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From Semiotics
towards Philosophical
Metaphysics
From Semiotics
towards Philosophical
Metaphysics

By
Abraham Solomonick

English Editor
Libby Schwartz
From Semiotics towards Philosophical Metaphysics

By Abraham Solomonick

English Editor Libby Schwartz

This book first published 2017

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2017 by Abraham Solomonick

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-8645-9

ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8645-1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................ vii

Part I. Essays on Semiotics

Chapter One ............................................................................... 2

A New Model of Semiotics as a Science of Signs,
Sign-Systems and Semiotic Activity

Chapter Two ............................................................................... 23

On Semiosis

Chapter Three ............................................................................. 42

Some Sign-System Classifications Based on Semiotics

Chapter Four .............................................................................. 65

Compound Signs

Chapter Five ............................................................................... 103

On Visuality

Part II. Semiotics and Philosophy

Chapter Six ................................................................................. 122

Philosophical Aspects of Semiotics

Chapter Seven ............................................................................ 155

On Semiotic Reality
vi Table of Contents

Chapter Eight ............................................................................. 190

On the Three Types of Reality

Chapter Nine .............................................................................. 202

The Saga of the Four Realities

Chapter Ten ................................................................................ 239

The Thought as the Basic Unit of Consciousness

Part III. Practical Implementations

Chapter Eleven ........................................................................... 248

A Semiotic Perspective on the Language of Science

Chapter Twelve .......................................................................... 274

Visuality in Signs (As Exemplified in Cartography)

Chapter Thirteen ........................................................................ 278

Illustrated Bibliography

Chapter Fourteen ........................................................................ 290

Forerunners and Followers of My Theory
 PREFACE

For more than a quarter of a century, I have been working

on the problems of semiotics – the science of signs, sign-
systems, and semiotic reality. The consummation of this work
came to fruition in my last book, A Theory of General
Semiotics (2015), which, like this volume, was published by
Cambridge Scholars Publishing. While writing that book, I
encountered a great deal of serious philosophical problems,
and these issues nagged at me constantly. In that work, I
asserted that signs and their systems erected and fostered
semiotic reality, a form of reality that differs from ontological
reality, on the one hand, and from our individual mental
conceptions of reality, on the other. Yet, what this semiotic
reality is, how it appears and functions, and how it diverges
from ontology, was not clear, because the very notion of
semiotic reality was not part any of the mainstream modern
philosophical schools of thought.
I decided to tackle this problem on my own, and published
a number of papers about it. It is said that appetite comes with
eating, and so it was for me. The more I worked on these
issues, the more involved I became; over time, I gradually
became engulfed in them. I soon found myself daring to
challenge the ingrained notion that metaphysics only deals
with the realm of ontology and how it relates to people’s
mental worlds; adding semiotic reality to the discussion
enlarged and deepened that whole conceptual framework.
Later, I added another plane to this framework: virtual reality.
Initially, I envisioned these four realities as if they were all
interwoven and intermingled into a single entity. On further
consideration, I devised a new model, in which the mental
viii Preface

reality was in the center, like the sun in our planetary system,
and the other forms of reality orbited it. The point of this
model was to show that it is the human mind that deals with
and makes use of all the other types of realities, so it should
be situated in the center of the scheme. You can see this
model of human existence on the cover of this book; in it, our
thoughts issue commands and dispatch them to the other parts
of reality, which is thus affected by them.
The essays in this book are divided into three groups based
on three aspects of my work on semiotics and its relation to
philosophy:

i Part I: The incipient semiotic buds that blossomed and

led to a new philosophy of being
i Part II: How this philosophy evolved and took shape in
my writings
i Part III: Some practical applications of these ideas

The reader should bear in mind that these essays were

composed over a long period of time. As a result, the same
concepts are explained in various ways, and sometimes even
have slightly divergent meanings, in different essays.
Repetitions from one paper to another are also unavoidable
and will, I hope, be forgiven. I hope, too, that readers will be
lenient in their judgment of my sometimes precipitate views.

Abraham Solomonick February 2017

 PART I.

ESSAYS ON SEMIOTICS
 CHAPTER ONE

A NEW MODEL OF SEMIOTICS AS A SCIENCE

OF SIGNS, SIGN-SYSTEMS AND SEMIOTIC
ACTIVITY

Summary: Semiotic activity is part of the process of cognition.

That is, semiotics belongs to the sphere of knowledge attainment,
rather than the sphere of ontology. Ontology is concerned with col-
lecting data about what exists, is being perceived, and investigated.
From an ontological standpoint, events and phenomena usually
occur in an undefined and syncretistic manner. When we try to un-
derstand and delineate events, we must first isolate them, and as-
sign them unique and specific forms, which we can then study. In
the course of extracting events from a collection of ontological da-
ta, people use signs to code the subject-matter they are studying,
and process these signs by applying the rules of the sign-systems to
which the signs belong. In this way, the domain of semiotics, which
we define as the science of signs, sign-systems and semiotic activity,
comes into play.

Of late, many amateur semioticians - and even those who

call themselves professionals - deny that semiotics is a dis-
tinct branch of science, with its own subject-matter and meth-
ods of study. On the contrary, they declare it to be a sort of
"interdisciplinary method," "interdisciplinary endeavor"
(whatever that might be), and the like. Thus, one of the lead-
ing contemporary semioticians, Scott Simpkins, begins his
work, Critical Semiotics, in this way:
 A New Model of Semiotics 3

"Semiotics" could be said to exist only as a topic of discus-

sion.1

Although it is commonly referred to as though it were a

concretely established discipline (or even a "science"), the
legerdemain behind this practice cannot be exaggerated.
And elsewhere in the same work, he says:
If semiotics is considered as a wide-ranging and heterogene-
ous discussion, then perhaps it follows that it cannot possess
basic concepts.2

The damaging effect of such statements for the field of

semiotics and for its status really cannot be exaggerated. The
current state of affairs is described aptly in the well-known
text, Semiotics for Beginners, by Daniel Chandler:
If you go into a bookshop and ask them where to find a book
on semiotics, you are likely to meet with a blank look. Even
worse, you might be asked to define what semiotics is -
which would be a bit tricky, if you were looking for a begin-
ner's guide. It is worse still if you do know a bit about semi-
otics, because it can be hard to offer a simple definition,
which is of much use in the bookshop.3

Let me add that the situation has been this way for a very
long time - for more than a century. In fact, not only is it not
improving, it is worsening, because more and more people
have reached the conclusion that semiotics is anything but a
science. As a result, at every conference on semiotics we re-

1
Scott Simpkins. Lecture 1 of Critical Semiotics. At:
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/cyber/sim1.html (accessed Feb. 2017).
2
Ibid., Lecture 2. At:
http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/semiotics/cyber/sim2.html (accessed Feb.
2017).
3
Daniel Chandler. Semiotics for Beginners. At:
http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/ (accessed Feb. 2017).
4 Chapter One

peat the same experience - we find ourselves listening to so-

called semiotic papers that discuss anything but semiotic mat-
ters. It is useless to protest against this, because the lecturers
invariably answer: "You understand semiotics in your way,
we in our own specific light." Or: "Since in our presentation
we use the concepts signs and meaning, it falls within the do-
main of semiotics." Since the discussion of every topic may
include these concepts, anything may be presented as falling
within the domain of semiotics. This, in fact, accurately sums
up the situation; anything and everything is included in the
realm of semiotics. Or, as Eugene Gorny put it, "Semiotics is
that which is called semiotics by the people who call them-
selves semioticians."4
This deplorable situation arose, in my opinion, because the
delimitation of the scope of semiotics has remained frozen
since the founders of the field (Ch.S. Peirce, F. de Saussure
and Ch.W. Morris) formulated their initial and inevitably in-
complete ideas about what might be the nature of our science.
Since that time, nobody has dared to reformulate these ideas
in the light of new developments in science in general and in
the concrete sciences in particular. We continue to cringe be-
fore their views, as if they are final and all-embracing. And
this servility has brought our science to the lowly state it is in
nowadays.
My work attempts to overcome this barrier. While it is
firmly based on the classical views cited above, it neverthe-
less does not treat them as untouchable and inviolable. Rather,
it expands classical semiotic theory. This is evident in my
conception of what a sign is, as well as in my shift of empha-
sis from the sign-notion to the discussion of sign-systems and
semiotic activities.

4
Eugene Gorny. What is Semiotics? At:
http://www.zhurnal.ru/staff/gorny/english/semiotic.htm (accessed Feb. 2017).
The original quote is entirely in capital letters.
 A New Model of Semiotics 5

I am convinced that in laying the foundations of any sci-

ence we must base ourselves on specific philosophical con-
siderations. First and foremost, we should consider what the
proposed science does and why it must exist at all. In other
words, we must identify what area of human knowledge it
covers and from what standpoint.
In my view, the justification for the science of semiotics
can be found in the comparison between the two types of re-
alities - ontological reality and semiotic reality. By "reality" I
mean something that exists outside of and independently from
ourselves. This is a purely materialistic point of view: I pro-
ceed from the assumption that something objective, some-
thing entirely independent from our senses, exists - something
with which we make contact when we come into this world,
and which remains after our departure from it. This is onto-
logical reality - the amalgam of data that makes up our exter-
nal environment.
We confront ontological reality inescapably, because we
are part of it and have to adjust ourselves to it. In the process
of confronting this reality, we try to comprehend it and utilize
this comprehension to our advantage. And through this pro-
cess, we transplant the ontological reality into another plane,
that of semiotic reality, a reality that is expressed by signs
(sometimes, nowadays, it is also called virtual reality).
This second kind of reality is the result of our dealings
with the first, ontological one, but it embodies something dif-
ferent from it. It is also objective; it exists independently from
us in the form of different theories, separate signs, and sign-
systems. As with ontological reality, we investigate and use
semiotic reality, and change it in the process. But semiotic
reality is a world in its own right, and in many respects it dif-
fers from the ontological reality that it reflects.
6 Chapter One

In what specific ways does semiotic reality differ from on-

tological reality? To my mind, there are three main distinc-
tions:

i Semiotic reality is a human creation.

i Signs and sign-systems are idealizations of ontological
facts.
i Semiotics is built on the other sciences.

The next sections explain what I mean by each of these

statements.

Semiotic reality is a human creation

While ontological reality reveals itself to our senses as a
chaotic, syncretic, and non-ordained something, semiotic real-
ity, which is derived from our efforts to cope with ontological
reality, constitutes a reality of various signs that we ourselves
have created. They are organized into sign-systems, which are
continuous, discrete, preordained, and inherently consistent.
Because of this, they can be reviewed and reconsidered,
changed and improved. In the long run, they can be applied
and reintroduced into ontological reality; this last stage repre-
sents their final approval and recognition. Thus, the first dis-
tinction between ontological reality and semiotic reality is
this: ontological reality was created independently of us and
was given to us ready-made, while semiotic reality is a com-
pletely human product.
From this statement we can draw several very substantial
conclusions. The first is that we have to separate - even sever
- the treatment of semiotic signs and sign-systems from that of
ontological reality. While the study of ontological phenomena
belongs exclusively to the spheres of various natural and so-
cial sciences, the study of their corresponding sign procedures
also belongs to the sphere of semiotics. Treating these two
 A New Model of Semiotics 7

distinct kinds of systems under the general heading of "Gen-

eral System Theory" is a widely accepted, but unfortunately
misguided practice.5
The second very important conclusion lies in the fact that
the creation of signs and their systems is exclusively the result
of human activity and cannot be accomplished by animals or
by machines. The process consists of the conscious produc-
tion of signs denoting other things and also comprises the un-
derstanding of the symbolic nature of such signs. Neither an-
imals nor machines are able to do this. The belief that ma-
chines are capable of dealing with semiotic matters, that even
inanimate objects can respond semiotically to stimuli, greatly
hampered the development of semiotic science as a special
branch of knowledge. Humans can delegate to machines some
tasks of transforming signs (by providing the machines with
programs for matching signs), but no machine can, as yet,
create symbolically charged and meaningful signs. This is the
prerogative of the well-developed human mind.

Signs and sign-systems are idealizations of ontological

facts
The second difference between the two kinds of realities
lies in the fact that signs and sign-systems aim to reflect onto-
logical facts and phenomena, and should always remain their
manifestations. Signs are idealizations of ontological data;
although they are initially created by human beings, in many
ways they resemble Platonic ideas. In this sense, they are des-
tined to be only approximations of their referents.
These approximations can have varying degrees of proxim-
ity to their referents because they can only reflect a finite
number of qualities. If they are taken to one extreme, such

5
See, for example, this very popular book: Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Gen-
eral System Theory (New York: George Braziller, 1968).
8 Chapter One

that they are overly similar to their referents, they cease to be

signs, and instead turn into ontological objects (as, for exam-
ple, functional models of ontological occurrences). If they are
taken to the other extreme, they can even become false repre-
sentations of their referents, or representations of non-existent
referents. The latter constitute, as the history of science
shows, the inevitable initial stages in human gnosis. Even at
later stages in human development, there are cases when evil-
doers intentionally use signs that misrepresent ontological re-
ality (like in the totalitarian state that George Orwell visual-
ized).

Semiotics is built on the other sciences

The third difference between semiotic reality and ontologi-
cal reality has to do with the way semiotic reality is construct-
ed. Semiotic reality is built from different kinds of signs,
which are frequently combined into sign-systems of various
qualities and coherence. But these signs and sign-systems are
themselves created within the bounds of various other con-
crete sciences, each of which deals with ontology from its
own vantage point. Each field constructs its own signs and
sign-systems, within its own conceptual framework and with
the help of its specific methodology. Thus, the other sciences
provide the building blocks from which semiotic reality is
constructed and the subject-matter that the science of semiot-
ics studies.
Physics, for example, produces formulas that deal with
concrete phenomena. The production of these formulas is pre-
ceded by specific physical investigations that produce the on-
tological data from which the formulas are derived. Similarly,
economics produces complex diagrams and charts from the
accumulated results of purely economic research. These prod-
ucts of physics and economics belong to the semiotic world as
well as their own fields. This last world is the field of semiot-
 A New Model of Semiotics 9

ic activity and constitutes the subject-matter of the semiotic

branch of science. The field of semiotics can only succeed,
however, if it is permitted to develop and apply its own tools
to the semiotic data that is produced in other fields.
Thus, in my opinion, semiotics is a secondary science -
secondary not in its status, which is very high (as I will try to
prove), but in that it studies the data that is collected by other
sciences and embodied in their signs. Let us, with the help of
an example, demonstrate this proposition.
In the middle of the 19th century, Robert Wilhelm Bunsen
invented a gas-burning device. In the flames of this burner,
which is now known as the Bunsen burner, and is used in vir-
tually all chemistry laboratories, the temperature can reach
2000° C. Bunsen began to use the burner to incinerate differ-
ent chemical compounds. In the resulting vapors, he saw col-
ored and black lines. After his colleague, the physicist Gustav
R. Kirchhoff, introduced lenses to the device, the two re-
searchers observed distinctive colored patterns when they
burned specific chemical elements and compounds. Thus,
they invented a new method of identifying the chemical con-
tents of a substance - "spectrum analysis." Using this method,
chemists very soon discovered many elements that were pre-
viously unknown, such as cesium, which was named for the
bright blue color it produces in the flames of the burner, and
rubidium, named for the ultra-red color it emits when burned.
By using this method, researchers could even determine that
the Sun consists of the same chemical elements that are found
on Earth; by no other means could we prove this very im-
portant fact.
In 1869, the great Russian chemist Dmitry Mendeleyev
published his first version of what was later called the "peri-
odic table of elements." In it, he placed all the elements that
were known at the time, ordered according to their atomic
weights and, in some cases, their valences. Instead of simply
10 Chapter One

listing them in a single, continuous chain, from the first ele-

ment to the last, he arranged them based on a repetitive pat-
tern of properties that groups of elements shared, so that ele-
ments with similar characteristics appeared in the table in the
same column (i.e. periodically). Because of this arrangement,
many of the squares in the original table were left empty.
Mendeleyev declared that the empty squares represented ele-
ments that were still unknown to science. He even dared to
predict the qualities of some unknown elements, e.g., of eco-
aluminum (similar to those of aluminum), eco-boron, and eco-
silicon. Soon after this, in 1875, the French chemist Paul-
Émile Lecoq de Boisbaudran, while investigating a substance
in the flame of a Bunsen burner, discovered a new element.
He managed to extract and examine the new element, and
concluded that it appeared to be Mendeleyev's eco-aluminum.
These historical facts do not merely describe a series of
events that occurred. They also describe the interplay of sci-
entific research and sign-systems. Spectrum analysis is not
only a research method, it is also a sign-system - a system of
color signs that can be used to identify the chemical composi-
tion of a substance. When Bunsen and Kirchhoff developed
the method, they brought a new sign-system into existence as
well. The sign-system they developed spurred them and other
researchers to further achievements. Similarly, Mendeleyev's
periodic table was a sign-system, and it too opened the door to
additional discoveries.
This common process is reminiscent of what we do with a
car when it fails to ignite: to start the car, we push it down a
slope and wait until the motor has warmed a little; once the
motor has warmed up, it can be ignited more easily. Similarly,
once a sign-system has been created, it makes it easier for
people to make additional discoveries. To begin the process,
we construct a sign-system that applies to a specific case and
describes a particular repetitive pattern. Once we establish
 A New Model of Semiotics 11

this pattern, we can draw conclusions about the usual state of

things or about the normal relations between certain causes
and effects. Finally, our knowledge of the pattern spurs us to
postulate the existence of additional elements that fit into the
pattern, and to investigate these elements.
Note that this entire process takes place within the realm of
a single science. Both spectrum analysis and the periodic table
are sign-systems, but they are chemical sign-systems, worked
out through chemical investigation and according to the rules,
the logic, and the conceptual framework of that branch of sci-
ence. They grew out of many centuries of chemical work ex-
ploring different elements, defining their qualities, their atom-
ic weights and valences, etc. In turn, these systems provided
additional impetus for furthering and advancing chemical in-
sight in the external world. Chemistry as a whole can be pre-
sented as the mutual cooperation of direct methods of chemi-
cal inquiry and the answering push of semiotic systems on
them. In fact, any comprehensive compendium on the subject
treats the matter along these lines. That is why it would be
unjust and counterproductive to declare these sign-systems to
simply be semiotic systems and to include them as they are in
the field of semiotics.
Then where does semiotics come into play? It becomes
relevant when we approach and analyze these types of facts as
semiotic matters, following the lines of inquiry that belong to
the field of semiotics and framing the investigation within its
conceptual structure. For example, the sign-systems men-
tioned above could be compared by describing the first as a
linear and continuous sign-system and the second as a period-
ic sign-system. The relative advantages and disadvantages of
each of these types of systems could then be posited, im-
portant conclusions about their appropriate spheres of applica-
tion could be reached, and detailed rules for their construction
could be deduced.
12 Chapter One

In semiotics, each type of sign-system can be investigated

separately and compared with similar systems. The results
may have significant practical implications. For example, why
not compare chemical spectrums with the system applied
nowadays in shops for marking different products, or books in
libraries? There are definitely some common traits and we
may reach some conclusions that are applicable in practical
terms.
Nevertheless, one can only expect semiotics to achieve
significant accomplishments after we, semioticians, forge out
together, with our own conceptual framework, a conceptual
framework that is shared by and understandable to all of us,
or, at any rate, accepted by the majority of semioticians work-
ing in the field. What should this framework be? I will try to
formulate my answers to this question in the rest of this paper.
Before I begin, let me just assert that, in view of the com-
plexity of the issue and the novelty of my views, the answers
may be necessarily incomplete and in many respects even er-
roneous. Still, because somebody must initiate the discussion
of the problem, I am taking the risk.
To begin my comments, I will refer to what is called the
formal axiomatization of semiotics. After that, I will describe
the foundations of my model of semiotics in greater detail.

Formal axiomatization of semiotics

This argument for defining semiotics as a science is based
on what D. Gilbert, in his Basics of Geometry, called formal
axiomatization. Gilbert identified and outlined the principal
concepts of the science of geometry. He then deduced all the
other geometric concepts, and the relations between them,
from those basic concepts. The concepts he chose were: point,
straight line, and plane.
In geometry, the characteristics of these elements can be
varied to result in different types of geometry. For example, if
 A New Model of Semiotics 13

we declare that two parallel lines never cross, we get the ge-
ometric system called plane geometry. If we declare that par-
allel lines do meet (and in curved space they do), we get an-
other kind of geometry, like Lobachevsky's or Riemann's.
In a similar way, in the field of semiotics I have identified
three interrelated concepts: sign, sign-system, and semiotic
activity. By varying the characteristics of these basic con-
cepts, as Gilbert did in the field of geometry, I can define dis-
tinct kinds of semiotics. Thus, the field of semiotics can be
treated as a science, just as the field of geometry is. Though
formal axiomatization is a necessary step for delimiting a sci-
ence, it is not a sufficient step. One must also show how these
main concepts work, and this is our next task.

My model of a semiotic sign

My understanding of the concept of a sign is based on
what was established in the classic works of the field, but I go
further than they did on many important points. My view is
demonstrated in the following diagram (Fig. 1-1):

Figure 1-1
14 Chapter One

The above parallelogram can be viewed as a composite of

two triangles, one on the left and one on the right. The corners
represent the various aspects of sign dependence, and the ar-
rows indicate the interactions between them.
In my diagram, the left triangle represents the model of a
sign as it is usually demonstrated, e.g. by Peirce (except for
the base line, which is unbroken, and the arrows at the ends of
each line). The right triangle is my addition to the model, and
it makes all the difference between my variant and all the pre-
vious ones. It reflects the distinction between the two realities
- the ontological and the semiotic. Within the left triangle we
form our signs and our mental ideas by direct contact with the
outside world, but within the right triangle we do so through
social experience - through the interpretation of the entire
body of cultural heritage that we receive through contact with
humanity, including what we hear from other people, glean
from our education and from reading books, etc. In the long
run, our ideas appear to be nurtured from both of these
sources, but the second source definitely prevails over the
first. That is why its addition to the model of a sign is com-
pletely justified.
Another aspect of my expansion of the sign model - the
most significant aspect, in fact - is not illustrated in the dia-
gram. It is an extension of Charles W. Morris's theory about
different lines of sign analysis.
As is well known, in 1938 Morris published his Founda-
tions of the Theory of Signs. In this work, he delineated three
approaches to sign investigation: semantic - researching the
dependence of the sign on its referent; pragmatic - studying
the connection between a sign and its interpreter; and syntac-
tic - seeking out ties and interdependencies among different
signs. All three types of investigation are very significant and
useful in the organization of sign research. Nevertheless, I
think that we should add a fourth element of sign analysis to
 A New Model of Semiotics 15

his system - the identification of a sign's degree of abstract-

ness. As the right triangle in my model indicates, I believe
signs are the most important component of human heritage.
From this I conclude that, in our current state of knowledge,
each type of sign has a fixed charge of abstraction. Natural
signs are less abstract than images, the latter are less abstract
than words, etc. Thus, the concept of the degree of abstrac-
tion enables me to construct a system for the classification of
signs and also allows me to lay the foundations of a sign tax-
onomy.

Classification of signs and sign-systems

There is no satisfactory classification of signs that is ac-
cepted by the majority of semioticians. The nearest thing to an
acceptable classification is the one created by Peirce, which
divides all signs into three categories: indices, images and
symbols. Even this incomplete, rough, and non-hierarchic
classification gave rise to many fruitful studies in the field of
semiotics.
The following classification, which was included in my
first book on semiotics,6 is to my mind much more complete,
mature, and structured than that of Peirce. It relies on two cri-
teria: basic signs and types of sign-system. Thus, it is not only
a classification of signs but of sign-systems as well.
The diagram below (Fig. 1-2) describes my classification
system:

6
Abraham Solomonick. Semiotics and Linguistics (Paris: Editions des
Ecrivains, 2001).
16 Chapter One

Figure 1-2

In the boxes there are different types of sign-systems. Each

type comprises all the sign-systems belonging to it. For ex-
ample, the language type includes all the natural languages,
artificial languages, esoteric ones (like drum languages), etc.
According to my theory, these types of sign-systems de-
veloped in the order in which they are arranged in the dia-
gram; they developed in this order in both the ontogenesis of
the whole of human society and the phylogenesis of each hu-
man individually. The stages of development reflect the in-
creasing complexity of the basic signs on which each type of
sign-system is built. Each subsequent stage is built upon the
previous one, subsumes it, and develops in its wake. It is thus
that the consistent and continuous development of each hu-
man being and of the whole race is guaranteed.
There are many kinds of basic signs in every concrete sign-
system. Let us randomly choose the sign-system of traffic
regulation, for example. In this system, we find many draw-
ings, which I call images, many geometrical figures, words,
purely color signs, etc. The images are the most outstanding
elements in this system; they define the syntactical ties be-
tween all the signs in the system and, above all, they define
 A New Model of Semiotics 17

the patterns of our dealings with the system and with external
reality through the system. This is what I call the logic of the
system. In this particular system, the logic is exclusively
"transductive" - that is, it is based on "reading" one sign after
another and compiling them into one general picture. (The
term "transductive" was coined by Jean Piaget; I rely heavily
upon his work in this discussion.) Basic signs of higher order
demand another type of logic - for example, deductive logic
or inductive logic.
The hierarchy of the basic signs is based on their increas-
ing degree of abstractness; the more abstract a sign is, the
higher its position in the hierarchy. The degree of abstractness
of a sign is determined by its relative proximity to its refer-
ents.
In my view, natural signs, such as stars in the systems of
orientation and natural symptoms in medical diagnosis, being
themselves part of the picture, are very close to the things
they designate. Thus, natural signs are the least abstract signs
of any of the types. For this reason, they appeared earlier in
human history than images, words, hieroglyphs, and symbols;
the complexity of each kind of basic sign determines when it
emerges, both in human ontogenesis and phylogenesis, and
complexity is a function of degree of abstractness. This is also
why it is easy for us to recognize them as signs of something
else.
Images are connected to their referents by their likeness
(similarity or iconicity) to their referents. Because they are not
themselves part of the whole, they stand further from their
designates and are thus more abstract than natural signs. Each
higher level of basic sign has a higher degree of abstractness;
words are more abstract than images, hieroglyphs are more
abstract than words, and so forth.
Being further from referents does not mean being less
meaningful or less forceful. On the contrary - by distancing
18 Chapter One

themselves from their designates, signs become more all-

embracing. Images comprise a much greater scope of desig-
nated objects than natural signs do. A chair that is prepared
for me during a reception (and marked accordingly) is a
unique object for that particular occasion; the drawing of a
chair (an image) represents all particular chairs of this kind,
and the word "chair" means all existing chairs in the world.
Thus, increased abstractness of various types of signs goes
hand in hand with their becoming more remote from their ref-
erents and with their escalating level of generalization. This
seems to be the decisive factor in the creation of increasingly
abstract signs and sign-systems in the history of our develop-
ment as Homo sapiens.
My classification of signs is much more solid than Peirce's
tripartite one because:

i It conjoins the classification of signs with that of sign-

systems.
i It aims to be all-embracing.
i It has foundations not only internally, in all the existing
signs and systems, but also externally, in other fields;
we can follow its exposition alongside the empirical
findings of developmental psychology and other scienc-
es.
i Being built hierarchically, it can serve as a kind of tax-
onomy for sign-systems that are already established.

I would like to elaborate on this last point. My classifica-

tion (together with that of Peirce) served as the basis for the
doctoral thesis of Ahmad Daud Jaffar, defended at Stafford-
shire University http://www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/01_2/solomoni
 A New Model of Semiotics 19

ck15.htm - 6.7 As a specialist in the field of computer pro-

gramming, he examined about forty different business man-
agement programs. And he posed these questions: Which of
the programs are more useful for the suggested aims? Which
are easier for the intended users to use? Which have the po-
tential to be learned quickly and used efficiently? For the an-
swers to these questions, he looked to semiotics, the science
of signs and sign-systems. In the long run, he analyzed the
programs from the point of view of my classification, utilizing
it also as a taxonomy. In this way, he reached conclusions that
enabled him to evaluate the programs as sign-systems and rate
their degrees of efficiency in this way.

Conceptual basis of the proposed semiotics

In the light of what I have said above, I can now suggest
what topics may be included in semiotics, give a brief de-
scription of their characteristics, and mention issues that still
require clarification.

Concerning signs:

i The sources of signs: ontological and semiotic reality.

i The characteristics of various kinds of signs.
i The composition of signs: denotation and connotation
elements of signs.
i The four dimensions of a sign: semantic, pragmatic,
syntactic, and degree of abstractness.
i Classification of signs into two groups: signs that can be
used separately and signs that can only be used in sign-
systems.

7
Ahmad Daud Jaffar. A Semiotic Framework for Measuring Effective
Representations of Business Process (Ph.D. diss.: Staffordshire Universi-
ty, 2003).
20 Chapter One

i Comparison of basic signs with other kinds of signs in

the same system that have a different degree of abstrac-
tion.
i Open issue: How do basic signs determine the main
traits of a system?
i Comparison of basic signs and their derivatives.
i Open issues: What kinds of derivatives can there be?
How are they formed? How do paradigmatic and syn-
tagmatic parameters affect signs?
i The addition of new signs in existing sign-systems: their
incentives and transparency.
i The feasibility of transferring signs of various degrees
of abstractness from one system to another system.

Concerning sign-systems and their classification:

i Classification by the degree of abstractness of basic

signs;
i Classification by the structure of the system: linear
structure, periodic structure, structure that allows for the
addition of new categories;
i Open and closed sign-systems: entropy in semiotic sign-
systems;
i Classification based on whether the sign-system devel-
oped chaotically or was planned;
i Classification of sign-systems by their application ob-
jective: finding items by their signs (e.g., telephone
books), describing items that are included in a collection
(e.g., library cataloguing systems like the Dewey deci-
mal system or trademark registration systems), the
methods of processing of the initial signs (e.g., architec-
tural details in buildings, signs in chemical or physical
formulas);
Another random document with
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mouth open one mornin’, a year after, when I saw those roses, that
oughter been red, just come out into a yeller. Of course it was a
mistake in the bushes, but how did he know?”
“It might have been a coincidence.”
“Yes, it might have been a coincidence. But when a boy’s life is
made up of just those things you begin to suspect after a while that
perhaps they are too everlastingly reliable for coincidences. You
can’t always bet on coincidences, but you can bet every time on
Amos. My daughter Phœbe kept school down in the village for a
spell when Amos was about ten years old. There was another boy,
Billy Hines, who never missed a lesson. Phœbe knew he was a dull
boy and that he always tried to give larnin’ the whole road whenever
he saw it comin’, and it kinder surprised her to have him stand at the
head of his class all the time and make better recitations than
smarter boys who worked hard. But he always knew everything and
never missed a question. He and Amos were great friends, more
because Amos felt sorry for him, I guess, than anything else. Billy
used to stand up and shine every day, when she knew mighty well
he was the slowest chap in the whole school and hadn’t studied his
lessons neither. Well, one day Amos got hove about twenty feet by a
colt he was tryin’ to ride and he stayed in bed a few weeks. Durin’
that time Billy Hines couldn’t answer a question. Not a question. He
and arithmetic were strangers. Also geography, history, and
everything else that he’d been intimate with. He jest stopped shinin’,
like a candle with a stopper on it. The amount of it was she found
that Amos had always told him ahead the questions he was goin’ to
be asked, and Billy learned the answers just before he stood up to
recite.”
“Why, how did Amos—how did Mr. Judd know what questions would
be asked?”
“I guess ’twas just a series of coincidences that happened to last all
winter.”
Molly laughed. “How unforgiving you are, Mr. White! But did Amos
Judd explain it?”
“He didn’t. He was too young then to do it to anybody’s satisfaction,
and now that he’s older he won’t.”
“Why not?”
“Well, he’s kind of sensitive about it. Never talks of those things, and
don’t like to have other folks.”
Molly stood looking over toward the Judd house, wondering how
much of the Deacon’s tale was truth, and how much was village
gossip exaggerated by repetition.
“Did you ever hear about Josiah’s death?”
Molly shook her head.
“’Twas to him that Amos was fetched from India. One mornin’ Josiah
and I were standin’ in the doorway of his barn talkin’. The old barn
used to be closer to the house, but Amos tore it down after he built
that big new one. Josiah and I stood in the doorway talkin’ about a
new yoke of oxen; nothin’ excitin’, for there wasn’t any cause for it.
We stood in the doorway, both facin’ out, when Josiah, without givin’
any notice, sort of pitched forward and fell face down in the snow. I
turned him over and tried to lift him up, but when I saw his face I was
scared. Just at that particular minute the doctor, with Amos sittin’ in
the sleigh beside him, drove into the avenue and hurried along as if
he knew there was trouble. We carried Josiah into the house, but
’twa’n’t any use. He was dead before we got him there. It was heart
disease. At the funeral I said to the doctor it was lucky he happened
along just then, even if he couldn’t save him, and I found there was
no happen about it; that Amos had run to his house just as he was
starting off somewheres else, and told him Josiah was dyin’ and to
get there as fast as he could.”
“That’s very strange,” Molly said, in a low voice. She had listened to
this story with a feeling of awe, for she believed the Deacon to be a
truthful man, and this was an experience of his own. “This
mysterious faculty,” she said, “whatever it was, did he realize it fully
himself?”
“I guess he did!” and the Deacon chuckled as he went on with his
work. “And he used to play tricks with it. I tell you he was a handful.”
“Did you say he lost it as he grew up?”
The Deacon turned about and answered, in a serious tone: “No. But
he wants folks to think so. All the same, there’s something between
Amos and the Almighty that the rest of us ain’t into.”
One Monday morning, toward the last of June, Molly left Daleford for
a two weeks’ visit at the seashore. Her absence caused a void that
extended from the Cabot household over to the big white mansion at
the further end of the maples. This emptiness and desolation drove
the young man to frequent visits upon Mr. Cabot, who, in his turn,
found a pleasant relief in the companionship of his neighbor, and he
had no suspicion of the solace this visitor derived from sitting upon
the piazza so lately honored by the absent girl. The eminent lawyer
was not aware that he himself, apart from all personal merit, was the
object of an ardent affection from his relationship to his own
daughter. For the first twenty-four hours the two disconsolates kept
in their own preserves to a reasonable extent, but on Tuesday they
took a fishing trip, followed in the evening by a long talk on the Cabot
piazza. During this conversation the lawyer realized more fully than
ever the courageous ignorance of his neighbor in all matters that had
failed to interest him. On the other hand, he was impressed by the
young man’s clear, comprehensive, and detailed knowledge upon
certain unfamiliar subjects. In spite of his college education and a
very considerable knowledge of the world he was, mentally,
something of a spoiled child; yet from his good sense, originality, and
moral courage he was always interesting.
Wednesday, the third day, brought a northeast gale that swept the
hills and valleys of Daleford with a drenching rain. Trees, bushes,
flowers, and blades of grass dripping with water, bent and quivered
before the wind. Mr. Cabot spent the morning among his books and
papers, writing letters and doing some work which the pleasant
weather had caused him to defer. For such labors this day seemed
especially designed. In the afternoon, about two o’clock, he stood
looking out upon the storm from his library window, which was at the
corner of the house and commanded the long avenue toward the
road. The tempest seemed to rage more viciously than ever.
Bounding across the country in sheets of blinding rain, it beat
savagely against the glass, then poured in unceasing torrents down
the window-panes. The ground was soaked and spongy with
tempestuous little puddles in every hollow of the surface. In the
distance, under the tossing maples, he espied a figure coming along
the driveway in a waterproof and rubber boots. He recognized Amos,
his head to one side to keep his hat on, gently trotting before the
gale, as the mighty force against his back rendered a certain degree
of speed perfunctory. Mr. Cabot had begun to weary of solitude, and
saw with satisfaction that Amos crossed the road and continued
along the avenue. Beneath his waterproof was something large and
bulging, of which he seemed very careful. With a smiling salutation
he splashed by the window toward the side door, laid off his outer
coat and wiped his ponderous boots in the hall, then came into the
library bearing an enormous bunch of magnificent yellow roses. Mr.
Cabot recognized them as coming from a bush in which its owner
took the greatest pride, and in a moment their fragrance filled the
room.
“What beauties!” he exclaimed. “But are you sure they are for me?”
“If she decides to give them to you, sir.”
“She? Who? Bridget or Maggie?”
“Neither. They belong to the lady who is now absent; whose soul is
the Flower of Truth, and whose beauty is the Glory of the Morning.”
Then he added, with a gesture of humility, “That is, of course, if she
will deign to accept them.”
“But, my well-meaning young friend, were you gifted with less poetry
and more experience you would know that these roses will be faded
and decaying memories long before the recipient returns. And you a
farmer!”
Amos looked at the clock. “You seem to have precious little
confidence in my flowers, sir. They are good for three hours, I think.”
“Three hours! Yes, but to-day is Wednesday and it is many times
three hours before next Monday afternoon.”
A look of such complete surprise came into Amos’s face that Mr.
Cabot smiled as he asked, “Didn’t you know her visit was to last a
fortnight?”
The young man made no answer to this, but looked first at his
questioner and then at his roses with an air that struck Mr. Cabot at
the moment as one of embarrassment. As he recalled it afterward,
however, he gave it a different significance. With his eyes still on the
flowers Amos, in a lower voice, said, “Don’t you know that she is
coming to-day?”
“No. Do you?”
The idea of a secret correspondence between these two was not a
pleasant surprise; and the fact that he had been successfully kept in
ignorance of an event of such importance irritated him more than he
cared to show. He asked, somewhat dryly: “Have you heard from
her?”
“No, sir, not a word,” and as their eyes met Mr. Cabot felt it was a
truthful answer.
“Then why do you think she is coming?”
Amos looked at the clock and then at his watch. “Has no one gone to
the station for her?”
“No one,” replied Mr. Cabot, as he turned away and seated himself
at his desk. “Why should they?”
Then, in a tone which struck its hearer as being somewhat more
melancholy than the situation demanded, the young man replied: “I
will explain all this to-morrow, or whenever you wish, Mr. Cabot. It is
a long story, but if she does come to-day she will be at the station in
about fifty minutes. You know what sort of a vehicle the stage is. May
I drive over for her?”
“Certainly, if you wish.”
The young man lingered a moment as if there was something more
he wished to add, but left the room without saying it. A minute later
he was running as fast as the gale would let him along the avenue
toward his own house, and in a very short time Mr. Cabot saw a pair
of horses with a covered buggy, its leather apron well up in front,
come dashing down the avenue from the opposite house. Amid
fountains of mud the little horses wheeled into the road, trotted
swiftly toward the village and out of sight.
An hour and a half later the same horses, bespattered and dripping,
drew up at the door. Amos got out first, and holding the reins with
one hand, assisted Molly with the other. From the expression on the
two faces it was evident their cheerfulness was more than a match
for the fiercest weather. Mr. Cabot might perhaps have been
ashamed to confess it, but his was a state of mind in which this
excess of felicity annoyed him. He felt a touch of resentment that
another, however youthful and attractive, should have been taken
into her confidence, while he was not even notified of her arrival. But
she received a hearty welcome, and her impulsive, joyful embrace
almost restored him to a normal condition.
A few minutes later they were sitting in the library, she upon his lap
recounting the events that caused her unexpected return. Ned Elliott
was quite ill when she got there, and last night the doctor
pronounced it typhoid fever; that of course upset the whole house,
and she, knowing her room was needed, decided during the night to
come home this morning. Such was the substance of the narrative,
but told in many words, with every detail that occurred to her, and
with frequent ramifications; for the busy lawyer had always made a
point of taking a very serious interest in whatever his only child saw
fit to tell him. And this had resulted in an intimacy and a reliance
upon each other which was very dear to both. As Molly was telling
her story Maggie came in from the kitchen and handed her father a
telegram, saying Joe had just brought it from the post-office. Mr.
Cabot felt for his glasses and then remembered they were over on
his desk. So Molly tore it open and read the message aloud.
Hon. James Cabot, Daleford, Conn.
I leave for home this afternoon by the one-forty train.
Mary Cabot.
“Why, papa, it is my telegram! How slow it has been!”
“When did you send it?”
“I gave it to Sam Elliott about nine o’clock this morning, and it
wouldn’t be like him to forget it.”
“No, and probably he did not forget it. It only waited at the Bingham
station a few hours to get its breath before starting on a six-mile
walk.”
But he was glad to know she had sent the message. Suddenly she
wheeled about on his knee and inserted her fingers between his
collar and his neck, an old trick of her childhood and still employed
when the closest attention was required. “But how did you know I
was coming?”
“I did not.”
“But you sent for me.”
“No, Amos went for you of his own accord.”
“Well, how did he know I was coming?”
Mr. Cabot raised his eyebrows. “I have no idea, unless you sent him
word.”
“Of course I didn’t send him word. What an idea! Why don’t you tell
me how you knew?” and the honest eyes were fixed upon his own in
stern disapproval. He smiled and said it was evidently a mysterious
case; that she must cross-examine the prophet. He then told her of
the roses and of his interview with Amos. She was mystified, and
also a little excited as she recalled the stories of Deacon White, but
knowing her father would only laugh at them, contented herself with
exacting the promise of an immediate explanation from Mr. Judd.
 V
EARLY in the evening the young man appeared. He found Mr. Cabot
and Molly sitting before a cheerful fire, an agreeable contrast to the
howling elements without. She thanked him for the roses, expressing
her admiration for their uncommon beauty.
With a grave salutation he answered, “I told them, one morning,
when they were little buds, that if they surpassed all previous roses
there was a chance of being accepted by the Dispenser of Sunshine
who dwells across the way; and this is the result of their efforts.”
“The results are superb, and I am grateful.”
“There is no question of their beauty,” said Mr. Cabot, “and they
appear to possess a knowledge of coming events that must be of
value at times.”
“It was not from the roses I got my information, sir. But I will tell you
about that now, if you wish.”
“Well, take a cigar and clear up the mystery.”
It seemed a winter’s evening, as the three sat before the fire, the
older man in the centre, the younger people on either side, facing
each other. Mr. Cabot crossed his legs, and laying his magazine face
downward upon his lap, said, “I confess I shall be glad to have the
puzzle solved, as it is a little deep for me except on the theory that
you are skilful liars. Molly I know to be unpractised in that art, but as
for you, Amos, I can only guess what you may conceal under a
truthful exterior.”
Amos smiled. “It is something to look honest, and I am glad you can
say even that.” Then, after a pause, he leaned back in his chair and,
in a voice at first a little constrained, thus began:
“As long ago as I can remember I used to imagine things that were
to happen, all sorts of scenes and events that might possibly occur,
as most children do, I suppose. But these scenes, or imaginings,
were of two kinds: those that required a little effort of my own, and
another kind that came with no effort whatever. These last were the
most usual, and were sometimes of use as they always came true.
That is, they never failed to occur just as I had seen them. While a
child this did not surprise me, as I supposed all the rest of the world
were just like myself.”
At this point Amos looked over toward Molly and added, with a faint
smile, “I know just what your father is thinking. He is regretting that
an otherwise healthy young man should develop such lamentable
symptoms.”
“Not at all,” said Mr. Cabot. “It is very interesting. Go on.”
She felt annoyed by her father’s calmness. Here was the most
extraordinary, the most marvellous thing she had ever encountered,
and yet he behaved as if it were a commonplace experience of
every-day life. And he must know that Amos was telling the truth! But
Amos himself showed no signs of annoyance.
“As I grew older and discovered gradually that none of my friends
had this faculty, and that people looked upon it as something
uncanny and supernatural, I learned to keep it to myself. I became
almost ashamed of the peculiarity and tried by disuse to outgrow it,
but such a power is too useful a thing to ignore altogether, and there
are times when the temptation is hard to resist. That was the case
this afternoon. I expected a friend who was to telegraph me if unable
to come, and at half-past two no message had arrived: but being
familiar with the customs of the Daleford office I knew there might be
a dozen telegrams and I get none the wiser. So, not wishing to drive
twelve miles for nothing in such a storm, I yielded to the old
temptation and put myself ahead—in spirit of course—and saw the
train as it arrived. You can imagine my surprise when the first person
to get off was Miss Molly Cabot.”
Her eyes were glowing with excitement. Repressing an exclamation
of wonder, she turned toward her father and was astonished, and
gently indignant, to find him in the placid enjoyment of his cigar,
showing no surprise. Then she asked of Amos, almost in a whisper,
for her throat seemed very dry, “What time was it when you saw
this?”
“About half-past two.”
“And the train got in at four.”
“Yes, about four.”
“You saw what occurred on the platform as if you were there in
person?” Mr. Cabot inquired.
“Yes, sir. The conductor helped her out and she started to run into
the station to get out of the rain.”
“Yes, yes!” from Molly.
“But the wind twisted you about and blew you against him. And you
both stuck there for a second.”
She laughed nervously: “Yes, that is just what happened!”
“But I am surprised, Amos,” put in Mr. Cabot, “that you should have
had so little sympathy for a tempest-tossed lady as to fail to observe
there was no carriage.”
“I took it for granted you had sent for her.”
“But you saw there was none at the station.”
“There might have been several and I not see them.”
“Then your vision was limited to a certain spot?”
“Yes, sir, in a way, for I could only see as if I were there in person,
and I did not move around to the other side of the station.”
“Didn’t you take notice as you approached?”
Amos drew a hand up the back of his head and hesitated before
answering. “I closed my eyes at home with a wish to be at the station
as the train came in, and I found myself there without approaching it
from any particular direction.”
“And if you had looked down the road,” Mr. Cabot continued, after a
pause, “you would have seen yourself approaching in a buggy?”
“Yes, probably.”
“And from the buggy you might almost have seen what you have just
described.” This was said so calmly and pleasantly that Molly, for an
instant, did not catch its full meaning; then her eyes, in
disappointment, turned to Amos. She thought there was a flush on
the dark face, and something resembling anger as the eyes turned
toward her father. But Mr. Cabot was watching the smoke as it curled
from his lips. After a very short pause Amos said, quietly, “It had not
occurred to me that my statement could place me in such an
unfortunate position.”
“Not at all unfortunate,” and Mr. Cabot raised a hand in protest. “I
know you too well, Amos, to doubt your sincerity. The worst I can
possibly believe is that you yourself are misled: that you are perhaps
attaching a false significance to a series of events that might be
explained in another way.”
Amos arose and stood facing them with his back against the mantel.
“You are much too clever for me, Mr. Cabot. I hardly thought you
could accept this explanation, but I have told you nothing but the
truth.”
“My dear boy, do not think for a moment that I doubt your honesty.
Older men than you, and harder-headed ones, have digested more
incredible things. In telling your story you ask me to believe what I
consider impossible. There is no well-authenticated case on record
of such a faculty. It would interfere with the workings of nature.
Future events could not arrange themselves with any confidence in
your vicinity, and all history that is to come, and even the elements,
would be compelled to adjust themselves according to your
predictions.”
“But, papa, you yourself had positive evidence that he knew of my
coming two hours before I came. How do you explain that?”
“I do not pretend to explain it, and I will not infuriate Amos by calling
it a good guess, or a startling coincidence.”
Amos smiled. “Oh, call it what you please, Mr. Cabot. But it seems to
me that the fact of these things invariably coming true ought to count
for something, even with the legal mind.”
“You say there has never been a single case in which your prophecy
has failed?”
“Not one.”
“Suppose, just for illustration, that you should look ahead and see
yourself in church next Sunday standing on your head in the aisle,
and suppose you had a serious unwillingness to perform the act.
Would you still go to church and do it?”
“I should go to church and do it.”
“Out of respect for the prophecy?”
“No, because I could not prevent it.”
“Have you often resisted?”
“Not very often, but enough to learn the lesson.”
“And you have always fulfilled the prophecy?”
“Always.”
There was a short silence during which Molly kept her eyes on her
work, while Amos stood silently beside the fire as if there was
nothing more to be said. Finally Mr. Cabot knocked the ashes from
his cigar and asked, with his pleasantest smile, “Do you think if one
of these scenes involved the actions of another person than yourself,
that person would also carry it out?”
“I think so.”
“That if you told me, for instance, of something I should do to-morrow
at twelve o’clock, I should do it?”
“I think so.”
“Well, what am I going to do to-morrow at noon, as the clock strikes
twelve?”
 It seemed a long five minutes
“Give me five minutes,” and with closed eyes and head slightly
inclined, the young man remained leaning against the mantel without
changing his position. It seemed a long five minutes. Outside, the
tempest beat viciously against the windows, then with mocking
shrieks whirled away into the night. To Molly’s excited fancy the
echoing chimney was alive with the mutterings of unearthly voices.
Although in her father’s judgment she placed a perfect trust, there
still remained a lingering faith in this supernatural power, whatever it
was; but she knew it to be a faith her reason might not support. As
for Amos, he was certainly an interesting figure as he stood before
them, and nothing could be easier at such a moment than for an
imaginative girl to invest him with mystic attributes. Although
outwardly American so far as raiment, the cut of his hair, and his own
efforts could produce that impression, he remained, nevertheless,
distinctly Oriental. The dark skin, the long, black, clearly marked
eyebrows, the singular beauty of his features, almost feminine in
their refinement, betrayed a race whose origin and traditions were far
removed from his present surroundings. She was struck by the little
scar upon his forehead, which seemed, of a sudden, to glow and be
alive, as if catching some reflection from the firelight. While her eyes
were upon it, the fire blazed up in a dying effort, and went out; but
the little scar remained a luminous spot with a faint light of its own.
She drew her hand across her brow to brush away the illusion, and
as she again looked toward him he opened his eyes and raised his
head. Then he said to her father, slowly, as if from a desire to make
no mistake:
“To-morrow you will be standing in front of the Unitarian Church,
looking up at the clock on the steeple as it strikes twelve. Then you
will walk along by the Common until you are opposite Caleb
Farnum’s, cross the street, and knock at his door. Mrs. Farnum will
open it. She will show you into the parlor, the room on the right,
where you will sit down in a rocking-chair and wait. I left you there,
but can tell you the rest if you choose to give the time.”
Molly glanced at her father and was surprised by his expression.
Bending forward, his eyes fixed upon Amos with a look of the
deepest interest, he made no effort to conceal his astonishment. He
leaned back in the chair, however, and resuming his old attitude,
said, quietly:
“That is precisely what I intended to do to-morrow, and at twelve
o’clock, as I knew he would be at home for his dinner. Is it possible
that a wholesome, out-of-doors young chap like you can be
something of a mind-reader and not know it?”
“No, sir. I have no such talent.”
“Are you sure?”
“Absolutely sure. It happens that you already intended to do the thing
mentioned, but that was merely a coincidence.”
For a moment or two there was a silence, during which Mr. Cabot
seemed more interested in the appearance of his cigar than in the
previous conversation. At last he said:
“I understand you to say these scenes, or prophecies, or whatever
you call them, have never failed of coming true. Now, if I wilfully
refrain from calling on Mr. Farnum to-morrow it will have a tendency
to prove, will it not, that your system is fallible?”
“I suppose so.”
“And if you can catch it in several such errors you might in time lose
confidence in it?”
“Very likely, but I think it will never happen. At least, not in such a
way.”
“Just leave that to me,” and Mr. Cabot rose from his seat and stood
beside him in front of the fire. “The only mystery, in my opinion, is a
vivid imagination that sometimes gets the better of your facts; or
rather combines with your facts and gets the better of yourself.
These visions, however real, are such as come not only to hosts of
children, but to many older people who are highstrung and
imaginative. As for the prophetic faculty, don’t let that worry you. It is
a bump that has not sprouted yet on your head, or on any other.
Daniel and Elijah are the only experts of permanent standing in that
line, and even their reputations are not what they used to be.”
Amos smiled and said something about not pretending to compete
with professionals, and the conversation turned to other matters.
After his departure, as they went upstairs, Molly lingered in her
father’s chamber a moment and asked if he really thought Mr. Judd
had seen from his buggy the little incident at the station which he
thought had appeared to him in his vision.
“It seems safe to suppose so,” he answered. “And he could easily be
misled by a little sequence of facts, fancies, and coincidences that
happened to form a harmonious whole.”
“But in other matters he seems so sensible, and he certainly is not
easily deceived.”
“Yes, I know, but those are often the very people who become the
readiest victims. Now Amos, with all his practical common-sense, I
know to be unusually romantic and imaginative. He loves the mystic
and the fabulous. The other day while we were fishing together—
thank you, Maggie does love a fresh place for my slippers every
night—the other day I discovered, from several things he said, that
he was an out-and-out fatalist. But I think we can weaken his faith in
all that. He is too young and healthy and has too free a mind to
remain a permanent dupe.”
 VI
THE next morning was clear and bright. Mr. Cabot, absorbed in his
work, spent nearly the whole forenoon among his papers, and when
he saw Molly in her little cart drive up to the door with a seamstress
from the village, he knew the day was getting on. Seeing him still at
his desk as she entered, she bent over him and put a hand before
his eyes. “Oh, crazy man! You have no idea what a day it is, and to
waste it over an ink-pot! Why, it is half-past eleven, and I believe you
have been here ever since I left. Stop that work this minute and go
out of doors.” A cool cheek was laid against his face and the pen
removed from his fingers. “Now mind.”
“Well, you are right. Let us both take a walk.”
“I wish I could, but I must start Mrs. Turner on her sewing. Please go
yourself. It is a heavenly day.”
As he stepped off the piazza a few minutes later, she called out from
her chamber window, “Which way are you going, papa?”
“To the village, and I will get the mail.”
“Be sure and not go to Mr. Farnum’s.”
“I promise,” and with a smile he walked away. Her enthusiasm over
the quality of the day he found was not misplaced. The pure, fresh
air brought a new life. Gigantic snowy clouds, like the floating
mountains of fairy land, moved majestically across the heavens, and
the distant hills stood clear and sharp against the dazzling blue. The
road was muddy, but that was a detail to a lover of nature, and Mr.
Cabot, as he strode rapidly toward the village, experienced an
elasticity and exhilaration that recalled his younger days. He felt
more like dancing or climbing trees than plodding sedately along a
turnpike. With a quick, youthful step he ascended the gentle incline
that led to the Common, and if a stranger had been called upon to
guess at the gentleman’s age as he walked jauntily into the village
with head erect, swinging his cane, he would more likely have said
thirty years than sixty. And if the stranger had watched him for
another three minutes he would have modified his guess, and not
only have given him credit for his full age, but might have suspected
either an excessive fatigue or a mild intemperance. For Mr. Cabot,
during his short walk through Daleford Village, experienced a series
of sensations so novel and so crushing that he never, in his inner
self, recovered completely from the shock.
Instead of keeping along the sidewalk to the right and going to the
post-office according to his custom, he crossed the muddy road and
took the gravel walk that skirted the Common. It seemed a natural
course, and he failed to realize, until he had done it, that he was
going out of his way. Now he must cross the road again when
opposite the store. When opposite the store, however, instead of
crossing over he kept along as he had started. Then he stopped, as
if to turn, but his hesitation was for a second only. Again he went
ahead, along the same path, by the side of the Common. It was then
that Mr. Cabot felt a mild but unpleasant thrill creep upward along his
spine and through his hair. This was caused by a startling suspicion
that his movements were not in obedience to his own will. A moment
later it became a conviction. This consciousness brought the cold
sweat to his brow, but he was too strong a man, too clear-headed
and determined, to lose his bearings without a struggle or without a
definite reason. With all the force of his nature he stopped once
more to decide it, then and there: and again he started forward. An
indefinable, all-pervading force, gentle but immeasurably stronger
than himself, was exerting an intangible pressure, and never in his
recollection had he felt so powerless, so weak, so completely at the
mercy of something that was no part of himself; yet, while amazed
and impressed beyond his own belief, he suffered no obscurity of
intellect. The first surprise over, he was more puzzled than terrified,
more irritated than resigned.
For nearly a hundred yards he walked on, impelled by he knew not
what; then, with deliberate resolution, he stopped, clutched the
wooden railing at his side, and held it with an iron grip. As he did so,
the clock in the belfry of the Unitarian Church across the road began
striking twelve. He raised his eyes, and, recalling the prophecy of
Amos, he bit his lip, and his head reeled as in a dream. “To-morrow,
as the clock strikes twelve, you will be standing in front of the
Unitarian Church, looking up at it.” Each stroke of the bell—and no
bell ever sounded so loud—vibrated through every nerve of his
being. It was harsh, exultant, almost threatening, and his brain in a
numb, dull way seemed to quiver beneath the blows. Yet, up there,
about the white belfry, pigeons strutted along the moulding, cooing,
quarrelsome, and important, like any other pigeons. And the sunlight
was even brighter than usual; the sky bluer and more dazzling. The
tall spire, from the moving clouds behind it, seemed like a huge ship,
sailing forward and upward as if he and it were floating to a different
world.
Still holding fast to the fence, he drew the other hand sharply across
his eyes to rally his wavering senses. The big elms towered serenely
above him, their leaves rustling like a countless chorus in the
summer breeze. Opposite, the row of old-fashioned New England
houses stood calmly in their places, self-possessed, with no signs of
agitation. The world, to their knowledge, had undergone no sudden
changes within the last five minutes. It must have been a delusion: a
little collapse of his nerves, perhaps. So many things can affect the
brain: any doctor could easily explain it. He would rest a minute, then
return.
As he made this resolve his left hand, like a treacherous servant,
quietly relaxed its hold and he started off, not toward his home, but
forward, continuing his journey. He now realized that the force which
impelled him, although gentle and seemingly not hostile in purpose,
was so much stronger than himself that resistance was useless.
During the next three minutes, as he walked mechanically along the
sidewalk by the Common, his brain was nervously active in an effort
to arrive at some solution of this erratic business; some sensible
solution that was based either on science or on common-sense. But
that solace was denied him. The more he thought the less he knew.
No previous experience of his own, and no authenticated experience
of anyone else, at least of which he had ever heard, could he
summon to assist him. When opposite the house of Silas Farnum he
turned and left the sidewalk, and noticed, with an irresponsible
interest as he crossed the road, that with no care of his own he
avoided the puddles and selected for his feet the drier places. This
was another surprise, for he took no thought of his steps; and the
discovery added to the overwhelming sense of helplessness that
was taking possession of him. With no volition of his own he also
avoided the wet grass between the road and the gravel walk. He
next found himself in front of Silas Farnum’s gate and his hand
reached forth to open it. It was another mild surprise when this hand,
like a conscious thing, tried the wrong side of the little gate, then felt
about for the latch. The legs over which he had ceased to have
direction, carried him along the narrow brick walk, and one of them
lifted him upon the granite doorstep.
Once more he resolved, calmly and with a serious determination,
that this humiliating comedy should go no farther. He would turn
about and go home without entering the house. It would be well for
Amos to know that an old lawyer of sixty was composed of different
material from the impressionable enthusiast of twenty-seven. While
making this resolve the soles of his shoes were drawing themselves
across the iron scraper; then he saw his hand rise slowly toward the
old-fashioned knocker and, with three taps, announce his presence.
A huge fly dozing on the knocker flew off and lit again upon the panel
of the door. As it readjusted its wings and drew a pair of front legs
over the top of its head Mr. Cabot wondered, if at the creation of the
world, it was fore-ordained that this insect should occupy that
identical spot at a specified moment of a certain day, and execute
this trivial performance. If so, what a rôle humanity was playing! The
door opened and Mrs. Farnum, with a smiling face, stood before him.
“How do you do, Mr. Cabot? Won’t you step in?”
As he opened his lips to decline, he entered the little hallway, was
shown into the parlor and sat in a horse-hair rocking-chair, in which
he waited for Mrs. Farnum to call her husband. When the husband
came Mr. Cabot stated his business and found that he was once
more dependent upon his own volition. He could rise, walk to the
window, say what he wished, and sit down again when he desired.