LIQUEFIED GAS

FIRE HAZARD
MANAGEMENT
EDITION 2
 LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE
HAZARD MANAGEMENT
EDITION 2

A VIDEOTEL PRODUCTION
IN ASSOCIATION WITH

THE PRODUCERS WOULD LIKE TO ACKNOWLEDGE

THE ASSISTANCE OF THE MASTERS, OFFICERS AND CREWS OF

SS AL DEEBEL INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

BG LNG SERVICES
CALOR GAS LTD
CALOR GAS CANVEY TERMINAL
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT,
LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY
FALCK RISC ROTTERDAM
FLUXYS LNG TERMINAL ZEEBRUGGE
(IMO)
MISC BERHAD
MOL LNG TRANSPORT (EUROPE) LTD.
NYK SHIP MANAGEMENT
PORT OF ZEEBRUGGE
RASGAS COMPANY LIMITED
RESOURCE PROTECTION INTERNATIONAL

WARNING
Any unauthorised copying, lending, exhibition, diffusion, sale, public performance or other exploitation of the
CONSULTANTS: NIALL RAMSDEN, KAUSHIK ROY
accompanying workbook training package is strictly prohibited and may result in prosecution.
PRINT AUTHOR: SHEILA BROWNLEE
COPYRIGHT © VIDEOTEL 2011 WRITER/ DIRECTOR: MICHAEL CAINE
This video and accompanying workbook training package is intended to reflect the best available techniques PRODUCER: ANDY BELL
and practices at the time of production. It is intended purely as comment. No responsibility is accepted by
Videotel, or by any firm, corporation or organisation who or which has been in any way concerned with the
production or authorised translation, supply or sale of this video for accuracy of any information given hereon
or for any omission herefrom.
CONTENTS
ABOUT THE TRAINING
1 / INTRODUCTION
2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD
MANAGEMENT
3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE
4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND
TRAINING
5 / FIRE PREVENTION
6 / STAYING ON TOP
7 / CASE STUDIES
8 / GLOSSARY
9 / REFERENCE SECTION
10 / APPENDIX
11 / ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
12 / ASSESSMENT ANSWERS
04 CONTENTS
ABOUT THE TRAINING
LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT EDITION 2 is for training all
ship crew including Master and officers, and additionally terminal and tug
personnel. It can be used by individuals on board ship, or in trainer-led group
PAGE sessions in colleges and fire fighting schools.
Its learning objectives are to:
05 • provide key knowledge about the fire hazards of liquefied gases
07 • explain how to prevent a liquefied gas fire
• demonstrate fire-fighting equipment and correct procedures for dealing
with a leak or fire
11 • outline basic fire hazard management principles
18
THE TRAINING PACKAGE
The video is structured in chapters, allowing users to choose the section they
29 need, and with the advantage that trainers can show single sections in shorter
37 training sessions.
The workbook follows the same structure as the video. As well as the key
41
learning points, it includes a template and checklist, case studies, a reference
43 section, and assessment questions.
48 > HOW TO USE THE TRAINING
52
The following are suggested guidelines for how to prepare for, and run,
53 effective training sessions with a small group.
54 PREPARATION
58 Think about the group
How much do your trainees already know about liquefied gas fire hazard
management? How familiar are they with the gas monitoring and fire-fighting
ABOUT THE TRAINING 05
equipment on your ship or in your terminal? What do they need to know? What
are the kind of questions they might ask you? What do you want this session to
achieve?
Watch the video
What section(s) of the video do you want to concentrate on in the session? It’s
important to familiarise yourself with the video in advance, so that you can
anticipate possible questions from the group and research your answers.
TIPS FOR RUNNING AN EFFECTIVE TRAINING SESSION
Begin with an overview
Tell the group what the objectives of the session are, what you’re going to
cover, what they’ll be able to do by the end of the session, and how long it will
take.
Ask questions throughout
It’s a good idea to ask them questions from the start, and to encourage them to
ask you questions throughout the session.
Start discussions
Encouraging discussions in a small group will help each individual to make a
contribution to the session. But remember that some people are reluctant to
speak up.
Sum up what the session has achieved
At the end, go back to the objectives and the outline, and briefly pull together
everything you’ve covered. Make sure that you’ve asked for any other
questions, and answered them. Ask the group what they found most useful
about the session.
And finally...
Afterwards, spend a few minutes thinking about how the session went, and how
you might want to change it next time.
06 ABOUT THE TRAINING
1 / INTRODUCTION
> 1.1 / WHAT IS LIQUEFIED GAS?
Liquefied gas is carried all over the world for a variety of industrial and
domestic uses, especially as fuel and chemical feedstock.
Liquefied gas cargoes are:
• Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), produced either from natural gas or from
refining crude oil. Key LPGs are propane and butanes and mixtures of the
two
• Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), produced from natural gas. Its main
constituent is methane
• chemical gases such as ammonia, butadiene and propylene. These
require additional measures and are not specifically covered in this
programme
The gas is converted into liquid form by the producers to make it more
economically viable to transport in bulk, as its volume is many times smaller
than the vapour, for example One volume of LPG is equivalent to over 250
volumes of vapour. One volume of LNG is equivalent to 600 volumes of vapour.
> 1.2 / THE FIRE HAZARDS FROM LIQUEFIED GASES
Liquefied Natural Gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gases and most of the chemical
gases are hydrocarbons and their single most hazardous property is the
flammable nature of their vapours, although it should be remembered that
many are toxic and asphyxiants.
Luckily, most vapour emissions and liquefied gas spills do not turn into fires
because of the mitigation measures in place, particularly the control of sources
of ignition.
1 / INTRODUCTION 07
 FIREBALL
What is a BLEVE?

BLEVE

However, if some of the cargo escapes and evaporates, then comes into
A BLEVE can occur in a flammable liquefied gas containment
contact with a source of ignition (e.g. a flame, a spark, static electricity, a
vessel when the heat of the fire increases the internal tank
hot surface), it will ignite if it is within a specific concentration range, i.e. the
pressure, particularly at the part of the vessel not cooled by the
flammable range. If there should be a large release of LPG that does not ignite
internal liquid.
immediately but mixes turbulently with air, it is also possible for there to be a
vapour cloud explosion. Ever greater pressures are created, until the steel fails and large
pieces of the tank shell can be thrown considerable distances.
The two most common types of liquefied gas fire are:
The escaping liquefied gas rapidly vaporises and ignites, forming
• JET FIRES from pressurised liquid or vapour leaks, for example at pump a large rising fireball.
glands, pipe flanges etc.
BLEVES have accounted for some of the most catastrophic
• POOL FIRES from confined liquid pools
liquefied gas accidents, though these are extremely rare.
BLEVEs – boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions – are a rarer type of
liquefied gas accident. Whatever the incident, it must be contained extremely rapidly, or it could result
in serious harm to personnel and/or damage to the ship or shore equipment
and structures.

08 1 / INTRODUCTION 1 / INTRODUCTION 09
 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD
Trainer question:
MANAGEMENT
★ Have you ever been involved in a liquefied gas
incident?
★ What happened? > 2.1 / THE FLAMMABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF LIQUEFIED
★ How could it have been prevented?
GASES
It is not the liquid that catches fire, but the vapours given off by the process of
evaporation. Liquefied gas cargoes have extremely low temperatures, but their
Case studies of liquefied gas fires can be found in Chapter 7 of this Work book. flash points are also very low:

LIQUEFIED GAS FLASH POINT

Methane -175°C
Propane -105°C
Butane -60°C

Vapours and gases will only ignite if they are within the ‘flammable range’. This
is the range between the minimum and maximum concentrations of vapour (per
cent by volume) in air which form a flammable mixture. The flammable range is
defined by the terms Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) and Upper Flammable Limit
(UFL), although sometimes the terms Lower and Upper Explosive Limit (LEL
and UEL) are used to mean the same thing.

Below the LFL the mixture is said to be ‘too lean’ to burn, and above the UFL
the mixture is said to be ‘too rich’ to burn.

Different gases have different values, and the concept is illustrated for propane
in the diagram opposite.

All the liquefied gases transported in gas carriers are flammable, but the
values of the flammable range are variable and depend on the particular
vapour. The flammable range of a particular vapour is broadened if there is
more oxygen than would normally be present in air. Although the LFL is not
much affected, the UFL is considerably raised. All flammable vapours exhibit

10 1 / INTRODUCTIONL 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 11

this property and as a result oxygen should not be introduced into a space > 2.2 / LNG AND LPG CHARACTERISTICS AND HAZARDS
where flammable vapours exist.
LPG and LNG have key differences that affect how they are handled and
PROPANE VAPOUR IN AIR approached.

100% LNG LPG

Propane vapour in air VISIBILITY LNG generally burns with a very
(% by volume) clean flame so it can be difficult to
Rich see. However, a vapour cloud that
has been created from a liquid spill
or pool is usually visible because
of the water vapour condensed
9.5% out of the atmosphere. This visible
Flammable range cloud is not the exact size of the
(in air) Flammable flammable cloud but generally
2.1% provides a good indication of it.
When LPG escapes into the
air it becomes a gas which
is heavier than air at normal
ambient temperatures,
forming a dense white cloud
that remains over the pool
of liquid. Above this visible
cloud will be an invisible
layer of gas.

Lean HEAT A LNG fire gives off more radiant
0% heat than LPG, so it becomes more
difficult to get close to the fire. It is
the extreme heat of a LNG fire that
causes most damage to people and
structures.
A LPG fire generates twice
as much radiant heat as
an equivalent gasoline fire,
creating a high risk of burns
to personnel and deformation
or weakening of nearby
structures.

Trainer question: BUOYANCY At first, a LNG vapour will hug the LPG is heavier than air, so it
★ If an incendive spark is introduced into a space ground but then become buoyant as will flow downhill.
it warms up above -100°C.
containing 6% by volume of propane vapour, would
there be an ignition? VAPOUR LNG boils off more quickly than
LPG and has a higher vapour
Answer: CONTROL
pressure meaning that it is more
difficult to control vapour emission.
★ Yes, if the propane is mixed with air containing 21%
oxygen, but not if the atmosphere only contains 10% BURNBACK Flame spread through a LNG If LPG comes into contact
oxygen. vapour cloud is slower than that of with a source of ignition,
LPG. there may be an explosion
with rapid burnback (‘flash
fire’) to the LPG pool which
may be a considerable
distance away.

12 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 13

CRYOGENIC As LNG is stored at -162°C, its
cryogenic properties can crack
HAZARDS
steel plates and cause severe
frostbite. It can also reduce the
effectiveness of protective clothing
and boots.
Propane, stored at -40°C, can
cause similar problems to
LNG when in its refrigerated
state.
The gas detection system’s alarm should be activated if the gas concentration
reaches 30% of the cargo’s LFL. Some cargo systems are designed to shut
down automatically at 60% LFL.
TESTING

> 2.3 / WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF A LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE

A useful way of thinking about how to respond to a liquefied gas fire is the
mnemonic F-I-R-E.

F FIND IT

I IDENTIFY AND INFORM

R RESPOND

E EXTINGUISH

FIND
A fire is usually obvious to find, but detecting escaped gases before they ignite
is another matter. Both LPG and LNG are odourless and colourless (even Trainer question:
though LPG will form a partly visible cloud when mixed with air) so detection ★ Are you familiar with your gas detection system?
has to be done using appropriate equipment (see 'Testing' image overleaf). What is required to test and calibrate a gas detection
Odorant may be added to LPG, which will also give warning of a leak. system?

Detection systems
The IGC Code (The International Code for the Construction and Equipment of
Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk) requires vessels to have gas detection The positioning of detector heads will depend on the density of the gas being
systems that will sample each individual enclosed space at intervals of no more monitored.
than 30 minutes. These spaces include cargo machinery rooms, electric motor
Terminals also have gas and fire detection systems and their fire fighting and
rooms, airlocks and hold spaces. Gas ducts and ventilation hoods require
mitigation systems will be installed according to local requirements.
continuous gas detection.

14 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 15
IDENTIFY AND INFORM
The alarm should be raised immediately a fire or gas leak is detected.
To manage a fire or unignited gas leak successfully, the source should be
identified and the situation assessed.
At this point, an emergency control centre may be established, and service
vessels, fire services and any fire fighting tugs should be alerted, as
appropriate.
EXTINGUISH
Extinguish or control? Clearly the fire must be dealt with at some point, but it is
not always best to put it out immediately. If extinguishing it could lead to a risk
of another gas cloud developing that could result in an uncontrolled explosion
or another fire, a better solution may be to contain the burning and extinguish it
later or let it burn itself out. This will depend on:
• how much gas or liquid is likely to escape
• where it will flow

RESPOND • wind strength

• whether it could disperse harmlessly
Once the fire has been reported:
• whether the fire will heat vulnerable machinery, pipes, valves or storage
• the cargo transfer should be shut down, by both ship and shore. Care that could create further gas or liquid escapes
must be taken to ensure that the ship’s valves are not shut against shore
When taking the decision, do not forget potential ignition sources downwind,
pumps
such as vessels, port facilities and houses.
• the fire fighting teams should be mustered and the emergency plan
activated
• the source of the gas should be located quickly, and cut off, if possible,
remotely Trainer question:
★ A small hole has appeared in a 300mm pipe which has a
20 metre run between closed valves. If the leak should
catch fire, would you extinguish or control? Why?
Trainer question:
★ What does your cargo emergency shut-down system
operate?

• the correct Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), including breathing

apparatus if appropriate, should be prepared
• the hoses should be run out and crews moved to their fire fighting
positions

16 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 2 / LIQUEFIED GAS FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 17
3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE > 3.2 / METHODS OF CONTROLLING LNG AND LPG FIRES
There are four approaches to fighting a liquefied gas fire, by tackling the
different elements of the fire tetrahedron.
> 3.1 / THE INGREDIENTS OF A FIRE
Fuel ➞ Starvation
For most fires to start, three elements are needed:
Oxygen➞ Smothering
1. fuel Heat ➞ Cooling
2. oxygen Chemical chain reaction ➞ Flame inhibition
3. a heat (or ignition) source
STARVATION
New research shows, however, that in certain chemical fires there is a fourth
Shutting off the fuel supply will starve the fire.
element - a chemical chain reaction - that feeds the fire more heat and keeps
it burning. The fire triangle plus the chemical chain reaction is sometimes This can be done by activating the ESD, which will close valves and stop pumps.
referred to as a fire tetrahedron. Passive systems such as melt plugs on deck activate the ESD at approximately
100°C. The ESD can be controlled remotely.
THE FIRE TRIANGLE THE FIRE TETRAHEDRON Fuel to the fire can also be shut off by closing the valves manually.

SMOTHERING
Smothering the fire is most effective in enclosed spaces, mast risers and
storage tank bunds.
CHEMICAL Fixed fire extinguishing systems
CHAIN
REACTION
Enclosed cargo machinery spaces are provided with a fixed fire extinguishing
system suitable for the cargoes carried, to smother the fire. However, it is
important to evacuate spaces before they are used.

In confined spaces such as a container vessel, where there is no outlet for the
Trainer question:
expanding gases produced by combustion, the chemical chain reaction can escalate.
The internal pressure and its rate of increase can then cause a violent explosion. ★ What fixed fire-fighting systems are available on your
ship or terminal?

18 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 19

 Nitrogen
Nitrogen may be injected into mast risers to smother the fire.
Carbon dioxide (CO2)
Like nitrogen, CO2 works by depleting oxygen. When released at pressure it can
cause ignition through static electricity, so it must only be used to extinguish
fires and never used to inert spaces with a possible flammable atmosphere that
are not on fire.
transfer from the fire to the pool of liquefied gas. The foam forms
a frozen crust when it comes into contact with the liquefied gas,
and the vapour is vented in a controlled way.
If the vapour is still in gaseous form, large quantities of foam will
minimise the risk of ignition.
By its nature, foam is ineffective against jet fires.

Gaseous fire extinguishing agents FOAM BLANKET

Gaseous agents that extinguish fires through chemical inhibition rather than
oxygen depletion are also available for protection of enclosed spaces such as
compressor rooms. They should not pose an asphyxiation risk as they require
lower concentrations to extinguish fires than CO2. However, the gases or their
breakdown products may have toxic effects and exposure to them should
always be minimised.

Foam
Foam is a key means for extinguishing contained, low vapour pressure pool
fires and is used in terminals for fighting liquefied gas fires. The higher the
vapour pressure, the less effective is foam for tackling a liquefied gas fire.

Foam can be ‘non-aspirated’ or ‘expanded’, and expanded foam may have low,
medium or high expansion. For LNG and LPG fires, high expansion foams –
where available – are used to reduce vapour emissions in bunded containment
areas. Foam will control the size of the fire and reduce the levels of radiant heat
COOLING
but will normally not extinguish it completely. Water is the most effective medium for cooling and for reducing damage to
steelwork adjacent to liquefied gas fires. Large quantities of water can be
How does high expansion foam work? supplied by fire fighting tugs, and when applied to gas containers will reduce
the evaporation pressure from the heat of the fire.
High expansion foam (with a ratio of approximately 500:1) is
extremely aerated and has a lower water content per unit volume Water can also be used to disperse gas, but it does not normally extinguish
than low or medium expansion foams. fires unless the gas can be dispersed by water spray at high volume and
pressure.
It works by forming a thick blanket that reduces the rate of heat

20 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 21

 Important! Applying water to a pool fire will increase the rate of evaporation DRY POWDER
and make it worse. It should be avoided at all costs.

Water curtain
A water curtain will divert or dilute the gas vapour, and will act as a barrier
against radiant heat. Water curtains may be portable or fixed.

Water spray/deluge
These systems, which may be manually or automatically operated, have
discharge outlets open to atmosphere and they discharge simultaneously.
Their purpose is to protect the people operating valves, or certain equipment or
areas.

Trainer question:

★ What water systems are available on your ship or

terminal?
★ What experience do you have of using them? Trainer question:
★ What dry powder system is available on your ship or
terminal?
★ What experience do you have of using it?
FLAME INHIBITION
Flames can be inhibited through the use of dry chemical powder, which works
by interrupting the chain reaction of the combustion process.
> 3.3 / RESPONDING TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF FIRE OR LEAK
Note that dry chemicals will not prevent natural gas vapour from being
generated, however, and consequently there is always a high risk of reignition. 3.3.1 / Release of liquefied gases

In terminals, dry powder is often used in conjunction with foam. Care must be
taken to ensure that the two products are compatible with each other.
Gas release may result in ‘flash fires’ that rapidly burn back to the release
source, if gas should leak and then migrate some distance and ignite. Even
if it only lasts a few seconds, that may be enough to burn – or even kill – any
personnel who have made the mistake of entering a gas cloud or have been
trapped within it.

22 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 23

 If necessary, try to deflect the vapour cloud away from potential ignition
sources using water spray.
Vapour cloud precautions
• bear in mind that although a vapour cloud may be visible,
the white area may not be the limit of the vapour and the
flammable cloud may extend beyond it
Caution!
• do not enter the liquid/gas hazard area under any circumstances
• expect gas ignition at any time, even if there does not appear to be any
ignition source
• be aware that if a large gas cloud ignites in an area that is full of
equipment or plant an explosion may occur

• do not assume that the wind direction and speed of the Should you ignite the gas?
gas migration will be constant during the incident Although ignited gas is often safer than unignited gas,
deliberately igniting gas can be very hazardous, because you
Procedure cannot be sure how far it has spread and where it has pooled.
This is therefore not recommended.
Make an initial risk assessment, and continue to assess the situation as
1
it unfolds.
3.3.2 / Pool fires
2 Stop all work and evacuate non-essential personnel to their muster points.
POOL FIRE
Set up water curtains or sprays to try to disperse the cloud. Do not direct
3 water streams into the liquid release as this will increase the rate of gas
evolution.

Hose-handling teams should use water curtains to protect the

4
deployment teams.

5 Isolate the liquid release source, if it is possible, safe and practical to do so.
Identify potential ignition sources and extinguish heaters and naked
6 lights. Isolate electrical devices, but only if it is possible to do this before
gas migrates to the equipment.

Use portable gas monitoring equipment to monitor the extent of the gas
7
leak.

Where provided, use foam to suppress the LNG vapour or LPG liquid
8 All efforts must be directed to limiting the hazards from the fire as quickly
release.
as possible. Let the gas burn off if the fire is in a bund where no important

24 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 25

 equipment is at risk, as long as the source of the fuel can be isolated. If the fire JET FIRE
is not in a bund, foam is used rather than water. (Water would increase the rate
of vaporisation and intensify the fire.)

Procedure

1 Stop all work.

2 Evacuate all non-essential personnel.

Make an initial risk assessment, and continue to assess the situation
as it unfolds. In particular, assess the impact of flames or radiant
3
heat impact on nearby LPG vessels, drums, tanks or gas-containing
equipment as quickly as possible.

Alert ship’s crew and neighbouring or public areas to the potential

4 escalation hazard, and mobilise any external emergency plan to
evacuate people, etc.
Procedure
Activate any fixed water spray or deluge system to cool the affected and
5 Make an initial risk assessment, and continue to assess the situation as
adjacent containment vessels, drums, etc.
1
it unfolds.
Use water jets, sprays, screens or curtains to protect any radiant heat-
6 As soon as possible, apply water in large quantities to the vessels and
exposed containment vessels, drums or plant.
2 other liquid or gas-containing equipment in the area, NOT to the fire
Use foam if LNG is involved (and possibly also LPG) to reduce the flame
7 itself. Do not try to extinguish the fire with either dry powder or water.
and fire size and radiant heat.

Use large-volume water stream on to any flame-impinged area of LPG 3 Responders should wear full fire-resistant personal protective equipment.
8 vessels, drums or tanks (if this can be achieved in a safe time and will Use wheeled or portable fire water monitors, taking care when
not expose the fire responders to danger). 4
manoeuvring them into position.

If the jet fire is relatively low pressure, it may be possible to ‘bend’ it or

3.3.3 / Jet fires 5
to deflect it away from containers or equipment.
Where the gas is released from a pressurised tank or line, the flash fire may
burn back, leaving a gas jet fire at the leak source. The ideal response to a jet
How do you ‘bend’ a fire?
fire is to isolate it.

If a jet fire could affect a containment vessel, drum or related equipment, the • set several water streams to a pattern between semi-fog
aim should be to reduce the heat input to such equipment and so protect it. and straight jet

26 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 27

 • aim them at a large area of the flame near the
impingement area and push it away from the equipment
4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND
Under no circumstances should bending be attempted if flame
TRAINING
impingement has been under way for more than 15-20 minutes.
If it cannot be done within the first several minutes of the fire
Emergency plans must be capable of dealing with the largest
incident starting, the area must be evacuated.
incident that can reasonably be foreseen, but detailed
planning should concentrate on events that are most probable.

UK Health and Safety Executive

> 4.1 / THE MANDATORY EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

Emergencies can occur at any time, and they can only be rapidly and effectively
responded to if they have been carefully planned and regularly practised.

Under the ISM (International Safety Management) Code, all ships must not only
have identified potential emergency shipboard situations but must also have
established procedures to respond to them, written down in an emergency
response plan (ERP). The ERP should be specific to the vessel, and should be
prepared jointly between the ship and its owners or operators.

The overall purpose of the emergency response is to protect, in this order of

priority:

• crew/personnel
• the environment
• property/assets
• the business or the return to production with the minimum delay

As well as the overall instructions and procedures for an emergency, there

are procedures that cover particular incidents, areas, enclosures, plant and
equipment. Each of these latter scenarios has either a generic or specific ERP
which is a blueprint for actions to take in the first 15-20 minutes.

28 3 / EXTINGUISHING FIRE 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 29

 The ship’s ERP
The ship’s ERP should include:
• up to date company contacts such as the Designated Person and contact
details of any other interested parties
• the allocation of duties and responsibilities on board
• actions to be taken to regain control of a situation
• communication methods to be used on board
• procedures for requesting assistance from third parties
• procedures for notifying the company and reporting to relevant authorities
• maintaining communications between the ship and shore
• procedures for dealing with the media or other outside parties
The plan must be updated regularly and understood by all crew and staff.
Trainer question:
★ Are you familiar with your ship or terminal’s ERP?
★ What are the procedures laid down in it for responding
to (for example) an unignited gas leak?
> 4.2 / RESPONSIBILITIES
Emergency control must be the responsibility of an identified officer or
manager. Fire fighting roles must be identified, and actions for isolation and fire
response must be coordinated. To achieve this, there must be a pre arranged
shutdown and system isolation plan. Fire fighters must be informed of the plan
before tackling the blaze.
30 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING
> 4.3 / PLANNING FOR EMERGENCIES IN TERMINALS
SIGTTO has produced a document outlining the requirements for emergency
planning at terminals called A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine
Terminals Handling Liquefied Bulk Gases. This publication will help terminal
personnel make detailed emergency response plans.
The core elements of the terminal’s emergency plan should comprise, as a
minimum:
• initial actions to be taken by identified individuals
• emergency sirens and their meanings
• mobilising of response groups
• identification of an incident controller
• identification of an overall incident manager
• structured chain of command
• evacuation, security procedures and location(s) points
• control centre for incident management and support personnel
• details of any mutual aid plan and resource availability
> 4.4 / EMERGENCY TRAINING
The emergency plan should be regularly rehearsed, so that responding to
an emergency becomes second nature to those having to deal with it. This
is extremely important because if an emergency happens there may not be
enough time to consult the plan.
Ships’ crews are required to be trained in fire fighting under international
regulations: Standards of Training, Certification & Watchkeeping (STCW)
Convention, and International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
The European Union law SEVESO II (Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December
1996 on the Control of Major Accident Hazards involving dangerous substances)
and national regulations require that terminal personnel are similarly trained
in fire-fighting.
4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 31
 Fire drills for ships’ crews
Under SOLAS regulations, practice drills should be held every month but you Trainer question:
should comply with the minimum period laid down by your flag State. Each drill
★ Have you undergone hot training?
should include a briefing before the exercise. Afterwards, constructive
★ What did you learn from it that you didn’t learn from
comments should be made so that lessons can be learned. Feedback will also
your on-site or on-ship training?
put the crew in a better position to appreciate the extent and gravity of the
overall situation, and to familiarise themselves with the strategy for tackling
the emergency.

Hot training > 4.5 / PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

HOT TRAINING
FIRE FIGHTERS MAKING READY

In addition to the on-site or on-ship training, it is good practice to undertake

training with real fires, known as 'hot training'. This should focus on the risks PPE for responding to a fire will usually consist of:
associated with fighting gas-related fires and on the dangers of using the • fire helmet with visor
wrong techniques. For ship’s crews, this needs to be undertaken at shore • fire coat
training establishments, but some terminals may have these facilities on site. • fire trousers
In some countries hot training is a regulatory requirement. • fire boots
• fire gloves

32 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 33

 Every member of the fire fighting team should practise putting on the
appropriate PPE as quickly as they can.
Trainer question:
★ Do you know where your fire fighting PPE is kept?
★ How quickly can you put it on?
Note that emergency escape respiratory protection, i.e. air sets with a
compressed air cylinder containing enough air to last a maximum of 15
minutes, are only suitable for escape (if it can be achieved in this timescale).
They should NOT be used for fire fighting. Escape sets that filter the air through
a canister must NOT be used in an oxygen deficient atmosphere.
> 4.7 / EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN TEMPLATE
Here is a template that you can use for responding to different types of fire or
leak emergency.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR... [TYPE OF FIRE HERE]

> 4.6 / BREATHING APPARATUS
STRATEGY - The fire control (firefighting) strategy which states the overall
objectives to prevent escalation and bring the incident under control.

IMMEDIATELY ACTIONS EQUIPMENT RESOURCES COMMENTS

Usually control Logical What equipment Any specific As required.

room or site step-by-step required to carry resources not
personnel who actions which out the actions. previously
will alert and are required mentioned
Valves or devices
shutdown and according to or personnel
to isolate.
evacuate etc. the fire type who will
and location. need to react
Typically, immediately.
alarm,
evacuation,
isolation,
shut down,
informing etc.

1st RESPONSE ACTIONS EQUIPMENT RESOURCES COMMENTS

When breathing apparatus is to be used, there must be a minimum of two
people in a team.

SOLAS requires that breathing apparatus must either be a self-contained

compressed air-operated breathing apparatus (SCBA) with an air volume in
the cylinders of at least 1,200 litres, or other type of self-contained breathing
apparatus that is capable of functioning for at least 30 minutes.

34 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 35

 May be site
personnel
Logical
step-by-
Valves or
devices to
Any foam
concentrate
As required. 5 / FIRE PREVENTION
who will use step actions isolate. required. The
portable fire necessary to anticipated
Fixed fire
equipment isolate the
systems
water demand > 5.1 / PREVENTION PLANNING
or fixed fire fuel, or carry for the fire.
installed on site.
systems. If out initial Fire hose/
To minimise the risk of accidents, ships and terminals have been designed
no personnel fire control Portable fire nozzles
available for actions. equipment for required. with safety in mind, clear and simple product handling procedures have been
this, the 1st initial control. The number developed, and the ship and terminal personnel should be fully trained and
response Any water or of hose will
would be site be based on with a high level of risk awareness.
foam monitors
fire brigade. required. the hydrant It is up to the personnel therefore to:
locations and
fire vehicles • follow the product handling procedures
used. The fire
• take ignition source control precautions
vehicles from
the local fire • refer to the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) that describe the
department
product’s characteristics and how it should be handled
and manpower.

2nd RESPONSE ACTIONS EQUIPMENT RESOURCES COMMENTS > 5.2 / PRECAUTIONS FOR CONTROLLING THE SOURCE OF
Usually the Logical Fixed fire Any foam Foam
IGNITION
supporting fire step-by- systems concentrate application
group or local step actions installed on site. required. The rate applied Taking out this side of the fire tetrahedron is the key to fire prevention.
municipal fire necessary to anticipated etc. The most basic measures include:
Any water/
brigade. Site control and water demand
foam monitors
personnel may extinguish the for the fire. • no smoking except in designated areas
required.
be required to fire. The fire
do other tasks vehicles from • control of hot work by a Permit To Work system
at this stage. the local fire • prohibiting the use of mobile phones, radios and other non-approved
brigade and
portable electronic equipment
manpower.
• wearing anti-static clothing and safety boots
• following anti-static procedures when loading and unloading
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS - Any obvious hazards which will be present
because of the anticipated fire either from flame impingement or radiated or
conducted heat. Also consider any explosion possibility. > 5.3 / VIGILANCE BEFORE AND DURING PRODUCT
OTHER CONCERNS - Any other concerns. Personnel safety, gas releases, public
OPERATIONS
exposure etc.
Throughout loading/unloading operations personnel should maintain
communications between ship and shore so that alarm and response (e.g.
shutdown) to any incident can quickly be activated.

36 4 / EMERGENCY PLANNING AND TRAINING 5 / FIRE PREVENTION 37

 Before arriving If a fire starts, it is too late to test systems and equipment! There should be
Thorough pre-arrival checks should be undertaken by both the ship and the regular inspection and maintenance of all the relevant systems:
terminal, and the results should be recorded. • valves
On arrival • pumps and seals
On arrival, cargo handling procedures must be discussed in detail and agreed • gauges and domes
between the responsible persons from ship and terminal. • hoses

The ship/shore safety checklist must be completed jointly before cargo transfer • manifolds
operations begin. The checklist includes: • pressure management systems

• communications • gas and fire detection systems

• emergency actions • ESD systems

• emergency shutdown procedures • fire pumps

See ISGOTT (International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals) for a
sample checklist.
> 5.4 / INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF CARGO TRANSFER
AND FIRE AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
• water, dry powder, inert gas and foam systems
• Fire fighting PPE
The ship’s portable fire extinguishers are to be inspected and serviced by
appointed specialist.
Accurate records must be kept of all inspections and maintenance.

INSPECTION
The equipment’s history record must include:

• the date of inspection and service

• the maintenance that has been done
• the parts used, including recharging

Trainer question:

★ How often are the firefighters’ outfits inspected on

your ship?

38 5 / FIRE PREVENTION 5 / FIRE PREVENTION 39

 The fire wallet
6 / STAYING ON TOP
On the ship, the fire wallet must be prominently placed and contain an up to
date crew list, cargo plan and fire plan identifying the type and location of fire
fighting equipment. Liquefied gas is safe when handled correctly. Every aspect of LNG and LPG
processing and handling has been designed with safety in mind, from the
> 5.5 / VISITORS design of structures and equipment, to systems and procedures.

To minimise the risks from visitors, all ships and terminals should regularly
FIRE FIGHTING DRILL
review their safety arrangements and strengthen them if needed. Visitors to the
terminal and ship should be checked for potential sources of ignition, such as
lighters and mobile phones. Care should be taken that visitors to the ship who
do not pass through the terminal are similarly checked.

> 5.6 / PERMIT TO WORK SYSTEMS

It is the responsibility of the operator to ensure that safe working practices are
carried out by both the company employing staff/crew and using contractors, as
well as the contractors themselves. In particular, it is important that whoever is
carrying out the maintenance or repair work has a Permit To Work where required.

> 5.7 / OTHER GOOD FIRE PREVENTION PRACTICE

Other good practice includes:

• making regular fire rounds
• reporting fire hazards and near misses so that lessons can be learned
• keeping a ship specific 'Fire Training Manual'
• keeping records of all maintenance carried out on systems and equipment
Trainer question:
That said, accidents do happen, and your own personal safety, and that of the
ship/terminal and of nearby populations could depend on:
• your understanding of the nature of liquefied gases
• your knowledge of the risks involved in handling LNG and LPG
• strict adherence to the procedures for product handling and emergency
response
• alertness to possible sources of ignition

★ What other ways can you think of for preventing fire on • regular inspection and maintenance of product handling systems and
your ship (or in your terminal)? equipment

40 5 / FIRE PREVENTION 6 / STAYING ON TOP 41

 7 / CASE STUDIES
Trainer question:

★ What is the main message that you will take away from
doing this training programme? From “Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management” (SIGTTO)

> VAL ROSANDRA PROPYLENE FIRE

On 28 April 1990 the 3,990 m3 ethylene carrier Val Rosandra, laden with 2,250
tonnes of fully refrigerated propylene at -47°C, was discharging at Brindisi in
Italy when a violent explosion occurred in the cargo compressor motor room.
The motor room was so severely damaged that a switch panel was blown on
to the deck and cargo pipework outside the room ruptured. In addition, the
port and starboard domes of No 3 cargo tank also ruptured. As a result of the
explosion, the escaping propylene ignited and the fire continued to be fed by
cargo evaporating from the damaged domes.

The exact cause of the explosion was never determined with any certainty.
However, it most likely occurred as a result of a release of gas being ignited by
electrical equipment in the compressor motor room. This equipment was not
designated for use in hazardous areas, but relied on the pressurisation of the
room with fresh air drawn from a safe area. Therefore, the release of gas would
have had to be considerable to encroach into a ventilation system specifically
designed to avert this possibility. A more likely pathway for the gas release was
entry into the compressor room through defective airlock doors. It has been
suggested that the original source of the release was either a tube failure in the
cargo heater or, more likely, a failure of the cargo compressor or its adjacent
pipework.

As local emergency services responded to the incident, the crew abandoned

ship. The vessel was subsequently towed to the edge of the port limits where
the fire was monitored from a safe distance. Although the fire showed no signs
of escalation over a number of days, it was decided not to attempt to salvage
the vessel or her cargo. Instead, charges were detonated around the domes of
the remaining four tanks to allow the propylene cargo to escape gradually and

42 6 / STAYING ON TOP 7 / CASE STUDIES 43

 burn off. It was agreed that once this had been accomplished, the vessel would
be scuttled.
On the 21 May 1990, over three weeks after the initial explosion and with the
fire still burning at No 3 tank, the vessel was towed out to sea. The tank domes
of the four undamaged tanks were breached with explosive charges. Although
this resulted in some escalation of the fire, it was to nothing like the extent the
authorities had anticipated. The slow burn rate was attributed to the fact that
the cargo was fully refrigerated and would only burn as fast as heat penetrated
the insulated tank walls and domes and evaporated the propylene. On 8 June
1990, 41 days after the initial explosion and fire, a large quantity of explosive
was detonated on Val Rosandra’s hull. This resulted in a massive fireball and
pool fire, and the Italian authorities and other involved parties considered that
their safest option was to scuttle the vessel in deep water, rather than attempt
a salvage operation.
> PAJARITOS PORT LPG TRANSFER FIRE
One of the worst accidents involving fire during a shore/ship LPG transfer
operation occurred at about 1200 hours on 15 June 1985 when a flash fire
engulfed the five-year old, 57,000 m3 refrigerated LPG carrier Ahkatun during
cargo loading at Pajaritos, Mexico.
At the time of the accident Ahkatun was loading LPG at Berth No 2 West and
had already taken onboard about 25,000 tonnes of cargo. Two other LPG
carriers, Nuevo Laredo and the Mundogas Rio, were tied up at Berths No 1 East
and No 1 West, the two berths in closest proximity to Ahkatun. Eleven ships
in all, including five LPG carriers, were moored in Pajaritos at the time of the
accident.
According to reports in Lloyds List newspaper, a serious spillage of liquefied
gas had been seen on the jetty prior to a major fire breaking out. The reports
go on to strongly suggest that the leakage emanated from a burst in the cargo
hose used to load Ahkatun. Just why the hose might have split is unclear, but
either poor hose maintenance or misoperation of valves on board is possible.
44 7 / CASE STUDIES
Accounts of the accident also suggest that the fire continued to be fed by
flowing liquefied gas cargo for some time after the hose burst.
The fire itself is said to have started as a result of an explosion onboard the
tug/crewboat Pemex 383, as she was manoeuvring nearby in the harbour. The
boat had become engulfed in the flammable vapour cloud from the leaking LPG
and, clearly, this cloud had been set alight by an ignition source onboard. The
ensuing fire swept over Pemex 383, completely gutting the accommodation
and superstructure and distorting much of the hull and main deck plating. This
small vessel was subsequently declared a total loss.
The fire spread immediately to Ahkatun and to Berth Nos 1 East and West
where Nuevo Laredo and Mundogas Rio were lying alongside. The fire
continued unabated for about one hour and during this period Ahkatun and
Nuevo Laredo were covered in flames for extended periods. Once the worst of
the fire had subsided, Ahkatun was piloted from the port by her master, without
the aid of tugs. During this manoeuvre, with fire still spitting from the damaged
hose, Ahkatun struck the outer dolphin at Berth 2 West, causing further
damage to the ship in way of its bunker tanks.
In the general confusion several ships quickly departed Pajaritos at about the
same time, doubtless for self-preservation. These included Lake Anne, Marine
Reunion, Endeavor and Mariano Escobedo. During the melee Mariano Escobedo
and the harbour tug Gulf Tide, which was assisting, collided. Altogether, two
people were killed and 15 people were injured as a result of the LPG leakage
from Ahkatun and the ensuing fire.
The Pajaritos fire provided some valuable lessons, which can be itemised as
follows:
1. LPG vapour clouds present a significant hazard and they may need to
travel only a short distance before they encounter a source of ignition.
2. Loading arms are preferable to hoses for the transfer of large volumes of
liquefied gases at high rates.
3. The provision of automatic shutdown systems is essential to keep
spillages of liquefied gas to a minimum.
7 / CASE STUDIES 45
 4. Good operating practices, as described in ISGOTT, including keeping
doorways and portholes closed while a ship is at a hazardous cargo
terminal, must be strictly adhered to.
5. The LPG in the tanks of both Ahkatun and Nuevo Larado did not ignite
and the tanks on both ships remained intact throughout the incident,
indicating the relative fireproof nature of refrigerated liquefied gases
while contained in insulated cargo tanks.
> MEXICO CITY LPG DISTRIBUTION DEPOT FIRE
Early on the morning of Monday, 19 November 1984 a number of explosions
and a severe fire completely destroyed the Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) LPG
distribution terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec on the outskirts of Mexico City.
The exact number of casualties was never determined, but is known that in
excess of 500 were killed as a result of the destruction of the installation, which
incorporated six spherical and 48 cylindrical storage tanks and road tanker and
rail tank car filling facilities.
It was impossible to ascertain the cause of the disaster as the site was
completely destroyed. Also, all the Pemex employees on the site at the time
died in the incident.
such that LPG would have built up under the tanks following a leak. This layout
is believed to have resulted in a very severe fire after initial ignition from one of
the flare pits within the site. Any gas discharging from the storage tank relief
valves was piped to these flare pits. The displacement of those cylindrical
vessels that remained intact at the site suggested that local high pressures
were developed at some time during the incident.
The overpressures at over 350 metres from the site were apparently low
because of the lack of window glass breakage. The damage and injury appeared
to have been due to fire, heat radiation and rocketing fragments and missiles
from exploding plant vessels and pipework. Damage to buildings outside the
350-metre radius was all due to the latter.
There were two main explosions in this incident and both were accompanied
by very large fireballs. They occurred about half an hour apart, the first being
about 15 to 20 minutes after the start of the incident. These main explosions
would be at the time the four spheres BLEVE’d. There were also a number of
smaller explosions when cylindrical tanks ruptured.

During the fire four 1600 m3 spheres disintegrated and at least 15 of the
cylindrical pressure vessel storage tanks ruptured. Although the remaining
two spheres were still in position and intact, the legs on one side had collapsed.
All but two of the 48 cylindrical vessels had been moved from their concrete
saddles, in some instances by tens of metres. Many were badly distorted. Most
of the connecting pipework had disappeared or was torn away from the vessels.
Many pieces of the storage vessels, some very large, had become projectiles,
landing considerable distances outside the site.

A housing area, within 300-350 metres of the spheres, was severely damaged
by fire. Very little fire damage occurred outside that area, although trees over 1
km away had scorched leaves on the side facing the site.

The arrangement of the bunding around the tanks at the Pemex facility was

46 7 / CASE STUDIES 7 / CASE STUDIES 47

 8 / GLOSSARY
BLEVE
This is the acronym for a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion. It is
associated with the rupture, under fire conditions, of a pressure vessel
containing liquefied gas.
Bund
A raised impermeable structure around the perimeter of an impounding area for
the confinement of hydrocarbon spills, usually associated with storage areas.
Cryogenic
Of or relating to very low temperatures, in the case of LNG, for example.
Emergency Shutdown System
The functions of the cargo Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system are to stop cargo
liquid and vapour flow in the event of an emergency and to bring the cargo
handling system to a safe, static condition.
Flammable range (also referred to as 'Explosive range')
The range of hydrocarbon gas concentrations in air between the Lower and
Upper Flammable (explosive) Limits. Mixtures within this range are capable of
being ignited and of burning.
Flashpoint
The lowest temperature at which a liquid gives off sufficient gas to form a
flammable gas mixture near the surface of the liquid. It is measured in a
laboratory in standard apparatus using a prescribed procedure.
Foam
A fire-extinguishing agent formed by mixing a foam-producing compound with
water and aerating it. Foam reduces combustion by cooling, moistening and
excluding oxygen.
48 8 / GLOSSARY
Hot Work
Work involving sources of ignition or temperatures sufficiently high to cause the
ignition of a flammable gas mixture. This includes any work requiring the use
of welding, burning or soldering equipment, blow torches, some power driven
tools, portable electrical equipment which is not intrinsically safe or contained
within an approved explosion-proof housing, and internal combustion engines.
IMO
International Maritime Organization. This is the specialised United Nations
agency dealing with maritime safety and pollution prevention matters.
Inert gas
Inert gases can be either a single, unreactive gas, such as nitrogen, or a
mixture of non-flammable gases containing insufficient oxygen to support
combustion.
Inerting
The introduction of inert gas into a space to reduce and maintain the oxygen
content at a level at which combustion cannot be supported, or to maintain the
quality of the cargo. Inerting covers the following operations:
(a) the introduction of inert gas into a tank with the object of attaining an inert
condition suited to a safe gassing-up operation
(b) the introduction of inert gas into a tank after cargo discharge and warming
up with the object of achieving one of the following:
(i) reducing existing vapour content to a level below which combustion
cannot be supported if aeration takes place
(ii) reducing existing vapour content to a level suited to gassing-up prior
to the next cargo
(iii) reducing existing vapour content to a level stipulated by local
authorities if a special gas-free certificate for hot work is required
ISGOTT
The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals.
8 / GLOSSARY 49
 Jet fires where the fuel vapour has very low initial momentum.
Jet fires result when pressurised liquefied gas escaping from a rupture or leak
Radiant heat
in the containment system is ignited.
Heat that is radiated by all warm bodies. It is in the invisible infrared part of the
Liquefied gas electromagnetic spectrum and causes heating when absorbed.
A liquid which has saturated vapour pressure exceeding 2.8 bar absolute at
SOLAS
37.8°C formed by refrigeration, pressurisation or a combination of both, and
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.
certain other substances of similar characteristics specified in the Gas Codes.
Developed under the auspices of IMO, these are the basic rules for the design
LNG and provision of safety equipment on ocean-going ships, including gas carriers,
This is the abbreviation for Liquefied Natural Gas, the principal constituent of by way of the gas carrier codes.
which is methane.
Upper Flammable Limit (UFL)
Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) The concentration of a hydrocarbon gas in air above which there is insufficient
The concentration of a hydrocarbon gas in air below which there is insufficient oxygen to support and propagate combustion. Sometimes referred to as Upper
hydrocarbon to support and propagate combustion. Sometimes referred to as Explosive Limit (UEL).
Lower Explosive Limit (LEL).
Water curtain
LPG A fan-shaped stream of water applied between a fire and an exposed surface to
This is the abbreviation for Liquefied Petroleum Gas. This group of products prevent the surface from igniting from radiated heat.
includes propane and butane, which can be shipped separately or as a mixture.
Water mist system
LPGs may be refinery by-products or produced in conjunction with crude oil or
A water spray used in firefighting and fire control having, typically, 90 per cent
natural gas.
of water droplets below 400 microns in size. Also known as water fog or fine
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) water spray.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provides appropriate levels of protection
Water spray system
to emergency responders engaged in firefighting and rescue operations and
A system that delivers a stream of water droplets on to tanks and equipment
when dealing with liquefied gas spills and leaks. PPE should be regarded as
for cooling purposes and on to fires as an extinguishing agent.
a complete “system” to provide the wearer with total protection, rather than
as separate items. Depending on the response scenario, PPE can range from
normal facility coveralls to full fire turnout gear. Breathing apparatus is often
part of the package.

Pool fire
A turbulent diffusion fire burning above a pool of vaporising liquefied gas fuel

50 8 / GLOSSARY 8 / GLOSSARY 51
 9 / REFERENCE SECTION 10 / APPENDIX

> REGULATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS Properties of Liquefied Gases

2. Short term exposure limit

1. Long term exposure limit
VALUE
10min
Fire Safety Systems (FSS) Code, 2007, as amended (IMO)

STEL2

PPM
TWA

125

750

750

150

35

-3
3
International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying

VALUE
LTEL1

PPM
TWA
8hr.

100

600

600

100

25
Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code)

1
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, adopted by the International

AUTO-IGNITION
TEMPERATURE
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)

(°C)

595

510

468

365

500

453

453

440

465

418

220

472

429

465

615
‘Seveso II’. Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of

Non-flammable
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (as amended)

(% BY VOLUME
FLAMMABLE

3.1 - 12.5

2.1 - 9.5

1.8 - 8.5

1.8 - 8.5

1.6 - 9.3

1.8 - 8.8
5.3 - 14

2 - 11.1

2 - 12.6

2.8 - 37
RANGE

IN AIR)

3 - 100

16 - 25
1 - 9.7
3 - 32

4 - 33
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)
Standards of Training, Certification & Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention,

FLASH
POINT

- 175

- 125

- 105

- 150

- 180
(°C)

- 60

- 83

- 80

- 72

- 60

- 50

- 78

- 18

- 37

- 57
amended 2010

RELATIVE

(AIR = 1)
DENSITY
VAPOUR
> PUBLICATIONS

0.554

1.048

0.975

0.597
1.55

2.09

2.07

1.48

1.94

1.94

1.88

2.15

1.52

2.00

2.49
2.3
Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management (SIGTTO)

ATMOSPHERIC
BOILING

- 161.5

- 103.9
POINT

- 88.6

- 42.3

- 11.7

- 47.7

- 13.8

- 33.4
- 0.5

- 6.1

- 6.9

- 5.0

10.7

34.2
(°C)

- 34
LNG Fire Protection & Emergency Response (BP Process Safety Series)

34
Model Code of Safe Practice Part 9: Large bulk pressure storage and

ABSOLUTE)
refrigerated LPG. ISBN: 978-0-471-91612-3 2nd edition, 1987.

PRESSURE
AT 37.8°C
VAPOUR

(BARS,

Gas*

Gas*

Gas*
13.1

15.7

14.7

10.7
3.6

5.5

4.4

4.4

4.1

5.7

2.7
Hazard and risk assessment for bulk liquefied petroleum gas storage events
ISBN: 978 0 85293 563 7, 1st edition Nov 2010.

FORMULA

37.8°C is above the critical temperature for these gases

SIMPLE

C2H3Cl

C2H4O

C3H6O
C4H10

C4H10
C2H6

C3H8

C2H4

C3H6

C4H8

C4H8

C4H6

C5H8

NH3
CH4

Cl2
Witherbys books on Liquefied Gas Carriers: see www.witherbyseamanship.com

3 or 2 methyl-1,
> RELATED VIDEOTEL PROGRAMMES
SYSTEMMIC

Epoxypropane
Chloroethene

ANHYDROUS
Epoxyethane
3 butadiene
NAME

AMMONIA,
But-1-ene

But-2-ene

Butadiene
2-Methyl
Methane

Chlorine
Propene
Propane

Propane
Butane

Ethene
Ethane
LNG Training Course
753 Introduction to Liquefied Gas Carriers

α-BUTYLENE

γ-BUTYLENE
PROPYLENE

PROPYLENE
BUTADIENE
LIQUIFIED

ETHYLENE

ETHYLENE
n-BUTANE

ISOPRENE

CHLORINE
METHANE

AMMONIA
i-BUTANE
PROPANE
GAS

ETHANE
641 The Chemistry of Liquefied Gases

OXIDE

OXIDE
VCM
642 The Physics of Liquefied Gases

*
52 9 / REFERENCE SECTION 10 / APPENDIX 53
 11 / ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 6. What normally causes the most damage from a LNG fire?
a) The burnback from a flash fire
b) The extreme heat
c) Environmental damage from the toxic fumes
1. What is the volume equivalent of Liquefied Natural Gas to vapour?
d) Brittle fracture
a) 1 volume liquefied LNG = 25 volumes of vapour
b) 1 volume liquefied LNG = 60 volumes of vapour 7. A LPG fire gives off more radiant heat than a LNG fire.
c) 1 volume liquefied LNG = 250 volumes of vapour
True or False?
d) 1 volume liquefied LNG = 600 volumes of vapour
8. When should the gas detection system’s alarm be activated?
2. What is the volume equivalent of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to vapour?
a) When the gas concentration reaches 10% of the cargo’s LFL
a) 1 volume liquefied LPG = 25 volumes of vapour
b) When the gas concentration reaches 20% of the cargo’s LFL
b) 1 volume liquefied LPG = 60 volumes of vapour
c) When the gas concentration reaches 30% of the cargo’s LFL
c) 1 volume liquefied LPG = 250 volumes of vapour
d) When the gas concentration reaches 60% of the cargo’s LFL
d) 1 volume liquefied LPG = 600 volumes of vapour
9. How does a dry powder chemical extinguish a fire?
3. A BLEVE is when:
a) By starvation
a) Liquefied gas in a tank is heated by fire and causes the tank to rupture
b) By smothering
b) Liquefied gas burns in a pool and spreads over a large area
c) By cooling
c) Liquefied gas burns back to its source some hundreds of metres away
d) By breaking the reaction of the combustion process
d) Liquefied gas escapes from a relief valve and explodes
10. Smothering is most effective in:
4. The flash point of methane is:
a) Fires in enclosed spaces
a) -60°C
b) Low vapour pressure pool fires
b) -75°C
c) Fires in semi-confined areas
c) -105°C
d) Fires in the accommodation
d) -175°C
11. Foam is most effective for:
5. The flash point of butane is:
a) Jet fires
a) -60°C
b) Low vapour pressure pool fires
b) -75°C
c) High vapour pressure pool fires
c) -105°C
d) BLEVEs
d) -175°C

54 11 / ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 11 / ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 55

 12. CO2 should only be used to inert spaces with a possible flammable 18. ‘Hot training’ is training in how to avoid accidents when carrying out hot
atmosphere that are not on fire. work (welding, etc).
True or False? True or False?

13. Water is the most effective medium for cooling and for reducing damage to 19. How often are fire drills required by SOLAS to be held for ships’ crews?
steelwork adjacent to liquefied gas fires. a) Every 24 hours
True or False? b) Once a week
c) Once a month
14. Dry chemical powder is indicated for: d) Once every 3 months
a) Cooling steelwork
b) Extinguishing fires 20. How many people should there be in the responder team if breathing
c) Extinguishing BLEVEs apparatus is to be used?
d) Preventing natural gas vapour from being generated a) There is no minimum number
b) At least 2
15. In a pool fire, how should radiant heat-exposed containment vessels be c) At least 3
protected? d) At least 4
a) With foam
b) With CO2
c) With dry powder
d) With water jets, sprays, screens or curtains

16. The best response to a jet fire is to:

a) Isolate the fuel source
b) Extinguish it with dry powder
c) Smother it with foam
d) Extinguish it with water spray

17. How do you bend a fire?

a) By creating a circle of dry powder at the base of the flame
b) By spraying a steady jet of dry powder downwind of the fire
c) By aiming water streams at a large area of the flame
d) By waiting at least 15 minutes after the fire has started and then using a
water curtain

56 11 / ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 11 / ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 57

 12 / ASSESSMENT ANSWERS

NO. ANSWER

1 d
2 c
3 a
4 d
5 a
6 b
7 False: A LNG fire gives off more radiant heat than a LPG fire.
8 c
9 d
10 a
11 b:
False: Methods.... Smothering... CO2. CO2 can cause ignition
through static electricity when released at pressure, so
12
it should NEVER be used to inert spaces with a possible
flammable atmosphere.
13 True: Methods… Cooling.
14 b
15 d
16 a
17 c
False: Hot training is carried out on real fires, and focuses on
18
the risks associated with fighting gas-related fires.
19 c
20 b

58 12 / ASSESSMENT ANSWERS
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