders, absence of neutron-absorbing vessel wall, plutonium solutions without free nitric acid, etc.) are unlikely to be approached in practice; hence, if @ limit is reached, there will ordinarily be a larger margin of suberiticality than the minimal value used in its derivation, However, no account was taken of this unlikelihood in setting the limits, Its legitimate for the users of the standard, if they so choose, to make conservative adjustments in the limits to take advantage of the extent to which process conditions may deviate from stated onditions, ¢-g., to inerease a eylinder dismeter limit to take advantage of # finite height and of neutron absorption in steel walls. The present revision of the standard is primarily intended to clarify the use and interpretation of the process analysis requirement, the double-contingency-principle recommendation, and their relationship in anew Appendix. In addition, the definitions for “parameter” and “process conditions” were added to assist with the understanding of the double-contingeney recommendation. Theseand other minor changes were made that do not change the intent of the words in the previous revision. They represent clarification and amplification that should aid in uniform application of the standard. This standard might reference documents and other standards that have been superseded or withdrawn at the time the standard is applied. A statement has been included in the references section that pravides guidance on the use of references. ‘This standard does not incorporate the concepts of generating risk-informed insights, performance-based requirements, or a graded approach to quality assurance. The user is advised that one or more of these techniques could enhance the application of this standard, The working group would like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions by Terry L. Hofer, who diod prior to the publication of this revision. This revision of American National Standard ANSVANS-8.1.2014 was prepared by Working Group ANS-8.1 of Subcommittee 8 of the Standards Committoo of the American Nuclear Society. Working Group ANS-8.1 had the following membership at the time of the revision: D. G. Bowen (Cochair), Oak Ridge National Laboratory N. W. Brown (Cochair), Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. R. Beck, USBC Incorporated A. Garcia, U.S, Department of Energy8, Goluoglu, University of Florida C. Gross, Paschal Solutions Incorporated C, Haught, B&W Y-12 J. Hicks, U.S. Department of Energy 1. Hofer, USBC Incorporated M. LeTellier, C. 8. Engineering, Inc ‘T, Marenehin, U.S. Nuelear Regulatory Commission J. Miller, Sigma Science, Ine. L, Montierth, Zdaho National Laboratory J. Morman, Argonne National Laboratory L. Paschal, Paschal Solutions Incorporated L. Paulson, GE Hitachi, Nuclear Eneray K. Reynolds, B&W ¥-12 E, Saylor, Oak Ridge National Laboratory F, Winstanley, Sellafield Ltd. K. Woods, Pascial Solutions Incorporated ‘This standard was prepared under the guidance of ANS Subcommittee 8, which had the following membership at the time of its approval: TP. McLaughlin (Chair), Individual B.O. Kidd (Vice Chair), Babcock & Wileox ‘M. Crouse (Secretary), Washington Safety Management Solutions FM. Alcorn, Individual J. Baker, Los Alamos National Laboratory E, Elliott, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board D. Brickson, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions A. 8. Garcia, U.S. Department of Energy D.A. Reed, Individual ‘TA. Reilly, Individual H. Toffer, Individual ©. Tripp, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission F. Winstanley, Sellafield Ltd, ‘The American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee had the following membership at the time of its approval: R.D. Busch (Chair), University of New Mexico W. R. Shackelford (Vice Chair), Nuclear Fuel Services, Ine. L. Berg, U.S. Department of Energy G.H. Bidinger, Individual R-S. Eby, American Institute of Chemical Engineers (Employed by USEC, Ine.) CM. Hopper, Individual R Knief, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (Employed by Sandia National Laboratories) W. Doane, AREVA T, Marenchin, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ‘TP. McLaughlin, Individual S.P. Murray, Health Physics Society (Employed by General Electric) RE, Povey, University of Tennessee RL, Reed, URS Professional Solutions LLC R.G. Taylor, INM Nuclear Safety Services R. M. Westtall, Oak Ridge National Laboratory LL, Wetzel, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group R.E, Wilson, U.S, Department of BnerayContents Section Page 1 Introduction 2 Scope 3 Definition: 8.1 Limitations 3.2 Shall, should, and may 3.3. Glossary of term: 4 Nuclear criticality safety practices... 4.1 Administrative practices. 4.1.1 Responsibilities Process analysis... Written procedures. Materials control... Operational control Operational reviews. Emergency procedures... Hanical practices . Controlled parameters Double-ontingency principle. Geometry control. ‘Neutron absorbers. Moderation Other Suberitical Himit.c.nc 4.3. Validation of a caleulational me gaeaaas 42 ReAaBR Bibb ® SiG bs fo fo to Bats ustastoko Bebb oeoueeEEKENNEL 5 Single-parameter limits for fissile nucl 5.1 Uniform aqueous solutions 5.2 Aqueous mixtures, 5.2.1 Enrichment suberitical limits... 5.3. Metallic units 0 5A Oxides. ees 6 Multipsrameter eontrol. 6.1 Uranium metal-water mixture and ura *°U enrichment. 6.2. Aqueous uranium solutions at low ®U enrichment... 6.3 Uniform aqueous solutions of Pu(NO,), containing “Pu 6-4 Aqueous mixtures of plutonium containing "Pu. 1 m oxide-water mixture at low 7 References... Appendices ‘Appendix A Appendis B... Figures Figure 1 Suberitical mass limits for uranium-water lattices 8 Figure 2 Suberitical eylinder diameter limits for uranium-water lattices... 8Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 ‘Tables Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Subcritieal slab thickness limits for uranium-water lattices 9 Subcritical volume limits for uranium-water lattices.. Subcritieal areal density limits for uranium-water lattices 10 Single-parameter subcritical limits for uniform aqueous solutions of fissile nuclides. 4 ®"U enrichment suberitical limits for uranium mixed homogeneously with water Single-parameter subcritical limits for metal units.. Singie-parameter subcritical limits for oxides containing no more than 1.5% water by weight at full density. * Single-parameter subcritical limits for oxides containing no more than 1.5% water by weight at no more than half density, Subcritieal limits for uniform aqueous solutions of low-onriched uranium... 10 Suberitieal limits for uniform aqueous solutions of of PutNO,), containing "Pu. : nNuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors 1 Introduction Operations with some fissionable materials introduce risks of a criticality accident resulting in @ roloase of radiation that can be lethal to nearby personnel. However, experience has shown that extensive operations can be performed safely and economically when proper precautions are exereised. Tho fow criticality aceidents thet have occurred show frequency and severity rates far below those typical of nonnuclear accidents. This favorable record can be maintained only by continued adherence to good operating practices such as are embodied in this standard; however, the standard, by itself, cannot establish safe processes in an absolute sense, Good safety practices should recognize economic considerations, but the protection of operating personnel and the public is the dominant consideration, Guidance for establishing an alarm system for protection of personnel is contained in ANSVANS-8.3-1997 (2012) [11." 2 Scope This standard is applicable to operations with fissionable materials outside nuclear reactors, except for the assembly of these materials under controlled conditions, such as in critical experiments. Generalized basic criteria are presented, and limits are specified for some single fissionable units of simple shape containing *“U, **U, or Pu, but not for multiunit arrays. Suberitical limits for certain multiunit arrays are contained in ANSI ANS-8.7-1998 (R2012) [2]. Requirements are stated for validation of any calculational method used in assessing nuclear criticality safety. This standard does not include the details of administrative controls, the design of processes or equipment, the description of instrumentation for processcontrol, nor detailed ‘teria to be met in transporting fissionable materials. Guidance for transporting light Numbe water reactor (LWR) fuel is contained in ANSI ANS.8.17-2004 (R2009) [3]. 3 Definitions 8.1 Limitations ‘The definitions given helow are of a restricted nature for the purposes of this standard. Other specialized terms are defined in Glossary of Nuclear Criticality Terms [4]. 3.2 Shall, should, and may ‘The word “shall” is used to denote a requirement; the word “should” is used to denote 8 recommendation; and the word “may” is used to denote permission, neither a requirement, nor a recommendation. 3.8 Glossary of terms areal density: The total mass of fissionable material per unit area projected perpendicularly onto a plane. (For an infinite, uniform slab, it is the product of the slab thickness and the density of fissionable material within the slab.) calculational method: The mathematical procedures, equations, approximations, ascumptions, and associated numerical parameters (e.g., cross sections) that yield the calculated results controlled parameter: A parameter that is kept within specified limits. criticality accident: The release of energy as a result of accidental production of a self sustaining or divergent neutron chain reaction. effective multiplication factor _ (&,,): Physically, the ratio of the total number of neutrons produced during a time interval (excluding neutrons produced by sources whose strengths are not a funetion of fission rate) to the total number of neutrons lost ‘brackets efer to corresponding numbers in Se. 7, “References.”by absorption and leakage during the same interval. Mathematically (computationally), the eigenvaluo number that, when divided into the actual mean number of neutrons emitted per fission in an assembly of materials, would make the calculated result for the nuclear chain reaction of that assembly critical, nuclear criticality safety: Protection against ‘the consequences of a criticality accident, preferably by prevention of the accident. parameter: One of the total set of factors that defines a fissionable system and determines its neutronie behavior. process conditions: ‘The —_ identifying characteristics of a process that have an elfeet on nuclear criticality safely (e.g., parameters, environment, and operations). suberitical limit: The limiting value assigned toa controlled parameter that resulis in a subcritical system under specified conditions, ‘The controlled parameter limit allows for uncertainties in the calculations and experimental data used in its derivation but not for contingencies, e.¢., double batching or failure of analytieal techniques to yield accurate values, validation: The process of quantifying (establishing the appropriate bias and bias uncertainty) the suitability of a caleulational method for uso in nuclear criticality safety analyses. 4 Nuclear criticality safety practices 4.1 Administrative practices administrative practices is /ANS-8,19-2005 [5]. Guidance for contained in AN’ 4.1.1 Responsibilities ‘Managementshall clearly establish responsibility for nuclear criticality safety. Supervisors should he made as responsible for nuclear criticality safety as they are for production, development, research, or other functions. Each individual, regardless of position, shall be made aware that nuclear criticality safety in his or her work area is ultimately his or her responsibility. ‘This may be accomplished through training and periodic retraining of all operating and support personnel. Guidance for the training of personnel is contained in ANSVANS-8.20-1991 (R2005) [6]. Nuclear criticality safety differs in no intrinsic way from industrial safety, and good managerial practices apply to both. Management shall provide personnel skilled im the interprotation of data pertinent to nuclear criticality safety, and familiar with operations, to serve as advisors to supervisors, These specialists, shouldbe, otheextentpracticable, administratively independent of process supervisors. Management shall establish the criteria to be satisfied by nuclear criticality safety eontrols. Distinction may be made between shielded and unshielded facilities, and the criteria may be less stringent when adequate shielding and confinement assure the protection of personnel Guidance is provided in ANSVANS-8.10-1983, (R2005) (71 4.L.2 Process analysis Before a new operation with fissionable material is begun, or before an existing operation is changed, it shall be determined that the entire process will be suberitical under both normal and credible abnormal eonditions.® In some cases it may be necessary or desirable to resort to in situ neutron multiplication ‘measurements to confirm the suberiticality of proposed configurations. Guidanee for safety in performing such measurements is contained in ANSI/ANS-8.6-1983 (R2010) [8], 4.1.8 Written procedures Operations to which nuclear criticality safety is pertinent shall be governed by written procedures. All persons participating in these operations shall understand and be familiar with the procedures, The procedures shall specify all parameters that they are intended to control. The procedures should be such that no single, inadvertent departure from a procedure can cause a criticality accident. 4.1.4 Materials control ‘The movement of fissionable material shall be contrelled. Appropriate material labeling and area posting shall be maintained specifying material identification and all limits on parameters subject to procedural control. Examples of variations or changes in process conditions or abnormal conditions ave provided in Appendix A.4.1.5 Operational control Deviations from procedures and unforeseen alterations in process conditions that affect nuclear criticality safety shall be reported to ‘management and shall be investigated promptly. Action shall be taken to prevent a recurrence, 4.16 Operational reviews Operations shall be reviewed frequently (at least annually) to ascertain that procedures arc being followed and that process conditions have not been altered so as to affect the applicable nuclear criticality safety evaluation. These reviews shall be conducted, in consultation with operating personnel, by individuals who are knowledgeable in nuclear criticality safety and who, to the extent practicable, are not imediately responsible for the operation, LT Emergency procedures Emergency procedures shall be prepared and approved by management. On-site and off-site organizations that-are expected to respond to emergencies shall be made aware of conditions that might he cneountered, and they should hbo assisted in preparing suitable procedures governing their responses 4.2 ‘Technical practices ‘The hy of a system depends on the mass, distribution, and nuclear properties of the fissionable materials and all other materials with which they are associated. Nuclear criticality safety is achieved by controlling one or more parameters of the system within subcritical limits and by allowances for process contingencies. Control may be exercised through + physical restraints, such as confining a solution to a cylindrical vessel with diameter no greater than a specified value + use of instrumentation, such as keeping a fissile concentration below a specified value by devices that measure concentration and prevent its buildup in a chemical system; + chemical means, such as prevention of, conditions that allow precipitation, thereby maintaining a concentration that is, characteristic of an aqueouis solution; + reliance on # natural or credible course of events, such as a process whose nature is to keep the density of uranium oxide less than a specified fraction of theoretical; ‘+ administrative procedures, such as requiring that # mass not exceed a posted limit; or + other means. 4.2.1 Controlled parameters All controlled parameters and their limits shall be specified. The influence of variations in these parameters on the k,, of the system shall be understood. 4.2.2. Double-contingency principle Procoss designs should incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and coneurrent changes in process conditions before acriticality accident is possible.” 4.2.3 Geometry control Where practicable, reliance should be placed fon equipment design in which dimensions fare limited rather than on administrative controls. Full advantage may be taken of any nuclear characteristics of the process materials ‘nd equipment. All dimensions and nuclear properties on which relianea is placed shall be verified prior to the beginning of operations, and control shall be exercised to maintain them. 4.2.4 Neutron absorbors Reliance may be placed on neutron-absorbing materials, euch as cadmium and boron, that fare incorporated in process materials, or in equipment, or in both. Control shall be exereised to maintain their continued presence with the intended distributions and concentrations. Caro should be taken with solutions of absorbers hecause of the difficulty of exercising such control. Guidance for the use of fixed neutron, ‘absorbers as a controlled parameter is contained in ANSVANS.8.21-1995 (R2011) [9]. Guidance for the use of a particular absorber is eontained in ANSVANS-8.5-1996 (R2012) [10]. Guidance for the use of soluble neutron absorbers as a controlled parameter is contained in ANSU/ANS- 8.14-2004 (R201) [11]. 4.2.5 Moderation Reliance may be placed on limiting the moderator content of fissile material processes. Guidance for the use of moderators as a controlled * Examples of variations or changes in provess conditions are provided in Appendix A.parameter is contained in ANSVANS-8.22-1997 (R201) (12). 4.2.6 Other Reliance may be placed on any controlled parameter that influences f,, either directly, or indirectly, with preference given to engineered design features rather than administrative control, 4.2.7 Suberitical limit Where applicable data are available, suberitical limits shall be established on bases derived from experiments, with adequate allowance for ‘uncertaintiosin the data, In the abeence of directly applieable experimental measurements, the limits may be derived from calculations made by a method shown by comparison with experimental data to be valid in accordance with Sec. 4.3. 4.8 Validation of a calculational method critical and exponential experiments, and the area of applicability for the validation should be established from this comparison.” There are many calculational methods suitable for determining the subcritical state of a system, The methods vary widely in basis and form, and each has its place in the broad spectrum of situations encountered in the nuclear criticality safety field. The validity of any method used to determine the suberitical state of a fissionable material system shall beestablished. The general procedure to be followed in establishing validity is common to all. Guidanee for the validation of neutron transport methods for nuclear criticality safety calculations is contained in ANSI! ANS-8,.24-2007 (R2012) [13]. The applicable technical requirements and recommendations in that standard (eg, establishment of bias, trending, and applicability) may he adapted for other calculational methods with technieal justification. 5 Single-parameter limits for fissile nuclides Operations with fissile materials can be performed safely by complying with any one of the auberitical limits given in Secs, 5.1 through 5.4 for single units of ®U, *°U, and plutonium, provided the conditions under whieh the limit applics are maintained; these subcritical limits wero calculated by mothods satisfying the requirements in See. 4.3. Guidance for other ‘Table 1 - Single-parameter subcritical limits for uniform aqueous solutions of fissile nuclides ‘Parameter Subcritical limit for fissile solute =270,F, | *U0,(NO,), | *U0,F, | *U0,(NO,), |"PuCNO,), nisi 115) nisi U6) 6) Mass of fissile nuclide (ke) 0.54 0.55 0.76 0.78 0.48 Diameter of eylinder of 105 47 13.7 144 15.4 solution (em) Thickness of slab of solution | 2.5 BL 44 49 3S (cm) Volume of sotution (L) 28 36 55 62 73 Concentration of fissile 108 108 116 11.6 73 nuclide (g/L) ‘Atomic ratio of hydrogen to 2390 2250 fissile nuclide’ ‘Areal density of fissile 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.25 nuclide (gem?) Lawor limit, Useofsubcritcllimitdata provide! in ANSVANS Sandards or accepted reference publications doesnt equire further validation.fissionable isotopes is contained in ANSVANS- 8.15-1981 (R2005) [14]. Such subcritical limits shall be applied only when the surrounding materials, including other nearby fissionsble materials, can he shown to increase the ky no more than it would be inereased if the unit were enclosed by a contiguous layer of water of unlimited thickness. A limit may be applied to ture of fissile nuclides by con: all components of the mixture to be the one with ‘the most restrictive limit. Process specifications shall incorporate margins to protect against ‘uncertainties in process variables and against a limit being accidentally exeeeded. 5.1 Uniform aqueous solutions Any one of the subcritical limits of Table 1 is applicable provided a uniform aqueous solution is maintained at concentrations that_do not exceed those of the saturated solutions. The "Pu suberitical limits apply to mixtures of plutonium isotopes, provided that the concentration of Pu exceeds that of "Pu, and provided that “Pu is considered to be "Pu in computing mass oF concentration. (Less restrictive subcritical limits are provided in Sec. 6.3 for plutonium isotopic compositions containing appreciable concentrations of “Pu.) The limit on atomic ratio is equivalent to the limit on solution concentration, but the ratio limit may also be applied to nonaqueous solutions, regardless of the chemical form of the fissile nuclide. 5.2 Aqueous mixtures ‘The areal densities of Table 1 are independent of chemical compound and are valid for mixtures that have density gradients, provided that the areal densities are uniform, The suber limits for ®U, "°U, and might not be uniform are 0.50, 0.70, and 0.45, kg, respectively, and are likewise independent of compound [15, 16, 17) 5.21 Enrichment subcritical limits Table 2 contains *°U enrichment subcritical limits for uranium compounds mixed homogeneously” with water with no limitations ‘on mass or concentration. ‘Table 2-°U enrichment subcritical limits for uranium mixed homogeneously with water” Compound Subcritical Limits Gwt% 2) Uranium metal 0.98 UO,, Uy, oF UO! 0.96 UO{NO,), 1.96 " See Ret [161 ‘With water content limited to 1.5%, the enrichment limit ie increased to 3.2% =U [16] 5.3 Metallic units ‘The enrichment subcritical limit for uranium ‘and the mass suberitical limits givon in Table 3 apply to asingle piece having no coneave surfaces. ‘Table 3 - Single-parameter subcritical limits for metal units Parameter Suberitical limits for =p | =u | Py ts} | We) | 17) Mass of fissile nuclide | 6.0 | 20.1 | 5.0 (ks) Cylinder diameter (em) | 4.5 | 79 | 44 Slab thickness (em) oss | 13 | 0.65 Uranium onriehment - Joo] - (wt =U) Maximum density 18.65 | 18.81 | 19.82 for which mass and dimension limits are valid (giem®) In the homogeacous mixtures to which calculations ofthese subcritical limits were normalized, the average particle size of dry VO, was 60 jm [V1 Neeley and H, F. Handler," Measurernen of Multiplication Constant for Slightly Enriched Fiomoyensoxs ‘UO, Water Mixtures and Minimum Enrichment for Critica.” HW:70310, Hanford Atomie Produets Operations (Aux. 1961) Iu stems likely thatthe average panicle size ofthe ditydrate of UO.(NO,), was ~100 jm [V. I. Neeley, JA. Berberet, and R. H, Masterson, “ke of Three Weight Per Cent *5U Enriched UO, and UO (NO, }, Hydrogenous Systems,” HW-65882, Hanford Atomic Products Operations Sep. 1961)] Various H/U ratios in the nitate mixtures were achieved with 108-in. spheres of polyethylene [S. R, Bierman and G. M. Hess, "Minimum Critical *“U Enrichment of Homogeneous Uraayl Nitrate,” ORNL CDC-5, Oak Ridge Crticalty Data Center June 1968)