Running head: ACQUISITION PROCESS 1

Acquisition process

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Department of Defense Acquisition process

The department of defense acquisition process is often made of three main

processes which include the acquisition, requirements, and funding. The three processes are the

key elements in the acquisition system by DOD under the DOD 5000 operation of the defense

acquisition system. A program in this regard often undergoes various processes, milestones, and

reviews before implementation with each milestone depicting whether or not the programs

proceeds. Acquisition programs are categorized through an Acquisition Category also regarded

to as ACAT which is varied according to funding level and vitality it posses (Defense

Acquisition University (U.S.) Press, 2010). 

Policies and principles that are used in monitoring operations in the acquisition system by

the DOD are categorized further into flexibility whereby tailoring program strategies and

oversight is accounted for; responsiveness assessed through the rapidness of technologies and

their integration; innovation whereby practices that reduce periods and costs are accounted for;

discipline as well as effective management as per the DOD 5000 operation of the acquisition

system of the DOD. This paper analyses the acquisition of the department of defense as well as

with the Information technology systems (IT) (Defense Acquisition University (U.S.) Press,

2010). 

The process and culture of acquisition

Prior to 1966, there was a separation of processes and policies in the acquisition of the

department of defense as well as with the Information technology systems (IT) as depicted by the

Brooks Act of 1965. The policies were soon merged following the rationale brought about by the

Brooks Act as well as the relative DOD 8000 process that that was thereby rendered slow and
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cumbersome. With that challenge, the IT processes were acquired through one acquisition

process as brought out through the DOD 5000 regulation whose mandate had been to provide

efficiency through integration of a more versatile and rigid framework for the programs therein.

After the integration of the IT systems under the DOD 5000 factors such as tailoring oversight as

well as the documentation as per the DOD 5000 became necessary in order to ascertain that the

needs of the IT processes were met. In 2008 efforts had been taken to address the change in

processes as laid out by the DOD 5000 that would be effective in addressing the challenges that

lay therein the acquisition system (National Research Council, 2010).

The DOD as everyone knows is always trying to provide relatively low cost but

efficient and highly effective military capacity via the defense acquisition systems. The

acquisition processes have been facing attempts aimed at reforming the process of acquisition

with more focus emphasized on weaponry and to the highly visible programs in the massive

programs. Within the acquisition programs by the DOD account for the largest part of the budget

on acquisition inclusive of programs like the Strike Fighter (F-35), SSN 774-class submarine,

Combat Systems, as well as the systems on Missile Defense (National Research Council, 2010).

Weaknesses in the acquisition process by the DOD have been seen in the insufficient

analysis of the maturity of technological processes prior to starting system development, the fact

that government does not give any or enough feedback in forms of reviews as well as oversight

in the system’s development phase; multiyear design and development phase, and finally

challenges on insufficient preparation and implementation of the operational testing. With regard

to this weakness as well as any other underlying weaknesses, the DOD is always making effort

to address the challenges through the integration of more processes as well as ensuring they have

enough reviews (National Research Council, 2010).

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The acquisition process is under scrutiny with people arguing that the reforms have not

impacted the process in a positive way but rather have burdened the acquisition system

especially with the integration of oversight. It has been argued further that the changes focused

on countering the challenges with massive weapon system programs have rather impacted on the

IT programs negatively. IT program managers have realized that the DOD 5000 processes

increased the period needed for the delivery of solutions most notably the commercial off-the-

shelf (COTS) solutions. The DOD 5000 processes also contribute directly to the modification of

bigger formal acquisition programs which also ameliorate the documentation requirements with

respect to the sizes of the teams supporting the system (Defense Acquisition University (U.S.)

Press, 2010). 

Review of the DOD processes by Obama’s transition team noted that the

cooperation of the main data officers of the DOD as well as the services by the military had

rendered the acquisition process by the DOD voidable. According to them, the acquisition

process by the DOD was so inadequate that it could not deliver on a commercialized system of

technology albeit it still being an exceptional system. The team advocated for the integration of

petit IT acquisition projects that were less likely to fail and that could hasten the fielding of

critical mission capacity (National Research Council, 2010).

The IT processes may include a magnitude of characteristics that vary from the

defense weapon systems of the DOD programs. The differences between the IT programs and

the programs on the defense weaponry are identified by the DOD CIO community as the reason

behind the challenges that arise. IT programs depend on COTS technology; therefore, technology

development in the DOD 5000 series is not necessary. The DOD 5000 processes align with the

COTS-based IT programs in order to assess technology demonstrations with the more advanced
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commercial technology. The program manager in this regard shows the mature and identified

technology whilst undertaking the fielding utilizing similar technology (National Research

Council, 2010).

IT programs vary from the weapons systems programs in their scheduling of the

evaluation undertakings and operational test respectively. The operational test and evaluation act

as risk reduction activity and is often monitored by trained professionals who assess whether or

not the system is ready to go into absolute production which is a prediction of the overall

program cost. Spending decisions and risk assessments are often employed in the development

and design phase to avoid future problems. The systems of weaponry and IT differ in their

technology cycles. IT systems use far more rapid systems and take relatively shorter durations of

time to develop. The average time for a DOD acquisition program is relatively 2years for the full

establishment and implementation and takes a longer time in the production of IOCs for testing.

It could be said therefore that the acquisition program by DOD does result in a lag in IT

advancement (National Research Council, 2010).

Acquisition programs by DOD encourage the integration of numerous

requirements into more complex programs. COTS acquisition aligns with the governance model

and relative processes to bring about the new development. Contemporary IT systems advocate

for the acquisition processes in the DOD enabling the integration of many capacities into one

single program activity. The bundling allows for effective delivery without necessarily creating

an entirely new team. This causes a reduction in the learning curve and the time meant for

starting with the DOD. The aggregation of the smaller developmental efforts into a single larger

major program in the current acquisition process allows for an increase in time and costs as well
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as cause an impediment to the state-of-the-art technology. Program size can impact the success

and failure and mask the operational problems (National Research Council, 2010).

Huge and comprehensive DOD information technology (IT)-based programs were found

to be very effective and successful with the utilization of nontraditional oversight. The success

stories act as evidence of the changes that resulted in positive impact. These characteristics

include the need for effective operational need, support, iterative incremental developmental

approach, continuous involvement and satisfaction of the consumer in the processes

development, proof of the army digitization experiments, field experiments, leveraging of the

solutions by COTS as well as contractor logistics amongst others. Examples of these include:

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) which was a system based on

command and control developed to work as a key element of the army’s more comprehensive

PMT which consults the PM in order to make informed decisions on development strategies that

can result in future capacities that allow for the end user to achieve experience with their ever-

changing requirements (National Research Council, 2010).

DOD IT programs are in high demand for justification, programming, and the cost

processes in order to rise multiyear funding found in the Program Objectives Memorandum and

one that is appropriated annually as well as the use of the ACAT I-level oversight processes.

Agility can be achieved through structuring the portfolio on the acquisition process of the DOD

IT to include numerous valid programs rated at the enterprise level that are vast, vital and costly

in such a manner that they need management and oversight that is intensive at the secretary of

defense office. Take international data on expansion programs of the Grid-Bandwidth for

example: that is a large enterprise that has integrated the IT programs at the enterprise-level

(National Research Council, 2010).

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These kinds of programs ought to be scheduled in such a manner that they are in a

position to deliver platforms to the next generation at a time that platforms of legacy can no

longer be sustained via upgrades that occur once a year and therefore should be eradicated

entirely or rather replaced. The programs left in the portfolio by DOD IT have to be modified for

the management and oversight that is decentralized in such a manner that the systems of IT

would be adaptable for agile acquisition. In doing so two categories are necessary modification-

in-service programs as well as contemporary programs that have been modified in such a manner

they allow for ACAT II and ACAT III at the dollar levels. These are mostly utilized by the

weaponry systems and oversight through services, executive officers whose mandate is the

program and the agencies involved therein (Defense Acquisition University (U.S.) Press, 2010). 

The DOD is focused on maintaining cautionary strategies over speed strategies. The

DOD undertakes in moderately dangerous missions, while the global operations, huge

workforce, crystal action are all characteristics of a classic command-and-control culture adopted

by the DOD. With demand being relatively high the trends are bound to rise thereby meaning the

systems and processes will receive yet more demand and will become centralized albeit the DOD

initiative to attain a more integrated, cross-service environment with prompt decision making at

all managerial levels. In such an environment, the IT programs lifecycle which normally takes

28months is based entirely on reviews that are frequent and stakeholders alike. With such an

environment the DOD does not necessarily have to adopt rapid innovation or developmental

processes (National Research Council, 2010).

With a command and control environment assessment become hard to make when the

massive programs encounter long durations between their significant milestones. DOD practices

often need requirements prior to having a program approved in order to pave way for a
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successful risk assessment in which the costs and risks are assessed (National Research Council,

2010). Weapon systems allow for this whereas with IT systems more years of development are

called for thus contributing to the delivery of IT programs trying to incorporate traditional

requirements that have either changed or are already shifting and continuing to do so.

The DOD IT system acquisition culture can be recalibrated but the focus should be made

entirely on the fielding of the increments of capacity that are otherwise successive and prompt.

The delivery time a key indicator in this case. Promptness in delivery is essential with regard to

the available commercial technologies with a fielding model that allows for the changes in

capabilities with the evolution of technology during training, use, maintenance, and support. The

DOD often calls for the adoption of contemporary technologies and one that assesses where

integration of developments is necessary. The delivery of useful capacity increments is supposed

to attain more evaluation as opposed to delivering nothing albeit being in the field for several

years (National Research Council, 2010).

The process involves direct communication that is granted in the form of pragmatic

consultation granted by the organization's oversight to the operational managers together with the

component of advocacy. A culture such as this replaces oversight that is in excessive, an

achievement mentality as well as security. The culture must have team effort incorporated in

helping the PM deliver that capability to the end user. Incentives on the utilization of the IID and

agile-inspired approaches of acquisition and development are paramount. The successful use of

the IID approaches and delivery of a capability should be in such a manner that every team

member receives merit for the same (National Research Council, 2010).
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Conclusion

It is important that the leadership is derived from senior levels in the IT organizations and

not necessarily tied to the IT staff only. The defense acquisition has an important mandate in

formulating and maintaining a culture that promotes the use of IID. More so, the successes and

failures of a process are reviewed periodically in order to provide the teams with necessary

knowledge or the operational processes. The Iterative approach, therefore, can be used in the

process and technology alike (National Research Council, 2010).

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References

Defense Acquisition University (U.S.). Press. (2010). Introduction to Defense Acquisition

Management (10th Ed.)  Fort Belvoir, Va.: Washington, DC. Defense Acquisition

University Press.

National Research Council. (2010). Achieving effective acquisition of information technology in

the Department of Defense. National Academies Press.