Issue No.

09 August 2007

August 2007

Issue No. 09

From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and efficiency in daily operation. E-JETS NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance. Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to EMBRAER Customers. Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at CIS / Aerochain at
http://www.aerochain.com

- Login (enter username and password); - Select Technical Services and then EMBRAER Customer Services; - Select Maintenance Support; - Select E-JETS NEWS; - Click on desired E-JETS NEWS. If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS publication can be addressed to:

E-JETS NEWS Tel: Fax: +55 12 3927 5762 +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third party without EMBRAERs written consent. Also, no article published should be considered authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

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August 2007

Issue No. 09

Engine-Driven Pump (EDP) -03 Removals Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS release No 7, EMBRAER issued SBs 170-29-0011 and 190-29-0007 on October 2006 replacing the current EDP with a new one 51164-03 to reduce the occurrences of external leakage and increase the reliability of the pump. The retrofit campaign is ongoing and around 80% of the fleet has the new part number. Until August 2007, fourteen units of new EDP 51164-03 were returned to Parker. Four of them were No Fault Found: One unit removed during troubleshooting because of a system pressure fault. A defective ground wire causing a low pressure indication on the hydraulic system synoptic page was identified. Three units removed because of system leakage. Pump determination: No Fault Found about the other units

Pitch Trim Backup Switch Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS release No. 4, EMBRAER has identified in the field some occurrences of pitch trim backup switch failure. It was observed that during the attempt to clear the message, power-down/ powerup was performed with no success. In order to advise the operators about the correct procedure as described in FIM TASK 27-43-00-810-809-A, EMBRAER would like to emphasize that, to clear the message, the procedure below must be followed: 1 - Reset the SYS 1 CUTOUT and SYS 2 CUTOUT pushbuttons on the Trim Control Panel; 2 - Do the return-to-service test of the flight control system (AMM TASK 27-0000-070-801-A); 3 - Perform the BACKUP PITCH TRIM switch check; Note: No power-down / power-up is required. In addition, Primus Epic Load 19.3 incorporates a feature in which the Pitch Trim Backup Fail message will not be latched on ground unless a hard failure condition is detected. A dedicated forum has been created in the EFF (EMBRAER Fleet Forum) to discuss this issue.

The findings resulted:

One unit ran dry for over an hour. It is suspected to have had an internal failure of the barrel assembly from running dry, resulting in high case pressure, causing system leakage and depletion. One unit returned for leakage was found with rotating group worn. Eight units found leaking at the split line. Upon disassembly, the large face seal was found damaged, resulting in an external leakage. The EDP split line seal is under investigation.

APU inlet silencer Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER and Hamilton Sundstrand have reported APU inlet silencer (PN 4952354) damage as presented in E-Jets NEWS Release No 06. Moreover, common damage in the APU inlet silencer splitter vanes (refer to figure 2) and their joints with the main assembly (refer to figure 3) have been observed.
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The investigation about the seal failure is ongoing and EMBRAER is working on a sampling plan with a specific operator. Units will run on-condition in an attempt to replicate the failure.

August 2007
A repair procedure has been available since April 2007. The repair procedure covers most of the reported damage. As recent investigations have identified the root causes as being the ingestion of debris, vibrations, aerodynamic erosion and handling, the interim solution includes additional inspection criteria for units that are in operation. A special repair procedure was also included in the Component Maintenance Manual (CMM Part Number 4952354) since July 2007. Final solution has involved improved metallic material and longer fasteners installed on the production line and during repair since March 2007. The APU silencers will be reworked and/or upgraded at shop visit. In addition, a retrofit plan will be informed.

Issue No. 09

CF34-8E Early Engines Removal Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER was informed about early engine removals due to the combustor liner as presented in the E-Jets NEWS Release No 6 (Topic: CF34-8E Combustor Liner). Inspection was performed after the engine experienced high ITT. After a borescope inspection, damage exceeding limits described in EMM (Subtask 72-00-00-220-065 (Page 843) For the inspection limits, refer to Table 803) was found. Preliminary investigation on removed engine indicated no impact on engine operability. On High Pressure Compressor, significant deposits were observed along the leading edges of all blades and vanes from stage 4 and up, not silt-like, as found in the hot section. Missing material was also observed at stage 1 & 2 of the HPT nozzle. The root cause is environment-related and caused by sand ingestion and accumulation. So far this has been observed only at one operator. GE interim recommendations to this particular operator were already given. By end of September, GE will complete them and fix proposals releasing a field SB to determine other operators condition.

Figure 1 APU Inlet PN 4952354

Figure 2 APU Inlet

Figure 1 Combustor liner Assembly

Figure 3 Detailed APU Inlet silencer

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August 2007

Issue No. 09

BRK LH / RH FAULT correlated to pressure higher than BCM Commanded UPDATE

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 This article is an update of E-Jets NEWS release No. 6. The accomplishment of SB190-32-0017 (Flushing Procedure for Brake System), SB190-32-0019 (Shutoff Valve improvement), and SB190-32-0020 (Brake Control Valve Replacement) requires the opening of the brake system hydraulic lines. Therefore, it is necessary to bleed the system. Reports received from operators indicate the occurrence of BRK LH / RH Fault CAS messages in post-mod aircraft. For the reported cases, EMBRAER has recommended the bleeding of the brake system and improvement was noticed. An EMBRAER document (IC2007-190/05787) has been issued to all EMBRAER 190 operators with an update of AMM task 32-41-00870-801-A Main Brake System Bleeding. The updated task will be published in the next AMM scheduled revision (September). The bleeding procedure should always be performed whenever a component is replaced, specially during the accomplishment of SB190-32-0017, SB190-32-0019, and SB190-32-0020, strictly following the instructions of the aforementioned IC.

Figure 2 Combustor liner

Figure 3 - Deposits on HPC

New Engine Bleed LowPressure Check Valve Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 As an update of the articles related to the new LP Check Valves of E-Jets NEWS No. 1, 2 and 7, EMBRAER would like to clarify and update the following items: - ANAC AD 2005-09-03 R01 for the EMBRAER 170 and ANAC AD 2006-1101 for the EMBRAER 190 are in revision process in order to allow the new part number suffix -4 installation; - New part number suffix -4 in conjunction with the MRBR task number 36-11-02002 revised in May/07 will be considered a terminate action for those ANAC ADs; - FAA approved an AMOC (Alternate Means of Compliance) for the FAA AD 2005-23-14 paragraph (f) to EMBRAER 170 aircraft; - An AMOC to FAA AD 2007-16-09 applicable to EMBRAER 170 and 190 aircraft has already been released.

BRAKE FAULT during without hydraulic system

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

taxi

EMBRAER has received some reports of BRK LH (RH) FAULT message being displayed during taxi with no correlated CMC maintenance messages. After analyzing the DVDR, it was possible to identify that the hydraulic systems were off with the aircraft ground speed higher than 5 knots. In this condition, the brake system assumes that brake usage is necessary, but it is not available. Thus the BRK LH/(RH) FAULT message comes into view. In this case, the message does not represent a failure and it will extinguish when the condition is not presented.
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August 2007

Issue No. 09

Un-commanded dry motoring upon APU start Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 As described in E-Jets NEWS Release No 7, EMBRAER has been informed about an event involving one EMBRAER 190 aircraft which resulted in an uncommanded dry motoring. This was solved when the MAU1 GEN I/O 1 (Slot 11/12) was replaced. Honeywell has proceeded with MAU card teardown and provided shop findings information which states that the failure mode was incorrect data fetched by the CPU, or CPU unable to erase DPRAM, most likely in a BGA solder connection between the I/O FPGA and the ARINC DPRAM. The following actions have already been taken by Honeywell to mitigate future occurrences: Corrective actions have been implemented in production to prevent and/or detect intermittent solder issues. Corrective actions added following the manufacture of the DGIO card include continuous monitoring of product performance for early detection of failure trends and ongoing quality improvement programs to reduce or eliminate manufacturing issues as they arise.

PSEM event with Weight OFF Wheels

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

aircraft

A minor change made to the Proximity Sensor Electronics Module (PSEM) has resulted in an incompatibility between PSEM and MAU 1 Generic I/O 1 and MAU 3 Generic I/O 3. Only a specific number of PSEMs, with part numbers 80-003-04 and 80-003-05, are affected by this modification. On 16/Jul/2007, EMBRAER issued an Information to Technical and Field Support informing this issue and the list with the serial number of all PSEM affected by the modification. Most of the parts were localized at EMBRAER and ELDEC stocks or were already returned to ELDEC, the list below consists of units sent to the field, which have not yet been returned. These units shall be returned to manufacturer for retrofit. SNL 170-32-0023 and 190-320019 were issued regarding this subject and will be revised soon to update these serial numbers not found yet.

SERIAL NUMBER C246 E440 C259 E456 C269 E541 D127 E559 D294 E586

WING TIP LENS Useful information

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 EMBRAER has recently received some reports of Wing Tip Lens found cracked. After the replacement, the new one installed presents cracks again. A preliminary analysis concluded that the reason for this reoccurrence is an overtorque during installation. So, EMBRAER recommends that Operators follow AMM TASK 57-30-00-400-801-A Wing Tip Installation - paying special attention to the step sequence and torque application.

AFT avionics installation

compartment

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER informs that aircraft SN 17000130 and on have a different smoke ventilation system (without smoke seal) factory-incorporated. Consequently, they do not require additional action to comply with ANAC Airworthiness Directive N 2006-05-04 released on June 14th, 2006.

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August 2007

Issue No. 09
Please find below the general outline of the SNL procedure: Disconnect the 100% level sensor (75% level sensor automatically shifts to the FULL indication); To guarantee that the toilets will not be disabled, the operator must establish the waste tank servicing according to their convenience; Dispatch aircraft as per MMEL 38-00-02 Water & Waste System Indications on Flight Attendant Panel; Clear MEL by cleaning 100% level sensor and reconnecting it. For detailed information on the scenario description, AMM tasks and maintenance action, please refer to the abovementioned SNLs.

Waste Tank Sensor

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Events were observed of waste system tank TANK FULL or SERVICE TANK indication on FAP (Flight Attendant Panel) remaining after waste tank servicing. In these situations, the waste tank level sensors retain waste thus causing erroneous indications and interrupting operation of the waste system (no flush in lavatories). The SNL 170-38-0012 and 190-38-0013 are available and provide operators with an alternate procedure to allow the dispatch of an aircraft with the TANK FULL indication on the FAP even after waste tank dumping.

Removal of Engine-DrivenPump (EDP) Pressure Attenuator of No. 1 and No. 2 Hydraulic Systems
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 Some occurrences of EDP (Engine Driven Pump) Quick Disconnect Coupling failures on the EMBRAER 170/ 175 were reported to EMBRAER. These reports can be attributed to the pressure ripple between the EDP and Pressure Attenuator. Some analyses were performed and it was identified that the removal of the Pressure Attenuator can reduce this ripple. 100% Liquid Level Sensor 75% Liquid Level Sensor Thus, EMBRAER issued SB 170-29-0020 HYDRAULIC POWER - REMOVAL OF ENGINE-DRIVEN-PUMP PRESSURE ATTENUATOR OF No. 1 AND No. 2 HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS with the removal procedure for the Engine-Driven-Pump (EDP) Pressure Attenuator concerning its threaded port.

Figure 1 - Waste Thank sensor location Page 6

August 2007

Issue No. 09

IEVM-292 cards Issues

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 VIBRO-METER (VMSA) has discovered a production of 27 IEVM cards (PN IEVM 241-292-004-023 and IEVM 241-292003-022) with defective PCBs (Printed Circuit Board) that have to be removed from service and scrapped. When a defective card is inserted in the MAU rack and the holding screws are properly tight, a small constraint seems to be applied on the card. These small mechanical constraints are the probable cause that some pads are not well connected with vias any more, causing intermittent contacts on the PCB. Due to defective IEVM card installation, MAU3 Channel B may become inoperative since NIC6 (Network Interface Controller 6) is not able to work properly. As a result, AVNX MAU 3B FAIL message will be displayed in the EICAS and all the client modules from NIC6 will be inoperative as well. Upon engine start with MAU3 channel B inoperative, ENGINE NO DISPATCH CAS message will be triggered correlated to IEVM input fault. After IEVM card removal from MAU3 cabinet, system returns to normal operation without maintenance or CAS fault messages. Of the 27 defective cards, 21 have already been returned to VMSA repair shop. Defective PCBs are known to be date codes E24-6 and E25-6, however, due to VIBRO-METERs traceability difficulties, it is not possible to determine exactly which IEVM card has a defective PCB installed. Therefore, VIBROMETER informed a list of 73 units that could possibly be affected in the EMBRAER 170/190 fleet. Based on this information, a Service Bulletin will be issued to properly inform customers and address this matter.

Nuisance Engine Fire Detection Fault Messages on CMC

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 Based on some events recently reported, EMBRAER would like to emphasize that SNL190-26-0003 instructs the operator to check the torque applied to the electrical terminal connectors of the engine fire loop detectors in order to avoid nuisance ENG FIRE DET FAULT messages on the CMC (due to contacts). For a better understanding: there are four fire detectors on each engine, being one fire loop located on each extremity of each fire detector. Thus, there are eight fire loops per engine (see reference E on the figure below).

Figure 1 Fire Loop Locations

According to the analysis conducted by EMBRAER when the issue was discovered, the root cause could be related to miss-torque application on the electrical terminal connectors of the engine fire loop detector (see figure 2).

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August 2007

Issue No. 09

Implementation of Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-372

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 During scheduled maintenance task for escape slide deployments, there were instances where the evacuation slide did not release from the door and stalled it. The root cause is the reduction of internal inflatable expansion forces to overcome the resistance produced by the lacing and soft cover after the pack has been in the field for a long time. The following picture shows the event in which the described scenario can be observed:

Figure 2 - fire loop detector electrical terminal connectors

If you are experiencing similar events, please refer to SNL190-26-0003 for proper instructions. In case the nuisance messages persist, perform a troubleshooting according to the FIM task related to the fire detector that is presenting the message.

WIRING MANUAL
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER has released SNLs 170-000029 and 190-00-0024 to inform operators about the addition of hyperlinks to the HOOK UP CHART (Chapter 91-1002) and WIRE LIST (Chapter 91-10-03) sections of the Wiring Manual (WM). This aims at improving the interface to the Standard Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM). This new functionality will be available in st all Wiring Manuals issued from July 01 , 2007 onwards.
Figure 1 Event observed in the field.

The general outlines of Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-372, which was released in May/2007, consists of: 1. Replacing lower soft cover and speed lacing;

Load 19.3 - SNLs revision

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Service News Letters 170-00-0027 and 190-00-0023 (Information about Epic Load 19.3) are being revised to include all the observed misbehaviors, including the one that is being corrected in Load 19.4, their interim solution/ mitigatory action available and the expected final solution for each issue.

Speed lacing
Figure 2 Speed lacing to be replaced.

2.

Addition of an assist lacing to pull the vertical speed lacing and ensure that it will unlace and open after pack release pin is pulled.

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August 2007

Issue No. 09
Taking this scenario into account, EMBRAER encourages and supports operators to approach Goodrich for a customized plan for parts and man-power in order to accomplish SB 25-372 in the timeframe set by the authorities.

FLT CTRL BIT EXPIRED CAS message during roll out

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 During further analyses of the download received from the field, the FLT CTRL BIT EXPIRED CAS message on ROLL OUT after landing was verified. It was verified during download that the P-BIT (ELEC and HYD) was not accomplished during the required time for expiration. This means that: 1. During the first power-up of the day the (ELEC and HYD) P-BIT was not accomplished accordingly. During the first power-up of the day the ELEC P-BIT was performed correctly and the HYD P-BIT was not performed. The HYD # 1, 2 and 3 were not turned ON after the first powerup of the day. To avoid these scenarios both (ELEC and HYD) P-BIT should be accomplishing during the first power-up of the day. To do this, follow the AMM TASK (24-4202-860-801-A) to avoid interruption on the ELEC P-BIT. After that, turn ON the HYD # 1, # 2 and # 3 on the HYD control panel following the safety conditions in the AMM TASK (29-11-00-710-801-A) and (2912-00-710-801-A).

Figure 3 Addition of assist lacing.

The components affected by this Service Bulletin are: 1. FWD escape slides (PN 4A4030-2) that are 18 months from DOM (date of manufacture); AFT escape slides (PN 4A40112) that are 24 months from DOM.

2.

2.

By the time of the discussion with the authorities on the effectiveness of the proposed assist lacing solution and its approval, it was accepted taking into account that the affected slides in service would be retrofitted within 6 months after SB approval, timeframe that expires by the end of November/2007. If the affected slides on EMBRAER 170/175 fleet compliance with the Goodrich SB 25-372 within the specified period is not completed, authorities may rule out the SB 25-372 and issue an AD (Airworthiness Directive) to require the implementation of SB 25-350, upgrade from -2 to -4. This scenario would be less favorable to operators once the upgrade of the slides to -4 must be performed in a Qualified Service Center what takes 2 (two) days of work besides the shipping and handling.

3.

The P-BIT (ELEC and HYD) is explained in the AMM Part I (27-00-00). If the FLT CTRL BIT EXPIRED CAS Message does not go out of the view on the EICAS Display after power-down/ power-up, follow the applicable FIM task to do the troubleshooting.
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August 2007

Issue No. 09

NEW REVISION OF QRRG QUICK-REFERENCE RESET GUIDE (REV. 6)

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 The purpose of the QUICK-REFERENCE RESET GUIDE is to provide information to help users in the troubleshooting routine and elimination of some faults detected on the aircraft through the reset procedure. EMBRAER reinforces that this guide does not cover all the messages / faults that may be detected on the aircraft. If the message / fault is not given in the quick-reference guide, refer to the FAULT ISOLATION MANUAL. This guide will be reissued on all revisions, as necessary, and will only be available through the AEROChain. EMBRAER recommends that all operators have access to the AEROChain portal and subscribe to the Alerts & Newsletters service to receive an email when a new revision is issued. For more information, refer to SNL 170-000021 and SNL 190-00-0017.

N2 Fuel Pump Out of Range CMC message

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER has received reports about the occurrences of ENGINE SHORT DISPATCH on the EICAS with the correlated N2 FUEL PUMP OUT OF RANGE CMC message (fault code 73216417). Note: OVSP TEST FAULT message can also be triggered. CMC

In most of the cases the N2 pump sensor replacement was the final action. Therefore, based on events and the removals, GE and EMBRAER have started an investigation on this sensor. The sensors removed were sent to the manufacturer and after tests no faults were identified in the components. So, in order to duplicate the fault, the suspected sensor was installed in an engine at GE for running test, but the fault could not be duplicated. The next steps of the investigation will be a test on a specific bench (with a variable gap), and also GE is planning to collect data in the field (from an aircraft which has this message triggered).

NIM MOD AK availability

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 with NIM PN=7517964-917 Honeywell has released SB 7517964-230010 (Pub. Number A21-6720-011) to implement the MOD AK on NIM PN=7517964-917 (FOC condition). This modification replaces the main NIM CCA with a new one with more robust flash EPROM package. Such improvement is intended to address the NAVCOM 1 (2) FAIL events, consequently increasing the aircraft reliability. NIMs SN=07042768 and on have MOD AK factory-incorporated. EMBRAER SNLs 170-34-0016 and 190-34-0015 have also been issued to inform operators about MOD AK availability. Further information regarding the modification and implementation is described in Honeywell's SB that can be found on its publication website: https://pubs.cas.honeywell.com/

FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH due to ACMP overpressure

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 During the troubleshooting of the FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAS message, the following scenario was identified: FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAS message correlated with the following CMC messages: 1) LWR RUDDER PCU TP PRESS SNSR and R OUTBD EL PCU TP PRESS SNSR together with HYD3 PRESS XDCR/MAU3 GIO3/ACMP3A CMC message.

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August 2007
2) LWR RUDDER PCU TP PRESS SNSR or R OUTBD EL PCU TP PRESS SNSR together with HYD3 PRESS XDCR/MAU3 GIO3/ACMP3A CMC message.

Issue No. 09

Acronyms
ACMP = Alternating-Current Driven Pump AD = Airworthiness Directive AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog Motor-

Some downloads were analyzed and a pressure on HYD SYS #3 more than 3300 PSI was found. This is the reason for scenarios 1 and 2 described above, which occurred due to PCU Total Pressure Sensors tripping. All the applicable FIM tasks for the scenarios described above already address the correct root cause identification.

AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual AMOC = Alternate Means of Compliance ANAC = Agncia Nacional de Aviao Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority) AOM = Airplane Operations Manual BCM = Brake Control Module CAS = Crew Alerting System

NOSE /WING taxi light useful information

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 A new improvement on the Taxi Light is available in order to reduce cracking events that is occurring in the field. This improvement is an additional re-usable gasket to be installed in the bulb. This reusable gasket can be removed and reinstalled multiple times as the sealed beam lamp is replaced. For the Nose Taxi Light position, AIPC 33-42-03 (Nose Landing Gear Taxi Light) and AMM Part II TASK 33-42-03 (Nose Landing Gear Taxi Light Lamp) were revised to incorporate such information. Units in service can be modified to include the re-usable gasket by incorporating Honeywell FSB 50-034233-0002. For the Wing Root Taxi Light position, the solution effectiveness validation is ongoing. Upon solution validation, the applicable AMM will be revised in order to extend this solution to the Wing Root Taxi Light position as well. SNLs 170-330011/190-33-0017 (NOSE /WING TAXI LIGHT USEFUL INFORMATION) were revised to inform the Operators about this improvement as well.

CMC = Central Maintenance Computer CMM = Component Maintenance Manual DLS = Data Load System DVDR = Digital Voice-Data Recorder EFF = EMBRAER Fleet Forum EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual EPROM = Erasable Read-Only Memory Programmable

FAP = Flight Attendant Panel FHDB = Fault History Database FIM = Fault Isolation Manual FOL = Flight Operations Letter HPC = High Pressure Compressor HPT = High Pressure Turbine IEVM = Integrated Engine Vibration Monitor ITT = Interstage Turbine Temperature LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information LH = Left-Hand MAU = Modular Avionics Unit MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List
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August 2007
NIC = Network Interface Controller NIM = Network Interface Module OB = Operational Bulletins OVSP = Over Speed PCB = Printed Circuit Board PN = Part Number PSEM = Proximity Sensor Electronic Module QRRG = QUICK-REFERENCE RESET GUIDE RH = Right-Hand SB = Service Bulletin SN = Serial Number SNL = Service Newsletter Note: All abbreviations used in EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

Issue No. 09

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