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Textbook Political Anthropology Helmuth Plessner Ebook All Chapter PDF
Plessner
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POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Northwestern University
Studies in Phenomenology
and
Existential Philosophy
Helmuth Plessner
Support for the publication of this book was provided by the Helmuth Plessner
Gesellschaft and the Groninger Helmuth Plessner Fund.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Introduction vii
Heike Delitz and Robert Seyfert
Political Anthropology
Helmuth Plessner
v
10 Excursus: Why It Is Significant for the Question of
Power That the Primacy of Philosophy or Anthropology
Is Undecidable 61
Notes 111
Glossary 123
The Topic
(that is, by comparing forms of the living) but on the contrary by look-
ing at the historical and cultural diversity of human life alone—which
also includes recognizing oneself to be human in relation to animals or
God, for example. Instead of grounding anthropology exclusively in a
philosophy of organic life, Plessner now also bases it on a philosophy of
historical and political life. Or, in yet another set of terms: while Levels of
the Organic foregrounded the human as subject and object of nature and
(organic) life, the specific, singular relation of the human to itself (the
awareness not just of being a body but of “having” a body, of being able
to objectivize it), Political Anthropology thematizes the human as subject
and object of culture. At its core, “excentric positionality” now constitutes
the originary foundation of anthropology, philosophy (of life), and poli-
tics equally (73–74). Because the human confronts itself excentrically, it
must always make itself into something— endow itself with an identity,
settle. This is true on the individual as well as, and above all, the cultural
level. To make this point, Plessner discusses the philosophy of Wilhelm
Dilthey (as well as that of Georg Misch).7 The task Plessner has set himself
is to develop a philosophy of the political, a theory of political existence,
from the radical historicity of the human. The human, society, is always
also a differentiation from the other. For Plessner, this follows from the
very principle of unfathomability, which not only allows the self to en-
counter an other (for breaking out of the self) but the very “possibility of
understanding the human” (84). In the analogous space of the political,
it refers to the ethnically other, to other cultural spheres. Every identity
implies difference and therefore implies the political in the sense of de-
fining what is one’s own in delimiting it from what is foreign.
Political Anthropology thus develops, alongside its theory of the
political, a political ethics as well. Each concrete politics— the question
of how one fashions oneself and how one treats others— always depends
on an anthropology, on the contemporary philosophical (or, generally,
cultural) definition of the human. The political relation also permeates
all social relations. For Plessner, besides international relations, relations
of neighborship in the literal sense are “political,” too. With Schmitt and
against him, Plessner here advocates an ethics or a civilizing of politics.
The diversity of human possibilities results from excentric positionality
and thus from the unfathomability of human life. This diversity has a cor-
relate in the competition for political existence, in contest, in striving for
success. The political means a relationship of power. Yet from excentric
positionality also follows powerlessness and thus the possibility of hubris,
crime, and blunders.8 Human life remains tied to the body and to one’s
history. Given the potential seriousness of the political, namely violence
done to organic and mortal living beings, politics, in modern, liberal
x
HE I K E D E LI T Z AND RO BE RT S E Y FE RT
societies, must curb itself. This, for Plessner, is the function of the state
and of the law.
In other words, Plessner’s concept of the political, which adopts but
at the same time formalizes Schmitt’s friend–enemy distinction, results
from his definition of human life as an “and-connection” (81) of power
and powerlessness (excentricity and positionality). The differentiation into
friend and enemy corresponds to the formal structure of the human, “ex-
centric positionality,” thanks to which humans in their own familiarity can
also always encounter themselves as foreign. The friend–enemy relation
is to be thought abstractly. It also concerns political-existential questions,
but it permeates all social relationships. In 1931, in the face of the loom-
ing catastrophe, Plessner urges a limitation of the intensity of the struggle
for power, and he urges a playful form of the political, democracy, which
turns the struggle into a competition, an election instead of a violent
campaign. Plessner thus seeks to derive the seriousness and the relativity
of the political from the simultaneity of power (in the sense of creative
ability and genuinely political power) and powerlessness, from the fact
that the human is creative, formative of world, and a physical “thing.”
Not least of all, Plessner’s anthropology and ethics seek to engage
with the philosophy that dominated contemporary debate, the philos-
ophy of Martin Heidegger.9 As a philosophy of the human (Dasein) that
despises the sphere of the public and political, Heidegger’s philosophy
is co-responsible for the Fate of the German Spirit at the End of Its Bourgeois
Period (as the original title of Plessner’s 1935 book, Belated Nation, has it).10
It is an apolitical thinking that turns out to be indifferent toward the usur-
pation of power and racist political ideologies. When moral philosophy,
and the study of art and culture, despise the political, it is no wonder
that politics attacks cultural life “from below” (87) and becomes racist,
for example. Against existentialism, Plessner also stresses the equal status
of all forms of being human, their historical, sociocultural relativity—
which acknowledgment of relativity is at the same time genuinely Euro-
pean. Plessner thus insists, on the one hand, on relativizing all values, on
“renouncing the supremacy” of one’s own system of values (47). On the
other hand, he stresses the concomitant binding quality that each cul-
ture has for itself and the achievement of European culture (in the sense
of humanism, liberalism, the peaceful struggle for power) that consists
in having reached this idea. Relativization must not lead to giving one-
self up. Relativization cannot stop at seemingly universally valid human
rights— that would be yet another “one-sided reduction,” a “monopoli-
zation of a specific, historically become human-kind” (54)— yet neither
does it relativize its own values: it legitimizes them in particular ways,
like other cultures. Nor can European culture view humanist values as
nonbinding (74).
xi
I N T R O D UCT I O N
crisis and the civil war of ideologies (between the equally radical ideas
of community on the left and right Plessner had diagnosed in Limits of
Community). Yet its future still remained open; the republic had not yet
been dissolved. Plessner in this situation placed his hopes in a “civil com-
promise” in which agreement on European values would be reached.
Europe had experienced wars of religion and the First World War; in
the “German civil war, the real possibility of a second world war” already
announced itself, a war between (European) nation-states. Only empires
stood a chance “to survive a state of exception, i.e., Carl Schmitt’s crite-
rion for political sovereignty.” In that sense, Plessner was not just con-
cerned with a compromise, not just with cherishing European values in
the sense of a lowest common denominator; he sought actively to defend
them.15 This is true in particular with respect to the concept of the people.
Plessner seeks to demystify this concept— which in Political Anthropology
has a connotation so positive it puts off some readers— the way he had
sought in 1928 to demystify the concept of life and in 1924 the concept of
community. At precisely this point, in the age of the people or “the age of
the demos and its self-determination in a nation-state,” precisely in “an age
in which dictatorship has become a living power,” the task is to outline a
political philosophy that does not substantialize the “people.” The task is to find
an anthropological concept of the political or, in other words, “to under-
stand the human necessity of politics” (5).
The concrete occasion for Plessner’s writing Political Anthopology, in
a professional and personal situation severely impacted by accusations of
plagiarism,16 was, it seems, an invitation by the publisher Ernst von Hippel
to write a volume on “Political Anthropology” in the series Fachschriften
zur Politik und staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung (Technical Papers on Poli-
tics and Civic Education), specializing in politics and civic education.
Plessner himself wrote about the project that he was now (following the
Levels) attempting the “‘derivation’ of excentric positionality as a struc-
ture that opens up the political (the ‘historical’).”17
the religious energies that nourished it. In the background of this Fate of
the German Mind at the End of Its Bourgeois Period— that is, its self-demise in
National Socialism—Plessner sees on the one hand a specifically German
Protestant (Lutheran) piety.25 Unlike the lighter, institutionally bound
faith of Catholicism, its endowment of secular objects and ideas with
religious content and intensity leads to German intellectuals’ apolitical
attitude. Political Anthropology is written against this attitude. On the other
hand, the specifically German political situation (the irresolvably double
imperial tradition of Prussia and Austria) leads to a belated (compared
to Britain and France) formation of the idea of nationhood. That is why,
according to Plessner, the concept of the “people” is formed instead of
that of a “nation,” which defines itself through civil society and citizen-
ship. The concept “people” was not endowed with European values; the
German nation was defined by its shared “blood.” Political Anthropology is
also written to oppose this community of the people. In short, Plessner (like
Voegelin) seeks a genealogical and anthropological sobering of the genu-
inely German mystification of the concept of the people, which served
to legitimize a policy of exclusion, cleansing, and extermination. In this
sense, the book is a direct continuation of what Plessner had described
as the motivation behind his Introduction to Philosophical Anthropology (the
subtitle of Levels of the Organic and the Human) in 1928:
Every age finds its own redeeming word. The terminology of the eigh-
teenth century culminated in the concept of reason; that of the nine-
teenth in the concept of progress; the current one in the concept of
life. . . . And yet all periods want to grasp the same thing, and the actual
meanings of the words become for them merely the means . . . for ren-
dering visible that ultimate depth of things without a consciousness of
which all human beginning would be without background and without
meaning.26
Now, in 1931, as already in 1924, Plessner pushes ahead with the demys-
tification of the “people.” This is why he speaks of the “nationality” of
human existence in an entirely formal or structural and precisely not a
substantialist sense.
Plessner was considered Jewish according to the Nazis’ racist clas-
sification and so was forced to emigrate in 1933, first to Turkey, then to
the Netherlands and the United States. There, he was one of the “ar-
gonauts on Long Island”— the intellectual community around Hannah
Arendt, Gershom Scholem, Theodor Adorno, Siegfried Kracauer, Carl
Löwith, and Max Horkheimer.27 In 1962– 63 he was the first Theodor
Heuss Professor at the New School for Social Research in New York City.
xv
I N T R O D UCT I O N
While the reception of his work in Germany was stymied for a long time,
first by the accusations of plagiarism already mentioned, and then by
his exclusion from German academia because of an arbitrarily assigned
Jewishness, in the years since 1989 his oeuvre has increasingly become a
subject of discussion in German and Continental philosophy and related
fields (sociology, political theory, pedagogy).
Internationally and in the English- speaking world, he is known
thanks to the translations of The Limits of Community and Laughing and
Crying: A Study of the Limits of Human Behavior (1941). Written in the midst
of World War II, this latter anthropological study addresses laughing
and crying in order to “proceed” to philosophy or philosophical anthro-
pology “from man as a whole,” from “what is common to all men” and
women “and differentiates them from other beings.” In this way, “laugh-
ing and crying are revealed as genuine, basic possibilities of the univer-
sally human, despite all historical change, all varieties of jest, wit, drollery,
humor, irony, pain, and tragedy.”28 An English translation is underway
of Plessner’s first major work, Levels of the Organic and the Human, which
may rightly be considered his major work overall. In addition, there are
translations of several shorter essays.29 Among the secondary literature in
English, special mention must be made of Marjorie Grene’s work, even
if it does not concern Plessner’s theory of the political but philosophical
anthropology and biology.30 The number of studies and the range of
topics they address have increased in recent years.31
The Book
Exposure of the Human”), he lays out the foundation and the conse-
quences of his own political theory. In its relation to historicity, European
culture paradoxically relativizes itself in the very move by which, for itself,
it asserts this view of the world to be the only one that is “correct.” It sees
itself as one among many possible cultures past and present, it becomes
aware of “its own relativity”— and yet it is deeply convinced that a way
of thinking that accepts “unfathomability as binding for any knowledge
of the life of the human” remains “viable in the future” (47–48). In ac-
knowledging the indeterminacy of the human or the contingency of each
and every cultural form, the human now conceives of itself as a political
being— as power, as ability, as an open question that must be answered
anew time and again. Historicity here is, first of all, a “theoretical” power,
a power over history, the power of again and again letting history become
anew (54–55). Yet it is also “practical- political power” (45). The past is not
only re-actualized or instrumentalized politically; all creation, all making
of history is a political act. In this respect, the human is “a historical and
therefore political being” (45).
Here, too, Plessner engages with Heidegger, specifically his “abso-
lutiz[ing] our own Western position” (50). This is the most important
backdrop to Plessner’s foundation of the political in the sense of a
struggle about familiarity and foreignness, about one’s own culture and
that of others, about integration and exclusion— even if these formu-
las are introduced in an entirely formal or abstract way. “As power, the
human”— and not just a given society or culture—“is necessarily engaged
in a struggle for power, i.e., in the opposition of familiarity and foreignness,
of friend and enemy” (53). Why is the other always uncanny, why is the
other structurally more enemy than friend, why is the foreign the danger-
ous, and why does this institute a political situation? The friend–enemy
distinction is an effect and consequence of the “essential constitution of
the human” (53), its excentric positionality. Precisely because the human
perceives itself to be indeterminate, encounters itself as an open ques-
tion, a horizon appears in the human world that separates the famil-
iar from the unfamiliar. The friend–enemy distinction begins in being-
oneself: “the human does not see ‘itself’ only in its Here but also in the
There of the other” (54). This horizon traverses excentric positionality
(the individual) as much as it does the cultural sphere or the nation. It
is culturally and historically indeterminate. There can thus be politics
concerning just about anything— wherever a horizon separates the fa-
miliar from the unfamiliar, within one’s own self as much as “between
man and woman, master and servant, teacher and student,” or different
cultures (55). “Unfathomability” entails that cultures determine them-
selves. Accordingly, they determine themselves differently historically. Un-
xix
I N T R O D UCT I O N
fathomability here means for Plessner (referring to Freud) that the other
appears as uncanny, as an alterity. This uncanniness is not explained by
some “detrimental effect the foreign might possibly have on the sphere of
familiarity” (54) but paradoxically by the familiarity of the foreign: “The
foreign is that which is one’s own, familiar, and homely in the other” (54).
Such structural foreignness (which pervades the self as much as it does
cultures) is radical and cannot be resolved by universal values, not even
by the idea of human rights, which absolutizes one conception of being-
human (54). Plessner stresses throughout that “horizon[s] of uncanni-
ness” differ in each culture and that the friend–enemy distinction shifts
constantly (55) and exists on many levels (thus also, for example, in the
relations between the sexes or between classes).
This is where he now defines the political. The political is the “con-
stant of the human situation” that is concerned with “securing and in-
creasing one’s own power by restricting or annihilating the foreign do-
main” (55). Plessner immediately ties this definition to the institution
of (always specific) law. The political relation is changeable, it is never
clearly delimited. Between what is one’s own and what is foreign, there
is instead an “unstable front line on which, in a thousand ways, what is
needed for life must be won from the opponents, it must be wrought from
them, they must be prayed to for it, cheated out of it” (57). These oppo-
nents may include nature, or the extraterrestrial, or Ebola, or some other
entity, yet what Plessner is aiming at is the essential non-securedness or
“exposure” of the human. This is the reason for an always artificial institu-
tion of the law, of a meaning that denies the “randomness, corrigibility,
and one-sidedness” of all modes of being-human (59). Law, as Cornelius
Castoriadis would say, is grounded in a culture’s central imaginary, which
itself needs no further foundation, in the “empty signifier.” In appealing
to God or to human rights, in instituting an in their eyes “‘natural’ order as
the just order,” in inventing for themselves “what is right and what is just,”
cultures establish it as, precisely, not unfounded. “The human does not
invent anything it does not discover” and vice versa.33 In this imaginary,
unfounded-founding enforcement of statutory law lies the meaning of
the organization of power, including the state (59).
Following a further excursus on the “nondecidability of the pri-
macy of the philosophical or anthropological view of the human,” Pless-
ner brings in the second paradox, that of the power and powerlessness
of the human. Human facts such as the formation of collectives testify
to human power, to creative ability, to the imagination of worlds. At the
same time, this form of life, too, remains tied to the body, it is subject to
the laws of nature “like a head of cattle” (80). As a body, the human is an
other to itself, the body determines the human “down to the last detail”
xx
HE I K E D E LI T Z AND RO BE RT S E Y FE RT
(81). A theory that seeks to know “what makes the human the human”
(how the human makes itself the human) cannot ignore this aspect of
human existence. As “excentric position,” the human is foreign to itself
(84). This is where we may situate the point at which Plessner could have
thematized the role of political violence.34 In terms of social theory, how-
ever, Plessner draws a different conclusion: because human existence is
tied to a body, there is no form of being-human that would not already
be “particular and partisan” and necessarily spatialized in a juxtaposition.
Plessner situates this particularity on several levels, yet on none of these,
not even on the level of the people, is there a “ground” to be found,
something substantially divided: “Belonging to a people is an essential
trait of the human like being able to say I and You, like familiarity and
foreignness, like . . . riskedness and authenticity” (86). What people one
belongs to, moreover, is contingent. For both of these reasons, it is nec-
essary to civilize politics.
“You must give the Devil his due” was the epigraph Plessner had chosen
for The Limits of Community in 1924.37 Both Schmitt and Plessner sought
xxi
I N T R O D UCT I O N
One could test all theories of state and political ideas according to
their anthropology and thereby classify these as to whether they con-
sciously or unconsciously presuppose man to be by nature evil or by
nature good. The distinction is to be taken here in a rather summary
fashion and not in a specifically moral or ethical sense. The problematic
or unproblematic conception of man is decisive for the presupposi-
tion of every further political consideration, the answer to the ques-
tion whether man is a dangerous being or not, a risky or a harmless
creature.39
I would like to draw attention to only one point: that the concept of
“life” is applied without qualification to existences of all types, per-
sonal and individual human existence as well as collective existence. I
consider this breadth of meaning to be inappropriate because a whole
range of problems concerning the interhuman constitution of a supra-
personal, social existence is not considered.41
ways that resemble Plessner. Central for these authors’ definition of the
political is an “ever present possibility of antagonism”57 and the curbing
of enmity, of struggle, in the conflict about power conducted according
to democratic-parliamentarian rules. Plessner’s text can thus also be re-
lated to a general theory of collective identity, a theory of the logic of the
social as such, in addition to a theory that specifies this social logic in the
case of democratic regimes. Laclau and Mouffe think the general logic
of the social as identification via difference:
In the field of collective identities, we are always dealing with the crea-
tion of a “we” which can exist only by the demarcation of a “they.”
This does not mean of course that such a relation is necessarily one
of friend/enemy, i.e. an antagonistic one. But we should acknowledge
that, in certain conditions, there is always the possibility that this we/
they relation can become antagonistic.58
3
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