因此，地方法院認為，FTC承擔了《謝爾曼法》所規定

的責任，證明“市場支配力以及某些證據表明，受到挑
戰的限制會損害競爭。” ​ID。 ​在804（引用 ​Ohio
v.Am.Express Co.​，138 S.Ct.2274，2284（2018））。此
外，地方法院認為，它可以“推斷”高通行為與反競爭傷
害之間的因果關係，因為該行為“合理地出現，能夠為
做出重大貢獻”。 。 。維持壟斷力量。'“ ​標識。 ​在
804–05（原始更改）（引用 ​Microsoft​，第79頁的253
F.3d）。

高通公司及時提出上訴。它要求我們推翻地方法院
的《謝爾曼法》（Sherman Act）裁決，撤消地方法院關
於高通公司的SSO承諾的禁令和即決判決，然後將後者
退還審判。基於以下原因，我們推翻了地區法院的《謝
爾曼法》（Sherman Act）裁決及其在全球範圍內發布的
禁令。由於我們的撤銷不取決於地區法院對高通將其
SEP許可給競爭對手芯片供應商的合同承諾的部分即決
判決，因此我們撤消了該訂單，但沒有達到其應有的價
值。​13

13 ​
​ 12。儘管FTC在投訴中討論了高通公司的FRAND承
見上文 注
諾，並爭辯說：“高通公司違反其FRAND承諾，拒絕許可競爭的基
帶處理器製造商使用許可證，這有助於其向競爭對手的銷售徵稅並
維持其競爭優勢。壟斷，“投訴本身僅指控違反反托拉斯法，並要
求公平救濟”，這是糾正和防止高通公司違反《聯邦貿易委員會
法》和《謝爾曼法》所必需的。
FTC ​訴Q
​ ​UALCOMM 2
​ 1

II

反托拉斯法與專利法一樣，“旨在鼓勵創新，產業和
競爭。” ​Atari Games Corp.訴Am。，Inc.的任天堂​，897
F.2d1990年）（引自 ​Loctite Corp.訴Ultraseal Ltd.​1572，
1576（聯邦巡迴法院，，781 F.2d 861，876-77（聯邦）
（Cir.1985）。 “儘管有衝突的機會。 。 。專利法和反
托拉斯法的主要目標都是通過競爭性經濟促進公共利
益。” 國 ​ 際木材加工商訴Power Dry，Inc.​，792 F.2d 416
，427（4th Cir.1986）; 另 ​ 請參閱Express​，138S.Ct。在
第2290頁（“畢竟是'促進品牌間競爭'，這是...是反托拉
斯法的主要目的。”（原始內容的某些改動）（引用
Leegin Creative Leather Prods。，Inc.訴PSKS，Inc.877，
890​，551 US（2007））。確實，經常審查專利與反托
拉斯法交匯處案件的聯邦巡迴法院評論說：“專利與反
托拉斯法是相輔相成的，專利制度旨在鼓勵發明和將新
產品推向市場。調整基於投資的風險，反托拉斯法有助
於促進產業競爭。” ​Intergraph Corp.訴Intel Corp.​，195
F.3d（聯邦1999年）（引自 ​Loctite Corp.​1346、1362法
院，，781 F.2d，866-67）。

在反托拉斯法中，《謝爾曼法》（《美國法典》第
15條第1款，第2款）特別“對維護經濟自由和我們的自
由企業製度非常重要。” 美 ​ 國訴Topco Assocs。，Inc.596
，610​，405 US（1972）。在1890年，當信託和壟斷與
力量壓制競爭和完全控制市場的出現已經成為重大公眾
利益的問題，制定

[T]他謝爾曼法的目的是要的
經濟自由綜合包機
22 FTC ​V​。 Q​UALCOMM

旨在將自由和不受限制的保留
競爭為貿易規則。它
的前提是，競爭力的無限制互動將產生的
最佳
我們的經濟資源分配，
最低的價格，最高的質量和最大的物質進
步，同時
提供有利於維護民主的環境政治和社會機
 構。

N.Pac。 y訴美國​，356 US 1，4（1958）。為了實現這

些目標，《謝爾曼法案》保護“保障每一筆生意的自
由。 。 。競爭—充滿活力，想像力，奉獻精神和獨創
性來主張自己可以鼓舞的經濟力量。” ​Topco Assocs。​，
405 US at 610​。

謝爾曼法第1條禁止“[E]很合同，組合信託或其他方
式，或陰謀的形式，在幾個國家間的貿易或商業的束
縛。” 15 USC§1.最高法院“長期以來一直認為，'在通過
《謝爾曼法》時'對普通法和該國法律的看法'，'貿易約
束'一詞最好理解為“不當限制。”“ ​就是。 Express​，
138S.Ct。在2283年（原始更改）（引用 ​NJ訴美國的
​ 221 US 1，59-60（1911年））； ​另請
Standard Oil Co.，
參見State Oil Co.訴Khan案​，美國法律522，第3卷，第
10期（1997年）（請注意，《謝爾曼法》第1條被理解
為“僅禁止 不 ​ 合理的 ​限制”）（著重強調）（省略了引
文）。因此，“根據第1條確立責任，原告必須證明（1
）協議的存在，以及（2）該協議受到 不 ​ 合理 ​限制
​ 的​。 Q​UALCOMM ​23
FTC V

​ 836
交易。” ​Aerotec Int'l，Inc.訴Honeywell Int'l，Inc.，
F.3d 1171，1178（9th Cir。2016）（加重）（援引 ​Am
​
Needle，Inc.訴Nat'l Football League， 560 US 183，
189–90（2010）。

“約束那些不講理的 本 ​ 身 ​是下判斷”合理原則。“” 就 ​
是。 Express​，138S.Ct。 （第2283頁）（引用 ​Business
Elecs。Corp.訴Sharp Elecs。Corp.717，723​，485 US（
1988））。 “合理規則要求法院對'市場力量和市場結構
進行針對事實的評估。 。 。評估[約束]的 實 ​ 際 ​對競爭
影響。” ​ID。 ​（原案中的變更）（加上重點）（引用
Copperweld Corp.訴Indep。Tube Corp.752，768​，467
US（1984））； ​另請參閱在Nat'l Football League的周
日票證Antitrust Litig1136，1150。​ ，933 F.3d（2019年9
月9日）中（“在此規則下，我們研究了“企業特有的事
實，約束的歷史，以及實施該保護措施的原因，“以確
定對相關產品市場競爭的影響。”（引 自 ​ Prof.l Eng'rs v
。United States的Nat'l Soc'y679，692，​ 435 US（1978
）。 ））。 “我們的目標是”反競爭效果是有害於消費
者和約束刺激競爭是在消費者的最佳利益約束之間
​ 是。 Express​，138S.Ct。 （第2284
distinguis [H]。“” 就
頁，原價更改）（引用 ​Leegin Creative Leather Prods。
，第551頁，第886頁）。

在 上 ​ 午Express）​例如，最高法院（最高法院裁定，
原告未能承擔起責任，無法證明美國運通（American
Express）商戶協議中的反轉向規定-禁止商戶鼓勵銷售
點的客戶使用較低的Visa等其他信用卡交易費用-具有損
害消費者的反競爭影響。 ​ID。 ​在2280、2289–90。相反
，美國證交所獨特的商業模式和antisteering
24 FTC 訴​ ​QQ​所UALCOMM

依據的規定 增 ​ 強 ​通過迫使Visa和Mastercard等競爭對手
進行適應和創新來信用卡交易市場的競爭，這最終通過
“提高信用卡交易的質量和數量”使消費者受益。 ​ID。
在2290換句話說，什麼初看起來是 ​反​competitive-美國運
通獨特的商業模式和它的使用antisteering的條款，實際
上是 有​ 利於​競爭力和創新。市場調整隻花了一段時間。

原告可以證明約束具有“直接或間接”的反競爭作
用。 上 ​ 午。 Express​，138S.Ct。在2284。直接證據包括
“'[對競爭的實際有害影響的證明”，” ​id。 ​（原文為替
代）（引自 ​FTC訴牙醫業聯合會447，460​美國，476 US
（1986）），“例如在相關市場上產量下降，價格上漲
或質量下降” 。 ​ ​（引自1 J. Kalinowski，《反托拉斯法與
貿易法規》§12.02 [2]（2d）； ​ed。2017Craftsmen
Limousine，Inc.訴Ford Motor Co.​，491 F.3d 380，390（
2007年8月8日）； 維 ​ 珍航空有限公司訴英國航空公司（
British Airways PLC）​，257 F.3d 256，264（2nd Cir。
2001）。間接證據包括“市場支配力證據，以及一些受
到挑戰的限制損害競爭的證據。” ​ID。 ​（引自1
Kalinowski§12.02 [2]； ​Tops Markets，Inc.訴Quality
Markets，Inc.，​ 142 F.3d 90，97（2nd）； ​Cir。1998Fla
的西班牙廣播系統訴Clear Channel Commc'。 ns，Inc.， ​
376 F.3d 1065，1073（11th Cir。2004）。

《謝爾曼法》第1條針對 ​協調一致的 ​反競爭行為，

​ 競爭行為。 ​上午。 Needle，Inc.
而第2條針對 ​獨立的 反
，美國法律560，第190頁。該法規將“壟斷。 。 。幾個
國家之間貿易的任何部分。” 15 USC§2.建立根據§2責任
，原告必須證明
​ ​QU
：FTC 訴 ​ ALCOMM ​25“”（

一）在相關市場的壟斷權力的佔有; （b）故意獲得或維
持該權力；和（c）因果反壟斷的傷害。“” ​薩默斯訴蘋
果公司​，729F.3d 953，963（第九巡迴2013年）（報價
盟軍矯形器具公司訴泰科醫療保健群島​LP，592F. 3d
991，998（2010年9月9日）（“​聯合整形外科​”）。 “僅
僅擁有壟斷權，並隨之收取壟斷價格，並不是（本身）
非法的； [相反，]這是自由市場體系的重要組成部
分。” ​Verizon Commc'ns Inc.訴Curtis V. Trinko LLP的律
師事務所398，407​，540 US（2004）（“​Trinko​”）。
“至少在短期內，收取壟斷價格的機會首先吸引了'商業
敏銳度'；它會引發冒險，從而產生創新和經濟增長。”
ID。

“為捍衛創新的動力，除非伴隨反競爭的要素，否則
[根據第2條]擁有壟斷權不會被視為非法 ​行為。​” ​Id。
因此，原告必須證明“以反競爭的方式濫用或利用壟斷
力量，或試圖掠奪相關市場的掠奪性或排他性手段。”
聯盟骨科醫師​協會，592 F.3d at 1000（引用 ​Foremost
Pro Color，Inc.訴Eastman Kodak Co.​，703 F.2d 534，
545-46（9th Cir。1983））； ​另請參見United
StatesCorp.v​ 。Grinnell，384 US 563，570-71（1966）
（將“故意獲得”壟斷權力與“由於優質產品，商業敏銳
性或歷史性事故而發展”區別開來）。 “ [被譴責為排他
性行為，壟斷者的行為必須具有'反競爭作用'”，也就是
說，它“必須損害競爭 ​過程 ， ​ 從而損害消費者。” 微 ​ 軟
，253 F.3d，第58頁。“相反，對一個或多個傷害是 ​競爭
對手的 不 ​ 夠的。” ​ID。​; 另
​ 請參閱Spectrum Sports，Inc.
訴McQuillan案​，《美國506卷第447頁，第458頁（1993
年）（注意到
​ .​Q判
26 FTC V ​ 例彙編UALCOMM

》第反托拉斯法的目的是“不是針對具有競爭性的行為
，甚至是嚴厲的行為，而[僅]針對不公平地傾向於破壞
競爭本身的行為”）。

做出的指控“具有減少消費者選擇或提高消費者價格
的作用，但不足以指稱競爭受到損害。 。 。 [因為] [效
果]與自由競爭的市場完全一致。” ​Brantley訴NBC
Universal，Inc.​，675 F.3d 1192，1202（9th Cir.2012）
（引文省略）; ​另請參閱Brooke Grp。 Ltd.訴Brown＆
Williamson煙草公司案​，509 US 209，237（1993）（
“……在產量增加的同時價格也在上漲，上漲的價格與
不斷增長的產品需求是一致的”）。相反，為了證明違
反了《謝爾曼法》，原告必須證明，由於人為的限製或
掠奪性和排他性行為，消費者選擇減少和價格上漲是市
場競爭較弱的結果。 ​見上午。 Express​，138S.Ct。在第
2288頁（“缺少一些證據，往往無法證明產量受到限製
或價格高於競爭水平，該法院將不會從價格和產出數據
中推斷出競爭傷害。”（引用 ​Brooke Grp。Ltd.​，509美
國，第237頁） ））。

此外，新穎的商業慣例，​尤其是 在 ​ 技​​術市場中，不
應“最終推定為不合理的，因此是非法的，而無需詳細
詢問其造成的確切傷害或使用商業的藉口。” ​Microsoft
，第253 F.3d，第91頁（引自 ​N. Pac。Ry。Co.​，第356
美國，第5頁）。 “由於創新涉及新產品和商業慣例，法
院[']和經濟學家對這些慣例的初步理解將歪曲創新具有
反競爭性和反托拉斯審查的適當主題的最初可能性。”
Geoffrey A. Manne和Joshua D. Wright，《 ​創新與的局限
性》
FTC V​ ​。 Q​UALCOMM ​27

反壟斷​，6 J.小樣。 L.＆Econ。 153，167（2010）; ​另

請參見 R ​ achel S. Tennis和Alexander Baier Schwab，《
商業模式創新和反托拉斯法》​，第29頁，耶魯J. 307，
319（2012）（解釋“反托拉斯經濟學家以及律師和法官
如何傾向於將新產品或商業慣例視為反競爭”，並且“在
迅速變化的動態市場中可能會錯誤地判定案件，”持久
的影響，特別是在技術市場上，在這種市場中，創新
“對於經濟增長和社會福利至關重要”，而“錯誤的決定
將剝奪大量消費者利益”）。

無論所指控的違反反托拉斯法涉及第1條所述的一致
反競爭行為還是第2條所述的獨立反競爭行為，根據理
性規則進行的三部分負擔轉移測試基本上是相同的。 ​參
見新澤西州標準石油公司​美國（221 US），電話：
61-62； ​Microsoft​，253 F.3d，58-59。根據第1條的規定
，“原告承擔起舉證責任，以證明所提出的約束具有實
質性的反競爭作用，損害了相關市場中的消費者。” 上 ​
午。 Express​，138S.Ct。見2284（引用1
Kalinowski§12.02 [1]； P。Areeda＆H. Hovenkamp，
《反托拉斯法基礎》§15.02 [B]（2017年第4版）（
Areeda＆Hovenkamp）； ​Capital Imaging Assoc。，PC
訴Mohawk。 Valley Med.Assocs。，Inc.537，543， ​ 996
F.2d（1993年第2次發行）。 “如果原告承擔了重擔，那
麼重擔將轉移到被告身上，以顯示出有約束力的競爭理
由。” 同 ​ 上​。 （引自1 Kalinowski§12.02 [1]； Areeda＆
Hovenkamp§15.02 [B]； ​Capital Imaging Assoc。​，996
F.2d，第543頁）。 “如果被告出庭，那麼責任就轉移到
原告身上，以證明可以通過減少反競爭手段合理地實現
競爭效率。” ​ID。 ​（引自1 Kalinowski§12.02 [1]；
Capital Imaging Assoc。​，996 F.2d，第543頁）。
28 FTC 訴​ ​QU
​ ALCOMM
 同樣地，“如果原告成功建立表面 ​通過證明反競爭
效果§2下證據，則可以壟斷為毫無顧忌其行為一個”促
進競爭理由'“。 ​Microsoft，​ 第253 F.3d，第59頁（引自
Eastman Kodak Co.訴Image Tech。Servs。，Inc.451，
483​，504 US（1992））。 “如果壟斷者主張具有競爭性
的理由-一種非言辭的主張，即其行為確實是一種基於優
點的競爭形式，因為它涉及例如更高的效率或增強的消
費者吸引力-那麼，負擔就轉移到原告身上，以反駁該主
張。” ​ID。 如 ​ 果原告無法反駁壟斷者的競爭性正當理由
，“那麼，原告必須證明行為的反競爭傷害大於競爭優
勢。” ​ID。

§§1和§2中轉移負擔測試的相似性意味著法院通常會
同時審查每個部分下的索賠。如果法院在審查涉嫌違反
《謝爾曼法》的行為時發現，，該行為行為 ​不是
根據第1條反競爭，則法院無需根據第2條單獨分析該行
為 ​。Williams訴IB Fischer Nev。999​F.2d 445 448（9th
Cir。1993）。但是，儘管測試在很大程度上相似，但
原告不得使用 ​間接 根 ​ 據§2通過反競爭行為證據來證明
非法維持壟斷。 ​請參閱Broadcom Corp. Qualcomm Inc.
，501 F.3d 297，307–08（3d Cir （2007年）（區別於通
過間接證據證明壟斷權的存在與證明反競爭行為本身，
這是§2要求的第二個要素）。在這方面，儘管法院還裁
定可以推斷出第2項索賠的第三個要素，即因果關係要
素，證明依據《謝爾曼法》第2條的違反反托拉斯法比
證明第1條的違反要嚴格得多。 ​見微軟​，253 F.3d在79
FTC 訴​ ​QU
​ ALCOMM ​29

在任何反托拉斯案件中，門檻步驟是準確定義相關
市場，即“有效競爭領域”。 ​上午。 Express​，138S.Ct。
在2285（省略引用）; ​另請參閱圖像技術。 Servs。，
​ 125 F.3d（9th Cir
Inc.訴Eastman Kodak Co.1195，1202，
。1997）（“相關市場是據說存在有意義競爭的領域。”
（引自 ​US v。Continental） Can Co.​，378 US 441，449
（1964））。 “法院沒有正確定義相關市場，通常無法
適當地應用理性規則。” 上 ​ 138S.Ct。在
​ 午。 Express，
2285。否則，“'沒有辦法衡量[被告]減少或破壞競爭的
能力。'” 同 ​ 上。 ​（原件變更）（引用 ​Walker Process
Equip。，Inc.訴Food Mach。Chem。Corp.， ​ 382 US 172
，177（1965））。此外，在評估所謂的反托拉斯損害
時，法院必須關注“在（據稱）限制競爭的市場中”的反
競爭影響。 ​上午。 Ad Mgmt。，Inc.訴Gen. Tel。加州公
司​，190 F.3d 1051，1057（9th Cir。1999）。 “儘管其
傷害源於使被告的行為不合法的事實，但在另一個市場
上遭受的傷害卻未受到反托拉斯法的傷害。” ​ID。​; 參 ​
見Intergraph Corp.​，195 F.3d，1353（請注意，“被禁止
的行為必須直接針對 ​競爭對手， 並 ​ 且必須旨在損害競
爭”（加重）（引用 ​Spectrum Sports​，美國第506頁，第
458頁））。​14

14 ​
但見上午。廣告管理。​，190 F.3d at 1057 n.5（注意到最高法
院“針對市場參與者的傷害在市場參與者的傷害中“不可避免地交織
在一起”，對當事人的市場參與者規定了一個狹義的例外”）（引自
Blue Shield訴McCready​，《美國判例彙編》第457卷第465頁（1982
））。
30 FTC ​訴Q ​ 高​通

在這裡，地區法院正確地將相關市場定義為“ CDMA
調製解調器芯片市場和高級LTE調製解調器芯片市
場”。 高​ 通公司​，411F。 3d at683。儘管如此，它對高
通公司的商業行為及其反競爭影響的分析似乎不僅僅局
限於這些市場，而是更大範圍的蜂窩服務市場。因此，
地方法院的裁決中有很大一部分被認為對原始設備製造
商（即高通的經濟損害， ​客戶​，而不是其競爭對手）造
成從而給消費者帶來了更高的價格。這些危害，即使是
真實的，在反托拉斯意義上也不是“反競爭”的，至少不
是 ​直接的，​因為它們不涉及“有效競爭”領域的貿易限製
或排斥行為。 ​上午。 Express​，138S.Ct。在2285。
 地方法院對相關市場之外的反競爭影響的考慮反映
在其框架和組織問題的方式上。例如，地方法院理性分
析規則的第一部分（“針對OEM的反競爭行為和由此造
成的危害”）通過公司的“無許可，無芯片”政策詳細說
明了高通的“針對OEM的反競爭行為”。 。 ​高通公司​，
411F。 3d在697–744。然而，當地方法院提出其反競爭
損害的主要理論時（即高通的許可使用費率“對競爭對
手的現代芯片徵收附加費”，從而抑制了相關市場中的
自由和公平競爭），它只是通過了。 ​ID。 在 ​ 790–92。

此外，在整個分析過程中，地方法院未能區分高通的 ​許
​ 例（主要影響原始設備製造商）和其與有關的慣例
可慣
​ 相關的反托拉斯市場）。這是毫無疑問
現代芯片銷售 （
，故意：地方法院
​ ​QU
FTC 訴 ​ ALCOMM ​31

將高通公司的各種業務實踐描述為“相互關聯”和相輔相
成，並將其反競爭影響描述為“複合”和“循環”。 ​ID。
在797–98。但是，即使高通的做法相互關聯，對相關市
場之外的客戶和消費者的實際或所謂的損害也超出了反
托拉斯法的範圍。

III

因此，我們對問題進行了重新組織，以重點關注有
效競爭領域（如CDMA和高級LTE調製解調器芯片市
場）中高通做法的影響。因此，我們首先從地區法院得
出的結論開始，即高通負有反托拉斯責任，以將其SEP
許可給現代芯片市場中的直接競爭對手。然後，我們考
慮高通的特許權使用費率，“無許可證，無芯片”政策以
及與蘋果公司在2011年和2013年達成的協議，以供應蘋
果用於2016年前型號iPhone的全部或很大一部分調製解
調器芯片。

在整個分析過程中，我們檢查了地方法院的事實調
查結果是否存在明顯錯誤，並且從頭審查了其法律結論
以及法律和事實的任何混合問題。 ​OneBeacon Ins。訴
​ 634 F.3d 1092，1096（9th Cir。
Haas Indus。，Inc.，
2011）。

A“

作為最高法院一再強調，有”沒有義務處理下由[競
爭對手]對手首選的條款和條件 ​[。]“AEROTEC國際​，
836 F.3d在1184（報價 ​精靈。貝爾電話訴LinkLine
Commc'ns，Inc.，​ 555 US（2009）（“​438，457linkLine”​
））。同樣，“《謝爾曼法》不限制從事完全私人的貿
易商或製造商的長期認可權利
​ 的​。 Q​高通公司的
32 FTC V

業務，可以自由選擇要與之交易的各方行使自己的獨立
酌處權。”” ​Trinko， ​ 540 US，第408頁（原始更改）
（引自 ​v。Colgate＆Co.U ​ S，250 US 300，307（ 1919
））； ​參見linkLine， ​ 555 US，第448頁（“一般而言，
企業可以自由選擇將與之交易的交易方，以及交易的價
格，條款和條件。”（引自 ​ 露潔​，第250卷，第307
高
頁） ））。這是因為包括《謝爾曼法》在內的反托拉斯
法是“為保護而頒布的 競 ​ 爭 ​而不是 競 ​ 爭者​。” ​Brunswick
Corp.訴Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat，Inc.​，429 US 477，488（
1977） （加了強調）（引用 ​Brown Shoe Co.訴United
​ 370 US 294，320（1962））。或者，就像我們
States，
最近所說的那樣，用一些更加多彩的術語來表達：“競
爭對手不必參加愛情節。” ​Aerotec Int'l​，836 F.3d at
1184年

。最高法院在的裁決中，對不承擔反托拉斯義務的
一般性規則進行了一個有限的例外 ​Aspen Skiing Co.訴
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.。​，472 US585（1985）。
在那裡，法院裁定一家公司在（1）“單方面終止”時從
事被禁止的反競爭行為。 。 。 “自願和有利可圖的交易
過程”， ​MetroNet服務。 Corp.訴Qwest Corp.​，383 F.3d
1124，1132（9th Cir。2004）； （2）“唯一可以想到的
理由或目的是'犧牲短期利益，以便從競爭中排除長遠來
看獲得更高的利潤，'” ​Aerotec Int'l， ​ 836 F.3d，1184年
（引用 ​MetroNet Servs 。​，383 F.3d at 1132）； （3）
拒絕交易涉及被告已經在現有市場上出售給其他類似客
戶的產品， ​請參閱MetroNet Servs。​，383 F.3d在
1132–33。最高法院後來將“ 阿 ​ 斯彭滑雪場” 例 ​ 外定義為
“在第2條責任的外邊界處或附近”。 ​Trinko，540在 ​ 美國
409
FTC 訴​ ​QU
​ ALCOMM ​33

地區法院的結論是，高通拒絕向競爭對手的芯片供
應商提供詳盡的SEP許可證符合 ​Aspen Skiing ​例外，這
忽略了高通的業務實踐與有爭議的行為之間的重大差異
Aspen Skiing​，並且無視最高法院隨後在提出的警告
Trinko中 ​該 滑​ 雪阿斯 ​例外應該只在極少數情況下使
用。結果，FTC在這裡承認錯誤。我們同意。

首先，地區法院對“高通終止了'自願和有利可圖的交
易過程'”的錯誤看法是，它先前曾在芯片製造商級別進
行許可。 ​高通公司​，411F。 3d在759–60（引用
MetroNet Servs​，383 F.3d在1131）。為了支持這一發現
，地方法院引用了一條記錄證據：高通律師的一封電子
郵件，內容涉及調製解調器芯片供應商3％的專利使用
費許可。但是這封電子郵件是在1999年發送的，距離高
通公司在CDMA調製解調器芯片市場上的壟斷地位還不
到七年。此外，高通公司聲稱從未向競爭對手的芯片供
應商授予詳盡的許可證。相反，正如1999年的電子郵件
所暗示的那樣，它與“芯片製造商簽訂了並非詳盡無遺
的，收取專利使用費的協議，明確未將芯片製造商的客
戶授予權利。”上訴人的開幕詞在45歲時。

根據高通公司的說法，它是針對專利法窮竭原則的
發展而停止這種做法的 ​，例如參見​， ​Quanta Comput。
，美國法典第553卷第625頁（注意“專利產品的最初授
權銷售會終止該產品的所有專利權”），這使高通公司
更難辯稱它可以以特許權使用費的形式提供“非窮舉性”
許可協議。記錄或地方法院的事實調查結果均不能反駁
這些主張。從，FTC沒有提供任何證據
​ 開始​。 Q​UALCOMM
34 FTC V

高通公司首次獲得了在2006年的調製解調器芯片市場的
壟斷力量到現在為止，它曾經在調製解調器芯片級，而
不是OEM一級提供詳盡的許可證的做法。

其次，高通公司“轉向” OEM級別許可的理由不是
“犧牲短期利益，從長遠來看，從競爭中排除以獲得更
高的利潤”，這是的第二個要素 ​Aspen滑雪 ​ 外。
例
Aerotec ​ 836
Int'l， F.3d，1184年（省略了引號和引
文）。相反，高通通過選擇是“，也更有利可圖，”無論
是在短期的路徑回應專利用盡法律上的變化 ​和 長 ​ 期來
看，無論在任何競爭影響。 ​高通公司​，411F。 3d，電
話：753。地區法院本身承認這是高通公司的宗旨，並
觀察到：“在高通公司的領導下，諾基亞和愛立信等其
他SEP許可人得出的結論是，僅向OEM授予許可會更有
利可圖，並相應地制定了自己的做法。” ​ID。 ​在754–55
。由於高通公司的目的是在短期和長期內獲得更高的利
潤，因此的第二個必需元素 ​Aspen Skiing ​本例中不存在
例外。​15

15 ​
在整個分析過程中，地方法院將意圖最大化利潤與“破壞競爭
本身”的意圖混為一談。 光 ​ 譜體育​，美國506，第458頁。 ​如上所述
，反托拉斯法的目標不是迫使企業放棄利潤，甚至不是“向壟斷價
格收取費用的機會”，這是“吸引商業頭腦的原因”。第一名。”
Trinko，​在407 540美國這裡，高通的願望實現利潤最大化無論是在
短期 ​和 ​長期的破壞，而不是支持，根據§2.的反競爭行為的聯邦地
區法院的裁定 ​見 ​道格拉斯·H·金斯堡等人。 ， ​第2節“糾結”： F ​ TC
訴高通公司 ​的交易義務，價格緊縮和獨家交易Geo。Mason ​13（U.
Law＆Series，Paper
FTC ​V.​Q​Econ。Res。PaperUALCOMM 3​ 5

最後，與不同 ​Aspen Skiing​，地方法院沒有發現任何

證據表明高通公司在其SEP許可中選擇了任何特定的芯
片供應商進行反競爭性處理；在 ​Aspen Skiing中​，被告
拒絕將其纜車票出售給較小的競爭對手滑雪場，即使它
出售了相同的纜車向任何其他願意的買家（包括任何購
買門票 ​其他 滑 ​ 雪勝地）；此外，這種拒絕是專門為了
使附近的較小競爭對手破產而定的。472 US at 593-94。
高通公司在尊重他人權益方面平等地採用了OEM級許可
政策對調製解調器中的所有競爭對手芯片市場，並且拒
絕對這些競爭對手強制執行其專利，即使他們實踐了高
通的專利（免版稅）。取而代之的是，高通通過使用“
CDMA ASIC協議”為這些競爭對手提供賠償 ​-Aspen
Skiing ​相當於拒絕向滑雪者出售纜車票，但無論如何都
讓他們乘坐纜車。因此，儘管高通對OEM的政策是“沒
有許可證，沒有芯片”，但它對競爭對手芯片製造商的
政策卻可以被描述為“沒有許可證，沒有問題”。由於高
通公司對後一種政策 ​所有 競 ​ 爭的調製解調器芯片製造
商，因此第三個 ​Aspen Skiing ​均不採用要求不適用。

​
​ 斯彭滑雪” 例
由於沒有出現“所需的要素要素了 阿
外，更不用說所有，地方法院錯誤地認為高通公司負有
反托拉斯責任，以許可競爭對手芯片製造商。我們認為
，高通的

19-21號，2019）（以下簡稱“地區法院擴大 阿 ​ 斯彭滑雪 ​通過其應

用到以前由被告公司談判的所有合同，並通過推斷企業願意遠遠超
出第2節的”外邊界“即使面對有證據表明公司改變了業務模式以的
情況下，也犧牲了利潤 增 ​ 前利潤。”）
​ 加當
36 FTC ​訴Q
​ ​UALCOMM

OEM級別的許可政策，儘管很新穎，但並不違反《謝
爾曼法》（Sherman Act）。

乙
 在區法院的結論退讓錯誤，高通是受到反壟斷職責
，應對下 ​阿斯彭滑雪​，美國聯邦貿易委員會認為，該法
庭仍可認為高通公司從事反競爭行為，違反§2，這是如
此，FTC衝動，因為（1）“高通公司（Qualcomm）在
SSO流程中做出了自願與競爭對手競爭的合同承諾，這
本身就是對正常市場競爭的克減”，以及（2）高通（
Qualcomm）違反了此合同承諾，“滿足了傳統條款2個
標準（這樣做）往往會削弱競爭對手和競爭對手的機
會。 。 。不會在價值上進一步競爭。'” Appellee's Br。
69頁）（引自 ​29卷Cascade Health Sols。v。PeaceHealth
（第，第，515 F.3d 883，894（9th Cir。2008））。我
們不同意。

即使地區法院是正確的，即高通公司通過其SSO承
諾向競爭對手的芯片供應商提供許可而承擔了合同義務
（我們不必也沒有達到結論）​16​的，聯邦貿易委員會仍
不能令人滿意地解釋高通公司所謂的違反此合同承諾的
行為受到 ​本身是否 會 ​ 損害競爭對手的機會。它辯稱，
違規行為“助長了高通向競爭對手客戶收取的附加費。”
Appellee的Br。現年77歲。但這是指一種獨特的商業慣
例，許可使用費以及對OEM而非競爭對手芯片製造商的
所謂損害。 In any case, Qualcomm's royalties are
“chip-supplier neutral” because Qualcomm collects them
from ​all ​OEMs that license its patents, not just “rivals'
customers.” The FTC argues that

16 ​
See supra n​ otes 12 and 13.
FTC ​V​. Q​UALCOMM ​37

Qualcomm's breach directly impacts rivals by “otherwise

deterring [their] entry and investment.” ​ID。 B ​ ut this
ignores that Qualcomm's “CDMA ASIC Agreements”
functionally act as de facto licenses (“no license, no
problem”) by allowing competitors to practice Qualcomm's
SEPs (royalty-free) before selling their chips to downstream
OEMs. Furthermore, in order to make out a § 2 violation,
the anticompetitive harm identified must be to ​competition
itself​, not merely to competitors. ​Microsoft​, 253 F.3d at 58.
The FTC identifies no such harm to competition.

The FTC's conclusion that OEM-level licensing does

not further competition on the merits is not only belied by
MediaTek and Intel's entries into the modem chip markets
in the 2015–2016 timeframe, it also gives inadequate weight
to Qualcomm's reasonable, procompetitive justification that
licensing at the OEM and chip-supplier levels
simultaneously would require the company to engage in
“multi-level licensing,” leading to inefficiencies and less
profit. Qualcomm's procompetitive justification is supported
by at least two other companies—Nokia and Dolby—with
similar SEP portfolios to Qualcomm's.​17 ​More critically, this
part of the FTC's argument skips ahead

17 ​
​ r. of Amicus Curiae Nokia Technologies Oy at 18–19
See B
(noting that “[t]here are good reasons for SEP owners to structure their
licensing programs to license end-user products,” including the
reduction of “transaction costs and complexities associated with
negotiating and executing licenses at multiple points in the supply
chain,” the avoidance of “overlapping and duplicative licensing,”
“expedite[d] access to SEPs for the entire supply chain,” and “greater
visibility to what products are actually licensed, for example, for
auditing purposes”); Br。 of Amicus Curiae Dolby Laboratories, Inc. at
28 (“Forcing SEP holders to license component suppliers would
interfere with historical precedents and established practices, and
produce significant inefficiencies and lack of transparency regarding
whether products in the stream of commerce are in fact licensed.”).
38 FTC ​V.​ Q​UALCOMM

to an examination of Qualcomm's procompetitive

justifications, failing to recognize that the burden does not
shift to Qualcomm to provide such justifications unless and
until the FTC meets its initial burden of proving
anticompetitive harm. Because the FTC has not met its
initial burden under the rule of reason framework, we are
less critical of Qualcomm's procompetitive justifications for
its OEM-level licensing policy—which, in any case, appear
to be reasonable and consistent with current industry
practice.

The FTC points to one case, ​Broadcom Corp. v.

Qualcomm Inc.,​ 501 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2007), as support for
its argument that a company's breach of its SSO
commitments may rise to the level of an antitrust violation.
But in that earlier antitrust action against Qualcomm, the
alleged anticompetitive conduct was not Qualcomm's
practice of licensing at the OEM level while not enforcing
its patents against rival chip suppliers; instead, Broadcom
asserted that Qualcomm intentionally deceived SSOs by
inducing them to standardize one of its patented
technologies, which it then licensed at “discriminatorily
higher” royalty rates to competitors and customers using
non-Qualcomm chipsets. ​ID。 ​at 304. The ​Broadcom ​court
held that Qualcomm's “intentionally false promise to license
[its SEP] on FRAND terms . 。 。 coupled with an SDO's
reliance on that promise” and Qualcomm's subsequent
discriminatory pricing sufficiently alleged “actionable
anticompetitive conduct” under § 2 to overcome
Qualcomm's motion to dismiss. ​ID。 a​ t 314.

Here, the district court found neither intentional

deception of SSOs on the part of Qualcomm nor that
Qualcomm charged discriminatorily higher royalty rates to
competitors and OEM customers using non-Qualcomm
FTC V​ ​. Q​UALCOMM ​39

chips. Instead, it is undisputed that Qualcomm's current

royalty rates—which the district court found “unreasonably
high” (a finding discussed in greater detail in the next
section of our opinion)—are based on the patent portfolio
chosen by the OEM customer regardless of where the OEM
sources its chips. Furthermore, competing chip suppliers are
permitted to practice Qualcomm's SEPs freely without
paying any royalties at all. Thus, the Third Circuit's
“intentional deception” exception to the general rule that
breaches of SSO commitments do not give rise to antitrust
liability does not apply to this case.​18

Finally, we note the persuasive policy arguments of

several academics and practitioners with significant
experience in SSOs, FRAND, and antitrust enforcement,
who have expressed caution about using the antitrust laws to
remedy what are essentially contractual disputes between
private parties engaged in the pursuit of technological
innovation. The Honorable Paul R. Michel, retired Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
argues that it would be a mistake to use “the hammer of
antitrust law . 。 。 to resolve FRAND disputes when more
precise scalpels of contract and patent law are effective.”
Amicus Curiae Br. of The Honorable Paul R. Michel (Ret.)
at 23.

18 ​
​ right, ​supra n​ ote 1, at 803 (“There is no empirical evidence
See W
that supports the proposition that breach of an SSO contract—even one
resulting in higher royalty rates—is somehow analogous to the collusive
interaction between rivals conventionally condemned by the antitrust
laws, or that it generates similar economic effects. Furthermore, courts
have uniformly rejected this view when interpreting and applying the
Sherman Act. In particular, to date there does not appear to be a single
case that finds breach of an SSO agreement without proof that deception
resulted in acquisition of market power, a violation of the Sherman Act.”
(citing ​Rambus Inc. v. FTC,​ 522 F.3d 456, 466–67 (DC Cir. 2008), ​cert.
denied​, 555 US 1171 (2009); ​Broadcom,​ 501 F.3d at 310–12)).
40 FTC ​V.​ Q​UALCOMM

Judge Michel notes that “[w]hile antitrust policy has its

place as a policy lever to enhance market competition, the
rules of contract and patent law are better equipped to
handle commercial disputes between the world's most
sophisticated companies about FRAND agreements.” ​ID。
at 24. Echoing this sentiment, a former FTC Commissioner,
Joshua Wright, argues that “the antitrust laws are not well
suited to govern contract disputes between private parties in
light of remedies available under contract or patent law,”
and that “imposing antitrust remedies in pure contract
disputes can have harmful effects in terms of dampening
incentives to participate in standard-setting bodies and to
commercialize innovation.” Wright, ​supra ​note 1, at
808–09.

In short, we are not persuaded by the FTC's argument

that we should adopt an additional exception, beyond the
Aspen Skiing ​exception that the FTC concedes does not
apply here, to the general rule that “businesses are free to
choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well as the
prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing.” ​linkLine,​ 555
US at 448 (citing ​Colgate​, 250 US at 307). We therefore
decline to hold that Qualcomm's alleged breach of its SSO
commitments to license its SEPs on FRAND terms, even
assuming there was a breach, amounted to anticompetitive
conduct in violation of § 2.

We next address the district court's primary theory of

anticompetitive harm: Qualcomm's imposition of an
“anticompetitive surcharge” on rival chip suppliers via its
licensing royalty rates. According to the district court,

Qualcomm's unreasonably high royalty rates

enable Qualcomm to control rivals' prices
because Qualcomm receives the royalty even
FTC V ​ ​. Q​UALCOMM ​41
 when an OEM uses one of Qualcomm's
rival's chips. Thus, the “all-in” price of any
modem chip sold by one of Qualcomm's
rivals effectively includes two components:
(1) the nominal chip price; and (2)
Qualcomm's royalty surcharge.

高通公司​，411F。 3d at 791. This central component of

the district court's ruling is premised on the district court's
findings that Qualcomm's royalty rates are (1)
“unreasonably high” because they are improperly based on
Qualcomm's monopoly chip market share and handset price
instead of the “fair value of Qualcomm's patents,” and (2)
anticompetitive because they raise costs to OEMs, who pass
the extra costs along to consumers and are forced to invest
less in other handset features. ​ID。 a​ t 773–90, 795, 820–21.
The FTC agrees with this aspect of the district court's ruling,
pointing out that its “reasonableness” determination
regarding Qualcomm's royalty rates is a factual finding
subject to clear error review and arguing that this finding
“was supported by overwhelming evidence.” Appellee's Br.
at 44 (citing ​Faulkner v. Gibbs​, 199 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir.
1952)).

We hold that the district court's “anticompetitive

surcharge” theory fails to state a cogent theory of
anticompetitive harm. Instead, it is premised on a
misunderstanding of Federal Circuit law pertaining to the
calculation of patent damages, it incorrectly conflates
antitrust liability and patent law liability, and it improperly
considers “anticompetitive harms to OEMs” that fall outside
the relevant antitrust markets. Furthermore, even if we were
to accept the district court's conclusion that Qualcomm's
royalty rates are unreasonable, we conclude that the district
42 FTC V ​ ​. Q​UALCOMM
court's surcharging theory still fails as a matter of law and
logic.

First, the district court's determination that Qualcomm's

royalty rates are “unreasonable” because they are based on
handset prices misinterprets Federal Circuit law regarding
“the patent rule of apportionment” and the smallest salable
patent-practicing unit (“SSPPU”). The district court
observed “that 'it is generally required that royalties be
based not on the entire product, but instead on the
[SSPPU].'” ​Qualcomm,​ 411 F. Supp. 3d at 783 (quoting
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc.​ , 694 F.3d 51,
67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The district court then cited an
unpublished, district court case for the proposition that “the
modem chip . 。 。 'is the proper [SSPPU]' in a cellular
handset.” ​ID。 ​(quoting ​GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc.​, No. 12-
CV-02885-LHK, 2014 WL 1494247, at *13 (ND Cal. Apr.
16, 2014)).​19 ​Based on ​LaserDynamics a​ nd ​GPNE,​ the
district court concluded that “Qualcomm is not entitled to a
royalty on the entire handset.” ​ID。

Even if we accept that the modem chip in a cellphone is

the cellphone's SSPPU, the district court's analysis is still
fundamentally flawed. No court has held that the SSPPU
concept is a per se rule for “reasonable royalty”
calculations; instead, the concept is used as a tool in jury
cases to minimize potential jury confusion when the jury is
weighing complex expert testimony about patent damages.
See Ericsson,​ 773 F.3d at 1226 (explaining that the SSPPU
concept is a flexible evidentiary tool, not an unyielding

GPNE ​was presided over by the same district court judge that
19 ​

presided over this case.

 FTC ​V​. Q​UALCOMM ​43

substantive element of patent damages law); ​VirnetX, Inc. v.

Cisco Sys., Inc.,​ 767 F.3d 1308, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(same); ​LaserDynamics​, 694 F.3d at 68 (same). As this case
involved a bench trial, the potential for jury confusion was
absent.

Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected the premise of

the district court's determination: that the SSPPU concept is
required ​when calculating patent damages. ​See
Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc.​, 809 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The rule Cisco
advances—which would require all damages models to
begin with the [SSPPU]—is untenable [and] conflicts with
our prior approvals of a methodology that values the
asserted patent based on comparable licenses.”) (citations
omitted). The Federal Circuit has also observed that
“'[s]ophisticated parties routinely enter into license
agreements that base the value of the patented inventions as
a percentage of the commercial products' sales price,' and
thus '[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with using the
market value of the entire product.'” ​Exmark Mfg. Co. Inc.
v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Grp., LLC​, 879 F.3d
1332, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (some alterations in original)
(quoting ​Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.​, 580 F.3d
1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). These statements of law and
current practice run counter to the district court's conclusion
that patent royalties ​cannot ​be based on total handset price
and that doing so exposes a firm to potential antitrust
liability.

A second problem with the district court's “unreasonable

royalty rate” conclusion is that it erroneously assumes that
royalties are “anticompetitive”—in the antitrust sense—
unless they precisely reflect a patent's current, intrinsic
value and are in line with the rates other companies charge
for their own patent portfolios. Neither the district court nor
44 FTC V ​ ​. Q​UALCOMM

the FTC provides any case law to support this proposition,

which sounds in patent law, not antitrust law. ​See 3​ 5 USC §
284 (entitling a patent owner to “damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty ​for the use made of the invention by the
infringer” (emphasis added)). We decline to adopt a theory
of antitrust liability that would presume anticompetitive
conduct any time a company could not prove that the “fair
value” of its SEP portfolios corresponds to the prices the
market appears willing to pay for those SEPs in the form of
licensing royalty rates.​20

Finally, even assuming that a deviation between

licensing royalty rates and a patent portfolio's “fair value”
could amount to “anticompetitive harm” in the antitrust
sense, the primary harms the district court identified here
were to the OEMs who agreed to pay Qualcomm's royalty
rates—that is, Qualcomm's ​customers,​ not its ​competitors.​
These harms were thus located outside the “areas of
effective competition”—the markets for CDMA and
premium LTE modem chips—and had no direct impact on
competition in those markets. ​See Rambus​, 522 F.3d at 464
(noting that if a practice “raises the price secured by a
seller” or otherwise

20 ​
Qualcomm and several amici additionally argue that the district
court committed reversible legal error by failing to apply the governing
legal standard for determining whether a royalty is reasonable—that is,
by “using the claimant's established royalties.” Appellant's Reply Br. at
16–17 (quoting ​US Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Fabri-Valve Co. of Am.,​
235 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1956)); ​see also, eg​, Amicus Curiae Br. of
The Honorable Paul R. Michel (Ret.) at 18–22 (discussing a long line of
Federal Circuit cases emphasizing the “established royalty” rule and
criticizing the district court's failure to even acknowledge this body of
case law). Because our holding does not depend on the “reasonableness”
of a licensor's royalties, a determination that sounds in patent law and
not antitrust law, we need not decide whether the method the district
court used to assess reasonableness in this case was erroneous.
FTC ​訴Q​ ​UALCOMM 4 ​ 5

harms customers, “but does so without harming

competition, it is beyond the antitrust laws' reach”); ​accord
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc​., 525 US 128, 136 (1998) (no
Sherman Act violation where “consumer injury naturally
flowed not so much from a less competitive market . . . as
from the exercise of market power that is ​lawfully i​ n the
hands of a monopolist . . . combined with a deception
worked upon the regulatory agency that prevented the
agency from controlling [the monopolist's] exercise of its
monopoly power”).

Regardless of the “reasonableness” of Qualcomm's

royalty rates, the district court erred in finding that these
royalties constitute an “artificial surcharge” on rivals' chip
sales. In ​Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,​ 87 F. Supp. 2d
1244 (D. Utah 1999), the primary case relied upon by the
district court for its surcharging theory, Microsoft required
OEMs “to pay [it] a royalty on every machine the OEM
shipped regardless of whether the machine contained MS
DOS or another operating system.” ​ID。 ​at 1249–50. This
resulted in OEMs having to pay two royalties instead of one
for a portion of their product base unless they chose to
exclusively install Microsoft's operating system in their
products. ​ID。 ​at 1250. Microsoft's policy thus had “the
practical effect of exclusivity,” as it imposed a naked tax on
rivals' software even when the end-product—an individual
computer installed with a non-Microsoft operating system—
contained no added value from Microsoft. ​Id.​ The ​Caldera
court held that this hidden surcharge, combined with
Microsoft's related practices that were designed to secure
exclusivity, were sufficient to defeat Microsoft's motion for
summary judgment on the question of whether its policy
46 FTC V​ ​. Q​UALCOMM

amounted to anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2. ​Id.

at 1250–51.

Qualcomm's licensing royalties are qualitatively

different from the per-unit operating-system royalties at
issue in ​Caldera.​ When Qualcomm licenses its SEPs to an
OEM, those patent licenses have value—indeed, they are
necessary to the OEM's ability to market and sell its cellular
products to consumers—regardless of whether the OEM
uses Qualcomm's modem chips or chips manufactured and
sold by one of Qualcomm's rivals. And unlike ​Caldera​,
where OEMs who installed non-Microsoft operating
systems in some of their products were required to pay
royalties for both the actual operating system ​and ​MS DOS
(which was not installed), here OEMs do not pay twice for
SEP licenses when they use non-Qualcomm modem chips.
Thus, unlike Microsoft's practice, Qualcomm's practice does
not have the “practical effect of exclusivity.” Even the FTC
concedes that “this case differs from ​Caldera ​in [that]
Qualcomm holds patents practiced by its rivals' chips, and
no one disputes that Qualcomm is entitled to collect a
royalty equal to the reasonable value of those patents.”
Appellee's Br. at 39.

In its complaint and in its briefing, the FTC suggests

that Qualcomm's royalty rates impose an anticompetitive
surcharge on its rivals' sales not for the reasons at play in
Caldera,​ but rather because Qualcomm uses its licensing
royalties to charge anticompetitive, ultralow prices on its
own modem chips—pushing out rivals by squeezing their
profit margins and preventing them from making necessary
investments in research and development.​21​ ​But this type of

21 ​
One of Qualcomm's main competitors, Intel, shares this theory.
參見 ​Br。 of Intel Corporation as Amicus Curiae at 3–4 (arguing that
FTC ​V​. Q​UALCOMM ​47

“margin squeeze” was rejected as a basis for antitrust

liability in ​linkLine.​ 555 US at 451–52, 457. There, multiple
digital subscriber line (“DSL”) high-speed internet service
providers complained that AT&T was selling them access to
AT&T's must-have telephone lines and facilities at inflated
wholesale rates and then shifting those increased profits to
charge ultra-low rates for DSL services at retail, effectively
squeezing these DSL competitors out of the market. ​Id. a​ t
442–44. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion of
anticompetitive harm, holding that AT&T was under no
antitrust duty to deal with its competitors on the wholesale
level, and that the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence of
predatory pricing (that is, charging below cost) at the retail
level.​22​ ​ID。 a​ t 450–51.

Here, not only did the FTC offer no evidence that

Qualcomm engaged in predatory pricing, the district court's
entire antitrust analysis is premised on the opposite
proposition: that Qualcomm “charge[s] monopoly prices on
modem chips.” 高 ​ 通公司​，411F。 3d at 800. Indeed, the
district court faulted Qualcomm for lowering its prices only
when other companies introduced CDMA modem chips to
the market to effectively compete. ​ID。 a​ t 688–89. We

Qualcomm “shift[s] part of its chip revenues into its royalty rates,
overcharging on the patent royalty, while undercharging for chips . 。
。 [which] destroys the normal competitive process in the chip
market”).
 The Court explained in ​linkLine t​ hat “to prevail on a predatory
22 ​

pricing claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) 'the prices

complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs'; and
(2) there is a 'dangerous probability' that the defendant will be able to
recoup its 'investment' in below-cost prices.” 555 US at 451 (quoting
Brooke Grp. Ltd.​, 509 US at 222–24); ​see also Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co.​, 495 US 328, 340 (1990) (“Low prices benefit consumers
regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”).
48 FTC ​V.​ Q​UALCOMM

agree with Qualcomm that this is exactly the type of

“garden-variety price competition that the law encourages,”
Appellant's Reply Br. at 43, and are aware of no authority
holding that a monopolist may not lower its rates in
response to a competitor's entry into the market with a
lower-priced product.

As with its critique of Qualcomm's royalty rates, the

district court's analysis of Qualcomm's “no license, no
chips” policy focuses almost exclusively on alleged
“anticompetitive harms” to OEMs—that is, impacts outside
the relevant antitrust market. The district court labeled
Qualcomm's policy “anticompetitive conduct against
OEMs” and an “anticompetitive practice[] in patent license
negotiations.” ​高通公司​，411F。 3d at 697–98. But the
district court failed to identify how the policy directly
impacted Qualcomm's competitors or distorted “the area of
​ 午。 Express,​ 138 S. Ct. at 2285.
effective competition.” 上
Although OEMs consistently described Qualcomm's “no
license, no chips” policy as “unique in the industry,” none
articulated a cogent theory of anticompetitive harm. Instead,
they objected to Qualcomm's licensing royalty rates, which
they have to pay ​regardless ​of whether they chose to
purchase their chips from Qualcomm or a competitor (or
else risk a patent infringement suit from Qualcomm).

Furthermore, it appears that OEMs have been somewhat

successful in “disciplining” Qualcomm's pricing through
arbitration claims, negotiations, threatening to move to
different chip suppliers, and threatened or actual antitrust
litigation. These maneuvers generally resulted in
settlements and renegotiated licensing and chip-supply
agreements with Qualcomm, even as OEMs continued to
look elsewhere for cheaper modem chip options. A good
FTC V​ ​. Q​UALCOMM ​49

example of this is Apple's 2014 decision to switch to Intel

as its main chip supplier, demonstrating that Qualcomm's
“no license, no chips” policy did not foreclose competition
in the modem chip markets.

According to the FTC, the problem with “no license, no

chips” is that, under the policy, “Qualcomm will not sell
chips to a cellphone [OEM] like Apple or Samsung unless
the OEM agrees to a license that requires it to pay a
substantial per-phone surcharge ​even on phones that use
rivals' chips.​ ” Appellee's Br. at 1 (emphasis in original).​23
But this argument is self-defeating: if the condition imposed
on gaining access to Qualcomm's chip supply applies
regardless of whether the OEM chooses Qualcomm or a
competitor (in fact, this appears to be the essence of
Qualcomm's policy), then the condition by definition does
not distort the “area of effective competition” or impact
competitors. At worst, the policy raises the “all-in” price
that an OEM must pay for modem chips (chipset + licensing
royalties) regardless of which chip supplier the OEM
chooses to source its chips from. As we have already
discussed, whether that all-in price is reasonable or
unreasonable is an issue that sounds in patent law, not
antitrust law. Additionally, it involves potential harms to
Qualcomm's ​customers,​ not its competitors, and thus falls
outside the relevant antitrust markets.

The district court stopped short of holding that the “no

license, no chips” policy itself violates antitrust law. For

23 ​
See also A ​ ppellee's Br. at 9 (“Qualcomm uses its chip monopoly
to force OEMs to pay Qualcomm a surcharge ​even when they use its
rivals' chips.​ ”) (emphasis in original); ​id. ​at 35 (“[Qualcomm] forced
customers to accept terms that raised the costs of using rivals' chips, as a
condition of access to its own must-have chips.”).
50 FTC ​V.​ Q​UALCOMM

good reason: neither the Sherman Act nor any other law
prohibits companies like Qualcomm from (1) licensing their
SEPs independently from their chip sales and collecting
royalties, and/or (2) limiting their chip customer base to
licensed OEMs. As we have noted, “[a]sa general rule,
businesses are free to choose the parties with whom they
will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that
dealing.” ​linkLine,​ 555 US at 448 (2009) (citing ​Colgate,​
250 US at 307); ​cf.上午。 Express​, 138 S. Ct. at 2289–90
(holding that Amex's antisteering provisions did not unduly
restrain trade). Indeed, the FTC accepts that this is the state
of the law when it concedes that “Qualcomm holds patents
practiced by its rivals' chips, and . 。 。 is entitled to collect
a royalty” on them. Appellee's Br. at 39.

In addition, the district court's criticism of “no license,

no chips” treats that policy as if Qualcomm is making SEP
licenses contingent upon chip purchases, instead of the other
way around. If Qualcomm were to refuse to license its SEPs
to OEMs unless they first agreed to purchase Qualcomm's
chips (“no chips, no license”), then rival chip suppliers
indeed might have an antitrust claim under both §§ 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act based on exclusionary conduct. This is
because OEMs cannot sell their products ​without o​ btaining
Qualcomm's SEP licenses, so a “no chips, no license” policy
would essentially force OEMs to either purchase
Qualcomm's chips or pay for ​both Q ​ ualcomm's and a
competitor's chips (similar to the no-win situation faced by
OEMs in the ​Caldera c​ ase). But unlike a hypothetical “no
chips, no license” policy, “no license, no chips” is chip
neutral: it makes no difference whether an OEM buys
Qualcomm's chip or a rival's chips. The policy only insists
that, whatever chip source an OEM chooses, the OEM pay
Qualcomm for the right to practice the patented
technologies
FTC V​ ​. Q​UALCOMM ​51

embodied in the chip, as well as in other parts of the phone

or other cellular device.

This is not to say that Qualcomm's “no license, no

chips” policy is not “unique in the industry” (it is), or that
the policy is not designed to maximize Qualcomm's profits
(Qualcomm has admitted as much). But profit-seeking
behavior alone is insufficient to establish antitrust liability.
As the Supreme Court stated in ​Trinko,​ the opportunity to
charge monopoly prices “is an important element of the free
market system” and “is what attracts 'business acumen' in
the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth.” ​Trinko,​ 540 US at 407.
The record suggests that this case is more like ​Am. Express,​
where a company's novel business practice at first appeared
to be anticompetitive, but in fact was disruptive in a manner
that was beneficial to consumers in the long run because it
forced rival credit card companies to adapt and innovate.
138 S. Ct. at 2290. Similarly here, companies like Nokia
and Ericsson are now “[f]ollowing Qualcomm's lead” with
respect to OEM-level licensing, and beginning in 2015 rival
chipmakers began to successfully compete against
Qualcomm in the modem chip markets. We decline to
ascribe antitrust liability in these dynamic and rapidly
changing technology markets without clearer proof of
anticompetitive effect.

Having addressed the primary components of the district

court's antitrust ruling with respect to Qualcomm's general
business practices, we now address the district court's more
specific finding that from 2011 to 2015, Qualcomm violated
both sections of the Sherman Act by signing “exclusive
deals” with Apple that “foreclosed a 'substantial share' of
the [CDMA] modem chip market.” ​Qualcomm​, 411 F.
52 FTC V ​ ​. Q​UALCOMM

Supp. 3d at 771–72 (quoting ​Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville

Coal Co.​, 365 US 320, 327 (1961)).

“Exclusive dealing involves an agreement between a

vendor and a buyer that prevents the buyer from purchasing
a given good from any other vendor.” ​Allied Orthopedic​,
592 F.3d at 996. Because “[t]here are 'well-recognized
economic benefits to exclusive dealing arrangements,
including the enhancement of interbrand competition,'” an
exclusive dealing arrangement is not per se illegal. ​ID。
(quoting ​Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.​, 127 F.3d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997)). Instead, such an arrangement
violates the Sherman Act under the rule of reason only if
“its effect is to 'foreclose competition in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected.'” ​Id. (​ quoting ​Omega
Envtl.,​ 127 F.3d at 1162); ​see also Caldera​, 87 F. Supp. 2d
at 1251 (“[T]he competition foreclosed by the contract must
be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant
market . . . [t]hat is to say, the opportunities for other traders
to enter into or remain in that market must be significantly
limited”) (quoting ​Tampa Elec.​, 365 US at 328).

Qualcomm argues that its agreements with Apple were

“volume discount contracts, not exclusive dealings
contracts.” Unlike exclusive dealing arrangements, “volume
discount contracts are legal under antitrust law . 。 。
[b]ecause the contracts do not preclude consumers from
using other . 。 。 services.” ​W. Parcel Express v. United
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc.​, 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing ​Fedway Assocs., Inc. v. United States Treasury​, 976
F.2d 1416, 1418 (DC Cir. 1992)). Likewise, conditional
agreements that provide “substantial discounts to customers
that actually purchase[] a high percentage of their . 。 。
requirements from” a firm are not exclusive dealing
arrangements, de facto or actual, unless they “prevent[] the
buyer from purchasing a
FTC V ​ ​. Q​UALCOMM ​53

given good from any other vendor.” ​Allied Orthopedic​, 592

F.3d at 996–97; ​see also ​XI Philip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1807a at 129 (2d ed. 2000)
(noting that “[d]iscounts conditioned on exclusivity in
relatively short-term contracts are rarely problematic”).

The district court concluded that the Apple agreements

were not volume discount contracts, but rather “de facto
exclusive deals” that “coerced '[Apple] into purchasing a
substantial amount of [its] needs from [Qualcomm]'” and
thereby “'substantially foreclosed competition' in the
[CDMA modem chip] market.” 高 ​ 通公司​，411F。 3d at
763, 766 (some alterations in original) (quoting ​Aerotec
Int'l,​ 836 F.3d at 1182; ​Tampa Elec.,​ 365 US at 334). The
FTC argues that these agreements “'easily' qualified as ​de
facto ​exclusive-dealing agreements under ​Tampa Electric'​ s
'practical effect' test.” Appellee's Br. at 87; ​see Tampa Elec.,​
365 US at 326 (holding that a contract is exclusive, even
though it does not contain specific agreements not to use the
goods of a competitor, if its “practical effect” is to prevent
such use) (citation omitted).

There is some merit in the district court's conclusion that

the Apple agreements were structured more like exclusive
dealing contracts than volume discount contracts.​24

Of note, the agreements did not ​just p​ rovide substantial discounts

24 ​

to Apple in exchange for Apple “purchas[ing] a high percentage of [its]

. 。 。 requirements from” Qualcomm. ​Allied Orthopedic​, 592 F.3d at
996. Instead, they sought to “prevent[] the buyer [Apple] from
purchasing a given good [CDMA modem chips] from any other
vendor,” ​id.​, by making volume discounts (or “incentive funds”)
contingent on exclusivity. Nor were these agreements “easily
terminable,” even though Apple did, in fact, terminate them. ​See id. a​ t
997 (noting that “[t]he 'easy terminability' of an exclusive dealing
arrangement 'negate[s] substantially [its] potential to foreclose
competition'”
54 FTC ​V.​ Q​UALCOMM

However, we do not agree that these agreements had the

actual or practical effect of substantially foreclosing
competition in the CDMA modem chip market, or that
injunctive relief is warranted.

During the relevant time period (2011–2015), the record

suggests that the only serious competition Qualcomm faced
with respect to the Apple contracts was from Intel, a
company from whom Apple had considered purchasing
modem chips prior to signing the 2013 agreement with
Qualcomm. The district court made no finding that any
other specific competitor or potential competitor was
affected by either of Qualcomm's agreements with Apple,
and it is undisputed that Intel won Apple's business ​the very
next year,​ in 2014, when Apple's engineering team
unanimously recommended that the company select Intel as
an alternative supplier of m odem chips. The district court
found that “Qualcomm's exclusive deals . 。 。 delayed
Intel's ability to sell modem chips to Apple until September
2016.” ​ID。 ​at 737. There is no indication in the record,
however, that Intel was a viable competitor to Qualcomm
prior to 2014– 2015, or that the 2013 agreement delayed
Apple's transition to Intel by any more than one year.​25
Given these undisputed facts, we conclude that the 2011 and
2013 agreements did

(quoting ​Omega Envtl.,​ 127 F.3d at 1163–64)). Clearly, the requirement

that Apple forfeit or reimburse Qualcomm millions of dollars in
incentive funds was a strong deterrent to termination.

25 ​
See A​ ppellant's Opening Br. at 110 (pointing out that at trial, the
FTC itself only contended “that the [2013] agreement foreclosed Intel
from supplying chips for a mere five iPad models released over three
years and 'perhaps' delayed Intel's ability to sell chips for the iPhone by
one year”).
FTC ​訴Q ​ ​UALCOMM 5 ​ 5

not have the actual or practical effect of substantially

foreclosing competition in the CDMA modem chip market.

Furthermore, “[a]sa general rule, '[p]ast wrongs are not

enough for the grant of an injunction'; [instead,] an
injunction will only issue if the wrongs are ongoing or
likely to recur.” ​FTC v. Evans Prods. Co.​, 775 F.2d 1084,
1087 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting ​Enrico's, Inc. v. Rice​, 730
F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1984)); ​see also 1​ 5 USC § 53(b)
(providing that the FTC “may” seek an injunction in federal
district court only when the defendant “is violating, or is
about to violate,” one or more of the antitrust laws). Even if
we were to agree with the district court that the Apple
agreements were exclusive dealing contracts that
substantially foreclosed competition in the relevant antitrust
markets, it is undisputed that these agreements do not pose
any current or future threat of anticompetitive harm. Despite
the “clawback provisions,” Apple itself terminated the
agreements in 2015—two years before the FTC filed its
action. Thus, while we agree with the district court that
these were structured more like exclusive dealing contracts
than volume discount contracts, they do not warrant the
issuance of an injunction.

IV

Anticompetitive behavior is illegal under federal

antitrust law. Hypercompetitive behavior is not. Qualcomm
has exercised market dominance in the 3G and 4G cellular
modem chip markets for many years, and its business
practices have played a powerful and disruptive role in
those markets, as well as in the broader cellular services and
technology markets. The company has asserted its economic
muscle “with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity.”
Topco Assocs.​, 405 US at 610. It has also “acted with sharp
elbows—as businesses often do.” ​Tension Envelope Corp.
56 FTC V ​ ​. Q​UALCOMM

v. JBM Envelope Co.,​ 876 F.3d 1112, 1122 (8th Cir. 2017).
Our job is not to condone or punish Qualcomm for its
success, but rather to assess whether the FTC has met its
burden under the rule of reason to show that Qualcomm's
practices have crossed the line to “conduct which unfairly
tends to destroy competition itself.” ​Spectrum Sports​, 506
US at 458. We conclude that the FTC has not met its
burden.

First​, Qualcomm's practice of licensing its SEPs

exclusively at the OEM level does not amount to
anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2, as Qualcomm is
under no antitrust duty to license rival chip suppliers. To the
extent Qualcomm has breached any of its FRAND
commitments, a conclusion we need not and do not reach,
the remedy for such a breach lies in contract and patent law.
Second,​ Qualcomm's patent-licensing royalties and “no
license, no chips” policy do not impose an anticompetitive
surcharge on rivals' modem chip sales. Instead, these
aspects of Qualcomm's business model are “chip-supplier
neutral” and do not undermine competition in the relevant
antitrust markets. ​Third,​ Qualcomm's 2011 and 2013
agreements with Apple have not had the actual or practical
effect of substantially foreclosing competition in the CDMA
modem chip market. Furthermore, because these agreements
were terminated years ago by Apple itself, there is nothing
to be enjoined.

We therefore ​REVERSE ​the district court's judgment

and ​VACATE ​its injunction as well as its partial grant of
summary judgment.