G.R. Nos.

174730-37               February 9, 2011

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 174845-52

PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision1 promulgated on August
18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and
Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The facts are as follows:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16,
1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998.2

On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera)
for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of
the Municipal Engineer.3 Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual
employees of the municipal government.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos
answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated
"n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query.4 The boxes for
"Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN.5 Rivera in
his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in government.6 In their 1996 SALN, both
Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query.7Ong’s
signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath when
Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.

In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional Director,
Civil Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City, it was attested that:

This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of positions, hiring and
issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the
total/supplemental appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of
positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on nepotism;
Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc.
have been duly complied with in the issuance of this appointment.

This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in
accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was
submitted for review and action.8(Emphasis supplied.)

The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.

On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-
complaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then incumbent Vice-
Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employeesand Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
for the crime of falsification of public documents.

On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for
falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
connection with the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the
1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos.10

On August 16, 2000, the following Informations11 were filed against the petitioners:

As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of
Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows
the mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or Peñaranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned
"Bining Suarez," Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez
is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related to Galeos because Ong’s mother,
Conchita Suarez, and Galeos’ mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife
Kensiana,14 is the daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew
the Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently visited
when he was still studying.15

Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not
personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up by "people in the municipal hall" when
they signed them.

Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN,16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he
understood the question "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He
claimed that the "X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other
entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he signed it. When shown his SALN for the years
1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to
sign them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted
that he carefully read the documents and all the entries therein were explained to him before he
affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term
"fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative.17

Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor
because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a distant relative of hers. Rivera added
that it was not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee but Ong’s predecessor, Mayor
Vicente Mendiola.18
On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did
not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there are several persons with the surname
"Galeos" in the municipality. He signed Galeos’ 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos
at his office. There were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer their
oaths on what were written on their SALN, among them were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know
of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the
Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows
him as a casual employee of the previous administration. As successor of the former mayor, he had
to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates. He
maintained that his family was not very close to their other relatives because when he was not yet
Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu and Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his
relatives while he was campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th
and 7th degree are still regarded as close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted that
his style of campaigning was based only on his performance of duties and that he did not go from
house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no
longer recall those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had administered. He admitted
that he was the one who appointed Galeos and Rivera to their permanent positions and signed their
official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was
related to them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As to
the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it and their appointments were no
longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera were
brought to his office, the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted
that before the permanent appointment is approved by the CSC, he issues a certification to the
effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been complied with.19

In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED

UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER’S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND

LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.

3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR

THE PROSECUTION.22

In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements
in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus silence or non-disclosure
cannot be considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they
were not made in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of
law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to support the finding that
he was aware of their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of
good faith, Galeos avers that the fourth element of the crime – the perversion of truth in the narration
of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person – is missing. He also faults the
Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution’s sole
witness despite the fact that there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

(a)
 . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED
UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(b)

IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY

ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF
FACTS.

(c)

. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, … IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE

ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT’S
EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE
APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA.23

Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a
narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the
execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely
administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer
administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the contents of the document.
Neither can he be maxde liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there
was no evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera’s appointment.

In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos categorically admitted during his testimony that
before affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries
therein have been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial
under the joint stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at all that he became aware of his
relationship with Galeos and Rivera only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense
of lack of knowledge of a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it
can be legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without qualification reckons from
the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to mistaken reliance
on the testimony of prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not
show that such testimony was even taken into consideration in arriving at the conviction of
petitioners.24

With respect to Ong’s liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful
statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a general rule, it is not the duty of the
administering officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this
is that the administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful.
However, when the facts laid out in the document directly involves the administering officer, then he
has an opportunity to know of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless
administers the oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false,
he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering officer, but because he participated
in the falsification of a document.25

After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.

Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document,
the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty
to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the
official custody of the document which he falsifies.27Likewise, in falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not
call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of
the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and
collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are
related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to
petitioners’ assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and
thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose
his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of
facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears
to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employee’s eligibility
for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing
power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the
government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement
therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree
of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995
and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v.
Mudlong,34 it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and
personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his
appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s
in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that
the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the
disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which provides:

No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.

Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC shall disapprove the appointment
of a person who "has been issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations." Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related to the appointing or
recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.35

The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:

SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters
shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are
those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or
recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

xxxx

The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and
reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the
disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.36 Permanent employees employed by local government
units are required to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN);
(b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service;
(c) financial and business interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law.37 A similar
requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives38. – It shall be the duty of every public official or
employee to identify and disclose to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the
Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment
or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public
office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted
against him.

The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos’ negative answer reflected in his SALN is
absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins
but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed.
The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended
family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure
having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the
1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.

The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first
cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal government and appointed by him to a permanent
position during his incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply
unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time
unaware that he himself appointed to permanent positions the son of his mother’s sister (Galeos)
and the husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture
renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing. Despite his
knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to
Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in
finding that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have
no relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.

Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the
crime,39 as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.40 In this case, Ong administered the oaths to
Galeos and Rivera in the subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he
concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein concerning relatives in the government
service.

Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism

As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the
certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos’ appointment although he admitted only
the authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the
prohibition on nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 7941 of R.A.
No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his
knowledge that he and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in
fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Rivera’s wife is the sister of Ong’s mother,
Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of
facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil
Service rules, is required to issue such certification.

The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the
local government unit, regarding compliance with the prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No.
7160 cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code
of 1987, a head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in
violation of Civil Service Law and Rules or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional
misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates,
refuses or neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,42 we held that mere issuance of appointment in favor of a
relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the
law. Although herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public
document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure of relationship to the appointing
power in the local government units simply aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition
against nepotism. 1avvphil

Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In
Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism
also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud
or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need
now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug
the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal
procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."43 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of
public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal
ground to reverse petitioners’ conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA, J.:

The Antecedents

On May 27, 2003, accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate

Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. 03-25726, accused-
appellant was charged with possession of shabu in violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Informations read:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Antipolo,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been lawfully authorized by law, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing 0.03 and 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance or with total
weight of 0.09 gram, which after the corresponding laboratory examination
conducted thereon by the PNP Crime Laboratory both gave positive results
to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No. 03-25727, accused-appellant was charged with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of shabu. The
Information states:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not having been authorized by law to sell or otherwise
dispose of any dangerous drug, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Rache E. Palconit, who acted
as a poseur-buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, for and in consideration of the
sum of P-200.00, which after the corresponding laboratory examination
conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory gave a positive result to the test
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On July 22, 2003, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Forensic
Chemist P/Insp. Sharon Lontoc Fabros (Fabros), PO2 Rache E. Palconit
(Palconit) and Barangay Captain, Dr. Rina Gabuna Junio (Dr. Junio), as its
witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, Palconit, SPO2
Gerry Abalos (Abalos), PO2 Manuel Bayeng (Bayeng), and PO3 Russel
Medina (Medina), conducted a buy-bust operation at Sitio Lower Sto. Nino,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. A confidential informant (CI) told them
that a certain Anastacio was peddling drugs in the area. A buy-bust team
was formed with Abalos as the team leader and Palconit as the poseur-
buyer. Abalos marked two (2) P100.00 bills for the operation. After briefing
and coordination with the local police, the team was dispatched to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. Upon arrival, the CI pointed to their target person.
Palconit approached accused-appellant and asked if he could buy shabu.
After receiving the marked money, accused-appellant handed to Palconit
one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. At that point,
Palconit scratched his head to signal that the sale was consummated, and
the rest of the team rushed to the scene. Abalos introduced themselves as
police officers and immediately frisked accused-appellant. Abalos recovered
the marked money and two (2) other plastic sachets containing shabu from
the left pocket of accused-appellant's pants. Thereafter, accused-appellant
and the seized items were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Office in Barangay San Roque, Antipolo City. The seized
items were turned over to the case investigator who prepared the
corresponding request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, Palconit
brought the seized items to the crime laboratory. After examination, Fabros
issued a report confirming that the crystalline substance in the sachets were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Version of the Defense

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on May 25, 2003 at around

1:15 o'clock in the morning, he was playing billiards at Sitio Lower Sto. Nino
when three (3) armed men suddenly arrived and pointed a gun at him.
Without saying anything, the men frisked and handcuffed him but found
nothing illegal on him. He was arrested and brought to an office in Lores
where he was detained, interrogated, and forced to admit a wrongdoing. He
was also asked to point to other persons so that he could be released.

The RTC Ruling

In its January 29, 2014 decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. It also sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 for violation of Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165.

The RTC held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police
officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated did not automatically render accused-appellant's
arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible for it was shown
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved
by the apprehending officers. It opined that the witnesses presented by the
prosecution successfully established the chain of custody of the seized
illegal drugs. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Anastacio Hementiza y Dela

Cruz is hereby found guilty beyond any shadow of a doubt of the offense
charged in the Informations and is sentenced to the penalty of Life
Imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 03-25727 with a fine of Php
500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 03-25726, the same accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an Imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years with a fine of Php300,000.00 as provided for
under Sec. 11 Par. (3) of RA 9165, as amended.

Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is to be promptly committed to the

National Bilibid Prisons for immediate service of his sentence.

The seized specimens subject of the instant cases are ordered destroyed in
the manner provided by law.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA. 

The CA Ruling

In its October 16, 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant. It explained that the police witnesses had adequately established
the conduct of the buy-bust operation which resulted in the consummated
sale of the illegal drugs and the recovery of two (2) sachets and the marked
money in his possession. The CA added that prior surveillance of the
suspected offender was not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust
operation and that failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Section
21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, on the handling of confiscated illegal
drugs, as well as its IRR, was not fatal and would not render accused-
appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. The CA
disposed the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the appeal is DENIED. The

Decision dated 29 January 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Antipolo City is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
In a Resolution,[7] dated December 7, 2016, the Court required the parties to
submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In his
Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief,[8] dated February 28, 2017,
accused-appellant manifested that he was adopting his Appellant's Brief
filed before the CA as his supplemental brief for the same had adequately
discussed all the matters pertinent to his defense. In its Manifestation,
[9]
 dated February 6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated
that all matters and issues raised by accused-appellant had already been
discussed in its Brief before the CA and asked that it be excused from filing
its supplemental brief.
 The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the appeal.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of

dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to
have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged.[10]

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of

dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.[11]

The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of

the dangerous drug itself. In People v. Alcuizar,[12] the Court held:

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the

very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under
Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily
arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct,
not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal
drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.[13]
Thus, the chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to
establish the corpus delicti.

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,

[14]
 which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,[15] the Court explained the importance of the chain of
custody:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires

that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was, received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it
is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody
becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and even substitution
and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application
of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an

exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar
to people in their daily lives. Graham v. Statepositively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance was later analyzed as heroin was
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time
it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the
court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed
heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless
the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of
the exhibit at least between the time it came into the posession of the police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily

identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine
their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to
the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain
of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which
are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to
render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with. [16]
In connection thereto, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the manner
by which law enforcement officers should handle seized items in dangerous
drugs cases:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

2. Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

3. A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall

be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating
therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be
issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]
Strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement, however, is not
always the case. Hence, the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

SECTION 21.(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial
compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by
R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the
records are bereft of any showing that an inventory of the seized items was
made. Neither does it appear on record that the apprehending team
photographed the contraband in accordance with law.

Further, People v. Dahil[17] restated the links that the prosecution must

establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.

First Link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the
Apprehending Officer

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they have been seized from the
accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that
the seized contraband be immediately marked because the succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking
of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of
all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.[18]

Still, there are cases when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when
the marking of the seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the
presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.[19]

In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized
items. Based on his testimony, it is clear that the marking was not
immediately done at the place of seizure; instead, the markings were only
placed at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did not offer any
justifiable reason. Even if the Court glosses over this lapse, still, it could not
be said that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. For one, neither in the direct examination nor in the cross-
examination of Palconit was it mentioned that the markings were made in
the presence of accused-appellant or his representatives. He merely
testified that he placed the markings at the PDEA office, without any
allusion to the identities of the persons who were present when he did the
markings.

Moreover, in the Incident Report[20] as well as in the Affidavit of Arrest,

[21]
 the specific markings made on the seized items were not mentioned. The
same documents merely specified that three (3) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing suspected methamphetamine
hydrochloride of undetermined quantity were found in accused-appellant's
possession. Considering that the apprehending officers did not mark the
sachets of illegal drugs at the place of seizure, then, it logically follows that
the marking should have been their foremost priority and should have been
made prior to writing the incident report and executing the affidavit of
arrest. It, therefore, behooves the Court how Palconit could have said that
he placed the markings at the PDEA office, but no mention of the same
whatsoever was made in both the incident report and in the affidavit of
arrest. If the sachets of illegal drugs were already marked, then there would
have been no reason for its non-inclusion in the aforecited documents.
Thus, the Court can only guess the time when the markings were made and
whether they were placed before the preparation of the incident report and
the affidavit of arrest.

To make matters worse, from the place of seizure to the PDEA office, the
seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how
the unmarked drugs were transported and who took custody of them while
in transit.

Unfortunately, the direct examination of Palconit left much to be desired

for it offered no explanation and justification for these lapses. At most,
what can be gleaned is the prosecution's lack of zealousness and interest in
ensuring the conviction of accused-appellant despite the time and resources
at its disposal, viz:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two
other sachets were recovered, what did you do? 
Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and
we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned
over?
Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets
which were recovered from the suspect.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one
that was bought and the two others which were recovered from the target
person?
Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory
examination.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?

Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Do you remember what marking was placed? 

Palconit: Yes, ma'm, REP-1, REP-2, REP-3.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What are these markings about?

Palconit: Those are my initials, Rache E. Palconit.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Where did you put the markings?

Palconit: At the sachets.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What sachets are you talking about? 

Palconit: The sachet that I bought and the sachets that were recovered.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What marking was placed on the specimen found on

his possession? 
Palconit: REP-2 and REP-3.
Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do? 
Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it? 

Palconit: Me.[22]
In People v. De La Cruz,[23] where the marking of the seized items was made
at the police station, and without any showing that the same had been done
in the presence of the accused or his representatives, the Court concluded
that the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined
by R.A. No. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs
significantly impaired the prosecution's case.

The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of

seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. [24] While
law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely
just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which
when challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. [25]

Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to

the Investigating Officer

The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the police
officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising
officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing. This is a necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the
investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare
the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly
prepare the required documents.[26]

Here, the identity of the investigating officer was unknown.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and

we informed our CO that the operation was positive.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned
over?

Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets
which were recovered from the suspect.[27]
It is unlikely that Palconit did not know the officer to whom he supposedly
turned over the seized drugs. Surely, this investigating officer worked with
him in the same office. Indeed, the apprehending officer and investigating
officer might be one and the same person. If that was the case, however,
then there would have been no need to say that Palconit turned over the
seized items to the investigator. He could have simply said that he was the
one who conducted the investigation and prepared the necessary
documents for the filing of a criminal case against accused-appellant.

Similarly, in People v. Nandi,[28] where the apprehending officer was unable

to identify the investigating officer to whom he turned over the seized
items, the Court held that such circumstance, when taken in light of the
several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the case, raises
doubts as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal
drugs had been preserved.

Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to

the Forensic Chemist

From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic
chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be
the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance.[29] In this case, it was uncertain who received the seized items
when it was brought to the forensic laboratory, to wit:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two
other sachets were recovered, what did you do? 
Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office? 

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and
we informed our CO that the operation was positive.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned
over?
Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets
which were recovered from the suspect.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one
that was bought and the two others which were recovered from the target
person?
Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory
examination.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items? 

Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items. [30]

xxx

Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?
Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?

Palconit: Me.

Prosecutor Sampayo: Why did you bring it to the crime laboratory.

Palconit: For laboratory examination.[31]
There are several unexplained and doubtful points in this step.

First, Palconit testified that he placed the markings on the sachets upon
arrival at the office. Then, he turned over the seized items to the
investigator. In the latter part of his testimony, however, he said that after
placing the markings, he brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory.
The circumstances surrounding the custody of the illegal drugs, from the
time they were brought to the PDEA office up to their turnover to the
forensic laboratory, are all muddled. Moreover, it is unclear whether
another officer intervened in the handling of the illegal drugs or it was only
Palconit himself who placed the markings and delivered the illegal drugs to
the forensic chemist.

Further, a perusal of the records shows that the request for laboratory
examination[32] was prepared and signed by a certain Police Chief Inspector
Raul Loy Bargamento (Bargamento), who had necessarily taken custody of
the seized items at some point in order to execute the request for laboratory
examination. Yet, Palconit did not even bother to mention Bargamento in
his testimony. The prosecution would have the Court guess (1) whether
Bargamento was the same person to whom Palconit turned over the seized
items and (2) whether Bargamento was the one who handed Palconit the
seized items for delivery to the forensic laboratory. Hence, the identities of
the officers who had custody of the illegal drugs, even for momentary
periods, are open to question.

Finally, Fabros testified that their office received the request for laboratory
examination on May 25, 2003 at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon. The
request for laboratory examination[33] indicated that the same was received
by Fabros. It is worthy to note, however, that she did not affix her signature
thereon. Moreover, in their testimonies, neither Palconit nor Fabros
identified each other as the person who delivered and received the seized
drugs respectively. Hence, for failure of Fabros to mention before the court
that she indeed received the seized drugs from Palconit, her name,
appearing on the request for laboratory examination, remained to be
hearsay.

In People v. Beran,[34] the investigator of the case claimed that he

personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there was no
showing who was the laboratory technician who received the drug from
him. The Court noted that there was serious doubt that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item had not been fatally compromised.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic
Chemist to the Court

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic
chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the criminal case. [35]

In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence as to how the illegal
drugs were brought to court. Fabros merely testified that she made a report
confirming that the substance contained in the sachets brought to her was
positive for shabu.

The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the
lapses and save the prosecution's case. In People v. Garcia,[36]the Court
stated that "the saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized
the procedural lapses, and thereafter cited justifiable grounds." Failure to
follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be
adequately explained.[37]

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction

cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are
present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first
place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict.[38]

In fine, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence presented does not
support a finding of guilt with the certainty that criminal cases require. The
procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring gaps
in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt on whether
the shabu seized from accused-appellant was the same shabu that were
brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually
offered in court as evidence. Hence, the corpus delicti has not been
adequately proven.

It could be that the accused was really involved in the sale of shabu, but
considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the prosecution's
evidence, the Court has no recourse but to give him the benefit thereof. Law
enforcers should not only be mindful of the procedures required in the
seizure, handling and safekeeping of confiscated drugs, but the prosecution
should also prove every material detail in court. Observance of these is
necessary to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the
apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws.[39]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The October 16, 2015 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 06847
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Anastacio Hementiza
y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged against him and
ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is confined for
some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately

implement this decision and to inform this Court of the date of the actual
release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of
a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELITA REYES Y GINOVE AND JOSEPHINE

SANTA MARIA Y SANCHEZ, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision1 dated January 13, 2015 dismissing accused-
appellants' appeal and affirming the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82,
Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143175 convicting accused-appellants of Violation of Section
5, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The facts follow.

On September 22, 2006, around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, P/Insp. Alberto Gatus of the Galas Police Station
– Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit received a report from a confidential informant about the activities of an alias
"Babang" at No. 13 Manungal Street, Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City. On the following day, around 4:30 in
the afternoon, the chief of police dispatched some policemen to confirm the veracity of the information,
conduct a surveillance and a buy-bust operation. P/Insp. Gatus gave PO2 Talosig two (2) P100 bills, which
he marked with his initials. When they arrived at the place, the confidential informant told PO2 Talosig that
the person standing in front of the house is alias "Babang," later identified as appellant Angelita Reyes. The
informant introduced PO2 Talosig to appellant Reyes as a buyer of shabu. When appellant Reyes asked him
how much he will buy, he replied P200.00. Appellant Josephine Santa Maria, who was standing beside
appellant Reyes, asked for money. When PO2 Talosig . gave appellant Santa Maria the marked money, she
told appellant Reyes, "bigyan mo na." Appellant Reyes then got a plastic sachet containing a crystalline
substance from her right pocket. PO2 Talosig removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal that the transaction
was consummated, and PO1 Mirasol Lappay, SPO1 Mario Abong, PO2 Jonathan Caranza, Insp. Alberto Gatus
and another policeman swooped in. PO1 Lappay asked appellant Santa Maria to empty her pockets and
retrieved the marked money from the right pocket. PO1 Lappay then placed appellant Santa Maria under
arrest, while PO2 Talosig arrested appellant Reyes, keeping the seized plastic sachet in his possession.
Appellants were informed of their violation and their rights. Thereafter, appellants and the seized evidence
were brought to the police station. At the police station, PO2 Talosig placed the seized evidence in another
plastic sachet, sealed it and marked it "DT-AR-JS." An inventory of seized items and request for laboratory
examination were prepared by PO1 Erwin Bautista, while PO2 Talosig took the photo of appellants and the
seized evidence. Thereafter, PO2 Talosig brought the request for laboratory examination and the seized
plastic sachet of suspected shabu to the Quezon City Police District Crime Laboratory. He was furnished a
copy of Chemistry Report No. D-381-2006.

Thus, an Information3 was filed against the appellants for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
that reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of September 2006 in Quezon City, accused conspiring and confederating with
and mutually helping each other without lawful authority did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport, or act
as broker in the said transaction, a dangerous drug, to wit:

Zero point zero two (0.02) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellants denied the allegations against them. According to appellant Reyes, on September 23, 2006,
around 10 o'clock in the morning, she was sleeping with her husband and children in their house when
someone knocked on their door. Her daughter woke her up and as she rose, three (3) men asked her if she
knew a certain "Bugoy," to which query she replied in the negative. The men brought her out of the street,
was made to board a jeep arid then brought to the Galas Police Station. At the police station, she was again
asked whether she knew a certain Bugoy and she insisted that she did not know this certain Bugoy. Thus,
she was detained. Meanwhile, on the same date, appellant Santa Maria claimed that he left her house to sell
rugs when PO2 Talosig and two (2) other policemen accosted her and asked if she knew a person running
by. She answered "no." After about five minutes, she was brought to a passenger jeep where PO1 Lappay
and the driver were waiting. PO2 Talosig arrived with appellant Reyes. The policemen then asked her if she
knew a certain Ray, and when she replied in the negative, they were brought to the police station.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them to the
following:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ANGELITA REYES y
GINOVE and JOSEPHINE SANTA MARIA y SANCHEZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II, of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002.

Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to each pay a fine
in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) PESOS.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency the
dangerous drug subject hereof for proper disposition and final disposal.

SO ORDERED.4

The RTC ruled that appellants were validly arrested through a buy-bust operation and that appellants'
denials are weak and unsubstantiated.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC  in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 24, 2011, issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 82, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143175 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA ruled that the illegal sale of shabu has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It also ruled that
the defense of denial should be looked with disfavor for they are easily concocted but difficult to prove,
especially the claim that one has been the victim of a frame-up. The CA also ruled that appellants' arrest
was valid and there was a necessity to conduct a buy-bust operation. Finally, it ruled that there is no broken
chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drugs.

Hence, the present appeal. Pending appeal, appellant Reyes passed away, hence, her appeal was dispensed
with by this Court in its Resolution6 dated February 15, 2016.

The errors presented in the appeal are the following:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
WHEN THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TO BE ADMISSIBLE DESPITE
BEING THE RESULT OF AN INVALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST.
According to appellant Santa Maria, her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial
court erred in finding the prosecution evidence to be admissible despite being the result of an invalid
warrantless search and arrest.

There is merit in the appeal.

First of all, as to the argument of appellant Santa Maria that the arresting officers illegally arrested them
because they did not have with them any warrant of arrest nor a search warrant considering that the police
officers had enough time to secure such, the same does not deserve any merit. Buy bust operations are
legally sanctioned procedures for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. These operations are often
utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
nefarious activities.7 There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. A prior surveillance,
much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during the entrapment.8 Hence, the said buy-bust operation is a legitimate, valid entrapment
operation.

As to whether the prosecution was able to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds
that the prosecution failed to do so.

Under Article II, Section 5 of R. A. No. 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of
the said violation, the following must concur:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.9

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that "the
[procured] object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from
the accused."10

In illegal sale, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the
charges.11In People v. Gatlabayan,12 the Court held that it is of paramount importance that the identity of
the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that
the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence
before the court. In. fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit and that which was
exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from the suspect.13 Thus, the chain of custody carries
out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed."14

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 916515 specifies:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it
essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.

In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator
Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to
safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said
section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and
also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts."16 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on
witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always available
in all corners of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where
elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended."17 In addition,
"[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very limiting. Most police
stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended."18

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in
drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing
law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation."19 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:

Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and
international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to
mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a)
impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the
proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.

xxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in
2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and
photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself
are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place
where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the seized
drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe
and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be
conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law
enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a
safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly
conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation
is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in
the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media
people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not
automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official
also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.20

The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a number of cases. Just recently, We opined
in People v. Miranda:21

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165 – under justifiable grounds will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.22

Under the original provision of Section 21, after confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was
immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph seizure and required to the same in the
presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is
assumed that the presence of these three persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame
up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity."23 Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official
and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the present case, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR shall
apply since the alleged crime was committed before the amendment.

The CA ruled that the chain of custody was aptly followed, thus:

In this case, the chain of custody was aptly described in the testimony of PO2 Talosig, in the joint affidavit
he and PO1 Lappay executed on September 24, 2006, and the stipulations and admissions made by the
prosecution and the defense during pre-trial. These pieces of evidence showed that the transaction in the
buy-bust operation was completed, the seized evidence remained in the custody of PO2 Talosig, the poseur-
buyer, who placed the evidence in another plastic sachet, sealed it and marked it as "DT-AR-JS" at the
police station where appellants and the seized evidence were brought; that PO2 Talosig delivered the
request for laboratory examination together with the seized evidence to the crime laboratory; that Forensic
Chemist P/Insp. Ma. Shirlee M. Ballete conducted a qualitative examination on the specimen contained in a
plastic sachet with marking "DT-AR-JS" and found the specimen positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride; that the said forensic chemist reduced her findings in Chemistry Report No. D-381-2006,
incidentally marking the plastic sachet itself as "D-381" to correspond to the number of the Chemistry
Report. Though there were deviations in the making of the Inventory of Seized Items, in that it was signed
by Kagawad Balignasan only, and the seized item was marked and inventoried, and with appellants,
photographed, without the presence of counsel; nonetheless, the prosecution proved that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence, was duly accounted for and preserved. The fact that the process of
marking, inventory and photographing was undertaken without the presence of counsel was explained by
PO2 Talosig, i.e. because appellants had no counsel at that time.
Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect
of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug item in admissible. Although the
police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, their
noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from appellant Reyes as the chain of
custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case.24

Clearly, from the very findings of the CA, the requirements stated in Section 21 of R.A. 1965 have not been
followed. There was no representative from the media and the National Prosecution Service present during
the inventory and no justifiable ground was provided as to their absence. It must be emphasized that the
prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain requirements provided in Sec. 21
such as, but not limited to the following: (1) media representatives are not available at that time or that the
police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to
undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the same reason,
failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution Service; (3) the police officers, due to
time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply
with the provisions of Article 12525 of the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not
able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.26 It has the positive duty to demonstrate
observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in
acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law.27 Its failure to
follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance
with the rules on evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a
justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the
steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item.28 A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required
where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it Is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or
alteration.29

If doubt surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the stage of an
appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless rule in favor of the accused, lest it betray its duty to protect
individual liberties within the bounds of law.30

Absent therefore any justifiable reason in this case for the non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
the identity of the seized item has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. As such, this Court finds
it apt to acquit the appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 13, 2015 dismissing appellants' appeal and
affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-06-143175 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellant Josephine Santa Maria y Sanchez
is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause. Let an entry
of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, for
immediate implementation. Said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5)
working days from receipt of this Decision the action he/she has taken.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200396

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN, Petitioners 

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondents

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.  A 1

mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into
private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are
instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the
constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case
at bar.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the June 13, 2011
Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the October 25,
2

2006 Judgment  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Virac, Catanduanes in Criminal
3

Case Nos. 3463 and 3464) convicting both petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1602 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9287, otherwise known as "An Act Increasing the
Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games Amending Certain Provisions of PD 1602 and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner Martin T. Villamor (Villamor) was convicted as a collector of bets in the illegal
numbers game of "lotteng" under Section 3(c) of RA 9287, while petitioner Victor G. Bonaobra
(Bonaobra) was convicted as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) of the said
Jaw. The RTC sentenced Villamor to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one
(1) day as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum, while Bonaobra was sentenced to suffor the
penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as
maximum.

Factual Antecedents

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for
an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng' and possessing a list of various numbers, a
calculator, a cellphone, and cash. The charge stemmed from the following lnformation: 4

That on or ahout the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of
Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, \vi thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [ willfully ], unlawfully and
feloniously engage, collect [and] solicit x x x bets for illegal numbers game locally known as
"Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money
and lotteng paraphernalias.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Another Information  was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law,
5

committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of
Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" while in
possession of gambling paraphernalias, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, list of various numbers
and cash in the amount of ₱1,500.00 representing collection of bets.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners filed t1eir respective Motions for Reinvestigation, which were both granted by the RTC.
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued separate Resolutions both dated
September 13, 2005 amending the Informations in both cases.

In the Amended Information, the phrase "acting as a collector" was included to charge Villamor as a
collector in an illegal numbers game. The Amended Information  provides:
6

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of
Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused acting as a collector with intent [to] gain thru illegal means[,] did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and foloniously engage, collect and solicit bets for illegal numbers game locally known as
"Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money
and lotteng paraphernalias.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On the other hand, Bonaobra was charged as a manager or operator in the Amended
Info1mation,  the incriminatory paragraph of which states:
7

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of
Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused acting as manager and operator with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there,
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as
"lotteng" while in possession of gambling paraphernalia, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, lists of
variott5 numbers and cash in the amount of ₱l,500,00 representing colleciion of bets.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When separately arraigned, Villamor, on October 4, 2005 and Bonaobra, on November 29, 2005,
both pleaded not guilty to the respective charges filed against them. After the pre-trial conference, a
joint trial on the merits followed.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial Director,
Police Superintendent Francisco Penaflor (PD Peñaflor), SP04 Severino Malasa, Jr., and POI David
Adrian Saraspi (POI Saraspi). Culled from the records were the following facts:

On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call from an infonnant regarding an
ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the
residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO 1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and
a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.
Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced
by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside.
According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the
Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are
slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and
confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to ₱l,500.00 in different
denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then
brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling.
Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented six witnesses, namely Villamor, Bonaobra, Demetrio Bonaobra. the brother
of Bonaobra, Florencio Bonaobra (Florencio), the father of Bonaobra, Juan Vargas, and Jonah
Bonaobra (Jonah), the wife of Bonaobra. Their testimonies are summarized below.

On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30 a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to
the latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio inside
their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra ₱2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra
then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later
identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and
said, "Caught in the act ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search
warrant. Two more men entered the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then
made to board the service vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known
as ''lotteng," a variant of the game Last Two,  respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c),
8

and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were
caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng," a variant
of Last Two. The RTC held that petitioners were seen by the arresting officers in the act of counting
bets before the arrest was made inside Bonaobra' s compound. 1he petitioners were also caught
holding "'papelitos," which contained the three rows of two-number combinations. Since the winning
combination in "lotteng" is taken from the first two numbers of the winning combinations in the daily
draw of the lotto in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, the RTC held that the number combinations
shown in the ''papelitos" were meant to correspond to the lotto results.

The RTC further held that Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a collector
since he brought bet money to Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator, controller, or
supervisor after it was shown that he received the money from Villamor.

The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:

WHEREFORE, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby SENTENCES Martin
Villamor to suffer a penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine
(9) years as maximum, and Victor Bonaobra to suffer a penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day as
minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum. Likewise, the money amounting to ₱l,500.00 and the
other personal properties used as gambling paraphernalia, like the calculator, ballpen and cellular
phone are confiscated in favor of the state.

SO ORDERED 9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's
argument that his right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different from
that with which he was charged. The CA held that the classification of a maintainer, manager, or
operator includes a coordinator, controller, or supervisor. The CA ratiocinated that to hold a
10

maintainer guilty of the lesser offense of acting as a coordinator will not be violative of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of his accusation since the graver offense of acting as a maintainer
necessarily includes being a coordinator.

With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting
officer who were presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. The
CA held that Villamor' s denials cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the police officers who
caught him in the act of revising and counting bets.

The CA disposed the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

SO ORDERED. 11

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector
or agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor m1der Section
3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.

Our Ruling

We find the Petition meritorious.

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire "case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision [based on] x x x grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors." 12

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid
warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a
valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by
the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation
of the said right.
Section 2, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of
probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without
the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution
and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. "Evidence obtained and confiscated on
13

the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree."
14

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or
caught in the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim that
petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested without a
warrant.

We are not persuaded.

Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without a
warrant of arrest in the following instances:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely
"(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer."15

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid
warrantless arrest on petitioners.  It was not properly established that petitioners had just committed,
1âwphi1

or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in
the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor,
they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. PO 1 Saraspi's testimony during
cross examination reveals the following:

ATTY. SAMONTE:
Q While you were outside the compound of Bonaobra, what was your distance to accused Martin
Villamor and Victor Bonaobra?

A More or less fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters.

Q Is it not that the compound of Bonaobra is surrounded with fence?

A Yes, sir.

Q Bamboo fence, right?

A Yes, sir, without a gate.

Q Are you sure it's without a gate?

A Probably it was open.

Q Can you determine the height of the fence?

A Between 5'7" to 5'9".

Q More than your height?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us whether you can see what the person is doing inside the compound while you are
outside?

A The fence is made up [sic] of bamboo and there were gaps as far as the fence is concerned that is
why when we alighted from the Frontier we saw what was inside the compound.

Q And the space of each bamboo, can you determine [sic]?

A One and half to two inches apart.

Q When you were already outside the compound what were the accused doing?

A They were sitting and they were revising.

Q Were they seated with [sic] a table?

A They were sitting and Victor Bonaobra was without a shirt.

Q What were they holding?

A 'Papelitos'.

Q What else?
A While they were holding 'papelitos' the monies were just on the table.

Q At the distance of 15 to 10 meters can you determine the contents of the 'papelitos'?

A No, sir.

Q So you are not sure whether those are gambling paraphernalia?

A No, sir.

Q Because you do not know the contents of that and you are not sure whether those are gambling
paraphernalia you went inside, is that right?

A After we introduced ourselves that we are [sic] police officers we entered the compound.

Q Meaning to say you were outside the compound and saying you are policemen?

A We entered first and we introduced ourselves.

Q Which is first, going inside or introducing yourselves?

A While entering we were also introducing ourselves simultaneously.

Q When you reached inside, what did you determine?

A We determined that there were lotteng paraphernalia on the table.

Q That is the only time that you determined that those were gambling paraphernalia?

A No, even on the [sic] outside we identified it already.

Q A while ago you said at a distance of 15 to 10 meters you can determine whether they were in
possession of the illegal gambling paraphernalia?

A What I am trying to say is that I cannot identify those that are written on the 'papelitos' at the
distance and I saw the calculator, the money bets.

Q So what you saw within a distance of 15 to 10 meters are calculators, money and cellphone?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you consider money gambling paraphernalia?

A Yes, sir.

Q So every time you see money you will consider that a gambling paraphernalia?

A In other situations.
Q How about calculator, do you consider calculator gambling paraphernalia?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you go to a department store there are calculators, do you consider those calculators
gambling paraphernalia?

A If you are going to consolidate all these items in a table all of these are gambling paraphernalia

Q So when you consolidate these items and papers and calculators, if you see those items at
Century Trading, will you consider those as gambling paraphernalia? 16

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the
petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a c1iminal
activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a
search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the
compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see
what was happening inside the compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on
the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime
had just been c01m11itted, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their
presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering
the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that
from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;"
yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the
same to be gambling paraphernalias.

On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound, he
could not determine the activities of the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally entered the
compound, since he was not armed with a warrant, that he supposedly saw the gambling
paraphernalia. PD Peñaflor's testimony in this regard is as follows:

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness, the distance of the house of Victor Bonaobra to
that place where you parked your vehicle when you arrived in the vicinity?

A When I parked my vehicle in front of the compound because that is a street, the distance from the
street to that place where there is an on-going 'revisar' of 'lotteng', more or less 15 to 20 meters, I
believe, from the gate.

Q So, you did not immediately go inside the compound of Victor Bonaobra?

A Yes, sir. I verified first if there is really [sic] persons in the compound.

Q So, at that distance of 15 to 20 meters, you were able to verify what they were doing on the
particular 1ime, Mt. Witness?

A No, sir. 17

During his direct examination, Bonaobra testified that he was only answering his cellphone when PD
Peñaflor barged into his compound and arrested him. The relevant portions of his testimony reveals
the following:
ATTY SAMONTE:

Q At around 9:00 a.m. of June 17, 2005, what were you doing if you still remember?

A I stood up and I went out and made [sic] three steps from the door to answer the cellphone and
later on I was surprised when the police whom I could not identify, kicked the door.

Q Mr. Witness, which door [are you] referring to [that] was kicked by the police?

A The gate outside of our fence.

xxxx

Q You said a while ago that the policeman kicked the door of your fence x

xx who was that policeman, if you know him?

A: Provincial Director Peñaflor.

Q: Who was with PD Peñaflor on [sic] that particular time, if any, Mr. Witness?

A Two (2) persons in civilian clothes.

xx xx

Q After PD Peñaflor kicked the door of your fence, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A He held my hand and he seized my cellphone.

xxxx

Q After PD Peñaflor seized your cellphone, what else did he do?

A He said, "caught in the act."

Q Which comes first, Mr. Witness, the utterance made by PD Peñaflor that you were caught in the
act or the utterance made by your father whether they had a warrant?

A When my father asked them whether they have a warrant.

Q And what was the answer of PD Peñaflor when your father asked that question?

A He said, "caught in the act."

Q And what was the reply of your father?

A My father said that what you am doing is wrong, that is prohibited.

Q And what did PD Peñaflor answered [sic] to your father?

A He shouted at my father, "Di na kailangan yan" (That is not needed). 18

From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt act
indicating that the petitioners were actually committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims that he
caught the petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet money, this observation was
highly improbable given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the fact that the
compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence.

For his part, Villamor claimed that he was at the Bonaobra compound to repay his loan to Jonah.
The prosecution, through Prosecutor Tañon, even admitted this fact during Jonah's direct
examination. The following exchange between the prosecution and the defense was quite revealing:

ATTY. SAMONTE:

Your Honor, please, [may] I respectfully offer the testimony of Jona[h] Bonaobra to show that she is
the ·wife of Victor Bonaobra; that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 17, 2005 she was inside their
residence at Bonaobra's compound, Francia, Virac, Catanduances and on that particular time and
date, Martin Villamor arrived to pay his debt and she personally witnessed the unlawful act
committed by the policemen who entered their dwelling on that particular lime and date and such
other matters relative thereto, Your Honor.

COURT:

Any comment from the prosecution?

PROS. TAÑON:

We will admit that she is the wife of Victor Bonaobra; that on Jw1e 17, 2005 at 8:30 in the morning
she was inside the residence of Bonaobra's compound; that accused Martin Villamor arrived to pay
his debt. We are to contest on that she personally witnessed the unlawful act.

A1TY. SAMONTE:

To clarify that, the prosecution is admitting the fact that Martin arrived to pay the loan on that
particular day?

PROS. TAÑON:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, so that we can proceed to the other matters.  (Emphasis supplied)

19

From the exchange above, it is clear that the prosecution admitted that Villamor went to Bonaobra's
house to pay his loan to Jonah. Thus, at the exact moment of the arrest, neither Bonaobra, who was
answering his cellphone, nor Villarr1or, who was paying his loan. was performing any overt act
constitutive of a crime.

Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same
does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and
seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be no
valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house
is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised
before arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the
arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in this case. However, we
have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest. In People v. Racho,  the Court held
20

that:

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, 'any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding'.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining

evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of illegal
gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or
supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any person
who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who
is usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia."  On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or
21

supervisor is defined as, ''any person who exercises control and supervision over the collector or
agent."  The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and
22

confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the
offense.

All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence
since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the
alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court
acquits petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which
affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in Criminal
Case Nos. 3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Martin
Villamor y Tayson and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and are ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.