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Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in The American South (Politics and Culture in The Twentieth-Century South Ser., 18) Frederickson
Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in The American South (Politics and Culture in The Twentieth-Century South Ser., 18) Frederickson
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Cold War Dixie
SERIES EDITORS
ADVISORY BOARD
KARI FREDERICKSON
Frederickson, Kari A.
Cold War Dixie : militarization and modernization in the American
South / Kari Frederickson.
pages cm. — (Politics and culture in the twentieth-century South)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn-13: 978-0-8203-4519-2 (hardcover : alkaline paper)
isbn-10: 0-8203-4519-9 (hardcover : alkaline paper)
isbn-13: 978-0-8203-4520-8 (paperback : alkaline paper)
isbn-10: 0-8203-4520-2 (paperback : alkaline paper)
1. Savannah River Valley (Ga. and S.C.)—History—20th century.
2. Savannah River Valley (Ga. and S.C.)—Social conditions—20th
century. 3. Savannah River Valley (Ga. and S.C.)—Economic
conditions—20th century. 4. Cold War—Social aspects—Savannah
River Valley (Ga. and S.C.) 5. Nuclear weapons industry—Social
aspects—Savannah River Valley (Ga. and S.C.)—History—20th
century. 6. Savannah River Plant (E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Company)—History. 7. Militarism—Savannah River Valley (Ga. and
S.C.)—History—20th century. 8. Social change—Savannah River
Valley (Ga. and S.C.)—History—20th century. 9. Aiken (S.C.)—
Social conditions—20th century. 10. Aiken (S.C.)—Economic
conditions—20th century. I. Title.
f277.s3f74 2013
975'.043—dc23 2012048326
List of Illustrations ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
One. “This Most Essential Task”: The Decision to Build the Super 10
Notes 177
Bibliography 205
Index 221
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I L LU S T R AT I O N S
Figure 1. Redcliffe 26
Figure 2. John Shaw Billings on the balcony of Redcliffe 27
Figure 3. Graniteville Mill 38
Figure 4. Louise Hitchcock 42
Figure 5. Banksia 43
Figure 6. Ellenton depot 54
Figure 7. Ellenton businesses 54
Figure 8. Cassels’s Long Store, Ellenton 55
Figure 9. Strom Thurmond 62
Figure 10. Construction administration area 76
Figure 11. Construction workers attending a mandatory safety meeting 82
Figure 12. Shift change during the construction phase 83
Figure 13. Savannah River Plant under construction 86
Figure 14. “Why We Eat Better” 129
Figure 15. Crawford H. Greenewalt 133
Figure 16. Aiken City Seal 145
This page intentionally left blank
AC K N O W L E D G M E N T S
xii · A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
INTRODUCTION
Open any South Carolina highway map and you will find standard features—
blue highways and roads, black railroad lines, dotted lines denoting county
boundaries, red flags marking schools and hospitals, green parks and golf
courses. Near the state’s western border, though, is a massive blank space la-
beled “The Savannah River Site—U.S. Department of Energy.” Covering ap-
proximately 20 percent of Aiken County, 30 percent of Barnwell County, and
10 percent of Allendale, the Savannah River Site is rendered featureless on most
maps, a vast expanse of federal white space that is devoid of traditional car-
tographic characteristics. Built in the early 1950s amid the escalating tensions
and threats of the Cold War, the Savannah River Plant (as it was known until
the 1980s) was an Atomic Energy Commission (aec) facility operated by the
Du Pont Corporation and dedicated to producing plutonium, tritium, deute-
rium, and heavy water for the hydrogen bomb. In size and scope, the Savan-
nah River Plant (srp) was a technological and engineering marvel—the most
expansive federal project ever undertaken. Its five nuclear reactors and more
than two hundred other industrial and administrative buildings were spread
across more than three hundred square miles—an area roughly the size of
Washington, D.C. Built to meet the needs of a new kind of war—a war with
no end in sight—the srp imprinted the modern military state on the southern
landscape, transforming not only the space within its boundaries but the sur-
rounding communities.
As the aec’s largest installation, the experiences and problems encountered
in the development of the srp provided a blueprint for future Cold War com-
munities across the nation. The changes that unfolded in this mostly rural
section of South Carolina reflected the intersection of national policy and
priorities with complex local realities. The srp was the first aec installation
Map 1. The Savannah River Plant, South Carolina.
Map 2. The Savannah River Plant and surrounding area.
bomb. The president replied that he had nothing to say until he had made his
decision, his first public acknowledgment that the issue existed and was being
debated within the corridors of power. Much to the scientists’ dismay, Tru-
man was determined to keep discussions of the new weapon restricted. Conse-
quently, speculation abounded regarding who supported and who opposed the
hydrogen bomb. On January 2, 1950, syndicated columnists Joseph and Stewart
Alsop laid out the issue of the “super bomb,” somberly noting that “dustily and
obscurely, the issues of life and death are settled nowadays—dingy committee
rooms are the scenes of the debate; harassed officials are the disputants; all the
proceedings are highly classified; yet the whole future hangs, perhaps, upon the
outcome.” The Alsops urged the principals to “bring the present debate out of
its native darkness. . . . [T]his must be done, since deeper issues are involved,
which have been far too long concealed from the country.”
Shut out of the debate, concerned citizens wrote anxious letters to the presi-
dent. Many sympathized with his “terrible burden” but nevertheless demanded
that the discussion and decision for taking such a fateful step be made in the
open and not by one man. Some correspondents, like Roy Valencourt of North
Manchester, Indiana, anguished over this turn of events, reminding the presi-
dent that “we American people are ultimately responsible, morally, for the acts
of our political officials.” Valencourt worried about the consequences of mov-
ing forward on the development of the hydrogen bomb, consequences that
included provoking the Russians to build their own bomb, “perhaps an even
greater number of nervous breakdowns and psycho-neurotic cases as a result
of increased psychological insecurity, an increased and intensified antagonism
between representatives of the Russian and American governments.” Ann
Hedges, who identified herself as a “young wife and mother” from Baltimore,
likewise saw the question in personal and moral terms, urging the president
more aggressively to pursue arms control talks with the Russians. “What will
our possession of powerful weapons mean if my family is dead and the world
around me all but destroyed?” Columbia University philosophy professor Hor-
ace L. Friess stated that “if it should seem necessary to construct this weapon,”
Congress and the president should resolve “not to use it unless it is used against
us. . . . Without some such heroic restraint I believe the moral loss to our cause
would more than offset any tactical and diplomatic advantages.” Many writers
simply told the president that they were praying for him in this difficult time.
It is unclear to what extent the president wrestled with the decision, as he
left nothing in writing. On January 31, 1950, Lilienthal, Acheson, and Johnson
“ T H I S M O S T E S S E N T I A L T A S K ” · 15
presented their recommendation that work should proceed on the hydrogen
bomb, although Lilienthal continued to express strong reservations. Relying
on atomic weapons as the country’s chief defense, he argued, was dangerous.
Truman asked one question of his advisers: “Can the Russians do it?” When
all solemnly nodded, Truman declared, “In that case, we have no choice. We’ll
go ahead.” Later that day, Truman authorized an accelerated program to de-
velop the hydrogen bomb. Almost immediately following this decision, the
president, in response to new realities, directed the State Department’s Policy
Planning Staff to review the nation’s security needs. The result was National
Security Council Document 68 (nsc-68), a fifty-eight-page memorandum that
became a blueprint for American Cold War policy. The authors characterized
the Soviet Union as a hostile power “animated by a new fanatical faith” and de-
termined “to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.” Among
other recommendations, nsc-68 proposed meeting the growing Soviet threat
with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.
As the administration was developing policy to confront the new realities
of Soviet atomic capabilities, international events dictated an immediate mili-
tary response to the communist threat. In the early hours of Sunday morning,
June 25, 1950, given the green light from Stalin, thousands of North Koreans
poured southward over the Thirty-Eighth Parallel into South Korea, a blatant
violation of the United Nations–sanctioned boundary and thus a “challenge
[to] the entire structure of postwar collective security.” Within hours, Tru-
man’s administration determined that it would come to the defense of South
Korea and would seek United Nations approval and support for that effort.
With un approval, the international community took only days to mobilize
against this new threat to international security. The Korean War had begun.
Amid these frightening international developments, the aec undertook a fe-
verish expansion program beginning in October 1950. Key to this expansion
was the development of a facility to produce plutonium and tritium. This
new plant to create material for the world’s first thermonuclear weapon would
constitute a key component of the nation’s beefed-up arsenal.
With Truman’s decision to go forward with the development of the hydro-
gen bomb, the country began mobilizing in no uncertain terms for a new kind
of war, one for which no models existed. This new mobilization demanded new
facilities and infrastructure. The aec was charged with finding a contractor
and a site for the new weapons complex.
Established in 1947, the aec “supplanted the Manhattan Engineering District
16 · C H A P T E R O N E
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Title: Ampiaispesä
Kyläkertomus
Language: Finnish
Kyläkertomus
Kirj.
VEIKKO KORHONEN
I.
Maaliskuu oli lopuillaan. Kolmojoki oli luonut jääpeitteensä ja
virtaili tasaisesti lämpimässä auringon paisteessa.
Kolmojoki oli aikoinaan virtaillut koskemattoman metsän läpi.
Vähitellen sen rannoille oli muodostunut viljelyksiä ja taloja, ja nyt se
jo eroitti toisistaan kaksi kyläkuntaa, jotka olivat sen äyräille
muodostuneet. Kyläkunta olisi oikeastaan sopinut olemaan yhtenä,
mutta se oli jotenkuten eroittunut kahdeksi. Joen pohjoispuolinen
kyläkunta sai joesta nimensä ja eteläistä sanottiin Korpijoeksi,
koskapa sen kylän asukkaat vieläkin väittivät Kolmojokea aikoinaan
sanotun Korpijoeksi.
— Eikö mitä… Oli se isä pannut rysän jokeen, mutta oli jättänyt
kalasimen auki. Se ukko on välistä semmoinen toljake, virkkoi Eedla.