Hitra Procedure Kz01 CG Pro 53 0113 A02

Khazzan
Project
Security Classification:
Project Internal Contract No. CO-BPXO-12-0376
Khazzan Commissioning
Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment
(HITRA) Procedure (CPF)
Khazzan Project Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)
Revision History
Amendment Revision Amender

Amendment
Date Number Initials
24/02/2016 A01 RT
Related Documents
Document Number Document Name Description of Content
Petrofac Golden Rules of

Safety
Khazzan Commissioning Commissioning specific CoW process including PtW and

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0107
Control of Work Authorisations
KZ01-SA-PLN-53-0005 Emergency Response &

Crisis Management Plan
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111 Energy Isolation Khazzan Project Commissioning Energy Isolation procedure

Procedure
A02 24/02/2016 RE-ISSUED FOR REVIEW RT CM CE

ELIE
A01 05/02/2016 ISSUED FOR REVIEW VK EC
LAHOUD
Rev. Date Reason for Issue Author Checked Approved
Rev.
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 A02
Holds
Section Number Short Description of Hold
Abbreviations
AA Area Authority
AAD Area Authority Designate
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
CoW Control of Work
KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 2 of 41 Rev: A02

Project Internal
CSE Confined Space Entry

GPO BP Global Projects Organisation
GRoS BP Golden Rules of Safety
HITRA Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment
ISA Isolating Authority
MOC Management of Change
PA Performing Authority
PTW Permit to Work
PTWC Permit to Work Coordinator
SA Site Authority
TBT Toolbox Talk
TRA Task Risk Assessment
TRAT Task Risk Assessment Table

Project Internal
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................
1.1. PURPOSE......................................................................................................................................
1.2. SCOPE...........................................................................................................................................
2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES............................................................................

2.1. SINGLE POINT OF ACCOUNTABILITY.........................................................................................
2.2. SITE AUTHORITY..........................................................................................................................
2.3. AREA AUTHORITY.........................................................................................................................
2.4. AREA AUTHORITY DESIGNATE....................................................................................................
2.5. PERFORMING AUTHORITY..........................................................................................................
2.6. RESPONSIBILITIES OF HITRA FACILITATORS..........................................................................
2.6.1. HITRA LEVEL 1 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY PA) 10
2.6.2. HITRA LEVEL 2 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY AA OR REPRESENTATIVE FROM
THE HSE SITE TEAM) 10
3.0. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

.......................................................................................................................
3.1. TASK RISK ASSESSMENT LEVELS............................................................................................
3.2. HITRA PROCESS STEPS............................................................................................................
3.3. LEVEL 1 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................
3.4. LEVEL 2 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................
4.0. ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK.............................................................

4.1. HAZARDS.....................................................................................................................................
4.2. DETERMINING CONSEQUENCES.............................................................................................
4.3. RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK RANKING.................................................................................
4.4. IDENTIFICATION OF CONTROLS...............................................................................................
5.0. PERFORM TASK................................................................................................

5.1. PERMIT TO WORK AND COMMUNICATION..............................................................................
5.2. PERFORMING THE TASK............................................................................................................
5.3. MONITOR FOR CONDITION CHANGE.......................................................................................
5.4. LESSONS LEARNED...................................................................................................................
6.0. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY............................................................................

6.1. GENERAL.....................................................................................................................................
6.2. LEVELS OF TRAINING................................................................................................................
7.0. TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)..............................................................
APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS.....................................................................
APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS.........................................................
APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE....................................................................

Project Internal
APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX......................................................................
APPENDIX E APPROVAL MATRIX..................................................................................
APPENDIX F TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT).....................................................
APPENDIX G LEVEL 1 RISK ASSESSMENT PRO FORMA...................................................
APPENDIX H HITRA FORM...........................................................................................

Project Internal
1.0. INTRODUCTION
Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (HITRA) is used during the planning and execution stages
of Commissioning Control of Work (CoW) to identify hazards associated with performing tasks. It prescribes
the control measures to implement during task execution to prevent or eliminate, isolate or minimize task
risks so that work is executed in a safe, systematic and compliant manner. This document should be read in
conjunction with Khazzan Commissioning Control of Work Procedure KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0107 and the
Energy Isolation Process KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111
1.1. Purpose
The purpose of this procedure is to describe how to identify work-related hazards and assess risks
associated with activities undertaken as part of the Khazzan Project Commissioning scope. It provides the
necessary detail to illustrate ‘what good hazard identification and task risk assessment looks like’.
The HITRA process forms an essential part of the Commissioning Control of Work (CoW) process.
Before conducting HITRA, evaluate:
1. Is the job really necessary?

2. Is there an alternate way(s) to do the work that ‘eliminates’ inherent hazard(s) involved?
It is a Khazzan Project principle that no unnecessary work will be done. Only work that provides business
value will be undertaken.
1.2. Scope
This procedure applies to work undertaken –inside the CPF boundary limits. See Figure 1 below illustrating
the CPF Commissioning CoW document structure. An equivalent approach managed by BP for GWES
Category 1 scope.

Project Internal
Figure 1: Commissioning CoW Document Structure

Project Internal
2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1. Single Point of Accountability

Khazzan CPF HITRA Single Point of Accountability (SPA) is the Petrofac Commissioning Manager and is
responsible for ensuring that:
 All activities within their area of responsibility comply with this procedure
 Delegation of any of the CoW role’s responsibility is documented
 CoW audit, assurance and self-verification systems are in place, including lessons learned and continual
improvement processes
 Sufficient resources (time, people and budget) are allocated to implement this procedure
 Personnel involved in facilitating HITRA are properly trained and competent
 Periodic self-verification against the requirements in this procedure is undertaken
Responsibility can be delegated but not accountability. This delegation must be documented (Refer to CPF
Commissioning CoW ProcedureKZ01-CG-PLN-53-0107.
2.2. Site Authority

The Site Authority (SA) is responsible to:
 Ensure that an adequate number of competent persons are appointed to manage the work and the
associated risks, as defined in this procedure
 Confirm that a process is in place to manage the appointment of competent persons as:
o Authorizing signatories for Level 1 and Level 2 HITRAs,
o Level 1 HITRA completers,
o Team Leaders to facilitate the Level 2 HITRA process.
 Ensure that the HITRA process is in place and followed consistently
 Review and self-verify the HITRA process to confirm that the quality of the HITRAs and areas of
improvement have been identified and implemented
 Ensure that the HITRA process is subject to regular monitoring and Self Verification , acting upon the
results of Self Verification to maintain the integrity of the system and proposing any recommendations for
system improvement
 Ensure that formal records of all TRAs are maintained
 Ensure that the training and competency standards, and formal authorization of personnel, as defined in
this document and in Control of Work Procedure (KZ01-CG-PLN-53-0107) are followed
 Manage the TRAT
Note: The SA is the Single Point of Accountability for CoW on their site. The responsibilities but not the
accountabilities can be delegated to a competent person with proper documented approval from the SPA.
Review and authorization of all Level 1 & 2 HITRA should be commensurate with the level of risk. It is
incumbent on the SA to request a higher level of risk assessment should they consider that risks have not
been fully addressed.

Project Internal
2.3. Area Authority

The Area Authority (AA) role is central to the site CoW process for the management and control of CoW
tasks. AAs are accountable for task hazard identification and risk control measures associated with work
performed in their area of responsibility. The number of areas can be depending on the complexity and the
footprint of the work to be undertaken.
Responsibility can be delegated but not accountability. This delegation should be through documented
approval from the SA.
The Area Authorities are responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this procedure are adhered to for
all TRAs conducted within their area of responsibility. The AA or their competent delegate (AAD) shall be
trained and competent to lead the team in performing a Level 2 HITRA. They shall be responsible to:
 Ensure that everyone associated with the work activity is aware of the requirements of HITRA, permit to
work conditions and any risks or hazards
 Ensure that the appropriate level of risk assessment is conducted for the task
 Organise and participate in the HITRA process
 Ensure that the Performing Authority (PA. Refer to Section 2.5) participates in risk assessments and
conducts Tool Box Talks associated with the work activity
 Ensure that the HITRA is communicated to the workforce in commonly used language(s)
 Ensure that the risk assessment requirement is included in the planning for each work activity
 Ensure that a pre-job site visit is conducted with the PA to identify all hazards and appropriate controls
that need to be included in the Work Permit or risk assessment
 Ensure that the appropriate level of HITRA has been carried out for the task
 Ensure that all the appropriate control measures have been put in place prior to a permit being issued,
confirming that the PA fully understands the scope of work and tasks involved
 Ensure that active permits and hazard control measures are effective at the work site and can continue
simultaneously with other PTW tasks
 Ensure that the PA is competent to perform the task and HITRA
 Promote the culture to “STOP the Job” if anyone feels unsafe.
2.4. Area Authority Designate

The AAD serves as a delegate for the AA, can facilitate L1 HITRA, participate in L2 HITRA and perform site
visit for low residual risks tasks. Only certain elements of the AA role can be delegated by the AA to the
AAD. The accountability for ensuring hazards are identified and the associated risks are controlled cannot
be delegated. The AA cannot delegate worksite visit for high residual risk tasks or approval of Level 2 HITRA
that requires AA approval as per the Approval Matrix (Appendix E)
2.5. Performing Authority

The Performing Authority (PA) is the person responsible for the activity being carried out under the Permit to
Work. For permit-related work, the PA should perform the Level 1 HITRA assessment. The PA may also
participate in Level 2 HITRAs.
The PA shall be competent to supervise performance of the task and be very familiar with the equipment
and tools being used. The PA may be the person carrying out the task or supervising a group of people
carrying it out.

Project Internal
The PA can be responsible for more than one task at a time providing they can safely manage the tasks
simultaneously. This should be discussed and agreed with the Area Authority
The PA shall ensure that:
 All personnel under their supervision comply with this procedure when involved in risk-assessed activities
 Level 1 HITRA is completed where required and that adequate consultation has taken place, typically with
AA and the line supervisor
 The necessity of Level 2 HITRA is identified and participate in Level 2 HITRA
 Risk assessment has been performed and a toolbox talk conducted
 Where other persons are involved in the task, they fully understand the scope of the work and the
hazards and controls for the job by holding a toolbox talk meeting. This includes ensuring that all of those
involved in the specific work activity sign the worksite hard copy of the Work Permit
 The controls identified in the HITRA are effectively in place and that the activity is executed in accordance
with this procedure
 Work activity is STOPPED if an unsafe situation occurs
 Work activities have been reviewed and pertinent information exchanged with all other affected parties
 Appropriate authorisation is obtained prior to the commencement of work
 The proposed controls reduce the risks associated with the task; consider the controls specified by any
relevant local procedure and the capability of the person in charge.
 Work is stopped immediately when there is any change to the Work Permit conditions, including an
emergency, and that hazards and risks are reassessed before the work is resumed
 A culture prevails to “STOP the Job” if anyone feels unsafe.
2.6. Responsibilities of HITRA Facilitators

1.1.1. HITRA Level 1 Facilitator (Typically PA)
The Level 1 HITRA Facilitator should:
 Complete Level 1 HITRAs

 Confirm that adequate consultation has taken place, typically with the AA and / or line supervisor
 Confirm appropriate authorisation is obtained prior to the commencement of work
1.1.2. HITRA Level 2 Facilitator (Typically AA or

representative from the HSE site team)
The main responsibilities are to:
 Lead the assigned team in performing a Level 2 HITRA as described in this procedure
 Ensure the team understands the assessment process and its objectives
 Take responsibility for maintaining the quality of the HITRA
 Ensure that the assessment team includes personnel with the necessary experience, knowledge and
competence for the task involved
 Ensure that the HITRA includes a worksite visit prior to issuing PTW

Project Internal
 Ensure that all members of the HITRA team have full opportunity to contribute and that the details of the
assessment are agreed by all team members
 Ensure that the details of the assessment are accurately recorded and correspond with the agreed level
of risk
 Take appropriate guidance on health, safety and environmental legislation and consequent limits on
operation
3.0. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW
This section outlines the HITRA process for systematically examining a task to identify the hazards, evaluate
the risks and specify appropriate controls.
3.1. Task Risk Assessment Levels

There are two levels of Task Risk Assessment (TRA).
Level 1 TRA includes a detailed overview of the task to identify the hazards involved and required controls.
It is conducted by one or more competent persons, typically the Performing Authority (PA) and / or the Area
Authority (AA).
Level 2 TRA includes a structured semi-quantitative assessment, conducted when the Site Authority (SA) or
AA determines that there are greater hazards or complexities associated with the task, necessitating a more
rigorous assessment. Level 2 TRA is performed by a TRA team.
The reasons for a Level 2 HITRA include, for example:
 The task is new and unfamiliar

 It is not possible to comply fully with the standards in a relevant local procedure or other recognized
source of guidance
 Previously used controls may not be reasonably practicable in this case
 The task is complex and/or has potential impact on other activities.
 Energy of significant magnitude will be introduced into the system/process
The following activities require a Level 2 TRA:
 Confined space entry

 Excavation of a trench or pit more than 4 feet or 1.2 metres deep or other ground disturbance, such as
piling
 Working at heights, where a fall could result in serious injury
 Work on energised systems
 Complex (Category 2) or critical (Category 3) lifting operations
 Activities that could involve exposure to substances for which there are defined exposure limits,
including:
o hydrogen sulphide (H2S)
o products that contain benzene
o inert gases
 Work that could result in performance or availability of safety critical equipment or systems falling
below expected standards, for example:
o Removal or inhibition of protective devices

Project Internal
o Blocking of escape routes

o Taking a fire pump or emergency generator offline
Note, safety critical performance shall be considered with respect to the hazards present in a
Commissioning, pre hydrocarbon environment.
 Online connections to process equipment tanks or pipelines, including hot tapping.

 Planned deviation from an existing policy, procedure or practice.
More examples of activities, and whether they warrant Level 1 or Level 2 assessment, are included in the
TRAT, Appendix F.
3.2. HITRA Process Steps

 Identify the site and process hazards that could result in harm such as injury, illness, damage to the
environment, plant or process
 Identify risk; determine the credible consequences and their probabilities to assess the level of risk-
(consequence x probability = risk) including who or what could be affected
 Reduce risk by eliminating or substituting the hazards AND controlling and / or mitigating the risks
 Evaluate residual risk that remains with all the planned controls in effect. Confirm that residual risk has
been considered and no additional controls are needed for the task(s) to be conducted safely
 Document in a standard format the hazards, controls and residual risk
 Record approvals of the HITRA document
 Communicate the hazards and controls to all personnel involved in performing the task. Confirm that
the controls are effective throughout the task.
 Monitor the on-going work to identify any new hazard that may be introduced during or because of the
activities.
3.3. Level 1 HITRA Process

A Level 1 HITRA involves a review of the task by the PA in consultation with the AA to identify the hazards
associated with the task and appropriate control measures required to manage these hazards. The PA uses
their technical knowledge and task information to select job hazards from the prompt list on the permit (see
Figure 2 below). The PA should not be constrained by the list and must use their judgement to identify any
other hazards and record on the space provided on the permit.
The PA then uses the controls listed to show how the hazards will be managed. Once again, the PA should
not be constrained by the list and must use their judgement to identify any other control measures and
record on the space provided on the permit.
The AA with the PA will review task details, hazards and control measures described on the permit along
with any documentation. Prior to the commencement of the job, they will visit the worksite to confirm all
hazards have been identified and adequately controlled.
During Commissioning, where there will be repetitive low risk tasks carried out such as instrument loop
checks, or uncoupled motor runs; a Level 1 risk assessment may be carried out and recorded on a specific
L1 risk assessment pro forma, included in Appendix G These risk assessments shall be held in the PtW
office and given a unique reference number. The assessment shall be reviewed, copied and attached to
subsequent equivalent permits as required. This will ensure a level of consistency in low risk activities.
Additional site specific hazards can be added directly to the permit as required.

Project Internal
This approach shall also be followed when considering Risk Assessed Procedures and the existing HITRA
shall be reviewed for applicability and any lessons learned from previous application of the procedure.
Figure 2: Example from Cold Work Permit - Hazards and Controls Checkboxes
Figure 3: Level 1 HITRA Flowchart
If the proposed controls are adequate for the identified risks of the task, and the task can be conducted
safely, the task risk assessment is approved. If, considering any residual risks, the authorised signatory
doubts that the risks are adequately controlled by the proposed means, they will request a Level 2 HITRA.
Those who conducted the Level 1 HITRA may also participate in the Level 2 HITRA.

Project Internal
3.4. Level 2 HITRA Process

A Level 2 HITRA is a structured examination of all hazards associated with a task to devise a set of control
measures that reduce the level of risk sufficiently to allow a task to proceed safely. If the risk cannot be
sufficiently reduced, alternative methods must be found before the task can proceed.
The Level 2 method uses a risk assessment proforma sheet and a suite of matrices to help to determine the
consequences and likelihood of hazardous conditions in a consistent and repeatable manner.
To complete a Level 2 risk assessment, a team is formed with a minimum of 3 persons with suitable
experience, led by a competent Level 2 HITRA facilitator appointed by the AA. The objective of forming a
team is to bring together understanding and experience of the task to examine all the hazards and devise a
set of controls that will ensure that the level of risk is reasonable.
Where larger tasks, series of tasks or significant introduction of energy is planned the potential to require
Level 2 HITRAs should be identified early, to allocate time in the plan to complete the HITRAs.
A Level 2 HITRA can be carried out at any stage in the work process if the PA, AA, a member of
management or any other personnel believes that significant risks exist which will not be adequately
controlled without a more rigorous assessment and the application of additional controls. The AA is
responsible for deciding whether a L2 HITRA is required.
The decision about when Level 2 Risk Assessment is required is somewhat subjective, depending on the
people involved, but the following rules should be applied to ensure a consistent level of assessment is
being carried out across the organization.
Figure 4: Level 2 HITRA Flowchart
4.0. ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK
This section provides guidance on the use of an energy source approach to identify hazards and clarifies
the differences between hazards and risks.
4.1. Hazards
Hazards are anything with the potential to result in harm such as injury, illness or damage.

Project Internal
NOTE: Through Commissioning, the absence of hydrocarbons and associated SIMOPs makes the process
of hazards identification and risk assessment less complex than Operational facilities.
To identify all the hazards, consider the aspects below:
 Affected Hazards: The energy sources affected by the work, e.g. commissioning fluids and the system in
which they are transported and contained (e.g. operations equipment).
 Applied Hazards: Uncontrolled or unwanted contact with an energy source that may occur while setting
up tools and equipment at the job site.
 Ambient Hazards: The site conditions that may cause uncontrolled or unwanted contact with an energy
source (e.g. weather conditions or concurrent work).
Other considerations may include;
 Characteristics of the plant and / or systems involved:

 Access
 Type of service (e.g., water, diesel, inert gas)
 Likelihood of foam, sand, and sludge, types of scale
 Sensitivity of the location within the premises, including proximity to Health, Safety, Security and
Environment (HSSE) critical plant or systems such as:
o Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) intakes
o Flare header
o Emergency Shut Down Valves (ESDVs)
o Escape routes, fire pumps, large inventories (pipelines, vessels or tanks)
 Possible interactions between simultaneous activities within the task, or with another task taking place
nearby, that call for close coordination or controls.
Energy Sources and Hazard Identification prompts are found in Appendices A and B.
Also, consider what would occur in the event of an emergency.
4.2. Determining Consequences

After identifying the hazards, the potential credible consequences should also be identified, taking into
consideration any impact on personnel or plant.
The worst reasonably credible consequences should be identified and recorded for each hazard. There may
be more than one consequence per hazard. Refer to Appendix C: Impact Assessment Table for guidance on
determining the level of impact for each of: Health and Safety, Environment or Financial consequences.
4.3. Risk Assessment and Risk Ranking

Risk assessment assigns semi-quantitative values for each consequence and probability. The product of
these values lies inside or outside the allowed limits. The risk created by each hazard on the list should be
evaluated according to:
The worst reasonably credible impact, should anything go wrong (taken from Appendix C) AND the
probability of such an impact being realized (from Appendix D)
The result is a numerical risk ranking which must be recorded and approved according to the requirements
found in Appendix E.

Project Internal
For example, impact level F and probability level 4 gives a ranking of 6, which falls in Risk Area II, requiring
approval by Site Authority.
4.4. Identification of Controls

For each risk, control measures shall be identified.
The HITRA Facilitator works systematically through the list of hazards to specify all the methods necessary
to control each of the associated risks. Existing controls are recorded along with any additional controls that
the team considers necessary to achieve a sufficient level of overall control. The hierarchy of controls
shown below should be used as a guide to confirm that a full range of options is considered.
Note: As consequences are deemed reasonably credible, then control measures should be
reasonably practicable. They should be chosen to adequately reduce the identified risk.
Figure 5: Hierarchy of Controls
Two types of control measures should be identified from a Level 1 or Level 2 HITRA process:
 Prerequisite controls that should be in effect prior to job execution. These may or may not include a
PTW.
 Supplementary controls that should be applied during the job. Consideration should be given whether
supplementary controls introduce another hazard, while in effect.
Before the task is authorised to start, the person controlling the work activity should confirm that:
 All the prerequisite controls are in effect

 The persons allocated to perform the task are competent to initiate and manage the supplementary
controls
 The output from the risk assessment (with Work Permit where applicable) has been “communicated in
writing and signed off by all involved in the task”
 Monitoring activities are arranged e.g. controls are still effective, no new hazard is introduced
 Actions in the event of an emergency are understood by all involved in the task.
Controls Check

Project Internal
Consideration should be given to the following questions:
 Have all the necessary control measures been fully identified?

 Is an engineering change necessary for eliminating or reducing the risk?
 Are any additional capabilities needed to complete the task?
 Should the plant or process be shut down?
 Is the residual risk at a level to allow the task to be safely completed?

Project Internal
Residual Risk Check

A. If the residual risk is not at a level to allow the task to be completed safely, the hierarchy of controls
should be used again with emphasis on the most effective or prevention categories.
 If any control measures are practicable to implement and would reduce the residual risk, they should be
recorded.
 If further control measures cannot reduce the risk to a level that allows the task to be completed safely,
the HITRA team cannot authorize the task and should refer back to the work requester.
B. The HITRA team will document:
 The assessment including all the identified control measures that should be in effect for the defined task.
 The residual risk level for each identified hazard, with the highest residual risk defining the level of
approval. (Appendix E)
C. Agreement on risks and controls
 Approval to proceed is sought when the HITRA team unanimously agrees that the hazards and risks are
controlled to the point that the task(s) can be conducted safely
D. Documentation and records
 The HITRA team shall record the findings in the HITRA format included as Appendix G
E. Approval levels are explained in Appendix E.
5.0. PERFORM TASK
5.1. Permit to Work and Communication

This section discusses the approval to proceed and the importance of communication to the success of
HITRA.
Before work commences, the risk assessment shall have been approved based on the residual risk and
according to the approval matrix Appendix E.
The success of a HITRA depends on the effective communication of its results, so that people who execute
the job are fully aware of and thoroughly understand the hazards and the controls in effect.
The HITRA document is used as the basis for workforce communications so that all personnel concerned
have an understanding of the following:
 The steps involved in carrying out the job

 The hazards they may encounter at each step
 Control measures in effect or planned and how they relate to the hazards
 Individual actions and responsibilities at various steps in the work
All involved in the task have the opportunity to identify further hazards and control measures that may have
been overlooked in the HITRA. The HITRA Facilitator should be notified if such improvements are identified.
5.2. Performing the Task

Each person involved in actually performing the task should:
 Be satisfied that all the defined controls are actually in place and effective (even though the task has been
duly authorised)

Project Internal
 Feel empowered (and obliged) to voice any concerns to their supervisor and not start the job if they do
not think it can be completed safely
5.3. Monitor for Condition Change

The HITRA includes a monitoring frequency for the work. However, personnel who execute the task should
monitor their activities on an on-going basis and be alert to:
 Any new or unauthorised personnel

 Conditions at the work site (e.g. isolations, weather, SIMOPS)
 Hazards generated by the activity
 Hazards not originally covered by the HITRA
 Whether controls are still effective
If necessary, personnel should stop the job so that the hazards and risk can be re-assessed.
5.4. Lessons Learned

It is important to capture lessons learned upon completion of work and incorporate the lessons into the
process. This may be in the form of changes or revisions to:
 Links between a procedure and the underpinning HITRA.

 HITRA records.
 The HITRA process, including team composition.
Lessons learned should be communicated to all concerned through existing methods such as meetings,
circulars, training and toolbox talks.
6.0. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY
6.1. General
All personnel involved in the HITRA process are trained on HITRA process & procedure and competent.
The competency of all relevant personnel shall be established during the planning process for a particular
risk assessment. The AA shall ensure that the personnel involved in the activity have the correct
competencies through training records or requesting individuals to produce relevant certification.
While it is simple, successful application of the HITRA method depends upon participants having industry
experience, different perspectives and understanding of relevant hazards, realistic consequences and a
hierarchy of risk reduction measures (hierarchy of controls is shown in Section 4.5 above).
All personnel involved in the HITRA process should complete the fundamental training module (Refer to
Section 6.2 below for links) which covers:
 Definitions of hazard, consequence, probability, risk, control, hierarchy of controls and risk matrix
 The principles and process of HITRA
 When to conduct Level 1 and 2 HITRAs
 HITRA tools (checklists, prompts)
 Expectations of team members: the need to contribute personal experience, reach agreement and record
divergent views
 Responsibility after the completion of the HITRA (communication, responding to changes at the task
location)
Project Internal
Before selection for training, Level 2 HITRA Facilitators should be able to demonstrate an extensive
knowledge of the work environment. They should be able to apply informed judgment when using checklists
and other available tools.
6.2. Levels of Training

All members defined in the Control of Work team (PA, AA, , AAD, PTWC, SA, ISA, AGT) are required to
carry out HITRA awareness training. This will capture HITRA level 1 and a summary of what level 2 risk
assessment includes and awareness of why and when it should be used.
Personnel identified to be Level 2 facilitators, shall carry out further training to HITRA Level 2 facilitator level.
Personnel shall only take on the roles of authorised signatory or HITRA Facilitator after successfully
completing the supplementary training and competency assessment.
Training and Competency Matrix:
Role Experience Training Assessment Criteria Assessor

SA 1. Has led and facilitated 1. Completed Practical field assessment shall include: SPA with
Level 1 and 2 HITRAs training for both 1. Can lead a Level 2 TRA. support
using the HITRA process. HITRA from
2. Can articulate the difference between
2. Practical demonstration participation and Technical
a hazard and a risk.
in leading a level 2 HITRA facilitation Discipline
modules. 3. Can state the difference between Level Engineers
1 and 2 HITRAs. (if needed)
2. Satisfactorily
passed the HITRA 4. Understands how residual risk is
knowledge determined and the approval process.
assessment 5. Leads a field CoW verification/audit,
criteria. including HITRA.
6. Can articulate the HITRA hierarchy of
controls.
AA 1. Has led and facilitated 1. Complete the Field assessment shall include/verify the SA
Level 1 and 2 HITRAs HITRA following:
using the HITRA participation and 1. He or she has led a Level 2 HITRA.
process. facilitation training
2. Demonstrate that they understand the
2. Practical course.
HITRA and approval process.
demonstration in 2
3. Explain the difference between Level 1
leading a level 2
and Level 2 HITRAs.
HITRA.
4. Demonstrate ability to lead a L2
HITRA.
5. Apply the HITRA tools and approval
process.
6. Explain the HITRA hierarchy of
Controls and residual risk.
PA Explain the PA’s role in HITRA Awareness Assessment shall include: AA
worksite visits and Level 1 (participation) 1. What is a Level 1 HITRA, and what are
HITRA or equivalent. the key principles
2. Name the energy sources and identify
hazards.
3. What hazards to look for during a
worksite visit
4. When to escalate to Level 2 TRA

Project Internal
7.0. TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)
TRAT lists typical Commissioning activities, prescribing Level 1 or 2 HITRA, recommended participants and
approver. The TRAT table included in Appendix F is based on BP Upstream guidance The purpose of the
TRAT is to:
 Categorise a number of standard tasks according to their residual risk level

 List the appropriate permit to work types (including procedures and routine)
 Define the required Level (1 or 2) of TRA and the approval/authorization level
The Site Authority is accountable for the management of the TRAT. When a task is not covered in the TRAT,
the Site Authority will determine the level of TRA required by applying the HITRA process.

Project Internal
APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS
Energy
Description / guidance
sources
Biological - including wildlife and viruses or bacteria, e.g., as found in sewage systems, drain
lines, cooling towers
Biological
Body Mechanics - human strength and agility applied to a task involving lifting, pushing,
pulling, climbing or positioning
Body
Mechanics
Chemical - in the form of reactive or life-threatening gases, liquids, solids, e.g., water, methane,
nitrogen, process chemicals, etc.
Chemical
Electrical - includes all types and voltages of electricity: high voltage power systems ( (AC),
battery systems (DC) and static.
Consider whether the task:
 Requires equipment related to the task or in the area of the task to be
isolated.
Electrical  Involves electricity powered equipment.
 Is in an area where there is vulnerable electrical equipment such as
insulated cabling, un-insulated overhead power lines, etc.
 Involves transfer of fluids, powers, etc. or friction between non-
conducting materials which could generate static electrical charges. Are
systems and equipment where this could occur adequately grounded and /
or bonded.
Gravity - causes tools, equipment or people to fall or move. This affects lifting task, work at
height and potential dropped objects
Gravity
Mechanical - includes mobile equipment as well as moving parts on stationary equipment and
rotating equipment. Even though items are non-powered, their momentum as they are moved
may crush or cut people or vulnerable equipment. Also includes sharp edges of tools and / or
equipment.
Mechanical

Project Internal
Energy
Description / guidance
sources
Noise - A form of pressure energy.

Consideration should be given to whether:
 The task is in a high noise area.
 Noisy tools / equipment will be used.
 Noise could cause communication problems, including in any
Noise emergency.
Pressure - air, water, pneumatics, springs, gases are all possible sources of significant
pressure.
Consideration should be given to:
 Non-Return Valves (NRVs) where system contents may be trapped
between the NRV and an isolation point.
Pressure  Section of equipment in which trapped or undrained contents may
remain.
 General equipment / line condition, e.g., area of corrosion, where a
pressure leak is foreseeable.
 Reaction forces from a pressure leak, which may move an
unrestrained item, such as a hose, cylinder or pipe segment.
Radiation - in the form of sunlight, radio waves or ionizing radiation (radioactivity)
Radiation
Thermal - energy associated with hot or cold surfaces and fluids, undesired chemical reactions
and / or ambient temperatures.
Thermal

Project Internal
APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS
Category Type of harm Examples

Mechanical Trapping (crushing, pressing, drawing in Two moving parts, or one moving
and shearing injuries) part and a fixed surface
Conveyor belt and drive
V belt and pulley
Power press
Using hammer
Hoist, crane
Impact (includes puncture) / mobile Something that may strike or
equipment stab someone or may be struck
against
Moving vehicle, machine, aircraft
Drill, lathe
Crane hook or load
Contact (cutting, friction or abrasion) Something sharp or with a rough
surface
Knife, chisel, saw
Fan blade
Circular saw blade
Sanding belt
Abrasive wheel
Entanglement (rotating parts) Power take-off shaft
Pipe threading machine
Abrasive wheel
Ejection (of work piece or part of tool) Cartridge tool
Hammer and chisel
Abrasive wheel
Abrasive blasting
Electrical Shock / burn / fire / Electricity > 240v, 240v, 110v…
Explosion DC electricity, especially
Ignition sources batteries (hydrogen gas) when
charging
Static
Batteries
Pressure Release of energy Compressed air
(explosion / injection / Compressed gas
implosion) Process fluid
Steam
Vacuum
Hydraulic system

Project Internal

Hydro-blasting
Stored energy Flying objects, Springs under tension
Electrical / hydraulic / pneumatic systems Springs under compression
Turbine variable inlet guide
vanes
Conveyor tension weight
Counterweight
Accumulators/ pulsation
dampers
Gravity Struck by falling objects Overhead work areas / platforms
Items mounted or stored on
ceilings or on walls
High rack storage areas
(warehouse)
Hoist platform cage
Load carried by crane
Raised tipper lorry body
Thermal Burns / fires / scalds / frostbite Hot surface
Welding flame / arc
Refrigerant
Steam
Process fluid, heat transfer
medium
Radiation Burns, cancer, sunburn, melanoma, skin X Rays
Ionizing radiation cancer  or  radiation
Ultra violet
Non ionizing radiation Burns Micro wave
Radio frequency
Laser
Infrared
Noise Hearing loss, tinnitus Noise > 85 dB(A) continuous
Noise >? dB impact
Vibration Vibration white finger, whole body effects Pneumatic drill
Driving mobile plant
Using jackhammer
Stability Crushing Inadequate crane base
Fork lift truck on slope
Machine not bolted down
Mobile scaffold too high
Scaffold not tied
Overload or defect due to Crushing Crane overload

Project Internal

mechanical failure Chain sling
Scaffold overload
Structure overload, especially
extreme weather
Fire / explosion Burns Paper store
Combustion Grease
Plastic foam
Flammable substances Burns Petrol, diesel, avgas
(highly and extremely Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
flammable)
Hydrogen
See also explosive below
Oxidizing substance Burns Organic peroxide, other oxidising
agents
Nitric acid
Gas explosions Burns, structural failure Flammable gas or liquid above
its flash point in a confined space
Dust explosions Burns, structural failure Wood dust
Health hazards Skin, eyes and respiratory track effects; Sulphuric acid, other acids –
Corrosive / irritating noise especially hydrofluoric
materials Caustic soda, other alkalis
Ammonia, chlorine
Sensitising materials and Sensitisation, fibrosis and cancers of the Silica dust
particulates lungs irritation / injury to eyes Wood dust
Iron dust
Vapours Acute and chronic effects on health Benzene
Toluene
Acetone
Fumes Acute and chronic effects on health (local Lead fume
and systemic effects) Rubber fume
Asphalt fume
Gases Acute and chronic effects on health and Carbon monoxide
death Hydrogen sulphide
Sulphur dioxide
Mists Acute and chronic effects on health Oil mist, cutting fluids
Printing ink mist
Detergents
Aerosols
Asphyxiates Acute and chronic effects on health and Nitrogen
death Carbon monoxide
Smoke
Argon
Health hazard by ingestion Burns to upper alimentary tract Corrosive liquids
Project Internal

Poisoning Toxins
All harmful aerosols
Polluted water
Contaminated food and drink
Hazards by contact Cuts, abrasions Metal swarf
Concrete blocks
Burns, frostbite; Molten metal
also structural failure Cryogenic gases
Environmental Hazards Sewage systems / groundwater / soil Crude / condensate
Biological / hazardous waste pollution / biohazardous waste and sharps / transportation and storage
storage and disposal influenza / malaria Storage of hazardous sludge /
material in pits
Infectious and non-infectious
diseases, parasites
Human factors / fatigue Injuries, illness Shift work
Work patterns
Driving
Poor ergonomic design of plant
Control / alarm systems
Procedures

Project Internal
Khazzan Project Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment
APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE
Severity Health and Safety Environmental

Comparable to the most catastrophic  Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any
Levels A-C health/safety incidents ever seen in industry.
environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5
maintain the The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset years.
visibility of of life threatening health effects) shall always
risks with the be classified at this level.  Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which
A
potential for remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
catastrophic  Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and
impact even if
which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more
their
probability of than 1 and up to 5 years.
occurrence is Catastrophic health/safety incident causing very  Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and
extremely low. widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.
which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
The upper The potential for 50 or more fatalities (or onset
level of this of life threatening health effects) shall always  Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which
framework is be classified at this level. can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1
defined by the and up to 5 years.
B most severe  Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and
level of impact
ever seen in
industry. than 1 and up to 5 years.
 Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and
which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Catastrophic health/safety incident causing  Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and
widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.
The potential for 10 or more fatalities (or onset than 1 and up to 5 years.
of life threatening health effects) shall always
be classified at this level.  Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and
C which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
 Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
 Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and
which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Every employee associate with this project has the ultimate responsibility for Health, Safety, Security & Environmental performance. This will be achieved through a
positive HSSE culture at all the levels and by implementing a robust HSSE Management system. Petrofac and its Sub-Contractor management will continually strive
towards reducing HSSE risks to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) in all its operations to achieve the Project HSSE goals.

Project Internal

Very major health/safety incident  Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and
The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
 Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which
30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
D requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
 Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Major health/safety incident  Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and
1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged. which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or  Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and
requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
E
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
High impact health/safety incident  Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and
Permanent partial disability(ies) which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts.  Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and
Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC) which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
F
 Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and
which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Medium impact health/safety incident  Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment
Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
common source/event.
 Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and
G
 Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and
H Low impact health/safety incident  Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment

Project Internal

First aid and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or
Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but weeks.
no actual health effects

Project Internal
Financial Impact
Severity Non-financial Business Impact (equipment damage, business value
lost)
Public or investor outrage on a global scale.
A >$20 billion
Threat of global loss of license to operate.
Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market – US, EU, Russia.
Intervention from major Government – US, UK, EU, Russia.
B $5 billion - $20 billion
Public or investor outrage in major western markets – US, EU.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.
Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major
market.
C $1 billion - $5 billion
Intervention from other major Government.
Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration.
Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major
market.
Interventions from non-major Governments.
Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited “interest-group” outrage in a major
D market. $100 m to $1 billion
Prolonged adverse national or international media attention.
Widespread adverse social impact.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment.
Other adverse enforcement action by regulators.
Limited “interest-group” outrage in non-major market.
E $5m -$100m
Short term adverse national or international media coverage.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU.
Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence
Prolonged local media coverage.
F $500k-$5m
Local adverse social impact.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).
Short term local media coverage.
G $50k -$500k
Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).
H Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode). <$50k

Project Internal
APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A similar A similar Similar Similar A similar Likely to Event likely Common
event has event has event has event has event has occur once to occur occurrence
not yet not yet occurred occurred occurred, or or twice in several (at least
occurred in occurred in somewhere somewhere is likely to the facility times in the annually) at
Impact
our industry our industry. in our within the occur, lifetime. facility the facility.
Level
and would industry. BP Group. within the lifetime.
only be a lifetime of
remote 10 similar
possibility. facilities.
A 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
B 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Area
C 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 V
D 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Area
E 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 IV
Area
F 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 III
Area
G 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 II
Area
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I
Less than Less than Less than Less than Less than Less than Greater Greater
Probability 1 in a 1 in 1 in 1 in 1,000 1 in 100 1 in 10 than 1 in than 1 in
million 100,000 10,000 10 4

Project Internal
APPENDIX E APPROVAL MATRIX
Residual risk Minimum level of approval
Area V Not allowed

Area IV Not foreseen during commissioning phase
Area III Project Director
Area II Commissioning Manager / Deputy Commissioning Manager
Area I Site Authority

Project Internal
APPENDIX F TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)
The following tables are based on Khazzan Operational risk assessment guidance
Risk area I
Legend: CW (Cold Work),HW (Hot Work), HWSP (Hot Work Spark Potential), MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet),
Other CoW Minimum

Supplementary
Task Permit to work type documentation to Risk assessment recommended TRA TRA Approval
certificates
consider participants
Abrasive blasting: not on live equipment and

CW Chemical data sheet Level 1 AA/AAD, PA AA
not in a hazardous area
Area lighting repairs (lamp replacement) HW spark potential ICC if relevant Level 1 AA, PA AA
CW on proven isolated equipment, no breaking ICC if not a personal

CW Isolation plan Level 1 AA, PA AA
containment isolation
CW or HW spark
ICC if not a personal
Electrical heat tracing work (isolated) potential (task Isolation plan Level 1 AA, PA AA
isolation
dependent)
Electrical work, isolated in non-hazardous ICC if not a personal

CW Isolation plan Level 1 AA, PA AA
areas isolation

Electrical work isolated in hazardous areas HWSP Isolation plan Level 1 AA
isolation
CW, HW spark
Field instrument testing and minor repairs potential, Level 1 AA, PA AA
isolation
(task dependent)
Commissioning loop checks in ICC if not a personal

CW Level 1 AA, PA AA
non-hazardous areas isolation
Isolating electrical equipment (by Electrical ISA CW or HW spark

- only site defined low voltage); no exposure to potential, Isolation plan Level 1 AA, PA AA
isolation
live conductors (task dependent)

Project Internal
Risk area I
Legend: CW (Cold Work),HW (Hot Work), HWSP (Hot Work Spark Potential), MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet),
Other CoW Minimum

Supplementary
Task Permit to work type documentation to Risk assessment recommended TRA TRA Approval
certificates
Isolation plan, AA (or based on

Isolation of twinned relief valve not in service
CW Locked Open/Locked Level 1 AA, PA residual risk in
(not removal)
Closed register approval table)
CW, HW spark
Radiography (if no nucleonic instruments on
potential (dependent Level 1 AA, PA AA
live units in affected area)
on equipment used)
Chemical data sheet,

Painting and insulation work CW Level 1 AA, PA AA
procedure
Insulation removal and reinstatement for

Insulation procedure,
inspection - no known leak or heat trace CW Level 1 AA, PA AA
chemical data sheet
removal
Scaffolding at or above grade not over side:

erecting, dismantling or modifying (connected CW Scaffolding procedure Level 1 AA, PA AA
to plant, equipment and structure)
Ground disturbance (with no identified buried

CW Ground disturbance Level 1 AA, PA AA
cables/pipework)

Project Internal
Risk area II and III
Legend: CW (Cold Work), HW (Hot Work), HWSP (Hot Work Spark Potential), MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet), Ops (operations) RA (Risk Assessment)
TRA Approval
Other CoW Minimum
Permit to work Supplementary (or higher, based on
Task documentation to Risk assessment recommended TRA
type certificates the residual risk in
the approval table)
Breaking containment Isolation plan, chemical Level 1 or Level 2 (task

CW ICC PA, AA, ISA AA
(as per isolation procedure) data sheet dependent)
Procedure,
Breaking containment
non-conformant
(does not meet energy isolation CW ICC Level 2 PA, AA, ISA SA
isolations approval,
procedure)
chemical data sheet
Tasks in CSE: vessels with positive ERRP, chemical data

Task dependent CSE, ICC Level 2 PA, AA Site Authority
isolation sheet
Tasks in CSE: vessels in Greenfields (not PA, AA, HSE

Task dependent CSE ERRP Level 2 Site Authority
connected to system) specialist
Isolation plan, isolation

Use of mechanical device (stopple/plug PA, AA, Site
CW ICC device procedure, Level 2 Site Authority
for secondary isolation method) Authority
chemical data sheet
Field instrument work (isolation of a safety Bypass/inhibit override PA, AA, Lead
CW or HW spark
critical device, when the device is in use register; temporary Discipline
potential ICC Level 2, Site Authority
for its intended purpose, not operating procedure, if Commissioning
(task dependent)
Commissioning fault finding) required Engineer
Level 2/ Level 1
HW open flame in (AA to determine
PA, AA, HSE
non-classified hazardous area or HW open flame appropriate level of risk Site Authority
specialist
greenfield assessment based on local
conditions and plant status)
Commissioning of mechanical machinery.

generators, compressors, pumps, fans Commissioning PA, AA, Lead Site Authority
Task dependent ICC Level 2
(i.e. equipment listed in handover procedure Discipline Engineer
package)

Project Internal
Risk area II and III
TRA Approval
Other CoW Minimum
Permit to work Supplementary (or higher, based on
Task documentation to Risk assessment recommended TRA
type certificates the residual risk in
the approval table)
Bypass/inhibit override
Level 2/ Level 1
register, Locked
Isolation of protective device (when level (AA to determine
CW Open/Locked Closed PA, AA, Lead
of protection is reduced, e.g. single relief ICC appropriate level of risk Site Authority
(task dependent) register, isolation plan, Discipline Engineer
valve) assessment based on local
temporary operating
conditions and plant status)
procedure
PA (for lifting task),

Lift over live equipment CW Lifting plan Level 2 AA, Site Lifting Site Authority
competent person
Pressure/leak test
procedure, chemical
Pressure/leak testing CW ICC Level 2 PA, AA Site Authority
data sheet, isolation
plan
Work at height (no fixed access platforms, Specific procedure,

PA, AA, HSE
walkways or installed approved scaffold, CW competency verification, Level 2 Site Authority
specialist
use of fall arrest system) ERRP
Commissioning AA, PA, Electrical

Energized electrical commissioning HWSP Energized electrical Level 2 Site Authority
procedure Engineer
Specific risk- assessed

Ground disturbance (with identified buried Ground disturbance PA, AA, Discipline
CW procedure, ERRP, Level 2 Site Authority
cables/pipework) CSE (if applicable) Engineers
chemical data sheet
High pressure nitrogen/helium leak Leak testing procedure,

CW ICC Level 2 PA, AA, ISA Site Authority
testing isolation plan

Project Internal
Risk area IV (excluding C+)
Minimum TRA Approval (or

Other CoW
Permit to work Supplementary recommended higher, based on the
Task documentation to Risk assessment
type certificates Level 2 TRA residual risk in the
consider
participants approval table)
No Risk Area IV identified for CPF

facilities

Project Internal
APPENDIX G LEVEL 1 RISK ASSESSMENT PRO FORMA
Level 1 Risk Assessment

Date: Performing Authority:
Task
description
Hazard – Tasks, process and worksite

The hazards directly related to performing the task steps, using the tools and equipment at this jobsite.
Body Toxic Human Hazardous

Biological mechanics substances Electrical Gravity Thermal Mechanical Noise Pressure Radiation SIMOPS Weather process
factors
materials
Hazard description Control measures Pre

requisite
What, How and Detail What, How and Detail Y/N
Residual Risk:
Eliminate  Substitute  Engineering  Isolation/Segregation  Administrative  PPE
PA Signature
AA Signature

Project Internal
APPENDIX H HITRA FORM
if not known now, complete date of assessment

INSTALLATION : PERMIT No : DATE : HITRA REF No :
later
DEPARTMENT/SYSTEM/LOCATION: RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM (Name of Facilitator first)
NORMAL HITRA 
RISK ASSESSMENT TYPE:
SORA  ORA  NAME POSITION
TASK DESCRIPTION:
Who, What, Why, How and When. As the task becomes more complex, the level of detail and
supporting documentation increases. Consider system boundaries, the extent of equipment, hardware,
or software affected by the activity.
Will the work be carried out on isolated or un-isolated systems? Where are the isolations, or interfaces
with other systems?
What area could be affected in an accident? People working or passing nearby, working on related
activities or connected systems.
Time and duration of work, one shift or multiple shifts? During the day, night or both?
Tools and equipment to be used: hand tools, power tools, ladders, lifting equipment, specific PPE?
Interfaces with adjacent work fronts, will work affect or be affected by other simultaneous work?
I, the HITRA Facilitator confirm that the HITRA has been reviewed to ensure that the risks
identified are relevant and that all control measures are in place.
Name: Date: Sign:
REFERENCES AND OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION :

CONFIRMED ALARP
(e.g. Emergency Provision Required, Competency requirements, Tools & Equipment, additional PPE, P&IDs, Drawings, PTW,
HITRA APPROVED: REFER APPROVAL MATRIX
Procedures, Certificates, other Risk Assessments)
NAME (PRINT):
sign after worksheets are complete and the AA

SIGNATURE : accepts the TRA
POSITION :
DATE :
TASK DESCRIPTION SUMMARY : HITRA REF No :
Give the completed form to the Permit to Work Coordinator

Project Internal
2. Sub-Task Activity 3. Hazard 4. Hazard Impact 5. Existing Control 6. Initial Risk 7.List All Risk Reduction 9. Residual Risk 10. 11. Actions
1. Sub-
/ Description Description category Measures Measures Required Approver closed
Task No safety, health, Required for L1 and L2
environment and
business impact, probability impact, probability and
and rating rating
S H E B I P R I P R

Project Internal

Hitra Procedure Kz01 CG Pro 53 0113 A02

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hitra Procedure Kz01 CG Pro 53 0113 A02

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Khazzan

Project Internal Contract No. CO-BPXO-12-0376

Amendment Revision Amender

Document Number Document Name Description of Content

Petrofac Golden Rules of

Khazzan Commissioning Commissioning specific CoW process including PtW and

KZ01-SA-PLN-53-0005 Emergency Response &

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111 Energy Isolation Khazzan Project Commissioning Energy Isolation procedure

A02 24/02/2016 RE-ISSUED FOR REVIEW RT CM CE

Section Number Short Description of Hold

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 2 of 41 Rev: A02

CSE Confined Space Entry

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 3 of 41 Rev: A02

2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES............................................................................

3.0. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

4.0. ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK.............................................................

5.0. PERFORM TASK................................................................................................

6.0. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY............................................................................

7.0. TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)..............................................................

APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS.....................................................................

APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS.........................................................

APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE....................................................................

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 4 of 41 Rev: A02

APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX......................................................................

APPENDIX E APPROVAL MATRIX..................................................................................

APPENDIX F TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT).....................................................

APPENDIX G LEVEL 1 RISK ASSESSMENT PRO FORMA...................................................

APPENDIX H HITRA FORM...........................................................................................

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 5 of 41 Rev: A02

Before conducting HITRA, evaluate:

1. Is the job really necessary?

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 6 of 41 Rev: A02

Figure 1: Commissioning CoW Document Structure

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 7 of 41 Rev: A02

2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. Single Point of Accountability

2.2. Site Authority

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 8 of 41 Rev: A02

2.3. Area Authority

2.4. Area Authority Designate

2.5. Performing Authority

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 9 of 41 Rev: A02

The PA shall ensure that:

2.6. Responsibilities of HITRA Facilitators

 Complete Level 1 HITRAs

1.1.2. HITRA Level 2 Facilitator (Typically AA or

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 10 of 41 Rev: A02

3.0. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW

3.1. Task Risk Assessment Levels

The reasons for a Level 2 HITRA include, for example:

 The task is new and unfamiliar

 Confined space entry

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 11 of 41 Rev: A02

o Blocking of escape routes

 Online connections to process equipment tanks or pipelines, including hot tapping.

3.2. HITRA Process Steps

3.3. Level 1 HITRA Process

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 12 of 41 Rev: A02

Figure 3: Level 1 HITRA Flowchart

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113 Page 13 of 41 Rev: A02

3.4. Level 2 HITRA Process

Figure 4: Level 2 HITRA Flowchart