Security Training Manual 08-12-2008

Security
Training Manual
Volume 7
SECURITY TRAINING MANUAL
Highlights Page
Volume 7
Highlights Page
• Added CRJ 200 Least Risk Bomb Location information
REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 HGH-1

Highlights Page
Volume 7
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 HGH-2

Record of Revisions
Volume 7
Record of Revisions
Record the revision number and date of insertion on this page.
All additions, corrections, or changes to manuals will be issued as manual revisions and will
be numbered in ascending numerical sequence. Revisions shall be incorporated into the
manual as soon as possible, but no later than the published effective date, and shall not be
inserted out of numerical sequence unless so instructed on the instruction page that
accompanies the revision.
REVISION NUMBER DATE ENTERED YOUR INITIALS
ORIGINAL, 26 JUL 2002 Jul 12, 2002 TR

REV.1, 1 APR 2004 March 19. 2004 TR
2 Sept 1, 2004 TR
3 May 1, 2005 MD
4 Sept 15, 2005 MD
5 Sept 12, 2006 DM
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Record of Revisions
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REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 ROR-2

Listing of Effective Pages

Volume 7
Page Revision/Dated Page Revision/Dated
HGH-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 APX 1-14 . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
HGH-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 APX 3-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
ROR-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
ROR-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
LEP-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 APX 3-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
LEP-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 APX 3-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
TOC-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 APX 3-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
TOC-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 APX 2-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
INTRO-1 . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 2-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . .REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
INTRO-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 4-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 4-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 IDX-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 IDX-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
1-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
1-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
1-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006
1-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
1-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
1-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
1-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
2-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
2-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006
2-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
2-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
2-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
2-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006
2-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
2-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
2-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
2-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
APX 1-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
APX 1-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005
APX 1-10 . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
APX 1-11 . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
APX 1-12 . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
APX 1-13 . . . . . . . . . . . REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005
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Volume 7
REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 LEP-2

Table of Contents
Volume 7
Table of Contents
Highlights Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HGH- 1

Record of Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ROR- 1
Listing of Effective Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LEP- 1
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TOC- 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTRO- 1
Chapter 1 Training Instructor Outline

Section 1. Initial Training 3 Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 1
A. Recognizing suspicious activities and determining seriousness of an
occurrence - RAA Common Strategy Video . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 1
B. Crew Communication and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 1
C. Use of Protective Devices Assigned to Crewmembers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 4
D. Use of Restraint Devices Assigned to Crewmembers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 4
E. Psychology of Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 4
F. Flight Deck Procedures and Maneuvers to Defend an Aircraft . . . . . . 1- 5
G. Proper Conduct of a Cabin Search for Deadly and Dangerous
Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 7
H. NORAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 8
I. Identification and Verification Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 8
J. Access to Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 9
K. Sterile Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 10
L. Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 11
M. Foreign Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 13
N. Federal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 13
Chapter 2 Recurrent Training and Instructor Outline

Section 1. Recurrent Training 2 Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 1
A. Recognizing suspicious activities and determining seriousness of an
occurrence - RAA Common Strategy Video . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 1
B. Crew Communication and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 1
C. Use of Protective Devices Assigned to Crewmembers . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 4
D. Use of Restraint Devices Assigned to Crewmembers . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 4
E. Psychology of Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 4
F. Proper Conduct of a Cabin Search for Deadly and Dangerous
Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 5
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G. NORAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 6
H. Basic Self Defense Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 6
I. Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 7
J. Foreign Rules - Regional Domestic Airline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 8
K. Federal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 9
Appendix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 1
Section 1. Level 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 1
A. At the Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 1
B. During Taxi Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 2
C. During Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 3
A. At the Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 4
B. During Taxi Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 4
A. At the Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 6
B. During Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 6
C. During Flight (MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL) . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 7
A. At the Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 8
B. During Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 8
Section 5. Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 10
A. During Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 10
B. During Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 11
C. After Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 12
D. During Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 1- 13
Appendix 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 2- 1
Section 1. Required Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 2- 1
Section 2. Class Participation:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 2- 1
Appendix 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 3- 1
Section 1. (NORAD) INTERCEPT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 3- 1
Appendix 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 4- 1
Section 1. BST Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APX 4- 2
Alphabetical Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IDX- 1

REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 TOC-2
Introduction
Volume 7
Introduction
Initial New Hire 3 Hours

Recurrent 2 Hours
The following pages contain the Chautauqua Airlines Flight Crew Training. The content is
formatted into a lesson plan outline. The material is taken from the Appendix XIII and
Attachment 1 Documents.
The lesson is developed using video segments, Power Point presentations, and role play-
ing segments using each student as an active participant.
The goal is for each student to be able to understand the terrorist threats as very real
encroachments to our way of civilized life and to be able to counter their threats by being
equipped with the skills and abilities to offset their harmful actions. A written exam will cover
all presented material.
The indoctrination class will also include 3 additional videos.
• US Airways “Dragnet”
• US Airways “GSI is None”
• “The Ultimate Terror”
End of course written critique
This program may be taught by Chautauqua Airlines or an approved contractor. Proper
documentation in the computerized record keeping program will be accomplished upon
completion.
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Introduction
Volume 7
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 INTRO-2

Section 1 Initial Training 3 Hours
Volume 7
Chapter 1
Training Instructor Outline
A. Recognizing suspicious activities and determining

seriousness of an occurrence - RAA Common Strategy Video
1. Behavioral traits that a person may demonstrate prior to becoming a threat and
during the escalation/de-escalation phases of a threat.
2. How to link patterns of behavior to the security threat levels as described in
Common Strategy.
3. How to link patterns of behavior that could lead to the use of an actual or improvised
weapon.
4. Role-Playing - Common Strategy; see Appendix 1 for information.
B. Crew Communication and Coordination

1. Introduction
a. Communication and coordination is critical to the survival of all crewmembers
and passengers and overall control of the aircraft.
b. Tactical communications should permit direct communication from the flight
attendant to the cockpit.
2. Duties and responsibilities
a. PIC
b. SIC
c. FA
d. GSC
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3. Pre-Flight Security Procedures

a. Verify identities of crewmembers and jump seat riders, and ensure the security
of crewmembers' baggage.
b. During pre-flight check of emergency equipment, the flight attendant should
ensure that suspect items are not present. If any such items are found, imme-
diately notify the captain and the Ground Security Coordinator (GSC), as
appropriate.
c. Crewmembers should check for any suspect or out of the ordinary objects,
inside and outside of the aircraft.
d. Ensure that the locations of all armed passengers, FAMs, and LEOs are known
to each other and the other crewmembers before the boarding door is closed.
e. Be alert to any signs of suspicious or unusual behavior. Signs of nervousness,
anxiety, hostility, or unresponsiveness can signal potential problems in the air.
It is illegal to transport a person who appears to be intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs.
4. Pre-Flight Briefing
a. Provides an opportunity for crewmembers to share any concerns they may
have.
b. Briefing must include safety and security topics. An effective briefing involves
every crewmember, LEO, and FAM, if aboard.
c. Captain should review with the crew the preferred method(s) of signaling
duress in the cabin.
d. Flight and cabin crews should coordinate flight deck entry signals prior to each
flight. Visual confirmation by a flight deck crewmember of any person legiti-
mately seeking to enter the flight deck is required.
5. Emergency Communications
a. Plain language is the most reliable form of communication during any
passenger disturbance, especially if a hijack is suspected.
b. When lockdown is in effect, face-to-face communication between the flight
crew and the flight attendant is suspended. The cabin interphone is the only
mode of communication required to be working between the passenger cabin
and the flight deck.
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6. Transponder Code 7500

a. 7500 transponder code, a radio transmission, or ACARS message indicating
that a hijacking is in progress activates a major hijack response effort on the
ground to track and support you during the crisis.
b. Captain will decide when to select transponder code 7500 and when to land,
based on the nature and clarity of the information coming from the cabin.
c. Precise details such as the number of hijackers, their seat locations, the nature
and number of their weapons, and their exact demands may be crucial to those
attempting to make effective responses on the ground.
d. For voice transmissions, a pilot may want to don an oxygen mask with a built-
in microphone and turn off the cockpit speaker. In one instance, a hijacker
accepted the pilot's explanation that in emergency situations, one member of
the crew needed to be on oxygen.
e. Squawking 7500, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will cause authorities
on the ground to initiate hijack response procedures, which may include being
intercepted by a fighter aircraft.
7. Flaps
a. Flaps placement should follow normal procedures and flows. Their movement
or repositionind is not an evacuation critical item.
b. After landing ground security coordinators may request flaps down to facilitate
or assist law enforcement.
8. Support Available During Emergency
a. Scope of Assistance
b. FAA Emergency Operations center with networks to tactical, explosive and
negotiations experts, doctors
c. Airport Command Post
d. Local law enforcement
e. FBI
f. Other
g. Hostage negotiation
h. Armed Intervention
i. Behavior during assault on plane by law enforcement: need for flight attendants
to be aware that law enforcement does not know who they are and that they
must comply with instructions; general idea of what will happen in an assault.
j. Victim (hostage) reaction and assistance
k. Stockholm Syndrome awareness briefing
l. Post-resolution procedures, e.g., FBI debriefing
m. Press/media interface
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C. Use of Protective Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

There is nothing currently available to the standard crew member. The only exception to
this is the FFDO.
D. Use of Restraint Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

There is nothing currently available to the crew. Consider the use of belts, neck ties, panty-
hose, or anything else that could be produced by a passenger to restrain an individual.
E. Psychology of Terrorists
How to cope with terrorist behavior and passenger responses:
1. Recognition of hijackers/terrorists traits
a. Intelligence indicates that determined terrorist groups are operating in almost
every continent, with no single purpose or common physical characteristics.
b. May not subject a person in air transportation to discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex or ancestry.
c. Universally accepted psychological profile of a terrorist does not currently exist,
certain behavioral patterns stand out.
1) Any passenger who is unduly nervous, or the opposite, sullen and distant,
should arouse the crew's suspicion.
2) Any passenger with an unusual interest in the flight deck, the flight crew, or
the cabin crew, should arouse suspicion.
3) History has shown that during the first 45 minutes and the last 45 minutes of
the flight is when a hijack attempt is most likely.
2. Psychology of passenger response during various security threat situations
a. Intimidation is a primary tool of the terrorist in causing submissive and
compliant behavior by crew and passengers.
b. Alternately intimidating and reassuring a victim, a terrorist can cause the Stock-
holm Syndrome to occur.
1) Stockholm Syndrome - the victim actually sympathizes with the terrorist.
2) Expect it in a hijack or other terrorist action, and resist it when they see it in
effect.
3) It generally takes quite some time to develop, and is most likely to occur
during an extended standoff situation.
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c. Intimidation and the Stockholm Syndrome do not change the underlying math
- crew and passengers will usually outnumber any hijack team by a great
margin.
d. Strength in numbers, favoring the crew and passengers so long as they are not
paralyzed by intimidation or subverted by the Stockholm Syndrome.
e. Able Bodied Passengers - ABPs
1) ABPs may overreact or their adrenaline could cause them to become overly
aggressive.
2) Crewmembers should direct and control the actions of the ABPs to the best
of their abilities.
3) Use firm commands to elicit help from the ABPs, and to direct their actions.
F. Flight Deck Procedures and Maneuvers to Defend an Aircraft

1. Common Strategy Guidance
a. Corporate/Government Support
1) Get the communication chain going
2) Dispatch will play an important role
b. Aircraft maintenance and system specialists
1) Specific areas of expertise comes into focus
2) Damage areas or potential damage may need assessment
c. Explosives specialists
1) What exactly you are dealing with
2) Adequately describe item
3) Determine containment procedures
d. Negotiators
1) Trained individuals
2) Takes some pressure off of the crews
3) May enable a peaceful resolution
e. Medical doctors, including psychologist/psychiatrists
1) These may be onboard and can be put to use
2) Both medical and mental actions can be of benefit
3) Ground personnel may be of some value if communications can be
employed
f. Incident management
g. Communications methods
h. Federal Air Marshal Program
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Volume 7
2. Crewmember Tactics
a. Response to Bomb Threats (GOM - Chapter 12, Section 4)
1) General
2) Type of threats
3) Receipt of a bomb threat
4) Device found
5) Least Risk Bomb Location
6) Bomb threat procedures
7) Bombs; when to leave them alone, and when to move them
a) On the ground, in all cases, leave it alone. Do not attempt to move it
b) In the air consider the least risk bomb location
c) Movement to the LRB location is contingent upon discussion with the FAA
explosive specialist and physical properties of the bomb
8) Trapping the perpetrator
b. Response to Hijacking (GOM - Chapter 12, Section 5)
1) General/Background
2) Guidelines to a hijacking
a) Judgment is key
b) Be suspicious about any passenger disturbance
c) Know where the helpers are in the cabin
d) Determine the threat level of any passenger disturbance; follow guidance
listed in GOM
3) Elements of security policy
a) Crew coordination and communication
b) “Lockdown" procedures
4) Appropriate responses to defend against hijacking
5) Personal Weapons/FFDO
c. Flight deck crews must not lose focus of their main goals
1) Keep intruder out of Flight Deck
2) Communicate to Ground Agencies
3) Maintain control
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Volume 7
d. Rapid descent maneuver initiated without notice to the aircraft cabin

1) FA will be seated in the closest location
a) FA jumpseat
b) Open passenger seat
c) Sit down where standing
2) Notify the closets ABP's to secure the person causing the disturbance if
possible.
G. Proper Conduct of a Cabin Search for Deadly and Dangerous

Weapons
1. Preflight aircraft using search policy and procedures, including catering procedures
and likely areas of an aircraft that may conceal a weapon or improvised explosive
device.
2. Identification of Deadly and Dangerous Weapons
a. Identification of weapons, e.g., weapons that have been broken down into
components
1) May be difficult due to limited knowledge
2) Small handgun
3) Knives
4) Sharpened lexan material, etc.
b. Identification of bombs and flammable devices
1) Describe as near as possible
2) Is the item one compact unit
3) Is the item attached to a person or stowed
4) What is the appearance of the flammable device?
5) What is the method of ignition?
c. Identification of chemical and biological threats
1) Perhaps the hardest to detect
2) Easily concealed in carry-on baggage
3) Can easily be left behind after passengers have deplaned. Search/inspect
overhead compartments.
4) Configuration of device may appear ordinary
5) Danger comes from rapid atomized potential
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Volume 7
3. How bombs and weapons are smuggled onboard

a. Catering and Cleaning Crews
b. Disgruntled, fired employee with ID that by-passes security
c. Items are concealed in a variety of methods
1) Clothing articles
2) Briefcases/handbags
3) Cameras/calculators/writing instruments
4. Least risk bomb location:
a. Third overhead bin towards rear. Appendix 2 outlines the training discussion.
b. Galley Service door, on the floor, tight against the door. Appendix 2 outlines the
training discussion.
H. NORAD
North American Aerospace Defense Command's policy and interception procedures for
suspected hijacking. See Appendix 3 for information.
I. Identification and Verification Procedures

1. Crewmember Verification Process
a. Positive ID required
b. Discharged employee may have old authorized ID
c. Identification may have been stolen
d. Do not piggy-back at swipe cards access areas
2. Jumpseat Occupant Verification requirements
a. Restatement of procedures from the GOM
b. Review as required
3. Flight Deck Access Procedures
a. Restatement of procedures from the GOM
b. Review as required
4. Baggage Restrictions - crew
a. Number of bags
b. Articles that are disallowed
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Volume 7
J. Access to Aircraft
1. Aircraft Protection
a. Attended
1) Positive ID match with those on board
2) Attention to what a person is doing and where they are
3) If possible try to remember how the cabin looked before their entry
4) Be alert for any suspicious behavior
b. Unattended
1) Doors should be closed
2) Steps should be removed if so positioned
c. Aircraft Security Searches
1) Normal routine - Seat cushions, overhead, under-seat, valet, etc.
2) Never underestimate the importance
d. Knowledge of screening and protection of aircraft supplies (persons, vehicles,
items)
2. TSA screening
a. Mission is to protect the Nation's transportation systems to ensure the freedom
of movement for people and commerce.
b. Multi-layered system of security that presents multiple obstacles to deter a
would-be hijacker or team of hijackers.
c. Methods
1) Collection and dissemination of intelligence information relating to aviation
security.
2) Centralized coordination on the ground of security elements by Federal
Security Directors (FSD) at commercial airports.
3) Passenger pre-screening and risk analysis
4) Screening of passengers and carry-on baggage at screening checkpoints
5) Checked baggage screening at airports
6) Enforcing compliance with security related laws and regulations
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 1-9

Volume 7
K. Sterile Area
1. Automated Passenger Screening Process (Background)
a. In place since the early 1980's
b. Appeared to do an ample job for the most part
c. Some carriers hired their own personnel
d. Early on Company employees with ID could by-pass the process
2. Security Checkpoint enhancements
a. Increased training/awareness
b. More detailed inspections
c. Bomb detection equipment
d. Consideration of personnel being Federal workers
3. Baggage Restrictions
a. One carry-on and one personal/convenience item (laptop, purse, etc.)
b. Refusal of seemingly normal household items
4. Ground procedures (i.e. crew ID, crew bags, attended/unattended aircraft,
uniforms, screening)
5. Flight procedures (i.e. crewmember communications/coordination)
6. Awareness of the possibility of infiltration into the air carrier system by terrorists
(through legal or illegal means)
7. Airport Operations Area Protection
a. AOA Access Screening
1) Checkpoints incorporated
2) All vehicles searched extensively
b. Barriers (e.g. perimeter/gates)
1) Concrete barriers placed at parking lots near airports
2) No Parking within 300 ft of airport building
c. Ramp/cargo area
d. ID system - Picture ID required
e. Challenge procedures
8. Basic Self Defense Exercises - See Appendix 4 for information
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 1-10

Volume 7
L. Law Enforcement
1. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAM)
a. FAM mission is to promote confidence in our Nation's civil aviation system
through the effective deployment of FAMs to detect, deter, and defeat hostile
acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews.
b. Carefully selected and rigorously trained professional federal law enforcement
officers.
c. Well versed in appropriate law enforcement response in an aircraft environ-
ment; FAMs are deployed in teams, domestically and internationally.
d. Discretely board the aircraft, but will always identify themselves to the crew.
e. Once passengers are boarded, FAMs blend in with the rest of the passengers;
FAM policy requires that flight attendants treat them like any other passenger.
f. FAMs generally will take no action unless the offense involves
1) Acts of terrorism
2) Crimes of violence (including assault, sexual abuse, murder or attempted
murder)
3) Interference with the flight crew that rises to the level of violence
4) Threats to the flight deck, the integrity of the aircraft, or the safety of the
passengers or crew
5) A request from the captain
g. Incidents where FAMs have deployed, the crew should make an announce-
ment to the passengers identifying the FAMs as law enforcement officers.
2. Federal Flight Deck Officer Program (FFDO) GOM Ch 12, Sec 5
a. Company Policy
1) Captain is the PIC and the ISC
2) First Officer is the SIC
3) FFDO may only override the chain of command only in a situation as defined
by company SOP.
b. Definitions
c. Mission of the FFDO
1) Threat levels 1-3: The PIC is responsible to decide on the most appropriate
response to the threat.
2) Threat level 4: The FFDO may use force against an individual who has
accomplished or is attempting a hostile breach of the flight deck.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 1-11

Volume 7
d. Law enforcement authority

1) The FAM has jurisdiction over LEOs and FFDO
2) LEOs have jurisdiction over FFDO
3) FFDO is the last to have jurisdiction
e. Carriage of weapon
3. Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
a. Authorized to carry weapons on board.
b. Typically an official or employee of the United States, or a State or political
subdivision of a State, or of a municipality who is authorized by their agency to
have the weapon.
c. No weapons will be carried in the flight deck except for a Government Agent
who is authorized to sit in the jumpseat and also authorized to carry a weapon.
d. Boarding Procedures
1) Company must be notified at least 1 hour prior
2) Must present themselves to the ticket agent with credentials
3) Must be introduced to the crew and other armed persons on board the
aircraft
4. Transport of prisoners
a. Types of prisoner
1) High/Maximum risk prisoner
a) Declared dangerous by law enforcement agency that has custody of the
prisoner.
b) Accepted on American Connection, Delta Connection, and United Express
flights.
2) Low risk prisoner - Not declared dangerous by a law enforcement agency
b. Conditions of travel
1) Advance notice is given
2) Captain must be informed
3) Boarded first and deplaned last
4) Seated in the rear most exit (not emergency exit)
5) Must be in handcuffs, no leg irons/shackles
6) Must agree to travel
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 1-12

Volume 7
M. Foreign Rules
Regional Domestic Airline. This category does not apply to our operations.
N. Federal Regulations
1. CFR 49 Part 1544 - Aircraft Operator Security
a. Passenger Screening
1) Sterile area
2) Individuals and accessible property
b. Use of explosives detection systems
c. Law enforcement personnel
1) Carriage of accessible weapons
2) Carriage of prisoners under the control of armed law enforcement officers
3) Transportation of Federal Air Marshals
d. Flight deck privileges
2. CFR 49 Part 1520 - Four Areas for the Protection of Sensitive Security Information
a. Applicability and Definitions.
1) Governs the release by the Transportation Security Administration of
records and information that has been obtained and developed for security.
2) Also any other person or agency utilizing sensitive information is included.
b. Records and information withheld by the Department of Transportation.
1) Not withstanding the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or other
laws, the records and information described in 1520.7 (Records and Infor-
mation Protected by Others) are not available for public inspection.
2) Copying or any other release to the public is prohibited.
c. Records and Information Protected by Others.
1) All individuals must protect and restrict sensitive information disclosure
2) The following list of individuals are responsible for such actions.
a) Each person employed by the airline.
b) Each airport operator.
c) Each aircraft operator.
d) Each foreign air carrier.
e) Each person receiving information from the Department of Transportation.
f) Each person for which a vulnerability assessment has not been autho-
rized.
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Volume 7
d. Sensitive Security Information

1) Information that the TSA prohibits from disclosure.
2) The administration prohibits disclosure of information developed in the
conduct of security or research and development activities under 49 U.S.C.
40119.
3) The following are considered sensitive.
a) Security Directives and Information Circulars.
b) Any selection criteria used in the Security Screening Process.
c) Any security contingency plan.
d) Technical Specifications of devices to be used.
e) A description of technical specifications.
f) Technical specifications of any security communications equipment.
g) Any information the TSA determined that may reveal a systematic vulner-
ability.
h) TSA information concerning threats against transportation.
i) Specific details of aviation security measures.
j) Any other information , the disclosure of which the TSA has prohibited
under the criteria of 49 U.S.C. 40119.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 1-14

Section 1 Recurrent Training 2 Hours
Volume 7
Chapter 2
Recurrent Training and Instructor Outline
A. Recognizing suspicious activities and determining

seriousness of an occurrence - RAA Common Strategy Video
1. Behavioral traits that a person may demonstrate prior to becoming a threat and
during the escalation/de-escalation phases of a threat.
2. How to link patterns of behavior to the security threat levels as described in
Common Strategy.
3. How to link patterns of behavior that could lead to the use of an actual or
improvised weapon.
4. Role-Playing - Common Strategy; see Appendix 1 for information.
B. Crew Communication and Coordination

1. Introduction
a. Communication and coordination is critical to the survival of all crewmembers
and passengers and overall control of the aircraft.
b. “Tactical communications" should permit direct communication from flight
attendant to the flight deck.
2. Duties and responsibilities
a. PIC
b. SIC
c. FA
d. GSC
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 2-1

Volume 7
3. Pre-Flight Security Procedures

a. Verify identities of crewmembers and jump seat riders, and ensure the security
of crewmembers' baggage.
b. During pre-flight check of emergency equipment, the flight attendant should
ensure that suspect items are not present. If any such items are found, imme-
diately notify the captain and the Ground Security Coordinator (GSC), as appro-
priate.
c. Crewmembers should check for any suspect or out of the ordinary objects,
inside and outside of the aircraft.
d. Ensure that the locations of all armed passengers, FAMs, and LEOs are known
to each other and other crewmembers before the boarding door is closed.
e. Be alert to any signs of suspicious or unusual behavior. Signs of nervousness,
anxiety, hostility, or unresponsiveness can signal potential problems in the air.
It is illegal to transport a person who appears to be intoxicated or under the influ-
ence of drugs.
4. Pre-Flight Briefing
a. Provides an opportunity for crewmembers to share any concerns they may
have.
b. Briefing must include safety and security topics. An effective briefing involves
every crewmember, LEO, and FAM, if aboard.
c. Captain should review with the crew the preferred method(s) of signaling duress
in the cabin.
d. Flight and cabin crews should coordinate flight deck entry signals prior to each
flight. Visual confirmation by a flight deck crewmember of any person legiti-
mately seeking to enter the flight deck is required.
5. Emergency Communications
a. Plain language is the most reliable form of communication during any
passenger disturbance, especially if a hijack is suspected.
b. When lockdown is in effect, face-to-face communication between flight crew
and the flight attendant is suspended. The cabin interphone is the only mode of
communication required to be working between the passenger cabin and the
flight deck.
REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 2-2

Volume 7
6. Transponder Code 7500

a. 7500 transponder code, a radio transmission, or ACARS message indicating
that a hijacking is in progress activates a major hijack response effort on the
ground to track and support you during the crisis.
b. Captain will decide when to select transponder code 7500 and when to land,
based on the nature and clarity of the information coming from the cabin.
c. Precise details such as the number of hijackers, their seat locations, the nature
and number of their weapons, and their exact demands may be crucial to those
attempting to make effective responses on the ground.
d. For voice transmissions, a pilot may want to don an oxygen mask with a built-
in microphone and turn off the cockpit speaker. In one instance, a hijacker
accepted the pilot's explanation that in emergency situations, one member of
the crew needed to be on oxygen.
e. Squawking 7500, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will cause authorities
on the ground to initiate hijack response procedures, which may include being
intercepted by a fighter aircraft.
7. Flaps
a. Flaps placement should follow normal procedures and flows. Their movement
or repositioning is not an evacuation critical item.
b. After landing ground security coordinators may request flaps down to facilitate
or assist law enforcement.
8. Support Available During Emergency
a. Scope of Assistance
b. FAA Emergency Operations center with networks to tactical, explosive and
negotiations experts, doctors
c. Airport Command Post
d. Local law enforcement
e. FBI
f. Other
g. Hostage negotiation
h. Armed Intervention
i. Behavior during assault on plane by law enforcement: need for flight attendants
to be aware that law enforcement does not know who they are and that they
must comply with instructions; general idea of what will happen in an assault.
j. Victim (hostage) reaction and assistance
k. Stockholm Syndrome awareness briefing
l. Post-resolution procedures, e.g., FBI debriefing
m. Press/media interface
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 2-3

Volume 7
C. Use of Protective Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

There is nothing currently available to the standard crew member. The only exception to
this is the FFDO. This may be modified at a later date.
D. Use of Restraint Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

There is nothing currently available to the crew. Consider the use of belts, neck ties, panty-
hose, or anything else that could be produced by a passenger to restrain an individual. This
may be modified at a later date.
E. Psychology of Terrorists
How to cope with terrorist behavior and passenger responses:
1. Recognition of hijackers/terrorists traits
a. Intelligence indicates that determined terrorist groups are operating in almost
every continent, with no single purpose or common physical characteristics.
b. May not subject a person in air transportation to discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex or ancestry.
c. Universally accepted psychological profile of a terrorist does not currently exist,
certain behavioral patterns stand out.
1) Any passenger who is unduly nervous, or the opposite, sullen and distant,
should arouse the crew's suspicion.
2) Any passenger with an unusual interest in the flight deck, the flight crew, or
the cabin crew, should arouse suspicion.
3) History has shown that during the first 45 minutes and the last 45 minutes of
the flight is when a hijacking attempt is most likely.
2. Psychology of passenger response during various security threat situations
a. Intimidation is a primary tool of the terrorist in causing submissive and
compliant behavior by crew and passengers.
b. Alternately intimidating and reassuring a victim, a terrorist can cause the Stock-
holm Syndrome to occur.
1) Stockholm Syndrome - the victim actually sympathizes with the terrorist.
2) Expect it in a hijack or other terrorist action, and resist it when they see it in
effect.
3) Generally it takes quite some time to develop, and is most likely to occur
during an extended standoff situation.
c. Intimidation and the Stockholm Syndrome do not change the underlying math
- crew and passengers will usually outnumber any hijack team by a great
margin.
d. Strength in numbers, favoring the crew and passengers so long as they are not
paralyzed by intimidation or subverted by the Stockholm Syndrome.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 2-4

Volume 7
3. Able Bodied Passengers - ABPs

a. ABPs may overreact or their adrenaline could cause them to become overly
aggressive.
b. Crewmembers should direct and control the actions of the ABPs to the best of
their abilities.
c. Use firm commands to elicit help from the ABPs, and to direct their actions.
F. Proper Conduct of a Cabin Search for Deadly and Dangerous

Weapons
1. Preflight aircraft search policy and procedures, including catering procedures and
likely areas of an aircraft that may conceal a weapon or improvised explosive
device.
2. Identification of Deadly and Dangerous Weapons
a. Identification of weapons, e.g., weapons that have been broken down into
components
1) May be difficult due to limited knowledge
2) Small handgun
3) Knives
4) Sharpened lexan material, etc.
b. Identification of bombs and flammable devices
1) Describe as near as possible
2) Is the item one compact unit
3) Is the item attached to a person or stowed
4) What is the appearance of the flammable device
5) What is the method of ignition
c. Identification of chemical and biological threats
1) Perhaps the hardest to detect
2) Easily concealed in carry-on baggage
3) Can easily be left behind after passengers have deplaned. Search/inspect
overhead compartments.
4) Configuration of device may appear ordinary
5) Danger comes from rapid atomized potential
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 2-5

Volume 7
3. How bombs and weapons are smuggled onboard

a. Catering and Cleaning Crews
b. Disgruntled, fired employee with ID that by-passes security
c. Items are concealed in a variety of methods
a) Clothing articles
b) Briefcases/handbags
c) Cameras/calculators/writing instruments
4. Bombs; when to leave them alone, and when to move them
a. On the ground, in all cases, leave it alone. Do not attempt to move it
b. In the air consider the least risk bomb location
c. Movement to the LRB location is contingent upon discussion with the FAA
explosive specialist and physical properties of the bomb.
5. Least risk bomb location:
a. Third overhead bin towards rear. Appendix 2 outlines the training discussion.
b. Galley service door, on the floor, tight against the door. Appendix 2 outlines the
training discussion.
G. NORAD
North American Aerospace Defense Command's policy and interception procedures for
suspected hijacking. See Appendix 3 for information.
H. Basic Self Defense Exercises

See Appendix 4 for information.
REV. 5, 12 SEP 2006 2-6

Volume 7
I. Law Enforcement
1. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAM)
a. FAM mission is to promote confidence in our Nation's civil aviation system
through the effective deployment of FAMs to detect, deter, and defeat hostile
acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews.
b. Carefully selected and rigorously trained professional federal law enforcement
officers.
c. Well versed in appropriate law enforcement response in an aircraft environ-
ment; FAMs are deployed in teams, domestically and internationally.
d. Discretely board the aircraft, but will always identify themselves to the crew.
e. Once passengers are boarded, FAMs blend in with the rest of the passengers;
FAM policy requires that flight attendants treat them like any other passenger.
f. FAMs generally will take no action unless the offense involves
1) Acts of terrorism
2) Crimes of violence (including assault, sexual abuse, murder or attempted
murder)
3) Interference with the flight crew that rises to the level of violence
4) Threats to the flight deck, the integrity of the aircraft, or the safety of the
passengers or crew
5) A request from the captain
g. Incidents where FAMs have deployed, the crew should make an announce-
ment to the passengers identifying the FAMs as law enforcement officers.
2. Federal Flight Deck Officer Program (FFDO) GOM Ch 12, Sec 5
a. Company Policy
1) Captain is the PIC and the ISC
2) First Officer is the SIC
3) FFDO may only override the chain of command only in a situation as defined
by company SOP
b. Definitions
c. Mission of the FFDO
1) Threat levels 1-3: The PIC is responsible to decide on the most appropriate
response to the threat.
2) Threat level 4: The FFDO may use force against an individual who has
accomplished or is attempting a hostile breach of the flight deck.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 2-7

Volume 7
d. Law enforcement authority

1) The FAM has jurisdiction over LEOs and FFDO
2) LEOs have jurisdiction over FFDO
3) FFDO is the last to have jurisdiction
e. Carriage of weapon
3. Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
a. Authorized to carry weapons on board.
b. Typically an official or employee of the United States, or a State or political
subdivision of a State, or of a municipality who is authorized by their agency to
have the weapon.
c. No weapons will be carried in the flight deck except for a Government Agent
who is authorized to sit in the jumpseat and also authorized to carry a weapon.
d. Boarding Procedures
1) Company must be notified at least 1 hour prior
2) Must present themselves to the ticket agent with credentials
3) Must be introduced to the crew and other armed persons on board the
aircraft
4. Transport of prisoners
a. Types of prisoner
1) High/Maximum risk prisoner
a) Declared dangerous by law enforcement agency that has custody of the
prisoner.
b) Accepted on American Connection, Delta Connection, and United Express
flights.
2) Low risk prisoner - Not declared dangerous by a law enforcement agency
b. Conditions of travel
1) Advance notice is given
2) Captain must be informed
3) Boarded first and deplaned last
4) Seated in the rear most exit (not emergency exit)
5) Must be in handcuffs, no leg irons/shackles
6) Must agree to travel
J. Foreign Rules - Regional Domestic Airline

This category does not apply to our operations.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 2-8

Volume 7
K. Federal Regulations
1. CFR 49 Part 1544 - Aircraft Operator Security
a. Passenger Screening
1) Sterile area
2) Individuals and accessible property
b. Use of explosives detection systems
c. Law enforcement personnel
1) Carriage of accessible weapons
2) Carriage of prisoners under the control of armed law enforcement officers
3) Transportation of Federal Air Marshals
d. Flight deck privileges
2. CFR 49 Part 1520 - Protection of Sensitive Security Information
a. Applicability and Definitions
1) Governs the release (by the Transportation Security Administration and by
other persons) of records and information that has been obtained or devel-
oped during security.
b. Records and information withheld by the Department of Transportation
1) Notwithstanding the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or other
laws, the records and information described in 1520.7 (Records and Infor-
mation Protected by Others) are not available for public inspection or
copying, nor is information contained in those records release to the public.
c. Records and Information Protected by Others
1) The following persons have the duty to protect and must restrict disclosure
of and access to sensitive security information.
a) Each person employed each airport operator, each aircraft operator, each
foreign air carrier, each indirect air carrier, each person receiving informa-
tion from the Department of Transportation, and each person for which a
vulnerability assessment has not been authorized.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 2-9

Volume 7
d. Sensitive Security Information

1) Information that TSA prohibits from disclosure.
2) The Administration prohibits disclosure of information developed in the
conduct of security or research and development activities under 49 U.S.C.
40119.
a) United States Mail, security directives and information circulars, any selec-
tion criteria used in any security screening process, any security contin-
gency plan, technical specifications of devices to be used, a description of
technical specifications, technical specifications of any security communi-
cations equipment, any information TSA determined may reveal a
systemic vulnerability, TSA information concerning threats against trans-
portation, specific details of aviation security measures, and any other
information, the disclosure of which TSA has prohibited under the criteria
of 49 U.S.C. 40119.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 2-10

Appendix 1
Section 1 Level 1
Volume 7
Appendix 1
Common Strategy - Role Playing
As required by the Homeland Security Administration, Chautauqua Airlines will use role
playing to further enhance crew understanding of all security levels. Appendix 1 provides
examples of the Security Levels during each phase of aircraft operation. All levels are cov-
ered throughout the course either during role playing exercises, Power Point presentations,
or class discussion. However, due to time constraints; only one situational role playing
exercise is used.(i.e., the role playing level might be level 1 during taxi, followed by a dis-
cussion of level 1 at the gate and in flight). This is done for each Security Level. Appendix
1 (Supplement) are the present role playing scenarios being used.
Section 1 Level 1
A. At the Gate
1. Disruptive Passenger:
a. Loud, obnoxious
b. Upset because there is no storage bin space for his/her carry on items.
2. Flight Attendant
a. Tries to establish rapport and defuse the situation.
b. Assures passenger, baggage that is gate checked will arrive at correct location,
on time.
c. Promises to talk to the gate agent to make sure luggage is stored properly and
quickly.
d. Notifies cockpit of the situation and corrective action taken.
e. Recommends:
1) Situation under control
2) Passenger removal
3. Pilot/Flight Crew
a. Notifies Flight Operations (Ops)
b. If necessary, request gate agent for removal of passenger
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-1

Appendix 1
Section 1 Level 1
Volume 7
B. During Taxi Operations

1. Disruptive Passenger
a. Loud and obnoxious
b. Extremely upset with ground weather delays.
2. Flight Attendant
a. Tries to establish rapport and defuse the situation
b. Assures passenger, everything possible is being done to correct the situation
and that the customer service representatives will set passenger up accord-
ingly.
c. Notifies cockpit of the situation and corrective action taken.
d. Recommends
a. Ensure cockpit is secure
b. Follows lock-down procedures
c. Notifies Flight Ops.
d. If necessary, request gate agent for removal of passenger
e. STOPS TAXIING
f. Makes PA announcement to passengers
g. Taxi's back to gate
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-2

Appendix 1
Section 1 Level 1
Volume 7
C. During Flight
a. Loud, obnoxious, upset with seat belt stipulation, and keeps hitting the Flight
Attendant Call Button
b. Wants to get up, stretch, move around, and/or use the rest room
2. Flight Attendant
b. Assures passenger it is for their safety, they must abide by Federal Aviation
Regulation
c. Promises to find out how much longer until seat belt stipulation is over
d. Notifies cockpit of the situation and corrective action taken.
e. Recommends
3. Pilot/Flight Crew (MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL)
b. Follow lock-down procedures.
c. Makes a seat belt reinforcement announcement
d. If necessary, notifies ATC and/or Flight Ops of situation and level.
e. Prepares for Level 2 situation.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-3

Appendix 1
Section 2 Level 2
Volume 7
Section 2 Level 2
A. At the Gate
a. Loud, obnoxious, and upset because there is no storage bin space for his/her
carry-on items
b. Physically touches Flight Attendant and/or other passengers (Includes biting,
pushing, grabbing, slapping, hitting, kicking, unwanted touching, physically
threatening, etc) May attempt to damage or remove other passengers luggage
from overhead bin.
2. Flight Attendant
b. If necessary, seeks able body person (ABP) to help subdue disruptive
passenger
c. Notifies cockpit of the situation and corrective action taken (request through
cockpit the summoning of law enforcement)
d. Responds to medical needs
a. Notifies Flight Ops
b. Request gate agent and law enforcement officer for removal of passenger.
B. During Taxi Operations

a. Loud, obnoxious, and upset with ground weather delays
b. Physically touches Flight Attendant and/or other passengers (Includes biting,
pushing, grabbing, slapping, hitting, kicking, unwanted touching, physically
threatening, etc) May physically push Flight Attendant out of the way in order
to go to the restroom
2. Flight Attendant
b. If necessary, seeks able body person (ABP) to help subdue disruptive
passenger.
c. Notifies cockpit of the situation and corrective action taken (request through
cockpit the summoning of law enforcement)
d. Responds to medical needs.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-4

Appendix 1
Section 2 Level 2
Volume 7
b. Follow lock-down procedures
c. Notifies Flight Ops.
d. Request gate agent and law enforcement officer for removal of passenger
e. Stops taxiing, makes PA announcement to passengers
f. Taxi's back to gate
C. During Flight
a. Loud, obnoxious, upset with seat belt stipulation, and keeps hitting the Flight
Attendant Call Button
b. Gets up will not return to his/her seat
2. Flight Attendant
b. Assures passenger it is for their safety, they must abide by Federal Aviation
Regulation, and promises to find out how much longer until seat belt stipulation
is over
c. If necessary, seeks able body person (ABP) to help subdue disruptive
passenger
d. Notifies cockpit of the situation and corrective action taken
e. If able, discreetly advises Federal Air Marshal (FAM)
f. Responds to medical needs
g. Works to block access to flight deck if situation continues to deteriorate
3. Pilot/Flight Crew (MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL)
c. Makes a seat belt reinforcement announcement
d. Notifies ATC and Flight Ops of situation and level
e. Prepares for Level 3 situation
f. Makes plans to divert if necessary
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-5

Appendix 1
Section 3 Level 3
Volume 7
Section 3 Level 3
A. At the Gate
a. Uses their belt in an attempt to choke another passenger because of a seat
dispute
2. Flight Attendant
a. Immediately seeks ABP to help subdue the disruptive passenger unless known
LEOs or FAMs are on board
b. Notifies the cockpit
c. Notifies ground staff or gate agent
d. If feels threatened, evacuates the aircraft
e. Responds to medical needs
a. Ensure cockpit is secure. Follows lock-down procedures
b. Establish and maintains communication with the flight crew
c. Notifies Flight Ops for law enforcement help
d. If appropriate, escapes aircraft
B. During Taxi
a. Makes a threat that an explosive device is in their luggage
2. Flight Attendant
a. Notifies the flight deck immediately
b. Notifies any FAMs on board
c. Provides the captain with information (Number and location of perpetrators,
physical description, area or seat assignments, possible location of weapon/
device)
d. Attempts to use delay tactics
e. Initiates an evacuation of the aircraft as appropriate
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-6

Appendix 1
Section 3 Level 3
Volume 7
3. Pilot/ Flight Crew

a. Ensure cockpit is secure. Follows lock-down procedures.
b. STOPS TAXIING
c. Advise ATC, Flight Ops, and dispatch if able
d. DO NOT TAKEOFF IF A THREAT IS ONBOARD
e. Makes PA announcement as appropriate
f. Evacuates the aircraft as appropriate
g. DISABLE aircraft and escape as appropriate
C. During Flight (MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL)

a. Stabs someone with a plastic letter opener
2. Flight Attendant
a. Notifies the flight deck immediately
b. Notifies any FAMs on board
c. Provides the captain with information (Number and location of perpetrators,
physical description, area or seat assignments, possible location of weapon/
device)
d. Attempts to use delay tactics
e. Seeks ABPs to subdue the disruptive passenger
a. Ensure cockpit is secure. Follows lock-down procedures.
b. Advise ATC, Flight Ops, and dispatch if able
c. Squawk 7700
d. Prepares to defend the flight deck
e. Makes PA announcement as appropriate
f. LAND at nearest suitable airport as necessary
g. After landing, DISABLE aircraft
h. Escape as necessary
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-7

Appendix 1
Section 4 Level 4
Volume 7
Section 4 Level 4
A. At the Gate
a. Rushes the cockpit, wants access to the flight deck
2. Flight Attendant
a. May try to block passenger
b. Seeks FAM, LEO, or ABP help
c. Notifies cockpit if necessary
c. Use all available resources to eliminate the threat
d. Notifies Flight Ops for law enforcement help
e. DISABLES AIRCRAFT
f. Evacuates as necessary
B. During Taxi
2. Flight Attendant
c. Use all available resources to eliminate the threat
d. STOPS TAXIING
e. Notifies Flight Ops for law enforcement help
f. DISABLES AIRCRAFT
g. Evacuates as necessary
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-8

Appendix 1
Section 4 Level 4
Volume 7
C. During Flight
2. Flight Attendant
3. Pilot/ Flight Crew (MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL)
c. Squawk 7500
d. Use all available resources to eliminate the threat
e. Notify ATC
f. Notifies Flight Ops for law enforcement help
g. LAND at nearest suitable airport as necessary
h. DISABLES AIRCRAFT
i. Evacuates as necessary
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 1-9

Appendix 1
Section 5 Levels
Volume 7
Section 5 Levels
Level - 1
A. During Taxi
1. Uncooperative Passenger
a. Obnoxious passenger refuses to fasten seat belt during taxi.
b. Despite a repeated request he/she tells the flight attendant he/she will get it
prior to take off.
2. Flight Attendant
a. Tries to establish support and defuse the situation.
b. Stresses safety and cooperation
c. Will inform the captain, could delay the flight.
d. Recommends returning to gate and passenger removal, if necessary.
a. Ensure secure cockpit.
b. Reinforcement announcement.
c. Stops taxiing as conditions permit.
d. Be aware if situation deteriorates. It may be necessary to notify flight opera-
tions and or return to gate.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-10

Appendix 1
Section 5 Levels
Volume 7
Level 2
B. During Taxi
1. Uncooperative passenger
a. Passenger allows his/her child to stand during taxi.
b. Passenger becomes loud and obnoxious at flight attendant's request to be
seated.
c. Ignores F/A use of "LAST."
d. Passenger actually physically touches the F/A.
2. Flight Attendant
a. Uses "LAST" approach.
b. As passenger becomes more verbally abusive, F/A identifies an "ABP" who
may be used to help.
c. As able, notifies cockpit of deteriorating situation.
a. Notifies ground for return to gate.
b. Makes reinforcement announcement.
c. Ensures cockpit secure.
d. If needed, request law enforcement assistance.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-11

Appendix 1
Section 5 Levels
Volume 7
Level 3
C. After Takeoff
a. Before seatbelt sign is off, passenger gets out of seat to use lavatory.
b. As flight attendant tries to reinforce safety, passenger pushes him/her out of
way. Demands to speak to cockpit crew.
2. Flight Attendant
a. Immediately seeks "ABP" to help subdue the disruptive passenger.
b. Seeks known FAM's if on board.
c. Notifies cockpit of situation.
d. Include passenger seat number, physical description, and if any weapon was
noted.
3. Pilot Flight Crew
a. Ensure Cockpit secure.
b. Establish and maintain communication with flight attendant.
c. Consider diverting
d. As situation requires, notify ATC and Dispatch.
e. Always designate Flying Pilot and Non-Flying Pilot.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-12

Appendix 1
Section 5 Levels
Volume 7
Level 4
D. During Flight
a. Throughout flight, a passenger continues to relocate and move randomly about
cabin.
b. “Disoriented" passenger physically rushes the cockpit and seeks entry.
2. Flight Attendant
a. Notify Cockpit
b. Provide as much information on passenger as required.
c. Seek "ABP" and/or FAM help (If not already done).
d. Secure perpetrator as required.
a. Ensure Cockpit secure.
b. Advise ATC, Flight Ops, and Dispatch.
c. Squawk 7700
d. Prepare to defend Cockpit.
e. Designate "Flying Pilot" vs. "Non-Flying Pilot."
f. Make PA announcement.
g. Land at nearest suitable airport, as necessary.
h. After landing consider
i. If situation requires, escape as necessary.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-13

Appendix 1
Section 5 Levels
Volume 7
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 1-14

Appendix 2
Section 1 Required Materials
Volume 7
Appendix 2
Least Risk Bomb Location (LRBL)
Section 1 Required Materials

A simulated explosive device.
A mock bomb concealed in a shoebox or similar shaped container, will contain the three
required components of an explosive device - power source, initiator, and explosive (PIE).
• P - Battery, ie. 9 Volt, will be the power source
• I - A mock initiator will be wired to a clock.
• E - Red tube items, candles or similar shaped items, will be taped together as
the explosive.
The Chautauqua Airlines Training Department will attempt to obtain additional updated
technical information and assistance from local law enforcement. Such material and data
would be used to only supplement other required presentations and is not a course require-
ment.
Section 2 Class Participation:

Students will be required to discuss the importance of each component and how they can
be concealed. The students will discuss the LRBL location on the aircraft they operate as
well as the importance of the location. It must be emphasized that protection of the cockpit
is the first priority. The cockpit crew would never leave the flight deck to move any device.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 2-1

Appendix 2
Section 2 Class Participation:
Volume 7
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 2-2

Appendix 3
Section 1 (NORAD) INTERCEPT PROCEDURES
Volume 7
Appendix 3
NORAD Interception Procedures For
Suspected Hijack
Interception procedures for peacetime operations are public information and are published
in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Chapter 5, Air Traffic Procedures, Section 6,
National Security and Interception Procedures. For security reasons, the AIM does not
publish details of interception procedures during times of increased states of readiness,
such as defense emergency or hijack.
The information contained in this appendix relates to interception procedures for suspected
hijack. It is provided to the TSA/FAA by the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) as general information for reference in crew training. Because of the sensitive
nature of NORAD's interception procedures for hijack those procedures may be changed
at any time without notice.

Although NORAD's mission of defending the North American continent from aerial threats
has not changed, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center twin-towers and the Pentagon
highlighted a new category of threat. In this post-September 11 environment, NORAD's
hijack role has changed significantly. Instead of merely shadowing hijacked aircraft,
NORAD fighters must now be prepared to shoot down aerial threats if the National Com-
mand Authorities (NCA) orders them to do so.
This appendix briefly outlines the likely actions NORAD fighter pilots will take when inter-
cepting a track-of-interest (TOI).
• Generally, the first step in any civilian aircraft intercept is notification by the FAA,
TSA or other government agency of an aircraft operating abnormally. The
notification is passed through direct links between the government and military
agencies.
• Although the FAA may ask for assistance, it is the responsibility of the military and
government security agencies to determine the type of assistance required,
including intercept of the aircraft.
• NORAD fighters will begin the intercept from either an airborne or ground alert
posture.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-1

Appendix 3
Volume 7
• As the intercept begins two important actions occur:

• A secure conference call including key civilian and military decision-makers is
convened.
• NORAD fighters start flying towards the TOI while the controlling agency
attempts to clear other aircraft traffic from the area and points out other aircraft
in the area to the responding fighters.
• Fighter pilots will comply with prevention of inadvertent Traffic Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) initiation procedures.
• Fighter pilots will fly one of two intercept profiles:
• Mission ID: Fighter intercept places the fighters close enough to the TOI for
identification by type and/or other characteristics as directed by the controlling
agency. Although the intent is to remain covert, people on board the TOI may see
the fighters.
• Mission Shadow: Fighter intercept places the fighters in a covert position behind the
TOI. People on board the TOI will not see the fighters.
• Fighters will not normally proceed inside of 500 feet to the TOI unless the controlling
agency requests an action requiring them to be closer. Proceeding inside of 500
feet will not occur unless the fighter pilot can insure flight safety is not compromised.
• After the fighters have successfully joined on the TOI, the fighters may be directed
to divert the TOI. Diversion actions include:
• Attempting radio contact with the TOI on assigned frequencies to include 121.5.
Fighter aircraft not VHF radio capable will attempt contact through the controlling
agency.
• Visual signals from the fighters to the TOI using International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Standard Intercept Signals.
• When directed by Commander, NORAD, fighters will fly in front of and slightly
below the TOI and dispense warning flares.
- The warning flares do not represent a flight safety issue to the TOI.
- The desired action from the TOI is to turn in the direction of the flares.
• If the TOI appropriately responds to diversion attempts, NORAD fighters will escort
the TOI through safe landing. With the TOI safely on the ground, fighter pilots will
communicate their departure intentions to the controlling agency so as not to alarm
the TOI's crew.
• If the TOI ignores diversion attempts and is deemed a threat to protected people or
infrastructure by the NCA, the fighter pilots may be ordered to shoot down the TOI.
• The primary decision-making authority to shoot down the TOI resides with
President, Vice President, or Secretary of Defense.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-2

Appendix 3
Volume 7
• In cases where time and conditions do not exist for NCA direction, Commander,
NORAD or his designated alternate have been given the authority to direct the
shoot down of the TOI.
• THE FIGHTER PILOT NEVER HAS AUTONOMOUS SHOOT DOWN AUTHORITY
AND WILL NOT FIRE ON THE TOI UNLESS A VALID AND AUTHENTICATED
ORDER IS RECEIVED.
• Every opportunity will be given to the people on board the TOI to regain control of
the aircraft or stop the hijack attempt prior to shooting down the TOI.
The seriousness of NORAD fighters intercepting a TOI cannot be overemphasized. This is
the first step in a potential shoot down. It is imperative that the TOI's crew immediately com-
plies with direction from either the controlling agency or fighters. Abrupt TOI maneuvers
will not be used as criteria for shoot down unless this places the TOI's flight path in close
proximity to protected people and points. The shoot down decision represents a difficult
choice in precluding additional loss of life through a terrorist attack.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-3

Appendix 3
Volume 7
SERIES INTERCEPTING AIR- MEANING INERCEPTED AIR- MEANING

CRAFT SIGNALS CRAFT RESPONDS
1 DAY-Rocking wings from a You have DAY-Rocking wings and fol- Understood,
position slightly above and been lowing will comply.
ahead of, and normally to the intercepted.
left of, the intercepted aircraft Follow me.
and, after acknowledgement,
a low level turn, normally to
the left, on the desired head-
ing.
NIGHT-Same and, in addition, NIGHT-Same and, in addi-

flashing navigational lights at tion, flashing navigational
irregular intervals. lights at irregular intervals.
NOTE 1-Meteorological con-

ditions or terrain may require
the intercepting aircraft to
take up a position slightly
above and ahead of, and to
the right of, the intercepted
aircraft and to make the sub-
sequent turn to the right.
NOTE 2-If the intercepted air-

craft is not able to keep pace
with the intercepting aircraft,
the latter is expected to fly a
series of race-track patterns
and to rock its wings each
time it passes the intercepted
aircraft.
2 DAY or NIGHT-An abrupt You may DAY-or-Night-Rocking wings. Understood,

break-away maneuver from proceed. will comply.
the intercepted aircraft con-
sisting of a climbing turn of 90
degrees or more without
crossing the line of flight of
the intercepted aircraft.
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-4

Appendix 3
Volume 7
3 DAY-Circling aerodrome, low- Land at the DAY-Lowering landing gear, Understood,

ering landing gear and over- aerodrome. following the intercepting air- will comply.
flying runway in direction of craft and, if after overflying the
landing or, if the intercepted runway landing is considered
aircraft is a helicopter, overfly- safe, proceeding to land.
ing the helicopter landing
area. NIGHT-Same and, in addi-
tion, showing steady landing
NIGHT-Same and, in addition, lights (if carried)
showing steady landing lights.
INTERCEPTING SIGNALS
Signals and Responses During Aircraft Intercept
Signals initiated by intercepted aircraft and responses by intercepting aircraft
(as set forth in ICAO Annex 2-Appendix A,2.2)
4 DAY or NIGHT-Raising land- Aerodrome DAY or NIGHT-If it is desired Understood,
ing gear (if fitted) and flashing you have that the intercepted aircraft follow me.
landing lights while passing designated follow the intercepting aircraft
over runway in use or helicop- is inade- to an alternate aerodrome, the
ter landing area at a height quate. intercepting aircraft raises its
exceeding 300m (1,000 ft) but landing gear (if fitted) and
not exceeding 600m (2,000 ft) uses the Series 1 signals pre-
(in the case of a helicopter, at scribed for intercepting air-
a height exceeding 50m (170 craft. If it is decided to release
ft) but not exceeding 100m the intercepted aircraft, the
(330 ft) above the aerodrome intercepting aircraft uses the Understood,
level, and continuing to circle Series 2 signals prescribed for you may pro-
runway in use or helicopter intercepting aircraft. ceed.
landing area). If unable to
flash landing lights, flash any
other lights available.
5 DAY or NIGHT-Regular Cannot DAY or NIGHT-Use Series 2 Understood.
switching on and off of all comply. signals prescribed for inter-
available lights but in such a cepting aircraft
manner as to be distinct from
flashing lights.
6 DAY or NIGHT-Irregular flash- In distress. DAY or NIGHT-Use Series 2 Understood.
ing of all available lights signals prescribed for inter-
cepting aircraft
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-5

Appendix 3
Volume 7
REV. 3, 1 MAY 2005 APX 3-6

Appendix 4
Section
Volume 7
Appendix 4
Basic Self Defense BST Approach
Introduction:
The FAA has only recommended training crews in very basic self defense maneuvers.
Chautauqua has elected use of the BST Approach. The best way to protect yourself is
remember the following key words.
• Breathing
• Space
• Throat
The BST Approach would be needed at threat levels 2, 3 and 4. Basic self defense maneu-
vers such as BST Approach, should always analyze the exact threat level.
Consider the following levels:
• At threat level 2, the hijacker is physically assaulting or threatening you. Going for
the throat, will stop them and with the help of ABPs, you’ll be able to subdue them
upon landing.
• At threat level 3 and 4, you are usually dealing with a weapon. The most important
thing to remember, our goal is not to take the weapon away, but to go for the throat.
In all of the Hollywood movies, you always see a fight over the weapon. Whoever
has control of the weapon will win. Now, let’s talk about reality. We want you to grab
the weapon, but only to move it out of harm’s way (away from the kill zone and then,
go for the throat). After incapacitating the hijacker, you will be able to take the
weapon away.
• Kill Zone: center of your body from head to waist. If the attacker comes up behind
you, do you think he/she will be expecting you to grab the blade of the knife or barrel
of the gun.
If the attacker does not use a gun or knife maybe they have a necktie and are trying
to strangle you. Don’t try to pull away because that will only tighten the rope around
your neck. Simply turn around and face them, so they are pulling on the back of your
neck. Then, go for the throat!
If you are sitting down (cockpit or pax seat), you will not be able to turn around completely.
Make an effort to turn your body and reach back and pinch the throat.
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 4-1

Appendix 4
Section 1 BST Approach
Volume 7
Section 1 BST Approach

Breathe:
• I will breathe deeply when I am afraid. I am not panicking or freezing, just holding
my breath
• I will get a grip for improved blood flow
• I will visualized my loved ones, an attack on me is a direct attack against them
Space:
• I will protect and defend my personal space.
• Breathe and make eye contact
• If necessary use harsh language. This will alert nearby ABP's
• Breathe… Speak loudly, even yell.
Go for the throat:
• I have the right to fight for my life
• Breathe
• Speak loudly - Yell
• Hit first when my "space" is invaded
• Strike with the intention to cause injury
• Go for the throat
• Avoid getting caught from behind
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 APX 4-2

Index
Volume 7
Alphabetical Index
A
Access to Aircraft ....................................................................................................... 1-9
Aircraft Protection ...................................................................................................... 1-9
Airport Operations Area Protection .......................................................................... 1-10
Automated Passenger Screening Process .............................................................. 1-10
B
Baggage Restrictions ............................................................................................... 1-10
Basic Self Defense BST Approach .................................................................... APX 4-1
Basic Self Defense Exercises .................................................................................. 1-10
C
CFR 49 Part 1520 .................................................................................................... 1-13
CFR 49 Part 1544 .................................................................................................... 1-13
Common Strategy - Role Playing ....................................................................... APX 1-1
Common Strategy Guidance ...................................................................................... 1-5
Crew Communication and Coordination .................................................................... 1-1
Crewmember Tactics ................................................................................................. 1-6
E
Emergency Communications ..................................................................................... 1-2
F
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAM) .......................................................................... 1-11
Federal Flight Deck Officer Program (FFDO) .......................................................... 1-11
Federal Regulations ................................................................................................. 1-13
Flaps .......................................................................................................................... 1-3
Flight Deck Procedures and Maneuvers to Defend an Aircraft .................................. 1-5
Foreign Rules ........................................................................................................... 1-13
I
Identification and Verification Procedures .................................................................. 1-8
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 IDX-1

Index
Volume 7
L
Law Enforcement ..................................................................................................... 1-11
Least Risk Bomb Location ................................................................................. APX 2-1
N
NORAD ...................................................................................................................... 1-8
NORAD Interception Procedures For Suspected Hijack .................................... APX 3-1
P
Pre-Flight Briefing ...................................................................................................... 1-2
Pre-Flight Security Procedures .................................................................................. 1-2
Proper Conduct .......................................................................................................... 1-7
Psychology of Terrorists ............................................................................................ 1-4
R
Recognizing Suspicious Activities .............................................................................. 1-1
S
Security Checkpoint Enhancements ........................................................................ 1-10
Sterile Area .............................................................................................................. 1-10
Support Available During Emergency ........................................................................ 1-3
T
Training Events
Initial New Hire 4 Hours ............................................................................... INTRO-1
Recurrent 2 Hours ....................................................................................... INTRO-1
Transponder Code 7500 ............................................................................................ 1-3
Transport of Prisoners ............................................................................................. 1-12
TSA Screening ........................................................................................................... 1-9
U
Use of Protective Devices .......................................................................................... 1-4
Use of Restraint Devices ........................................................................................... 1-4
REV. 4, 15 SEP 2005 IDX-2

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REVISION NUMBER DATE ENTERED YOUR INITIALS

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Chapter 1 Training Instructor Outline

Chapter 2 Recurrent Training and Instructor Outline

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Alphabetical Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IDX- 1

Initial New Hire 3 Hours

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Section 1 Initial Training 3 Hours

A. Recognizing suspicious activities and determining

B. Crew Communication and Coordination

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6. Transponder Code 7500

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C. Use of Protective Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

D. Use of Restraint Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

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F. Flight Deck Procedures and Maneuvers to Defend an Aircraft

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d. Rapid descent maneuver initiated without notice to the aircraft cabin

G. Proper Conduct of a Cabin Search for Deadly and Dangerous

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3. How bombs and weapons are smuggled onboard

I. Identification and Verification Procedures

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d. Law enforcement authority

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d. Sensitive Security Information

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Section 1 Recurrent Training 2 Hours

A. Recognizing suspicious activities and determining

B. Crew Communication and Coordination

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3. Pre-Flight Security Procedures

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6. Transponder Code 7500

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C. Use of Protective Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

D. Use of Restraint Devices Assigned to Crewmembers

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3. Able Bodied Passengers - ABPs

F. Proper Conduct of a Cabin Search for Deadly and Dangerous