International Journals

PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY

Author(s): Ishtiaq Ahmed
Source: International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 47-59
Published by: International Journals
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International , Vol.34,No. 1 (Spring)2008
ReviewofModemSociology

PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY

Ishtiaq Ahmed
InstituteofSouth Asian Studies
National UniversityofSingapore
and
StockholmUniversity

Thispaperpresentsan analysisoftheformationofPakistan's
national identity.I
thattheprocess
illustrate ofPakistani
nationalidentity
formationapproximates that
oftheGermanicmodel. AlthoughMohammad
'
AliJinnah
firstusedreligiontojustify
theclaimtoseparate forthe MuslimnationofIndia,hesubsequently
statehood
attemptedtoproject,
muchliketheFrench model
ofterritorial
nationalism,a visionof
inclusive
Pakistani thatwouldgrantequalrights
nationalism toall individuals.

As an ideology and politicaldoctrine,nationalismis a claim set forthon

behalf of a body of people claiming to constitutea nation to establisha
sovereignstateover a specificterritory.Once thatstatecomes intobeing,it
has to devise a national identityto distinguishitselffromotherstates.In
the case of new or recently established post-colonial states, the
constructionof a cohesive national identityis imperative.No state can
hope to survive in the long run only throughthe exercise of force or
threats.Deeper links in the largersocietyhave to be cultivatedso thata
substantialnumberofpeople, a majorityifnotthewhole ofitspopulation,
identifywith thestate in an emotionalsense. In orderto achieve that,the
statehas to disseminatethenationalidentityin thelargersocietythrough
theeducational system,themass media and thepoliticalsystem(Ahmed,
1998).
This is not easily done because theselectionof unifyingsymbolsand
values is a sensitivematter.There is no absolute or objectivecriterion(or
criteria)on whichnationalismin generalor state-nationalism in particular
can be grounded. Language, religion,common ethnic origin,historical
experience,cultural heritage or civilization,common residence in the
same region,and various othersuch factorshave been invokedfromtime
to time to constructthe national identity.Following Max Weber,I shall
employ theideal typemethodforclassifyingstate-nationalism in termsof

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48 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

its implications and ramificationsfor the status and rights of the

individuals who constitute its bona fide permanent population.
Accordingly,it is argued that all formsof nationalismas well as state-
nationalismcan be classifiedas varietiesof two analyticallydistincttypes:
thecivic-politicaland thecultural/ethnictypeof nationalism.
The civic model is conventionallyassociated with the emancipatory
ethos of the European Enlightenmentand the French Revolution. It
terminatedthe feudal systemof hereditaryprivilegesrequiringinferiors
to renderduties and obligationsto superiors.Instead an egalitarianbody
of equal citizensentitledto equal rightsvis-à-visthestatewas established
in the new dispensation.It took thatmodel another 156 years beforeit
became truly universal and inclusive when the UN Charter of 1945
proclaimed it as the preferredframeworkforestablishingparticipatory,
democraticstates. The second type is known as the cultural or ethnic
model of nationalism. Its origins are traced to the German Romantic
Movementwhichemergedin reactionto Napoleon's expansionistwars to
spread theEuropean Enlightenment's universalismand rationalismto the
whole of Europe. For the German patriotsit meant hegemonyof French
cultureratherthan some universal spread of rationalism.Consequently
theyemphasized thepeculiarityand even uniqueness of Germanculture.
The underlyinglogic of such theorizingwas thatnations were organic
communitiesbound togetherthroughfeelingsof affectionand solidarity
derivingfroma sense of common descent and culture.Thus ratherthan
individual citizensbeing the main bearers of rightsit was the nation or
communitywhich had priorityover members(Brubaker,1992).
It will be demonstratedbelow that the Pakistani national identity
approximates to the Germanic model, though the founderof Pakistan,
Mohammad Ali Jinnah,firstused religionto justifytheclaim to separate
statehoodforthe'Muslim nation'ofIndia,but thentriedtoprojecta vision
of inclusive Pakistani nationalism that would grant equal rightsto all
individuals in the Pakistani population in accordance with the French
model of territorial
nationalism.
The Controversyover Pakistani National Identity
The creationof Pakistan on 14th August 1947 througha partitioningof
colonial India on thebasis of contiguousreligiousmajorityof Muslims in
thenorth-western and north-easternzones of theIndian subcontinentwas
accompanied by thebiggestinvoluntarymigrationof populations across
the internationalborders thatwere created between India and Pakistan.
While Hindus and Sikhs fled forsafetyin what became India, Muslims
travelledin the opposite directionin search of safe haven. Some 700,000
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs lost theirlives because of the massacres and
riotsthattookplace at thattime.The All-IndiaMuslim League (henceforth

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PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 49

referredto as the Muslim League), which spearheaded the separatist

movementforPakistanhad claimed thatthe Muslims of India were not
simplya religiousminority;theywere a separate and distinctnation on
the basis of theirIslamic faithand culture.Therefore,it argued thatthe
Muslim nationwas entitledto separate statehood.No one articulatedthis
standpoint more eloquently and persuasively than Mohammad Ali
Jinnah,thesupreme leader of theMuslim League.
However, a notoriousambiguitysurroundedthepurposes forwhich
Pakistanwas created- was itto be simplya nationalstateofMuslims or a
theocraticIslamic state based on Shariah (dogmatic Islamic law)? An
answer to thatquestion carrieddirectimplicationsforthe rightsof non-
Muslim minorities.Even in termsof the rightsof the various sectionsof
the Muslim population,therewas a problemabout the rightsof women
and various minorityMuslim sects.Jinnahhad never provided any clear
answer to this question. In many of his formalstatementshe drew the
contours of a modern Muslim state but also gave assurances to the
religious elite that the Shariah would be applicable to Muslims
(Constituent AssemblyDebates, 1949:46).
For PakistaniMuslims,especially thosewho had eitherbeen victims
or activeparticipantsin thepartitionriots,therecould be littledoubt that
Pakistanhad been specificallyestablishedfortheMuslim nation.The All-
India Muslim League had invoked Islam to mobilize all sections of
Muslim society.Sectarianand doctrinaldifferences were cleverlyignored
and emphasis was laid on Islam as commoncultureand identity.Thus all
categoriesofMuslimswho identifiedthemselvesas Muslimsin thecensus
records rallied to the call of the Muslim League for the creation of a
Muslim polity. Not surprisinglytheynurtureddiverse interests,hopes
and visions with its establishment.One can sum up the variegatedideas
about Pakistanin thefollowingwords:
Pakistanmeantdifferent thingstodifferentpeople.To thelandlordsitmeant
continued leadership: to the doctrinal-minded Muslims, a unique
opportunity tocreatean Islamicstateinthelightoftheirideas:totheMuslim
and thepoorerclasses,a statewheresocialandeconomic
intelligentsia justice
wouldprevailand theirdignity established,accordingto Iqbaliteteachings;
to thepeasants,freedomfromtheyokeof theHindumoney-lender; to the
regionalleaders,a greaterautonomythanwas expectedin a unitedIndia
dominatedby Congress; to the Muslim bourgeoisie,the necessary
environment wheretheycoulddeveloptheirpotential...; and tobureaucrats
and themilitary, an excellent
opportunity tosecurequickpromotions; and to
themilitary establishment itbroughta centralrolein a country wherethe
civilianpoliticalprocesswas dependentfromtheverybeginningupon its
supportand activeparticipation (Ahmed,1987:80-1).
It should be noted thatafterPakistanbecame independent,the hopes of
themasses thatradical economicreformswould be undertakento liberate

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50 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

themfromabjectpovertyremainedlargelyunfulfilled. The mostdramatic

change was, of course, the remissionof all debts to Hindu moneylenders.
On the other hand, dependence and subordination to the Muslim
landlordscontinuedas before.Such difficulties were compounded further
by the fact that neitherin the West Pakistani provinces (Baluchistan,
North-WestFrontierProvince,Punjab and Sindh) norin East Pakistanwas
thereany significantindustrialdevelopment.Moreover,education levels
were very low and the overall social development was poor. Rich
landlords,a minisculecommercialbourgeoisie,a small intelligentsiaand
thevast majoritymade up ofmillionsofpeasants,artisansand othertypes
of poor people constitutedthe social pyramid of Pakistani society.The
crucialbroad-based and educated middle-classthatcould help provide a
strongsocial base fora secular typeof democracywas conspicuous by its
absence.
Moreover,the movementforPakistanwas essentiallynegativein its
orientation:ithad come intobeingin oppositionto a perceivedfearthatin a
unitedIndia the Hindu majoritywould be a permanentpoliticalmajority
thus reducing Muslims to the position of second-class citizens. Such
complicationswere aggravatedby thefactthatPakistancame intobeingin
theverylast monthsof thecolonialperiod,when negotiationsbetweenthe
Muslim League and theIndian National Congressmediatedby theBritish
failedto finda power-sharingformulathatcould keep India united.These
difficultieswere compounded further by the factthatthe Muslim League
was a loose collectionof Muslimpoliticianswithregionalsupportbases. It
did not representa cohesive or coherentpolitical partywith grassroots
organizationsthroughoutthecountry(Ahmed,1987:77-80).
Under the circumstances,the civil service and the militarycame to
dominate thestate.The typeof governmentthathas dominatedPakistan
has been described as the vice-regalsystemwhere bureaucratsand the
militaryestablishmenthave subordinated the representativesfromcivil
society,including those elected by the people (Talbot, 1998: 54). Since
Pakistaniindependence,the military-bureaucratic oligarchyhas stepped
in several timesdismissingsittinggovernmentson chargesof corruption,
inefficiency or thebreakdownof law and order.While thisoligarchyhas
preferredan authoritariantype of political order, in termsof national
identity,however, the elite have shown no clear vision. Over time,
however, the religious type of national identityhas strengthenedand
acquired fundamentalisttrappings.
The ModernistPhase. The firstauthoritativestatementon national
identitymade on 11 August 1947 by Mohammad Ali Jinnahsurprised
manybecause in ithe revertedto his earliermooringsofconstitutionalism
and democracy.Among otherthings,he observed thefollowingin a long
address:

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PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 51

You are free;you are freeto go to yourtemples,youare freeto go to your

mosquesor to anyotherplaceofworshipin thisStateofPakistan.You may
belongto any religionor casteor creed-that has nothingto do withthe
businessoftheState....We are starting withthisfundamental principlethat
we are all citizensand equal citizensofone State...I thinkwe shouldkeep
thatin front ofus as our ideal and youwillfindthatin due courseHindus
wouldceasetobe Hindusand Muslimswouldceasetobe Muslims, notinthe
religioussense,becausethatis thepersonalfaithofeachindividual, butinthe
politicalsenseas citizensoftheState(SpeechesandWritings ofMrJinnah,1976:
403-4).
This patentlysecular and territorialidea ofnationhas generatedunending
controversysubsequently. While thefundamentalists usually dismissitas
irrelevantand an aberration,moderates argue thatJinnahwas actually
operatingwithinan ideal Islamic frameworkof toleranceand justice for
non-Muslims within an Islamic state (Shah 1998). Marginalized
secularists,leftistsand oppressed minorities,however,raise it to thelevel
of a sacred covenantthathis successorshave allegedlybroken.Whatever
the motivationfor the speech it is doubtfulwhetherin the wake of the
communal riots such a prescriptionenjoyed any real credibilityin
Muslim-Pakistanisociety. Afterhis death on 11th September1948, the
idea of a secular state never again received much attentionin Pakistani
politics.Rather,Islamic idiom became a centralfeatureofofficialrhetoric.
It is interestingto note that in an officialcollectionof the speeches of
Jinnahpublished by the Research Society of Pakistan in 1966, his 11
August 1947 speech was omittedaltogether(SelectedSpeeches , 1966)
One can even argue that once the initialeuphoria was over and a
frameworkfornational identityand state building had to be found,the
Pakistani leadership felt constrained to distinguishitself from India.
Pakistanhad been won in thename of religiousnationalism.There were
undoubtedly other issues to be dealt with by the governmentof Prime
MinisterLiaqat Ali Khan (assassinated 16 October,1951),but maintaining
distinctivenessfrom Congress and secular India must have been an
importantconsideration.Thus the Objectives Resolution moved in the
PakistanConstituentAssemblyby Khan on 7 March 1949 proclaimedthe
novel idea that sovereigntyover the entireuniverse belonged to God.
Democracywas to be practised,but within'Islamic limits'.The minorities
were assured thattheirlegitimateinterestswould be safeguardedand that
provisionswould be made forthem,in accordance with Islam, to freely
profess and practise their religions and cultures (Constituent Assembly
Debates, 1949: 1-2). Such proclamationssounded pompous and decorative
ratherthansubstantive,but in the long run theyproved to be a source of
legitimationforthe Islamizationof Pakistan.
Thus the firstconstitutionof Pakistan adopted in 1956 contained a

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52 . INTERNATIONAL REVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

commitmentto bringingall laws intoconformity withIslam. It could not

be put into operation because the governmentwas overthrownby a
militarycoup in October 1958. The second constitutiongiven in 1962 by
General Mohammad Ayub Khan reiteratedthe commitmentto bringall
laws in conformitywith Islam. The thirdconstitutionadopted by the
National Assembly of Pakistan in 1973 took furthersteps towards
Islamization. Unlike the firsttwo constitutionsthat only required the
presidentof the republic to be a Muslim, the thirdrequired the prime
ministerto be a Muslim too. It further
obligedbothofthemto takean oath
testifyingtheirbelief in the finalityof Prophet Muhammad's mission
(ConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1975).
In 1974 the National Assemblydeclared the Ahmadiyyasect as non-
Muslim. The initiator,ironically,of this change was Prime Minister
ZulfikarAli Bhutto(1971-77),a man generallyconsidered a left-leaning
politician.Bhuttopossibly sought to capture the politicalinitiativefrom
the clerics by pre-emptingtheir favouritedemand that Ahmadis be
declared as non-Muslims.This proved to be a colossal miscalculationon
his part because it only emboldened the fundamentaliststo demand
greatercompliancewith theirprogrammeof Islamization.In 1977 Bhutto
was overthrownaftera prolonged nationwidecampaign against him by
the combined opposition parties who accused him of maintainingan
authoritarianand vindictivegovernment.The militarytookover. General
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was a committedfundamentalist.
Fundamentalism in the Periphery
A movementin favour of a fundamentalistpolity enjoyed favourwith
manyclericsfromtheverybeginningof thecreationof Pakistan.One can
define Islamic fundamentalism as an anti-modern,anti-democratic,
violence-proneideological-politicalmovement.It invariablyrefersto an
attitudeidealizing thepolitycreatedby theProphetMuhammad in the7th
century.The Sunni consider theperiod of his immediatefoursuccessors,
thepious caliphs,as a continuationof thatideal stateand seek to emulate
it.The Shias reduce thatperiod even moreand celebrateonlytheperiod of
thefourthcaliph Ali who theyconsideras theonlylegitimatesuccessorof
Muhammad. The ideal of a perfectIslamic state has fascinatedMuslims
throughout history (Ahmed, 1987). Until 1977, however, the
fundamentalistsin Pakistan remained alienated from positions of
authority,and it was theWesternizedelitewhich ruled.Nevertheless,the
fundamentalistscontinuedto put forththeiragenda in different ways.
The ideologue ofsuch a movementwas Abul Ala Maududi, theleader
of the Jama'at-e-Islami. In 1951 he compiled a 22-point political
programme which sought a thorough Islamization of Pakistan. He
interpretedthe notion of sovereigntyof God to mean that the Shariah

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PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 53

would apply to all sectorsof lifewithinthe Islamic polityas well as to

relationswithnon-Muslimstatesand societies.Althoughthegovernment
was to be formedthroughelections as in Westerndemocracies,female
equality and equal rightsfornon-Muslimswere rejected.He was able to
secure the signatures of the leading Sunni (of the various orthodox
orientations)and Shia clericsto thatdocument(Maududi, 1980:332-336).
In externalmatterstoo, Maududi wanted classical Islamic ideas of
Dar-ul-Islam(abode ofpeace where Islamic law applies) and Dar-ul-Harb
(enemyterritory) tobe observedby thestate.ItmeantthattheIslamicstate
could establish peace with its neighbours through treatybut in the
ultimatesense no real peace could be consolidatedbetween theworld of
Islam and non-Muslims(Maududi, 1981). The firstmajor outburstof a
fundamentalisttypeof politicstook place when the mainlySunni clerics
began a campaign in 1953 to have the Ahmadiyya sect declared non-
Muslim.
TheAnti-Ahmadiyya Riotsof1953.The controversy had itsoriginsin the
claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), born at Qadian in the
Punjab, to being a prophet.In addition he made statementswhich were
seen by other Muslims as openly pro-Britishand against the Muslim
community;most notably his rejectionof jihad (holy war) against the
British.Afternis death theAhmadiyyamovementwent througha period
of internalriftand conflict.During the colonial period the Ahmadis
received governmentprotection.They were able to win some convertsin
Punjab. Some prominent Ahmadis, among whom Sir Muhammad
Zafrulla Khan was the most well-known,played a leading role in the
struggle for the creation of Pakistan. Sir Zafrulla was subsequently
appointed as thefirstforeignministerofPakistanbyJinnah.Itwas widely
believed thatAhmadi officersin thearmyand thecivilservicewere using
theirinfluenceto convertpeople to theirfaithin Pakistan(CourtofInquiry
Report1954).
In 1953 a violentagitationbroke out in Punjab against the Ahmadis.
During thisagitation,many Ahmadis were killed and thelootingof their
property was widespread. The agitation was crushed following the
impositionofmartiallaw by thecentralgovernment.The CourtofInquiry
forthe riots,headed by two judges of the Lahore High Court,found that
not only clericsbut also leading figuresof the Muslim League provincial
governmentin Punjab were involved in the violence. In the reportthey
warned of theconsequencesofexploitingIslam forpoliticalpurposes and
described the Islamic state model of the clerics as an obscurantistand
oppressive one (CourtofInquiryReport1954).
Fundamentalismas State Ideology.The growth and ascent of a
fundamentalistpoliticaljargon in Pakistani politics can be traced to lay
politicians,whether in the governmentor outside it, who found it a

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54 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

convenientploy to outbid each other in assertingtheirown piety and

patriotism,while accusing othersof being renegades to Islam and agents
of hostile foreign powers. In cumulative terms, such a propensity
invariablybenefitedthe fundamentalistlobby since the employmentof
Islamic terminologymeantborrowingit fromfundamentalist sourcesand
authority. From the mid-1960s onwards, as class strugglesand regional
conflictsgreatlyincreased in Pakistan,Maududi's version of an Islamic
stateappeared as formidablecounterweightthatcould be wielded against
theemergingradical threats.He and some militaryofficers began to argue
that an ideology of Pakistan based on Islam existed and throughan
ordinance issued by the militarygovernmentof General Yayha Khan in
1969,Islam was declared exclusivelyas theideology of Pakistan(Ahmed,
1999: 230).
With the coming into power of General Zia in 1977, an unabashed
champion of fundamentalismwas now in power. He succinctlydeclared
his political mission: T consider the establishmentof an Islamic order a
prerequisite forthe country.'(Noman 1988: 118). In 1979 the government
announced theimpositionof theHudud Ordinance i.e. punishmentslaid
down in the Quran and Sunna for the offencesof adultery (death by
stoning),fornication(100 lashes), false accusation of adulteťy(80 lashes),
drinkingalcohol (80 lashes), theft(cuttingoffthe righthand), highway
robbery(when theoffenceis only robbery,cuttingoffhands and feet,for
robberywith murder,death eitherby the sword or crucifixion)(Ahmed,
1999: 231).
In 1983-84,furtherlegal restrictionswere imposed on the Ahmadis
who were forbiddento use Islamicnomenclaturefortheirworship,places
ofworshipand so on. In 1984,a new Law of Evidence was adopted which
reduced thevalue oftheevidence ofa femalewitnessto halfthatofa male
witnessin a courtof law. In 1985,a Shariatbill was moved in thenational
assemblyby two membersof theJamaat-e-Islamithatsoughtto establish
the supremacyof the Quran and Sunna in a substantialmanner.Sunni-
Hanafi interpretations ofpuritanUlama (Deobandi usually) were tobe the
standard norm and practice.Most centralto the bill was the creationof
Shariat Courts. Hudud offences were to be within the exclusive
jurisdictionoftheShariatCourts(Ahmed,1999:231). In 1986,a Blasphemy
Law was introducedunderSection295-C of thePenal Code. Accordingto
the law, the use of derogatoryremarkswith respectto the Holy Prophet,
whetherby words, eitherspoken or written,or by visible representation,
or by any imputation,innuendo or insinuation,directlyor indirectly,
would be punishable with eitherdeath, imprisonmentforlife,or a fine
(Ahmed, 2005: 203).
Women , non-Muslimsand minoritysects.The so-called Tslamization'of
the Pakistanilegal code institutionalizeddiscriminationagainst women,

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PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 55

non-Muslimsand deviantsects,therebyreducingthemto the positionof

second-ratecitizens.Thus forexample,when itcame to rape,women were
hugely disadvantaged by the Zina Ordinance introducedby General Zia.
It is interestingto note that rape as sexual intercourseforced upon a
woman is not recognized in the Quran, but it was acknowledged by
Muslimjuristsas zina biljabror sexual intercourseunderduress.Under the
PakistanPenal Code (PPC) Section375 inheritedfromthecolonial system
the evidence given by the victimwas accepted. Under the new law, the
evidence of the victim was not admitted,nor was that of any other
woman. MoreoverPPC Section375 had protectedgirlsunder fourteenby
providing that even with their consent,sexual intercoursewith them
would constituterape (Mehdi, 1994:123). This immunitywas notincluded
in theZina Ordinance.The traditionalIslamic Law ofEvidence pertaining
to zina biljabrwas thatfourmale witnesseshad to testifyunder oath that
theyactually saw the penetrationof the woman's vagina by the rapist.
Furthermore, under Islamic law, if the rape was not proved, the woman
accusing someone of rape could be punished severelyon chargesof false
accusation of rape. Under hadoodlaw the punishmentwas 100 lashes. In
subsequent years, many rape victimswere severely punished because
theycould notprovide therequiredevidence offourpious male witnesses
(Jahangirand Jilani,2003).
Besides such harsh misogynistlaws, more concretesocial measures
were undertakento impose a chastecode ofconductforwomen. In 1980,a
circularwas issued to all governmentofficesthat prescribeda proper
Muslim dress for female employees. Wearing of a chador (loose cloth
covering one's head) was made obligatory.A campaign to eliminate
obscenityand pornographywas also announced. This however took the
formof a campaign against thegeneralemancipationand equal rightsfor
women. Leading Muslim theologians notorious for their misogynist
prejudices against female emancipation were brought on national
televisiontojustifythevarious restrictions and limitationson thefreedom
of women (Ahmed, 1999: 232). As the general situation of women
deteriorated,some educated women in urban centressuch as Lahore,
Karachi and Islamabad began to agitate and demonstrate. Police
repressionfollowedimmediately.The succeedinggovernmentsofBenazir
Bhutto(1988-90,1994-96),Nawaz Sharif(1990-93;1997-99)did notdare to
remove thelaws againstwomen, imposed duringtheZia era.
Until1977,althoughvarious restrictions existedon thepoliticalrights
of non-Muslims, they were more symbolic than substantial. Zia
introduced separate electoratesfor non-Muslims in 1985. Non-Muslim
voterswere not to vote in the generalelectionsforgeneralseats,but only
for non-Muslim candidates. Since then, many individuals, mostly
Christiansand Ahmadis, have been charged with blasphemy.The death

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56 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

sentence has been passed at the lower levels but commuted to lighter
sentencesat thehigherlevel. Neverthelessa numberofindividualsset free
by thecourtshave subsequentlybeen murderedby assailantssuspectedof
belonging to various extremistgroups. In October 1997, a retiredhigh
courtjudge ArifBhattiwas shot dead by gunmenbelieved to belong to
extremistgroups, apparentlybecause he had acquitted two Christians
chargedwithblasphemy(Ahmed,2002: 57-89).
Since the 1990s, the perennial sectarian tensionbetween the Sunni
majorityand thesubstantialShia minority(some 15-20per cent)has taken
theshape of terroristattacksbetweenarmed militiasof thetwo sides. The
comingintopower of theShia Imam,AyutollahKhomeiniin 1979 in Iran,
and the reaction of Iran's Sunni Arab neighboursto it, resulted in the
clandestine supply of large sums of money, leaflets,books, audio and
video cassette-tapesand othermeans topropagateone pointofview or the
other in Pakistan. In addition to regular gun-battles,bomb-attacksand
assassinations targeting rival Sunni and Shia Ulama and activists,
innocentworshippersin mosques of rival sects have also been pitilessly
gunned down (Ahmed 1998: 208-209).
Pakistan Delinks fromMilitant Islam
On 12 October 1999, General Pervez Musharrafoverthrewthe elected
governmentof Nawaz Sharif,and declared himselffirstas the chief
executiveand lateras thepresidentof Pakistan.On 11 September2001, a
group of terroristsbelieved to be membersof theAl-Qaeda movementled
by a veteranof the Afghanjihad, the Saudi, Osama bin Laden, hijacked
civilianaircraftin various US cities and flew theminto the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. Following the monumentalattacksthatkilled
several thousand people, the US rapidly musteredits armed forcesand
establishedan anti-terroristcoalition.The pressureplaced on Pakistan to
choose sides at thetimeled to a decisive move by Musharrafto unlinkhis
administrationfromthevarious Pakistanifundamentalist militantoutfits,
while agreeing to open up Pakistani airspace, port facilitiesand even
allowing theAmericansto establishbases in Pakistan.
On 1 October and 13 December 2001, militantscarried out terrorist
attacks on the Kashmir Assembly in Srinagar,the capital of the India-
administeredKashmir,and the Indian Parliamentin Delhi, respectively.
India responded by mobilisingits troopsalong the2900 kilometresIndia-
Pakistanborderand theline ofcontrolin Kashmir.Pakistanfollowedsuit.
Given that both India and Pakistan had demonstratedtheirability to
explode nuclear devices in 1998 and had engaged in theKargilconflictin
May 1999, therewas widespread concernof the possibilitythatnuclear
weapons could be used by theadversariesiftheborder-standoff escalated
intoopen conflict.

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PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 57

Internationalconcernand pressureincreasedenormouslyòn the two

statesto withdrawfromtheirstandoff.India, however,refusedto do that
as long as Pakistansupportedwhat itdescribedas cross-borderterrorism.
The US, Britainand otherWesternpowers backed theIndian demand for
Pakistan to forgo its support to militantgroups. Consequently,in an
address to the Pakistani nation on 12 January2002, General Pervez
Musharrafpublicallydissociated himselffromfundamentalist tendencies
and movements.He described Pakistan as a modernIslamic statebased
on a moderate,tolerantinterpretation of Islam (Musharraf,2002). Laterin
an address to Muslimclericshe spoke about a middle path,a tolerantnon-
divisive approach to Islam (Musharraf, 18 January, 2002). Most
significantlyhe abolished thesystemofseparateelectorateswherebynon-
Muslims were requiredto vote separatelyfromtheMuslims,and thelaw
on rape was changed so thattherequirementoffourpious male witnesses
was not requiredto establishtheoffence.The testimonyof thevictimhas
also come to be admittedas valid.
In subsequent clarifications, however, Musharraf dispelled
speculationsthatPakistanmightbecome a secularstate.He reiteratedthat
Pakistan will remain an Islamic Republic. For example, when on 14
February2002 theUS House of Representativepassed a resolutionurging
Pakistan to abolish the blasphemy laws and the ban on the Ahmadiyya
sect to call themselves Muslims, the Pakistan governmentrefused to
comply. It stated thatthe Hudud and Blasphemylaws were an intrinsic
part of the Pakistani constitutionand would remain in forcealthough
measures would be taken to see to it that were not employed in an
arbitrarymanner(Kamran,2002).
Such vacillationbetweenmoderateand fundamentalist typesofIslam
has not helped Musharrafattaina consensus on nationalidentity.On the
contrary,the close relationshipwith the United States thathe cultivated
afterthe9/11 terrorists attackshave greatlyangered thefundamentalists
who, in turn,have declared a holy war on the Musharrafregime.The
resulthas been several armed conflictsbetween the PakistanArmyand
the fundamentalists.Hundreds of deaths, including those of innocent
people have taken place as a result of terroristbomb blasts and the
governmentbombardmentof fundamentaliststrongholdsin the tribal
areas on theborderwithAfghanistan.
Conclusion
Therecan be littledoubt thatPakistanistate-nationalism derivesfromthe
Germanictypeofculturalnationalism.Since Pakistanhad been createdin
the name of Muslim nationalism,its national identitywas inextricably
bound to thatculturalfactor.Soon afterindependence,therulingelite in
Pakistandecided to include Islam in the elaborationof national identity.

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58 INTERNATIONALREVIEWOF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

Such an eliteruled in thevice-regalauthoritariantradition.The distinction

between Muslim (cultural)and Islamic (religious)being ratherblurredin
the Muslim heritage,the constitutionaland legal frameworksbegan to
borrowterminologyand jargon fromclassical Islamic politicaltheory.
The coming into power of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1977
placed fundamentalist forcesdirectlyat thehelmofaffairsin Pakistan.He
stroveto Islamize Pakistaninational identityin line with fundamentalist
ideology.This resultedin various discriminatory laws beingintroducedin
Pakistan. After9/11, however, the Pakistani regime has moved away
considerablyfromfundamentalism, as is evidentin Musharraf'sassertion
that Pakistan will be a modern, moderate, tolerantIslamic state. Such
vacillations between moderate and fundamentalisttypes of Islam
however make it very difficultto place Pakistan on an ideological
continuumwith the theocraticand secular states being at the opposite
ends of the spectrum.Under all circumstances,however,Pakistanas an
Islamic state- moderateor fundamentalist- constitutionally and legally
discriminates between the primary Pakistani nation constituted by
Muslims,or ratherby Muslim men,and othercategoriesoflessercitizens.
Women ofall categories,non-Muslimsand 'deviant' sectsare subjectedto
legal and constitutionaldisadvantages. Consequentlyitsnationalidentity
is exclusiveas it does not include all thebona fidepermanentresidentsof
Pakistanas equal citizensof thestate.

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