Power System Security: Introduction to power system contingencies, Factors affecting

security, Contingency analysis, Network sensitivity using DC and AC load flow methods,
correcting the generation dispatch.

Introduction: After the great 1965 blackout of the northeast, there has been increasing
attention paid to the role of computers towards prevention of total or partial shut-down of
the power systems It is important that the computer programs which implement security
related functions in real time be very fast to execute. Graphical tools are developed those
not only show the current state of the system but the new state as well for the contingency
under consideration.
Breakdowns may be occurred due to technical faults and human errors but natural
calamities have also taken their toll.

1. In Jan 2, 2001 at 4.30am, cascading failure occurs in northern region (black out) due to
fault in transmission system. The failure of a substation in the state of Uttar Pradesh
triggered the collapse, while poor and inadequate transmission equipment were also
blamed.
The disruption began with a fault in the Panki substation in Uttar Pradesh, which
triggered a breakdown of the entire northern grid The states of Punjab and Haryana were
hit, along with parts of Uttar Pradesh. Kashmir, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh were
also reported to be without power.
2. Oct 12, 2020, Mumbai, faces black out due to failure of islanding system. Islanding
system developed by Tata power in 1981 fails to cut off the system due to sudden plunge
in load from 3500Mw to 1200MW. Islanding could not work because of grid failure at
multiple centres.
Four 400 KV power lines supply electricity to Mumbai. These four lines come together at the
400 KV Kalwa substation in Thane and from there power is distributed to the entire
Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR).
Of the four lines, the 400 KV Kalwa-Talegaon line shut down on Saturday at 1:47 pm due to
a broken conductor. The breakdown took place in a remote area at the top of the
Sahyadri range, and was being repaired.
On Monday, a second line, Padgha circuit-1, was shut down due to an overload at 4:33 am.
“Still the power supply was smooth through the two other power lines and power
generation in Mumbai,” according to the statement.
But at 10:01 am, the 400 KV Padgha-Kalwa circuit-2 tripped, and led to the tripping of the
400 KV Pune-Kharghar line. Mumbai’s power supply went into “islanding” mode, a
system by which power supply continues uninterrupted in spite of a grid shutdown,
through a distributed generator. Tata Power and Adani have islanding systems to protect
Mumbai’s power supply from grid troubles.
This “unforeseen event” due to the transmission system failure led to the cascading impact
to all downstream suppliers of electricity including Tata Power, BEST and its consumers,
Tata Power said.

“Besides the tripping of circuit-2 at Kalwa-Padghe centre, Kharghar transformer tripped,

Uran gas power plant developed a technical snag. This led to overload on Tata and Adani
plants resulting in failure of the islanding system,
3. July 30-31, 2012,: A bigger blackout occurred the on July 31 day in the NEW grid which
comprised the Northern, Western, Eastern and North-Eastern grids after the Northern
grid was restored and synchronised with it. It affected a total of 700 million people across
20 Indian states.
Overdrawing of electricity by certain states and weak inter-regional power transmission
corridors were cited as the reasons behind the blackout.

“At 02:35 IST , circuit breakers on the 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line tripped. As this line fed
into the Agra-Bareilly transmission section, breakers at the station also tripped, and
power failures cascaded through the grid. All major power stations were shut down in
the affected states, causing an estimated shortage of 32 GW. And is termed the failure
as the worst of the decade.”
The investigation committee (Dr. S.. Srivastava , A.K. Bakshi and reported the following
 Weak inter-regional power transmission corridors due to multiple existing outages (both
scheduled and forced);
 High loading on 400 kV Bina–Gwalior–Agra link;
 Inadequate response by State Load Dispatch Centers (SLDCs) to the instructions of
Regional Load Dispatch Centres (RLDCs) to reduce over-drawal by the Northern Region
utilities and under-drawal/excess generation by the Western Region utilities;
 Loss of 400 kV Bina–Gwalior link due to mis-operation of its protection system.

4. International blackouts: South and south-eastern Brazil in March 11, 1999 after a bolt of
lightning struck an electricity substation in Sao Paulo. The incident caused a chain
reaction that resulted in the shutting down of Itaipu, one of the world’s biggest
hydroelectric power plants.

5. Major parts of Brazil and the whole of Paraguay were blacked out for two to four hours
on 10 November 2009 when strong winds and heavy rains caused three transformers on
a high-voltage transmission line to short circuit, affecting a total of 67 million people.
Six states in central and southern Brazil, including the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao
Paulo, were blacked out, which eventually led to the shutdown of the Itaipu hydroelectric
dam after the lines connecting to the plant went down.
The dam, which is situated on the Paraguay-Brazil border, stopped producing 18,000MW
of electricity, affecting both countries. A number of car accidents were also reported
during the blackout due to lack of street lighting.

6. The worst black out in the North American history occurred on Aug 14-15, 2003, The
blackout occurred due to the shutdown of a high-voltage power line in Northern Ohio
after it came in contact with overgrown trees. A faulty alarm system of the FirstEnergy
Corporation failed to alert the operators, leading to a domino effect that resulted in
three other lines being shut down.
7. Italy experienced a blackout on 28 September 2003 after a power line which supplied
electricity to the nation from Switzerland was damaged by an uprooted tree during a
storm.
8. The entire province of Quebec, Canada, suffered a blackout for 12 hours on 13 March
1989. A solar geomagnetic storm was responsible for the collapse of Hydro-Québec’s
electricity transmission system, leading to a blackout which affected six million people.
 The geomagnetic storm caused a variation in the earth’s magnetic field, thus tripping the
Hydro-Québec power grid.
9. blackout that occurred during rush hour in parts of Canada and several northeastern U.S.
states on 9 November 1965 lasted for approximately 13 hours affecting more than 30
million people in New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New
Hampshire,Vermont, Quebec, and Ontario.
The blackout was caused by a faulty or improperly set safety relay at Sir Adam Beck
Station on the Ontario side of Niagara Falls that resulted in the tripping of a 230kV
transmission line, leading to a domino effect.
10. A lightning bolt caused a power outage in New York City during July 13th and 14th
1977. The Indian Point nuclear generating plant was rendered offline due to tripping,
while a second lightning strike caused two more 345kV transmission lines to shut down.
Subsequent power surges, malfunctioning safety equipment and human error left nine
million residents without electricity for nearly 24 hours.
Power system security is related with certain terms as the system operates in one of these
states

1. Normal state: Power balance equation is met. None of the electrical equipment
(Generators, Transformer, transmission lines etc.) are overloaded and voltage and
frequency are well within permissible limits. Difference in voltage phase angles
across line (adjacent buses) is much below 400.
2. Alert state: Power balance equation is met. But the margins in permissible variations
of voltage and frequency are exhausted and there is no spinning reserve in
generation.
3. Emergency state: If the power system all load is met then electrical equipment is
overloaded and powers system state variables exceed their limits. There is need of
preventive/corrective action (emergency control) to be taken like load transfer,
utilising the equipment to its breaking limits, fast shedding of loads, generation
transfer, use of fast acting protection devices etc.
4. Extreme-emergency state: Power balance equation (all load) is not met and there
may be failure of any control mechanism, failure of an equipment leads to black-out.
Any preventive action fails to restore the system to alert state.
5. Restorative /preventive state: A power system is in restorative state when all the
system loads are not being met. It implies a partial or total shut down of the system.
The main concern then is to restore all the system loads with as little delay as
possible.

Steady state of Power system is operation of the system under balanced operating
conditions. The system is said to operate in its ‘normal’ (Secured with no overload, able to
withstand contingency without violating constraints) state.
Security monitoring is performed for online identification of the actual operating conditions
of a system by checking the real time state to determine whether it is in a normal,
emergency or restorative state.
Current State of
Power System

Security Monitoring
System

Emergency Restorative
Emergency Restorative
Control Control
Normal
Contingency
Selection

Contingency
Evaluation
 Secure Insecure

Exit Preventive Action

If the system is in normal state, contingency analysis is carried out by subjecting the system
to an abnormal state. If the new state of the system after subjected to contingency is
normal then system is secured otherwise insecure.

Preventive action may require strengthening the transmission network by putting more
lines in service, adding generation, or changing the power flows by appropriate switching or
putting the operator in an "alert" state to shed some loads, if the contingency did occur, so
as to minimize the damage to the power system.

In India SCADA system perform n-1 contingency procedure (this means one disturbance is
taken at a time among n contingencies) .

Power System Security

Contingency analysis is the steady state analysis which is carried out to know the behaviour
of system due to outage of lines or any major equipment of the system subsequent to any
scheduled or unscheduled (forced) event.

Scheduled event: load and generation management (shedding of load or generation taken
out for service and maintenance

Unscheduled Event: opening of CB to clear fault leads to outage of

line/transformer/generation

The type of process in which a failure event in any part of system leaves other equipment
overloaded leads to cascaded outage.

To maintain the system reliability and security, there are three major functional analysis
carried out in operation and control centre.

System Monitoring: provides the operator of system with pertinent up-to-date information
on the conditions of the system.
Contingency analysis: to analyse the system and to study outage events and alarm the
operator to any potential overloads or out of limit voltage/frequency levels.

Security constrained optimal power flow: Contingency analysis is combined with OPF which
seeks to make changes to optimal dispatch of generation as well as other adjustments so as
to carry out security analysis such that no contingencies result in violations.

To carry out this, the power system is divided into four operating states:

1. Optimal dispatch: it is a pre-contingency state . It is optimal wrt economic

operation but may not be secure.
2. Post-contingency: It is a state of system after a contingency has occurred.
This condition has security violation like line/transformer operating beyond
permissible flow limits, bus voltage outside limits etc.
3. Security dispatch: It is the state of system with no contingency outages but
with corrections to operating parameters to account for security violations.
4. Secure post-contingency: It is the state of system when the contingency is
applied to base operating conditions with corrections.
Contingency Analysis:

There are two major types of failure events

1. Transmission Line Outage: It causes the change in line flows and the voltages on the
transmission equipment remaining connected to system.
2. Generation Failure: It causes flow and voltages to change in transmission system. It
also adds dynamic problems involving system frequency and generator output.

Contingency analysis procedures model single failure events (one line outage, one generator
outage) or multiple equipment failure (two transmission lines outage, one line and one
generator outage), one after another in sequence until all credible outages are studies. For
each outage tested , the contingency analyses checks all line flows and voltages in the
network against their respective limits. If the speed of solution of model in contingency
analysis is of concern then at the same time it is difficult to select all credible outages and
during CA it may possible that operating conditions of power system under consideration
may change.

Solution methods: There are two methods to carry out contingency analysis:

DC Load Flow method: It is a fast algorithm based on the approximate model of power
system. It provides adequate capability of system. In this procedure, bus voltages are kept
constant, line resistances are neglect ted and line reactance are replaced by their equivalent
resistance. DC load flow provides system and line flows with sufficient accuracy. It does not
involve iterative procedure. Bus voltage angles are calculated. But does not provide any
knowledge about MVARs flows and bus voltage magnitudes.

AC Load Flow method: It is an exact method and provides MVA flow, bus voltage
magnitudes.

Linear sensitivity Factors

Linear sensitivity factors provide quick calculations of possible overloads. These factors
show the approximate changes in line flows for changes in the generation or network
configurations and are derived from dc flow method.

There are two major sensitivity factors

1. Generation shift /outage factor

2. Line outage distribution factor

Generation shift/outage Factor: It is defined as the ratio of change in active power flow in
𝑚𝑡ℎ line connected between nodes r and s , when there is change in power generation at
𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus. Any change in network configuration is ignored.
 ∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) 𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠
𝑎𝑚𝑖 = =
∆𝑃𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑖 𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑢𝑠

∆𝑃𝑖 = −𝑃𝑖0 ; generation outage is considered as generation input with negative sign. Where
𝑃𝑖0 is the generation at 𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus before it is lost (out)

Change in generation ∆𝑃𝑖 is exactly compensated by an opposite change in generation at

reference bus and all other generation other than 𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus are taken as fixed.

Generation outage factor 𝑎𝑚𝑖 represents the sensitivity of flow of lines to a change in
generation.

New line flows on each line in network will be:

𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑜
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) + 𝑎𝑚𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) is line flow in 𝑚𝑡ℎ line after the generation at 𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus follows (post contingency)
𝑛𝑒𝑤
Due to outage the line flow 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) ; 𝑚 ∈ [1, 𝑁𝐿] on each line will be compared to its limits
and those exceeding limits are flagged for alarming.

The generation shift sensitivity factors are linear estimates of change in flow within a
change in power at a bus. The effects of simultaneous changes on several generator buses
can be calculated using superposition, in case the remaining participating (committed)
generators can take up load. The loss of generator at 𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus is compensated by pick-up
(governor action) of remaining generators in proportion to their maximum MW rating.

𝑃 𝑚𝑎𝑥
Proportion of generation pick up from 𝑗 𝑡ℎ unit (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) will be : 𝑟𝑗𝑖 = ∑𝑁 𝑗 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=1 𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖

Where 𝑃𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 is maximum MW rating of 𝑘 𝑡ℎ unit.

𝑟𝑗𝑖 is proportionality factor for pick up on 𝑗 𝑡ℎ generating unit when 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unit fails or generation
of 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unit is shifted to remaining units.

New line flows on each line in network will be:

𝑁
𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑜
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) + 𝑎𝑚𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖 − ∑(𝑎𝑚𝑗 𝑟𝑗𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑖 )
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖

Line outage distribution factor: This factor basically helps to find out overloads in lines if any
when transmission circuits are lost. Mathematically

∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠)
𝑑𝑚𝑘 = 0
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏)
𝑑𝑚𝑘 is line outage distribution factor to monitor 𝑚𝑡ℎ line connected between nodes r and s
after an outage of 𝑘 𝑡ℎ line connected between nodes a and b.

New line flows on each line in network will be:

𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑜 0
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) + 𝑑𝑚𝑘 × 𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏)

𝑜 0
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) and 𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) are pre-outage flows on 𝑚𝑡ℎ and 𝑘 𝑡ℎ lines respectively.

While calculating these factors following assumptions are taken:

1. Generator output of each committed unit is available and all line flows on the
transmission lines are well within permissible limits.
2. All generators pick-up will be made on the reference bus., if not possible then
generation outage updating is considered proportion rule.

Algorithm for DC load Flow

Step 1: Read System data (line data: number of lines, number of buses, line resistance,
reactance and susceptance , bus data: bus type, real and reactive power at generator
and load bus)
1 1
Step 2: Form B-matrix (𝐵𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑁
𝑘=1 𝑥 and 𝐵𝑖𝑘 = − 𝑥 )
𝑖𝑘 𝑖𝑘

Step 3: Form reduced order B matrix by considering one bus as reference bus by setting
𝐵𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑓 = 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑓,𝑖 = 0

𝑅𝑋 ⋯ 0
Step 4: Form reactance matrix as 𝑋 = [ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮]
0 ⋯ 0
(zero row/column corresponding to reference bus)

Step 5: Obtain pre-outage solution as [∆𝛿] = [𝑋][∆𝑃] where ∆𝑃 = 𝑃𝑔 − 𝑃𝑑

𝑜 𝛿 −𝛿𝑠
Step 6: Calculate pre-outage line flows as 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑥𝑟
𝑚(𝑟,𝑠)

Step 7: Calculate generation outage 𝑎𝑚𝑖 for all the generation outage consideration one
by one except the outage of reference bus.

Step 8: Calculate line outage distribution factors 𝑑𝑚𝑘 for all outages of lines separately
one by one.

Step 9: Calculate post outage solution:

𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑜 0
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) + 𝑑𝑚𝑘 × 𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) and
 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑜
𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) + 𝑎𝑚𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖

𝑛𝑒𝑤
Step 10: Check post-outage new line flows are within the limits 𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) ≤ 𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥 .
With consideration to line outage and generation outage one by one. If yes, Stop otherwise
display alarm message.
Fast Decoupled Flow Method:

Power flow equations are given as:

𝑷𝒊 = |𝑽𝒊 |(∑𝑵𝑩
𝒌=𝟏|𝑽𝒌 |{|𝑮𝒊𝒌 |(𝐜𝐨𝐬(𝜹𝒊 − 𝜹𝒌 ) + |𝑩𝒊𝒌 |𝒔𝒊𝒏(𝜹𝒊 − 𝜹𝒌 )}); 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … 𝑵𝑩

𝑸𝒊 = |𝑽𝒊 |(∑𝑵𝑩
𝒌=𝟏|𝑽𝒌 |{|𝑮𝒊𝒌 |(𝐬𝐢𝐧(𝜹𝒊 − 𝜹𝒌 ) − |𝑩𝒊𝒌 |𝒄𝒐𝒔(𝜹𝒊 − 𝜹𝒌 )}); 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝑵𝑩

Assumptions taken:

1. Dependency of variation of real power with change in bus voltage is neglected

𝜕𝑃𝑖
≅ 0; 𝑖 = 2,3, … 𝑁𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 = (𝑁𝑉 + 1), … 𝑁𝐵
𝜕𝑉𝑘
2. Dependency of variation of reactive power with change in bus voltage phase angle is
neglected
𝜕𝑄𝑖
≅ 0; 𝑖 = (𝑁𝑉 + 1), … 𝑁𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 = 2,3, … 𝑁𝐵
𝜕𝛿𝑘
3. Power equipment in transmission network is highly reactive and conductance << than its
susceptance
4. Secondly under normal operating conditions the (𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑘 )(5 to 10 deg) so sin(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑘 ) 
small and neglected.
5. Hence coupling of real power with bus voltage magnitude and reactive power with
voltage phase angle are quite weak and hence neglected to simplify NR Jaccobian to
formulate decoupled flow method.
6. For transmission lines x/r ratio >>1, 𝑟𝑖𝑘 ≪ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 hence
𝐺𝑖𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐵𝑖𝑘
7. Difference in voltage phase angles (𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑘 ) 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙. Therefore cos(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑘 ) ≅
1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 sin(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑘 ) ≅ 0.
8. Voltage |𝑉𝑖 | = 1.0 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 to simplify Jacobian matrix.
9. 𝐴𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 |𝐺𝑖𝑘 | sin(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑘 ) ≪ 𝐵𝑖𝑘 therefore 𝑄𝑖 <<𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑖2
10. Phase shifting transformer off nominal ratio is neglected. And other tap ratios are
taken as constant.
11. Shunt reactors and capacitive compensators are not considered to be present.

Newton Raphson mapping is reformulated as Fast decoupled flow method as:

∆𝑷𝒊
|𝑽𝒊 | ∆𝜹𝒊
∆𝑷𝒌 −𝑩𝒊𝒊 −𝑩𝒊𝒌 𝟎 𝟎 ∆𝜹𝒌
|𝑽𝒌 | −𝑩 −𝑩𝒌𝒌 𝟎 𝟎
= [ 𝒌𝒊 ] ∆𝑽𝒊 and can be partitioned as for
∆𝑸𝒊 𝟎 𝟎 −𝑩𝒊𝒊 −𝑩𝒊𝒌 |𝑽𝒊 |
|𝑽𝒊 | −𝑩𝒌𝒊 −𝑩𝒌𝒌 ∆𝑽𝒌
𝟎 𝟎
∆𝑸𝒌 [ |𝑽𝒌 | ]
[|𝑽𝒌 |]
calculations
 ∆𝑷𝒊 ∆𝑸𝒊
|𝑽𝒊 | ∆𝜹𝒊 |𝑽𝒊 |
′
Such that P-δ equation will be : ⋮ = [𝑩 ] [ ⋮ ] And Q-V equation will be: ⋮ =
∆𝑷𝒌 ∆𝜹𝒌 ∆𝑸𝒌
[|𝑽𝒌 |] [|𝑽𝒌|]
∆𝑽𝒊
|𝑽𝒊 |
[𝑩′′ ] ⋮
∆𝑽𝒌
[|𝑽𝒌 |]

DC load Flow method: DC flow algorithm is further simplified by dropping Q-V equations.
This will result in a completely linear, non-iterative power flow algorithm.

∆𝑷𝒊 ∆𝜹𝒊
Assume |𝑽𝒊 | = 𝟏. 𝟎 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕 :[ ⋮ ] = [𝑩′ ] [ ⋮ ]
∆𝑷𝒌 ∆𝜹𝒌

DC flow algorithm is helpful in calculating MW flows in transmission lines and

transformers . It gives no indication about voltage magnitudes or MVAr/MVA.

Power flow in 𝑚𝑡ℎ line connected between nodes r and s is given by

∗
𝑉𝑟 − 𝑉𝑠 ∗ 1
𝑆𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑉𝑟 𝐼𝑟𝑠 = 𝑉𝑟 ( ) = ∗ [|𝑉𝑟 |2 − (|𝑉𝑟 ||𝑉𝑠 |∠(𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ))]
𝑧𝑚 𝑧𝑚

𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 ∶ 𝑉𝑟 = |𝑉𝑟 |∠𝛿𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑠 = |𝑉𝑠 |∠𝛿𝑠 , 𝑧𝑚 is primitive impedance of 𝑚𝑡ℎ line

Solving :
1
𝑆𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = ∗
[|𝑉𝑟 |2 − (|𝑉𝑟 ||𝑉𝑠 |𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ) + 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛 (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ))]
𝑧𝑚

Taking |𝑉𝑟 | = 1.0, |𝑉𝑠 | = 1.0

(𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ) 𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙. 𝑆𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ) ≈ 1.0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 sin (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ) ≈ (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 )

1 1 ∗ 𝑟𝑚 +𝑗𝑥𝑚 𝑗
Also 𝑧 ∗ = (𝑟 ) = 2 +𝑥 2 =𝑥 (for 𝑥𝑚 ≫ 𝑟𝑚 )
𝑚 𝑚 +𝑗𝑥𝑚 𝑟𝑚 𝑚 𝑚

Substituting simplifications and assumptions as

𝑗 (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 )
𝑆𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = [1.0 − (1.0 + 𝑗 (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 ))] =
𝑥𝑚 𝑥𝑚
(𝜹𝒓 −𝜹𝒔 )
Hence line flow in 𝑚𝑡ℎ line connected between r and s nodes will be 𝒇𝒎(𝒓,𝒔) = 𝒙𝒎

Generation outage factor with respect to perturbation on sing /reference bus

∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) 𝑑𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠)
𝑎𝑚𝑖 = =
∆𝑃𝑖 𝑑𝑃𝑖
It is assumed that power on swing bus is equal to sum of injections of all the buses. Similarly
nay perturbation on swing bus is equal to sum of perturbation of all other buses.

Hence [∆𝛿] are taken as equal to derivatives of bus angles wrt change in power injection at
𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus.

Using [∆𝛿] = [𝑋][∆𝑃]

Therefore
∆𝛿𝑟 = 𝑋𝑟𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑖

∆𝛿𝑠 = 𝑋𝑠𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑖

𝑑𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) 𝑑 1 1 𝑑𝛿𝑟 𝑑𝛿𝑠

𝑎𝑚 (𝑟,𝑠)𝑖 = = ( (𝛿𝑟 − 𝛿𝑠 )) = ( − )
𝑑𝑃𝑖 𝑑𝑃𝑖 𝑥𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) 𝑥𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) 𝑑𝑃𝑖 𝑑𝑃𝑖
1
= (𝑋𝑟𝑖 − 𝑋𝑠𝑖 )
𝑥𝑚(𝑟,𝑠)
𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑜
Hence 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) + 𝑎𝑚𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖

1
Where 𝑎𝑚𝑖 = 𝑥 (𝑋𝑟𝑖 − 𝑋𝑠𝑖 )
𝑚(𝑟,𝑠)

Line Outage Distribution factor

A line is modelled by adding power Injection to a system one at a each end of the line
to be dropped. Consider a 𝑘 𝑡ℎ line connected between nodes a and b to be dropped.
Let 𝑃𝑎𝑏 be the line flow before its outage. Such that when CBs on either end opens to
drop the line and is isolated from the remaining network.

This line is modelled as CBs are still closed and ∆𝑃𝑎 and ∆𝑃𝑏 be the power injected
at two ends of the line such that ∆𝑃𝑎 =𝑃𝑎𝑏 and ∆𝑃𝑏 =−𝑃𝑎𝑏 . Such that power
0
⋮
∆𝑃𝑎
mismatch vector will be ∆𝑃 =
0
⋮
[∆𝑃𝑏 ]

Using [∆𝛿 ] = [𝑋 ][∆𝑃 ]

∆𝛿𝑎 = 𝑋𝑎𝑎 ∆𝑃𝑎 + 𝑋𝑎𝑏 ∆𝑃𝑏

∆𝛿𝑏 = 𝑋𝑏𝑎 ∆𝑃𝑎 + 𝑋𝑏𝑏 ∆𝑃𝑏

∆𝛿𝑎 , ∆𝛿𝑏, ∆𝑃𝑎𝑏 are the incremental changes resulting from outage.
The line outage modelling criteria requires that the incremental injections ∆𝑃𝑎 and ∆𝑃𝑏
equal to power flowing over the outage line after the injections are imposed.
𝑛𝑒𝑤
∆𝑃𝑎 = −∆𝑃𝑏 = 𝑃𝑎𝑏

Let 𝑥𝑘 be the primitive reactance of line connected between nodes and b to be dropped
(simulation of outage).
𝒏𝒆𝒘
(𝜹𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒂 −𝜹𝒃 )
Power flow over the line = 𝑷𝒏𝒆𝒘 𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒂𝒃 = 𝒇𝒌(𝒂,𝒃) = 𝒙𝒌

Such that post outage voltage phase angle will be 𝜹𝒏𝒆𝒘

𝒂 = 𝛿𝑎 + ∆𝛿𝑎 and 𝜹𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒃 = 𝛿𝑏 + ∆𝛿𝑏

∆𝛿𝑎 = 𝑋𝑎𝑎 ∆𝑃𝑎 − 𝑋𝑎𝑏 ∆𝑃𝑎

∆𝛿𝑏 = 𝑋𝑏𝑎 ∆𝑃𝑎 − 𝑋𝑏𝑏 ∆𝑃𝑎

𝒏𝒆𝒘
Line flow in post outage condition will be = 𝑷𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒂𝒃 = 𝒇𝒌(𝒂,𝒃)

(𝜹𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒂 − 𝜹𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒃 ) 𝟏 𝟏
= = [(𝛿𝑎 + ∆𝛿𝑎 ) − (𝛿𝑏 + ∆𝛿𝑏 )] = [(𝛿 −𝛿 ) + (∆𝛿𝑎 − ∆𝛿𝑏 )]
𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌 𝑎 𝑏

Substituting and arranging

𝟏
𝒇𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒌(𝒂,𝒃) = [(𝛿 −𝛿 ) + (𝑋𝑎𝑎 − 𝑋𝑎𝑏 )∆𝑃𝑎 − (𝑋𝑏𝑎 − 𝑋𝑏𝑏 )∆𝑃𝑎 ]
𝒙𝒌 𝑎 𝑏

𝟏
𝒇𝒏𝒆𝒘 𝒐
𝒌(𝒂,𝒃) = 𝒇𝒌(𝒂,𝒃) + ((𝑋𝑎𝑎 + 𝑋𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑋𝑎𝑏 )∆𝑃𝑎 )
𝒙𝒌

𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝑷𝒏𝒆𝒘
𝒂𝒃 = 𝒇𝒌(𝒂,𝒃) = ∆𝑷𝒂

𝒇𝒐𝒌(𝒂,𝒃)
Solving for ∆𝑷𝒂 = 𝟏
𝟏− (𝑋𝑎𝑎 +𝑋𝑏𝑏 −2𝑋𝑎𝑏 ))
𝒙𝒌

Considering the effect of outage of 𝑘 𝑡ℎ line on 𝑚𝑡ℎ line connected between noes r and s

1
∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) (∆𝛿𝑟 − ∆𝛿𝑠 ) 1 ∆𝛿𝑟 ∆𝛿𝑠 1
𝑥𝑚
𝑑𝑚𝑘 = = = [ 0 − 0 ]= (𝛿 − 𝛿𝑠,𝑎𝑏 )
0
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 0
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝑥𝑚 𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝑥𝑚 𝑟,𝑎𝑏

∆𝛿𝑟 (𝑋𝑟𝑎 − 𝑋𝑟𝑏 )∆𝑷𝒂 𝟏

𝛿𝑟,𝑎𝑏 = 0 = 0 = (𝑋𝑟𝑎 − 𝑋𝑟𝑏 )/(𝟏 − (𝑋𝑎𝑎 + 𝑋𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑋𝑎𝑏 ))
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝒙𝒌

∆𝛿𝑠 (𝑋𝑠𝑎 − 𝑋𝑠𝑏 )∆𝑷𝒂 𝟏

𝛿𝑠,𝑎𝑏 = = = (𝑋𝑠𝑎 − 𝑋𝑠𝑏 )/(𝟏 − (𝑋 + 𝑋𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑋𝑎𝑏 ))
0
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 0
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝒙𝒌 𝑎𝑎
 ∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) 1 𝒙 (𝑋 −𝑋 )−(𝑋𝑠𝑎 −𝑋𝑠𝑏 )
Hence 𝑑𝑚𝑘 = 0 = 𝑥 (𝛿𝑟,𝑎𝑏 − 𝛿𝑠,𝑎𝑏 ) = 𝑥 𝒌 [ 𝒙 𝑟𝑎 𝑟𝑏
]
𝑓𝑘(𝑎,𝑏) 𝑚 𝑚 −(𝑋 +𝑋
𝒌 𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏 −2𝑋𝑎𝑏 )

Where neither node a or node b reference nodes.

(𝒙 𝑋 )
If node a is reference node ; 𝛿𝑟,𝑎𝑏 = (𝒙 𝒌−𝑋𝑟𝑏 and
𝒌 𝑏𝑏 )

(−𝒙𝒌 𝑋𝑟𝑎 )
if node b is a reference node then 𝛿𝑟,𝑎𝑏 = (𝒙
𝒌 −𝑋𝑎𝑎 )

If bus r is itself a reference bus then 𝛿𝑟,𝑎𝑏 = 0 since the bus angle of reference bus is
constant.

To find the sensitivity factor for 𝑚𝑡ℎ line, when 𝑖 𝑡ℎ generator is out and 𝑘 𝑡ℎ line is
dropped. This is calculated by taking the change in generation at 𝑖 𝑡ℎ bus and then
dropping of 𝑘 𝑡ℎ line.

Change in line flow of 𝑚𝑡ℎ line will be

∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑎𝑚𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖 + 𝑑𝑚𝑘 ∆𝑓𝑘(𝑎.𝑏)

Such that ∆𝑓𝑘(𝑎.𝑏) = 𝑎𝑘𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖

∆𝑓𝑚(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑎𝑚𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖 + 𝑑𝑚𝑘 × 𝑎𝑘𝑖 × ∆𝑃𝑖 = (𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝑑𝑚𝑘 × 𝑎𝑘𝑖 )∆𝑃𝑖

Where (𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝑑𝑚𝑘 × 𝑎𝑘𝑖 ) is called compensated generation shift sensitivity.

Factors affecting Contingency

Due to many blackouts in interconnected power system the priority of operation of

power system involves:

1. Operate the system in such a way that power is delivered reliably

2. Within the constraints placed on the system operation by reliability considerations,
the system will be operated most economically.

Reliability means adequate generation has been installed to meet the load and that
adequate transmission has been installed to deliver the generated power to the load.

However, any piece of equipment in the system can fail, either due to internal causes or
due to external causes such as lightning strikes, objects hitting transmission towers, or
human errors in setting relays. It is impossible to build a power system with so much
redundancy (i.e., extra transmission lines, reserve generation, etc.) that failures never
cause load to be dropped on a system.

Rather, systems are designed so that the probability of dropping load is acceptably
small. Thus, most power systems are designed to have sufficient redundancy to
withstand all major failure events, but this does not guarantee that the system will be
100% reliable.