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Intuition Analysis and Reflection An Exp
Intuition Analysis and Reflection An Exp
PII: S1746-0689(14)00029-7
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijosm.2014.04.004
Reference: IJOSM 329
Please cite this article as: Spadaccini J, Esteves JE, Intuition, analysis and reflection: An experimental
study into the decision-making processes and thinking dispositions of osteopathy students, International
Journal of Osteopathic Medicine (2014), doi: 10.1016/j.ijosm.2014.04.004.
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Authors
Jonathan Spadaccini
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Research Center, The British School of Osteopathy 275 Borough High Street, London,
United Kingdom, SE1 1JE
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Jorge E. Esteves*
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Research Center, The British School of Osteopathy 275 Borough High Street, London,
United Kingdom, SE1 1JE
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*Corresponding Author Details:
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Dr Jorge E. Esteves
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Abstract
Background
Decision-making and reflective thinking are fundamental aspects of clinical reasoning. How
osteopathy students think and make decisions will therefore have far-reaching implications
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throughout their professional lives. Models of decision-making are firmly established in
cognitive science literature and their application is universal, yet the decision-making
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processes and thinking dispositions of osteopathy students remain relatively unexplored.
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Objectives and Method
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Using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)13 to measure decision-making preferences and
the 41-item Actively Open-minded Thinking disposition scale (AOT)29, this study set out to
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explore how osteopathy students at the start (novice; n=44) and end (intermediate; n=32) of
their pre-professional training make decisions and how reflectively they think.
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Results
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than their novice peers (p = 0.007; effect size = 0.31); however, reflective thinking
significant association was found between analytical decision-making and reflective thinking
(p = 0.85).
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Conclusions
The trend for intermediate level practitioners to demonstrate more analytical decision-making
than novices, without significant differences in reflective thinking processes, supports other
research that suggests osteopathic education promotes deductive over inductive reasoning
in its graduates and that reasoning and thinking dispositions may develop independently of
each other, given the skills and knowledge-based requirements of osteopathic education.
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1. Introduction
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Clinical reasoning is the thinking and decision-making process that informs and underpins
autonomous clinical practice, involving the interrogation and application of both declarative
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and procedural knowledge, reflection, and evaluation.1 Clinical reasoning in autonomous
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processes associated with, for example, reasoning, problem-solving and decision-making.
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Thinking and decision-making remain, however, an under-researched topic in osteopathy.
concepts and models of decision-making and during the last two decades, the Dual Process
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theory has become widely accepted and established as a model of human reasoning and
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underpinned by two distinct systems of judgment, which cluster at either end of a continuum
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processes such as similarity, association, and memory retrieval; judgments are fast,
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judgments are slow, deliberative and conscious.7, 8 The Dual Process theory illustrates the
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two main forms of human reasoning: inductive and deductive.8 Whereas inductive reasoning
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is primarily based on the rapid retrieval, and appraisal of world knowledge, i.e., System 1;
It has been claimed that osteopathy is distinguished from other health care professions by
the fact that it is practised according to an articulated philosophy.9 However, it can be argued
that the decision-making processes and thinking dispositions of osteopathic practitioners are
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field of cognitive science, the application of the Dual Process theory to medicine remains
uncommon10 and only limited attempts have been made to explore it in the context of
osteopathy.11, 12
In the UK, as primary contact practitioners, osteopaths have a statutory
obligation to demonstrate appropriate thinking skills in order to justify their clinical decision-
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making, but also to regularly engage in reflective thinking to ensure their knowledge remains
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relevant.13 The present study is especially timely as osteopathy’s inclusion in national
guidelines for the management of non-specific low back pain14 must make it more available
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for scrutiny in the context of changing health care purchasing and provision.15
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As a general psychological construct, System 1 processes can be adaptive and useful
strategies to reach reasonable, if not always considered, conclusions.16 Although there may
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have been certain evolutionary advantages to fast intuitive thinking, it continues to exert
considerable control over human decision-making today.3 Frederick17 illustrates this well in
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his extensive research involving over 3000 subjects across 35 separate studies. Despite
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(CRT). Frederick17 argued that the items on the test are easily understood when the solutions
are explained, that high level mathematical skills are not needed, but that in order to reach
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the correct answer, an erroneous, impulsive and intuitive response must be suppressed: “A
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bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat cost $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost?” Although the correct answer is 5¢, the more common (and incorrect System 1)
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answer given is 10¢. As a result of such examples, there is now considerable consensus in
the medical literature, often without criticism or investigation, on how faulty reasoning results
in diagnostic errors.18-22 On this point, Croskerry18 argues that whereas the majority of errors
occur with System 1 judgments and are to some extent expected, errors made with System 2
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An additional feature of Frederick’s17 CRT may be its ability to implicate thinking dispositions,
especially those related to thinking reflectively. Performance on the CRT demands that a pre-
potent and incorrect response is overridden in favour of a more reflective (and therefore
correct) one. Baron23, p. 172 defines good thinking as a complex process that demonstrates the
“optimal search for possibilities, evidence and goals”. In contrast, poor thinking is
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characterised by an inadequate search for evidence and the general tendency of people to
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allow their own biases to affect their reasoning. The zenith of Baron’s23, p. 173 good thinking is
termed ‘actively open-minded thinking’, in which enhanced objectivity is ensured during the
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search for, and review of, the evidence.
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The existence of a dual process model of decision-making is well established. Indeed,
Notwithstanding this, the literature in the field of medical cognition is clearly divided over the
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merits of one system over the other, and recent developments in cognitive science seem to
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osteopathy is scarce.
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How osteopathy students think and make decisions will have potentially far-reaching
implications throughout their professional lives. In particular, given that the nature of
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patient-centred responsibility to continue to reflect upon and evaluate its impact.27 It is also
assumed that throughout training, thinking and reasoning styles develop as clinical
experience and understanding grow. This study therefore set out to ask: what are the levels
different stages in their pre-registration education? In doing so, this study explores whether
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osteopathy students favour System 1 or System 2 processes when making decisions; and
thinking disposition. Finally, it also explored whether final year (intermediate practitioner)
students demonstrate more analytical decision-making and reflective thinking than their first
year (novice practitioner) colleagues, measured using the CRT and Actively Open-minded
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Thinking Scale (AOT) scales respectively.
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2. Methods
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2.1 Study design
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A quasi-experimental design was used to explore links between year of pre-professional
training, decision-making and reflective thinking preferences. The independent variable was
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expertise, with two levels (novice vs. intermediate), and dependent variables were decision-
making and reflective thinking preferences, measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test
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(CRT) and the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (AOT) respectively. This study draws
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upon methodology commonly used in the field of cognitive science exploring decision-making
2.2 Participants
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at the British School of Osteopathy (BSO) and taken from years 1 (novices: n = 44) and final
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recruited through email invitation, participated in the study. Following the model of medical
colleagues33 in the domain of allopathic medicine, novices are students in their pre-clinical
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training years whereas intermediates are students who have already completed a substantial
All students from both years were contacted via their year forum intranet address. They
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received written details of the study with an instruction to contact the researchers directly if
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they wished to participate.
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In line with existing research in the field of cognitive science, English as second language
and familiarity with the tests were not regarded as exclusion criteria.28, 31 The items on the
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CRT and AOT demonstrate sufficient internal reliability and validity that they may be easily
completed even with English as a second language. Moreover, Costa and colleagues.34 have
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recently found that performance on the CRT is not affected by language; foreign language
does not reduce the impact of System 1 on participants’ decisions. Additionally, it was
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assumed that students on the course possess competence in the English language, having
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already fulfilled the entry requirements for the osteopathy pre-registration masters’ course.
With regard to familiarity with the CRT, it was reasoned that although some participants may
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have already been familiar with items on the CRT, it is unlikely that they would have
memorised the correct answers. Therefore, even familiarity required participants to think
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more analytically to score well. Finally, we did not screen participants for their cognitive
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ability for two main reasons: firstly, we assumed they possessed the cognitive ability to study
at undergraduate level; and secondly, cognitive ability was not one of the study’s outcome
measures.
The Cognitive Reflection Test introduced by Frederick17 is a brief 3-item test, which
differentiates between more impulsive and more reflective decision-makers.30 The CRT’s
three items are: “1) A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat cost $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?; 2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?; 3) In a lake there is a patch of lily
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pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire
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lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?” The CRT demonstrates
high levels of internal reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83).28 It is scored in terms of accuracy,
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thus subjects can score between 0 and 3 out of 3, with higher scores reflecting more
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analytical and deliberative (System 2) decision-making.
participants are asked to mark in the box which best describes their thoughts on each item,
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” (with 4 other options between). Examples of
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items include, “People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their
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beliefs”. Some of the items are reversed scored and a total score is achieved by summing
the responses. Higher scores implicate more open-minded thinking.36 The AOT also shows
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high internal reliability and validity (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.81)28 in assessing whether subjects
are able to separate prior beliefs and opinions from the evaluation of current evidence and
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arguments.
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Participants completed both the CRT and AOT individually during a single session, lasting on
average around ten minutes per person. Participants were able to complete the scales in any
order they preferred. They were advised verbally and in writing they could leave blank any of
the CRT questions they felt unable to answer, but to complete all 41 statements on the AOT.
Anonymity was assured verbally and in writing. All participants completed the scales in a
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classroom setting with instruction to complete both measures without discussing their
answers with their peers, during or after completion. This study was approved by the BSO
Research Ethics Committee and conducted according to the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
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Descriptive statistics were computed for each group to establish the normality of the CRT
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and AOT scores (Skewness and kurtosis; Shapiro-Wilk test and histogram inspections) and
to report measures of central tendency and spread of data. To examine the null hypothesis
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“there is no difference in ‘intermediate’ and ‘novice’ students’ decision-making preferences
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and reflective thinking skills”, we used a Mann-Whitney U test, an independent t test and
Spearman’s rank correlation. Cohen’s d and effect size correlations for CRT and AOT scores
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were calculated if they reached statistical significance. The significance level for all analyses
3. Results
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Figure 1 illustrates the CRT median scores (MDN) across the two levels of expertise (novice
and intermediate). For novices (n=44), 61% failed to answer any of the problems correctly,
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with 4.5% solving all three items. For intermediates (n=32), 38% of participants did not solve
469.0; p = 0.007; effect size = 0.31] with intermediates scoring higher in the CRT (Mdn = 1)
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3.2 Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale (AOT)
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The AOT scores in both groups were tested for normality based on skewness (-2 < Z < 2),
kurtosis (-2 < Z < 2) and Shapiro-Wilk (p > 0.05) values. All of the data were normally
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distributed (novices, p = 0.955; intermediates, p = 0.352)
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Table 1 shows the AOT mean scores (M) and standard deviations (SD). Differences in
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correlation did not reveal a statistically significant association between analytical decision-
making (CRT) and reflective thinking (AOT) [rs (74) = -0.022, p = 0.85] (see Figure 2).
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4. Discussion
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This study explored how pre-registration osteopathy students at different levels of expertise
think and make decisions. It also examined whether any relationship exists between their
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reasoning preferences and thinking dispositions. The results show that students nearing the
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end of their education demonstrate significantly more analytical decision-making than their
novice peers; however, there was no evidence to suggest that reflective thinking dispositions
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change as students progress through their training. Moreover, there was no significant
association between analytical decision-making and reflective thinking. Taken together, the
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results from this study provide preliminary empirical evidence suggesting that in contrast to
thinking, despite their lengthier exposure to osteopathic education. The lack of association
between reasoning and reflection suggests that one may not be a predictor of the other.
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Therefore, intermediate practitioners who are not yet separating their beliefs and biases to
think openly and reflectively across a range of domains, may nevertheless have begun to
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Despite the significant difference between the reasoning preferences of each group, overall
median scores suggest that System 1 decision-making strategies may still prevail. This is
consistent with much of the literature in the field of cognitive science, which supports the
decision-making.17, 37, The term ‘cognitive miser’ was initially proposed by Fiske and Taylor38
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to illustrate the fact that individuals commonly evaluate information and make decisions using
cognitive shortcuts. In the field of clinical reasoning, Kassirer39 argued that the analytical
reasoning approach fails to take into consideration the fact that humans are human, not
heuristics. According to Stanovich6, the cognitive system tends to default to the state
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requiring minimal cognitive effort, i.e., the ‘cognitive miser’ function. Importantly, much of the
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medical cognition literature supports this tendency in otherwise thoughtful and educated
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there is a significant move away from this in subjects nearing the end of their osteopathic
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education. That is to say, intermediate practitioners are starting to reason more analytically
and this analytical reasoning may be consistent with the ‘technical rationality’, or the reliance
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27
on factual knowledge and skills applied in predictable ways that Thomson et al argue
much greater predisposition towards the intuitive, pattern recognition approach inherent in
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System 1. If, as it is widely acknowledged within osteopathic literature, that “evaluation within
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osteopathic practice is a complex thing” , then what emerges from the literature is
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curious, as it seems to suggest that with expertise comes pattern recognition and therefore
education and endorsed by the profession’s governing body13, may overload the system and
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exceed the decision-making capacities of the individual.43 For novices, this then presents
something of a dilemma, as they are more likely to consider the problem as complex and
possess insufficient knowledge, yet may benefit from advice to use their intuition and
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This ‘thinking about thinking’ encourages practitioners to constantly monitor and adjust their
thoughts and reasoning processes from both deductive (System 2) and inductive (System 1)
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problems25 with specific instruction to use both reasoning strategies, there are fewer
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cognitive or reasoning errors. Arguably, metacognition may provide the link between
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medicine.12 However, it would appear that for osteopathy students in this study at least, a
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metacognitive disparity exists if, as the results suggest, components such as reflective
thinking and analytical reasoning develop at different rates and that one may not predict the
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other.
CRT and AOT scores, is consistent with cognitive science research. This research suggests
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that cognitive ability (of any level) is independent of that individual’s ability to decouple their
prior beliefs and opinions from their evaluation of the evidence and arguments before
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them.29, 36
It is therefore possible that pre-registration professional osteopathic education
encourages analytical or deductive reasoning (System 2) as rules, procedures and facts that
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must be learned and understood at a high level before they are applied clinically. Therefore,
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the move towards more analytical reasoning, as demonstrated by the intermediate level
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or actively open-minded thinking, may develop post-graduation if, as Thomson et al
argue; “an undergraduate curriculum which is excessively skill-based may not promote
the development of diagnostic expertise and professional autonomy.46 For example, Rivett
and Jones47, p.406 have argued that expert clinicians are able to effectively use metacognitive
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absence of metacognition, clinicians are unable to effectively use their clinical reasoning to
manage clinical complexity.47 Although the concept of ‘professional artistry’ may imply a
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profile. During their professional journey from novice to expert, clinicians should develop their
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skills of criticality and their ability to reflect on, and analyse their practice experiences in and
on action.11, 12
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Investigating the cognitive aspects of clinical reasoning, such as thinking and decision-
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making, inevitably means removing them from the larger context of clinical relevance, as
ultimately subjects were not called upon to make clinical decisions. One of the major flaws of
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this study is a lack of osteopathic context, particularly, as Croskerry20 argues, decision-
making relies heavily on contextual cues, both to provide meaning but also to minimise
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cognitive effort. This is especially important for System 1 reasoning, which, as has been
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shown, may be more prone to error. Future research investigating students’ reasoning and
thinking dispositions may therefore need to consider using clinically relevant scenarios that
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require decisions to be made, or even a more qualitative approach, consistent with previous
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clinical reasoning research in physiotherapy and occupational therapy.48 We also propose
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experienced osteopaths in the study design. This may prove to be a useful benchmark for
the two student groups, as it would enable researchers to investigate reasoning strategies
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and reflective thinking dispositions along the continuum from novice to expert.
Other methodological flaws may also limit the validity of these findings beyond pilot study
status, namely the recruitment of peers and the number of subjects ultimately recruited. The
very nature of convenience sampling prevents the significance of these findings being
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applied to a population beyond the institution from where the sample was drawn. Arguably,
those interested in research and willing to participate already demonstrate levels of reflective
thinking and reasoning processes at odds with the rest of the student population. Despite a
medium effect size observed with the CRT outcome, participant numbers may have been
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acknowledged, trends are more subtle and preferences may develop differently over time.
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A final area worth scrutiny concerns the tools used to measure the dependent variables.
Although both the CRT and AOT demonstrate consistent levels of internal validity and
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reliability, the CRT relies on numerical calculation, however basic, and may therefore be a
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measure of intelligence and not reasoning, ultimately correlating with measures of
mathematical ability and predicting bias in tasks of calculation and IQ only. Moreover,
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familiarity with the CRT test items and awareness that deliberative decision making
processes might be required before an answer is given, may have skewed the results.
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Similarly, the length of the AOT and some of the less culturally relevant items, for example, ‘I
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believe the “new morality” of permissiveness is no morality at all’, may limit its relevance in
5. Conclusion
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Using a three-item cognitive reflection test and a 41-item thinking disposition scale, this study
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set out to explore the reasoning strategies and reflective thinking dispositions of osteopathy
more analytical and reflective thinking. The results demonstrate that students nearing the
than their novice peers. However, reflective thinking dispositions do not change with
increased exposure to osteopathic education and nor does analytical reasoning predict
reflective thinking preferences. Results from the CRT are consistent with cognitive science
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research that supports a Dual Process Model of decision-making. However, the trend for
support to recent osteopathic research that suggests osteopathic education promotes the
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thinking styles, which arguably develop alongside reasoning post-graduation to become
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‘metacognition’. The development of metacognitive proficiency is, in our opinion, a critical
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analytical decision-making and reflective thinking in this study supports both this notion and
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previous research that suggests cognitive ability is separate from thinking bias and
preference.
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JEE is an Associate Editor of the Int J Osteopath Med but was not involved in review or
editorial decisions regarding this manuscript.
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Tables
Figures
Figure 1: Median outcomes for novice (1st yr) and intermediate (4th Yr) groups
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Figure 2: Scatter plot for AOT and CRT scores
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Subjects n M SD
Novices 44 125.2 14.6
Intermediates 32 119.6 11.7
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osteopathy students.
• The emphasis on ‘technical rationality’ in osteopathic education might
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prevent students from developing reflective thinking styles, which are
central role to the development of metacognitive proficiency, a critical
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component of an osteopath’s clinical competence profile.
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