Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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BOR General
2017, the review will be done on the next submission
I ii INoted I Closed
I MOOS-GDB-ENG-CER- 1
DVE Design and Verification Cer1ificate (MOOS.GDB-ENG-
__ ..___ ·--REV 1) includes EIGHT cond~ions.
Therefore cannot be considered as Design Verification Certification.
I ' Discussions have been held between ORIPMC, JV, DVE, Areadis and
I
2 I IMC
00125 REV 1
1
1
ii Atkins on 27th March 2017. caveats will be removed as far as possible , Closed
- · · - · ·- certificate with t he submission without conditions CK but some will be rema ining on MSI and until the MEP design is issued..
Include all life safety and cr~ica l systems (e.g. Signalling systems,
'Communication systems, Fare collections gates, Emergency lighting We note that the majority of items listed by the reviewer are already
5 I IMC I
Page 24 of28
Section 6 .4.2 I 1 system, Fire command centre, Em ergency mechanical ventilation
system, Fire fighting pumps, Fire fighting lifts, etc.), shall be connected
ii included. The switchbox does not contain fare collection gates. We do
not sea that the signalling system is relevant to this FLS report..
I Closed
9 SPO Section 1.5.3 and 1.54 2015 and QCS 2014 edition shall be mentioned here
14 BOR General
ft;l~
Eric
PREPARATION BY CONTRACTOR:
Action Name Signature Role Company Date
~ 6Z./;7~ v
Reviewer Dionysios PP ( Engineering
ALYSJ-JV
Panagiotopoulos · - · Man"!g_er
Approval Carlo Germani Ji;~/ Project Director ALYSJ-JV ax-b-~ ~
/I"' f
ENGINEER'S ASSISTANT /
l\
,. \~~
Engineer's
Samuel Adair McChesney ~ Qatar Rail 4 AUG Z017
Assistant
STATUS ~
A B c \ D) E F
Approved "'---/
Fail/Not No Review
Approved w ith SONO NOWC
Approved Required
Comments
Revision History:
Rev. Date Description Originator Checked Reviewed Approved
Controlled Copy Issue Log: (Applicable only for hard copy as may be required outside of EDMS)
This hard copy document has been assigned as below and will be reissued automatically upon any future
revision.
CONTENTS
TABLES
Table 1: Components Fire Rating ............................................................................................................. 15
Table 2: Fire ratings for specific rooms/areas .......................................................................................... 16
Table 3: Minimum NFPA dimensional criteria for exit stairwell ................................................................ 20
Table 4: Power supply .............................................................................................................................. 25
Table 5: Relevant drawings ...................................................................................................................... 27
FIGURES:
Figure 1: Location Plan ............................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2: 3D massing................................................................................................................................ 10
Figure 3: Switchbox walkways .................................................................................................................. 18
Figure 4: Fire appliance highway turning radii [QCDFSS 4.1 Annex D] ................................................... 23
ABBREVIATIONS
DEFINITIONS
Term Definition
Point of safety A point of safety is one of the following: (1) an enclosed exit that leads to a
public way or safe location outside the station, trainway, or vehicle; (2) an at-
grade point beyond the vehicle, enclosing station, or trainway; (3) any other
approved location. [NFPA 130:3.3.35]
Point of safety A location that (a) is exterior to and away from a building; or (b) is within a
building of any construction type protected throughout by an approved
automatic sprinkler system and that is either (1) within an exit enclosure
meeting the requirements of this Code, or (2) within another portion of the
building that is separated by smoke barriers in accordance with Section 8.5
having a minimum 1 / 2 -hour fire resistance rating, and that portion of the
building has access to a means of escape or exit that conforms to the
requirements of this Code and does not necessitate return to the area of fire
involvement; or (c) is within a building of Type I, Type II(222), Type II(111),
Type III(211), Type IV, or Type V(111) construction (see 8.2.1.2) and is either
(1) within an exit enclosure meeting the requirements of this Code, or (2) within
another portion of the building that is separated by smoke barriers in
accordance with Section 8.5 having a minimum 1/ 2 -hour fire resistance rating,
and that portion of the building has access to a means of escape or exit that
conforms to the requirements of this Code and does not necessitate return to
the area of fire involvement. [NFPA 101:3.3.213 & Glossary of terms]
Place of A place where people are protected from the effects of fire and smoke [CIBSE
relative safety Guide E “Fire Safety Engineering”]
Exit That portion of a means of egress that is separated from all other spaces of a
building or structure by construction or equipment as required to provide a
protected way of travel to the exit discharge.
[NFPA 101:3.3.83 & Glossary of terms]
Exits include exterior exit doors, exit passageways, horizontal exits, exit stairs,
and exit ramps. In the case of a stairway, the exit includes the following:
Term Definition
Smoke barrier A continuous membrane, or a membrane with discontinuities created by
protected openings, where such membrane is designed and constructed to
restrict the movement of smoke. [NFPA 101:3.3.31.2 & Glossary of terms]
Smoke A continuous membrane that is designed to form a barrier to limit the transfer
partition of smoke [NFPA 101:3.3.256 & Glossary of terms]
Draft Stop A continuous membrane used to subdivide a concealed space to resist the
passage of smoke and heat [NFPA 5000:3.3.173 & Glossary of terms]
(Draft stopping materials shall be not less than 13 mm gypsum board, or other
approved materials adequately supported)
NOTE:
Images within this document are indicative for the purposes of fire safety and may not be an
accurate representation of the final layout.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is to provide description of the Fire Protection and Life Safety
features to be adopted for the Gold Line Bin Mahmoud Switchbox.
The Gold Line comprises 13 stations, three switchboxes and a stabling yard. Fire and Life
Safety reports have been produced for each individual station, switchbox and the stabling
yard to support the architectural, structural, mechanical, electrical and public health
submissions; which this report should be read in conjunction with.
This submission addresses Fire Protection provisions and Means of Escape, together with
measures such as fire compartmentation, mode of protection (extinguishment),
standpipes, risers, call points etc.
All the Fire Safety protection provisions are designed to comply with NFPA 130:2014 and
the QCDD regulations prevailing at the date of this report, as well as all the latest editions
of the standards, codes and regulations in relation to the fire regulations in Qatar. No
waivers to the above requirements are needed for this switchbox and the design is
compliant with these fire and life safety standards.
This report is the DD2 stage continuation of the DD1 stage FLS report M006-GDB-ARC-
RPT-00098.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Description
1.1.1 This report outlines the principles of the Fire and Life Safety design for the Bin
Mahmoud switchbox as part of the larger Gold Line Doha Metro contract.
1.1.2 The Bin Mahmoud switchbox shall be constructed using a cut and cover technique,
overall measures circa 197m long x 18-31m wide with the track circa 22m below
ground.
1.1.3 The switchbox is located immediately to the east end of the Bin Mahmoud station box
and is a section of tunnel where a portion of the wall separating two trainways is omitted
so that trains can move from one track to the other. The switchbox is not normally
occupied except for planned maintenance. There is an emergency evacuation shaft
located centrally at the east end of the switchbox and access to the station platform
emergency egress system at the west end.
1.1.4 The grade level buildings have been addressed in the production of this report.
1.1.5 This report addresses the Bin Mahmoud switchbox only. Fire and life safety provisions
for separate switchboxes, tunnels, stations or other facilities are addressed by other
individual line or system wide reports.
1.1.6 Separate documents and reports have been prepared by the JV, or are the
responsibility of other parties, to address specific elements, such as:
Figure 2: 3D massing
1.2 Scope
i. construction classification;
1.3.1 The Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) for this project is Qatar Civil Defence.
1.4.1 Drawings listed in Volume 8 of the Employer’s Requirements are provided for
information only.
1.5.1 The principal codes and documents upon which the tunnels, switchboxes and stations
have been designed are listed below. Where the Employer’s Requirements do not
specify a particular edition of a code or standard then the most current is adopted.
1.5.2 The ER subsume the standards on which they are based, in the following order of
priority:
i. NFPA 130
ii. Qatar Civil Defence Fire Safety Standards (QCDFSS)
iii. Qatar Construction Standards (QCS)
ii. QCDFSS 2.10: Fire protection water supplies, 27 March 2008 edition;
iii. QCDFSS 6.2: Rising main for fire-fighting, 18 February 2008 edition;
iv. QCDFSS 4.1: External access to site and building, 18 February 2008; and
v. QCDFSS 8.2.3: Fire command centre, 17 September 2007.
1.5.6 The lists above are not exhaustive. Standards such as the British Standards (BS),
European Standards (EN) and other internationally approved standards may be used
in specifying, detailing of structure, fire safety systems, materials and devices subject
to the approval of QCD.
1.6.1 The fire protection methods of ER 6:10.3.2.9, NFPA 130, NFPA 101, QCDFSS and the
design approach outlined in this report are based on the premise that there will be a
single fire event from a single fire source and that multiple simultaneous fire incidents
will not occur.
1.6.2 The fire safety strategy for the Bin Mahmoud switchbox, Bin Mahmoud station and
associated ancillary facilities is based on the prescriptive-based methods of the code
and includes client specific requirements noted within the documents listed in Section
1.5 above.
1.6.3 The rolling stock and traction units are not part of the JV’s contract, but the fire strategy
has been based on the premise that they will be constructed to meet the requirements
of EN 45545.
1.6.4 Protection against certain terrorist acts will generally require protection methods
beyond those required by NFPA 130, NFPA 101 and are outside the scope of this fire
and life safety report.
The authority that is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the passenger
rail system shall anticipate and plan for emergencies that could involve the system.
This shall comply with NFPA 130 Chapter 9 and involve, as a minimum –
The authority shall operate an Integrated Control Centre (ICC) for the operation and
supervision of the system in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 130: 9.6. It is
noted that the provision of the ICC falls outside the scope of the Gold Line JV.
Blue light stations are required at locations dictated by NFPA 130: 6.4.2 to allow
emergency service and authorised personnel to communicate with the ICC and
disconnect traction power.
2.1.1 Per the definition given by NFPA 130: 3.3.52.1 the switchbox is part of a “Automated
Fixed Guideway Transit System”. Namely an electrified transportation system, utilizing
a fixed guideway, operating on right-of-way for the mass movement of passengers
within a metropolitan area, and consisting of its fixed guideways, fully automated
driverless transit vehicles, and other rolling stock; power system; buildings;
maintenance facilities; stations; transit vehicle yard; and other stationary and movable
apparatus, equipment, appurtenances, and structures
2.2.1 The switchbox presents the conditions found in most buildings and will be classified as
Ordinary Hazard with regard to life safety hazard evaluation, per NFPA 101: 6.2 and
ER 6-10.4.1.2. i.e. contents likely to burn with moderate rapidity or to give off a
considerable volume of smoke. This classification does not apply to the sprinkler
protection classification, NFPA 13, Standard for the installation of sprinkler systems.
3.1.1 The switchbox has been designed to be constructed in reinforced concrete using a cut
and cover method. The minimum type of construction stipulated by NFPA 130 for
perimeter walls and related construction is Type II non-combustible construction. The
Employer’s Requirements further stipulates this as Type II (222). The switchbox vertical
exit shaft and ventilation structure are required to achieve at least Type I (332) non-
combustible construction [NFPA 130: 6.2.2.5]. Reinforced concrete is proposed and
meets the Type I criteria.
3.1.2 Steelwork is proposed for the switchbox walking surfaces intended for evacuation of
passengers and meets the non-combustible criteria.
3.1.3 Within the switchbox, ancillary areas are separated from the trainway sections by a
minimum of 2 hour fire resistive construction.
3.1.4 Type I and Type II construction are those types in which the fire walls, structural
elements, walls, floors and roofs are of approved non-combustible or limited
combustible materials. The switchbox structural elements have been designed to be
constructed in reinforced concrete and this meets the Type I and Type II criteria. Table
2 below is extracted from NFPA 220 Table 4.1.1 and indicates the fire resistance rating
that components of Type I (332) and Type II (222) construction must achieve.
3.1.5 Fire windows in fire resistance-rated assemblies are restricted to those locations
permitted by NFPA 101: Table 8.3.4.2.
3.2 Compartmentation
3.2.1 Refer to the Fire and Life Safety Strategy [Fire Policy] drawings listed in Appendix A for
the location of fire resistance rated barriers and fire doors.
3.2.2 Compartmentation for the switchbox is summarized in Table 3 below and based upon
the Employer’s Requirements ER 6-10.5.2., NFPA 130 and NFPA 101.
3.2.3 Where one element supports another, the more onerous fire rating requirement has
been applied to the supporting structure.
3.2.4 Underground structures (stations, egress shafts, vent shafts, etc,) are protected from
the accidental ingress of flammable and combustible liquids. This includes the
prohibition on any vent or fan shaft used for the ventilation of the underground station
3.3.1 The grade level emergency shafts, ventilation shafts and other structures are presently
more than 6m from other buildings such that there is no requirement for non-load
bearing external walls to be fire rated.
3.3.2 The requirement that external finishes comply with QCD FSS 3.2 and NFPA 5000
Chapter 37 “Exterior Wall Construction” has been communicated to and co-ordinated
with the Branding Architect.
3.4.1 For construction Type I (332) & Type II (222) the required minimum roof-covering
classification is Class B [NFPA 5000: Table 38.2.2]. This has been communicated to
and co-ordinated with the Branding Architect for incorporation. The roof covering shall
be tested and is required to comply with one of the following:
3.5.1 Interior finish for walls, floor and ceilings comply with NFPA 101 Chapter 10 “Interior
Finish, contents and furnishings” and are non-combustible.
3.6.1 Fire doors serving as opening protectives have a minimum fire protection rating as
specified in NFPA 101: Table 8.3.4.2 and part repeated in Table 3 herein.
3.6.2 Fire door assemblies shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80 and shall be self
closing or automatic closing in accordance with NFPA 101: 7.2.1.8.
3.6.3 Fire windows in fire resistance-rated assemblies are restricted to those locations
permitted by NFPA 101: Table 8.3.4.2 and shall be required to comply with NFPA 251.
4 MEANS OF EGRESS
4.1 Evacuation scenarios:
4.1.1 In the event of a fire within the tunnel or switchbox the intent is for the train to continue
to the next station where passengers may evacuate via the exit system within the
station.
4.1.2 If a train is halted within the switchbox or tunnel due to a fire it is understood that the
emergency smoke control system shall operate so that occupants may evacuate in the
direction of the fresh air along the walkway and then evacuate via either the exit system
within the station or the exit system in the switchbox or tunnel.
4.2.1 The level of exit discharge for the switchbox is external ground level.
4.3.1 The switchbox incorporates a walkway on one side of each trainway so that occupants
may evacuate to the nearest exit system. The walkway provides an unobstructed clear
space of at least 800mm width at the walking surface and corresponds with the NFPA
130: 6.3.2.1 requirements above that plane per ER 6-10.5.1.1 i), i.e. 610mm at the
walking surface, graduating to 760mm wide at 1575mm above the walking surface to
430mm wide at 2025mm above the walking surface.
4.3.2 If a train is halted within the Bin Mahmoud station, switchbox or adjacent tunnel due to
a fire it is understood that the emergency smoke control system shall operate so that
occupants may evacuate in the direction of the fresh air along the walkway and then
evacuate using an emergency exit shaft.
4.3.3 The location of the train when it stops, the nature of the incident (e.g. whether it is a
derailment or fire and where it originates) will in part influence the ICC directed tunnel
ventilation response and hence whether passengers evacuate to the switchbox escape
shaft, Bin Mahmoud station escape shaft or cross passages east of the switchbox and
hence Al Sadd Station
4.3.4 Evacuation of a train is based on the premise that occupants of a 60m long 3 car section
may move up or down within it and access to the walkway is controlled by the ICC to a
single door. Qatar Rail have confirmed that occupants cannot move between two 60m
long trains.
4.3.5 Raised walkways are provided with a continuous handrail on the side opposite the
trainway. The handrail does not project more than 114mm into the clear zone stipulated
by the Employer’s Requirement ER 6-10:5.1.1 i).
4.3.6 While the trainway is more than 760mm below the walkway a guarding is not required
along the open edge as the bottom of the trainway is closed with a deck (NFPA 130:
6.3.3.6).
4.3.7 In the switchbox the raised walkways connect with the track level crosswalk with steps.
The crosswalks are provided at track level to ensure walkway continuity and provide a
uniform walking surface at the top of the rail.
4.3.8 The switchbox fire-fighting stair and fire-fighting lift shaft are separated from the
trainway by a fire-fighting lobby.
4.3.9 The fire-fighting stairwell, fire-fighting lift and lift lobby are all pressurized.
4.3.10 The fire-fighting lobby at track level measures 9m2 in area with a minimum dimension
of 2.7m and so is compliant with the minimum dimensions set out by QCDFSS 2.2.13
of not less than 6m2 in area and 2m in either dimension. Thus the lobby is large enough
to accommodate a wheelchair refuge, fire-fighting equipment and passengers escaping
4.3.11 The exit stair shaft from track level to transfer level, linking exit passage way at transfer
level and exit stair shaft from transfer level to grade is protected as required for exits.
This includes but is not limited to –
i. minimum 2 hour fire rated enclosure with 90 minute self-closing fire doors;
ii. only contain equipment necessary for life safety within the exit; and
iii. do not open directly into any normally unoccupied space, i.e. are lobbied from
lift shafts, technical shafts and technical rooms.
4.3.12 Employer’s Requirements stipulate that the fire-fighting stairwell be provided with air
conditioning during evacuation. This requirement is achieved without compromising
NFPA requirements for the protection of exit enclosures [NFPA 101: 7.1.3.2.1].
4.3.13 The utility chase (Level -5) below the transfer corridor (level -4) is normally unoccupied,
secured from unauthorized access and used exclusively for the routing of electrical,
mechanical, or plumbing equipment. Hence the space is not subject to the provisions
of chapter 7 (Means of Egress) of NFPA 101.
4.4.1 A exit door clear width of 820mm is provided between the tunnel walkway and fire-
fighting lobby, fire-fighting lobby and exit stairwell, and this exceeds both NFPA 130
and ER requirements of 810mm The doors open in the direction of escape, i.e. into the
lobby and into the stairwell at tunnel level and in the opposite direction at street level
4.4.2 While noting that NFPA 130 does not require the fire-fighting stair to be any wider than
1120mm, a width of circa 1175mm is proposed, excluding a 114mm allowance for
handrails on each side.
4.4.3 Minimum dimensional criteria for the switchbox exit stairs are as follows:
4.5.1 As a minimum the lighting and emergency lighting systems comply with the
requirements of NFPA 101 sections 7.8 and 7.9, except as modified by NFPA 130 and
the Employer’s Requirements -
i. Exit lights, essential signs and emergency lights are included in the emergency
lighting system in accordance with NFPA 70;
ii. emergency fixtures, exit lights, and signs are wired separately from emergency
distribution panel;
iii. lighting system is designed so that, during a period of evacuation, illumination
levels of trainway walkways and walking surfaces shall not be less than 2.7 lx
measured along the path of egress at the walking surface;
iv. the emergency lighting system in the trainway produce illumination on the
walkway that does not exceed a uniformity ratio of 10:1 for the maximum
maintained horizontal illuminance to the minimum maintained horizontal
illuminance;
v. point illumination of means of egress elements are permitted to exceed the
10:1 uniformity ratio; and
vi. dynamic signs indicating the direction and distance to the nearest safe
emergency exit are provided at 25m centres along the walkway.
5.1.1 Whilst not required by NFPA 130 the tunnel trainway and technical rooms located within
the switchbox are provided with automatic fire detection as mandated by the
Employer’s Requirements.
The tunnel trainway and the switchbox fire detection system is provided and designed
by others (Railway Systems Contractor) except in the switchbox technical rooms where
the fire detection system is provided and designed by the JV contractor.
The fire detection and alarm system will interface with ICC/Rail SCADA via BACS
5.2.1 As per NFPA 130 and the Employer’s requirements an automatic sprinkler protection
system is not provided in the tunnel trainway.
5.3.1 Electrical rooms within the switchbox and at grade, where the presence of water is not
desirable, are protected with clean agent fire extinguishing systems designed, installed
and maintained in compliance with NFPA 2001 [per ER 6-10:4.7.3-bi]. The fire
suppression system is operated automatically by a QCD approved fire detection
system. It is noted that QCDFSS 6.8 does not permit the use of Carbon Dioxide for fire
suppression or the storage of the clean agent within the protected enclosure.
5.3.2 The TPS room between Bin Mahmoud station and switchbox and the electrical rooms
at grade are protected with a clean agent fire extinguishing system.
5.4 Standpipes
5.4.1 A Class I standpipe system, wet pipe, is provided within the switchbox as required by
NFPA 130 and ER 6-10.5.5.2.c. The system shall be installed in accordance with NFPA
14 [per ER 6-10.5.5.2.c.ii] and ER 6-13.2.14.6.
5.4.2 Water breaching inlets to the system to permit QCD to supply additional water are
provided at fire service access points at grade per QCD standards including QCDFSS
6.2:5.0 and within 18m of the adjacent fire appliance access road.
5.4.3 The initial supply of water for the sprinkler and standpipe system is from storage tanks
located in the adjoining stations and be of adequate supply for at least one hour,
including supply to the adjacent tunnel system. The tanks comply with QCDFSS 2.10.
5.4.4 Within the tunnel the standpipe system is not enclosed in fire-rated construction as the
system is fed from two locations and isolation valves are installed not more than 244m
apart.
5.4.5 The fire standpipe system complies with and be approved by QCD (QCDFSS 1.1, 6.1,
6.2).
5.5.1 NFPA 14 requires that a hydrant be provided within 30.5m (100ft) of the fire department
breeching inlet such that it is readily accessible by emergency services and can be
used to supply water to the underground standpipe systems. The provision of fire
hydrants falls under the landscaping and roadside improvements being undertaken by
Ashghal. The provision of fire hydrants will be raised as part of the interface with the
Ashghal works. It is noted that NFPA 14 permits the distance between breeching inlet
and hydrant to exceed 30.5m with the approval of the AHJ.
5.6.1 Portable fire extinguishers shall be provided in such numbers, sizes and types and at
such locations as determined by the authority having jurisdiction in accordance with
NFPA 130: 6.4.5. At this time it is not proposed to provide portable fire extinguishers
within the operational trainways.
5.6.2 Both CO2 and ABC type portable fire extinguishers shall be provided for the sub-surface
and at grade technical areas such that they are within 15m of all areas, or as otherwise
required by the authority having jurisdiction in accordance with NFPA 130: 6.4.5.
5.7.1 The tunnel emergency ventilation system [by others] does not form part of this report
and shall be developed and submitted in due course by the Systems Contractor. This
submission should include fire scenarios involving a train on fire stopping in the tunnel
and a train stopping in the tunnel due to another emergency in the tunnel.
5.8 Pressurization
5.8.1 The switchbox stairwell, lift shaft and lobbies and are protected from the ingress of
smoke as follows [ER 6-10.4.6.3d-v & ER 6-13.2.6.6 b)]:
Stair case & lift shaft are pressurized with relief @ 50 Pa pressure difference.
Fire lobbies and pressurized corridors are pressurized with relief @ 25 Pa
pressure difference.
5.9.1 Access to the switchbox for the fire and rescue service is available via both the station
and switchbox escape shafts. Each escape shaft incorporates a fire-fighting lift and
pressurized stairwell. Access at street level incorporates a separate entrance for fire
service personnel to access the fire-fighting lift without being hindered by exiting
patrons. Vehicular access routes for Civil Defence appliances is by either public road
or service road and extends to within 10m of the access points to the emergency shaft
entrances.
5.9.2 Fire service vehicle access routes are a minimum of 6m wide, have an unobstructed
vertical clearance of 4.5m, accommodate two way traffic and be capable of
accommodating the stationary load from a 24 tonne fire appliance.
5.9.3 Access routes for the emergency services are such that dead end roads occur; hence
turning areas are provided.
5.9.4 The fire appliance hard standing are within 10m of the building entry points, measure
at least 6m x 15m and are capable of accommodating the stationary load from a 45
tonne fire appliance. In addition, the hard standing is within 45m of every point on the
projected plan area of each building at ground level and within 50m of a fire hydrant.
5.9.5 Vehicle access route turning radii, internal and external, comply with QCDFSS 4.1,
refer to extract from Annex D below.
5.9.6 At the time of writing the structures above grade are predominantly single storey. As
the design evolves these structures shall be evaluated in terms of compliance with
QCDFSS in terms of providing access panels along the perimeter.
5.9.7 The area between the switchbox emergency exit at grade and the public road has been
designed as a open and unrestrained space. A 400m2 area has been safeguarded for
the emergency services to use and may be used as a muster area to facilitate
passengers being bussed away but it is not intended that passengers be restricted or
prevented from dispersing themselves.
5.9.8 Interface meetings shall be held with Ashghal to discuss and agree responsibility for
roads and lay-bys.
6 BUILDING SERVICES
6.1 General:
6.1.1 Specifications for general building services and utilities are included in other
documents. Specific and/or additional requirements for building services and utilities
resulting from fire and life safety provisions are included in the sections below.
6.2.1 Heating ventilation ductwork and related equipment is in accordance with NFPA 90A.
6.3.1 All wiring materials and installations within the station other than those for traction
power conform to the requirements of NFPA 70 and in addition satisfy the requirements
of NFPA 130: chapter 12.
6.3.2 Fire resistive cables are listed and have a minimum 1 hour fire resistive rating in
accordance with ANSI/UL 2196 and be installed per the listing requirements. It is
understood that the ER 6- 10.3.2.14 statement that cables be non-combustible is a
typing mistake and that ER 6-10.4.4.4. takes precedence.
6.4.1 Emergency power is provided in accordance with Article 700 of NFPA 70 and Chapter
4 of NFPA 110. The supply system for emergency purposes, in addition to the normal
services to the station building, is one or more of the types of systems described in
subsections 700.12(A) through 700.12(E) of NFPA 70. All cabling is fire resistive per
6.3.2 above.
6.4.2 The following emergency systems are connected to the emergency power supply:
6.4.3 Per Qatar Rail letter M006-GDB-ENG-LTR-00516 (Low voltage power distribution
system guidelines) the power supply for various systems shall be as follows:
6.5.1 The station control room in Bin Mahmoud Station fulfils the role of a fire command
centre and is designed in accordance with NFPA 72 and the relevant Qatar standards
QCDFSS 8.2.3. The room is enclosed in 2 hour rated construction, approached via a 2
hour protected corridor from the fire-fighting staircase and is protected from the ingress
of smoke (ER 6-10.4.7.5a i-iii, ER 6-10.8.5.8 and ER6-11.4.6.4).
6.6 Lifts
6.6.1 The switchbox box evacuation shaft contains a staggered lift arrangement for
emergency services access and the evacuation of injured or disabled persons.
Consequently the design of each lift complies with the requirements of QCDFSS 6.6.3
per ER 6-10.5.1.3.b.j and section 54 of NFPA 5000 as this is now directed by Civil
Defence.
The lift lobbies and transfer corridor (exit passageway) can accommodate the turning
movements required by a 610mm x 2030mm ambulance stretcher.
7 APPENDIX A - DRAWINGS
The following drawings have been produced to accompany this report:
Discipline: Architecture
Location: Bin Mahmoud switchbox
Title: Fire Policy Drawings
M006-GDB-ARC-DWG-YWSB010
AG 32340 Ground level Fire policy 1-100
IL 32341 Intermediate level Fire policy 1-100
ZZ 32342 Intermediate, Track & Undertrack Fire policy 1-100
ZZ 32343 Longitudinal section Fire policy 1-100
CONCLUSION
This Fire Life Safety Report addresses the FLS requirements for Bin Mahmoud switchbox.
The station design complies with the requirements of NFPA 130:2014 and QCDD and no
waivers are required for fire and life safety compliance.
END OF REPORT
BOR I General I 3 r.;-_,-_:_ ;:.:..: :: ~:.--·: ---- ·- -~:·.- - ...... ---- ----------· :-.. :.. -.__.. -· I ii
All design is being based on a SIL-2 system and thus compliant with
'Confirm the Fire Detection System within the Switch Box Technical I l theER
Page 21 of 28
4 I IMC I Section 5.1 .1 I 1 Rooms will be designed and installed to SIL-2 as per the Employers
Requirements. Any discussion for an alternative system will be conducted by the JV
outside the design.
Include all life safety and critical systems (e.g. Signalling systems,
Communication systems, Fare collections gates, Emergency I I
We note that the majority of items listed by the reviewer are already
5 I IMC I
Page 24 of 28
Section 6.4.2 I 1
I
lighting system, Fire command centre, Emergency mechanical
ventilation system, Fire fighting pumps, Fire fighting lifts, etc.), shall
nnected to the Emergency Power System. Comply with ER
ii included. The switch box does not contain fare collection gates. We
do not see that the signalling system is relevant to this FLS report.
13.3.2.5.b.iv