τ Laudan, δε ε α ε τ α στ ε τα τ ατ α στ ε στ τ τα ε τ α

σε ε φ στ σ ε φ . Η ε στ τ τα, ατα ε τα στα ε τε α

ασατ α δ σ τ Δ τ σ , δε ετα σ α α ετ α ,α ε
αφετ α σ ε ε ε δε α στ α :

Η ε στ ε α δε α σ .
Η τ τα σ , τ στ , ε ε σ δ τ στ τ α τ
ε ε τα ε α δεδ .
Α τ τ τα δε σ στ σ α α ετ α , α τε ε στ
α α τ σ τ α τ ε ε α εα .

τε ε τα α τ ε ε α ε α α τ ε δ . ατ τ Popper, α α τε α σ ε
σ εα τ ε α σε ε ε δ ασ ε , δ αδ τα τ ετα ε τ δ α α
δα ε α στασ . Η α τ τ Popper α τ ε τ ε στ ε στ φετα
α α εταφ σ α σα , στ α στ ετα τ τ α α τ σ τ α εα
(quest for truth). δ α α τ α τ δ , ετ δ α α εταφ σ δ στασ
τ , δ αφα ετα α σε ε ε δ ε : Feyerabend ε ε τ δ τ ε τε τ
α ε τ α, τ α ε δ ε α ε α αφ ε στ τ ε στ α τ ,
α τ α στ τα τ α στ ε στ σ ε α ε ε ε δ α α α.
Α τ ετα, στ Lakatos, δ α ατ ε τα σα α α ε δ αδ ασ α
σα , ε τε τ ατ τ ε α στα ε ε σσ ε α δ α ε δ τ α ε τε
τ ε α στ ετα α ε α τ τ σ τ εφα τ . , α τ Kuhn,
αφ σ τ ατ φα α τ α δε α α τ σ ε ε α φ εσ τε
δ τ α αδε ατ , ε α τ εσ α τ α ατ στασ σ α δ ε στ ε α δ σ
α τ αδ α φ σ τ τ εδ α σ τ ( τ , 1983).

6.9.
. Popper ε σ α ε τ τ τ δ α ε σ τ τα στ ε στ . ε στ τ σε , α τ
Popper, ε τα σ α δε τ δ ε σ , ε ε ε στ τ τ δ α ε σ τ τα ,
δ αδ ε α ε α ατασ ε ασ ε ε τ τ τ στε α ε α δ ατ α δ α ε στ . ε ,
ε στ ε α α δ αστ τ τα, α ε ετα σε α α α ε α (δ τ ε
ε στ τ σε ε α ε φ σε σ ). Η ε στ , ασφα , α ε τ φ α
δ α α ατ α ατ τ τα, ε τ α ε αφα ε α ασ ε δ ε , ε σε α α ε .Η
α α τε δ α τ ε στ , σ α α α ετ τ α ε , ε ατα ε ετα στ ασ
τ σ σ ε α α φ σ φ α τ ε στ .
ε σα ε στ σ ε α στ Kuhn, δε δ ετα τ δ ατ σ ε τ σ . φ α
ε τ δ , ε στ ε ε ετα σε σ α τ α α τ στ α ε ,
α τε ε , δ αδ , α α δ αστ τ τα, α ε τ σσετα σε α σ ε -
στ ασ , τ σ στ α τ α. Kuhn ε σ α ε τ α τ ε στ
α αδε ατ (scientific paradigm), στ σ , « α δε α» δε ε τ δα α τ
α δδ ε στ α . α ε στ α αδε ατα α α α τ α στα τα , ε ,
δε ε σ σσ ε σ σε α τ σ σ σ τ α ε α. Α τ ε δα ε α τ τ α
τ 19 α α ε τ ε στ δε δε δε ετα α δε τ στ σ
ε στ α.
Lakatos σ ε ε τ α δ σ , τ Popper, α ε σ ε τ α τ «ε στ -
ε ε τ α τ ». Α τ τ , Feyerabend α α τ σσε α α α σ αστ α τ ,
ατ α φ σ τε τ ε τ τ τ τα στ ε στ .Ε α τ α τε
α α δ σ α , α, σ αστ α τ ε στ ε ετ σα ε, δ τ
ε ε δ τα α α τ α τ τ τα . φ α ε τ Feyerabend,
α ε ε ατ α αδ σε . ε α σ σ στ α α φ α αα α τ ,
στ σ α ε ε τα αδ , τε ασφα α . τ σ τ τ τα , ε
ε , ε σ ετα α τ α ασ ασ τ σε , α στ ετα στ α τ τα
τ α ε .

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