范泰尔护教学中级课程：基督教的知识论201411

歸正護教學：
范泰爾的預設派護教學中級課程
REFORMED APOLOGETICS:
AN INTERMEDIATE COURSE
ON THE PRESUPPOSITIONALISM
OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL
編譯：林慈信
EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY SAMUEL LING
中華展望
CHINA HORIZON
2014 年 11 月
編者注：
此讀本裏有關論述范泰爾的作品，乃中華展望早期的譯稿，與後期出版的定稿略有出
入，只供學生學習護教學之用。這些初稿不應視作已出版之書籍，編者不為翻譯的錯誤
負責。未經編者同意，不可轉載，亦請勿引用。
Editor’s Note:
This syllabus contains first-draft translations from the writings of Cornelius Van Til
which is being edited and published by China Horizon. The translation which appears
here should not be treated as a final product, i.e., a published manuscript. These
pieces are provided to the student of apologetics courses for study purposes only.
The editor is not responsible for any errors or any other deficiency in translation. All
rights reserved. Do not duplicate. Do not quote.
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目錄
第二部份范泰爾的知識本體論............................................ 9
第四章上帝：自含豐滿與絕對位格 .......................................................... 9
I. 本於《聖經》的世界觀 .......................................................................................... 9
II. 上帝，自含的豐滿 ............................................................................................... 12
III. 上帝，絕對的位格 .............................................................................................. 20
第五章三位一體 ........................................................................................... 26
I. 范泰爾的三一論：正統教會信仰........................................................................ 26
II. 三位一體與神人相互依存主義........................................................................... 28
III. 「一而眾」的問題 .............................................................................................. 31
IV. 宇宙中的事實和定律 .......................................................................................... 40
第六章上帝的主權 ...................................................................................... 43
I. 上帝的主權：范泰爾思想的中心........................................................................ 43
II. 決定論與人的自由 ............................................................................................... 45
III. 邪惡的問題 ........................................................................................................... 51
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第七章類比的知識 ...................................................................................... 56
I. 類比的知識 ............................................................................................................. 56
第九章上帝的啟示 ...................................................................................... 67
I. 效法上帝的思維而思維 ........................................................................................ 67
II. 普遍啟示 ................................................................................................................ 69
III. 視角主義 ............................................................................................................... 76
IV. 特殊啟示............................................................................................................... 82
V. 《聖經》 ................................................................................................................ 84
VI. 《聖經》的原本 .................................................................................................. 89
VII. 《聖經》的範圍 ................................................................................................. 92
第十章預設的問題 ...................................................................................... 94
I. 范泰爾是一位預設主義者嗎？ ............................................................................ 94
II. 預設的意義 .......................................................................................................... 103
III. 一些對「預設」的誤會 .................................................................................... 106
IV. 「非終極的預設」與「終極的預設」........................................................... 108
第十一章理性的優先性 ...........................................................................110
I. 理性的優先性 ....................................................................................................... 110
II. 弗蘭姆的檢討 ...................................................................................................... 117
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第十二章邏輯 .............................................................................................123
I. 邏輯........................................................................................................................ 123
第十三章類比系統 ....................................................................................142
I. 類比系統 ............................................................................................................... 142
II. 基督徒的「界限觀念」 ..................................................................................... 148
III. 又回到「表面矛盾」 ........................................................................................ 154
IV. 多元視角主義 .................................................................................................... 156
第十四章證據 .............................................................................................171
I. 證據........................................................................................................................ 171
第三部份范泰爾的知識倫理學....................................... 186
第十五章「勢不兩立」的概念 ..............................................................186
I. 「勢不兩立」的概念 .......................................................................................... 186
II. 極端性的「勢不兩立」說法 ............................................................................. 196
III. 準則性的說法..................................................................................................... 205
IV. 處境性的說法 .................................................................................................... 211
V. 存在性的說法 ..................................................................................................... 215
VI. 實踐性的說法 .................................................................................................... 224
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VII. 結論 .................................................................................................................... 229
第十六章普遍恩典 ....................................................................................234
I. 普遍恩典 ............................................................................................................... 234
II. 福音白白的呼籲（邀請） ................................................................................. 245
III. 丹雅各的批判..................................................................................................... 252
IV. 區分過程............................................................................................................. 255
V. 諾德的批判.......................................................................................................... 257
第十七章理性主義與非理性主義 .........................................................261
I. 理性主義與非理性主義 ...................................................................................... 261
附錄一作業 ...................................................................... 272
附錄二引用范泰爾和弗蘭姆著作簡寫一覽表 ............... 276
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范泰爾的基督教知識論
CORNELIUS VAN TIL’S CHRISTIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
弗蘭姆對范泰爾護教學的詮釋
摘自《哥尼流范泰爾：他思想的分析》
英漢對照及附列經文講義
THE APOLOGETICS OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL
AS INTERPRETED BY JOHN M. FRAME
EXCERPTS FROM
CORNELIUS VAN TIL: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS THOUGHT

ENGLISH-CHINESE WITH BIBLE VERSES
原著：弗蘭姆
JOHN M. FRAME
編譯：林慈信
EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY SAMUEL LING
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第二部份范泰爾的知識本體論
VAN TIL’S METAPHYSICS OF KNOWLEDGE
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R Publishing, 1995, pp. 51-184.)
第四章上帝：自含豐滿與絕對位格
GOD: SELF-CONTAINED FULLNESS AND ABSOLUTE PERSONALITY
I. 本於《聖經》的世界觀
BIBLICAL WORLDVIEW
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg,
NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 4, pp. 51-53.)
我們應該現在開始有系統地研究范泰爾的思想。根據我的分析，他最重要的洞
見可分作四個範疇：知識本體論、知識倫理學、基督教的論證和對「不信」的
批判（包括「非信徒的思想」和「不信的思想對基督教神學的影響」）。…
We shall now begin to look at Van Til’s thought systematically. On my analysis, his
most significant insights can be divided into four general categories: the
metaphysics of knowledge, the ethics of knowledge, the argument for Christianity,
and the critique of unbelief (including both the thought of unbelievers and the
influence of unbelieving thought upon Christian theology). …
1. 本體論、知識論、倫理學
Metaphysics, Knowledge, Ethics
在第二部份「知識本體論」，我會討論范泰爾對人類知識的基要本質的看法，
這看法來自基督教的世界觀。第三部份「知識倫理學」會處理墮落對人類知
識的影響。…
In Part Two, “The Metaphysics of Knowledge,” I will discuss Van Til’s view of the
basic nature of human knowledge within a Christian worldview. Part Three,
“The Ethics of Knowledge,” will deal with the effects of the Fall upon our
knowledge. …
范泰爾常常討論本體論、知識論和倫理學這三個傳統哲學的主要學科。本體
論（可以說是形而上學的同義詞）廣泛地描述實存的本質，處理宇宙整體的
結構問題：一與眾之間的關係、位格與非位格的關係、上帝與人的關係、無
限與有限的關係、時間與永恆的關係、能看見的與不能看見的的關係。倫理
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學則處理個人行為的準則；如何確知這些準則，如何把這些準則應用在行為
上。知識論（epistemology, theory of knowledge）則討論我們如何能認識真
理，包括在本體論和倫理學範圍內的真理。…
Van Til often discussed relationships among metaphysics, epistemology, and
ethics, three traditional philosophical disciplines. Metaphysics, roughly
synonymous with ontology, describes in broad terms the nature of reality and
deals with questions about the general structure of the world: the relations of
unity and diversity, personality and impersonality, God and man, infinitude and
finitude, time and eternity, the visible and the invisible. Ethics deals with norms
for personal behavior, ways of determining those norms, and ways of applying
them to behavior. Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, discusses how we
can know truth, including truth in metaphysics and ethics. …
2. 本體論 = 聖經的世界觀
Metaphysics = Biblical Worldview
范泰爾最早的教學講義，原是以《護教學的本體論》為題目（近年來被改為
《基督教知識論綜覽》）。「本體論」在這裏是指聖經的世界觀，也就是創
造者與被造者之間的關係。因此，從最早期的教學生涯開始，他就關心「人
類的知識」和「基督教護教學」兩者與聖經的世界觀之間的關係。…（范泰
爾的）知識本體論特別配得最高的讚揚，因為它徹底地本於聖經，又富有理
性上的深度；並且大體上澄清了人類思想的基要本質。…
Van Til’s first class syllabus was originally entitled “The Metaphysics of
Apologetics.” (More recently it was retitled A Survey of Christian Epistemology.)
“Metaphysics” in this context refers to the biblical worldview, namely, the
relation between Creator and creature. Thus, he was concerned from the
earliest days of his career to discuss human knowledge and Christian
apologetics in relation to the biblical worldview. … (Van Til’s) account of the
metaphysics of knowledge merits superlative commendation. It is profoundly
biblical and intellectually penetrating, and it provides substantial clarification of
the fundamental nature of human thought. …
3. 簡單的思想架構：兩個圈子──創造主與被造者的區別
Simple Structure: Two Circles,
The Creator-Creature Distinction
范泰爾寫道：「我思想的架構非常簡單。」（DF1, 23）事實上也是如此。范
泰爾的起點是基督教創造論：上帝是創造者，世界是祂的創作。他常常在教
室黑板上畫兩個圓圈，一個大的圈，代表上帝；下面一個較小的圈，代表被
造物（宇宙）。兩個圈由幾條直線連起來，代表上帝的護理（掌管宇宙）和
啟示。不過范泰爾所強調的，是兩個圈之間的區別。
Van Til wrote, “Now the basic structure of my thought is very simple” (DF1, 23),
and in essence it is. Van Til’s starting point is the historic doctrine of creation:
God is the Creator, the world is his creation. Over and over again in class he
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would draw two circles on the blackboard: a large circle representing God and a
smaller circle below it representing the creation. The two are connected by lines
representing providence and revelation, but Van Til emphasized the distinctness
of the two circles from one another.
4. 「聖經」與「世俗」：「二圈思維」與「一圈思維」：
「相互依存」的錯誤
Bible Versus World: Two Circles Versus One Circle Thinking:
The Error of Correlativity
范氏堅持，基督教的世界觀是「二圈」的世界觀。這與世俗的世界觀截然不
同，後者只有「一圈」的思維。這一類不合乎聖經的思維，視宇宙一切的實
存彼此同等，所以，上帝若存在，祂就與世界同等。可是對基督教來說，上
帝是全權的創造者與主宰；世界絕對不能與祂同等。這就是范泰爾所謂的「簡
單的思想架構」。
He insisted that Christianity has a “two-circle” worldview, as opposed to secular
thought, which has only “one-circle” thinking. Non-biblical thought makes all
reality equal: if there is a God, he is equal to the world. But for Christianity, God
is the sovereign Creator and Lord; the world is in no sense equal to him. That is,
in essence, the “simple structure” of Van Til’s thought.
[ DF1 = The Defense of the Faith, 1st edition ]
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II. 上帝，自含的豐滿
GOD, THE SELF-CONTAINED FULLNESS
1. 「自存」：上帝是自足的，不是相互依存的
Aseity: God Is Self-Sufficient, Not Correlative
我們若要了解范泰爾的知識本體論，首先要探索他的上帝觀。他在《系統神
學導論》的第一頁說：「我們預設上帝的先存與自存，並預設祂無謬誤地在
聖經中向人啟示自己；這是所有正統信仰的基礎。」（IST, 1）「自存」
（self-existence 或 aseity）所指的是這個事實：「上帝在任何意義上，與任
何在祂以外的存有都是不相互依存的（correlative），也不依靠祂以外的一
切存有。上帝是祂自己存有的來源；或者應該說「來源」這詞並不適用於上
帝。上帝是絕對的，上帝對自己是自足的。」（DF2, 9）范泰爾常說「上帝
是自含的」（self-contained），就是指這個事實。
Evidently, then, our first priority in trying to understand Van Til’s metaphysics of
knowledge is to explore his doctrine of God. On the first page of his Introduction
to Systematic Theology, he says, “Fundamental to everything orthodox is the
presupposition of the antecedent self-existence of God and of his infallible
revelation of himself to man in the Bible.” (IST, 1.) “Self-existence,” sometimes
called aseity, refers to the fact “that God is in no sense correlative to or
dependent upon anything besides his own being. God is the source of his own
being, or rather the term source cannot be applied to God. God is absolute. He
is sufficient unto himself” (DF2, 9). Often Van Til summarizes this concept by
referring to the “self-contained God.”
2. 上帝是自足的，因此是不變的
God Is Self-Sufficient, Therefore Unchangeable
范泰爾很喜歡引用巴文克的一段話，意思是說，上帝所有其他的屬性（美德）
都包括在祂的自存（aseity）裏（IST, 206）。因此，當范泰爾討論上帝的不
變性時，他將上帝不變性的教義建立在上帝的自存上：「顯然的，上帝不會
改變，祂不能改變；因為除了祂自己永恆的存有（eternal Being）之外，祂
不靠任何其他的事物（瑪 3:6，雅 1:17）。」（DF2, 9）
He quotes favorably a passage from Bavinck to the effect that all the other
virtues of God are included in his aseity (IST, 206). Thus, when Van Til goes on to
discuss God’s immutability, he bases that doctrine upon the divine aseity:
“Naturally God does not and cannot change since there is nothing besides his
own eternal Being upon which he depends (Mal. 3:6, James 1:7).” (DF2, 9.)
瑪 3:6
因我耶和華是不改變的，所以你們雅各之子沒有滅亡。
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雅 1:17
各樣美善的恩賜和各樣全備的賞賜都是從上頭來的，從眾光之父那裏降下來的；在他並
沒有改變，也沒有轉動的影兒。
3. 「上帝的不變性」與「世俗的不變性」
God’s Immutability Versus Secular Immutability
上帝的不變性既是建立在祂的「自含豐滿」（self-contained fullness）上，它
與亞理斯多德「不動的動者」（unmoved mover）的不變性就是相反的；後
者只是一個抽象的理念在思想它自己（IST, 210）。
Since God’s immutability is based upon his “self-contained fullness,” it is quite
opposite to the immutability of Aristotle’s unmoved mover, an abstract thought
thinking itself (IST, 210).
4. 世俗的「自含觀」：它們都引致「一圈思維」──藉著延伸或否定之法
Secular Ideas of “Self-Contained”:
All Lead to One-Circle Thinking – Through Extrapolation or Negation
請注意他如何從「自含」進到「自含的豐滿」，這是重要的一步。所有嘗試
建構完整的本體論系統，都有一個「自含」的東西。可能是「第一因」（uncaused
cause）、「終極的物理粒子」、「現實中抽象的一致性」（abstract unity）、
「抽象的形式」（abstract form，也稱為「相」）、「機率性」（pure chance）、
或「隨意性」（randomness）。這些主張的基礎，若不是從有限的現存「延
伸」（extrapolation），就是「否定」有限（negation），試圖藉著這些方法
達到無限（infinity）。按一般哲學家的作法，「延伸法」會引致一個所謂「自
含」的存有，可是它不過是有限宇宙的擴大而已。而「否定法」則會引致另
一個「自含」的存有，它之所以是「自含」的，正因為它沒有正面的屬性。
「延伸法」並不引致上帝，只將人帶到一個更大的宇宙而已；「否定法」則
引致虛無。兩條路都無法通到聖經中上帝的「豐滿」那裏；它們都把人領入
「一圈」思維，而非「二圈」思維。
Notice how he moves from “self-contained” to “self-contained fullness.” That is
important. All would-be comprehensive metaphysical systems include
something that is “self-contained.” It may be an uncaused cause, an ultimate
physical particle, an abstract unity in reality, an abstract form, or perhaps pure
chance or randomness. The basis for such assertions lies either in an
extrapolation from finite reality (the “way of eminence”) or in a negation of the
finite in an attempt thereby to reach infinity (the “way of negation”).
Extrapolation or eminence, carried out in the usual philosophical way, leads to a
“self-contained” being that is merely an enlargement of the finite universe;
negation leads to a being that is self-contained simply because it has no positive
qualities. Extrapolation leads to no God at all, but only a larger universe;
negation leads to emptiness. Neither leads to the “fullness” of the biblical God.
Both leads to “one-circle” thinking, rather than “two-circle” thinking.
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5. 「正確的否定法」與「不正確的否定法」
「不正確的否定法」 = 抽象
Correct Negation Versus Incorrect Negation
Incorrect = Abstract
范泰爾並沒有說「延伸」和「否定」是不合理的作法，他反對的是哲學和神
學歷史上「延伸」和「否定」的典型作法。論到（上帝的）無限，他說：「我
們必須用否定法來形容這個屬性。」（IST, 211）他繼續說：「可是，正確
地使用否定法，是至為重要的。」（IST, 211）
Van Til does not deny the legitimacy of extrapolations and negations as such.
But he objects to the way in which these have typically been carried out in the
history of philosophy and theology. With regard to infinity, he says, “We are
again compelled to describe this attribute chiefly by way of negation.” (IST, 211.)
He adds, however, “But it is again of utmost significance that we use the way of
negation correctly.” (IST, 211.)
不正確的否定法是「抽象」的，因為它：
The incorrect way is “abstract,” which is to
只不過將時間、空間等理念，減去排序、延續（succession, continuity）
等特徵，以致達到永恆、無所不在等理念。可是當我們接受這種勸告的
時候，我們達到的終點，是與上帝存有的豐滿完全相反的一端。我們會
來到純粹的虛無。
Simply take the notions of time and space, and subtract such
characteristics as succession or continuity from them in order to reach the
notions of eternity and omnipresence. But when we follow this advice we
land at the opposite pole from that of the fullness of the being of God. We
then come to pure emptiness.
因此，我們需要上帝那言語不能盡述的「存有的豐滿」，作為我們對於
時間、空間等理念的預設前提（presupposition）；然後減除這些理念裏
基於它們是上帝所造的緣故而有的限制。若這樣作，我們的「否定」就
是神本的（theistic）。這樣的「否定」同時也就是「肯定」。上帝是那
麼的圓滿、豐富，以致當我們論及祂而必須使用「否定」時，都不能不
先預設祂存有的豐滿。（IST, 211-212）
Accordingly, we need the indescribable fullness of the being of God as the
presupposition of our notions of time and space. Then we subtract from
these notions the limitations that pertain to them by virtue of the fact that
they are created by God. If we do this, we walk theistically on the way of
negation. The way of negation is then, at the same time, the way of
affirmation. God then appears so full and rich in his being that we cannot
even make negations with respect to him without the presupposition of
the fullness of his being. (IST, 211-212.)
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即使在討論上帝的屬性時，范泰爾也運用「預設前提」！…
Even in his basic discussion of God’s nature, the matter of presuppositions
comes into play!...
6. 上帝是合一的，因此是自足的
God’s Unity Is Basis of His Aseity
范泰爾也將上帝的合一性（unity）與祂的自含豐滿連接起來。在神學傳統上，
一般都將「上帝的獨一性」（singularity，宇宙中只有一位上帝）和「上帝
的單一性」（simplicity，上帝不是由可以分別被理解的不同部份或層次所組
成；上帝的存有是神性的存有，是完整的一體）區分開來。對范泰爾來說，
「上帝的獨一性」和「上帝的單一性」是彼此預設的：「上帝有絕對的獨一
性，因此，上帝的自足是內在質素的自足（internal qualitative sufficiency）。」
（IST, 215）
Van Til also relates God’s attribute of unity to his self-contained fullness.
Theologians traditionally distinguish God’s unity of singularity (that there is only
one God) from his unity of simplicity (that he is not made up of parts or aspects
that are intelligible in themselves, apart from the divine being as a whole). To
Van Til, the one implies the other: “We have in the case of God absolute
numerical identity and, therefore, internal qualitative sufficiency.” (IST, 215.)
7. 錯誤思想：若「抽象的屬性」（例如良善）高過上帝而成為宇宙的真神，
這也不過是非位格的上帝
Error: Abstract Attribute – e.g. Goodness,
Will Be Higher Than God,
And Be The True God, Albeit an Impersonal God
上帝若只有一位，那麼上帝「裏面」沒有任何事物是離祂而獨立的。就以「上
帝的良善」為例，「良善」並不是上帝思想裏的一樣東西，祂要將自己帶到
這「良善」面前，去遵守它。若是這樣的話，「良善」這一個抽象的質素就
成為「第二位上帝」，與上帝相輔相成了。因此，若否認上帝的單一性，則
違反了上帝的獨一性（宇宙只有一位上帝）。
If there is only one God, then there is nothing “in” him that is independent of
him. God’s goodness, for example, is not something in his mind to which he
brings himself to conformity. If it were, that goodness, an abstract quality,
would be a second deity coordinate with God himself. Thus, denial of God’s
unity of simplicity violates God’s unity of singularity.
從另一個意義上看，根據這樣的假設，宇宙中還是會有一位「上帝」，只不
過那不是聖經中的上帝。若抽象的良善比上帝更終極（ultimate），那就只
有這「良善」才是真正的神。而真神若只是一條抽象的原則，那麼真神就是
非位格的（impersonal），而不是有位格的（personal）。
In another sense, however, on this supposition, there would still be one god,
though not the God of Scripture. For abstract goodness would be more ultimate
15
than God is; it alone would be authentic deity. And if the true deity were an
abstract principle, then the true deity would be impersonal rather than
personal.
8. 上帝的良善就是祂自己；一切的屬性指向祂本身
God’s Goodness Is Himself; All Attributes Refer to His Self
相反地，范泰爾說，上帝的良善就是祂所是的一切。同樣地，祂的一切屬性
都指向祂自含的豐滿（當然，每一個屬性是從不同的角度指向祂的自含豐
滿）。
On the contrary, says Van Til, God’s goodness is everything that he is. All his
attributes, similarly, refer (from different perspectives!) to his self-contained
fullness.
9. 延伸與否定都必須預設上帝的啟示
Extrapolation and Negation Must Presuppose God’s Revelation
總的來說，上帝的本性是那麼的豐富、完滿，我們永遠不可能只靠延伸或否
定去認識的。可是，上帝若自我啟示的話，我們就可以在我們的延伸和否定
中預設這啟示了。因為上帝在祂的啟示中告訴我們，祂是創造者，我們是被
造者；祂也賜給我們很多關於「創造者與被造者如何不同」的啟示。我們必
須要作的第一件事情，就是謙卑地從祂手中領受這知識。我們有關「上帝屬
性的教義」，簡單地說，就是複述、解釋和應用上帝所告訴我們的事情。
In summary, the nature of God is so rich and full that we could never come to
know it on the basis of either eminence or negation taken by themselves.
However, if God reveals himself, then we can presuppose that revelation in our
extrapolations and negations. For he tells us in that revelation that he is the
Creator and we are creatures, and he tells us much about how Creator and
creature differ from one another. What we must do first is humbly accept that
knowledge from his hands. Our doctrines of the divine attributes will simply be
repetition, explanation, and application of what God has told us.
10. 應用聖經牽涉普遍啟示；對普遍啟示的回應必須預設聖經
Applying Scripture Involves General Revelation;
Response to General Revelation Must Presuppose Scripture
說到聖經的應用，當然牽涉到「使聖經的教訓與我們經歷的現實相連」。關
於上帝的不變性和無限性方面，我們需要問：這些與空間和時間有甚麼關
係？這是很重要的問題。聖經在這方面講得不多，也不仔細；我們在這方面
所學到的東西，多數來自「自然啟示」──即上帝在自然和歷史中的自我啟
示。可是當我們對空間和時間的分析先預設了聖經的真理時，我們就可以作
出有用的結論，知道上帝如何超越時間空間（transcendence），可是又同時
在時間空間裏臨在（immanence）。
16
But application, of course, involves relating the teachings of Scripture to the
realities of our experience. In the case of divine immutability and infinity, it is
important to ask how these are related to space and time. Scripture says little
specifically or in general about space and time; much of what we learn about
these things comes from “natural revelation,” God’s revelation of himself in
nature and history. But when our analysis of space and time presupposes the
truth of Scripture, we can draw useful conclusions about how God transcends
them, yet is also immanent in them.
11. 啟示使「延伸法」和「否定法」變得可能而有效
Revelation Makes Extrapolation, Negation Possible and Fruitful
因此，上帝的啟示讓我們能有效地使用延伸法和否定法。無論如何，我們只
有藉著啟示，才能避免相信一個「虛空」的神明；這樣的神明若「是」甚麼
的話，它只不過是我們自己的投射。
Thus, divine revelation enables us to use extrapolation and negation in a fruitful
way. In any case, it is only by revelation that we can avoid believing in an
“empty” god, one that is only a projection of ourselves, if indeed he is anything
at all.
范泰爾這樣討論了上帝所有不可傳遞的屬性：祂的自足性、不變性、無限性
和合一性。我們對這些屬性的理解，都必須與上帝的自含豐滿相連，並建基
於上帝的啟示。
In this manner Van Til discusses all the incommunicable attributes of God
(Incommunicable attributes, traditionally, are those that are unique to God;
communicable attributes are divine attributes that can also be predicated of
finite people or things. The distinction breaks down, because all of God’s
attributes are unique to him, and because the creation images all his attributes
in some faint way. Van Til understood the limitations of this classification, as
have most Reformed theologians; like them, however, he continued to use it.):
aseity, immutability, infinity, and unity. All of these must be understood to
pertain to God’s self-contained fullness, on the basis of his revelation. (You can
see how Van Til’s apologetic concerns press us far beyond the usual theological
formulations of the divine attributes. This and other examples of his theological
thinking led me to argue in VTT that Van Til is not only an apologist, but also a
theologian of first importance. Additional examples of Van Til’s theological
creativity are noted elsewhere in this volume.)
17
12. 上帝可傳遞的屬性：上帝的靈性是自我個別化的；
上帝的知識是與祂自己同極的
God’s Communicable Attributes: God’s Spirituality Is Self-Individuated;
God’s Knowledge Is Coterminous with Himself
關於上帝可傳遞的屬性，也是一樣。上帝是靈；祂的靈性「並不是一個含糊
的屬靈觀念與類別；好像上帝是這個類別裏的一個品種，人類是另一品種。
不是的！上帝是唯一絕對的靈（the absolute Spirit），祂是自含的靈。上帝
不需要與祂有別的其他物質性來自我個別化，上帝是自我個別化的靈
（self-individuated Spirit）。」（IST, 233）
The same thing is true of the communicable attributes. God’s “spirituality” is
not “some vague generic concept of spirituality of which God is one particular
instance and man another. God is the absolute Spirit. He is the self-contained
Spirit. He does not need materiality over against himself to individuate himself.
He is the self-individuated Spirit.” (IST, 233.)
關於上帝的無所不知，祂的知識和祂的存有（祂自己）是同極的
（coterminous）（IST, 234）。上帝完全透知祂自己和祂對世界的計劃；因
此，沒有任何在祂裏面或在祂外面的事物，是離祂而獨立的。上帝的知識與
祂所有的其他屬性一樣，都是自我依靠的（self-dependent）。用范泰爾的
說法，祂的知識是「分析性」（analytical）的 [IST, 236；參頁 8; CA, 6; JA, 275-305;
HDRA, 1:1-24；本書（CVT）第 27 章]。上帝的知識從來不依靠任何在祂以外
的事物，不然的話，上帝就不是自含的豐滿。
With regard to God’s omniscience, his knowledge and his being are
“coterminous.” (IST, 234.) He knows himself and his plan for the world
exhaustively; therefore, there is nothing within him or outside him that is
independent of him. Like all his attributes, his knowledge is self-dependent, or,
as Van Til sometimes describes it, “analytical.” [IST, 236; cf. p. 8; CA, 6. For a
discussion of the controversy between Van Til and Knudsen concerning this
term, see JA, 275-305, and HDRA, 1:1-24. In my view, Knudsen’s critique
amounts to a fairly elementary misunderstanding of a term that Van Til defines
quite adequately. I shall discuss the larger question of Van Til’s “rationalism” at
later points, especially chap. 27 (CVT).] His knowledge is never dependent on
anything outside of himself. Otherwise, he would not be self-contained fullness.
(This is not to say that God’s knowledge of the world is knowledge of himself
simpliciter. God’s knowledge is not mere introspection; he knows himself, and
he also knows what takes place in the temporal world. This point is important;
otherwise, we are pressed toward pantheism. The world is genuinely other than
God, and God knows it as something different from himself. Nevertheless, even
in knowing the world in its otherness, God knows something that he has
exhaustively interpreted prior to its existence, because he has , exhaustively,
made that world what it is. Van Til does not himself make this point, but he
does not deny it either, and we should recognize it as a legitimate qualification
of his emphasis.)
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13. 上帝的良善、聖潔、公義；
「上帝永恆的預旨」定旨了祂自己和萬物
God’s Goodness, Holiness, Righteousness;
God’s Eternal Decree Wills Himself and All Things
上帝的良善就是祂自己。假如不是這樣，上帝就會看見在祂以外的目標（IST,
238）。上帝的聖潔，就是「上帝絕對和永恆的道德純潔」（IST, 244）。上
帝的公義，就是「祂神性存有的內在一致性」。（IST, 245）上帝的旨意「定
旨祂自己為萬物的歸依／目標（end）」（IST, 246）；上帝的旨意是「被造
宇宙裏一切實體和能力的源頭」（IST, 247）。上帝隱密的旨意──即祂的
預旨（decretive will），包含要發生的所有事情，包括罪與邪惡（IST, 248）。
Goodness is God himself. If that were not so, he would be seeking goals outside
himself. (IST, 238. We should make another qualifying point parallel to the one
made in the preceding note: God seeks the goodness of his creatures. This does
not detract from his self-containment; rather, it presupposes self-containment.
Were he not self-contained, he would act to meet his own needs;
self-containment frees him to meet the needs of others, to be a servant-king.)
Holiness is “God’s absolute eternal moral purity.” (IST, 244.) Righteousness is
“the internal self-consistency of the divine being.” (IST, 245.) His will “wills
himself as his own end” (IST, 246) and is “the source of all substance and power
in the created universe.” (IST, 247.) God’s secret or decretive will includes
everything that comes to pass, including sin and evil. (IST, 248.)
14. 面對奧秘是可以理解的
Mysteries = Understandable
這裏面有很多的奧秘。一個良善的上帝怎能定旨邪惡的存在？上帝在世界裏
的作為，怎能既表達祂永恆的本性，而又同時是自由的作為呢？范泰爾並不
宣稱他解決了這些難題 [IST, 249；另參本書（CVT）第 11-13 章]，但透過強
調上帝本性中自含豐滿這最核心的真理，范泰爾讓我們看見，雖面對這些奧
秘，卻仍是可以理解的。
There are mysteries in all of this. How can a good God will the existence of evil?
How can God’s acts in the world express his eternal nature, yet be free? Van Til
does not claim to have solved the difficulties. [IST, 249; see chaps. 11-13 of this
book (CVT).] But, having emphasized the self-contained fullness that is essential
to God, he has made it quite understandable why we should expect to
encounter such mysteries.
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ VTT = John Frame, Van Til: The Theologian ]
[ CA = Christian Apologetics ]
[ JA = Jerusalem and Athens ]
[ HDRA = Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
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III. 上帝，絕對的位格
GOD, THE ABSOLUTE PERSONALITY
1. 上帝：絕對而位格
God: Absolute and Personality
范泰爾以「自含豐滿」（self-contained fullness）來歸納他的神論。他也以「上
帝是絕對位格」（absolute personality）（DF2, 12, 42）來總結這教義。「絕
對」和「位格」兩個詞都同樣重要。有些非基督教的系統（例如：多神宗教
和各種現代的「人格主義」哲學）都設定了某一種有位格的神明，可是這些
「神」都不是絕對者，因為它們都不是自含的神。而另一些非基督教的系統
則接受某一種的絕對實存，可是這些絕對者是非位格的。唯有在聖經的教導
裏，絕對性和位格性結合在最高的存有（上帝）裏面。
Van Til summarizes his doctrine of God in terms of “self-contained fullness.”
Another Van Tillian summary of this doctrine is that God is “absolute
personality.” (DF2, 12, 42.) Both words in the phrase are important. Some
non-Christian systems (as the polytheistic religions and modern philosophical
“personalisms”) posit personal gods of one kind or another, but those gods are
not absolute in the sense of being self-contained. Other non-Christian systems
accept absolute realities of various kinds, but those absolutes are not personal.
Only in biblical teaching are absoluteness and personality combined in the
Supreme Being.
2. 范泰爾：位格主義者
Van Til: Personalistic
論范泰爾的作者們多數沒有注意到他的「位格主義」，可是這是他思想中的
重要主題之一；甚至從他寫作生涯的早期開始，「位格主義」就是一個非常
重要的主題。在下面一段文字中，范泰爾借用了位格主義的觀念（範疇），
來護衛「亞當是人類的頭與代表」此一教義：
Van Til’s “personalism” is not widely noted in the literature about him, but it is
nonetheless an important theme in his thought, and it has been important since
his earliest writing. In the following passage, he employs personalistic
categories to defend the doctrine of Adam’s representative headship of the
human race:
毫無疑問地，三位一體裏有完全的「位格際」的關係（ personal
relationship）。因此，我們可以斷言，所有「人的動作」都是有位格的
（personal actions）。人的環境充滿著位格性（personality），因為萬
物都與這位無限、有位格的上帝有關。可是，當我們說人類的環境完全
充滿著位格時，我們也同時建立了「代表原則」此一事實
20
（representational principle）。人類一切的行為，必然代表了上帝的作
為。三位一體中每一位的作為，都代表其他兩位。祂們是彼此代表的，
祂們是徹底地彼此代表的（exhaustively representational）。而人因為是
受造者，因此，他的思想、感覺、意志的決定，都必須代表上帝。（SCE,
78-79；參頁 97）
In the Trinity there is completely personal relationship without residue.
And for that reason it may be said that all man’s actions are personal too.
Man’s surroundings are shot through with personality because all things
are related to the infinitely personal God. But when we have said that the
surroundings of man are really completely personalized, we have also
established the fact of the representational principle. All of man’s acts
must be representational of the acts of God. Even the persons of the
Trinity are mutually representational. They are exhaustively
representational of one another. Because he is a creature, man must, in his
thinking, his feeling and his willing, be representative of God. (SCE, 78-79;
cf. p. 97.)
因此，「上帝的創造除了用代表性的計劃（representational plan），沒有其
他可能。」（SCE, 79）「由於上帝設定了一個整體的計劃，每一個有限的人
的每一個動作，都影響後來每一個人的每一個動作。」（SCE, 79）
Therefore, “It was impossible for God to create except upon the
representational plan.” (SCE, 79.) “Every act of every finite person affects every
act of every other finite person that comes after him by virtue of the one
general plan of God.” (SCE, 79.)
3. 「非聖經的位格主義」事實上是「非位格主義」；
因為上帝被服在非位格的原則之下
Non-Biblical Personalisms Are In Fact Impersonalistic;
Because God Is Made Subject to Impersonal Laws
范泰爾有時會討論所謂「位格主義」的理想主義（如：鮑恩 Bowne、柏瑞門
Brightman 等）和所謂的「我－你」神學（如：Buber 和 Brunner 等）。這些
哲學和神學都用位格主義的措辭，可是它們都拒絕歷史上正統基督教（即聖
經）中那位絕對的上帝（absolute God）。范泰爾認為這些觀點其實都是非
位格主義的（impersonalistic），因為它們讓上帝服在偶然、孤存事實、抽
象邏輯等非位格的原則之下（SCE, 176-182「論鮑恩」；IST, 165-166「論現
代自由派神學家們」）。同樣，亞米念和路德宗的神學，由於他們限制「上
帝的主權」，好為「人的行為」留下空間，而「人的行為」都源自於偶然或
受造物的自主性，因此，他們的神學也是非位格主義的。論及亞米念的觀點，
他指出「道德的行為或不道德的行為，都必須發生在一個完全非位格的處境
裏」（SCE, 87。「論路德宗神學」，參頁 65-80）。范泰爾也批判了哲學上
的決定論，因為它也是非位格主義（DF2, 62; CTETH, 35; JA, 16。范泰爾強調
加爾文主義並不是哲學上的決定論）。
Van Til has often had occasion to address personalistic idealisms like those of
Bowne and Brightman and “I-Thou” theologies such as those of Buber and
21
Brunner. Such views use much personalistic rhetoric, but they reject the
absolute God of historic Christian orthodoxy. Van Til argues that these views are
in fact impersonalistic, since they make God subordinate to the impersonal
principles of chance, brute fact, and abstract logic. (SCE, 176-182 on Bowne; IST,
165-166, on modern liberal theologians.) Similarly, Arminian and Lutheran
theology, since they limit God’s sovereignty to make room for human acts that
spring from chance or creaturely autonomy, is impersonalist to that extent. On
the Arminian view, “An act to be moral or immoral, must take place in a
completely impersonal atmosphere.” (SCE, 87. On Lutheranism, see pp. 65-80.)
Van Til also criticizes philosophical determinism for its impersonalism. (DF2, 62;
CTETH, 35; JA, 16. Van Til is emphatic that Calvinism is not a form of
philosophical determinism.)
4. 加爾文和聖約神學是唯一真正的位格主義
Calvin and Covenant Theology: Only True Personalism
從正面來說，范泰爾指出，加爾文是一位真正的位格主義者。他認為加爾文
關於「人的意志」的教義，是「不致走向完全非位格主義的唯一出路」（DF2,
98；參 CTETH, 207; CFC, 23）。他知道「唯有聖約神學對實存的解釋是全然
位格主義的」（DF2, 98）。加爾文在《基督教要義》開宗明義，指出人對自
己的認識是依靠他對上帝的認識；反之亦然。他的預定論教義絕對不是非位
格主義的決定論（determinism）；他認為在大自然和歷史中所發生的每一
個事件裏，人與上帝的關係都是位格與位格之間的關係（關於范泰爾的位格
主義，參 CTETH, 19, 250-251; IW, 28; JA, 16; ICG, 5, 25-29; TG, 9）。
Positively, Van Til cites Calvin as a true personalist. He sets forth his doctrine of
man’s will “boldly as the only alternative to complete impersonalism.” (DF2, 98;
cf. CTETH, 207; CFC, 23.) He knew that “covenant theology furnishes the only
completely personalistic interpretation of reality.” [DF2, 98. (emphasis by Van
Til).] Calvin began his Institutes by saying that the knowledge of oneself is
dependent on the knowledge of God and vice versa. His doctrine of
predestination, far from being an impersonal determinism, placed man in a
person-to-person relationship with God in every event of nature and history.
(For more references to Van Til’s personalism, see CTETH, 19, 250-251; IW, 28;
JA, 16; ICG, 5, 25-29; TG, 9.)
5. 否認上帝的自含豐滿和單一性，等於將祂服在抽象觀念之下；
只有有位格者才可能是全權者
Denial of God’s Self-Contained Fulness and Simplicity
Makes God Subject to Abstract Qualities;
Only a Personal Being Can Be Sovereign
我們在前面注意到，否認上帝的自含豐滿，就等於主張非位格主義。記得范
泰爾的論證嗎？若否認上帝的單一性，就等於把上帝服在一些抽象的質素之
下。范泰爾認為上帝的主權和祂的位格之間關係非常密切，這層關係對我們
22
的啟發很大。因為只有一個有位格的上帝，才可能是全權的；也只有一位全
權的上帝，才可能是絕對的「那一位」（an absolute person）。換言之，只
有一位有位格的存有，才可能作出選擇並付諸執行；也只有一位全權的上
帝，才可以至終避免被服在非位格的原則以下。
We noted in the previous section that to deny God’s self-contained fullness is to
assert impersonalism. Recall particularly Van Til’s argument that the denial of
divine simplicity makes God subordinate to abstract qualities. Van Til finds a
close relationship between divine sovereignty and the divine personality. This
relationship is very illuminating. It is edifying to observe that only a personal
God can be sovereign and only a sovereign God can be an absolute person. That
is to say, only a personal being can make choices and carry them out, and only a
sovereign God can avoid being subject, ultimately, to impersonal principles.
6. 位格主義是為基督教辯護的基礎：
若拒絕「聖經中的上帝」，就只能接受「無情的命運」
Personalism Basic to Argument for Christianity:
Biblical God or Impersonal Fate
范泰爾經常將這個絕對的位格主義帶進他的護教學，尤其是當他比較改革宗
信仰和其他前面曾提及的「不真實的位格主義」時。我們也應該看見，他為
基督教所作的基本論證，乃是建立在聖經的位格主義上。人若拒絕聖經中有
位格的上帝，就只能接受一個由非位格的命運所掌控的宇宙。
Van Til often brought this absolute personalism into his apologetic, especially
when he compared the Reformed faith with various inauthentic personalisms,
such as those mentioned above. We shall see also that his basic argument for
Christianity depends on biblical personalism. To reject the personal, biblical God
leaves no alternative except a world governed by impersonal fate.
7. 范泰爾的學生必須更「位格主義」
Van Til’s Students Must Be Even More Personalistic
我的看法是，未來「范泰爾式的護教」需要比范泰爾更強調位格主義的原則。
范泰爾所用的某些名詞，或會讓人覺得范泰爾的護教所關心的只是一些抽象
觀念，例如「終極的一與眾」、「具體的共相」等。雖然這些觀念聽起來很
抽象，但它們實際上的意義是全然位格主義的；我們在下一章將會說明。在
范泰爾的思想中，只有一位有位格的存有，才可能是一個真正「具體的共
相」，才可能是「終極的一與眾」。可是，既然我們的護教是建立在范泰爾
的根基上，我們就應該是更明確的位格主義。
In my view, a Van Tillian apologetic of the future should emphasize this principle
even more than Van Til did. Some of van Til’s formulations suggest that the Van
Tillian apologist is, after all, concerned mainly with abstractions: an “ultimate
oneness and manyness,” a “concrete universal.” Abstract as these notions
sound, their actual meaning is entirely personalistic; for, as we shall see in the
following chapter, in Van Til’s thought only a person can be a truly concrete
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universal, an ultimate one-and-many. But, as we build on Van Til’s foundation,
we should be even more explicitly personalistic.
8. 非位格者不可能是終極的
The Impersonal Cannot Be Ultimate
非位格的事實和原則之所以不可能是終極的，正是因為它們是非位格的。它
們無法解釋宇宙中的合理性（rationality）、道德價值、因果關係和邏輯的
可用性。
Impersonal facts and laws cannot be ultimate, precisely because they are not
personal. They cannot account for rationality, for moral value, for the causal
order of the universe, or for the universal applicability of logic.
9. 聖經中位格性的世界觀對護教者四方面的幫助
Four Ways Biblical Personalism Helps Apologist
基督徒護教者必須比范泰爾更加強調這個「位格／非位格」的對照。位格性
的世界觀，將基督教的世界觀與其他所有的世界觀分別開來。強調基督教位
格性的世界觀，能給護教者們帶來幾方面的好處：（1）有些慕道朋友對我
們說：「探索基督教是毫無意義的，因為若要進行這樣的探索，我們必須同
時研究思想史上所有其他的哲學、宗教與意識型態（ideologies），這當然是
不可能的。」我們可以這樣回答：「你們應該給予基督教特別的關注，因為
在『宇宙是由有位格的存有在掌管，還是受無情的命運所控制？』此一重要
問題上，基督教的看法是獨特的。基督教是貫徹的位格主義，其他的思想體
系則在完全相反的陣營。」（2）對位格的強調，正視了當代世俗社會中人
的孤單問題。基督教為人提供終極的友誼、終極的愛，這在非基督教的世界
觀裏是找不到的。（3）唯有基督教的位格性世界觀才能給我們把握，知道
宇宙是由終極合理（rational）的主宰掌管的；（4）同時也給我們確據，知
道宇宙是由終極正直的主宰掌管的。正如我們所見，這些確據在任何其他世
界觀的大前提下，都是不可能的。
The Christian apologist should emphasize, more than Van Til did, the issue of
impersonalism versus personalism. It is this issue, as we have seen, that
distinguishes the Christian worldview from all others. To emphasize it gives the
apologist several advantages: (1) Inquirers sometimes tell us that there is no
point in investigating Christianity, for if they did that, they would also have to
investigate all the other religions, philosophies, and ideologies in the history of
thought – an impossible task, to be sure. We can reply that they should give
special attention to Christianity, for on the crucial question of whether the
universe is governed by a person or by impersonal principles, Christianity is
unique. It is consistently personalistic, and all its rivals are in the opposite camp.
(2) The emphasis on personalism also addresses the loneliness of modern
secular people. It offers them an ultimate friendship, ultimate love, something
they will never find in a non-Christian view of the world. (3) It assures them that
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an ultimate rationality – and (4) an ultimate justice – govern the world order.
These assurances are not possible on any other basis, as we shall see.

[ SCE = A Survey of Christian Epistemology ]
[ CTETH = Christian Theistic Ethics ]
[ CFC = The Case for Calvinism ]
[ IW = The Inerrant Word ]
[ ICG = The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel ]
[ TG = The Triumph of Grace: The Heidelberg Catechism ]
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第五章三位一體
THE TRINITY
I. 范泰爾的三一論：正統教會信仰
VAN TIL’S TRINITY: ORTHODOX DOCTRINE
我們已經明白，范泰爾有關上帝的「豐滿」和「位格性」的觀念，都與三位一
體論有關。他的位格主義取決於「三位一體的彼此代表」這個事實。讓我們再
仔細地研究范氏位格主義背後的三一論；這個教義在他的思想裏扮演著重要的
角色。
As we have seen, Van Til’s concepts of the fullness and the personality of God are
linked to the doctrine of the Trinity. His personalism depends on the fact that the
persons of the Trinity are “representational” of one another. Let us, then, look
more carefully at the doctrine of the Trinity that underlies Van Til’s personalism
and plays other important roles in his thought.
正如范泰爾其他的教義論說一樣，他的三位一體論是以早期教會的信經和宗教
改革的信仰告白為起點。他列出基本的聖經經文，並且勾畫出這項教義的歷史
發展（IST, 220-227）。在這樣的歷史綜覽中，范氏與一般改革宗神學家一樣，
都強調：（一）三位一體是本體論的（ontological），不是單用來指出三個位
格在救贖計劃上扮演的不同角色（economic Trinity），意思是，上帝的本性是
三又是一，這不能只從祂與世界的關係上去理解；（二）主張本體論的三位一
體中有從屬的關係（subordination）是錯誤的信念，例如：聖子從屬聖父（DF2,
25）。范氏特別強調加爾文有關「聖子是上帝本身（autotheotes）」的教導，
指出聖子的存有（being）並不是從父得來的（derived），祂自己（of himself）
就是上帝，在祂裏面（in himself）就是上帝（IST, 27-228; SCE, 110-112; TJD,
33-38）。「上帝的存有是從外界而得（derived）」這種說法本身就是自相矛
盾。
As with all his doctrinal formulations, Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity begins with
an affirmation of the ancient creeds and the Reformed confessions. He lists the
basic biblical texts and sketches the historical development of the doctrine. (IST,
220-227.) In this historical survey, he emphasizes, as have Reformed theologians
generally, (1) that the Trinity is ontological, not merely economic – God is both
three and one in his very nature, not only in his relations to the world – and (2)
that it is erroneous to assert relations of subordination (as, for example, of the Son
to the Father) within the ontological Trinity. (DF2, 25, he says, “It is a well-known
fact that all heresies in the history of the church have in some form or other
taught subordinationism. Similarly, we believe, all ‘heresies’ in apologetic
methodology spring from some sort of subordinationism.”) He particularly
emphasizes Calvin’s teaching about the autotheotes of the Son: that the Son does
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not derive his being from the Father, but is God in and of himself. (IST, 227-228;
SCE, 101-102; TJD – The Theology of James Daane, 33-38.) “Derived deity” is, of
course, an oxymoron.

[ TJD = The Theology of James Daane ]
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II. 三位一體與神人相互依存主義
THE TRINITY AND CORRELATIVISM
1. 范泰爾批判「神人相互依存主義」
Van Til’s Critique of Correlativism
范泰爾對這個歷史分析加上了他獨特的看法：撒伯流主義（Sabellianism）和
亞流主義（Arianism）這兩種異端，本質上是「相互依存主義」（correlativism）
的表現。「相互依存主義」宣稱上帝和世界是互相依賴的，這種想法違背了
「上帝是自含豐滿」的教義。這兩種異端都視上帝為一種「孤存的一體」（bare
unity），若沒有世界所提供的多元性，則無法運作（IST, 225）。
Then Van Til adds a distinctive twist to the historical analysis: that the heresies
of Sabellianism (The view that the three persons are nothing more than
historically successive manifestations of the one God.) and Arianism (The view
that the Son and the Spirit are mere creatures.) are, at root, manifestations of
correlativism. Correlativism asserts that God and the world are dependent
upon each other, contrary to the doctrine of God’s self-contained fullness. Both
of these heresies see God as a kind of bare unity, which cannot function without
the supplementation supplied by the plurality of the world. (IST, 225.)
2. 不合乎聖經的「一」：
全然他者、不能描述、沒有主權、需要世界
Unbiblical Oneness:
Wholly Other, Undescribable, Not Sovereign, Needs World
范泰爾對於這點的解釋不甚清楚，讓我嘗試補充。就如諾斯底主義
（Gnosticism）、新柏拉圖主義（Neo-platonism）、以及（不幸地也如）一
部份早期教父一樣，撒伯流主義和亞流主義認為：上帝只是「一」（oneness），
祂與現實世界的距離非常遙遠，以致無法被人形容。同樣，現代神學家也喜
歡說上帝是「全然的他者」（wholly other）。可是，一個不能言說的「一」
是一個抽象的「一」，而非一個有位格的絕對者（personal absolute）。在
這種情況下，如同我上一章所強調的，這樣的「上帝」不可能是真正的主權
者。祂（應該說：它）必定是與世界相互依存的，意即：它需要依賴世界，
才能存在。
Van Til does not explain his point very clearly; allow me to attempt an
elaboration. Like the Gnostics, Neoplatonists, and (unfortunately) some of the
church fathers, the Sabellians and Arians saw God as a “oneness” so far from
earthly reality as to be beyond human description. Similarly, modern
theologians like to say that God is “wholly other.” But an utterly undescribable
oneness is an abstract oneness, not a personal absolute. In that case, as I
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emphasized in the preceding chapter, God cannot be truly sovereign. He (or
rather “it”) must be relative to the world.
3. 用人的語言描述「全然他者」的「上帝」：
這樣的「上帝」只是「世界的延伸」
God’s Wholly Other Nature Through Human Language:
Therefore God = Extension of World
我們可以從不同角度來看這個相互依存性（relativity）。首先，當人們嘗試
論及「全然他者」的「上帝」時，他們必須使用人的語言，而人的語言是關
乎被造世界的言語。所以這位「上帝」充其量也只不過是世界的延伸而已。
如此一來，上帝的權能僅是地上能力的延伸，上帝的愛也只是地上的愛的延
伸……如此類推。其次，一個抽象的「一」不像三位一體的「一」，它不可
能自我定義（self-defined），因此，它必須與世界相互依存。比方說，它的
愛若可以被定義的話，一定會被定義為一種對世界的愛，而不是上帝三個位
格之間的愛。因為按此觀點，上帝的位格不是「眾」的（true plurality）。
第三，一個「全然他者的存有」不能為世界提供理性和道德秩序的基礎，那
麼，這個基礎就必須在世界裏尋找。這樣一來，世界就成為終極，而這位全
然他者──不論它是甚麼──就必須與世界相互依存。這種想法與聖經中
「上帝是掌權的主權者」的教導背道而馳。
We can see that relativity in various ways: First, when people try to speak of the
wholly other god, they must do so in human language, language about the
created world. Thus, the god becomes a mere extension of the world. God’s
power is merely an extension of earthly power, his love is an extension of
earthly love, and so on. Second, an abstract oneness, as opposed to a Trinitarian
oneness, cannot be self-defined and therefore must be relative to the world. His
love, for example, if it is defined at all, must be defined as a love for the world,
rather than a love among divine persons, for on this view there is no true
plurality of divine persons. Third, a wholly other being does not provide a basis
for the rational and moral order of the world. That basis must then be found in
the world itself. But then the world is ultimate, and whatever the “wholly
other” is, it is relative to the world. This pattern of thought rules out the biblical
view of God as sovereign Lord. (In Deuteronomy 6:4, the famous Old Testament
confession of faith, the unity of God is intimately related to his lordship. He is
the one Lord, whom we are to love with all our heart, permitting in ourselves no
rival loyalties. One Lord means one allegiance.)
相反，正統基督教的三位一體教義摒棄這種相互依存主義。正統的看法是：
上帝的「一」只與祂自己相互依存，上帝的「一」與祂自身存有的複雜性
（complexities）和多元性（plurality）相互依存。世界也是「一而眾」的，
因為上帝這樣造了世界。
Now orthodox Trinitarianism renounces such correlativism. On the orthodox
view, God’s unity is correlative only to himself, to the complexities and
pluralities of his own being. The world also is a unity and a diversity, because
God made it that way.
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4. 例子：上帝的愛
一個空白（單獨）的上帝需要世界作為愛的對象
Example: God’s Love
A Blank God Needs World to Love
讓我們思想「愛」這個上帝的屬性。上帝若只是一，而非三位一體，那麼，
上帝永恆之愛的對象是誰？是祂自己嗎？可是，按照聖經的意思，最完整的
愛在本質上必須伸向他者（reach out to another），不是只伸向自己。上帝
的愛的對象是世界嗎？那麼，上帝之愛的永恆屬性就取決於世界了；也就是
說，上帝的愛需要世界。但是，若根據三位一體的教義基礎，上帝的愛既是
位格之間（interpersonal）的愛，同時也是自含（self-contained）的愛；上
帝的愛乃是聖父、聖子、聖靈之間彼此的愛。這愛，並不依靠世界。
Consider love, as an attribute of God. If God is a mere unity without Trinity,
then what is the object of God’s eternal love? Himself? But love in the fullest
biblical sense by its very nature reaches out to another, not merely to the self.
The world? Then God’s eternal attribute of love depends on the world; it needs
the world. On a Trinitarian basis, however, God’s love is both interpersonal and
self-contained; God’s love is the love among Father, Son and Spirit for one
another, and it is not dependent on the world.
這裏我們看到范泰爾如何將上帝的自存性（aseity）、位格性（personality）
和三位一體連接起來；這是非常有深度的貢獻。三位一體論護衛了上帝的自
存性，因為若沒有三位一體，上帝就與世界相互依存。三位一體也護衛了上
帝的位格性：上帝不是「空白（單獨）的一」；這種「一」是非位格性的。
相反，上帝是「（三個）位格的一」（a unity of persons）。
We can see how Van Til has related, in a very profound way, the doctrines of
divine aseity, personality, and the Trinity. The Trinity guards aseity, for, without
it, God is relative to the world. The Trinity also guards the personality of God: he
is not a blank unity, which would be impersonal. Rather, he is a unity of
persons.
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III. 「一而眾」的問題
THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY
1. 范泰爾用三一論解決「一而眾」的問題
Van Til: Trinity Solves One-and-Many Problem
范泰爾對三位一體教義的另一重大貢獻，乃是他用三位一體的教義解決哲學
上「一而眾」的問題。從廣義來說，「一而眾」的問題來自人類在事物的複
雜性（plurality）中尋求一致性（unity）（DF2, 24）。具體來說：
Another distinctively Van Tillian contribution to our thinking about the Trinity is
his use of the doctrine in connection with the “one-and-many problem.” Most
generally, the problem is man’s quest “to find unity in the midst of the plurality
of things.” (DF2, 24.) More specifically:
「眾」必須彼此接觸，可是我們怎樣知道它們可能彼此接觸？我們怎樣
知道「眾」不是以彼此不相關的殊相存在？若真是如此，我們對它們就
一無所知，而它們亦將從我們所擁有的知識世界中抽離，它們只不過是
抽象的殊相而已。另一方面，我們又怎樣知道，我們能達到一個共相（一
致）而不會消滅所有的殊相？我們大概是透過普遍化（generalization）
來得到共相，也就是藉著與殊相抽離（abstracting），以致將殊相包含
在更大的一致（共相）裏。如果我們繼續這個普遍化的過程，直到我們
將所有的殊相都予以排除（假如它們都可能被排除），那麼，所有殊相
的殊性豈不都被消除了嗎？而我們最後所得到的不就只是一個抽象的
共相嗎（DF2, 25-26）？
The many must be brought into contact with one another. But how do we
know that they can be brought into contact with one another? How do we
know that the many do not simply exist as unrelated particulars? The
answer given is that in such a case we should know nothing of them; they
would be abstracted from the body of knowledge that we have; they
would be abstract particulars. On the other hand, how is it possible that
we should obtain a unity that does not destroy the particulars? We seem
to get our unity by generalizing, by abstracting from the particulars in
order to include them into larger unities. If we keep up this process of
generalization till we exclude all particulars, granted they can all be
excluded, have we not stripped these particulars of their particularity?
Have we then obtained anything by an abstract universal? (DF2, 25-26.)
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2. 弗蘭姆的解釋：人類將事物分類、普遍化、尋找「共相」
Frame Explains: We Classify, Generalize, Seek “Universal”
（摘譯：）人類自出生以來就嘗試在眾多的感覺（sensations）中尋找意義。
例如：一個小孩認識了 Fido（一條狗的名字）；後來藉著抽象化（abstraction）
得知 Fido, Rover, Spot 等都是「狗」；而「狗」又是「動物」（animals）
的一類……以此類推，化零為整（抽象化）。人把所知道的感覺組織分類；
每一個步驟，看起來似乎帶我們進入事物更深層的本質（essence）那裏，
直到我們找到存有的本身（being itself），也就是知識的高峰。
Again, let me try to put Van Til’s point into different and perhaps clearer
language. After we are born, we gradually learn to organize rationally the
“buzzing, blooming confusion” (William James) of our sense experience. A child
learns to distinguish himself from his mother, to distinguish one object from
another. His mind is organizing sensations into groups, each group representing
a thing, an object of knowledge. He is coming to know objects by understanding
their relationships with other objects. Fido would be one such object. With
additional experience and education, we learn to organize these groups into
larger groups. Eventually, we learn that Fido, Rover, Spot, and others
themselves form a group that we call “dog.” That represents an advance in
learning, for it means that we recognize significant similarities among these
animals and differences between them and other types of animals. Indeed,
when we learn that Fido is a dog, it seems that we are learning his essence,
what he really is. Then we learn that dogs can be grouped into still larger classes:
canines, mammals, living beings, being. This process is called “abstraction.”
Each of these steps may be seen as going deeper into the reality, the essence of
things. Philosophizing about “being as such” seems to be the consummation of
human knowledge.
（摘譯：）可是，隨著每一層的抽象化（化零為整），我們所能知道的知識
就越來越少。比方說：Fido 這條狗有它個別的特徵，但這些特徵不都包括在
「狗」的觀念裏；「狗」包括 Fido 的一些特徵，但並不包括 Fido 的其他特
徵。最高層次的抽象觀念是「存有」（being）；可是事物和觀念越是抽象，
其內容就越是虛空。「存有」是最高的抽象觀念，甚麼都包括了；可是存有
裏沒有甚麼具體的內容。「存有」（being）與「虛無」（nothingness）差
不多是同義詞（黑格爾 G.F.Hegel 的說法）！所以我們若說 Fido 是一個「存
有」（being），究竟我們說了甚麼東西？甚麼都沒有說！
On the other hand, the process of abstraction also brings cognitive loss. Fido,
after all, is more than just a dog. He is two feet high, black and white, trained to
roll over, partial to taking walks and playing ball. None of those qualities is
included in the definition of “dog,” for the concept of “dog” covers some
animals that have those qualities and some animals that do not. Thus, every
step on the abstraction ladder is a step toward emptiness. The highest
abstraction, “being,” covers everything. But it includes nothing specific. As
Hegel pointed out, “being,” as a general or abstract term, is indistinguishable
from “nothing.” It might seem that we gain a very profound level of knowledge
32
when we find “being” as the essence of all things. But actually, to say that Fido
is a “being” is to say almost nothing about him.
3. 正如「共相」是空虛的，「純物質」也是空虛的
Just Like Universal, Pure Matter is Void of Knowledge
（摘譯：）或者我們可以嘗試相反的方向：化整為零。我們從「存有」開始，
先列舉和描述所有的存有，接著列舉和描述所有的動物，最後是所有的狗。
甚至 Fido 這條狗也可以由不同的感覺（sensations）組織起來，例如：牠會
舔我們的右手；牠的毛是白色的……等等。想要尋求知識的人可以這樣作；
可是每一個感覺（例：Fido 舔我們的右手）都是在一個複雜的、整體的處境
（context）中被認識的。
So we might try, as some philosophers have, the opposite process: going down
the abstraction ladder, from general to particular. We understand “being” by
enumerating and describing the “beings.” We similarly proceed to the living
beings, mammals, and dogs. Even Fido may seem like something of an
abstraction. For arguably our concept of Fido is put together from many
experiences and memories. (The emphasis here on experience will sound
“empiricist” to some. However, I do not regard experience as pure sensation
without any rational mental activity. There is no knowledge of human
sense-data without a rational appropriation of them. In any case, the
description here of the cognitive process is not intended as a description of my
own epistemology, but only as a description of a common way of formulating
the process of human knowledge.) We never see all of Fido at one time: once
we see his profile, another time his face, another time his backside. We never
see his liver or kidneys, unless we observe him under veterinary surgery; yet,
from other learning experiences, we know they are in him. Those who wish to
gain knowledge by moving from abstract to concrete will want to reduce
knowledge to its smallest constituents. What are the elements that go into our
concept of Fido? They are a warm “licking” sensation on our right hand (rather,
many momentary ones, strung together by our mind), a visual impression of
whiteness with a black patch, etc.
（摘譯：）我們以為越找到事物的組成要素（elements），就越接近事物的
本質（essences）和真相（what it really is）。抽象化（abstraction）幫助我
們通過探究事物彼此的關係，來瞭解事物；殊相化（particularization）則是
透過研究關係中的不同事物，來瞭解這些關係。
As we move down the abstraction ladder in this way, it seems again that we are
learning about essences. When we reduce our experience of Fido to its
elements, it seems, we are learning what he “really is.” In moving up the
abstraction ladder, we sought to define objects by examining their relationships
to one another. In moving down, we seek to define relationships by examining
the objects related.
33
（摘譯：）可是，事實真的是這樣嗎？或者我們只是自己欺騙自己？因為我
們事實上從來都沒有看見過這些殊相；就像科學家們就從來沒有真正看見過
分子、原子、亞原子……等粒子一樣。這些暫時的感覺，都是抽象的觀念
（abstractions）。因此，我們不能說：Fido 這條狗是由我們大腦將一組理性
概念連接起來後所產生的個別感覺！
Or are we fooling ourselves? For we never experience any of these “elements,”
momentary sensations or whatever, outside of a broader context. We never
actually experience a momentary impression of whiteness; we experience
larger complexes of meaning, like Fido himself. When we speak of momentary
impressions, we are analyzing experience into what might be plausible
constituents, as the scientist analyzes ordinary things into molecules, atoms,
and subatomic particles. But we have never seen momentary sense impressions
any more than the scientist has actually seen his subatomic particles.
Momentary sense impressions are actually abstractions from the total reality.
In this way, we can see the implausibility of suggesting that Fido is “really” a set
of sensations or impressions, glued together, as it were, by the mind.
（摘譯：）當我們越朝「殊相」方向進行抽象化，我們所能得到的知識就越
來越少。假設我們可以分析出事物最小、最終極的組成要素，這個「終極物
質」就會與亞理斯多德所稱的「原始物質」（prime matter）非常類似。它
既然承載了所有的性質（事物的特性），它本身就沒有特性。因此，絕對的
殊相既是虛無（nothing）的，又是某種實在的東西（something）。
And as we move down the abstraction ladder, there is also a loss of content, as
there was when we tried to move in the other direction. Let us imagine that we
could trace the elements of the elements of the elements to the point where
we could discover some ultimate element of human experience, as scientists
have sought for ultimate particles in the physical universe. Let us call that
element “ultimate matter,” for it would be much the same as Aristotle’s “prime
matter.” What would it be? If it were identifiable, describable, like Fido, then it
would be subject to further analysis and would not be the ultimate constituent
of experience. Evidently, then, if it were really ultimate, nothing could be said
about it. To put the point differently: it could have no qualities, because it
would be the bearer of all qualities. But even to say that is to say something
about it. So it seems that the very notion of an ultimate component to
experience is self-contradictory (as was, indeed, Aristotle’s concept of prime
matter). The ultimate component is both nothing and something.
4. 純存有和純物質是一樣的
Being and Matter Are Same
歸根結底，「廣泛的存有」和「終極（原始）物質」之間並沒有分別；兩個
概念都是空洞、不可知的，不能告訴我們任何具體知識。如果一切事物的本
質和這個世界的真理，要在這兩個概念裏面才能被發現的話，宇宙就完全沒
有意義可言。如果事物終極的真相竟是「抽象的存有」，殊相就不存在了。
但是，若事物的真相是「抽象的殊相」，宇宙就沒有所謂的一致性。如果兩
34
者都是事實，那麼宇宙將會一片混亂，沒有任何真理 [參本書（CVT）第 4
章]。
In the end, there is no difference between “being in general” and “ultimate
matter.” Both concepts are empty, uninformative, and unintelligible. And if the
real essence of everything, the real truth about the world, is to be found in
either of these concepts, then the world is completely devoid of intelligible
meaning. If abstract being is the ultimate reality, then there is no particularity. If
abstract particularity is the ultimate truth, then there is no unity in the world. If
both are somehow true, then all is chaos, and nothing is true. [Compare this
discussion with the discussion of the ways of eminence and negation in chap. 4
(CVT). The issues are the same in both cases.]
另一種看法乃是：如果「關係」的意義是由關係中的事物來界定，而「事物」
的意義又是依靠關係來理解，如此惡性循環下去，我們怎麼可能開始整個認
識的過程呢？
Another way to look at the problem is this: if, in the end, objects are defined by
their relations, and relations are defined by their objects, a vicious circularity
enters, so that everything remains undefined. If objects are understood by their
relations and relations by their objects, how can the process get started?
5. 為甚麼會這樣？因為兩者都是偶像
Why This Result? Because Both Are Idols
為甚麼一個對真理的好意追尋，會走進這樣的死胡同？范泰爾的分析是：因
為這兩個概念在本質上都是偶像，因此，一定自我毀滅。它們都是偶像，因
為它們來自人想要透知宇宙萬物（exhaustive understanding）的欲望；而這
一點只有上帝才作得到！正如所有的偶像敬拜一樣，我們在被造物中尋找絕
對，因此，當我們以為找到的時候，我們會發覺它竟然是全然無能的！
How is it that this seemingly well-intentioned search for truth leads up such a
blind alley? Van Til’s analysis is that essentially both concepts are idols, and thus
self-destructive. They are idols because they are the result of man’s desire for
an exhaustive understanding of the world, an understanding that only God can
have. As is always the case in idolatry, we seek for an ultimate within the
creation, and when we think we have found it, we discover in due course that it
is utterly powerless.
6. 所有非基督教思維 = 抽象共相＋抽象殊相

因為它尋求透知萬物的知識（只有上帝才有的知識）
All Non-Christian Thought = Abstract Unity + Abstract Particularity
Because It Seeks Exhaustive Knowledge (God’s Prerogative)
范泰爾的觀點是：不信（不信聖經中的上帝）的思維，永遠把世界視為抽象
共相和抽象殊相的組合。「抽象共相」（即「廣泛的存有」或其他類似的觀
念）和「抽象殊相」（即我們稱之為「終極物質」的東西）兩個概念本身都
35
是虛空、沒有意義的，彼此之間不可能有任何關連。因此，不信的世界觀至
終要成為不知所云的胡言謬論（nonsense）。這是范泰爾批判「世俗哲學」
和「被它影響的基督教神學」的核心觀念。…
In Van Til’s view, unbelieving thought always sees the world as a combination of
abstract unity (“being in general,” or other variants of the idea) and abstract
particularity (what we have called “ultimate matter”). Both abstract unity and
abstract particularity are meaningless in themselves and impossible to relate to
one another. As such, unbelieving worldviews always reduce to unintelligible
nonsense. This is, essentially, Van Til’s critique of secular philosophy (and its
influence on Christian theology). …
世俗哲學家追求抽象的共相與殊相，是因為他們狂妄地企圖尋找唯有上帝才
能擁有的知識。他們看不到，宇宙的可知性並不在於一些抽象觀念或宇宙中
的抽象層面，而是由於上帝創造並掌管宇宙。世俗主義者試圖藉著一些非位
格的原則解釋宇宙，但聖經卻讓我們看見，只有一位有位格的上帝才能解釋
祂的宇宙。只有在上帝那裏，宇宙才有至終的解釋和可知的意義。
They pursue abstract unity and particularity because they presumptuously seek
a knowledge of the world that is available only to God, and because they fail to
see that the intelligibility of the world is not due to abstract aspects of the
world; rather, it is due to God’s creation and direction of the world. The
secularist tries to account for the world by reference to impersonal principles,
but Scripture shows us that only the personal God can account for his creation.
Only in God, then, is there an exhaustive and utterly intelligible rationale for the
creation.
7. 非基督徒所找到的準則，必然是「非位格」而「抽象」的
All Norms Non-Christian Find = Impersonal, Abstract
從另一角度我們可以看到：非信徒對宇宙一致性的尋找，本質上是在尋找一
種真理的準則。但在任何一個非基督教世界觀裏，絕對的真理準則必然是非
位格的。這個準則若不是「存有」本身，就是「終極物質」；但是它們都沒
有資格作真理的準則。因為這兩個概念都是虛空、沒有內容的；它們沒有資
格要求人相信任何事物，因此，都不可能作真理的準則（AGG, 89-118）。
Another way to look at it is this: the unbeliever’s search for unity is essentially
the search for a criterion of truth, a norm or standard. But in any non-Christian
worldview, the criterion for truth must be impersonal, rather than personal.
Ultimately, that criterion will be a concept of “being as such” or “ultimate
matter,” as we have seen. But neither of these concepts can serve as a criterion
of truth. Neither has any content. And neither creates an obligation to believe
anything, as any ultimate criterion must do. (Compare my argument to this
effect in AGG, 89-118.)
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8. 聖經中的上帝 = 位格、絕對、具體、一而眾
Biblical God = Personal, Absolute, Concrete, One-and-Many
上帝與這些偶像（觀念）截然不同。祂的計劃是整體的、完全一致的；一切
都按著次序，沒有顛倒混亂。對上帝來說，沒有甚麼事物是祂不知道的。同
時，上帝的無所不知，並不使宇宙中個別事物（殊相）的真實性和可知性受
損；而殊相（個別事物的細節）也不使宇宙整體的一致性受損。促使事物終
極一致的，並不是甚麼觀念，也不是甚麼原則，而是一個有位格者：上帝。
因此，這樣的一致性並非虛無和沒有內容；而終極的殊相和最小的細節也都
在上帝的計劃裏。上帝的計劃就是祂的自我表現。
God stands in contrast to these idolatrous concepts. His plan is perfectly unified;
nothing is out of order; nothing is unknown to him. At the same time, his
omniscience does not compromise the reality and intelligibility of the
particulars, the individual details of his plan. Nor do the details compromise the
overall unity. The ultimate unity is a person, not a principle or an abstract
concept. Therefore, that unity is not without content. And the ultimate
particularities, the ultimate details, are also divine, as God’s plan is his own
self-expression.
上帝的計劃是一個有位格的「一而眾」，因為上帝的本性是「一而眾」的。
上帝的「多面性」（manifold-ness）可以從祂的屬性、思想和計劃的多元性
中看出。而上帝多面性最突出的展現，就是三位一體裏的三個位格。個別位
格裏的一切，沒有不存在於三一真神的一體裏；而在三一真神一體裏的一
切，也沒有甚麼不完全表現在每一個位格之中。在上帝裏面，所有殊相
（particularity）都完全的合一；而所有的合一都完全展現在殊相（detail）
中。是的，豐富性與合一性都是上帝的本性，而上帝的「合一性」（oneness）
就是祂的「豐富性」的合一（unity of the riches of his nature）；上帝的「豐
富性」就是祂的自含豐滿，也就是在祂「合一性」當中的豐富。
God’s plan is a personal one and many, because his nature is one and many. The
“manifoldness” of God is seen in the diversity of his attributes, his thoughts, his
plans. But it is seen pre-eminently in the three persons of the Trinity. There is
nothing in the person that is not in the divine unity, and there is nothing in the
divine unity that is not fully expressed in the persons. In God, all particularities
are fully united, and all unity is fully expressed in detail. Indeed, God’s oneness
is a unity of the richness of his nature, and God’s richness is his “self-contained
fullness,” the richness of his uniform character.
因為上帝是一位絕對的位格，祂有資格作宇宙中最終極的準則，也就是受造
者思想中的真理性的最終準則。
Because God is an absolute person, he can also serve as the ultimate standard,
the final criterion for the truth of creaturely thought.
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9. 三一論如何解決「一而眾」的問題
How Doctrine of Trinity Solves One-and-Many Problem
從這些意義來理解，范泰爾認為，三位一體就是「一而眾的問題的解答」。
這裏的意思不是說：三位一體提供了一個模式，照此模式，抽象的「一」和
抽象的「眾」就能有意義地結合在一起。不是！它們不可能有意義地被結合。
三位一體也不是要讓我們看到：人類的知識若建立在（聖經的）有神論的根
基上，至終可以透知宇宙萬物。不是的！人不可能透知這個世界，絕對不可
能（參 IST, 24）。這種嘗試等於是快跑衝向「抽象存有」和「抽象殊相」的
磚牆。
In those senses, Van Til says, the Trinity is the “solution to the problem of the
one and the many.” It is not that somehow the Trinity furnishes a model by
which abstract unity and abstract particularity can, after all, be meaningfully
joined. They cannot be meaningfully joined. Nor is it that the Trinity shows us
how human knowledge of the creation can be exhaustive, after all, but on
theistic presuppositions. No, human beings cannot know the world exhaustively,
period. (See IST, 24.) When we try to do that, we run into the brick walls of
abstract being and abstract particularity.
確切的說，三位一體的教義呼召我們在信心中仰望上帝。我們必須認識到，
雖然我們不可能透知宇宙，但上帝卻完全透知。我們之所以能在一定的範圍
內認識世界，是因為上帝賜下祂的啟示，同時也賜予能力，使我們能在有限
的、「類比」（analogical）的層面上效法祂的思想。儘管在某個範圍內，我
們不能認識（透知）這個世界，可是我們可以相信世界是一個能被認識的
（intelligible）整體。同時，對我們來說如同奧秘的事物，並非源自一個終
極的「混沌」或「無意義」（meaninglessness, 即：虛空），而是源自上帝
那奇妙、豐富、超越我們理解的心思意念。我們雖然無知，但仍可以確實知
道，上帝至少賜下了足夠的知識，使我們能夠藉以遵行祂的旨意。而我們為
甚麼要追求知識呢？至終而唯一的理由就是為要遵行上帝的旨意。
Rather, the doctrine of the Trinity calls us to look to God in faith. We are to
understand that although we do not know the world exhaustively, he does.
Insofar as we can know the world, it is because he gives us revelation and the
ability to repeat his thoughts on an analogical, finite level. And insofar as we
cannot know the world, we can trust that the world is nevertheless an
intelligible whole. Things that are mysterious to us do not spring from an
ultimate chaos or meaninglessness; they spring, rather, from the wonderful
riches of God’s thought, which transcends our understanding. And in our
ignorance we may also be sure that God has at least given us sufficient
knowledge to do his will. And, in the final analysis, the only reason why we
should seek any knowledge at all is to do God’s will.
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10. 上帝呼召我們信祂：不是盲目的信
God Calls us to Faith: Not Blind Faith
所以，我們是被呼召來信靠上帝。可是，這樣的信心是盲目的信心嗎？如果
是，那麼，三位一體的教義並沒有有意義地解決「一而眾」的問題。在范泰
爾和我（弗蘭姆）的觀點裏，我們的信心不是盲目的。首先，相信宇宙的創
造者對祂所創造結構的解釋，是最合理不過的事。其次，三位一體的教義讓
我們大體看見，終極的「一」和終極的「眾」如何可以被調和。它們若被視
為一個位格的特性，而不是抽象的特性，它們就可以被調和。
So we are called to faith. But is this a blind faith? If so, then the Trinity really
does not solve the problem in any meaningful sense. In Van Til’s view and mine,
our faith is not blind. In the first place, it is the most rational thing in the world
to believe the Word of the world’s Creator as to the structure of his work.
Second, the Trinity shows us at least in very general terms, how ultimate unity
and diversity can be reconciled. They can be reconciled if they are seen not as
abstract qualities, but as qualities of a person.
一個廣泛的「存有」不可能整合我們經驗中的殊相，因此，也無法提供我們
任何亮光去解釋這樣的經驗。可是，我們若把世界看作是一位有位格的創造
者的精心設計，祂將宇宙萬事思考透徹後，把所有的事物都安置在最妥善的
位置上；那麼，這個解釋是充滿意義的，能給我們無限的亮光去解釋萬事。
在這個「一」裏包含了「眾」；這個「一」，是「眾」（所有殊相）的合一
（DF2, 26）。
“Being in general” does nothing to unite the particulars of our experience and
therefore to illumine that experience. But it is immensely illuminating to see the
world as the craftsmanship of a person who has thought everything through
and given everything its proper place. Here is a unity that includes the details, a
unity that is a unity of the details. (This is the way I understand Van Til’s use of
the term “concrete universal” in application to God, as in DF2, 26. This phrase
comes from idealist philosophy, but Van Til seeks to sharply differentiate his
view from theirs.)
這裏我將用范泰爾的話作總結：「我的合一像甚麼？像一個孩子和他的父親
一起漫步走過一個森林。」（WIB, 20，范泰爾，《我為甚麼信神》，臺北：
基督教改革宗翻譯社。）
I will summarize with a statement from Van Til: “My unity is the unity of a child
who walks with its father through the woods.” (WIB, 20.)

[ AGG = John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God ]
[ WIB = Why I Believe in God ]
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IV. 宇宙中的事實和定律
FACTS AND LAWS
1. 日常生活中也有「一而眾」的問題
One-and-Many Problem Exists In Everyday
「一而眾」的問題，不僅存在於終極的層面，也存在於日常生活的層面。有
些讀者會抗議說：「純粹的存有」和「純粹的物質」是否能被理解，對我們
並不重要；因為一般人並不關心最高或最低階層的抽象，他們只想知道「中
層」（最高以下、最低以上）的事物。可是，范泰爾的分析卻牽動了人類知
識的每一層次（IST, 22-23）。
The problem of the one and the many exists not only at the ultimate level, but
also at the level of everyday knowledge. Some readers may protest that it is not
important whether “pure being” and “pure matter” are intelligible concepts, for
most people are not worried about the highest and lowest levels of abstraction.
They only seek to know the middle levels. But the Van Tillian analysis affects all
of human knowledge. (Here, see Van Til’s discussion in IST, 22-23.)
2. 科學處理事實與定律
Science Deals with Facts and Laws
科學的知識，就是將事實（facts）在定律（laws）之下組織起來；或說，設
定一些定律來描述（解釋）事實；兩者是同一回事。日常生活中，我們也在
嘗試組織事實，在一些常規的範疇（categories）裏組合不同的資訊和經驗。
同樣的模式也適用於許多不同的學科，例如 Rousas J. Rushdoony 指出，在政
治範疇裏，人們嘗試藉著法律調和不同（「眾」）人的利益，以期社會能有
秩序（「一」）（JA, 339-349）。
Scientific knowledge involves grouping facts under laws, or formulating laws to
describe the facts, which is the same thing. In everyday life we also seek to
organize facts, to bring various kinds of data and experience together under
regular categories. This pattern describes many different areas of knowledge.
Rousas J. Rushdoony, for example, indicates how politics seeks to reconcile the
interest of the many to the order (unity) of society through the formulation of
laws. (JA, 339-349.)
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3. 非基督徒沒有基礎去支持定律
Non-Christian Has No Basis for Laws
可是，在不信（非基督徒）的根基上，人沒有理由去相信，宇宙中存在著一
些可以用來準確描述事實的定律。誰能知道宇宙的真相竟然是有規律的
（regular）呢？若世界至終來自「機率（或然率）」或「終極的物質」，那
麼，它當然就會是隨意或混亂的。如果我們的感官或理性，看起來像是要告
訴我們：「事情不是這樣的，宇宙是有規律的。」那麼，在一個混亂的世界
裏，為甚麼我們應該相信我們的五官和理性能告訴我們真理呢？
On an unbelieving basis, however, there is no particular reason to believe that
there are laws that accurately describe facts. Who is to know that reality is
regular at all? If the world is ultimately the result of chance (or “ultimate
matter,” which is the same thing), surely it is equally likely that the world will be
random or chaotic; and if our senses and reason seem to be telling us
differently, why should we believe that in a world of chaos they would be telling
us the truth?
4. 若宇宙由機率主宰，定律就只是理性中的抽象觀念？
World is Chance: Laws Are Abstractions of Mind?
機率（或然率）若主宰一切，定律又從哪裏來？定律並不存在於這樣一個客
觀的世界裏，因為世界是由機率（或然率）所造成，而不是由一位創造主所
設計，並賜予它規律和結構。從康德（Immanuel Kant）以降，大多數哲學
家都相信，秩序和結構都來自人的理性（思想）。但是我們為甚麼要相信，
這些結構能符合真實世界的真相？世界既然沒有秩序，這些結構和定律就不
可能適用於其上！那麼，這些定律豈不就只是一些抽象的觀念
（abstractions），就如「純粹的存有」那樣，與現實世界沒有關係？
And if chance is king, where do laws come from? They do not exist in the
objective world, because that world is the result of chance, not the product of a
designer who gives it a structure of regularity. Since Kant, most philosophers
have believed that structures of order originate in the human mind. But why
should we believe that such structures would have any application to the actual
world? Indeed, if the world is not orderly in itself, they cannot apply to it. Are
these laws not, in the end, abstractions that (like “pure being”) have no
application to the world?
將這些因素連結起來：「主觀的定律」應用在「沒有定律的現實」上。情況
不單令人絕望，而且互相矛盾！不但不能帶來更多的知識，反而只叫人成為
懷疑主義者，無法相信「認識真理的可能性」。
Put these factors together: subjective laws applied to lawless facts. The
situation is not only hopeless, but contradictory. It will not lead to greater
knowledge, but only to skepticism about the very possibility of truth.
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5. 日常生活中，抽象定律並不要求我們降服
In Everyday Life, Abstract Laws Do Not Impose Obligation
同樣，科學知識和日常生活的知識，與抽象（哲學）的思辨一樣，是需要準
則的。可是，非位格的定律並沒有賦予我們準則，並以這些準則要求（oblige）
我們相信甚麼或不相信甚麼。回到上述 Rushdoony 的主張：非位格的律法不
能得到人心，也沒有權利要求人在政治社會裏效忠。
It is also the case that scientific and everyday knowledge, like the more abstract
speculation discussed in the last section, require criteria. But laws, conceived
impersonally, do not impose upon us criteria, obligations to believe one thing
rather than another. Much less (to recall Rushdoony’s concerns) can impersonal
laws claim the allegiance of persons in political society.
因此，預設三一真神，不僅在本體論（對宇宙終極的探索）上是必須的，同
時在日常生活上也是必須的。
Therefore, it is not only metaphysical speculation about ultimates, but concrete,
everyday knowledge as well, that requires a Trinitarian presupposition.

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第六章上帝的主權
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
I. 上帝的主權：范泰爾思想的中心
GOD’S SOVEREIGNTY: CENTRAL TO VAN TIL
從前面的討論我們可以意料到，范泰爾有關「上帝主權」的教義是非常紮實的。
我們可以這樣預期，不僅是因為范氏出自改革宗教會，更因為我們已經看見范
泰爾如何討論上帝的屬性和三一論。范氏有關上帝屬性的論述，特別著重於上
帝「自含」的本性。如果世界不是完全在上帝的掌控之下，那麼，在某種程度
上，上帝就會與祂以外的事物相互依存。如此一來，上帝就不是完全自含的了。
We should expect to find in Van Til a strong doctrine of the sovereignty of God
from what we discussed before. We expect this, not only because of his personal
ecclesiastical background, but also from his discussions of the divine attributes
and the Trinity, which we have already considered. Van Til’s treatment of the
divine attributes focuses on the “self-contained” nature of God. If the world were
not wholly under God’s control, he would to some extent be relative to things
outside himself. He would not, then, be fully self-contained.
范泰爾的三一論著重在「相互依存主義」這個問題上。上帝不是一個孤存的、
與世界的多元性相互依存的「一」。上帝的「一」，只與祂自己三位一體中的
「多元」相互依存（relative only to his own Trinitarian plurality）；此一論點強
化了范氏對「上帝的自含性」的強調。此外，范泰爾對「一而眾」這個問題的
論述則強調：上帝──而且唯有上帝──能透知宇宙的真相（實存），也唯有
祂才能透徹地解釋（exhaustive interpretation）實存。但是，如果上帝在永恆
裏已經解釋了時間、空間中所發生的每件事情；那麼，所有事情的發生必定都
在祂的預定中（foreordination）：「世界中的事實與定律之所以存在，乃是因
為上帝對它們的計劃；上帝對世界完全的認識乃涉及上帝對世界的計劃。因
此，上帝對世界中的事實和定律的認識，是早於世界的存在之先。」（DF2, 11）
Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity focuses on the issue of correlativism. God is not a
bare oneness that is relative to the pluralities of the world. He is a oneness relative
only to his own Trinitarian plurality. This reinforces Van Til’s emphasis on the
self-containment of God. And his treatment of the one-and-many problem
emphasizes that God, and nobody else, has an exhaustive interpretation of reality.
But if God has eternally interpreted everything that comes to pass, then surely
nothing can happen without his foreordination: “The facts and laws of the world
are what they are because of God’s plan with respect to them. Therefore, his
knowledge of the world is involved in his plan for the world. Thus, his knowledge
of the facts and laws of the world precede the existence of the world.” (DF2, 11.)
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因此，上帝的預旨（decree）「是時間、空間中所發生一切事情的至終而唯一
的決定性力量。」（CA, 11）祂的預旨是「被造宇宙裏所有實體（substance）
和能力的來源。」（IST, 247）
God’s decree, then, “is the final and exclusively determining power of whatsoever
comes to pass.” (CA, 11.) It is “the source of all substance and power in the
created universe.” (IST, 247.)

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II. 決定論與人的自由
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
1. 范泰爾是否決定論者？
Is Van Til a Determinist?
范泰爾否認他的立場是一種哲學上的決定論。假如我們的意思是：對范泰爾
來說，有限世界裏的每一個事件都有一個成因；我想，我們可以稱范泰爾為
一位決定論者（determinist）。當然，對范氏來說，有限世界裏所有的事件，
它們的必要成因（necessary cause）和充份成因（sufficient cause）都在上帝
的預旨裏。
Van Til denies that his position is a form of philosophical determinism. We may,
I think, call Van Til a determinist if by that we mean simply that for Van Til every
event in the finite world has a cause. Certainly, for Van Til, it is the case that all
events in the finite world have their necessary and sufficient cause in God’s
decree.
2. 范泰爾：上帝的預定是位格性的
Van Til: God’s Foreordination = Personal
可是，范泰爾的立場與哲學史中典型的決定論有顯著的不同。首先，我們已
經看到，在范氏的思想中，上帝的預定（foreordination）是有位格的；而哲
學史中決定論的典型則認為，事物的成因至終是非位格性的。「哲學上的必
然論（necessitarianism）代表了一種終極的非位格主義（impersonalism），
而貫徹一致的基督教則代表著一種終極的位格主義。」（CTETH, 35; DF2, 62）
But Van Til’s position is different in significant ways from typical deterministic
systems in the history of philosophy. For one thing, as we have seen, God’s
foreordination on Van Til’s view is personal, while determinism in philosophy
typically ascribes events to causes that are ultimately impersonal.
“Philosophical necessitarianism stands for an ultimate impersonalism:
consistent Christianity stands for an ultimate personalism.” (CTETH, 35; DF2,
62.)
3. 范泰爾：次等成因可以是「自由」的
Van Til: Secondary Causes Can Be “Free”
范氏的立場與世俗決定論之間另外一個不同之處，在於「第一因」和次等成
因之間的區別。范泰爾堅持，雖然我們從來沒有脫離上帝的掌控，但有時候
我們可以脫離宇宙的因果結構（causal nexus）。范泰爾關於這一點的說明並
不多，不過在他的討論中卻暗示了這觀點，例如當他引用亞米念所否定的一
45
段話：「一件事，從次等成因（second causes）的角度來看是自由的（contingent
偶發的）；同時，從上帝預旨的角度來看，則是必然的（necessary）。」（CTK,
211）在這裏亞米念所否定的，正是范氏明顯地予以肯定的；換句話說，一
個事件，根據上帝的預旨是被必然預定的（necessarily foreordained）；而同
時，從它與「有限成因」的關係來看，也可以是自由和偶發的（free,
contingent）。
Another difference between Van Til’s position and secular determinism lies in
the distinction between primary and secondary causes. Van Til maintains that
although we are never free from divine control, we are sometimes free from
the “causal nexus” of the universe. This point is less explicit in Van Til, but it is
implicit, for example, in a passage where he quotes Arminius as denying “that a
thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done
necessarily in regard to the divine decree.” [CTK, 211 (emphasis by Van Til).]
Evidently Van Til here intends to affirm what Arminius denies, namely, that
events that are foreordained necessarily according to the divine decree may
nevertheless be contingent (i.e., free, not determined) in relation to finite
causes.
4. 范泰爾頌揚（基督徒的）人的自由：
自發性、自決性、動力
Van Til Celebrates (Christian) Human Freedom:
Spontaneity, Self-Determination, Momentum
藉著摒棄決定論，范泰爾因此可以積極地堅持人的自由。他的自由觀是非常
健全的。舉例來說，我們應該注意到，范泰爾一方面堅持上帝的國度是人最
高的良善；另一方面，他說：「人的『倫理的理想』應該是自我實現的
（self-realization）。」（CTETH, 44）「自我實現」的意思是「人必須努力鍛
鍊（work out）自己的意志」（CTETH, 45），也就是說，人的意志「在他的
反應上（reactivity）應該越來越有自發性（spontaneous）；……在他的自決
性上（ self-determination ）應該越來越堅定（ fixed ）； …… 他的動力
（momentum）應該越來越強。」（CTETH, 45）
By rejecting determinism, Van Til is able, positively, to maintain a robust view of
human freedom. We should note, for example, that he sees no difficulty in
maintaining both that the kingdom of God is man’s highest good, and that “the
ethical ideal for man should be self-realization.” (CTETH, 44. The term
self-realization comes from the idealist vocabulary, though of course in its
broader context Van Til’s view is significantly different from idealism.)
Self-realization means that “man must work out his own will.” [CTETH, 45
(emphasis by Van Til).] That means that man’s will must “become increasingly
spontaneous in its reactivity … become increasingly fixed in its
self-determination. … increase in momentum.” [CTETH, 45-46 (emphasis by
Van Til). See also Van Til’s reference to the “spontaneity” of the biblical writers
inspired by God in PDS, 25-26, and his account of the development of
obedience in the Christian education of the young in ECE, 152-155.]
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非常有意思！在這裏，范泰爾並沒有呼籲消除人的意志，反之，人的意志需
要被強化。當然，他並不提倡人應該越來越任性、自私；也不是說人的意志
應脫離被造的地位，從「依靠上帝」的情況中解放出來！更確切的說，范氏
的意思是：人的靈魂應該越來越堅決委身於遵行上帝的旨意；而這個委身應
該越來越自發、堅決，它的動力也應該越來越強。范泰爾的意思是：屬靈的
成熟，應帶來更多內在的自我約束，並且越來越不需要外在的強迫。「在基
督裏長進」的意思是：我們變得越來越願意遵行祂的旨意；我們的順服越來
越帶著喜樂，也越來越成為我們內心的熱望（passion of our heart）。遵行
上帝的旨意成為我們的習慣（「習慣」一詞的意思在這裏是正面的）。上帝
的成熟僕人，不需要被別人（父母親、牧師或其他人）驅使，才追求上帝的
義。他愛慕聖潔，並且在聖潔上不斷地穩定成長。對范泰爾來說，人的自由，
並不是一個與亞米念派人士辯論時迫不得已、勉強承認的概念；相反，人的
自由，在基督徒的生活中，是一個事實，並且具有積極、實用的重要性！
Remarkably, here, Van Til calls for the strengthening of the human will, not its
abolition. Of course, he is not advocating an increase of willfulness or
selfishness, or an attempt to sever the will’s created dependence on God.
Rather, he calls for an increase in the soul’s resolve to do God’s will. But that
resolve is to become more and more spontaneous, fixed, and growing in
momentum. What he means is that spiritual maturity brings more internal and
less external constraint. Growing in Christ means that we become more and
more willing to do his will; our obedience becomes more delightful, more the
passion of our own heart. It becomes habitual, in a good sense. A mature
servant of God does not need to be browbeaten (by parents, preachers, and
others) into seeking God’s righteousness. He loves holiness and steadily
increases in it. For Van Til, then, human freedom is not a concept grudgingly
conceded in the debate with Arminians. It is a fact of positive and practical
importance in the Christian life.
5. 極端加爾文主義者和亞米念主義者的共同錯誤
Hyper-Calvinists and Arminians Both Mistaken
我們必須記住，對范泰爾來說，創造主和被造者之間的區別至為重要。很多
時候，神學家們錯誤地假設：若我們把任何主權歸給上帝，就必須剝奪人的
自發性和自由。這是極端加爾文主義者（hyper-Calvinists）和亞米念主義者
共同的錯誤。前者放棄了人的責任，以維護上帝的主權；後者則損害了上帝
的主權，以維護人的責任。兩者都沒有想到，他們在這一點上，是把上帝和
人視為同一等級的存有（a common scale of being）；以致任何被歸給上帝的
東西，都必須從人那裏剝奪過來，人不可以擁有；反之亦然。
We should keep in mind here the importance that Van Til places on the
Creator-creature distinction. Often, theologians assume that any sovereignty we
ascribe to God must remove spontaneity and freedom from man. This is an
error both of hyper-Calvinists, who compromise human responsibility in order
to maintain divine sovereignty, and of Arminians, who do the reverse.
Unwittingly, both hyper-Calvinists and Arminians at this point see God and man
47
on a common scale of being, so that anything ascribed to God must be taken
from man, and vice versa.
6. 有些特權唯上帝獨有；但有例外；聖經分辨兩者
Some Prerogatives = Only God’s;
But There Are Exceptions; Bible Distinguishes Two
當然，有一些特權是上帝獨有的，例如唯有上帝有權接受被造者的敬拜；也
只有祂有終極的權利收取人的性命。當我們把這些權利歸給上帝時，等於否
定人能擁有這些權利。可是我們要謹慎，不可將這樣的推論應用在神人關係
的每一方面上。比方說，我們不應該假設：既然人的得救是上帝預定的，那
麼，人是否決志信主就無關緊要了。相反的，聖經說，人若想得救，必須要
有信心。有時很明顯地，上帝的第一因否定了被造者的因果性；可是有時候，
上帝的第一因卻支持了被造者的因果性。我們怎樣知道甚麼時候是否定？甚
麼時候是支持？答案很簡單：聖經會告訴我們。
Certainly there are some prerogatives that belong exclusively to God, for
example, the right to receive religious worship and the ultimate right to take
human life. Ascribing these rights to God means denying them to man. But we
must beware of applying such reasoning to all aspects of the divine-human
relationship. For example, we should not assume that because salvation is
foreordained by God, human decisions are of no consequence. The Bible says
that human faith is necessary for salvation. Sometimes, evidently, God’s
primary causality negates creaturely causality, but sometimes the former
reinforces the latter. How can we tell when there is negation and when there is
reinforcement? The answer is simply that the Bible tells us.
7. 作者與小說的比喻
The Author and Novel Illustration
第一因可以「否定」或「支持」次等成因，是因為上帝與世界並不存在於同
一個存有等級上。上帝所作的（God’s agency），不一定會消滅人所作的
（human agency）。實存（reality）有兩個不同的層次：創造主的和被造者
的。宇宙裏也有兩個不同的因果層次（levels of causality）：上帝所導致的成
因（第一因）和宇宙中的被造物所導致的成因。多數的事件，都是既有第一
因，也有次等成因；但是，上帝當然「也可隨己意，『不用』次因、『超乎』
次因或『背乎』次因，自由行事。」（威敏斯特信仰告白 5:3）
Primary causes can either negate or reinforce secondary causes because God
and the world are not on a common scale of being. It is not the case that divine
agency always eliminates human agency. There are two distinct levels of reality:
that of the Creator and that of the creature. There are also two distinct levels of
causality: divine causation and causation from within the world. Most events
have both primary and secondary causes, but God may, of course, work
“without, above, and against” (Westminster Confession of Faith, 5:3.) the
secondary causes at his pleasure.
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也許下面的比喻是最好的（范泰爾沒有用這個比喻，是 Vern Poythress 向我
建議的）：在一本精心設計的小說裏，作者會創造一個世界，所有的事件都
在這世界裏發生，每一個事件彼此間也含有意味深長的因果關係。在小說的
世界裏，每一個事件都有可以理解的成因。但是，每一件事都還有一個更高
的「因」，這個「因」存在於作者的思想裏。在一般的情況下，作者會維持
他創造的世界的秩序和因果結構。當然，他也可以任隨己意，「不用」這個
因果秩序、「超乎」這個因果秩序或「背乎」它來自由行事。不過，一般說
來，當一個作者混亂了小說中的因果結構時，故事的敘述就不容易令讀者感
到滿意。文學評論家會批評這樣的作者強詞奪理。
Perhaps the best illustration (though Van Til does not use it – it was suggested
to me by Vern Poythress) is this: In a well-crafted novel, the author creates a
world in which events take place in meaningful causal relationships to one
another. Each event has an intelligible cause within the world of the novel. But
of course each event also has a higher cause, in the author’s mind. Normally,
such an author will try to maintain the orderly causal structure of his created
universe. He may, of course, also work “without, above, and against” that
causal order when he is pleased to do so. Usually, however, when an author
disrupts the causal order of his novel, the narrative becomes less satisfying.
Critics accuse such an author of bringing things about by a deus ex machina.
因為真神是無限智慧的，當祂放鬆世界裏的因果規律時，不但不會破壞祂劇
本（計劃）的力量，反而藉此更加彰顯祂的大能。當然，上帝與宇宙的關係
還有一方面與「小說－作者」的比喻不同：上帝創造的世界是真實的，不是
虛構的。不過兩者也有相同點，兩者都有兩層不同的因果等級。我們可以這
樣說，在正常的情況之下，世界裏的事件都有兩套必要條件（necessary
conditions）和兩套充份條件（sufficient conditions）。
Because the true God is infinitely wise, his relaxations of causal regularity in the
world do not corrupt, but enhance, the power of his drama. And, of course, in
the case of God there is also the difference that his creation is real, not fictional.
But the two cases are parallel in that in each there are two levels of causality.
We may put it this way: normally, events in the world have two sets of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
因此，范泰爾的「二圈思維的本體論」──就是他對創造主和被造物的區分，
使他可以同時堅持上帝的主權，又堅持人的自由。
Thus, it is Van Til’s “two-circle metaphysics,” his distinction between Creator
and creature, that enables him to have a strong doctrine of divine sovereignty
together with a strong doctrine of human freedom.
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8. 「上帝的主權」是「人的責任」的基礎
Sovereignty of God = Foundation for Human Responsibility
范泰爾也處理了人的道德責任問題。他的論點是：人的道德責任與上帝的主
權不僅一致，而且前者是建立在後者的基礎上！除非上帝的旨意是完全自我
決定的（self-determinative），否則從某一個程度來說，世界一定是由機率
（chance）所控制。因此：
Van Til also addresses the moral responsibility of man. He argues that it is not
only consistent with, but actually based upon, divine sovereignty. Unless God’s
will is utterly self-determinative, the world is controlled to some extent by
chance. Therefore:
身為基督徒，我們堅持，上帝的絕對旨意若不存在，人的決定和經驗不
可能有任何前進的目標，不可能按照任何計劃運作，甚至乎不可能發生。
As Christians we hold that determinate human experience could work to
no end, could work in accordance with no plan, and could not even get
under way, if it were not for the existence of the absolute will of God.
因為這緣故，我們堅持，上帝的絕對旨意是人的意志的前提（譯者按：
先決條件）。從這個角度來看，一個絕對掌權的上帝，表面上是攔阻人
負責任的最大障礙，但其實，這正是人有可能有道德責任的基礎（DF2,
62；參 CGG, 140）。
It is on this ground then that we hold to the absolute will of God as the
presupposition of the will of man. Looked at in this way, that which to
many seems at first glance to be the greatest hindrance to moral
responsibility, namely the conception of an absolutely sovereign God,
becomes the very foundation of its possibility. (DF2, 62; cf CGG, 140.)

[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]
[ PDS = The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture ]
[ ECE = Essays on Christian Education ]
[ CGG = Common Grace and the Gospel ]
50
III. 邪惡的問題
EVIL
1. 上帝的主權淩駕罪與邪惡：
加爾文：上帝容許罪惡？
God Is Sovereign Over Sin and Evil:
Calvin: Permissive Will?
從范泰爾的觀點來看，上帝的主權範圍包括了所有事物，因此，也包括邪惡
與罪。上帝不為罪負責，可是我們必須否認有任何事能夠不本於祂（in spite
of him）或迴避祂的永恆計劃（in circumvention of his purpose）而獨立發生
（IST, 248）。在討論這方面的問題時，他經常引用加爾文駁斥 Pighius 的論
文《論上帝永恆的預定》，其中說到，上帝的預旨「是包括罪惡這個事實，
也容許罪惡這個事實」（IST, 248）。按照范泰爾的看法，我們可以「用『上
帝的容許（permissive will of God）』這個觀念，來強調人絕對要為罪負責。
可是在應用此一觀點時，我們絕不可推翻聖經清楚的教導：上帝擁有掌控萬
事的終極權能──即使這權能是一個奧秘。」（IST, 175）
On Van Til’s view, divine sovereignty extends to all things, and therefore also to
evil and sin. God is not responsible for sin, but we should deny “that anything
happens in spite of him and in circumvention of his purpose.” (IST, 248.) In this
connection he often refers to Calvin’s polemic against Pighius in his treatise The
Eternal Predestination of God. God’s decree “is inclusive and permissive of the
fact of sin.” (IST, 248.) According to Van Til, we may “speak of the permissive
will of God in order to stress man’s undoubted responsibility for sin, but this
distinction may never lead to subversion of the clear teaching of Scripture on
the all-controlling if ultimate and mysterious power of God.” (IST, 175.)
2. 范泰爾：邪惡的存在是奧秘；
自由意志並非絕對；邪惡不是幻覺；上帝並非無能
Van Til: Evil = Mystery;
Free Will Not Ultimate; Evil is Not Unreal; God is Not Weak
「一個良善、完全掌管一切的上帝，怎可能在祂創造的宇宙中容許、甚至預
定邪惡？」范泰爾回應這一類有關邪惡的問題時，「奧秘」是一個很重要的
觀念。因為范泰爾堅持聖經對「上帝主權」的教導，他就不能訴諸人的自由
意志來為上帝「辯護」，也不能用「邪惡並不是真的」或「上帝是軟弱無能
的」等論調來回應。可以確定的是，他對這一類問題發表的言論不多；可是
我認為，他已經說明了每一個最根本、最重要的觀念：
“Mysterious” is the operative word to describe Van Til’s response to the
“problem of evil,” the question of how a good, all-powerful God could permit or
even foreordain the presence of evil in his creation. Because of his biblical view
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of divine sovereignty, he is unable to “defend” God by appealing to human free
will, the unreality of evil, the weakness of God, etc. Positively, he says relatively
little about the problem, but I think he says everything that is essential:
基督徒如此宣稱（基督徒回應「邪惡」此一問題的基本立場，是符合他
的良心），因為他是按照他的基本預設來解釋他的道德良心，正如他也
是以此來解釋他所有的經歷一樣。他知道審判全地的主一定行事正直。
所有關於邪惡和罪的事實與難題，都從聖經的事蹟（上帝的救贖計劃）
裏得到它們的意義和真正的解決。基督徒的良心所作的是非判斷，都從
聖經事蹟裏──也惟獨從聖經事蹟裏──取得它們的意義（DF2, 218,
213-216）。
The Christian claims this [with respect to the problem of evil his position is
in accord with conscience] because he interprets his moral consciousness,
as an aspect of his total experience, in terms of his presuppositions. He
knows that the judge of all the earth must do right. All the facts and
problems of evil and sin take their meaning from and find their solution in
terms of the story of Scripture. The approvals and disapprovals of his
conscience take their meaning from this story and from this story alone.
(DF2, 218; cf. the argument with Montague on pp. 213-216.)
3. 批判：非基督徒不能分辨善惡；
或說：善不可能勝利
Critique: Non-Christian Cannot Distinguish Good/Evil;
Or Good Cannot Triumph
范泰爾接著批判非基督徒對邪惡的宣稱：非基督徒不能分辨善惡；或者，如
果他能分辨，他不可能盼望善會得勝。「那些自認為是『良善』的人，只能
透過『壓制他人所認為的良善』，才能使全地被他們所認為的善所說服；而
那些被壓制的人，也會認為自己才是『良善』的。如此一來，政治的權勢將
永遠取代所有倫理的區分。」（DF2, 218）這一段話，彷彿是范泰爾針對後
現代主義、解構主義和「政治正確（political correctness）」等當代運動所
發出的預言。這些潮流嘗試將所有的道德論述相對化，同時又試圖要求別人
遵從他們的道德價值觀。當他們宣稱「所有其他人的價值觀都是相對的」之
時，他們卻視自己的價值觀是絕對的 [范氏分別稱這兩種想法為「非理性主
義」和「理性主義」，參本書（CVT）第 17 章]，而且還會用粗暴的權力逼
人服從。
He adds a reductio of non-Christian claims about evil: either the non-Christian
cannot distinguish good from evil, or, if he can, he cannot hope that good will
triumph: “If those who think they are good succeed in making what they think is
‘good’ to prevail upon earth, it can only be the suppression of the ‘good’ of
others who also think they are ‘good.’ Thus power politics would forever
replace all ethical distinctions.” (DF2, 218.) This passage is almost prophetic of
postmodernism, deconstruction, and the “political correctness” movements
today, which relativize all moral discourse while seeking to require everybody to
conform to their values. They claim that everybody else’s values are relative,
52
while theirs are absolute [Van Til’s “irrationalism” and “rationalism,”
respectively. See chap. 17 (CVT).], and theirs are to be enforced by raw power.
下面是范泰爾對邪惡問題的另一個回應：
Here is another response by Van Til to the problem of evil:
4. 上帝用最好的方法達成祂的目標：
最好的方法就是上帝選用的方法
God Uses Best Means to End:
Best Means = Means God Chooses to Use
基督徒的神義論（「神義論」意指「上帝的義」，這是指任何就「邪惡
的問題」而提出的解釋方案…）…必須以一個預設為起始點，那就是：
上帝是自足的（self-sufficient）。一個自足的上帝，掌控萬事，因而知
道萬事，理所當然能用最好的方法達到祂的目標。可是甚麼是最好的方
法呢？就是上帝喜悅、認為適用的方法。既然是上帝所喜悅使用的方
法，它們有可能是人的理性不能理解、不能測透的。約伯受苦的原因，
是他完全不能明白的。…唯有當他完全將自己降服在上帝主權的手中
時，他才找到了問題的答案。誠然，上帝的智慧顯明在宇宙中，人可以
知道其中的一部分。可是，上帝的確在某種程度上隱藏了自己，沒有人
可以試圖用自己設定的標準來贊同或譴責聖潔上帝的作為。因此，改革
宗神學的神義論，與天主教和亞米念主義的神義論非常不同。（IST,
237-238。參 John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 149-190。中譯：
《衛道學概論》。）
A Christian theodicy (theodicy means “justification of God.” It refers to any
attempted solution to the problem of evil. Van Til does not distinguish
between “theodicy” and “defense,” as do such writers as Alvin
Plantinga.) … will need to start frankly from the presupposition of the
self-sufficient God. It goes without saying that this self-sufficient God, who
controls all things and knows all things because he controls them, can use
the best means to attain his end. But what are the best means? They are
those that God sees fit to use. And since they are those that God sees fit to
use they may be wholly beyond the reach of human understanding. It was
wholly beyond Job’s understanding to know why he should suffer. … He
found the solution only when finally he surrendered himself fully into the
hands of the sovereign God. To be sure, the wisdom of God appears in the
world, and man can see something of it. Yet it remains true that God is a
God that hideth himself, and no man should essay to approve or condemn
the deeds of the Holy One by standards of his own devising. The Reformed
“theodicy” is therefore quite different form the Romanist and Arminian.
(IST, 237-238. For an expansion of this “Jobian” response to the problem of
evil, see John Frame, AGG, 149-190.)
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5. 邪惡的存在是奧秘；
范泰爾運用「終極成因」和「近因」；
弗蘭姆認為不妥當
Evil = Mystery;
Van Til’s Use of “Ultimate/Proximate” Causes
Not Successful (Frame)
歸根究底，范泰爾的神義論訴諸上帝的奧秘和智慧。上帝有答案，可是祂並
沒有選擇向我們啟示它，至少沒有完全地啟示。我們的思維必須降服在祂的
啟示之下；當上帝沉默時，我們也應當沉默。
Essentially, Van Til’s theodicy is an appeal to God’s inscrutable wisdom. God has
the answer, but he has not chosen to reveal it to us, at least not
comprehensively. Our thinking must be subject to his revelation, and where
that revelation is silent, we must be silent as well.
有一次，范氏顯然想進一步去訴諸上帝的奧秘。當他回應 Buswell 的批判時，

他引用了加爾文《論上帝的永恆預定》。在該篇論文中，加爾文試圖證明絕
對的上帝不是罪的創造者，亦不需要為罪負責。加爾文的論點是：上帝是罪
行的終極成因（ultimate cause），而罪人自己則是罪的近因（proximate
causes）。范泰爾在這裏花了不少篇幅引用加爾文和賀治的話，並且同意他
們的看法（DF2, 183-187）。雖然這種處理邪惡問題的進路，有改革宗傳統
的淵源，我卻認為它終究是不能令人滿意的。我看不出來，為甚麼單單因為
上帝不是近因，就能解除祂和罪的關係，而不需要為罪負責。如果我雇用 A
君殺 B 君，我與 A 君同樣有罪，不是嗎？「間接」這種方式，並不能將謀殺
的罪責從我身上除去。對上帝來說，不也是一樣嗎？一般說來，改革宗神學
的看法認為，上帝向我們啟示的準則，是反映出祂本性的準則；雖然在某些
情況裏，上帝有一些特權是我們人沒有的。顯然，在這個情況（邪惡）下，
祂有這些特權！可是祂在這件事上，又沒有向人啟示些甚麼。
At one point, Van Til appears to go beyond this appeal to mystery. Replying to
Buswell’s criticism, he cites Calvin’s treatise On the Eternal Predestination of
God, in which Calvin claims to absolve God from the charge of being the author
of sin (theologians rarely define “author of sin.” Although they always insist that
the phrase does not apply to God. That creates confusion, especially between
Calvinists and Arminians. I take it to mean “doer of sin,” with some note of
“commending sin.”). Calvin’s argument is that God is the “ultimate” cause of
sinful acts, while the wicked themselves are the “proximate” causes. Van Til
quotes Calvin and Hodge at length in this connection, and with approval. (DF2,
183-187.) Although this approach to the problem of evil has some roots in
Reformed tradition, I believe it is ultimately unsuccessful. I do not see how God
is absolved from complicity in evil merely because his causality is once removed
from the event. If I hire A to kill B, I am as responsible as A, am I not? The
indirectness of my murder does not remove the guilt from me. Is it different
with God? Normally, on a Reformed view of the matter, the standards that God
reveals to us are standards that reflect his own nature, though there are some
cases where he has prerogatives and rights that we do not have. Evidently he
54
has such rights in this case. But he has revealed little or nothing to us in this
connection.
至終，邪惡再一次被歸結為「奧秘」。終極成因和近因的區分並沒有解決問
題。范泰爾若只提出約伯的神義論，可能更為妥當。
In the end, the matter resolves again into mystery. The proximate-ultimate
distinction does not help. Van Til would have been better off to stick with his
Jobian theodicy.

55
第七章類比的知識
ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
I. 類比的知識
ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
1. 范泰爾的知識本體論如何影響知識
How Van Til’s Metaphysics of Knowledge Impacts Knowledge
在我們對范泰爾「知識本體論」的分析中，我們已經討論了他的上帝論，和
他對「上帝與世界的一般關係」的看法。現在我們必須繼續討論，這個知識
本體論如何影響人的知識。
In our analysis of Van Til’s “metaphysics of knowledge,” we have discussed his
doctrine of God and his view of the general relationship between God and the
world. Now we must proceed to discuss how this metaphysical perspective
bears upon human knowledge.
我們已經看見，范泰爾的本體論強調：（一）創造主與被造物的區別；（二）
上帝對被造者的主權。因此，我們可以預料，范氏的知識論也會在知識的範
疇裏強調同樣的關係，即「上帝的知識」與「我們的知識」之間的區別，以
及上帝在知識範疇的主權。
As we have seen, Van Til’s metaphysics emphasizes (1) the distinction between
Creator and creature and (2) the sovereignty of the Creator over the creature.
We may well anticipate, therefore, that his epistemology will emphasize
precisely those relationships in the area of knowledge: the distinction between
God’s knowledge and ours, and the sovereignty of God in matters of
knowledge.
2. 范泰爾的主要觀念：類比
Van Til’s Idea of Analogy
范泰爾以「類比」這個觀念來歸納他的重點。人的知識是上帝的知識的「類
比」，意即：（一）人的知識是被造的，因此，與上帝自己的知識截然不同；
（二）人的知識是服在上帝的掌控和權威之下。
Van Til sums up these emphases in the term analogy. Human knowledge is
“analogous” to God’s, which means that it is (1) created and therefore different
from God’s own knowledge, and (2) subject to God’s control and authority:
56
基督徒想要獲得的知識系統，可稱為「類比的」知識。意即：上帝的知
識是原本的，人的知識則是衍生自上帝的知識（derivative）。上帝在祂
自己裏面有絕對的自含系統（self-contained system）。歷史當中所發生
的事，都是根據上帝的自含系統、和祂用以掌管宇宙的計劃。可是，人
身為上帝的被造者，不可能擁有上帝自含系統的複製品。不錯，人必須
效法上帝的思維而思維；可是，這意味著，人在嘗試形成自己的思想系
統時，必須不斷服在「上帝向人啟示的系統」的權威之下（CTK, 16；參
DF2, 39; DF1, 64）。
The system [of knowledge] that Christians seek to obtain may … be said to
be analogical. By this is meant that God is the original and that man is the
derivative. God has absolute self-contained system within himself. What
comes to pass in history happens in accord with that system or plan by
which he orders the universe. But man, as God’s creature, cannot have a
replica of that system of God. He cannot have a reproduction of that
system. He must, to be sure, think God’s thoughts after him; but this
means that he must, in seeking to form his own system, constantly be
subject to the authority of God’s system to the extent that this is revealed
to him. [CTK, 16, (emphasis by Van Til); cf. DF2, 39; DF1, 64.]
3. 帶來問題的名詞：
共在、錯置共在、類比（阿奎那的用法）
Problematic Terms:
Analogy, Univocal, Equivocal (Aquinas’s Usage)
范泰爾選用的「類比」這個詞，和歷史上另一些相關的反義詞，如 univocal
（共在）、equivocal（錯置共在），可能會帶來一些問題（JA, 321-327）。
多馬‧阿奎那和後來幾世紀的天主教思想家，對這些詞彙的用法，都與范泰
爾不同。當阿奎那談論存有和謂語時，使用了「類比」一詞，即「存有的類
比」（analogy of being）和「謂語的類比」（analogy of predication）。
Van Til’s choice of the word “analogical,” together with the terms historically
contrasted with it, namely, “univocal” and “equivocal,” poses some problems.
(In what follows, I am borrowing heavily from Gilbert Weaver’s excellent article,
“Man: Analogue of God,” in JA, 321-327.) Thomas Aquinas, followed by
centuries of Roman Catholic thinkers, used these terms in a way quite different
from Van Til. Aquinas speaks of “analogy” in terms of being, and then in terms
of predication.
「存有的類比」（這是阿奎那從亞里斯多德和新柏拉圖主義借來的觀念）是
指從上帝（最高的存有）到純物質（存有的最低層，即「非存有」）的連續
統（continuum）[參本書（CVT）第 19 及 25 章]。上帝是最高的存有，純物
質是最低的存有。在這個連續統裏，較高的存有在「本質（essence）」和
「存在（existence）」之間比較合一（unity）；意思是說：大體說來，他們
的動作和經驗是由他們的本性所支配。上帝的作為和經驗，完全是由祂自己
根據自己的本性（祂是甚麼）來掌管；人的行為和經驗，至少會有部份是由
外界掌控的；而純物質（undifferentiated matter）──就是最低的存有──
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則沒有任何本質可以表達；它就是「非存有」，或說是「無有」 [參本書（CVT）
第 5 章]。
The “analogy of being,” which Aquinas borrowed from Aristotle and
Neoplatonism, is a continuum that runs from God at the top to undifferentiated
matter at the bottom. [Certainly Aquinas did not intend to deny the Christian
doctrine of creation, or the distinction between Creator and creature. But
alongside his orthodox statements of these doctrines, he employed ideas from
Greek philosophy that were inconsistent with these doctrines. See other
discussions of Apuinas in chaps. 19 and 25 of this book (CVT).] God has the most
being, bare matter the least. Beings higher on the scale have a greater “unity
between essence and existence,” which means, roughly, that their nature
governs their actions and experience. God’s actions and experience are
completely governed by himself, by what he is. Man’s actions and experience
are at least partly governed by factors outside himself. Undifferentiated matter,
at the bottom of the scale, has no essence to express; it is strictly nonbeing or
nothing. [Compare my discussion in chap. 5 (CVT) of the attempt to gain
knowledge by ascending and descending the abstraction ladder. Van Til believes
that Aquinas’s continuum of being and nonbeing is essentially the same as the
continuum of empty abstractions and ultimate matter.]
按照阿奎那的模式，同一個存有層面上的存有，它們之間的關係是「共在的」
（univocal）；存有層面大不相同的存有，它們之間的關係是「錯置共在的」
（equivocal）；而存有層面比較接近的存有，它們之間的關係則是「類比的」
（analogical）。整個連續統（continuum）的存有之間，都有類比或相似的
地方；又或許，除了「純物質」與「在它上一層的存有」的關係以外，一切
事物都有相似的地方；因為，至少它們都「是」（存在）。
Beings at the same level on the scale are related “univocally,” in Aquinas’s
construction. Beings at far different levels are related “equivocally.” Beings at
closer levels are related “analogously.” There are analogies, or similarities,
between being at every point on the continuum, except, perhaps, between pure
matter and the beings above it. Everything is alike, at least in that it is.
4. 字的意義：字意？喻意？
Meaning of Words: Literal, Figurative?
阿奎那的「謂語論（predication）」──即「名詞的意義」，乃沿用了這方
面的分析。以「智慧」一詞為例，用在連續統內不同的事物上，就會有不同
的意義：對於同一個存有層面上的存有來說（例如：老李與老張），這個詞
彙的意義是「共在的」（univocal）；對存有層面大不相同的事物來說（例
如：老李的智慧和下棋策略的智慧），「智慧」的意義是「錯置共在的」
（equivocal）；而對於存有層面相類似的存有來說（例如：上帝的智慧和老
李的智慧），詞彙的意義是「類比的」（analogical）。上帝的智慧與老李的
智慧不同，但它們仍然是相似的──雖然我們不能確定它們究竟是在甚麼意
義上相似。因著上帝的單一性（simplicity），也因著祂的本質和存在完全合
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一，因此，「上帝的智慧」指的是上帝的所「是」（everything God is）。可
是老李的智慧就不同了，它可能與愚妄共存。
Aquinas’s doctrine of predication, or the meaning of terms, follows this analysis.
A word like wise applies in different senses to objects at various points along
the continuum. It applies “univocally” to beings who are at the same level, e.g.
to Bill and to Charles. It applies “equivocally” to beings far removed from one
another, e.g., to Bill and to a chess strategy. To beings closely related, but at
different levels on the scale, terms are used “analogously.” God’s wisdom is
different from Bill’s, but it is also similar, although we cannot be sure precisely
wherein the similarity lies. Because of God’s simplicity, his unity of essence and
existence, wisdom refers to everything God is. But Bill’s wisdom may coexist
with foolishness.
按照阿奎那的語言觀，「共在」大約相當於「字意性」的意思；「錯置共在」
大約相當於「隱喻性」的意思。「類比」的語言是喻意的語言，可是在某種
程度上，卻比「錯置共在」更接近字意性。
In Aquinas’s view of language, “univocal” is more or less equivalent to
“literal”,and “equivocal” to “merely metaphorical.” “Analogical” language is
figurative language, but somehow closer to the literal than equivocal language
is. (I am making vague distinctions. I do not believe that his own account can be
made more precise than this.)
5. 阿奎那：用人的語言，可以認識上帝嗎？
Is Aquinas Agnostic Toward God?
阿奎那的立場，在某一個程度上意味著對上帝的不可知論（agnosticism）；
也就是說，我們永遠不可能用「共在」的方式述說上帝，只能用「類比」的
方式。當我們查經時，當讀到基督是「羔羊」或「猶大的獅子」時，我們會
辨認出這種表達方式裏面的隱喻（metaphor）；而這些形容基督的詞彙，可
以用更「字意性」的方式來表達。可是對阿奎那來說，所有對上帝的稱謂都
是隱喻的，不可能字意化；無論我們如何描述上帝，至終，喻意的言語不能
以字意性的方式來表達。
Aquinas’s doctrine implies a certain agnosticism about God. We can never speak
univocally of God, only analogously. In our usual Bible study, when we read
about Christ being a “lamb” or the “Lion of Judah,” we recognize in these
expressions metaphors that can (apart from literary nuance) be expressed more
literally. But, for Aquinas, there is always a point beyond which such
literalization cannot go. Whatever we say about God is, ultimately, figurative
language that cannot be expressed literally.
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6. 克拉克批判阿奎那，也批判范泰爾
Clark Critiques Aquinas And Van Til
有一些學者，如克拉克（Gordon Clark），認為阿奎那的觀點等於懷疑論。
克拉克等人提出一個問題：除了字意性的解釋，還有甚麼樣的「意義」能被
喻意性語言所乘載？他們還問：是否所有的語言都帶有某種程度的隱喻性
（metaphor）？答案若是肯定的，那麼，就沒有純字意性的語言。「字意性」
和「喻意性」之間也只是程度上的差別，而不是指兩種截然不同的範疇。如
果字意和喻意之間的差別只是程度上的不同，那麼，當我們需要將喻意性的
詞彙予以字意化解釋時，我們就會問：「要多字意化？」於是，究竟是字意
性的語言較好？還是喻意性的語言更好？那就很難界定了。
Some, such as Gordon Clark [Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951).], have argued that this view of Aquinas amounts to
skepticism. Clark’s and similar arguments raise questions about what sort of
meaning, if any, is carried by figurative language, apart from literal explanations
of it. They also pose the question of whether there is an element of metaphor in
all language. If there is, then no language is “purely literal,” and the difference
between literal and figurative is a difference in degree, rather than a difference
between two sharply contrasted categories. And if the difference between
literal and figurative is a difference of degree, then the demand for literal
explanations of figurative terms raises the question, “How literal?” And the
advantage of relatively literal language over relatively figurative language
becomes rather hard to define.
無論如何，克拉克指出范泰爾的類比觀與阿奎那的觀念一樣，因此，Clark
對阿奎那立場的批判，范泰爾也必須接受。
At any rate, Clark wrote that Van Til’s view of analogy was the same as that of
Aquinas and therefore subject to Clark’s assessment of Aquinas’s position.
[Clark, “The Bible as Truth,” Bibliotheca Sacra 94 (April 1957): 166.]
7. Weaver 和弗蘭姆為范泰爾辯護：范泰爾的類比觀與阿奎那截然不同
Weaver and Frame Defend Van Til:
Van Til Different from Aquinas on Analogy
相反，Weaver 卻主張范泰爾的類比觀與阿奎那的截然不同；這樣的評論當
然是正確的。范氏堅決反對阿奎那的存有類比觀、以及與其相關的知識論
（IST, 206-210; CTK, 16-17; SCE, 60; RP, 83-105; WSA, 32-61; GH, 267-286）。范
泰爾認為，阿奎那的類比觀預設了上帝與人之間的連續統（continuum）。
On the contrary, Weaver is surely correct in arguing that Van Til’s view of
analogy is very different form that of Aquinas. Van Til strongly opposes
Aquinas’s view of the analogy of being and the view of knowledge connected
with it. (IST, 206-210; CTK, 16-17; SCE, 60; RP, 83-105; WSA, 32-61; GH, 267-286.)
He believes that Aquinas’s view of analogy presupposes a continuum between
God and man.
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8. 范泰爾：人的知識是上帝知識的有限副本
Van Til: Human Knowledge is Finite Replica of God’s Knowledge
我們可以用前文所引范泰爾的話，來總結他的類比觀，即人的知識是上帝知
識的「有限的副本」（IST, 206）。也就是說，在人的知識裏，我們的思想
反映（image）出上帝的知識到一個程度，我們可以說我們的知識是真知識。
因為當我們獲得真知識的時候，我們是「效法上帝的思維而思維」（think God’s
thoughts after him）。
His own view of analogy, summarized in our earlier quotation, is that human
knowledge is a “finite replica” of God’s. (IST, 206.) It is not God’s own
knowledge, nor is it on a continuum with God’s knowledge. Like everything
human, it is created, creaturely, finite. Nevertheless, our knowledge is a finite
replica of God’s knowledge. [Van Til was not absolutely consistent in his
terminology. In the earlier passage quoted from CTK, he denies that we can
have a “replica” of God’s knowledge, while in IST, 206, he asserts that we can
have a “finite replica.” There is an apparent contradiction here, but I think it is
plain what he is saying. The “replica” denied in CTK is clearly not the “finite
replica” of IST. See the following chapter (CVT) for a more complete view of Van
Til’s position on the relation of God’s knowledge to ours.] That is to say, in
human knowledge our thoughts image God’s in such a way that they can be
judged to be true. When we obtain knowledge, we “think God’s thoughts after
him.”
9. 范泰爾的類比思維法是降服於上帝啟示之下的思維
Van Til’s Analogical Thinking:
Thinking Submissive to God’s Revelation
范泰爾也用「類似」和「類比」等辭彙，來說明推理的方法和求知的方法。
注意前面幾處的引文：范泰爾提到「降服於上帝啟示之下」的重要性。這就
是「類比的思維」或「類比的推理」（參 PDS, 12-15）。范泰爾說，這種推
理是有「高度自我意識的類比」（CTK, 16）。相對來說，共在的思維（univocal
thinking）卻預設了人的自主性，並且拒絕降服在上帝的權威之下。我將在
後文裏多談一些…
Van Til also uses “analogous” and “analogical” to describe a method of
reasoning, a method of obtaining knowledge. Note that in the quotation from A
Christian Theory of Knowledge at the outset of this chapter and the other
passages cited with it, Van Til mentions the importance of being subject to
God’s revelation. This is “analogous thinking” or “analogous reasoning.” (Cf.
also PDS, 12-15.) Van Til speaks of such reasoning as “self-consciously
analogical.” (CTK, 16.) “Univocal” thinking, in contrast, presupposes human
autonomy and renounces proper submission to divine authority. I shall have
more to say about this later in connection with Van Til’s discussions of
revelation and of the ethics of knowledge.
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因此，范泰爾的類比觀與阿奎那一樣，都是表達一個本體論立場；可是，兩
者的本體論卻截然不同。范泰爾與阿奎那都是從各自的類比觀而得出知識論
方面的結果；不過，他們所得的結論也截然不同。
Like Aquinas, therefore, Van Til’s view of analogy expresses a metaphysical
position; however, the metaphysical views of the two men were very different.
Both Van Til and Aquinas also drew epistemological consequences from their
respective views of analogy; the consequences they drew, however, were very
different.
10. 阿奎那的不可知論：人的語言不能在字意上形容上帝；
克拉克批判范泰爾；Weaver 和弗蘭姆的回應
Aquinas’ Agnosticism:
Human Language Cannot Literally Describe God;
Clark Critiques Van Til; Weaver and Frame Respond
阿奎那從他的類比觀裏，推理出一些關於「名詞使用」的結論。他認為人類
所有關於上帝的語言，都不可能是字意性或共在性的。就是這個結論被 Clark
批判為不可知論。范泰爾的類比觀有任何相似之處嗎？我認為沒有。Weaver
說得對：「因為范泰爾的類比不是指字彙，而是指人類思想的整體過程：『人
的被造，是在本質和知識上類似上帝（created analogue）。』」Weaver 同
時也正確地批判了 Clark 有關錯置共在（equivocation）的謬論（JA, 327）。
Clark 錯誤地認定范泰爾對「類比」一詞的界定和阿奎那一樣。Weaver 還建
議范泰爾應該選用另外一個名詞，來描述他所謂「有限副本」的觀念（finite
replication）；我認為這也是正確的。他說：「或許我們可以說，人的知識
與上帝的知識之間，有著一個形象的關係（image-relationship），人的知識
具有上帝的知識的形象；或者說，人的知識反映（reflective of）出上帝的知
識。」（JA, 327）
From his doctrine of analogy, Aquinas also drew consequences concerning the
use of terms, concluding that no human language about God can be literal, or
“univocal.” That is the conclusion that Clark criticizes as skeptical. Does Van Til’s
doctrine of analogy entail anything similar? I think not. Weaver is right to say,
“For [Van Til] analogy applies not to terms, but to the overall process of human
thought: man is God’s created analogue in both his being and his knowledge,”
and he rightly accuses Clark of the fallacy of equivocation. (JA, 327.) Clark is
wrong to suppose that Van Til means the same thing as Aquinas by the term
“analogy.” I think Weaver is also right to suggest that Van Til should have
chosen a different term by which to describe his concept of finite replication. He
suggests, “It might be said that man’s knowledge bears an image-relationship
to God’s knowledge, or that man’s knowledge is reflective of that of God.” [JA,
327 (emphasis by Van Til).]
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11. 人論述上帝的語言必須是「擬人」的：
上帝的「俯就」
Human Language about God Necessarily Anthropomorphic:
God’s Accommodation
我們在這裏可以問（雖然 Weaver 並沒有問）：范泰爾是否曾經討論過「用

人類語言字意性地述說上帝」的可能性。據我所知，范泰爾沒有討論過。不
錯，他的確堅持人類論述上帝的語言必須是「擬人」的（IST, 205; CGG, 73; CTK,
37）。在這些討論中，范泰爾所強調的是改革宗神學有關「上帝的俯就」
（accommodation）的教義；也就是說，上帝用我們人──有限的被造者─
─所能理解的方式向我們說話。上帝使用的全然是人類的語言，而不是三位
一體之間那種奧秘的溝通。可是問題仍然存在：人類的語言可否字意性地講
述關於上帝的真理？
We might well ask at this point (though Weaver does not) whether Van Til ever
discusses the possibility of literal human language about God. So far as I know,
he does not. He does insist that human language about God is necessarily
“anthropomorphic.” (IST, 205; CGG, 73; CTK, 37.) In these contexts his concern
is to emphasize the traditional Reformed doctrine of accommodation, namely,
that God speaks to us in ways that we, as finite creatures, can understand. He
uses fully human language, not some mysterious intratrinitarian communication.
But that leaves open the question of whether a fully human language can speak
literal truth about God.
12. 有信心地肯定非字意性的教義；
例如：上帝改變態度
Affirm Nonliteral Teachings with Confidence,
Example: “God Changed His Attitude”
范泰爾要我們「盡量地擬人」（fearlessly anthropomorphic）；他的意思不
是要我們成為不可知論者，使得《聖經》中明顯的字意性教導成了非字意性
的教導。相反，范泰爾要我們放膽地肯定《聖經》中非字意性的教導，因為
這些教導都含有真正的（我想說：字意的）真理。在《普遍恩典與福音》一
書中（頁 73），他要我們放膽地說：「上帝對人類的態度改變了」，因為
《聖經》是這樣記載了上帝的態度。
When Van Til tells us to be “fearlessly anthropomorphic,” he is not telling us to
be agnostic, fearing that apparently literal biblicl teachings may, after all, be
nonliteral. On the contrary, he is telling us to affirm the nonliteral teachings
with confidence, since they contain genuine (I am tempted to say “literal”) truth.
In Common Grace and the Gospel (p. 73), he tells us to say fearlessly that “God’s
attitude has changed with respect to mankind,” since Scripture represents
God’s attitude that way.
一方面，我們從《聖經》得知，上帝「本身是不變的」。我想范泰爾會承認，
前面的表述（上帝改變態度）比後面的表述（上帝是不變的）更為喻意。可
是，他也要我們以嚴肅的態度領受前者（上帝改變態度）。我想，他相信，
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前者教導了我們一些真理，是我們不能單從後者學到的。因此，范泰爾不是
要我們作不可知論者（像阿奎那的結論一般），而是要我們更有信心
（confidence）！他不是說，《聖經》裏看似字意的表達，其實是喻意的；
乃是說，《聖經》裏看似喻意的表達，其實包含了字意性真理的元素。他告
訴我們，即使《聖經》中看上去最非字意性的詞句，都應該被我們放膽地領
受和宣講，就如《聖經》宣講它們的方式一樣。若解釋是必須的，而這些解
釋本身又合乎《聖經》，那麼就讓我們去解釋吧！這整個過程將帶領我們真
正地理解上帝的啟示。
We know, on the one hand, also from Scripture, that God “in himself is
changeless.” I think that Van Til would admit that the former formulation is less
literal than the latter. But he wants us to take the first seriously. I gather that he
believes the first formulation teaches us something important that we could not
learn from the second alone. So Van Til is not calling us to greater agnosticism,
as did Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy, but rather to greater confidence. He is not
trying to say that apparently literal expressions are really figurative, but that
apparently figurative expressions contain some element of literal truth. He is
telling us that even the most apparently nonliteral expressions should be set
forth with confidence, as indeed Scripture sets them forth. If explanations are
necessary, and those explanations are themselves scriptural, then let them be
given too. This whole process leads us to true understanding of God’s
revelation.
13. 「整本《聖經》都是擬人的」此一原則的涵義：
縮短字意和喻意之間的距離
Implication of “All Scripture Anthropomorphic” Principle:
Literal and Figurative Less Distant
范泰爾「整本《聖經》都是擬人的」這個原則，已經產生了一個後果，使得
字意和喻意之間的距離縮短了。這裏的意思不是說，「上帝改變祂的態度」
是一個純粹喻意的表述，而「上帝不改變」則是一個純粹字意性的表述。這
兩個表述都涉及到創造主與被造者之間的溝通，也都有其局限性；就好像父
母親與年幼的小孩講話時，也會受到類似的限制。可是，喻意性的表達不是
單單用以潤色語言的裝飾，隨時都可被字意性的字句取代。確切的說，它們
在傳達一些資訊，是我們不能從其他管道知道的；而這些資訊，需要被加入
我們「字意性真理」的知識庫裏。若僅僅知道「上帝是不改變的」，我們可
能會忽略歷史的重要性，例如：墮落前與墮落後、舊約與新約、道成肉身前
和道成肉身後、基督復活前與復活後、使徒時代和後使徒時代……等變化。
但「上帝改變祂的態度」則告訴我們，上帝非常認真地看待這些歷史上的演
變。我們會在本書（CVT）第 16 章「普遍恩典」裏，看見這一點。
Van Til’s principle, “All Scripture is anthropomorphic,” has the effect of
narrowing the gap between literal and figurative. It is not that the statement
“God changed his attitude” is purely and simply figurative, while the statement
“God does not change” is purely and simply literal. Both expressions partake of
the limitations involved in conversations between Creator and creature – similar
in some measure to the limitations in conversations between parents and small
64
children. But the figurative expressions are not merely aesthetic decorations,
easily replaced by literal truth. Rather, they convey some things that we would
not otherwise know, some things that we need to add to our storehouse of
literal truth. If we knew only that God did not change, we might be tempted to
ignore the significance of history, the movements in time between pre-Fall and
post-Fall, Old and New Tetament, pre-Incarnation and Incarnation,
pre-Resurrection and post-Resurrection, apostolic age and postapostolic age.
“God changed his attitude” tells us that God takes these movements in time
seriously, as we shall see in our discussion of common grace in chapter 16
(CVT).
14. 非字意性並不妥協上帝的超越性
Nonliterality Does Not Compromise God’s Transcendence
因此，范泰爾的「擬人論」並沒有清楚告訴我們，人的語言可否字意性地述
說上帝。我有一次曾問過他，他的答覆是：他從來沒有仔細想過這問題，也
沒有整理出一個立場。顯然，他不認為這個問題對他的知識論有多重要。在
這方面，范泰爾和 Gordon Clark 非常不同。我猜想，范泰爾的觀點可能和我
先前建議的一樣：字意性（literality）有不同的程度和種類，並且，純粹字
意性的語言是不存在的。既然非字意性的語言並沒有妨礙我們言說這個世
界，它也不能妨礙我們言說上帝。而字意性地言說上帝，並不一定會妥協祂
的超然性；雖然阿奎那不這麼認為，但他的觀念並不符合范氏的整個進路。
So Van Til’s doctrine of anthropomorphism does not settle the question of
whether human language can speak literally of God. I asked him once about
that, and his reply was that he had never thought much about it and had not
formulated a position on the question. Evidently it was not an issue he
considered important to his epistemology; in that respect he is very unlike
Gordon Clark. I suspect that Van Til held the view I suggested earlier, that there
are degrees (and perhaps kinds) of literality and no such thing as purely literal
language. Since nonliterality does not inhibit our language about the world, it
cannot be said to hinder our language about God, either. Nor does literal
language about God necessarily compromise his transcendence, although
Aquinas thought it did. At least this sort of view would be compatible with Van
Til’s overall approach.
15. 《聖經》給我們字意性的知識
Bible Gives Literal Knowledge
人的語言都有字意性（literality），那麼，人用來言說上帝的語言有沒有例
外呢？范泰爾似乎認為沒有一點例外。例如有關「上帝在歷史中的作為」的
宣稱，像是「上帝帶領以色列人走乾地過紅海」之類的記載，最好被看為字
意性的記載，而非喻意性的記載。對上帝的反面宣稱，例如「上帝不會撒謊」，
也不應被視為喻意性的宣稱，因為這句話將上帝和其他「在字意上而非喻意
上」撒謊的人──也就是真正撒謊的人──區別出來。此外，還有很多對上
65
帝的正面宣稱，例如「上帝知道萬事」等，都是字意性的。因為這樣說的同
時，我們是毫無疑問地相信，上帝的知識遠遠超越我們的知識。
There seems to be nothing in Van Til’s system that would prevent us from
ascribing to language about God the same kind of (relative) literality that we
regularly ascribe to language of other kinds. For example, statements about
God’s acts in history, like “God brought Israel across the Red Sea on dry land,”
are best described as literal rather than figurative. Negative statements about
God, e.g., “God is not a liar,” are not figurative in any way useful sense; this
statement distinguishes God from literal liars, not (or not only) figurative ones.
And many of our positive statements, such as “God knows all things,” are literal.
To say that, of course, is not to deny that God’s knowledge far transcends ours.
16. 上帝的啟示不被字意的語言所限制
God’s Revelation Not Limited to the Literal
當然，「上帝用『全然人類的語言』向我們啟示」此一事實，也許表示有些
關於上帝的真理，是不可能用字意性的方式啟示給我們的。的確，或許有一
些真理完全不可能用人的語言來表達（羅 8:26，林後 12:4）；可是，這一點
也不妨礙有些已經被啟示的事情，乃是以字意性的方式被啟示出來。
Of course, the fact that God speaks to us in “fully human” language may mean
that some truths about God cannot be literally stated in revelation. Indeed,
there may be some truths that cannot be stated at all in human language (Rom.
8:26; 2 Cor. 12:4). But that does not prevent some of the things that are
revealed from being revealed literally.
羅 8:26
況且我們的軟弱有聖靈幫助，我們本不曉得當怎樣禱告，只是聖靈親自用說不出來的歎
息替我們禱告。
林後 12:4
他被提到樂園裏，聽見隱祕的言語，是人不可說的。

[ RP = The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought ]
[ WSA = Who Do You Say That I Am? ]
[ GH = The God of Hope ]
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第九章上帝的啟示
REVELATION
I. 效法上帝的思維而思維
THINK GOD’S THOUGHTS AFTER HIM
我們已經看見，范泰爾的「類比知識觀」可以總結成兩點：（一）上帝的思維
不同於人類的思維，其間的差異，是創造主與被造者之間的天淵之別，兩者必
須分辨清楚；（二）人要效法上帝的思維而思維。……現在我們來討論第二點。
As we have seen, Van Til’s doctrine of analogical knowledge can be summarized by
saying (1) that God’s thoughts are distinct from man’s, as Creator from creature,
and (2) that man is to think God’s thoughts after him. … We must now explore the
second.
1. 效法上帝思維的意思：思維必須服從上帝的啟示
Think God’s Thoughts After Him Means:
Thinking Must Submit to Revelation
對范泰爾來說，「效法上帝的思維而思維」首先是指按照上帝的啟示來思維。
在這一章裏，我們要討論上帝的普遍啟示和特殊啟示。下面幾章，我們將探
索啟示在知識論中的涵義：我們將從預設、理性和邏輯的角色、以及神學系
統等角度來討論。
For Van Til, “thinking God’s thoughts after him” is first of all thinking according
to divine revelation. In this chapter, we shall discuss general and special
revelation. In the next chapters, we shall explore the implications of revelation
for epistemology: the roles of presuppositions, reason and logic, and theological
systems.
2. 改革宗傳統的普遍啟示與特殊啟示觀
General Revelation, Special Revelation
In the Reformed Tradition
范泰爾的啟示觀本質上與加爾文和改革宗的傳統大致相同，特別是包括凱柏
（Abraham Kuyper）、巴文克（Herman Bavinck）和華爾腓特（B.B. Warfield）
的神學。在上帝所有的創造當中，都有祂的「自然啟示」，或稱「普遍啟示」；
人身為上帝的形象，當然也不例外。普遍啟示顯明上帝的本性和祂對人的道
德要求（羅 1:18-20, 32）。自人類犯罪之後，上帝另外又添加了「特殊啟示」，
從中賜給人有關恩典的信息。特殊啟示的媒介有：上帝的親自顯現
67
（theophany，包括上帝兒子的道成肉身）、先知預言、神蹟和筆之於書的
《聖經》。《聖經》是上帝的話，它的原稿是無謬（infallible）、無誤（inerrant）
的（范氏在 IST, 62-158 裏詳細地解釋了他的啟示觀。另參 CA, 23-37; CTK,
25-71; PDS; NS; IW）。
Van Til’s view of revelation is essentially that of Calvin and the Reformed
tradition, especially including Kuyper, Bavinck, and Warfield. There is “natural”
or “general” revelation (With Van Til, I will use “natural revelation” and “general
revelation” as synonymous terms. We should of course remember that “nature”
in this context includes man’s own nature.) in all of creation, including man,
who is God’s image. This revelation indicates God’s nature and his moral
demands (Rom. 1:18-20, 32). After man sinned, the message of God’s grace was
given in additional “special” revelation, communicated through theophany
(including the incarnation of the Son of God), prophecy, and miracle, and
eventually committed to writing in Scripture. Scripture is God’s Word, infallible
and inerrant in its original manuscripts. (Van Til’s view of revelation is
expounded in greatest detail in IST, 62-158. See also CA, 23-37; CTK, 25-71; PDS;
NS; IW.)
羅 1:18-20, 32
18 原來，神的忿怒從天上顯明在一切不虔不義的人身上，就是那些行不義阻擋真理的人。
19 神的事情，人所能知道的，原顯明在人心裏，因為神已經給他們顯明。
20 自從造天地以來，神的永能和神性是明明可知的，雖是眼不能見，但藉著所造之物就
可以曉得，叫人無可推諉。
32 他們雖知道神判定行這樣事的人是當死的，然而他們不但自己去行，還喜歡別人去行。
當范泰爾把這些教義應用在知識論和護教學的時候，新的重點和洞見浮現
了。接下來，我將把焦點集中在范氏的啟示觀；我認為，這是他的特殊貢獻，
能幫助教會思索有關「啟示」的教義。
As Van Til relates these doctrines to his own epistemological and apologetic
concerns, however, new emphases and insights emerge. In what follows, I will
focus on what I take to be Van Til’s distinctive contributions to the church’s
thinking about revelation.

[ NS = Nature and Scripture ]
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II. 普遍啟示
GENERAL REVELATION
眾所周知，范泰爾堅持一切的護教見證必須建立在合乎《聖經》的預設上，不
可單以「對自然事實嚴謹、中立的論證」為根據 [參本書（CVT）第 10 章]。
因此，有些人批判他不重視上帝的普遍啟示。
Van Til is known for the view that all apologetic witness must be based on
presuppositions drawn from Scripture, rather than on religiously neutral argument
from the facts of nature alone. [We shall consider the concept of “presupposition”
in the next chapter (CVT).] Consequently, critics sometimes fault him for failing to
do justice to general revelation.
1. 范泰爾論普遍啟示：必須、權威、足夠、清晰
Van Til on General Revelation: Necessary, Authoritative, Sufficient, Clear
因此，我們必須瞭解，范泰爾有一套穩固紮實的普遍啟示觀。在他的著作中，
這是最主要的重點。他強調，普遍啟示與《聖經》一樣，為了達成其特殊目
標，它是「必須的、有權威性的、足夠的和清晰的」（CA, 30-37; NS, 269-283）。
我們將會看見，普遍啟示在范泰爾的護教學中扮演了舉足輕重的角色。因為
有了上帝清楚、權威性的普遍啟示，非基督徒才能「知道」上帝（羅 1:21）；
但這方面的知識，又正是非基督徒試圖去壓抑的。護教者所訴諸的就是：上
帝對非基督徒清楚的自我啟示；非基督徒知道它，但卻壓抑它 [參本書（CVT）
第三部份「范泰爾的知識倫理學」]。
It is important, then, to realize that Van Til has a very strong doctrine of general
revelation. This is a major emphasis in his writings. He stresses that general
revelation, like Scripture, is “necessary, authoritative, sufficient and
perspicuous” for its distinctive purposes. (CA, 30-37; NS, 269-283.) As we shall
see, this revelation plays a central role in his apologetic. It is because of that
clear, authoritative general revelation that the unbeliever “knows” God (Rom.
1:21); and it is that revealed knowledge which he seeks to suppress. It is to that
clear self-revelation of God to the unbeliever, known but suppressed, that the
apologist appeals. [Of course, the apologist also appeals to special revelation.
More on this will follow in our discussion of Van Til’s “Ethics of Knowledge” in
this book (CVT) “Part Three”.]
羅 1:21
因為，他們雖然知道神，卻不當作神榮耀他，也不感謝他。他們的思念變為虛妄，無知
的心就昏暗了。
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2. 普遍啟示：啟示上帝的永恆預旨
General Revelation Reveals Eternal Decree
如此堅強的普遍啟示觀，來自於改革宗對「上帝的主權」的信念。如果萬事
皆因上帝主權的預旨而發生，那麼，所有的事多多少少都會顯明上帝的預
旨。因此，「一切被造的實存，都啟示著上帝的本性與旨意。」（CA, 33）
范氏解釋道：
Such a strong doctrine of general revelation follows from Van Til’s Reformed
view of divine sovereignty. If all things come to pass by God’s sovereign decree,
then all things to some extent reveal that decree. Therefore, “All created reality
is inherently revelational of the nature and will of God.” (CA, 33.) He explains:
這位上帝顯然對被造的宇宙有一個整全、包含萬有的計劃。祂計劃了所
有被造存有之間的所有關係。祂從起初就計劃了結局。因此，所有被造
的實存實際上都在顯示著這個計劃；也因此，它們的本質是合乎理性的
（CA, 34-35）。
This God naturally has an all-comprehensive plan for the created universe.
He has planned all the relationships between all the aspects of created
being. He has planned the end from the beginning. All created reality
therefore actually displays this plan. It is, in consequence, inherently
rational. (CA, 34-35.)
3. 宇宙具啟示性，因為它是為上帝的榮耀而造；
亞米念主義不承認人性具啟示性
Universe Revelational, Because Created For God’s Glory;
Arminians Deny Human Nature Is Revelational
請注意：「如果整個宇宙正如《聖經》所不斷宣稱的，是為顯明上帝的榮耀
而被造，那麼，除非宇宙是上帝的啟示，它不可能顯明上帝的榮耀。」（IST,
64。在頁 110 及其他多處，范泰爾譴責亞米念神學，因為後者否認人性本身
具有啟示性。按照亞米念主義的看法，由於人的自由意志獨立於上帝的計劃
之外，那麼，人性就不可能是上帝的啟示和上帝的形像。既然如此，普遍啟
示就不足以叫人對罪無可推諉。）
Note also, “If the whole universe was created to show forth the glory of God, as
the Scriptures constantly say that it was, then it could not do this unless it was a
revelation of God.” (IST, 64. On p. 110 and elsewhere, he reproaches Arminian
theology because it does not see human nature itself as revelational. Since
human free will, on the Arminian understanding, is independent of God’s plan,
it cannot be a divine revelation, the image of God. As such, general revelation is
insufficient to leave man totally without excuse for sin.)
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4. 救贖（特殊）啟示預設普遍啟示；
「區分的過程」是歷史的關鍵
Redemptive (Special Revelation) Presupposes General Revelation;
Differentiation Key to History
「建立一個穩固的普遍啟示教義至關重要」的另一個原因是：救贖啟示（特
殊啟示、《聖經》）預設了普遍啟示：
A strong doctrine of general revelation is also important because the doctrine of
redemptive revelation (special revelation, Scripture) presupposes it:
上帝對人類的自然啟示從起初開始就是盟約性的（covenantal），祂有
意要以自然啟示作為一個平台，在歷史進程中進行區分的過程（the
process of differentiation）。上帝與亞當所立的約是條件性的，在人類
對分辨善惡樹採取行動之後，上帝在自然裏面為啟示添加了新的內容。
[NS, 267-268。「區分」一詞（differentiation）是指上帝的子民在歷史中
逐漸被顯明是從墮落的世界中分別出來的，與不被揀選的人不同。在《普
遍恩典與福音》一書中有詳細的解釋。參本書（CVT）第 16 章的討論。]
Being from the outset covenantal in character, the natural revelation of
God to man was meant to serve as the playground for the process of
differentiation that was to take place in the course of time. The covenant
made with Adam was conditional. There would be additional revelation of
God in nature after the action of man with respect to the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil. [NS, 267-268. “Differentiation,” a concept
explained at length in CGG, refers to the gradual manifestation in history of
the people of God in distinction from the reprobate world. See my
discussion in chap. 16 (CVT).]
5. 墮落後普遍啟示的新內容：上帝的忿怒
After Fall, New Content in General Revelation: God’s Wrath
這個新添的啟示，乃是有關「上帝的忿怒」的啟示（羅 1:18）；但是，「上
帝的恩典也與祂的忿怒一起被顯明。」上帝藉著彩虹向挪亞顯明祂的普遍恩
典，除此之外，上帝更在基督裏宣告了救贖的恩典。救贖啟示藉著先知預言
與上帝神蹟臨到我們。范泰爾解釋：「自然界的力量，永遠都在聽從、服事
宇宙中『區分的權柄』的召喚，去完成後者救贖與定罪的工作。這個超自然
同時又是自然的啟示，就是舊約《聖經》──尤其是詩篇──所要精心表達
的內容。」（NS, 268-269）
That additional revelation was a revelation of wrath (Rom. 1:18), but “together
with God’s wrath, his grace is also manifest.” God’s common grace is
manifested to Noah through the sign of the rainbow. But beyond this, God
proclaims saving grace in Christ. That revelation comes through prophecy and
miracle. Van Til explains: “The forces of nature are always at the beck and call of
the power of differentiation that works toward redemption and reprobation. It
is the idea of a supernatural-natural revelation that comes to such eloquent
expression in the Old Testament, and particularly in the Psalms.” (NS, 268-269.)
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羅 1:18
原來，神的忿怒從天上顯明在一切不虔不義的人身上，就是那些行不義阻擋真理的人。
6. 墮落前、墮落後，人都必須通過特殊啟示（上帝心意的傳遞）
來理解普遍啟示
Before And After Fall, Man Needs
Special Revelation (Thought-Communicatoin)
To Understand General Revelation
因此，范泰爾堅持普遍啟示和特殊啟示是一個整體，不應被硬性分割。用范
泰爾式的話來說，「就算在樂園裏」，人「也必須與超自然啟示的亮光接連，
才能正確地去解讀自然。」（DF2, 106；參 CTK, 29-3. IST, 68, 162, 189. …）在
人類墮落之後，超自然心意的傳遞，即現在的「特殊啟示」，越發成為必須，
因為墮落的人會本能地去歪曲普遍啟示的真理（羅 1:18-32）。
Van Til, therefore, insists that general and special revelation are integrated,
rather than sharply distinguished. “Even in paradise,” to use a common Van
Tillian phrase, man “could read nature aright only in connection with and in the
light of supernatural positive revelation.” [DF2, 106; cf. CTK, 29-3. IST, 68, 162,
189. But when Gordon Clark makes essentially the same point, Van Til charges
him with denying the clarity of general revelation (PDS, 62-63). To read Van Til’s
critiques, one might imagine that Clark never said anything right!] After the Fall,
that supernatural thought-communication, now a “special revelation,” became
all the more necessary, since fallen man naturally distorted the truth of general
revelation (Rom. 1:18-32).
羅 1:18-32
20 自從造天地以來，神的永能和神性是明明可知的，雖是眼不能見，但藉著所造之物就
可以曉得，叫人無可推諉。
21 因為，他們雖然知道神，卻不當作神榮耀他，也不感謝他。他們的思念變為虛妄，無
知的心就昏暗了。
22 自稱為聰明，反成了愚拙，
23 將不能朽壞之神的榮耀變為偶像，彷彿必朽壞的人和飛禽、走獸、昆蟲的樣式。
24 所以，神任憑他們逞著心裏的情慾行污穢的事，以致彼此玷辱自己的身體。
25 他們將神的真實變為虛謊，去敬拜事奉受造之物，不敬奉那造物的主；主乃是可稱頌
的，直到永遠。阿們！
26 因此，神任憑他們放縱可羞恥的情慾。他們的女人把順性的用處變為逆性的用處；
27 男人也是如此，棄了女人順性的用處，慾火攻心，彼此貪戀，男和男行可羞恥的事，
就在自己身上受這妄為當得的報應。
28 他們既然故意不認識神，神就任憑他們存邪僻的心，行那些不合理的事；
29 裝滿了各樣不義、邪惡、貪婪、惡毒（或作：陰毒），滿心是嫉妒、兇殺、爭競、詭
詐、毒恨；
30 又是讒毀的、背後說人的、怨恨神的（或作：被神所憎惡的）、侮慢人的、狂傲的、
自誇的、捏造惡事的、違背父母的。
31 無知的，背約的，無親情的，不憐憫人的。
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7. 特殊啟示預設普遍啟示
Special Revelation Presupposes General Revelation
與此同時，「超自然心意的傳遞」也預設了普遍啟示；所以，沒有普遍啟示，
我們就不能理解超自然啟示。因此，自然啟示也具有傳統上被歸於《聖經》
的四個屬性；和《聖經》一樣，自然啟示是必須的、權威性的、足夠的和清
晰的。
At the same time, supernatural thought-communication also presupposes
general revelation and therefore cannot be understood without it. Natural
revelation, therefore, bears the four attributes traditionally ascribed to
Scripture. Like Scripture, natural revelation is necessary, authoritative, sufficient,
and perspicuous.
A. 普遍啟示的必須性
Necessity of General Revelation
普遍啟示是必須的，因為「超自然若要顯明為超自然，自然就必須顯明為
自然……宇宙中若要有真正的『例外』，則必須先有『常規』。」（NS, 269-270）
上帝所賜有關人類生活的誡命，若要作為範例讓人遵守，這條誡命就必須
是一個例外（范氏在這裏指的是創世記 2:17，關於分辨善惡樹的誡命）。
General revelation is necessary, because “for the supernatural to appear as
supernatural the natural had to appear as really natural. … There had to be
regularity if there was to be a genuine exception.” (NS, 269-270.) And God’s
commandments concerning particulars of human life (Van Til speaks here of
the commandment concerning the tree of knowledge in Gen. 2:17) must, if
they are to serve as “examples” for our obedience in other areas, be
exceptional.
創 2:17
只是分別善惡樹上的果子，你不可喫，因為你喫的日子必定死！
自然與超自然之間的關係不只是墮落前，也是墮落後的實況。可是墮落之
後，兩者之間的關係加入了一個新的特性：「自然必須被顯明是需要救贖
的。……《聖經》當中有關醫治的神蹟，全都指向萬事萬物的更新。」（NS,
270-271）因此，必須有一個被罪咒詛的世界，才能顯明上帝救贖的特殊
計劃。上帝藉著祂救贖性的作為和話語來彰顯這個計劃。
The relation between the natural and the supernatural applies both before
and after the Fall. But after the Fall, another distinction enters: “The natural
must appear as in need of redemption. … The Biblical miracles of healing
point to the regeneration of all things.” (NS, 270-271.) So, it is necessary to
have a world cursed by sin in order to show by contrast the special plan of
God’s redemption. That plan is shown both by God’s saving deeds and by his
saving words.
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B. 普遍啟示的權威性
Authority of General Revelation
普遍啟示是具有權威性的。福音派人士有時天真地以為《聖經》比自然啟
示更具權威性，但這不是《聖經》的教導。雖然《聖經》是上帝所書寫的
惟一啟示，在啟示的體系裏扮演了獨特的角色，但是它的權威性並不比上
帝藉著自然所賜下的啟示更高或更低。因為，兩種啟示都來自上帝，雖然
一個是例外的，一個是常規性的。因此，范泰爾說：
General revelation is also authoritative. Evangelicals sometimes think naively
that Scripture has more authority than natural revelation. But that is not the
teaching of Scripture. Although Scripture has a unique role to play in the
organism of revelation, as the only divinely authored written revelation, it is
no more or less authoritative than God’s word through nature, for both
revelations, exceptional and ordinary, come from God. So, Van Til says,
上帝向人所發出的「例外性」聲音，它的權威性只不過說明了上帝也
透過自然界發出權威的聲音。……因此，人的科學研究方法必須是順
服上帝的（NS, 272-273）。
The voice of authority as it came to man in this exceptional manner was
to be but illustrative of the fact that, in and through the things of nature,
there spoke the self-same voice of God’s command. … Man’s scientific
procedure was accordingly to be marked by the attitude of obedience to
God. (NS, 272-273.)
就算是我們的罪也具啟示性，因為罪是「反常」的（NS, 275）。
Even our sins are “revelational, that is, in their very abnormality.”（NS, 275.）
C. 普遍啟示的足夠性
Sufficiency of General Revelation
普遍啟示本身足以達成它的歷史目的，也就是為「超自然的救贖與啟示」
提供一個適當的背景（平台）。雖然它本身並不足以傳遞上帝救贖應許的
恩典，可是，這並不是它的目的（NS, 275-276）。
General revelation is sufficient for its historical purpose, which is, of course,
to provide a proper background for supernatural redemption and revelation.
It is not sufficient to communicate God’s saving promises of grace, but that
was not its purpose. (NS, 275-276.)
D. 普遍啟示的清晰性
Perspicuity (Clarity) of General Revelation
普遍啟示是清晰的（perspicuous）。雖然上帝不能被透知，而且世界已經
受了咒詛，但是世界卻依然清楚地顯示了上帝（羅 1:18-21）。普遍啟示
本身雖然是清晰的，卻沒有被罪人正確地理解：「因為一個事實若是事實，
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它必須具啟示性。因此，罪人接受上帝的自然啟示，並不比接受上帝在《聖
經》中的啟示更為容易。」（NS, 280.）
Finally, general revelation is perspicuous, or clear. Although God is
incomprehensible, and the world is cursed, nevertheless the world reveals
God clearly (Rom. 1:18-21). Although clear in itself, general revelation is not
properly understood by sinful man: “For any fact to be a fact at all, it must be
a revelational fact. It is accordingly no easier for sinners to accept God’s
revelation in nature than to accept God’s revelation in Scripture.”(NS, 280.)
羅 1:18-21
18 原來，神的忿怒從天上顯明在一切不虔不義的人身上，就是那些行不義阻擋真理的
人。
20 自從造天地以來，神的永能和神性是明明可知的，雖是眼不能見，但藉著所造之物
就可以曉得，叫人無可推諉。
21 因為，他們雖然知道神，卻不當作神榮耀他，也不感謝他。他們的思念變為虛妄，
無知的心就昏暗了。
8. 總結
Summary
總結來說，普遍啟示和特殊啟示的必須性、權威性、足夠性和清晰性都是同
等的。特殊啟示的獨特性，不是在於它更具權威性（或更必須、更足夠、更
清晰），而是在於，它是為了一些獨特的目的而被賜下：（一）引導人正確
地解釋普遍啟示；（二）在人類墮落後，糾正人對普遍啟示的歪曲；（三）
將上帝在基督裏的救贖應許帶給我們，而這個信息是無法藉由普遍啟示而得
知的。
To summarize, general and special revelation are equally necessary,
authoritative, sufficient, and perspicuous. The uniqueness of special revelation
is not that it is more authoritative (or more of the other attributes) than natural
revelation. Rather, special revelation is unique because it is given for distinct
purposes: (1) to guide our interpretation of general revelation, (2) after the Fall,
to correct our sinful distortions of general revelation, and (3) to bring us God’s
promise of salvation through Christ, a message not available through general
revelation.

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III. 視角主義
PERSPECTIVALISM
1. 三面區分；九個範疇
Three-fold Distinction; Nine Categories
范泰爾在《系統神學入門》中（頁 62-109），發展了他對普遍啟示和特殊啟
示的整合理念。有趣的是，他在這裏放棄傳統普遍啟示與特殊啟示的二分
法，而使用三分法來論述「啟示」：從上帝而來的啟示、從自然界而來的啟
示和從人自身而來的啟示。（這讓我們想起加爾文在《基督教要義》的卷首
所說的，我們對自己的認識和對上帝的認識是不能分開的，這兩種知識息息
相關、互為因果，加爾文也沒有指出這兩種知識的先後次序。）
Van Til develops in An Introduction to Systematic Theology (pp., 62-109.) his
ideas on the integration of general and special revelation. Interestingly, at this
point he resorts to a threefold, rather than a twofold, distinction: instead of the
traditional general-special distinction, he refers to revelation from God, from
nature, and from self. (This is reminiscent of the first page of Calvin’s Institutes,
in which he declares the inseparability of our knowledge of self from our
knowledge of God. Calvin says that each is involved in the other, and he does
not know which “comes first.”)
他將以上這三方面的啟示來源，與另外一組的三種啟示──關於上帝的啟
示、關於自然界的啟示、關於人自己的啟示──結合起來，共得出九個範疇：
分別是從自然界、人自身和上帝所得知有關自然界的啟示；從這三種來源所
得知有關人自己的啟示；和從這三種來源所得知有關上帝的啟示。（也許是
很隨意、又或是嚴謹地，范泰爾賦予每一種關係一個專用的學科名稱，就如
凱伯的人類知識大全一樣。例如：來自自然界有關於自然界的啟示，就是物
理；來自人自身有關於自然界的啟示，就是心理物理。整個圖表載於《系統
神學入門》，頁 64-65。）
Relating these to another triad, that of revelation about God, about nature, and
about self, he ends up with nine categories: revelation about nature from
nature, self, and God; revelation about self from the same three sources; and
revelation about God from the same three sources. [Perhaps somewhat tongue
in check (but perhaps not), Van Til gives to each relationship a technical title, in
the manner of Kuyper’s Encyclopedia. For example, revelation about nature
from nature is physics, and revelation about nature from self is psycho-physics.
The whole chart is in IST, 64-65.]
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2. 啟示與知識相互依賴
Interdependence of Revelation and Knowledge
范泰爾指出，上述的三種來源涉及任何事物的知識；更重要的是，范氏堅持，
這九種關係中的每一種關係，都必須從「基督教有神論」的角度去理解。（弗
蘭姆曾在其著作《神學認識論》中闡述「視角主義」，他承認范泰爾在這方
面的洞見，是「視角主義」的一個重要來源。）比方說，當我們從自然界去
理解有關自然界的啟示時，我們必須認清自然界是上帝創造、掌管的，因此，
所有的事實都由定律管理，而所有的定律都與事實有關。（參本書（CVT）
第五章「三位一體」，我在當中解釋了范泰爾的三一神論對這個預設的理論
基礎。）事實之所以是事實，定律之所以是定律，都是因為上帝的緣故。離
開上帝的永恆計劃，事實與定律之間不可能存在任何有用的關係。
He argues that all three sources are involved in the knowledge of any object:
but, more important, he argues that each relationship must be understood from
a Christian-theistic perspective. (These insights of Van Til’s are one major source
(together with others) of the “perspectivalism” expounded in my DKG – John
Frame.) As we understand revelation about nature from nature, for example, it
is important that we recognize that nature is created and governed by God;
therefore, all facts are governed by laws, and all laws are related to facts. [Cf.
chapter 5 (CVT) of this volume, “The Trinity,” in which I describe the rationale
for this proposition in Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity.] And both facts and laws
are what they are because of God. Apart from his plan, they could not exist in
“fruitful relation” to one another.
3. 認識上帝是必須的（優先的必須）
Need for Knowledge of God (Prior Need)
范泰爾避開了傳統的經驗主義和先驗主義：「與定律分離的事實」和「與事
實分離的定律」同樣沒有意義。若上帝沒有將事實和定律有意義地互相連
接，知識不可能存在。因此，我們看見，對范泰爾來說，就算在思想「來自
自然界關於自然界的啟示」時，關於上帝的知識（認識上帝）也是我們必須
同時思想的（IST, 65-66）。
Van Til eschews both traditional empiricism and traditional apriorism: facts
apart from laws and vice versa are equally meaningless. Without God to relate
the facts and laws intelligibly to one another, knowledge is impossible. Thus we
see that for Van Til, the knowledge of God enters even into our consideration of
“revelation about nature from nature.” (IST, 65-66.)
4. 宗教與科學不可分割
Religion and Science Inseparable
「從人自身而來關於自然界的啟示」也很重要；因為，透過比較自然界和我
們自己，我們可以學習到許多有關自然的知識。可是，要正確地進行這樣的
比較和學習，就必須具備合乎《聖經》的自我觀念（人論）（IST, 66-67）。
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因此，「從上帝而來關於自然界的啟示」至為關鍵。是上帝透過自然啟示和
特殊啟示告訴我們，世界乃是被創造、被咒詛的。因此，我們不可以分割
（compartmentalize）宗教和科學。「即使在樂園裏」，上帝也要求人在祂
所說的話語的亮光中去研究大自然（IST, 67-68）。
“Revelation about nature from self” is also important, since we learn much
about nature by comparing it with ourselves. But to do this properly, we must
have a biblical concept of the self. (IST, 66-67.) “Revelation about nature from
God,” therefore, is crucial. It is God who tells us, both in natural and special
revelation, that the world is created and cursed. We may not, therefore,
compartmentalize religion and science. “Even in paradise,” God expected man
to study nature in the light of his spoken word. (IST, 67-68.)
5. 在墮落後，普遍啟示還是清晰的
Perspicuity of General Revelation After Fall
在《系統神學入門》接下來的三章中（第 7-9 章），范泰爾討論到人類的墮

落對「上帝有關自然界、人和祂自己的啟示」有何影響。我們會在本書的第
三部分──知識的倫理──討論這方面的問題。大體說來，上帝的啟示仍然
保持清晰，雖然它反映出神對大地的咒詛，雖然人的不義會歪曲真理，可是，
人依然可以從自然啟示中有所學習。
In the next three chapters of An Introduction to Systematic Theology (7-9), Van
Til discusses the effects of the Fall upon God’s revelation about nature, man,
and God. We shall consider this material in Part Three, “The Ethics of
Knowledge.” In general, the revelation remains clear, although it reflects the
curse on the earth, and although man sinfully distorts the truth, he learns from
it.
6. 「惟獨《聖經》」與《聖經》以外的知識
Sola Scriptura and Extrabiblical Knowledge
無疑地，范泰爾堅信傳統基督教（更正教）關於「惟獨聖經」的原則，意即：
只有《聖經》才是人類思想與生活的無上權威。在下一章，我們將會看到，
《聖經》乃是范泰爾的「預設」。然而，范泰爾的「惟獨聖經」觀並不是機
械式的，彷彿我們只可以單用《聖經》來發展知識，完全不必使用我們的理
性或感知。他瞭解到，在人類所認識的每一點知識中，都同時存在著有關上
帝的知識、有關世界的知識和有關人自己的知識。我們不可能認識一樣事
物，除非我們將它與其他的事物和我們自己連繫起來；我們不可能正確地認
識上帝，除非我們知道祂是這個世界的創造主，也是我們的創造主與救贖
主；我們不可能認識《聖經》，除非我們將《聖經》與我們自己和我們的經
驗世界連繫起來。普遍啟示和特殊啟示一定是合作共事的，雖然後者無疑是
我們理解前者的終極準則。
Certainly, Van Til believed in sola Scriptura in the traditional Protestant sense:
that only Scripture serves as the supreme authority for human thought and life.
We shall see in the next chapter how Scripture was Van Til’s “presupposition.”
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Nevertheless, Van Til did not hold a mechanical view of sola Scriptura, as if we
could develop our knowledge from Scripture alone, without any use of our own
reason or senses. He understood that in any instance of knowledge, there is
simultaneous knowledge of God, the world, and the self. We cannot know one
thing without relating it to other things and to ourselves. We cannot know God
rightly unless we know him as Creator of the world and as our own
Creator-Redeemer. We cannot know Scripture without relating it to ourselves
and to the world of our experience. General and special revelation always work
together, though certainly the latter must provide the ultimate criteria for
understanding the former.
7. 普遍啟示與特殊啟示：形成一個真理系統；互為界線觀念
General Revelation and Special Revelation:
Forms One Whole, Mutual “Limiting Concepts”
我們應該特別注意，在這個思維架構裏面，從自然界而來的啟示和從人而來
的啟示，並沒有抽離來自上帝的啟示。就算是從自然界而來關於自然界的啟
示，也必須以合乎《聖經》的角度去理解。誠然，自然界、人和上帝都必須
在它們彼此的參照下（in light of one another）被理解。范泰爾指出，「即使
在神學本身」，也就是「來自上帝關於上帝的啟示」這範疇內，「我們仍不
可人為地將從『自我反省』和『思想被造世界』所得關於上帝的知識，與得
自『上帝直接傳遞（啟示）的』關於上帝的知識隨便分開。」（IST, 107）
另外，也必須注意：
We should note especially that in this scheme, revelation from nature and
revelation from man are not isolated from revelation from God. Even revelation
about nature from nature must be understood in a scriptural way. Indeed,
nature, man, and God must all be understood in the light of one another. Even
in “theology proper,” the “revelation about God from God,” said Van Til, “we
cannot artificially separate the knowledge of God that man received or could
receive by his reflection on man and the created universe in general, and the
knowledge of God that man received from God by direct communication.” (IST,
107.) Note also:
「上帝親自直接啟示的知識」和「上帝以自然的方式向人啟示的知識」，
兩者共同形成了一個真理系統。上帝對宇宙有一個整體的計劃，包括祂
的自然啟示和超自然啟示。因此，我們必須認識到，每一種啟示都隱含
著另一種啟示，它們彼此互為界線觀念（limiting concepts）（IST, 74）。
What God did actually reveal directly, and what God revealed naturally to
man, together form one system of truth. God had one comprehensive plan
with respect to the universe inclusive of his natural and his supernatural
revelation. It is of great importance that the various aspects of revelation
be regarded as implying one another. They are limiting concepts of one
another. (IST, 74.)
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8. 弗蘭姆：相互依賴 = 視角主義
Interdependence = Perspectivalism (Frame)
從以上所引用的話，當范泰爾指出「自然啟示和超自然啟示彼此互為界線觀
念（limiting concepts）」時，我相信他的意思是：沒有不與特殊啟示摻雜的
「純」自然啟示；也沒有不與自然啟示摻雜的「純」特殊啟示。[「界線觀
念」是康德和其後的哲學家所用的術語。數學中的「無限」（infinity）就是
一個「界線觀念」，因為，雖然我們能在計算中有意義地使用這個概念，但
世上卻沒有真正在數量上是「無限」的事物。「界線觀念」在分析事物時非
常有用，可是它們並沒有代表甚麼真正存在的事物。關於范泰爾如何使用這
觀念，請參閱本書（CVT）第 13 章「類比系統」。] 自然（啟示）必須在超
自然（啟示）的光照中來理解；而超自然（啟示）也必須以自然（啟示）為
背景去理解它。若少了彼此作為彼此的背景（處境，context），兩者都不可
能起到「啟示」的作用。
When Van Til says in the above quotation that natural and supernatural
revelation are “limiting concepts of one another,” I believe that he means that
there is no purely natural revelation or purely supernatural revelation without
admixture of the other. [“Limiting concept” is a term used by Immanuel Kant
and later philosophers. Mathematical infinity is a limiting concept, because
although we can use the concept meaningfully in calculations, there are no
actually infinite quantities of objects in the world. Limiting concepts are useful
for analytic purposes, but they do not literally represent something that exists.
See chap. 13 (CVT), “The Analogical System,” for more on Van Til’s use of this
concept.] The natural must be understood in the light of the supernatural, and
the supernatural must be understood against the “backdrop” of the natural.
Apart from these contexts, they do not actually function as revelation.
我（弗蘭姆）在多處（《神學認識論》，中華展望翻譯，原著：Doctrine of the
Knowledge of God ）經常將這樣互為界線的觀念稱為「視角主義」
（perspectivalism）。意思是說：人類所有的知識，都同時是關於自己的知
識、關於世界的知識和關於上帝的知識。若少了其他兩個範疇，一個範疇的
知識是不可能自足的。若不認識上帝，我們不可能正確地認識自己；對其他
兩個範疇，也是如此。因此，「對自我的認識」實在是三方面的知識：自我
認識、認識世界和認識上帝，只不過焦點集中在自己而已。這樣，自我認識
就成了透視「自己、世界和上帝」這個三元體系（ triad）的一個視角
（perspective）。
I have elsewhere described this sort of view as “perspectivalism.” (In DKG,
throughout.) That is, all human knowledge is simultaneous knowledge of self,
world, and God. Knowledge of one area cannot be adequate without knowledge
of the other two. One cannot know the self rightly without knowing God, and
similarly with the other relationships. Therefore, “self-knowledge” is really a
knowledge of all three areas – self, world, and God, with a focus or emphasis on
the self. Self-knowledge in this case becomes a perspective on the entire triad.
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9. 自然神學和超自然神學必須區分：我們需要神學嗎？
Do Distinguish the Two: Do We Need Theology?
在上文所引述范泰爾的話的上下文，范泰爾的確說過，自然神學和超自然神
學依然必須「區分開來」。這個區分是「內容」上的區分：「我們若能在這
裏區分清楚，就能幫助我們認清：當罪進入世界之後，罪人透過自然與理性
的『神學方法』，能怎樣認識上帝？甚麼是必須留給『神學』去處理的呢？」
（IST, 74）
Van Til does say in the context of the last quotation that natural and
supernatural theology must nevertheless be “kept distinct.” The distinctness is a
distinctness of content: “If we keep them distinct at this place, it will help us
when we come to the question of what can, now that sin has entered the world,
still be known of God by the process of natural and rational theology, and what
must be reserved for theology proper.” (IST, 74.)
我相信范泰爾在這裏只是簡單地作了一個傳統上的區分：自然神學是傳遞上
帝的本性與忿怒，而啟示神學（超自然神學）則在傳遞福音。因此，自然啟
示與特殊啟示在內容上有所不同。不過，若要正確地瞭解和應用任何一者，
則必須透過另外一者。但我們不能因而誤解范泰爾的視角主義，以為上帝在
兩種啟示中的信息完全一樣。相反，范泰爾要我們既認清每一種啟示的獨特
本質，又明白上帝所有的啟示之間的相互依賴性。其實，啟示與被造的宇宙
一樣，都是三一真神的表彰。
Here I believe Van Til is simply making the traditional distinction between
natural theology as communicating God’s nature and wrath, and revealed
theology, as communicating the gospel. Natural and special revelation,
therefore, differ in content. But to understand and to apply each one properly,
we need the other. Van Til’s perspectivalism must not be taken in a leveling way
so that all God’s messages become identical. Rather, it calls us to recognize both
the integrity of each revelation and the interdependence of all God’s revelations.
For revelation is, after all, like creation, a manifestation of the divine Trinity.

[ DKG = John Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God ]
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IV. 特殊啟示
SPECIAL REVELATION
1. 特殊啟示掌管所有的知識
Special Revelation Rules Over All Knowledge
范泰爾的三重視角架構，出現在他討論普遍啟示的一系列篇章裏。可是，正
如我們所見，這個架構本身包含了特殊啟示。「來自上帝有關自然界、人和
上帝的啟示」除了普遍啟示之外，當然也包括了特殊啟示：的確，所有範疇
都需要來自《聖經》亮光的解釋。所以我們已經看到范泰爾特殊啟示觀裏最
重要的一點：特殊啟示必須管治人類知識的所有其他層面。
Van Til’s threefold perspectival scheme appears in a series of chapters devoted
to the topic of general revelation. As we have seen, however, this scheme
includes special revelation within its purview. “Revelation by God about nature,
man, and God” is a category that certainly includes special, as well as general,
revelation: indeed, all the categories require interpretation in the light of
Scripture. So we have already seen some of what is most important in Van Til’s
view of special revelation: that it must rule all other aspects of human
knowledge.
雖然如此，范泰爾也進一步將注意力的焦點更多放在特殊啟示──特別是
《聖經》──上。現在讓我們來注意這方面的討論。
Nevertheless, Van Til does go on to give more focused attention to special
revelation, and particularly to Scripture. We must now give attention to that
discussion.
2. 特殊啟示的必須性：人的罪性
The Need for Special Revelation: Man’s Sin
特殊啟示的必須性「不在於上帝創造人類時所給他的普遍啟示有任何缺欠。」
（IST, 110）按照它的目的來看，普遍啟示是全然足夠的；當時如此，現在
也如此。更準確地說，特殊啟示的必須性乃來自人的罪性（而不是人的有限
性，這是范泰爾尤其要強調的）。有關上帝恩典的信息，不能在自然界裏被
發現。此外，特殊啟示是必須的，它要糾正身為罪人的我們，對普遍啟示的
扭曲（IST, 111-112）。
The necessity of special revelation “does not lie in any defect in the general
revelation that God gave to man when he created him.” (IST, 110.) General
revelation was, and still is, fully adequate for its purpose. Rather, the need for
special revelation is found in man’s sin (not, Van Til emphasizes, in his finitude.)
The message of grace is not found in nature. In addition, special revelation is
necessary to correct our sinful distortion of general revelation. (IST, 111-112.)
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3. 特殊啟示：上帝的話語、作為、臨在
Special Revelation: God’s Words, Deeds, Presence
特殊啟示不僅包括聖靈默示的文字，還包括上帝啟示性的作為。范泰爾視《聖
經》裏上帝的顯現、先知預言和神蹟為一個整體：上帝救贖性的臨在、救贖
性的話語和救贖性的作為。（參弗蘭姆著《神學認識論》所講述的三個範疇：
準則性、處境性及存在性。）每一種啟示的方式（mode）都預設了另外兩
種啟示方式。上帝的話語解釋祂的作為；而上帝的話語和作為，則對祂的顯
現（上帝住在人間）賦予重要的意義（IST, 119）。這種對救贖性作為的強
調，使我們不至墮進「假理性主義」之中（IST, 130）。我們的需要不僅僅
是資料的缺乏；我們所需要的，是人性的改變。
Special revelation consists not only of inspired words, but also of revelatory
deeds. Van Til sees an organic relation in Scripture between theophany,
prophecy, and miracle: God’s saving presence, saving words, and saving deeds.
(Cf. the categories “normative,” “situational,” and “existential in my DKG – John
Fame.) Each mode of revelation presupposes the other two. God’s words
interpret his deeds, and both “give significance to God’s dwelling with man
(theophany).” (IST, 119.) The emphasis on saving deeds keep us from “false
intellectualism;” (IST, 130) our need is not a mere lack of information, but a
need for personal change.
「上帝的話語與祂的作為同工；上帝的作為與祂的話語同工。」（IST, 131）
透過這兩種形式，上帝親自來到我們中間，拯救我們脫離罪惡。在不瞭解所
有三種啟示方式的情況下﹐我們不可能認識其中任何一種方式，這又是另一
種視角性（perspectival）的關係。
“The words corroborate the deeds and the deeds corroborate the words.” (IST,
131.) And in the two, God himself comes to us to save us from our sin. We
cannot know one form of revelation without knowing all of them – another
“perspectival” relationship.

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V. 《聖經》
SCRIPTURE
1. 《聖經》的觀念與《聖經》的信息是不可分開的
Idea of Scripture, Message of Scripture: Inseparable
范泰爾這樣評價凱伯與巴文克的聖經觀：「他們的觀點何等基要！何等寬
廣！他們說，《聖經》的觀念（idea of Scripture）永遠不可與《聖經》的信
息分開！」（JA, 8；參 CTK, 31, 33，范泰爾在其中提到「《聖經》事實和《聖
經》內容兩個觀念的相輔相成性（interdependence）」。）「分開」（separation）
在神學上是一個微妙的觀念，有人曾用這個「觀念與信息」的關係來批評正
統的聖經觀。例如：有人會說，因為《聖經》的信息關乎救贖，因此，《聖
經》的無誤性應該侷限於狹義性的救贖範圍；這樣，我們就可以容許《聖經》
在論及其他事物時出現錯誤。可是當范泰爾討論這些問題時，卻對「《聖經》
的觀念」（idea of Scripture）和「《聖經》的信息」（message of Scripture）
持有不同的看法。對范氏來說，《聖經》的信息是上帝賜予人的恩典信息（話
語）；這位上帝是一位完全掌權、並以絕對權威說話的上帝。如果《聖經》
就是這「話語」，那麼，它必定傳遞了上帝至高的權威，因此，在任何事物
的記載上都應無謬無誤。范泰爾支持華爾非德的聖經觀：
Speaking of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s views of Scripture, Van Til remarks, “How
basic and how broad was their view! The idea of Scripture, they said, must
never be separated from its message.” (JA, 8; cf. CTK, 31, 33, where Van Til
speaks of the “interdependence of the idea of the fact and the content of
Scripture.”) “Separation” is a tricky word in theology, and some have used this
idea-message relationship to criticize orthodox views of Scripture. For example,
the claim is sometimes made that because the message of Scripture deals with
salvation, the idea of Scripture must limit inerrancy to matters of salvation
narrowly defined, thus allowing for errors when Scripture speaks of other things.
Van Til, however, comes to these questions with a different concept of both the
idea and the message of Scripture. The message of Scripture, for Van Til, is a
message of grace from a God who is absolutely sovereign and speaks with
absolute authority. If Scripture is this Word, then it must convey his ultimate
authority and therefore be inerrant in all matters. Van Til describes Warfield
with approval as holding that
古典基督教「《聖經》無誤默示」的教義與「上帝主權」的教義有著密
切的關係。上帝若不能在對人啟示自己時掌主權，祂就不可能在指揮人
類──有理性靈魂的人──的時候掌主權。上帝若在「存有」的領域中
掌主權，那麼，祂當然也在知識的範圍裏掌主權（IW, 3）。
The classical doctrine of the infallible inspiration of Scripture was involved
in the doctrine of divine sovereignty. God could not be sovereign in his
disposition of rational human beings if he were not also sovereign in his
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revelation of himself to them. If God is sovereign in the realm of being, he
is surely also sovereign in the realm of knowledge. (IW, 3.)
我們是從《聖經》來認識這位掌主權的上帝，這是《聖經》信息的一部份。
可是，當我們認識這樣的一位上帝的時候，我們會意識到，「這樣的一位上
帝必須自我表明；這樣的一位上帝也會指明宇宙中所有事實的真相。藉著指
明宇宙中的所有事實，祂就為這些事實建立彼此間的相互關係。」（CTK, 28。
參 IW, 1）
We learn of this sovereign God from Scripture; this is part of its message. But
when we learn of such a God, we realize that “such a God must identify himself.
Such a God … identifies all the facts of the universe. In identifying all the facts of
the universe he sets these facts in relation to one another.” (CTK, 28. Cf. IW, 1.)
因此，上帝的話（表明祂自己權威性的救贖應許）必須是自證的。《聖經》
就是這話，並不需要在它之外的引證來證實它；事實上這樣的證實是不可能
的，除非這個外來的證實已服在《聖經》的解釋與評估之下（參范泰爾在
RP, 37 的論據）。
Thus, a word of God, giving his own authoritative promise of redemption, must
be self-attesting. Scripture, as that Word, needs no corroboration from any
source outside itself; and no such corroboration is possible, unless the other
source is already subject to the interpretation and evaluation of Scripture. (Cf.
Van Til’s argument in RP, 37.)
《聖經》若是自我見證的，那麼，它必具有傳統的屬性：必須性、權威性、
清晰性和足夠性。范泰爾對這些屬性的解釋如下：
If Scripture is self-attesting, then it bears the traditional attributes – necessity,
authority, perspicuity, and sufficiency – which Van Til expounds as follows:
上帝默示了《聖經》，是祂筆之於書的話語；因為若任憑罪人自由發展下去，
他們「必定會曲解上帝救贖的作為」（IST, 133）。因此，《聖經》是必須
的，以致於上帝救贖的信息能夠：「（一）歷代保存，（二）傳到地極，（三）
客觀地向人傳講，（四）在《聖經》裏面見證它的真實性。」（IST,134）
God inspired Scripture as his written Word, because sinful man, if left on his
own, “would be sure to misinterpret” (IST, 133) the saving deeds of God. Thus,
there was the necessity for Scripture, so that God’s saving message “(1) might
remain through the ages, (2) might reach all mankind, (3) might be offered to
men objectively, and (4) might have the testimony of its truthfulness within
itself.” (IST, 134.)
《聖經》也帶有權威，因為它在本質上就是上帝的話語，必然要向人類所宣
稱的自主性發出挑戰。上帝的話必然傳達上帝的絕對權威，這是上帝的宣
稱，宣告上帝在人身上的主權。
Scripture also has authority, because, of its very nature, it must challenge man’s
claim to autonomy. It must convey God’s claim to absolute authority – his
lordship over man.
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《聖經》的清晰性是指：不需要「人間的解釋者介入《聖經》和它的受眾之
間」（IST, 135）。教會的教師或許能在理解《聖經》方面給予我們有用的
輔助；可是羅馬天主教卻錯誤地宣稱：「任何教會的信眾都不可以直接為自
己解釋《聖經》。」（IST, 135）否認《聖經》的清晰性，就等於否認《聖
經》的權威；因為如果「人間的教導權威」對「正確地使用《聖經》」是必
須的話，那麼，這位人間權威就成了教會的最高權威。
The perspicuity of Scripture means that there is no “necessity for human
interpreters to intervene between Scripture and those to whom Scripture
comes.” (IST, 135.) Teachers of the church may give us useful assistance in
understanding Scripture, but Roman Catholic theology is wrong to claim that
“no ordinary member of the Church may interpret Scripture for himself
directly.” (IST, 135.) To deny the clarity of Scripture is to deny its authority, for if
a human teaching authority is necessary for the proper use of Scripture, then
that human authority becomes the ultimate authority in the church.
因此，人的意見不可加在《聖經》之上，成為與《聖經》地位同等的權威。
換言之，《聖經》是足夠的。范泰爾說，宗教改革的領袖們相信《聖經》的
足夠性，「因而特別反對所有的宗派主義（sectarianism）；相信《聖經》的
清晰性，因而反對教權主義（clericalism）；相信《聖經》的必須性，因而
反對理性主義；相信《聖經》的權威性，因而反對人的自主性。」（IST, 136）
范泰爾以他特有的角度繼續說道：
Thus, no human opinion may be added to Scripture as an authority coordinate
with Scripture. In other words, Scripture has sufficiency. The Reformers, says
Van Til, thought of sufficiency “particularly in opposition to all manner of
sectarianism, as they thought of perspicuity chiefly in opposition to clericalism,
as they thought of necessity in opposition to rationalism, and as they thought
of authority in opposition to autonomy.” (IST, 136.) Characteristically, he adds:
這些要點全都相互重疊、彼此包含，這是適當的。《聖經》四項屬性的
重要性彼此相等，因為若缺少一樣，我們就會失去全部。問題的癥結在
於：一個絕對真確的解釋，進入了一個充滿著錯誤解釋的世界裏（IST,
136）。
All these matters overlap and are involved in one another, and it is well to
see that they do. The four attributes of Scripture are equally important
because, if we did not have them all, we would have none. The whole
matter centers about an absolutely true interpretation that came into a
world full of false interpretation. (IST, 136.)
所以，這四項屬性也是「視角」！
The four attributes, too, are “perspectives.”
這個論證總體的重點是：如果《聖經》自證它是上帝的話，信徒與上帝的啟
示之間就「不能混入人的解釋」（IST, 136）。有人可能會在這一點上提出
異議：人的解釋豈不是總會混雜在《聖經》的研究中嗎？正如范泰爾也意識
到的，在研究《聖經》的過程中，我們必須使用自己的感知與理性。范泰爾
在這裏肯定會提出他對普遍啟示和特殊啟示「視角式」的分析：在解釋《聖
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經》的工作上，我們的理性、感知和方法都必須遵從《聖經》。[若有人提
出循環論證的問題，請參看本書（CVT）第 10 章和第 22 章。] 范泰爾所反
對的「混雜」，按我（弗蘭姆）的判斷，不是指「服在《聖經》管理下的理
性」，而是指「自我標榜為終極權威，並且叛逆地曲解真理的理性」。
The overall argument here is that if Scripture is the self-attesting Word of God,
there must be “no admixture of human interpretation” standing between the
believer and the revelation. (IST, 136.) It might be objected at this point that an
“admixture of human interpretation” always does intervene in our study of
Scripture, since, as Van Til recognizes, we must use our own senses and reason
in that process. Here, Van Til would doubtless refer to his perspectival analysis
of general and special revelation: in the work of Bible interpretation, our reason,
senses, and methods must themselves be brought into conformity to Scripture.
[For the issue of circularity which arises here, see chaps. 10 and 22 (CVT).] The
“admixture” to which Van Til objects, in my judgment, is not an admixture in
which human reason is governed by Scripture, but one in which that reason
asserts its own ultimacy and rebelliously distorts the truth.
那麼，就算是信徒研讀《聖經》，不也同樣會有一些罪性的歪曲嗎？是的。
不過，信徒研讀《聖經》的目標，是想要瞭解《聖經》本身的教導。即使我
們是使用自己的能力去解釋《聖經》，但《聖經》卻永遠站在我們之上，不
斷向我們罪性的歪曲提出挑戰。《聖經》必須是上帝純粹、自證的話，本身
毫無罪性的歪曲，才能對我們發出這樣的挑戰。
Is there not some sinful distortion even in the believer’s study of Scripture? Yes.
But the goal of the believer’s study is to understand the teaching of the Word
itself. Although we use our own faculties to interpret Scripture, it always stands
over against us, challenging our sinful distortions. And to do that, Scripture itself
must be God’s pure, self-attesting Word, itself free from sinful distortion.
范泰爾在回應 A. E. Taylor 的時候，討論了這問題，後者對正統基督教聖經觀

的基本異議是：「領受權威性信息的人，若在領受的過程中有建設性作為，
那麼，就不可能有絕對權威的存在。」（IST, 139）可是，這項異議對人類
心智中「詮釋的功能」所作的假設是：
Van Til discusses this issue in dealing with A.E. Taylor, whose objections to the
orthodox view of Scripture amounts to this: “There can be no authority which is
absolute, if the one who receives the message of authority is, in any way,
constructive in the reception of it.” (IST, 139. I am not clear as to why the last
three words are emphasized – John Frame.) This objection assumes, however,
that the interpretive activity of the human mind is
人類的詮釋功能是獨立於上帝心意之外的解釋行為。人若以這樣的錯誤
假設為起點，當然不可能想像上帝在人之上的絕對權威；除非，人的心
智活動完全停止。（IST, 139）
something independent of the interpretive activity of the divine mind.
And if one starts with such a false assumption it is but to be expected that
one cannot think of the absolute authority of God over man unless man’s
mental activity is brought to a complete standstill. (IST, 139.)
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可是，根據基督教的信仰立場，當上帝創造人類的心智時，並沒有使它獨立
於上帝之外。我會這麼解釋：當人的心智否定了自己的自主性，轉而效法上
帝的思維去思維（類比性思維）時，它就能盡職地把解釋的工作做到最好。
罪（人的自主性）若進入信徒的思想裏，他和聖靈要勝過的是這「罪」，而
非其他。
On a Christian basis, however, the human mind was not made to be
independent of the divine. I would paraphrase: the human mind does its best
job of interpreting when it denies its own autonomy and “thinks analogically.” If
sin enters into the believer’s thought, it is sin that he and the Holy Spirit are
overcoming.

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VI. 《聖經》的原本
THE AUTOGRAPHA
我將不會處理范泰爾對「羅馬天主教的聖經觀」和「假神秘主義」的回應，他
的立場頗為傳統（IST, 140-145）。我也不會討論范氏有關「《聖經》是完全（逐
字）默示而成」的論證（這也很傳統）（IST, 148-158）。
I will not deal with Van Til’s rather traditional responses to the views of Scripture
of Roman Catholicism and “false mysticism,” (IST, 140-145) or with his scriptural
argument, also traditional, for plenary inspiration. (IST, 148-158)
可是范泰爾對《聖經》原本（autographa）的看法，會與我們的討論有關係。
傳統的改革宗神學立場認為，「《聖經》無謬誤」（infallibility）是指上帝直
接默示的原本，而不是泛指每一本抄本。有許多人抗議說，假如真是這樣，那
麼，今天我們手上的《聖經》就不是無謬誤的了（infallible）。《聖經》原本
既然已經失傳，實際上我們就沒有無謬誤的文本；那麼，我們的立場與自由派
神學又有甚麼兩樣？我們手上的《聖經》也只不過是「基本上可靠」（reasonably
reliable），而不是「無謬無誤」的，不是嗎？
His discussion of the “autographa” is, however, of some interest to us. Traditional
Reformed theology has argued that the infallibility of Scripture pertains strictly,
not to every copy of Scripture, but to the autographs, the original manuscripts,
which God directly inspired. Many have objected that if that is true, our present
copies of Scripture are not infallible. And since the original manuscripts are lost,
we have in fact no infallible text, and our position is no different from that of
liberalism. Are we not, then, left with a Bible that is not infallible but only
“reasonably reliable”?
范泰爾用一條稍微被水淹沒的橋來說明他的回應：
To answer this objection, Van Til employs the illustration of a bridge covered
somewhat by a flooding river:
只要水底下的根基穩固，把車開在幾寸深的水上，相對來說還算容易。但
是，若相信「《聖經》『大致可靠』（general trustworthiness），而不是
『無謬誤地默示』（infallible inspiration）」，就等於是在說：「我們車底
下有沒有穩固的根基並不重要，因為無論如何我們都必須把車從水裏開過
去。」但是我們已經看見，人需要絕對權威性的解釋。因此，《聖經》的
原本若不是無謬誤地默示，那麼，人的解釋在某方面將會站在上帝的解釋
之上。也就是說，
《聖經》中所宣稱的事實和對這些事實的解釋是否為真？
人終歸沒有把握（IST, 153）。
We can drive with comparative ease in water that is a few inches deep as
long as we have a solid bottom under the water. What the idea of general
trustworthiness without infallible inspiration does in effect is to say that it
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really makes no difference whether there is a solid bottom under us,
inasmuch as we have to drive through water in any case. But we have seen
that man needs absolutely authoritative interpretation. Hence, if the
autograph were not infallibly inspired, it would mean that at some point
human interpretation would stand above divine interpretation. It would
mean that men were, after all, not certain that the facts and the
interpretations given to the facts in Scripture are true. (IST, 153.)
在《基督教知識論》（A Christian Theory of Knowledge）一書中，范泰爾訴諸

上帝的主權來回應這個問題：
In A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Van Til responds to the same issue by
appealing to divine sovereignty:
除非人類的歷史是由上帝掌管，否則，人類歷史中就沒有「合理的可靠」
（reasonably reliable）方法可以辨認出上帝的話。…獨立於《聖經》之外
的思索，不可能得出這樣一個有關上帝的理念。…這位上帝必須介紹祂自
己的身分（identify himself）。……相信這樣的一位上帝、持守這樣的歷史
觀，必須先預設無謬誤的《聖經》；相信無謬誤的《聖經》，也必須預設
上帝是掌主權的上帝，歷史是由上帝掌管（CTK, 28；參 IW, 44）。
There would be no reasonably reliable method of identifying the Word of
God in human history unless human history itself is controlled by God. … It is
impossible to attain the idea of such a God by speculation independently of
Scripture. … Such a God must identify himself. … Such a view of God and
human history is both presupposed by, and in turn presupposes, the idea of
the infallible Bible. (CTK, 28; cf. IW, 44.)
《基督教知識論》裏的這段話很具啟發性，但是卻有幾分誨澀難懂。不過，這
兩段話的要旨乃是：除非上帝在時間、空間裏曾經賜下無謬誤的啟示，而且這
個啟示在原則上可以為人所認識（例如透過文本批判），否則，我們就不可能
接近上帝純粹的話語，更不可能對救恩、甚至對任何事物有把握。誠然，若沒
有上帝無謬誤的話語，我們就會知道《聖經》中的上帝並不存在。因為《聖經》
中的上帝確確實實是一位用權威向我們說話的上帝，這是上帝曉諭祂僕人的唯
一方式。
The passage in A Christian Theory of Knowledge is suggestive, but somewhat
obscure. The upshot of these two passages, however, is that unless the infallible
revelation has been given somewhere in space and time, and thus is accessible in
principle to human knowledge (e.g., by textual criticism), then we have no access
to the pure Word of God. And without that, there can be no certainty about
salvation, or, for that matter, about anything else. Indeed, without such a Word,
we would know that the biblical God does not exist. For the biblical God is one
who does address us authoritatively. That is the only way in which the Lord can
address his servants.
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因此，若沒有這樣無謬誤的話語，就沒有上帝。若沒有上帝，就沒有所謂「合
理的可靠」的事物。沒有上帝，萬物就是偶然與混沌。
Therefore, if there is no such Word, there is no God. And if there is no God, there
is no such thing as “reasonable reliability.” Without God, all is chance, chaos.

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VII. 《聖經》的範圍
THE SCOPE OF SCRIPTURE
如果（一位掌權的）上帝確實存在，並且藉著祂無謬誤的話語啟示了自己，那
麼，宇宙中所有的意義與可知性（intelligibility）都來自祂。祂的話──《聖經》
──和宇宙中所有的意義都會有關連。這裏的意思是：《聖經》的啟示範圍是
宇宙性的，雖然「有限的無誤論者」和其他人士不願承認。《聖經》「論及萬
事」（speaks of everything）。范泰爾解釋道：
If that God does exist, revealing himself by his infallible Word, then all meaning
and intelligibility in the universe is due to him. And his Word, Scripture, is relevant
to all meaning in the universe. This means, contrary to “limited inerrantists” and
others, that the scope of Scripture is universal. It “speaks of everything.” Van Til
explains:
我們的意思不是說《聖經》直接論及了足球比賽、原子等事物；不過我們
堅持，《聖經》直接或間接地論及了萬事。《聖經》不只向我們啟示了基
督和祂的救贖大工，也告訴我們上帝是怎樣的一位上帝、宇宙從哪裏來。
《聖經》不只寫下歷史，也給我們一套歷史哲學。不但如此，《聖經》在
這些問題上所提供的資料，也被編織成一個不可分割的整體。除非你拒絕
《聖經》是上帝的話，否則你不可能把《聖經》中所謂「宗教」和「道德」
的教導，與其他方面──例如：物質的宇宙──的教導分開（DF2, 8）。
We do not mean that it speaks of football games, of atoms, etc., directly, but
we do mean that it speaks of everything either directly or indirectly. It tells us
not only of the Christ and his work but it also tells us who God is and whence
the universe has come. It gives us a philosophy of history as well as history.
Moreover, the information on these subjects is woven into an inextricable
whole. It is only if you reject the Bible as the Word of God that you can
separate its so-called religious and moral instruction from what it says, e.g.,
about the physical universe. (DF2, 8.)
《聖經》「屹立在我們面前，有如一道光，使得被造宇宙中所有的事實，都必
須根據它來解釋。」（DF2, 107；參 CA, 23-29）
The Bible “stands before us as the light in terms of which all the facts of the
created universe must be interpreted.”(DF2, 107; cf. CA, 23-29.)
正如我前文指出的，很多神學家基於自己對《聖經》信息本質的看法，而試圖
證明《聖經》的範圍只限於狹窄的所謂「宗教關懷」。范泰爾在這方面對教會
作出了巨大的貢獻。他重新思想《聖經》信息的本質，並且得出結論：當《聖
經》的信息被正確理解時，我們就必定會在上帝的話語裏，看到一個沒有範圍
限制的信息；同時也會看見《聖經》是終極的權威。范泰爾的結論誠然是正確
的。
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As I indicated at the beginning of this section, many theologians tried to show,
based on the nature of Scripture’s message, that the scope of Scripture is limited
to certain areas of narrowly religious concern. Van Til has done the church a great
service here: he has rethought the nature of Scripture’s message and has
concluded, rightly, that when that message is properly understood, it will require
us to find in God’s Word a message of unlimited scope, together with ultimate
authority.
因此，范泰爾發揚了凱伯的偉大異象：將人生的一切範圍服在基督的統管之下
（參林前 10:31；林後 10:5）。畢竟，《聖經》確實論及了心理學、邏輯、數
學、歷史、科學、藝術、政治、經濟等，而不是只講論狹義的神學課題。很不
幸的是，許多凱伯的跟隨者認為《聖經》的範圍相當狹窄，因此，若要改革社
會，基本上必須忽略《聖經》的教導，雖然他們也承認《聖經》能激勵我們朝
著正確的方向前進。相反，范泰爾卻揭開了《聖經》的偉大能力，不只使人們
重生，還教導他們如何改變社會與文化。
Thus Van Til unleashes the great vision of Kuyper, to bring all areas of human life
under the sway of Christ (see I Cor. 10:31; 2 Cor. 10:5). Scripture does, after all,
talk about psychology, logic, mathematics, history, science, art, philosophy,
politics, economics, etc., as well as the narrowly theological disciplines. Many of
Kuyper’s followers have unfortunately argued that Scripture has a narrow scope
and that our desire to reform society must therefore largely ignore the teachings
of the Bible, although Scripture may motivate us in a useful direction. Van Til, on
the contrary, opens up the great power of Scripture, not only to regenerate
people, but also to instruct them for social and cultural change.
林前 10:31
所以，你們或喫或喝，無論作甚麼，都要為榮耀神而行。
林後 10:5
將各樣的計謀，各樣攔阻人認識神的那些自高之事，一概攻破了，又將人所有的心意奪回，
使他都順服基督。
這並不意味范泰爾是一位狹隘的聖經主義者。我們已經看見，對范泰爾來說，
上帝的啟示是一個有機體，特殊啟示和普遍啟示必須連在一起理解。我們也看
到，范泰爾不相信人的解釋可以使上帝話語的權柄變得相對。確切地說，上帝
呼召我們使用我們最好的恩賜，去將祂的話語應用在一切事物上；祂也應許，
若我們致力於謙卑地服在《聖經》之下，並試圖去應用《聖經》，這樣的努力
必定會結實累累。
This does not mean that Van Til is a narrow Biblicist. We have seen that for Van Til,
revelation is an organism, that special and general revelation must be taken
together. Van Til, as we have seen, does not believe that the presence of human
interpretation relativizes the authority of the Word of God. Rather, God calls us to
apply our best gifts toward applying his Word to all matters, and he promises that
such efforts, humbly subject to that very Word we seek to apply, will be fruitful.

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第十章預設的問題
PRESUPPOSITIONS
I. 范泰爾是一位預設主義者嗎？
IS VAN TIL A PRESUPPOSITIONALIST?
有些讀者或會覺得奇怪，本書前面九章完全沒有集中討論「預設」這個觀念，
但對范泰爾護教學最普遍的稱謂，卻是「預設主義」，不是嗎？
Some readers will be amazed that nine chapters of this book have passed without
any concentrated attention being given to the concept of presupposition. After all,
the most common name given to Van Til’s apologetic is “presuppositionalist.”
1. 范泰爾很少自稱預設主義者
Van Til Seldom Designate Himself Presuppositionalist
其實范泰爾本人很少用「預設主義」這個觀念。首先，他沒有標榜自己的護
教學為「預設派」，雖然他有時並不介意別人這樣稱呼他的護教學。……
Van Til himself used the concept rather sparingly. For one thing, he did not
voluntarily characterize his apologetic as “presuppositionalist,” although he did
sometimes accommodate the use of that term by others. In discussing Floyd
Hamilton’s critique of his apologetics, he uses the term, sometimes in quotes,
sometimes without, to allude to Hamilton’s phraseology. (CTK, 255-272.) He
uses it similarly in connection with James Oliver Buswell, (CTK, 273-309) who
claimed to have invented it to describe Van Til’s position. (CTK, 276.)
2. 哲學歷史中的先驗和後驗
A Priori and A Posteriori in the History of Philosophy
說起來，若論及此一概念的歷史，將范泰爾稱為「預設派」可能會有些許誤
導。這個歷史可以簡短總結為：自從古希臘以來，西方的哲學家一直關心先
驗（a priori）與後驗（a posteriori）知識之間的關係。[比較本書（CVT）第
5 章「宇宙中的事實與定律」的相關討論。] 後驗的知識乃是從經驗吸取的
知識；先驗的知識則獨立於經驗之外，不靠經驗而得。先驗的知識會被我們
帶入經驗當中，用以分析和評價我們的經驗。
For another thing, it is somewhat misleading to call Van Til a presuppositionalist,
in view of the history of the concept. To summarize that history briefly: Western
philosophers since the ancient Greeks have been concerned with the
relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. [Compare this
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discussion with the discussion of laws and facts in chap. 5 (CVT). The same
fundamental issues are found here, but with different terminology.] A posteriori
knowledge is knowledge gained from experience. A priori knowledge is
knowledge possessed independently of experience – that knowledge which we
bring to our experience in order to analyze and evaluate it.
3. 先驗的意義：獨立於經驗之外，不是時間上的先前
The Priority of A Priori Not Temporal Priority: Independence of Experience
[先驗的意思是「從先前而來」，聽起來像是時間上的先前。有些哲學家宣
稱，嬰孩生來就有先驗的知識，也許是「種子」的形式。可是先驗知識並不
一定在時間上先於經驗。重要的是，先驗知識相對於經驗是獨立的，它是分
析經驗和評價經驗的準則。我們對「預設」也必須如此理解。預設不是在我
們相信任何事物之前（時間上的「之前」）必須先有的信念；確切地說，預
設乃是獨立於其他知識的信念，並且在某程度上左右其他的知識。不少范泰
爾的批判者並沒有掌握這一點。]
[A priori means literally “from before,” suggesting temporal priority. Some
philosophers may have claimed that infants are born with a priori knowledge,
perhaps in “seed form.” But a priori knowledge does not necessarily precede
experience in time. The important thing is that a priori knowledge is
independent of experience, and that it serves as a criterion for analyzing and/or
evaluating it. The same point must be made regarding presuppositions. A
presupposition is not a belief that one must have before (temporally speaking)
one comes to believe in other things; rather, it is a belief that is independent of
some other knowledge and governs that knowledge to some extent. Many
critics of Van Til have erred at this point.]
4. 後驗的哲學家：洛克等
Philosophers of A Posteriori: Locke et al
有些哲學家的論調是：我們所有的知識都是後驗的，人的心智開始時像白紙
一張（blank slate──洛克），要讓經驗書寫於其上。但是我們知道有些知
識確實不是從經驗而來，例如「二乘二等於四」這個命題，在宇宙中任何一
個地方都是必然的；然而，這個命題卻不像是可以從經驗中導出的結果。
Some philosophers have tried to make the case that all our knowledge is a
posteriori – that the mind begins as a “blank slate” (Locke) to be written on by
experience. But we know some things that do not seem to be derived from
experience. For example, the proposition that two times two is four –
necessarily and everywhere in the universe – does not seem to be derivable
from any experience.
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5. 先驗的哲學家：柏拉圖等
Philosophers of A Priori: Plato et al
又有些哲學家，如柏拉圖和 Gordon Clark，宣稱所有知識都是先驗的，意指

我們的經驗不能帶來真知識，最多只能提醒我們天生就已經知道的事情。但
這種宣稱似乎賦予心智絕對的自由，使理性免去「符合我們共有經驗」的責
任。
Others, like Plato, and perhaps Gordon Clark, have claimed that all knowledge is
a priori, and that experience gives us no real knowledge, but at best reminds us
of what we know innately. But such a claim seems to give the mind free rein,
removing its responsibility to conform itself to the world of our common
experience.
6. 先驗與後驗兼顧的哲學家：亞理斯多德等
Philosophers Blending A Priori and A Posteriori: Aristotle et al
很多哲學家介於兩種極端之間，如亞理斯多德，他們的立場是：人的知識具
有先驗和後驗兩種元素。經驗是知識的必要成份，但是經驗必須被概念化、
被分析，並且根據人類心智中已有的先驗觀念，才能加以有系統的闡述。然
而，事實卻證明，我們卻很難將意識中的「純」先驗元素與「純」後驗元素
區分開來，原因在本書（CVT）第五章討論過。
Many philosophers in between these extremes, such as Aristotle, have argued
that knowledge has both a priori and a posteriori elements. Experience is a
necessary ingredient in knowledge, but that experience must be conceptualized,
analyzed, and formulated by a priori concepts already in the mind. However, it
has proved very difficult to distinguish purely a priori elements from purely a
posteriori elements in our consciousness, for reasons such as those discussed in
chapter 5 (CVT).
無論如何，先驗知識（獨立於經驗之外而又左右經驗）這個觀念，自古以來
就是哲學討論的課題。而「預設」這個名詞，雖然近兩個世紀才為哲學家們
普遍使用，但卻吸收了許多哲學家在討論先驗時試圖關注的意義。
In any case, the notion of a priori knowledge, gained to some extent
independently of experience and governing experience, has been a staple of
philosophical discussion for centuries. The term presupposition, although its
common philosophical use dates back two centuries, captures much of the
meaning that philosophers have sought to include under the label a priori.
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7. 康德反對休謨的經驗主義和萊布尼茲的理性主義
發展超驗哲學（探索知識的條件）
Immanuel Kant vs. Hume’s Empiricism and Leibniz’s Rationalism;
Develops Transcendental Method (Conditions of Knowledge)
康德（1724-1804）所面對的困擾是：強調後驗知識的經驗主義（empiricism）
導致了休謨筆下的懷疑主義（skepticism ）；強調先驗知識的理性主義
（rationalism）又導致萊布尼茲和其他哲學家筆下毫無經驗基礎的無理據思
辨。康德發展出超驗方法論（transcendental method）來取代實驗主義與理
性主義。[范泰爾也把他的方法稱為「超驗」（SCE,10-13），我將會把此一
概念與范氏「支援基督教的論證」放在一起討論，特別是在本書（CVT）第
23 章。]
Immanual Kant (1724-1804) was troubled that empiricism (emphasizing a
posteriori knowledge) was leading to skepticism in the writings of David Hume,
while rationalism (emphasizing a priori knowledge) was, in the writings of G.W.
Leibniz and others, producing implausible speculations without any grounding
in experience. As an alternative to both empiricism and rationalism, Kant
developed a “transcendental method.” [Van Til also called his method
“transcendental” (SCE, 10-13). I shall discuss that concept in connection with his
“Argument for Christianity,” especially in chap. 23 (CVT).]
與經驗主義者一樣，康德否認我們無需透過經驗就能擁有世界本身（in itself）
的先驗知識。不過他也同意理性主義的說法：如果我們想要理解經驗，那麼，
我們必須首先具備某種先驗的知識；並且，藉著提出「意義與合理性
（rationality）的先決條件是甚麼？」此一問題，這種先驗知識就能夠「超
驗」地被發現。換言之，即使知識是可能的，那麼，甚麼是必須先被我們預
設為「真」的呢？康德的結論是：我們必須對時間、空間和一些範疇（例如
一、眾、因、果等等）作出某些假設──這些範疇會被人的心智應用在經驗
上。
Like the empiricists, Kant denied that we have a priori knowledge of the world
“in itself” apart from our experience. But he also agreed with the rationalists
that some kind of a priori knowledge was necessary if we are to make any sense
out of experience. That a priori knowledge was discovered “transcendentally,”
that is, by asking, What are the preconditions of meaning and rationality?
Granting that knowledge is possible, in other words, what must we presuppose
to be true? Kant concluded that we must make certain assumptions about
space and time and about the “categories” (unity, plurality, cause, effect, etc.)
that the mind applies to experience.
8. 康德之後的理想主義（唯心哲學）
Idealism After Kant
德國的理想（唯心）主義（Fichte、Schelling、黑格爾）和英國的理想主義（Green,
Bradley, Bosanquet）繼承了康德的超驗方法，可是他們對知識的先決條件
（preconditions）卻持有不同的結論。在理想主義的作品中，預設變成了一
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個常見的哲學名詞。范泰爾的博士論文主題是討論「理想主義的上帝觀」；
因此，「預設」一詞無疑是借用自理想主義，雖然范氏對理想主義本身大致
上是採取嚴厲批判的態度。
Idealism in Germany (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) and Britain (Green, Bradley,
Bosanquet) continued Kant’s transcendental approach, although it reached
different conclusions about the preconditions of knowledge. It was in the
idealist literature that presupposition became a common philosophical term.
Van Til wrote his doctoral dissertation on the idealist concept of God, and,
doubtless, picked up the term from that school of thought, even though he was
very critical of idealism in general.
9. 重視預設的 20 世紀哲學家
20th Century Philosophers Who Place Premium on Presuppositions
雖然理想主義對二十世紀哲學的影響已經漸趨式微，但無論有否使用「預設」
這個字眼，其他學派仍然注重此一觀念在人類知識中的重要性。現象學者和
存在主義學者強調「生命世界」（life world）的重要性；這個生命世界就是
指日常生活經驗的世界，它為純理論的活動提供了預設。
Through the twentieth century, idealist influence on philosophy has waned, but
others have emphasized the importance of presuppositions in human
knowledge, with or without using the term. Phenomenologists and
existentialists have emphasized the importance of the “life world,” the world of
ordinary experience, which supplies the presuppositions for theoretical activity.
維根斯坦說，接受「某種生活形式」（form of life）或「語言遊戲」（language
game）乃是先於接受「那種生活形式或語言遊戲中的知識」。科學哲學家
們經常強調科學理論的預設，例如博藍尼（Michael Polanyi）的「默認知識」
（tacit knowledge）和孔恩（Thomas Kuhn）的「典範」（paradigms）。
Ludwig Wittenstein taught that acceptance of a “form of life” or “language
game” was prior to knowledge of anything within that form of life or language
game. Philosophers of science have often emphasized the presuppositions of
scientific theorizing: e.g., Michael Polanyi’s “tacit knowledge” and Thomas
Kuhn’s “paradigms.”
馬克思主義者則堅持「委身於一個『生命計劃』或『實踐』（praxis）」要
先於所有的理論。
Marxists have insisted that commitment to a certain life-project or praxis is
prior to all theorizing.
有些詮釋理論學者強調「『先』委身於一個故事（story）」的必要性。解構
主義學者發現，人類溝通中存在著太多偏見，因此，在批判他們的人看來，
他們完全否認「語言具有客觀內容」的可能性，因而把語言完全約化為「預
設的斷言」。
Some hermeneutical theorists have emphasized the need of prior commitment
to a “story.” And deconstructionists have found so much bias in human
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communication that, in the view of their critics, they have entirely denied the
possibility of objective content in language, reducing language entirely to the
assertion of presuppositions.
10. 每一位哲學家都必須處理預設的問題，包括范泰爾或證據派的護教學家
Every Philosopher Must Deal with Presupposition, Including Van Til
顯然，二十世紀中每一位稱職的護教家都要嚴肅處理「預設」這個概念，將
預設和其他方面的人類知識區分出來，也要將自己的觀點和所有其他存在的
可能性區分出來。范泰爾接受了這個任務。不過，從這個角度來看，范泰爾
與其他護教家（包括證據派和古典派）並沒有甚麼兩樣。
Clearly, then, any twentieth-century apologist worth his salt would have to deal
in a serious way with the concept of presupposition, distinguishing it from other
aspects of human knowledge, and distinguishing his own view from the many
other possibilities available. Van Til undertook this task, but in this respect he
was no different form many other apologists, even from many who would
prefer to be called “evidentialists” or “classicists.”
11. 多馬．瑞德的「常識實在論」影響史鮑爾的古典派護教學
Thomas Reid’s Common Sense Realism Influences Sproul’s Classical
Apologetics
[多馬‧瑞德（Thomas Reid）是「常識實在論」（commonsense realism）的

創始人，他認為哲學必須作出一些常識上的預設，並且從嚴格意義上來講，
這些預設是不可證明的，例如感知經驗的可靠性、外在世界的真實性等。瑞
德的思想成為老普林斯頓學派（Old Princeton；譯注：如賀治 Charles Hodge、
華爾非德 B. B. Warfield）護教學的基礎，也以各種方式反映在當今福音派的
護教學中。
[Thomas Reid, the nineteenth-century founder of the school of philosophy
called Scottish commonsense realism, argued that philosophy must make
certain commonsense assumptions that are not strictly provable, such as the
reliability of sense experience and the reality of the world external to ourselves.
Reid’s thinking became the basis of the “Old Princeton” apologetic, and it is
reflected in many forms of evangelical apologetics today.
參閱 R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, Arthur Lindsley 等人的古典主義護教學的著

作，都採用這種預設基礎。我個人認為，他們遠不如范泰爾那麼清楚「預設」
在護教論證中如何運作。]
See appendix A, in which I indicate that the book Classical Apologetics, by R.C.
Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984)
claims this kind of presuppositoinal basis. In my estimation, however, they are
far less sophisticated than Van Til in their account of how presuppositions
function in apologetic argument.]
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無疑地，一個人對「知識的先決條件」的關懷，不能成為他被稱為「預設派」
的正當理由。
Certainly, one’s concern for the preconditions of knowledge does not in itself
justify one’s being labeled a presuppositoinalist.
12. 預設主義 = 先驗主義？

范泰爾不是這種預設派！
Presuppositionalism = A Priorism?
Van Til is Not Presuppositionalist in This Sense
「預設主義」這個標籤或許有「先驗主義」的意味：若不是否定後驗知識，
就是相對貶低後驗知識的重要性。從這個意義上來說，Gordon Clark 肯定是
一位預設主義者，他也喜歡被貼上這樣的標籤，他否認人可以從感知經驗中
學到任何事物。可是，范泰爾並不是這個意義上的預設主義者，范氏肯定經
驗性的、有事實根據的研究，並且相信有事實證據的研究對於護教學相當重
要。[參本書（CVT）第四部份「支援基督教的論證」18-24 章。另參 IST, 146-147;
SCE, 7-13。] 他的立場大致如下：
That label may connote a kind of apriorism, which either denies a posteriori
knowledge or minimizes its importance relative to the a priori. Gordon H. Clark
was certainly a presuppositionalist in this sense, and he welcomed that label. He
denied that anything could be learned from sense experience. But Van Til was
not an apriorist in this sense. He approved of empirical, factual study and
believed that the study of factual evidence was important to apologetics. [See
our later discussion of Van Til’s “Argument for Christianity” (CVT, pt. 4, chaps.
18-24). Some references on this point are IST, 146-147; SCE, 7-13.] In general,
he took this position:
我不會人為地將歸納法（induction）與演繹法（deduction）分開；也不
會將「對自然事實的推理」和「用先驗分析的方式推理人意識的本質」
這兩件事情分開。我不會人為地將它們彼此抽離或分隔。相反，我認為
歸納法與分析推理是同一個解釋過程的一部份。[DF1, 258。范泰爾隨後
為「歷史性的護教學」予以認可，並提出警告，他認為，關於「事實」
的討論，應該要包括「向非信徒看待『事實』的哲學（philosophy of fact）
發出挑戰」。]
I do not artificially separate induction from deduction, or reasoning about
the facts of nature from reasoning in a priori analytical fashion about the
nature of human consciousness. I do not artificially abstract or separate
them from one another. On the contrary I see induction and analytical
reasoning as part of one process of interpretation. (DF1, 258. This is
followed by an endorsement of “historical apologetics,” with the caveat
that discussions of fact should include challenges to the unbeliever’s
philosophy of fact.)
范泰爾甚至說（不是最謹慎的說法），人類「必須拒絕一切形式的先驗推理，
重新開始把自己建立在上帝的啟示上。」（IST, 170，對 Clark 的回應。正如
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我們所見，范泰爾回應 Clark 的時候容易失去平衡。顯然，范氏在這裏應該
反對的不是先驗思維本身，而是先驗主義的知識論、對後驗知識立場的否
認、或離開上帝啟示的先驗推理法。）
He even said, with somewhat less balance, that human beings “must reject
every form of a priori reasoning and base themselves upon the revelation of
God from the start.” (IST, 170, in response to Clark. As we have seen, Van Til
tended to “lose his balance” when he dealt with Clark. Surely he should have
objected here, not to a priori reasoning as such, but to apriorism as a theory of
knowledge, to the denial of a posteriori knowledge, or to a priori reasoning
apart from revelation.)
13. 范泰爾支持證據與預設、多元視角
Van Til Supports Evidence and Presupposition, Multiperspectivalism
我們已經看見，范泰爾的知識論是多元視角的（multiperspectival）：他試圖
在事實與定律之間取得平衡，也就是在上帝話語的啟示、上帝作為的啟示和
上帝同在的啟示之間取得平衡。他整理出從上帝、從世界與從人自己所得的
關於上帝、世界與人自己的啟示，並且發現它們之間相互依賴
（interdependent）。在類似的架構下，我們看見范泰爾也試圖在知識的先
驗元素與後驗元素之間取得平衡。三一真神不只是一，也不只是三，而是永
遠的三而一（three in one）。因此，被造的宇宙是一而眾（unity in plurality）、
定律中的事實（fact in law）、事實中的定律（law in fact）。純粹的先驗和
純粹的後驗並不存在。單單尋找任何一面都是枉然、敬拜偶像的，因為所尋
找的目標是離開上帝的絕對準則。因此，預設主義若意味著先驗主義，那麼，
范泰爾就不是一位預設主義者。
As we have seen, Van Til’s epistemology is multiperspectival: it seeks a balance
between facts and laws, a balance between revelation in word, act, and divine
presence. He coordinates revelation from and about God, the world, and the
self, and he finds them interdependent. Similarly, we see in this context that
Van Til seeks a balance between a priori and a posteriori elements in knowledge.
The Trinity is not a mere oneness or a mere threeness, but always three in one.
So the creation is unity in plurality, fact in law, law in fact. There is no pure a
priori or pure a posteriori. The search for either is fruitless and idolatrous, being
the search for an absolute criterion apart from God. Therefore, if
presuppositionalism denotes apriorism, Van Til is not a presuppositionalist.
14. 「范泰爾是預設派」的意義
In What Sense Van Til is a Presuppositionalist
然而，從另一個意義上來講，范泰爾可以被稱為預設主義者。他毫無疑問地
相信上帝的啟示是所有人類思維的絕對權威（因此也優先於人類思維）。我
們已經看見，他的「類比知識觀」要求我們「效法上帝的思維而思維」。我
們也看見，在范泰爾眼中，啟示必須是我們生命所有範疇中終極的真理準則。
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However, Van Til may be called a presuppositionalist in another sense. Certainly
he believed that God’s revelation has absolute authority (and thus a certain
priority) over all human thought. We have seen that his concept of analogical
knowledge requires us to “think God’s thoughts after him.” We have seen that,
in Van Til’s view, revelation must serve as our ultimate criterion of truth in all
areas of life.
在某種意義上，這個啟示賜給我們一先驗的知識，它左右我們對經驗的解
釋，這也是先驗知識的傳統功能之一。但有些啟示，我們是從經驗（後驗）
當中去發現的，這一點和傳統上對先驗知識的理解不同。我們透過閱讀《聖
經》（在聖靈的光照之下）、並透過觀察上帝在宇宙中和在我們身上的創造
作為來認識祂，也就是說，我們是透過經驗來領受啟示。因此，范泰爾才能
夠在前面的引文中，以鮮明的對比來描述「先驗思維」與「以上帝啟示為根
基的思維」。
This revelation is given to us a priori, in a sense. It governs our interpretation of
experience, and that is one traditional function of a priori knowledge. But we
discover it partly through our experience, unlike a priori knowledge in the
traditional sense. We learn about God by reading the Bible (under the
illumination of the Holy Spirit) and by observing his handiwork in creation and in
ourselves. That is, we receive revelation through experience. This is why Van Til
is able, in the previously quoted passage, to draw a sharp contrast between a
priori reasoning and basing ourselves upon the revelation of God.
因此，我們可以稱范泰爾為預設派，也可以不這麼稱呼他。但更重要的是要
去明白，范泰爾在甚麼意義上肯定了傳統哲學上的先驗主義，又在甚麼意義
上拒絕了它。
So, we may or may not choose to call Van Til a presuppositionalist. But it is
more important in either case to understand in what ways Van Til affirms, and
in what ways he rejects, traditional apriorism.

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II. 預設的意義
THE MEANING OF PRESUPPOSITION
1. 心中的堅持（委身）──弗蘭姆
Heart Commitment – Frame
范泰爾使用「預設」一詞，來指明上帝的啟示在人類思維中應當扮演的角色。
我相信他從來沒有為「預設」下過定義。我嘗試替他下這個定義：「預設」
是心中的基本堅持（basic heart commitment）。對基督徒來說，我們的堅
持（委身）是向著「在祂話語中啟示自己」的上帝。對非基督徒來說，他們
則用別的東西來取代，例如另一位神明、他們自己、歡樂、錢財、理性或其
他，這些東西成為他們生命終極委身的對象，不但掌控他們整個生命，也包
括他們的思想（DF2, 83, 216）。我們的終極委身在我們的知識（理性）中扮
演相當重要的角色，它決定了我們判斷真與假、對與錯的終極準則。我們只
要一致地堅持自己所委身的終極準則，就不能接受任何與它矛盾的「真理」。
Van Til uses the term presupposition to indicate the role that divine revelation
ought to play in human thought. I do not believe that he ever defines the term. I
have tried to define it for him as a “basic heart-commitment.” For the Christian,
that commitment is to God as he reveals himself in his Word. Non-Christians
substitute something else – another god, themselves, pleasure, money,
rationality, or whatever – as that to which they are ultimately committed and
that which governs all of life, including thought. (DF2, 83, 216.) Our ultimate
commitment plays an important role in our knowledge. It determines our
ultimate criteria of truth and falsity, right and wrong. As long as we consistently
maintain our ultimate commitment, we cannot accept anything as true or right
that conflicts with that commitment.
2. 非信徒無意中承認上帝存在，這是「預設」的另一種意義
Unbeliever (Unconsciously) Concede God Exists: A Different Presupposition
在范泰爾的著作中，有少數地方是以不同的方式來使用「預設」一詞。比方
說，他勸告護教者應該「向非基督徒表明，即使在他們對上帝的實質否定中，
他們依然真正地預設了上帝（he is still really presupposing God）。」
（CTK, 13）
顯然，當非基督徒在這種意義上預設上帝時，他並不承認上帝是他生命終極
委身的對象。范泰爾這裏的論點是：非基督徒藉著假設「宇宙可以被瞭解」
（intelligible），而默認了他所否認的上帝的存在。這是「預設」的次要意
義，這種次要意義與范泰爾的通常用法相關，卻又在某種程度上有所不同。
因為非基督徒在這層意義上「預設」上帝是違背其意願的；這就說明，在其
意識的某一層面上，他承認上帝的真實性與重要性。
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There are a few instances in Van Til’s writings in which he uses the term
presupposition differently. For example, he urges the apologist to show “the
non-Christian that even in his virtual negation of God, he is still really
presupposing God.” (CTK, 13.) Clearly, when the unbeliever “presupposes” God
in this sense, he is not acknowledging God as his ultimate commitment. Van
Til’s point here is that, in assuming the intelligibility of the world, the unbeliever
implicitly concedes the existence of the God he explicitly denies. This lesser
sense of presuppose is related to Van Til’s more common use of the term, but it
is somewhat different. For the unbeliever to presuppose God in this context is
for him to think, say, or do something, contrary to his own inclination, that
indicates at some level of his consciousness a recognition of God’s reality and
significance.
3. 預設事物：必須條件
Presupposing Things: A Necessary Condition
在范氏著作的某些地方，「預設」所指涉的對象並不是人，而是論據、方法、
知識、學科、事物的狀況（如宇宙的可知性 intelligibility）等等。[例如科學
（CA, 24）、對自己與事物的意識（DF2, 77）、方法（DF2, 100）。] 在這種
情形下，被預設的對象是一個必須的條件（a necessary condition）或使某事
物合法化的因素（legitimizer）。我們可以說：假定ｘ預設了ｙ，所以，一
個人如果要有意義地解釋ｘ，ｙ就必須是他委身（堅持）的對象。也許藉著
這個公式，我們就可以將「預設」的這一類用法，與范泰爾的基本定義連繫
起來。[關於范泰爾的「預設的思維方式」（reasoning by presupposition），
參本書（CVT）第 23 章。]
There are also passages in Van Til in which the word presuppose is used, not of
persons, but of things: arguments, methods, knowledge, academic disciplines,
states of affairs (like the intelligibility of the universe). [Examples: science (CA,
24), consciousness of self and objects (DF2, 77), and methods (DF2, 100).] In
such contexts, that which is presupposed is a necessary condition or that which
legitimizes. Perhaps we can relate these uses to our basic definition by saying
that if x presupposes y, then y is that to which a person must be committed if he
is to give an intelligible account of x. [For Van Til’s concept of “reasoning by
presupposition,” see chap. 23 (CVT).]
4. 預設的同意詞：起始點、參考點
Presupposition’s Synonyms: Starting Point, Reference Point
范泰爾有時會使用其他的辭彙來表達與「預設」相同的意義，尤其是「起始
點」（starting point）與「參考點」（reference point）。我認為這些名詞比
較不清楚（參拙著 DKG, 125-126），特別是「起始點」，因為它含有時間序
列的「開始」的意味；然而正如我們所見，這不是預設必須具備的意義。
Van Til sometimes uses other phrases as equivalents to presupposition,
especially “starting point” and “reference point.” These latter phrases are, in my
104
estimation, less clear. (See DKG, 125-126.) “Starting point,” in particular,
suggests a temporal sequence which, as we have seen, is not necessary to the
concept of presupposition.
5. 預設式推理 = 范泰爾為基督教信仰所作的「超驗論證」
Reasoning by Presupposition: Van Til’s “Transcendental Argument”
最後，范泰爾的「預設式推理」（reasoning by presupposition）是指對基督
教有神論的超驗論證（transcendental argument）。因為范氏提倡這種論證，
所以他在某種意義上肯定可以被稱為預設主義者。我們將會在本書（CVT）
第 23 章討論這種形式的論證。
Finally, there is the phrase “reasoning by presupposition,” which for Van Til
designates the “transcendental argument” for Christian theism. Because he
advocates this sort of argument, Van Til may certainly in one sense be called a
presuppositionalist. We shall discuss this form of argumentation in chapter 23
(CVT).

105
III. 一些對「預設」的誤會
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
有些作者（如 Mark Hanna 和 R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, Art Lindsley 等人）把預

設誤解為單純的假設（assumption），意指一種隨意選用、沒有理性根據的信
念。這不是范泰爾的理解，在討論范氏思想時，我們不應該有這樣的假設。
Some writers understand a presupposition to be a mere supposition, assumption,
or postulate – a belief chosen arbitrarily, with no rational basis. [E.g., Mark Hanna,
Crucial Questions in Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), and Sproul, Gerstner,
and Lindsley, Classical Apologetics.] This is not Van Til’s understanding, and it
should not be assumed in discussions about him.
對范泰爾來說，基督徒的預設具有最堅固的理性基礎──即上帝的啟示。我們
甚至可以說，基督徒的預設在某一種意義上是可以被證明的；在討論范泰爾對
基督教信仰的論證（證明）時，我們將會看見這一點。范泰爾也不認為預設只
是為了思考而採用的假說（hypothesis）。雖然卡乃爾（E.J. Carnell）是持這樣
的預設觀（參 CVT 第 21 章）；但對范泰爾來說，預設是絕對的（categorical），
不是假設的（hypothetical）。
For Van Til, Christian presuppositions have the strongest possible rational ground,
namely, the revelation of God. Indeed, Christian presuppositions are even
provable in a sense, as we shall see in our examination of Van Til’s argument for
Christianity. Nor does Van Til use presupposition to refer to a hypothesis adopted
for consideration, as does, for example, Edward J. Carnell. [See the discussion in
chap. 21 (CVT).] For Van Til, presuppositions are categorical, not hypothetical.
再者，我們也不應該過分強調「預設」（presupposition）一詞中的「預」（pre-）
字，以免暗示「預設」必須在時間上先於所有其他知識。「預設」的「預」字
是「至」、「最」的意思，意指相對於其他信念來說，「預設」是至高的
（pre-eminent）。范泰爾說：「人對自我、對事物的意識，已經預設了上帝的
自我意識，以及『自我』和『事物』本身的可理解性（intelligibility）。在此，
我們並不是要思考一種時間上或心理上的優先次序。我們只是在處理一個問
題：『甚麼是解釋事物時最終的參考點？』」（DF2, 77）
Nor should we emphasize the pre- in presupposition to suggest that a
presupposition must be held at some point in time prior to all our other
knowledge. The pre- in presupposition refers to the “pre-eminence” of the
presupposition with respect to our other beliefs. Van Til says, “Man’s
consciousness of self and of objects presuppose for their intelligibility the
self-consciousness of God. In asserting this we are not thinking of psychological
and temporal priority. We are thinking only of the question as to what is the final
reference point in interpretation.” (DF2, 77.)
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有人會問，在人們相信上帝之前，我們怎能期望他們會預設上帝的啟示？答案
是：（一）藉著上帝的自然啟示（羅 1:21），每一個人都已經認識上帝。那些
選擇不要認識上帝的人，是違背自己最可靠的知識去選擇「不認識祂」。（二）
即使我們現有的知識不足以讓我們預設上帝，也不能免除我們預設上帝的義
務。確切地說，恰恰因為我們有預設上帝的義務，因此，更有義務去尋找這些
尚未得著的知識。（三）即使在某種意義上，人們不可能遵守「預設上帝」這
項要求，依然不能消減這個要求的合理性。加爾文主義的一貫教導是：倘若離
開恩典，上帝所吩咐的事，墮落的人一件也無法辦到。
The question is sometimes asked, How can people be expected to presuppose
God’s revelation before they have come to believe in God? The answers are: (1)
Everyone knows God already by virtue of natural revelation (Rom. 1:21). Those
who choose not to believe in him do so contrary to their own better knowledge. (2)
Even if presupposing God did require knowledge in addition to what we have, the
lack of such knowledge would not invalidate the obligation to presuppose God.
Rather, that obligation would entail the further obligation to gain that additional
knowledge. (3) Even if the requirement to presuppose God’s revelation were in
some sense impossible for man to obey, that fact would not invalidate it.
Calvinism typically teaches that God commands what depraved man cannot do
apart from grace.

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IV. 「非終極的預設」與「終極的預設」
PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE
從前面幾段中，我已經將「預設」的專門定義澄清為「一個人心中的終極堅持」
（ultimate commitment），而非基督徒對神的預設則是一種例外的用法。
In the preceding sections, I have reserved the word presupposition, as Van Til
usually does, for a person’s ultimate commitment. The example of the
non-Christian’s presupposing God was an exception.
還有其他的例外：「既然人的意識理所當然是次要（proximate）的始點，那
麼，上帝就永遠是人類解釋中最基本的──因此也是終極的──參考點。」（DF2,
77；參 IST, 72）
There are other exceptions: “If then the human consciousness must, in the nature
of the case, always be the proximate starting point, it remains true that God is
always the most basic and therefore the final reference point in human
interpretation.” (DF2, 77; cf. IST, 72.)
有人抗議說：我們不能要求人在他們的思維中預設上帝，或以上帝為始點；因
為他們必須以最接近他們的事物──即他們自己的意識──為始點。當我們應
用范泰爾的「始點」（starting point）時，這種抗議的說服力就會降低；因為
范泰爾的「始點」（starting point）不是指在時間上的開始，而是指一個人生
命中最高的權威。我們若認為預設的問題是時間方面的問題，那麼，任何事物
都可以作我們的始點。其實，我們思想內容的先後次序並不重要。
Some have objected that we cannot ask people to presuppose or “start with” God
in their thinking, for they must always “start with” whatever is most immediate to
them, namely, their own consciousness. This objection becomes less plausible
when we reply that Van Til’s “start with” in such a context does not have a
temporal meaning, but simply refers to that which has supreme authority over a
person. If we do treat the question as a temporal one, the answer is that we can
“start with” anything. It does not matter in what order we consider the various
items we think about.
更重要的是，就算我們真以自己的意識為始點，我們依然不能對自己的意識有
正確的解釋，因為我們已經離開上帝。誠然，對自己意識的真正洞見，一定會
帶引我們與上帝面對面，因為我們是上帝的形像。所以，加爾文強調「對上帝
的認識」和「對自己的認識」之間的相互依賴性。因此，就算在時間的意義上，
真正與自己的意識相遇的同時，也就是與上帝相遇。
But, more importantly, even if we do begin with our own consciousness, we will
not be able to interpret that consciousness rightly apart from God. Indeed, a true
insight into our own consciousness brings us face-to-face with God, for we are his
image. Hence Calvin emphasized the interdependence of our knowledge of God
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and of the self. Therefore, even in the temporal sense, a true encounter with
consciousness will simultaneously be an encounter with God.
就算我們必須在時間上以自己的意識作為「起始點」，那也不表示我們就必須
接受意識所提供的當時標準，來作為我們的規範性準則（normative criteria）。
「時間上的先後次序」和「歸範性」是兩個不同的問題，「起始點」這詞可能
帶來混淆，因此，它不是「預設」的最佳同義詞。
And even if we must “start with” the consciousness in a temporal sense, that does
not mean that we must accept as normative the present standards or criteria that
that consciousness affords us. The temporal question and the normative question
must be kept distinct. The term start with confuses that distinction, and therefore
is not a good synonym for presuppose.
范泰爾的說法是：人的「自我」或「意識」是「次始點」或「次預設」，上帝
才是「終極的預設」。我們知道自己的意識；我們也必須預設這樣的自我認識，
才能去認識其他的事物。[當然，如果我們不認識我們有限的環境，我們也沒
有辦法認識自己，因此，自我認識並不先於對外在環境的認識。自我、世界、
與上帝是同時被我們認識的，因為他們都是每一項知識（each act of knowledge）
的不同視角（perspectives）。這並不是說，三者彼此相同；而是說，他們是一
起、同時被認識的。這是我的闡述，但我認為大體上符合范氏的視角主義
（perspectivalism）。] 無論如何，我們的終極預設必須是上帝；祂必須是我
們惟一的預設。使徒正是預設了這個關係，所以他寫道：「我們的心若責備我
們，上帝比我們的心大，一切事沒有不知道的。」（約一 3:20）
Van Til’s formulation is that the self or consciousness is the “proximate” starting
point or presupposition, while God is the “ultimate” one. We know our own
consciousness, and we must presuppose that self-knowledge when we come to
know anything else. (Of course, it is also the case that we cannot know ourselves
without at the same time knowing something of our finite environment. So
knowledge of self is not prior to knowledge of the things outside ourselves. Self,
world, and God are known simultaneously, as perspectives on each act of
knowledge. That does not mean that the three are identical to one another, only
that they are known together. This is my formulation, but I think it is in accord
with Van Til’s overall perspectivalism.) But our ultimate presupposition must be
God alone. The apostle assumes that relationship when he write, “Whenever our
hearts condemn us, God is greater than our hearts, and he knows everything” (1
John 3:20).
約一 3:20
我們的心若責備我們，神比我們的心大，一切事沒有不知道的。

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第十一章理性的優先性
THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLECT
I. 理性的優先性
THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLECT
1. 理性：人的功能
Intellect: A Faculty in Man
現在我們討論范泰爾對人「理性」（reason）的看法。我相信他沒有寫下「理
性」的定義，可是很明顯，他認為「理性」是人的一種功能（faculty）。具
體地說，「理性」是人按照邏輯來思想與行事的能力，這包括了形成信念、
作出推論、構成論據等的能力。而「合理的」或「理性的」（rational）一
詞就用來形容這種思想能力及其帶來的結果（如合理的信念、合理的推論、
合理的論據等），並形容這種行事的能力，以及形容這個人本身和他理性的
能力（faculty）。
We will now look at Van Til’s view of human reason. I do not believe that Van Til
defines reason anywhere, but it is clear that he views it primarily as a human
capacity or faculty. Specifically, reason is the capacity of a person to think and
act according to logical norms, including the capacity to form beliefs, draw
inferences, and formulate arguments. The adjective rational can pertain to such
thinking (and the resulting beliefs, inferences, and arguments) and acting, as
well as to the person and his intellectual faculty.
2. 「理性」或「合理的」有兩種用法：形容人的理性、衡量人的理性
Reason/Rational: Descriptive, Normative
雖然范泰爾沒有明確指出，但我們卻必須瞭解「理性」與「合理的」有兩種
用法：一是形容人的理性（descriptive），二是衡量人的理性（normative）。
人的思想都是「合理的」（這是前者的意義）；可是根據後者的意義，只有
當理性形成真實的信念、作出有理據的推論、和按照正當準則行事的時候，
那種思想才是合理的。
Although Van Til does not point this out, it is important for us to understand
that reason and rational are used in both descriptive and normative senses. All
thinking is “rational” in the descriptive sense. But in the normative sense,
thinking is “rational” only when it formulates true beliefs, draws valid
inferences, operates according to proper criteria, and so on.
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3. 理性的至終準則：上帝的啟示
God’s Revelation: Ultimate Norm for Reason
對范泰爾來說，理性的至終準則乃是建基於上帝的啟示，這就如同所有的人
類活動一樣，都必須服在上帝啟示的準則下。所以說，「理性本身具有德性」
（the intellectual itself is ethical，參 DF2, 46；另參頁 17-18）。人的理性是被
造的，因此，不是絕對（至終）的、也不是自足的（DF2, 90），我們必須把
自己的理性（和我們所有的活動）都服在上帝的權柄下（IST, 192）。我們
已經看見，在范泰爾的思想中，人類的思想必須是「類比的」，意思是說，
必須接受上帝的啟示為人類知識的「至終預設」或「參考點」。歸根究底，
真理就是與上帝的「自我完整本性和知識」符合（CA, 10）。因此，「人若
不是自主的，人若誠如《聖經》所描述的那樣，是一個上帝所造的人，且是
一個在上帝面前的罪人，那麼，人就必須把他的理性服在《聖經》之下，並
尋求《聖經》的亮光來解釋他的經驗」（DF2, 108；另參頁 31-35）。
Ultimately, for Van Til, the norms of reason are found in the revelation of God.
Like all human activities, reasoning is subject to the norms of divine revelation.
Thus, “the intellectual itself is ethical.” (DF2, 46; cf. pp. 17-18.) The human
mind is created, and therefore not ultimate or self-sufficient. (DF2, 90.) We
must submit our reasoning, like every other activity, to God. (IST, 192.) In Van
Til’s thought, as we have seen, human thinking is to be “analogical,” accepting
God’s revelation as the ultimate presupposition or “reference point” for all
human knowledge. Ultimately, truth is correspondence with God’s
“self-complete nature and knowledge.” (CA, 10.) So, “if man is not
autonomous, if he is rather what Scripture says he is, namely, a creature of God
and a sinner before his face, then man should subordinate his reason to the
Scriptures and seek in the light of it to interpret his experience.” (DF2, 108; cf.
pp. 31-35.)
4. 范泰爾對賀治的回應：微妙
Van Til’s Response to Hodge: Subtle
因著對十九世紀普林斯頓神學家賀治（Charles Hodge）的主張作出回應，范
泰爾似乎更仔細地討論「理性」的功能（意思是：理性在神學上的功能，但
范泰爾並沒有將神學和其他學科明確地區分。參 IST, 14-16）。賀治指出理
性在神學上的三種功能：領受啟示、判斷信念（甚麼是可能的，甚麼是不可
能的）與判斷啟示的證據（IST, 31-42）。
Van Til looks more closely at the functions of reason (i.e., reasoning in theology.
But Van Til does not draw a sharp distinction between theology and other fields:
see IST, 14-16) by interacting with the views of the nineteenth-century
Princeton theologian Charles Hodge. Hodge lists three functions of reason in
theology: to receive revelation, to judge contradictions (possibilities and
impossibilities), and to judge the evidences of revelation. (IST, 31-42.)
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我們可能認為，范泰爾必然在第一點上同意賀治的看法，僅僅拒絕賀治的第
二和第三點。可是范泰爾對賀治的回應比較微妙，在其討論中引發了他三點
的關懷：理性的優先性、邏輯的地位和證據的角色。我們會逐一討論這三點，
本章先討論「理性的優先性」。
We might expect Van Til to agree with Hodge on the first point and simply reject
his second and third points. But his response to Hodge is more subtle than that,
and his discussion introduces three of his main concerns: the primacy of the
intellect, the place of logic, and the role of evidence. We shall consider these in
turn. This chapter will deal with the primacy of the intellect.
賀治認為，上帝的啟示主要向人的理性發出，因此，只有理性的活物才能領
受啟示；野獸與「蠢材」（idiots）都不能領受。范泰爾對這點的理解是，
領受上帝啟示的是人的理性，而不是人的意志或情感。他形容賀治的立場為
「理性的優先性」。
Hodge argues that revelation is directed specifically to the mind, and therefore
may be received only by intellectual beings, not “brutes” or “idiots.” Van Til
takes this to mean that it is the intellect, rather than the will or the emotions,
which receives the revelation of God. He describes Hodge as holding to “the
primacy of the intellect.”
5. 理性的優先性：Clark 在 OPC 的爭論

Primacy of the Intellect:
The Clark Controversy in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church
「理性的優先性」這教義，並沒有在改革宗的信條中出現，不過有些改革宗
神學家的確這樣主張，例如梅欽、克拉克（Gordon Clark）和賀治。克拉克
在信正長老會（Orthodox Presbyterian Church）引起的爭議，不僅關乎上帝
的不可知性（incomprehensibility），還涉及（上帝和人的）理性與意志和感
情之間的關係。OPC 總會對克拉克的指控包括：（一）否認上帝有感情；（二）
相信在宗教信仰上，人的理性比意志和情感更重要（IST, 16）。根據指控文
件（Complaint）所言，克拉克將「以理性默想上帝」視為榮耀上帝和享受
上帝同在的最高形式；他把意志與情感服在理性之下，作為理性的工具。
The doctrine of the primacy of the intellect is not found in the Reformed creeds,
but it is advocated in the writings of various Reformed theologians, including J.
Gresham Machen and Gordon H. Clark, as well as Hodge. The Clark controversy,
besides dealing with the incomprehensibility of God, also dealt with the relation
of intellect to will and emotions, both in God and in man. The Complaint
charges Clark with (1) denying that God has emotions and (2) believing that the
human intellect has a far greater religious importance than the human will or
emotions. (IST, 16.) According to the Complaint, Clark makes intellectual
contemplation of God the highest form of glorifying and enjoying him, and he
subordinates will and emotion to intellect as means to an end.
這指控文件也公允地讚揚克拉克並沒有把上帝或人的不同功能（理性、意
志、情感）分開；它指出克拉克嘗試維持這三種功能的合一性，並堅持（不
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論上帝或人的）理性的思想與行為都是整體性的。可是，指控文件卻指出，
當我們嘗試形容和審核這些整體人格的不同「層面」（aspects），並試圖說
明它們之間的關係時，克拉克卻會要求我們高舉理性的「優先性」。指控文
件認為這種觀點與《聖經》和改革宗信仰有出入。（指控文件又指克拉克對
「信徒使用理性」與「非信徒使用理性」兩者的分辨不夠明確。……）
The Complaint concedes that Clark does commendably resist separating these
faculties in either God or man; Clark wishes to maintain a unity among these
faculties so that the mind (whether divine and human) always thinks and acts as
a whole. Nevertheless, says the Complaint, when we seek to describe, relate,
and evaluate these different “aspects” of the unity of personality, Clark would
have us attribute “primacy” to the intellect. The Complaint considers this view
out of accord with the Scriptures and the Reformed faith. (The Complaint also
alleges that Clark makes an inadequate distinction between the believer’s and
the unbeliever’s use of reason. I shall not specifically discuss Clark’s view of that
distinction, but Van Til’s view will be discussed in the chapter on “Antithesis.”)
6. 克拉克：上帝沒有情感？
Clark: Does God Have Emotions?
根據克拉克的答辯文件（The Answer），克拉克這樣答覆：他之所以否認上
帝有情感，是因為他對「情感」的定義是根據威敏斯特信仰告白第二章第 1
條（答辯文件，頁 26），該處否認上帝有「激情」（passions），可是克拉
克並不否認上帝有感覺。他只不過是堅持上帝的感覺不是起起落落的，好像
Dabney 所說的「ebbing and flowing accesses of feeling」（答辯文件，頁 27。
弗蘭姆注：這裏的 accesses 一詞，可能應該是 excesses。譯者按：意即「過
分激情」的意思）。克拉克在答辯文件中指出，除非我們堅持理性的優先性，
不然的話，「我們不能分辨自己是跟隨理性對真理作出判斷，或是跟隨憤怒。」
（答辯文件，頁 29。在信正長老會的報告中並沒有討論這問題。）
The Answer replies that Clark denies emotions to God because he defines them
as among the “passions” that are denied to God in the Westminster Confession
of Faith, II, 1. (Answer, 26.) Clark, however, does not deny that God feels. He
only insists that God’s feelings are not, in Dabney’s words, “ebbing and flowing
accesses of feeling.” (Answer, 27. Should “accesses” be “excesses?” – Frame.)
The Answer argues that unless we assert the primacy of the intellect, “it would
be a matter of indifference whether one followed one’s anger or his sober
judgment of truth.” (Answer, 29. The General Assembly’s Report did not discuss
this issue.)
據我理解，范泰爾並沒有討論上帝是否有情感這問題，即使在其《系統神學
導論》一書中，當討論上帝的屬性時，他也沒有對此作出討論。[弗蘭姆注：
我猜想，他若討論這問題，他會鼓勵我們「盡量地擬人化」（fearlessly
anthropomorphic），接受上帝是有情感的。] 然而，當他討論到人理性的優
先性時，他作了兩個區分：一是基督徒與非基督徒對於「理性的優先性」在
看法上的區分；一是「本體上的優先性」（ontological primacy）與「實際上
的優先性」的區分（economic primacy）。
113
Van Til does not, to my knowledge, address the question of emotions in God,
even in the part of An Introduction to Systematic Theology where he discusses
the divine attributes. (I suspect that if he had, he would have urged us to be
“fearlessly anthropomorphic” in accepting the existence of divine emotions.)
But in discussing the primacy of the intellect in man, he makes two distinctions:
one between Christian and non-Christian views of the primacy of the intellect,
and one between ontological and economic primacy.
7. 史鮑爾等對范泰爾的批判
Sproul et al Critique Van Til
范泰爾認為基督徒對理性的優先性是「根據創造主與被造物之間的區分」
（IST, 3l；另參頁 161）。史鮑爾（R. C. Sproul）、John Gerstner 和 Arthur Lindsley
在其合著的《古典派護教學》（Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984。頁 227）中
提出異議：「任何的優先若根據其他因素，它就不再是優先。」這個說法沒
有分辨出「理性的優先」中的「優先」是指理性相對於意志和情感的優先，
而不是相對於人以外權威的優先。
The Christian view of the primacy of the intellect, according to Van Til, is “based
on the Creator-creature distinction.” (IST, 3l; cf. p. 161.) Sproul, Gerstner, and
Lindsley, in Classical Apologetics, object that “if any primacy is based on
something else, it does not have primacy.” [R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and
Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 227.]
This objection fails to see that the primacy alleged in the phrase “primacy of the
intellect” is a primacy with respect to other faculties of the mind, not a primacy
of the mind with respect to authorities outside itself.
8. 史鮑爾等人的誤會
Sproul’s Misunderstanding
人的理性可以比意志或情感優先，但不會先於上帝的啟示，也不會稱之為人
自己的至高真理準則。我想，范泰爾的意思，連《古典派護教學》的三位作
者都會在經過反省之後而同意他的。也就是說：基督徒對理性優先性的任何
觀點，都必須與《聖經》所啟示的神人關係一致。
Intellect may be prior to will or emotion, without being prior to God’s revelation
and without being its own ultimate standard of truth. Van Til’s point, however,
is one that I think even the authors of Classical Apologetics would concede after
a little reflection, namely, that any Christian view of the primacy of the intellect
must be consistent with the relationship between God and man as revealed in
Scripture.
114
9. 范泰爾用三位一體說明人的功能
Van Til on Faculties: Trinity as Analogy
范泰爾接著說，人的功能（知、情、意）之間的關係有如三位一體之間的關
係（有關這類比的整全觀點，參 CVT 第 5 章）。正如聖父、聖子、聖靈在本
體上是同質的，同樣地，人的知、情、意也是如此。三者之間不分優劣，沒
有一方本身更具犯罪的傾向。可是，三一真神在宇宙中工作時，聖子與聖靈
自願服從聖父；同樣地，理性在人心中有「工作上的」優先地位（economic
primacy）（IST, 32）。范泰爾解釋道：「人的意志不能正確地運作，除非它
知道朝向甚麼方向運作。人若要運用意志、感情回應真理的話，必須先認識
這真理。」（IST, 32）
Van Til then argues that the relations between the various faculties of the
human mind are analogous to the relations between the persons of the Trinity.
(See John Frame, CVT, chap. 5 for his overall perspective on this analogy.) As
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are ontologically equal, so are the human intellect,
will, and emotions. (As we saw earlier, Van Til takes the Creator-creature
distinction to imply that there are only two levels of being. This implies that
there are only two kinds of ontological status: God’s and the world’s. Everything
in the world has the same ontological status: see DF2, 26-27. Van Til’s
metaphysic does not rule out the presence of hierarchy within the creation, but
it does not encourage hierarchical thinking, as does the Greek philosophical
scheme of traditional Roman Catholicism.) Not one is better or worse than the
others; not one is inherently more or less prone to error or sin. Nevertheless, as
the Son and Spirit relate “economically” to the creation in voluntary
subordination to the Father, so the human intellect has an “economic” primacy
over the will and emotions. (IST, 32) Van Til explains: “The will of man cannot
function unless it knows in relation to what to function. Man must know the
truth if he is to react with his will and feelings to it.” (IST, 32)
范泰爾並沒有用解經來發展這個三一關係，要這樣做實在不易。可是他所講
的一點是有《聖經》根據的。在《聖經》裏，人所有功能的目的都是為了榮
耀上帝，因為這是人生本身的目的。當亞當墮落時，是整個人性的墮落，包
含了他所有功能的墮落。《聖經》在這方面是非常清楚的，在創世記 3:6，
撒但用詭計刺激夏娃的感情、理性與意志；而我們在基督裏，也是整個人，
包括所有的功能，都藉著基督被救贖、被重生、被成聖。
Van Til does not attempt to develop his Trinitarian analogy from Scripture itself;
that would be difficult to do. But there is a legitimate scriptural point here. In
Scripture, all human faculties have the purpose of glorifying God, for that is the
purpose of human life itself. When Adam fell, his whole personality fell. All his
faculties were involved in his sin. Scripture is quite explicit on this point: in
Genesis 3:6, Satan perversely stimulates Eve’s emotions, intellect, and will.
Through Christ, we ourselves, as whole persons, including all our faculties
equally, are redeemed, regenerated, and sanctified.
創 3:6
於是女人見那棵樹的果子好作食物，也悅人的眼目，且是可喜愛的，能使人有智慧，就
摘下果子來喫了，又給他丈夫，他丈夫也喫了。
115
范泰爾把這個觀念與一個非基督教的觀念作出對照，後者「來自古代哲學家
們」（IST, 32），他們否認上帝的創造與人類的墮落。此觀念認為，人的理
性有神性，並沒有墮落，但是感情則「本質上是無法無天的」（inherently
unruly）（IST, 34）。人類邪惡的行為，並不來自人完全的墮落，而是來自
人跟著情感、不跟理性行事。這樣，人的行為是可以改進的，不是藉著全人
的救贖，而是靠著竭力跟從理性、不跟從感情來行事。（范泰爾也在 SCE, 58;
CTEV, 112; PR, 67 討論到這觀念。）
Van Til contrasts this view with a non-Christian approach “which hails from the
ancient philosophers.” (IST, 32) That approach denies both the Creation and the
Fall. It holds that man’s intellect is divine and unfallen, but that emotions are
“inherently unruly.” (IST, 34) Wicked human behavior comes, on this view, not
from comprehensive depravity, but from following emotions rather than
intellect. Improvement comes, not through comprehensive redemption, but
through a determined attempt to follow reason rather than emotion. (Van Til
also formulates this argument in SCE, 58; CTEV, 112; PR, 67.)

[ CTEV = Christian-Theistic Evidences ]
[ PR = Psychology of Religion ]
116
II. 弗蘭姆的檢討
EVALUATION
范泰爾反對這個哲學觀念是對的；人所有的功能都服在罪之下，都需要救贖。
罪（墮落）和救贖都不會高舉人性中任何一個功能。罪與救贖都影響全人，影
響人所有的功能。
Van Til is right, I think, in denying this philosophical view and in saying that all
human faculties are equally subject to sin and redemption. Neither sin nor
redemption involves the elevation of one faculty above another; rather, both sin
and redemption equally affect all of our faculties.
有些基督徒在這方面的暸解出了錯誤，特別是三元論者，他們一般認為罪就是
在於肉體和魂勝過了靈，而救贖則恢復了靈的優先性。
Some Christians have erred at this point, particularly trichotomists who typically
argue that sin involves a primacy of body and soul over spirit, and that redemption
restores the primacy of spirit.
克拉克在這問題上犯了錯嗎？（范泰爾在 IST, 35, n. 1 指出克拉克是他其中一

個的目標。）據我看來，從目前所得的資料，他並沒有犯錯。克拉克肯定沒有
說「人的理性有神性」，或者說「理性沒有墮落」。克拉克的確堅持人應該跟
隨理性對真理的判斷，而不要跟隨自己的怒氣或一時的感受，可是，范泰爾主
張理性的優先性時，也差不多有同樣的意思。
Did Clark err at this point? (Van Til indicates in IST, 35, n. 1, that Clark is one of his
targets.) Not so far as I can see, judging from the evidence available at the time.
There was certainly no evidence that Clark regarded the human intellect as divine
or unfallen. Clark did insist that one should follow one’s sober judgment of truth
rather than his anger or other momentary emotions, but Van Til says virtually the
same thing in describing the “economic” primacy of the intellect.
至於范泰爾，他顯然承認理性在救贖上是重要的。救贖並不在於重組我們的功
能，但「跟隨我們的怒氣」而「不謹慎地跟隨理性」確實是一種罪；救贖的目
的之一乃是重建與之相反的生活模式。克拉克指出，若我們沒有重建「跟隨理
性」的模式，我們會墮入懷疑主義。
On Van Til’s side, he surely recognized that the role of the intellect is relevant to
redemption. Redemption does not consist of a rearrangement of our faculties. But
to “follow one’s anger” instead of “sober judgment” is certainly one form of sin,
and the reversal of that pattern is one of the goals of redemption. And, as Clark
maintains, if we do not reverse these patterns, we fall into skepticism.
117
這樣的改變並不是救贖的全部，也不是成聖的關鍵，但的確是我們在恩典中長
進的一個層面。我們不應該因為克拉克說，在這些情況中意志與情感應該跟隨
理性，就指控他將理性神化。
This sort of change is not the whole of redemption, nor the key to sanctification,
but it is surely one aspect of our growth in grace. It would certainly be wrong to
charge Clark with deifying the intellect simply because he believes that in such
cases the will and the emotions ought to follow the intellect. [On the other hand,
there are pantheistic implications (doubtless contrary to his intention) in some of
Clark’s later writings. First, he asserted that there must be an identity rather than
a mere correspondence between idea and object in human knowledge, Language
and Theology (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 29. What does this
say about human knowledge of God? Second, he argued that a person is a
composite of propositions (see chap.8) and that some human propositions are
identical with God’s.]
范泰爾的分析有它的洞見，可是對於批判克拉克來說，並不成功。我們已經看
見好幾次，他與克拉克討論時的表現是最差的。……
Van Til’s analysis, therefore, is insightful, but it is not successful as a critique of
Clark. We have seen several times in this book how Van Til seems to be at his
worst when he interacts with Clark. That suggests to me that the difference
between them was not merely theological or academic. But I would not care to
speculate as to the precise nature of the problem between them.
可是我認為范泰爾在最基本的區分上，就是對基督徒與非基督徒進路的區分，
以及對本體上與運作上關係的區分，都是正確的。
I do think that Van Til’s basic distinctions, between Christian and non-Christian
approaches and between ontological and economic relations, are sound as far as
they go.
范泰爾所說的，並不能作為「非理性主義者」這項罪名的根據，也不支持杜伊
威德（Dooyeweerd）和 Knudsen 等人說他是「理性主義者」的指控 [JA,74-127,
275-305; HDRA；參本書（CVT）第 27 章]。杜伊威德批判范泰爾，認為他嘗試
從《聖經》中找出哲學觀念。……
Certainly nothing in these constructions justifies the charge that Van Til is an
irrationalist. Nor does Van Til’s position justify the opposite criticism of
Dooyeweerd and Knudsen that he is a rationalist. [JA,74-127, 275-305; HDRA; see
chap.27 (CVT).] Dooyeweerd bases this criticism on the fact that Van Til seeks to
derive philosophical concepts from Scripture. Knudsen’s argument is that Van Til
speaks of God’s self-knowledge as “analytical” and thus uses the human
“analytical judgment” as a model of divine thought, rather than recognizing God’s
mind as transcendent to all human rationality.
杜伊威德的觀點只不過顯露了他的聖經觀的缺陷，卻沒有指出范泰爾的思想上
有甚麼問題。我們已經看見，范泰爾認為《聖經》向宇宙所有的範疇說話，包
括哲學，而杜伊威德顯然否定這一點。……
118
Dooyeweerd’s point reveals defects in his own view of Scripture rather than any
problems with Van Til. Van Til, as we have seen, insists that Scripture speaks to all
areas of life, including philosophy; Dooyeweerd evidently denies that Knudsen’s
argument fails to take adequate account of Van Til’s own explicit definition of
“analytical” (namely, that God’s knowledge does not depend on anything outside
himself). In the light of Van Til’s interaction with Clark, it is a bit strange for
somebody to accuse him of identifying God’s thought with human reason.
1. 弗蘭姆論知、情、意
Frame on Mind, Emotion and Will
至於人不同功能之間的關係，我想最好的做法，乃是超越范泰爾與克拉克的
辯論。很有趣的是，他們兩者都堅持人格的整體性，都看見若把人性過分分
割成理性、意志和感情，是危險的。
As to the relationship of the various human mental faculties with each other, I
think it best to go beyond both Clark and Van Til. (I will not discuss
Dooyeweerd’s view in this connection, beyond this brief comment: Dooyeweerd,
too, emphasizes the unity of personality. Dooyeweerd rejects even the
soul-body distinction of traditional Reformed orthodoxy as the product of Greek
dualism. It is a good thing to emphasize unity of personality, but Dooyeweerd is
wrong thereby to oppose any theological analysis of the aspects of personality.)
It is interesting that both of them insist on the unity of human personality and
suggest that there are dangers in dividing the human mind sharply into faculties
such as intellect, will, and emotion.
可是，這些共識在他們的辯論上，或在范泰爾的《系統神學導論》中並沒有
起甚麼作用。……
Nevertheless, this agreed premise of the unity of personality plays no role in the
Complaint, the Answer, or in Van Til’s Introduction to Systematic Theology. Van
Til and Clark, rather, carry on their argument as if the three faculties were each
self-contained and separate from the others, each competing for lat-out
dominance within the mind.
相反，對於我來說，我們的感情給我們的理性判斷提供很多重要的線索。我
們理性的判斷也影響了我們的感情。我們選擇所信、所感覺的，因此，我們
的意志也影響我們的信念與感情。我們的信念與感情也影響了我們的意志，
如此類推。因此，我們的所謂功能是相互依存的（interdependent），並不
那麼地自足自存（self-contained）！
On the contrary, it seems evident to me that our feelings supply legitimate data
for our intellectual judgments, that our intellectual judgments influence our
feelings, and to some extent we choose what to believe and feel (so that the
will influences beliefs and feelings), that our beliefs and feelings influence the
will, and so on. Thus, our “faculties,” if we choose to call them that, are highly
interdependent, not self-contained.
119
Furthermore, “following one’s anger over one’s sober judgment” (assuming we
are talking about what the Bible calls sinful anger) may be called a choice of
emotion over intellect, but it may also be described as the choice of one
emotion (anger) over another (our affection for God’s will), or as the choice of
one belief (that sinful anger will have good results) over another (that sinful
anger will be counterproductive to any good purpose). Each rational decision
has emotional characteristics, and each emotional decision has rational
characteristics.
以上所表述的，讓我們看見，情感、理性與意志其實是很難分割的。甚麼叫
做「情感」？甚麼叫做「理性的信念」？其實是相當含糊和隨意的。我們的
行為是整個人的行為。我們可以分開用理性、意志、感情等來形容我們所做
的（IST, 91），可是我們的理性層面也包含了感情與意志等等的層面。可能
我們應該把理性、感情與意志看作我們整個人性的不同視角（詳見 DKG,
328-346）。
These considerations make emotions, intellect, and will very hard to distinguish.
Indeed, it is to some extent a matter of arbitrary choice as to what we call
“emotion” and what we call “intellectual conviction.” Our acts, in other words,
are acts of the whole person. They may be characterized intellectually,
volitionally, emotionally, and perhaps in other ways as well. (Van Til,
interestingly, correlates reason and intuition in IST, 91.) But the intellect itself
has emotional and volitional aspects, etc. Perhaps it is best to see intellect,
emotions, and will as perspectives on the whole personality. (See my DKG,
328-346, where I have worked out this approach in some detail.)
按照這種分析，我們當然可以作出一些的提醒，鼓勵人們慎思明辨，不要只
靠一時的感受。我們是否稱這些思辨與感受為理性、感情、或意志，其實並
不重要，畢竟這些思考和感受發生的時候，並沒有帶著標籤！而它們的確都
具有三個層面。同時，我們也應該避免視理性為「軍官」，在我們的腦袋裏
指揮，左右其他的「功能」。更重要的是，我們必須避免將道德性和本體性
混為一談：我們不可視救贖只為了高舉一個功能。救贖，乃是全人的改變！
On this sort of analysis, we can make the obvious points about how people
should follow their sober judgments rather than their momentary inclinations.
It is unimportant for present purposes whether we describe these judgments
and inclinations as intellectual, emotional, or volitional. They do not, after all,
come with labels on them, and they always have all three aspects. At the same
time we can avoid seeing the intellect as a kind of master sergeant, subduing
and bossing around the other “faculties” up in our heads. More important, on
this basis we can avoid the temptation to confuse the ethical with the
metaphysical – to see salvation as the elevation of one human faculty rather
than the transformation of the whole person.
120
2. 改革宗圈子內的危機
Dangers within Reformed Community
我覺得，改革宗神學家們應該避免提倡理性的優先性。當然，這個觀念本有
道理，是叫人們不要跟著自己的怒氣行事。而在改革宗神學的圈子中，提倡
理性的優先，的確有它的原因，特別因為自由派和新正統派神學否定了上帝
啟示中有任何理性（命題）的內容，他們認為我們從啟示中只得到空洞的「感
覺」或「存在相遇」。再者，改革宗神學也必須正視福音派圈子中「感情至
上」的現象（emotionalism），這並不只是靈恩運動如此。可是，用「理性
的優先性」來形容人的心（psychology），是頗誤導的。
I think it is advisable for Reformed theologians to avoid advocating the primacy
of the intellect. The phrase can, to be sure, be used to make some legitimate
points about “following anger” and so on. And its use in Reformed theology is
understandable in light of the challenges of liberalism and neo-orthodoxy,
which denied any propositional or intellectual element in revelation, leaving us
with empty “feeling” or “encounter.” And, of course, Reformed theology has
also had to contend with various kinds of emotionalism within evangelicalism,
and not only within the charismatic movement. However, the primacy of the
intellect is rather misleading as a general concept of human psychology.
我相信，這個觀念的確在某些改革宗圈子促進了一種「惟理性精神」
（intellectualism）。在這些圈子中，成聖、主的帶領、敬拜、講道、門徒訓
練、輔導和傳道人的裝備（神學教育），都自然地偏向一種學術訓練的模式。
而很多時候，培養敬虔的情操、體貼服事人在情感上的需要、甚至建立牧養
的技巧等，都往往被忽略，甚至被輕視了。這種態度似乎更接近「理性主義
哲學」多於《聖經》的教導。
I believe this concept has also encouraged an unfortunate intellectualism in
some Reformed circles. In those circles, sanctification, guidance, worship,
preaching, discipleship, counseling, and ministerial preparation have often been
too easily and closely assimilated to the model of academic learning. Cultivating
godly emotions and ministering to the emotional needs of people, even the
development of pastoral skills, have often been neglected – and even treated
with a kind of smug contempt. [For an example, consider Richard Muller’s The
Study of Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991) in the lighy of my critique,
“Muller on Theology,” WTJ 56 (spring 1994): 133-151. Muller’s reply to me,
“The Study of Theology Revisited: A Response to John Frame,” WTJ 56 (fall
1994): 409-417, is even more smug than his book. I will not be permitted to
publish an additional response in WTJ, so I will say briefly here that (1) in the
reply Muller seems more interested in discrediting a critic than in making
progress on the issues, and (2) he writes, well, like a man who knows that his
opponent will not be permitted to reply.] This sort of attitude has much more in
common with rationalistic philosophy than with the Bible.
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3. 《聖經》是一本充滿感情的書！
Bible, An Emotional Book!
《聖經》是一本充滿著感情、同時又充滿著理性內容的書。《聖經》啟示上
帝的真理，不只是學術上的命題，《聖經》也講述故事、頒發命令、自我重
申、頌唱詩歌、向上帝禱告、提供視聽教材（象徵性的記號，特別是聖禮），
還吩咐我們要彼此祝福、親嘴問安。保羅在羅馬書中，亦往往從邏輯論據中
激發出讚詞來敬拜上帝！我深信，改革宗的信徒們需要在這些層面上多下工
夫，以致更全面體會《聖經》的信息。
The Bible is a very emotional book, as well as a book with profound intellectual
content. It does not reveal the truths of God merely as academic propositions. It
tells stories, issues commands, repeats itself, sings songs, offers prayers, gives
us visual aids (symbols, especially the sacraments), and calls upon us to greet
one another with a holy kiss. Paul breaks off from logical arguments in Romans
to shout praise. I do believe that Reformed people need to regain that
perspective in these areas.

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第十二章邏輯
LOGIC
I. 邏輯
LOGIC
引言：賀治的三要點
Introduction: Hodge’s Three Points
現在我們繼續討論范泰爾對理性的觀念，本章集中討論「邏輯」這題目。我們
在上一章看到他如何在「理性在神學的地位」與賀治互動。賀治三要點的第一
點是：理性有「接受」啟示的功能。范泰爾對這一點的理解是：理性有它優先
的地位，我們在上一章已經處理過。賀治的第二點是：理性是審核矛盾的審判
官。賀治認為理性有「權利決定一件事是可能或不可能。若理性視為不可能，
就不論有任何權威、也不論有多少證據，都不能強迫理性領受它是真的。」（IST,
36，引自賀治《系統神學》1:51）
We continue our discussion of Van Til’s view of reason by considering the subject
of logic. In the last chapter, we focused on his interaction with Hodge’s view of
the place of reason in theology. The first of Hodge’s three points was that reason
has the function of “receiving” revelation. Van Til took that as asserting the
primacy of the intellect, and we dealt with that in the last chapter. Hodge’s second
point is that reason is the judicium contradictionis, the judge of contradiction.
Hodge says that reason has the “prerogative of deciding whether a thing is
possible or impossible. If it is seen to be impossible, no authority and no amount
or kind of evidence can impose the obligation to receive it as true.” [IST, 36,
quoting Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.),
1:51.]
范泰爾應該會反對賀治！但他卻沒有這樣作。
Van Til Should Have Disagreed with Hodge! But He Doesn’t.
讀者若對范泰爾有一點熟悉，可能預料范氏在這裏會對賀氏提出異議。誠然，
我們對這段討論的初步印象是，范泰爾提出賀氏的說法，為要擊敗他。當然，
范泰爾至終會堅持，理性沒有權柄判斷甚麼是可能的，只有上帝有此權柄。
Persons with a little familiarity with Van Til’s thought might expect that he would
simply disagree with Hodge here. Certainly, our first impression of the discussion
is that Van Til is setting Hodge up for a fall. Eventually, surely, Van Til will insist
that reason has no right to judge what is possible, only God does.
123
范泰爾的回應比較微妙：
他分辨「有神論的邏輯觀」與「非有神論的邏輯觀」
理性的確有權判斷上帝的啟示，但問題是：如何判斷？
His Response Is More Subtle:
Distinguishes Theistic/Non-Theistic View of Logic
Reason Does Have A Right to Judge Revelation – Issue is: How?
范泰爾的確堅持，只有上帝有至終權柄做這種的判斷。可是他在這裏並沒有直
接反對賀治的看法，反之，他用令人驚奇的正面語調來回應賀治。基本上，范
泰爾同意賀治所說的，只是透過分辨「（基督教）有神論的邏輯觀」與「非有
神論的邏輯觀」來澄清問題。[范泰爾在《普遍恩典與福音》頁 183，似乎果斷
地拒絕賀治的立場：「普林斯頓的方法（譯者注：即賀治的立場）在甚麼程度
上（so far as）用這『訴諸人的理性身為（as such）審判官，來決定一件事是
可能或不可能』這方法來處事，是與普林斯頓神學完全矛盾的。」可是，「在
甚麼程度上」（so far as）和「身為」（as such）似乎暗示賀治的論點可以從
正面來理解。范泰爾在《普遍恩典與福音》第 184 頁（也在 IST）顯然批判賀
治，指他沒有分辨「基督教的理性觀」與「非基督教的理性觀」。] 范泰爾至
終的結論是，理性有權判斷上帝啟示的邏輯一致性，可是理性本身必須服在上
帝之下。
Van Til does accord to God the ultimate right to make such judgments, but here he
does not simply disagree with Hodge; rather, the tone of his response is
surprisingly positive. Basically, he also agrees with what Hodge says, but he tries to
clarify the question by pressing the distinction between (Christian) theistic and
nontheistic views of logic. (In CGG, 183, Van Til seems to reject Hodge’s position
flatly: “The Princeton method, so far as it worked by this method of appeal to the
reason of man as such as the judge of the possible and the impossible, was flatly
opposed to the Princeton theology.” However, the phrases “so far as” and “as
such” imply that Hodge’s point could be taken in a good sense. On p. 184, it is
plain that here, as in IST, Van Til criticizes Hodge mainly for failing to distinguish
Christian from non-Christian views of reason.) Ultimately, Van Til’s conclusion is
that reason does indeed have the right to judge the logical consistency of
revelation, but reason itself must be subordinate to God.
有神論者的獨特處：知道上帝的本性是邏輯的基礎
非有神論者離開上帝而獨立運作邏輯；
因此，其上帝的來源 = 可能性、或然率
Theist’s Uniqueness: He Knows That God’s Nature Is Foundation of Logic
Non-Theist’s Logic Operates Independently from God;
Thus, His God’s Source = Possibility/Probability
「有神論的邏輯觀」與「非有神論的邏輯觀」兩者主要的差別是，有神論者知
道上帝的本性是邏輯的基礎；而非有神論者則相信邏輯是「離開上帝而獨立地
運作」（IST, 37）。非有神論者若相信某一種的上帝，那個上帝「的來源乃是
124
可能性（possibility）」；他不相信上帝才是可能性的來源（IST, 38）。同樣的
意思也可用「或然率」（probability）來表達（IST, 38）。
The main difference between theistic and nontheistic views of logic is that the
theist finds the foundation of logic to be the nature of God, while the nontheist
believes that logic “operates independently of God.” (IST, 37.) If some god exists
for the nontheist, that god “has his source in possibility” rather than the reverse.
(IST, 38.) The same can be said for probability. (IST, 38.)
上帝的本性是理性的；上帝裏面有絕對真理系統
我們的理性表達上帝的理性
God’s Nature = Rational; In God = Absolute System of Truth
Our Rationality Expresses God’s Rationality
對范泰爾來說，上帝的本性是理性的，在上帝裏有一套絕對的真理系統（DF2,
43; CGG, 142）。我們的理性（rationality）是被造的，可是它表達著上帝的理
性。矛盾定律（the law of contradiction）是「在被造的層次表達上帝本性的內
在一致性（the internal coherence of God’s nature）」[IST, 11（弗蘭姆：范泰爾
親自加強語氣）]。
For Van Til, God’s nature is rational. In him is an absolute system of truth. (DF2, 43;
CGG, 142.) Our own rationality is created, but it expresses God’s; the law of
contradiction is “the expression on a created level of the internal coherence of
God’s nature.” [IST, 11 (emphasis by Van Til).]
非信徒保留一些「對上帝的認識」的殘餘：
因此保留一些「意義和可能性的真正來源」的殘餘
賀治訴諸這個殘餘：「人類共同意識」
Unbeliever Retains Some Remnant of Knowledge of God;
Thus Retains Some of True Source of Meaning and Possibility
Hodge Appeals to This Remnant: Men’s Common Consciousness
雖然非信徒壓制真理 [我們將會在本書（CVT）第 15 章詳細探索信徒與非信徒

之間的區別]，但他們仍然保留了一些殘餘對上帝的知識（knowledge of God），
亦因而保留了一些對可能性與或然率的真正來源和意義的殘餘認識。當賀治說
到上帝在人性中種植的信仰定律（laws of belief）時，他真正訴諸的就是這一
點殘餘的「真正有神論對經驗的解釋」。從這個意義上來理解，訴諸人類的「共
同意識」，不僅非常合理，而且是絕對必須的（IST, 11）。
Unbelievers, though they repress the truth [We will explore in detail the
differences between believer and unbeliever in chap. 15 (CVT)], nevertheless
retain some remnant of the knowledge of God and consequently of the true
source and meaning of possibility and probability. It is to this remnant of a truly
theistic interpretation of experience that Hodge really appeals when he speaks of
the laws of belief that God has implanted in human nature. It is, of course, not
only quite legitimate, but absolutely imperative to appeal to the “common
consciousness” of men in this sense. (IST, 11.)
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從有神論的意義上，上帝不可能做不道德的事
In Theistic Sense, God Cannot Do What Is Immoral
若從有神論的角度來理解邏輯，可以很正確地說：「上帝不可能作出、認可、
或吩咐任何不道德的事。」（IST, 39）「上帝也不可能吩咐任何與祂在我們本
性裏所刻印的信仰定律相矛盾的事。」（IST, 40）上帝不是不合邏輯的，因為
祂必然與祂自己本性的定律（the laws of his own nature）相一致。
Taking logic in the theistic sense, it is quite correct to say, “It is impossible that
God should do, approve, or command that is morally wrong.” (IST, 39.) Nor is it
possible that “God should command anything that ‘contradicts the law of belief
which He has impressed upon our nature.’ ” (IST, 40.) God is not illogical, for he is
consistent with the laws of his own nature.
范泰爾批評賀治：沒有區分基督徒和非基督徒使用邏輯的不同
Van Til Critiques Hodge: Didn’t Distinguish Christian/Non-Christian Logic
可是，范泰爾批評賀治沒有區分「基督徒使用邏輯」與「非基督徒使用的邏輯」
的不同。在這方面，賀治同樣犯了范泰爾指責克拉克（Gordon Clark）、卡爾
乃禮（E.J.Carnell）、史密夫（Wilbur M. Smith）、步斯威理（Oliver Buswell, Jr.）
和路易士（C.S. Lewis）的錯誤（IST, 39）。
Van Til critiques Hodge, however, for failing to draw a distinction between logic as
used by a Christian and logic as used by a non-Christian. In this respect, Hodge
makes the same error that Van Til attributes to Gordon H. Clark, Edward J. Carnell,
Wilbur M. Smith, J. Oliver Buswell, Jr., and C.S. Lewis. (IST, 39.)
因此，不要要求非信徒使用（他們心目中的）邏輯定律，來判斷（他們心目中
的）福音
甚麼是可能或不可能？甚麼是矛盾或不矛盾？信徒與非信徒持不同觀點
Thus: Don’t Ask Unbelievers to Apply Their Law of Contradiction, As They See It,
to the Gospel As They See It
What Is Possible/Impossible? What Is/Isn’t Contradiction?
Christian and Non-Christian Have Different Ideas
范泰爾認為非基督徒與基督徒對於甚麼是可能、甚麼是不可能、甚麼是與我們
的道德和理性本性矛盾、甚麼是不矛盾，都持截然不同的觀念。因此，我們不
可要求非信徒「將他們所理解的矛盾定律，應用在他們所理解的福音上」（IST,
41），因為這樣，他們就會拒絕福音。
Non-Christians, says Van Til, have very different ideas from Christians about what
is possible and impossible, and about what contradicts and what does not
contradict our moral and rational natures. Therefore, we must not ask unbelievers
to “apply the law of contradiction as they see it to the gospel as they see it,” (IST,
41) for then they would reject the gospel.
126
范泰爾評論：若華爾非德訴諸自然人，為要指責人，那是對的
基督的確要求人判斷上帝的啟示；但也要求人在上帝面前承認自己的愚蠢
Van Til: Warfield’s Appeal to Natural Man Is OK If of An Ad Hominem Nature
Christ Does Ask Natural Man to Judge Revelation;
But Christ Asks Man to Admit His Own Foolishness Before God
試比較范泰爾對第二代普林斯頓神學家華爾非德的評論：「誠然，若華爾非德
以指責人（ad hominem）的方式來訴諸自然人（罪人），那就不錯了。基督的
確要求自然人（罪人）判斷祂的自我宣稱的真實性，但祂亦要求罪人承認上帝
已經使他們的智慧成為愚拙。」（PDS, 61）
Compare Van Til’s comment about Warfield, the great Old Princeton theologian of
the next generation: “To be sure, if Warfield’s appeal to the natural man were of
an ad hominem nature, then it would be well. Christ does ask the natural man to
judge with respect to the truth of his claims. But then he asks them to admit that
their own wisdom has been made foolish by God.” (PDS, 61.)
范泰爾沒有在這裏處理所有問題
例如：非信徒不能用邏輯思考嗎？不是的
非信徒往往在邏輯上非常聰明！
信徒與非信徒之間的差別（勢不兩立）是道德性的，不是形而上（本體）性的
但是，非信徒卻使用他的理性（邏輯）來攻擊、壓抑真理
范泰爾的比喻：一把銳利的鋸子，卻放錯了方向
Van Til Doesn’t Answer All Questions Here
E.g. Is Unbeliever Unable to Think Logically? No
Often Non-Believers Are Excellent in Logic
Antithesis Between Believer/Unbeliever Is Ethical, Not Metaphysical
Unbeliever Uses His Reason to Attack/Repress The Truth
Example: Sharp, Efficient Saw – But Set In Wrong Direction
范泰爾在這段文字較簡潔地討論到邏輯，一些重要的問題仍有待解答，所以我
們必須參考他在其他地方所說的。例如范泰爾有否說非信徒沒有能力合乎邏輯
地思想？范泰爾沒有這樣說。信徒與非信徒之間的「勢不兩立」是倫理性的，
而不是形而上學的。就算是那些在地獄沉淪的人，「也沒有失去理性與道德判
斷的能力」（the power of rational and moral determination）（PDS, 254）。范
泰爾說的是，非信徒可能在邏輯上非常優秀，就如他可能有其他出人頭地的天
然才幹。信徒並不一定在才智上超過非信徒，而且事實往往相反：「蒙召的，
按著肉體有智慧的不多」（哥林多前書 1:26）。可是非信徒用他的自然恩賜來
壓制、攻擊真理。范泰爾在這方面引用「鋸子」（buzz saw）的比喻是有幫助
的：非信徒像一把非常銳利有效的鋸子，卻擺錯了方向（DF2, 74）。
Van Til’s discussion of logic in this particular context is somewhat abbreviated. It
leaves certain important question unanswered, and so we must look at what he
says elsewhere on these issues. Does Van Til want to say, for example, that
unbelievers have no ability to think logically? No, says Van Til. The antithesis
between believer and unbeliever is ethical, not metaphysical. Even the lost in hell
“have not lost the power of rational and moral determination.” (PDS, 254.) Van Til
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is saying that the unbeliever may be very competent in logic, just as he may have
other natural gifts in abundance. Believers do not necessarily excel unbelievers in
intelligence; indeed, the opposite is often true: not many wise are called (I Cor.
1:26). But the unbeliever uses his natural gifts to repress and attack the truth.
Here Van Til’s famous illustration of the buzz saw is helpful: the unbeliever is like a
buzz saw that is very sharp and efficient, but has been set in the wrong direction.
(DF2, 74.)
林前 1:26
弟兄們哪，可見你們蒙召的，按著肉體有智慧的不多，有能力的不多，有尊貴的也不多。
重生的人是否獲得新的邏輯定律、或新的建構推論的規則？沒有
信徒與非信徒的不同在於：邏輯哲學和如何使用邏輯各不相同
Does Regeneration Give Christian New Laws of Logic? No
New Rules for Contructing Syllogisms? No
Difference Is In Philosophy of Logic, and Use of Logic
那麼，信徒是否因著重生而獲得新的邏輯定律、或新的推理原則呢？當然不
是。范泰爾說：「我並不認為基督徒根據新的思想定律來行事，正如他們並沒
有配上新的眼睛或鼻子。」（DF1, 296；參 CGG, 27-29; IST, 254）我們在討論賀
治時已經看到，在邏輯的範圍裏，信徒與非信徒的不同，乃在於兩者的邏輯哲
學（DF1, 296）和如何使用邏輯各不相同。
Does regeneration give to believers new laws of logic, or new rules for
constructing syllogisms? Certainly not. “I do not maintain,” he says, “that
Christians operate according to new laws of thought any more than they have new
eyes or noses.” (DF1, 296; cf. CGG, 27-29; IST. 254.) The differences between
believer and unbeliever in the area of logic are rather, as we saw in the discussion
of Hodge, in the philosophy of logic (DF1, 296) and the use of logic.
如何回應非信徒？非信徒尋求一個非有神論的邏輯基礎
可是，在非有神論的世界中，邏輯只是抽象定律用來連接沒有意義的事實
How to Respond to Unbeliever?
Unbeliever Seeks Non-Theistic Foundation for Logic
But Non-Theistic World, Logic = Abstract Laws <->Meaningless Facts
我們應如何回應非信徒在這些事上的挑戰？從哲學來看，非信徒尋求一個非有
神論的邏輯基礎。可是在一個非有神論的世界裏，邏輯只能是一些純粹抽象的
定律，人用來與沒有意義的事實連接。正如范泰爾的比喻所說，「他的邏輯只
不過是在一個真空中的旋轉門裏轉，從虛無搬遷虛無到虛無那裏。」（CTK, 299）
在其他地方，范氏這樣形容非信徒：「他們面對的兩難是『絕對的無知』與『絕
對的無所不知』。」[DF2, 90；參 pp. 86-90; IST, 167；參考本書（CVT）第 17
章提到非信徒結合了「理性主義」（ rationalism ）與「非理性主義」
（irrationalism），與這裏所講的兩難是相應的。]
128
How should we respond to unbelieving challenges on these matters?
Philosophically, the unbeliever seeks a nontheistic foundation for logic. But in a
nontheistic world, logic can be nothing more than purely abstract laws, which man
seeks to connect with meaningless facts. As Van Til illustrates, “His logic is merely
the exercise of a revolving door in a void, moving nothing from nowhere into the
void.” (CTK, 299.) Elsewhere, he presents the unbeliever as facing “the dilemma of
absolute ignorance or absolute omniscience” (DF2, 90 cf. pp. 86-90; ITS 167. See
chap. 17 on the unbeliever’s combination of rationalism and irrationalism which is
equivalent to the dilemma discussed in this passage): either the unbeliever knows
the truth already and thus cannot learn anything new, or else he is ignorant and
cannot even ask the questions that would lead to the truth.
又回到「一而眾」的問題：在一個偶然的宇宙是沒有邏輯秩序的
所有的秩序都只是人思想中所構造的（因此，人原則上是無所不知的）
One-And-Many Problem Revisited
No Logical Order in Universe of Chance
All Order = Created in/by Man’s Mind – Thus Man is, In Principle, Omniscient
這些都是我們在本書（CVT）第 5 章所探索的「一而眾的問題」的不同形式。
除了人在自己思想中所創造的秩序以外，一個完全偶然的宇宙是沒有邏輯秩序
的。人若創造了這秩序，那麼在原則上，他肯定完全（無所不知）地認識這秩
序。
These are forms of the one-and-many problem that we explored in chapter 5. In a
universe of chance, there is no logical order, except one that man creates out of
his own mind. If man creates it, then in principle he must know it omnisciently.
但沒有理由相信，人所創造的秩序是與事實相符！
按照人的世界觀，也不能真正認識事實
因此，人是絕對無知的
But: No Reason to Suppose, Man-Imposed Order Relates To Facts!
Nor: Facts = Intelligible in Worldview Imposed By Man
Thus Man = Absolutely Ignorant
但是，我們沒有理由假設，人所創造的秩序是與事實相符；而按照人的世界觀，
也不能真正認識事實，因此，人是絕對無知的。范泰爾的整體哲學的結論就是，
《聖經》的世界觀是邏輯的前題。
But there is no reason to suppose that that humanly imposed order has any
relation to actual facts. Nor can the facts themselves be intelligible in such a
worldview. Hence, man is left with absolute ignorance. Van Til’s overall
philosophical conclusion is that logic presupposes a Christian worldview.
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非信徒如何使用邏輯，與基督徒不同
非信徒用非有神論「評斷事情可能或不可能的標準」來攻擊基督教
Unbeliever’s Use of Logic = Different from Believer
Unbeliever Uses Nontheistic Standards of Possibility to Attack Christianity
非信徒使用邏輯與信徒不同，非信徒會用他的邏輯來攻擊基督教的有神論，以
其非有神論的標準，來評斷甚麼是可能、甚麼是不可能，並試圖顯示基督教在
邏輯上是矛盾的，他們會針對一些吊詭的問題，例如三一神論、神的主權與人
的責任的關係。
The unbeliever also uses logic differently than the believer. The unbeliever
employs his logic to attack Christian theism, bringing to bear nontheistic standards
of possibility and impossibility. He tries to show that Christianity is logically
inconsistent by bringing up paradoxes like the Trinity and the relationship of divine
sovereignty to human responsibility.
基督徒不必向非基督徒證明「基督教能符合非基督徒的邏輯標準」
Christian: Don’t Try to Show Christianity = Logically Consistent According to
Non-Christian Standards
范泰爾說，基督徒不必就這些攻擊言論而試圖顯示基督教能符合非信徒的標
準，相反，基督徒乃要訴諸「類比」的一致性。
The Christian should not answer such objections, says Van Til, by trying to show
that Christianity is consistent by the unbeliever’s standards. Rather, he should
appeal to “analogical” consistency.
范泰爾常指出基督教信仰內容的「表面矛盾」
他拒絕接受簡易的解決方案
基督教信仰的吊詭性（三一神論）不是真正的矛盾，但卻不能除掉「表面矛盾」
根據基督徒的邏輯觀，還是會有「表面矛盾」
Van Til Frequently Refers to “Apparent Contradictions” in Christianity
Refuses To Accept Easy Resolutions
Paradox (Trinity) Is Not Really Contradictory; But It Is Impossible to Fully Remove
Appearance of Contradictions
Apparent Contradictions Exist in a Christian View of Logic, Too
更要明白這「類比的一致性」原則，我們必須更深入探討范泰爾常說的基督教
信仰中的「表面矛盾」（弗蘭姆：在這裏，我回到一些曾在 1976 年出版的《神
學家范泰爾》中所探討過的課題）。我們在本書（CVT）第 5 章中已看見范泰
爾一方面拒絕任何簡單的方法解決三位一體的吊詭問題，但另一方面，他又真
的堅信三位一體不是真正的矛盾。范泰爾認為，當我們講論三位一體時，我們
的確不可能完全除去表面上的矛盾。若按非信徒的邏輯觀念，三位一體的教義
顯然是矛盾的；但即使按基督教的邏輯觀念，這教義依然顯為表面矛盾的。同
樣的情況出現在「上帝裏一而眾」、「上帝本性與屬性的關係」（IST, 229; DF1,
26）。
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To understand this principle better, we should explore further Van Til’s frequent
references to the “apparent contradictions” in the Christian faith. (Here I return to
some of the territory I explored in 1976 in VTT.) We saw in chapter 5 that Van Til
refuses to accept any easy resolution of the Trinitarian paradox: one God in three
persons. He does believe that the Trinity is not really contradictory. Yet he also
maintains that it is not possible to fully remove from our formulations the
appearance of contradictions. The doctrine of the Trinity obviously appears
contradictory on an unbelieving view of logic, but this apparent contradiction also
exists on a Christian view of logic. The same thing is true with another form of
unity and diversity in God, the relation between God’s nature and his attributes.
(IST, 229; DF1, 26.)
對上帝裏的必然性與自由性，根據人的邏輯來理解，是有限制的
上帝的計畫是由祂的智慧指導的（必然性）；
可是上帝是真正自由的（主權、自由）
《聖經》：上帝的創造與救贖大工又是智慧的、又是自由（主權）的
Necessity and Freedom in God: Human Logic = Limited in Understanding It
God’s Plan = Directly By God’s Intelligence (Necessity);
God’s Free Acts Are Truly Free (Sovereignty/Freedom)
Bible: In Creation & Redemption, God is Both Intelligent and Sovereign/Free
范泰爾似乎看見，在理解上帝的必然性和自由性的問題上，人的邏輯是有限制
的。若單說上帝的計畫是由祂的智慧指導的，那麼，祂自由的行動（例如創造
與救贖）就變得必然：上帝必須創造和救贖我們。但若單說上帝的行動是真正
自由的，那就與祂的智慧指導無關，變得全然偶然：上帝無意中創造了。只強
調以上任何一者都不是《聖經》的教導，《聖經》乃要求我們同時確認上帝在
創造和救贖行動中的智慧指導和完全自由（主權）。
Van Til similarly sees a limit to human logic in dealing with the problem of
necessity and freedom in God. If God’s will is directed by his intelligence, then it
seems that his free acts, such as Creation and redemption, become necessary:
God had to create and redeem us. If, however, God’s free acts are truly free, then
it would seem that they must be unconnected with his intelligence and therefore
random: God just happened to create. Neither alternative is biblical. Scripture
requires us to affirm both the intelligence and the freedom of God’s acts of
Creation and redemption.
兩種必然性：「上帝本性的必然性」和「上帝作為的必然性」
范泰爾沒有繼續解釋
2 Kinds of Necessity: Necessity of God’s Nature, Necessity of His Free Acts
Van Til Doesn’t Explain Further
范泰爾指出我們必須區分兩種的必然性：「上帝本性的必然性」和「上帝作為
的必然性」，但他卻沒有解釋這兩種必然性，來解決表面矛盾的問題。他只以
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一句話來結束這討論：「這是超過我們有限的頭腦所能達到的。」（IST, 249；
參 pp. 176-178）
Van Til does suggest that we should distinguish two kinds of necessity: the
necessity of God’s nature and that necessity by which his free acts come about.
But he does not explain these two kinds of necessity, which might remove the
appearance of contradiction. Rather, he breaks off the discussion: “This is as far as
our finite minds can reach.” (IST, 249; cf. pp. 176-178.)
比喻：一個裝滿了水的桶子
Illustration: Full Bucket Difficulty
范泰爾以一個他名為「一個裝滿了水的桶子」的比喻，來說明上帝與世界之間
顯為表面矛盾的關係。
Van Til’s paradigm case of apparent contradiction in the relationship between God
and the world is what he calls “the full bucket difficulty”:
對非基督徒而言，我們的立場就如在一個裝滿了水的桶子再倒入水。他會
說：「你們基督教的三位一體自足性就如一個已裝滿了水的桶子，對上帝
而言，已不能加添甚麼，祂不能從所造之物中獲取任何榮耀。但你們的宇
宙歷史觀，就如將水倒入這個裝滿了水的桶子，萬物都要增添上帝的榮
耀。」（CGG, 10；參 pp. 27, 73; DF1, 61-62; IST, 63-64）
To the non-Christian our position may be compared to the idea of adding
water to a bucket that is already full of water. “Your idea of the self-sufficient
ontological trinity,” he will say, “is like a bucket full of water. To God nothing
may be added. He cannot derive glory from His creatures. Yet your idea of
history is like pouring water into the full bucket. Everything in it is said to add
to the glory of God.” (CGG, 10; cf. pp. 27, 73; DF1, 61-62; IST, 63-64.)
其他的表面矛盾
Other Apparent Contradictions
范泰爾也指出其他「表面矛盾」的課題。有邪惡的問題：上帝讓邪惡出現，卻
又不為邪惡負責（IST, 248; NS, 271; CTETH, 36, 139）。范泰爾也看見以下的課
題存在表面矛盾：上帝的隱秘旨意與啟示旨意之間（CGG, 27）、人的禱告與
上帝的永恆計劃之間（CGG, 27; DF 1, 61）、人是上帝的形像的狹義與廣義之間
（CTETH, 46; DF1, 29）、人是在亞當裏與人不在亞當裏之間（DF1, 249-251）、
罪既能夠又不能夠破壞上帝的作為（CGG, 199-200）、沒有重生的人既能夠又
不能夠認識真理 [IST, 26-27, 112-113。弗蘭姆：參我在本書（CVT）第 15 章有
關「勢不兩立的概念」的討論]、基督的神性與人性之間（DF1, 205）、上帝既
預定一切與福音的白白邀請之間（CGG, 10）。
Van Til also notes other areas of “apparent contradictions.” There is the problem
of evil: God brings evil to pass, but he is not to be blamed for it. (IST, 248; NS, 271;
CTETH, 36, 139.) Van Til sees apparent contradictions in God’s secret and revealed
wills (CGG, 27); prayer and the counsel of God (CGG, 27; DF 1, 61); the image of
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God in the “wider” and “narrower” senses (CTETH, 46; DF1, 29); mankind existing
and not existing in Adam (DF1, 249-251); sin being able, yet unable, to destroy the
work of God apart from common grace (CGG, 199-200); unregenerate man being
able, yet unable, to know the truth [IST, 26-27, 112-113. See my discussion of
“Antithesis” in chap. 15(CVT).]; the deity and humanity of Christ (DF1, 205); and
the free offer of the gospel (CGG, 10).
范泰爾與克拉克爭辯「吊詭」的問題
指控文件指出，有些難題是改革宗神學不能解決的。
克拉克竟聲稱可以解決，這叫人「驚奇」！
Clark Controversy: Issue of Paradox
Complaint: Reformed Theologians Cannot Resolve Some Difficulties
Clark Claims He Can Resolve Them: “Amazing!”
在范泰爾與克拉克爭辯中，論及有關上帝的主權與人的責任這吊詭問題。指控
文件中贊同克拉克有關上帝的主權與人的自由並不矛盾的講法，但卻承認這方
面仍存在困難，這是（改革宗神學家）無法解決的（指控文件，頁 22）。其
中一個難題是，既要堅持上帝的預定和護理，又要否認上帝是罪的創造者（指
控文件，頁 23）。對這些過去許多偉大神學家都承認無法克服的困難，但克
拉克竟聲稱可以解決，指控人員表示「驚奇」（指控文件，頁 24）！最後，
他們相信克拉克的解決方案是等於不太承認人的責任（指控文件，頁 26）。
During the Clark controversy, the issue of paradox was raised in connection with
divine sovereignty and human responsibility. The Complaint agreed with Clark in
saying that divine sovereignty and human freedom were not actually contradictory.
But it also asserted that “there are difficulties here which [Reformed theologians]
are unable to solve.” (Complaint, 22.) Among these is the problem of reconciling
comprehensive foreordination and concurring providence with the denial that
God is the author of sin. (Complaint, 23.) The complainants find it “amazing” that
Clark thinks he can solve such problems, when the greatest theologians of the past
have confessed their inability to do so. (Complaint, 24.) In the end, they believe
that Clark’s solution to the problem does violence to human responsibility.
(Complaint, 26.)
克拉克答辯：《威敏斯特信仰告白》本身鼓勵我們作邏輯推論
一個不能解決的問題，意指已查考所有經文，考慮所有含義，而仍找不到一點
解決辦法
這意味著：已完全窮究了《聖經》
克拉克：《聖經》本身暗示問題的答案，即：否認阿米念主義的自由意志
Clark’s Answer: Westminster Confession Encourages Logical Inference
Cannot Solve Problem? Implies All Scripture = Exhausted, All Implications =
Exhausted, and Cannot Find Any Hint of Solution
Implies: Exhaustive Knowledge of Scripture
Clark: Bible Hints at Solution, i.e.: Deny Arminian View of Freedom
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根據答辯文件，克拉克指出《威敏斯特信仰告白》本身就鼓勵我們從《聖經》
作邏輯推論，因而亦鼓勵我們去解決一些在邏輯上表面矛盾的問題（答辯文
件，頁 35）。而且，答辯文件更指出：「一個人若聲稱這是一個不能解決的
問題，在邏輯上意指他已查考所有經文，考慮所有含義，而仍找不到一點解決
辦法，……這等於聲稱，他已完全窮究了《聖經》。」（答辯文件，頁 36）
克拉克聲稱《聖經》本身已對難題提供了暗示，否定傳統亞米念主義的自由意
志觀。（答辯文件，頁 36-37。議會的報告中並沒有討論這課題。）
The Answer replies that the Westminster Confession itself encourages logical
inference from Scripture, and therefore, presumably, also intends to encourage
resolution of apparent logical contradictions. (Answer, 35.) Further, it says: “He
who claims that a given paradox cannot be solved, logically implies that he has
examined every verse in Scripture, that he has exhausted every implication of
every verse, and that there is no hint of a solution. … This is a claim to an
exhaustive knowledge of all Scripture.” (Answer, 36.) Clark’s claim, on the contrary,
is that Scripture itself provides hints for a solution of the problem, which amounts
to denying free will in the traditional Arminian sense. (Answer, 36-37. The
Report of the General Assembly committee did not discuss this particular issue.)
范泰爾不被說服；克拉克沒有完全解決吊詭的問題
乍眼看來，「上帝完全的預定」似乎與「人真正的選擇」相矛盾
「乍眼看來」是否意味，若多看一些，就會能解決？
范泰爾：不會
Van Til = Not Persuaded; Clark Didn’t Fully Solve Paradox
At First Sight, Complete Foreordination Seems to Contradict Genuine Choice
“At First Sight”: Will Problem = Solvable After Second Sight?
CVT: No
范泰爾不會被答辯文件說服，他亦無意為亞米念的自由意志觀辯護。但他亦不
相信克拉克已解決了這吊詭問題。究竟甚麼具體難題是未解決的呢？這是很難
判斷的。范泰爾說：「當說到宇宙歷史中的萬事都由上帝決定，乍眼看來，必
然否定了人的真正選擇。」（CGG, 10）「乍眼看來」這短語似乎意味若「多
看一眼」問題就會解決，但這不是范泰爾的觀點。范氏認為，人類永遠無法達
到看來不矛盾的地步。那麼，到了天堂又如何？我們在那裏會否發現解決吊詭
的方案？可能也不！根據范泰爾的觀點，我們沒有能力解決這些吊詭問題，是
與我們的有限性有關，即使到了天堂，我們依然是有限的。
Van Til, however, was not persuaded by the Answer. Certainly he had no interest
in defending the Arminian concept of free will. But he did not believe that Clark
had fully solved the paradox, either. What, specifically, is unresolved? That is hard
to say. Van Til says, “That all things in history are determined by God must always
seem, at first sight, to contradict the genuineness of my choice.” (CGG, 10.) That
phrase, “at first sight,” might seem to suggest that the problem can, in fact, be
resolved – “at second sight.” But that is not Van Til’s view. He holds, in fact, that
human beings never reach the point where these matters no longer appear
contradictory. What about heaven? Will we there discover solutions to the
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paradoxes? Probably not, according to Van Til, since our inability to solve them is
related to our finitude. And, of course, in heaven we remain finite.
弗蘭姆論范泰爾：基督徒越來越欣賞上帝的智慧和良善
我們在恩典中長進，曉得欣賞上帝的主權（自由）
我們在靈性上成熟，體會「上帝有答案的」，就不再因「矛盾」而抱怨
范泰爾的終點是屬靈的，而不是邏輯上的
范泰爾有很多屬靈的洞見，可是往往把它們約化為邏輯或神學原則
Frame on Van Til: Christians Grow in Appreciating God’s Wisdom, Goodness
We Grow in Grace, Appreciate Sovereignty/Freedom
We Mature, Appreciate: God Has Answer, We Don’t Complain Any More
Van Til Is Making a Spiritual (Not Logical) Point
Van Til Makes Penetrating Spiritual Insights (But Reduces to Logic/Theo.)
范泰爾在這裏的意思大概是指基督徒會成長，越來越曉得欣賞上帝作為的良善
和智慧。假如在「乍眼看來」，我們會覺得上帝的主權與人的責任相矛盾，那
麼，當我們在恩典中不斷長進，我們就會在「多看一眼」的情況下，不會那麼
衝動地作判斷。吊詭的問題永不能真正地解決，但我們在靈性上長大成熟，越
體會「上帝有答案的」，我們就不再因不能解決的「矛盾」而抱怨。我相信范
泰爾在這裏對「表面矛盾」所作的回應，是一個屬靈的勸勉，而不是邏輯的論
據。（正如我們在其他相關地方所見，范泰爾往往透徹觀察屬靈生命的現象，
並作出個人的分享，只是他會把這些洞見以邏輯和神學原則來表達。）
Perhaps what Van Til means to say is that Christians grow in their ability to
appreciate the goodness and wisdom of God’s ways. If our first impulse (“at first
sight”), in contemplating divine sovereignty, is to claim that it contradicts human
responsibility, we may nevertheless have better impulses (“at second sight”) as we
grow in grace. The problem is never actually resolved, but we gain the spiritual
maturity to appreciate that God has an answer, and we do not go around
complaining about an unresolved contradiction. This is, I believe, a spiritual, rather
than a logical, point that Van Til wants to make about apparent contradictions. (As
we shall see in other connections, Van Til often makes penetrating observations
on issues of spiritual life and interpersonal communication, but he tends to reduce
them all to issues of logic and theological principle.)
就算屬靈成熟，還是有邏輯上的問題；范氏應否稱它為「表面邏輯矛盾」？
若否定阿米念主義的架構，人的選擇＝真正的選擇
因此，為甚麼范泰爾要堅持這難題是邏輯上的難題？
Even With Spiritual Maturity, Logical Problem Remains
Should Van Til Call This “Apparent Logical Contradiction”?
If We Reject Arminian Construction, Choice = Genuine
So Why Does Van Til Insist: Problem = Problem in Logic?
135
范泰爾堅持，就算屬靈成熟，還是有邏輯上的難題。甚麼難題？就以上的例子
而言，在一個上帝預定一切的宇宙中，人「真正」的選擇是顯為矛盾的，范泰
爾描述這是「表面邏輯矛盾」，這樣說對嗎？當我們拒絕阿米念的自由意志觀，
我們所相信的根本就不會與上帝的完全主權產生矛盾。當我們拒絕阿米念的架
構時，我們也根本不會認同「完全無因或自主的選擇」才是「真正」的選擇。
按改革宗的立場，所有人類的選擇都是真正的選擇，所以，為何會有所謂「真
正選擇」的難題？而范泰爾又為何堅持這難題是邏輯上的難題？
Van Til, then, would insist that even with spiritual maturity, the logical problem
remains. What is the problem? In this example, it is a problem with the
“genuineness” of my choice in a God-ordained universe. But is Van Til right in
describing this problem as an “apparent logical contradiction”? Once we reject the
Arminian concept of free will, we do not then affirm anything that actually
contradicts the comprehensiveness of divine sovereignty. Also, once we reject the
Arminian construction, we must also deny that a “genuine” choice must be an
uncaused or autonomous choice. On a Calvinistic basis, all human choices are
genuine choices. So why is there a problem with genuineness? And why does Van
Til insist that the problem is a problem in logic?
看深一層：范泰爾將這問題喻為「倒滿水的水桶」
上帝既是自含的榮耀，人的選擇還能是重要而「真實」？
上帝的榮耀是否不能容納「加增」？
Look Deeper: CVT Sees Problem = “Full Bucket” Problem
God = Self-Contained in Glory; Can Man’s Choice = Important/Genuine?
Does God’s Glory Preclude Addition?
我們需要看更深一層。范泰爾將這難題比喻作「一個裝滿了水的桶子」。正如
我們之前所講，這難題要表達既沒有任何事能增添上帝的榮耀，但上帝又創造
了萬物來榮耀祂。應用在有關「選擇」的例子上，難題就是既然上帝已作了宇
宙歷史的一切決定，但人的決定卻仍有重要意義，這是范泰爾所謂「真正」的
選擇。
We need to look a bit deeper. Van Til sees this problem as a form of the full bucket
problem. As we have seen, that problem is that nothing can be added to God’s
glory, yet he makes creatures to glorify himself. Applied to “choice,” this means
that God’s choices have fully determined the course of history, yet human choices
are, somehow, also important or significant – what Van Til calls, somewhat
awkwardly, “genuine.”
所以這「真正選擇」的難題，其實就等於「上帝的榮耀既不能增添、卻又要求
人榮耀上帝」一樣。這真是一個邏輯上的難題，但重要是判斷這是哪一類的邏
輯難題。
So the question of “genuine choice” boils down to the question of how God’s glory
precludes, yet demands, addition. This is indeed a logical problem of sorts, but it is
important for us to see what kind of logical problem it is.
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三位一體是類似的難題：看來矛盾？言之過早的結論
表面矛盾是可以解決的，只要將用字較含糊的意義加以說明
從一種意義上，上帝是一；從另一種意義上，上帝是三（傳統信仰）
Similar to Problem of Trinity: Contradiction? Premature Conclusion
Can Resolve Apparent Contradictions: Are Terms Ambiguous?
God Is One In One Sense, Three In Another Sense (Orthodox Stance)
我認為，有關三位一體在邏輯上的難題也是類似的難題。《聖經》告訴我們，
上帝是三又是一，上帝既是三又不是三、既是一又不是一，這樣三位一體的教
義，就是一個邏輯上的矛盾。但正如我在之前關於三位一體的論述，這樣的判
斷是不成熟的，是言之過早。在邏輯的討論上，有一種常用的表達來化解表面
矛盾：上帝在一個意義上是三，在另一意義上是一，彼此並沒有矛盾。
It is, I think similar to the logical problem connected with the Trinity. Scripture tells
us that God is three and that God is one. From that teaching, one might allege that
because God is three and not-three (or one and not-one), the doctrine of the
Trinity is a logical contradiction. But, as I indicated in my earlier discussion of the
Trinity, such a judgment would be premature, to say the least. It is common in
discussions of logic to note that an apparent contradiction may be resolved
through consideration of ambiguities in the terms: if God is three in one respect
and one in a different respect, then there is no contradiction.
范泰爾：我們不能描述上帝如何又是一、又是三
我們不能表述這項教義在邏輯上的一致性
表面的邏輯矛盾仍然存在
Van Til: We Cannot Demonstrate How God Is Three And One:
We Cannot Demonstrate the Logical Consistency of the Doctrine
Apparent Contradiction Remains
教會也常這樣聲稱，上帝是一又是三，這是從不同的意義上來理解。正如我們
在之前的討論中見到，范泰爾也不會反對這種說法，但他卻指出我們其實並不
能精確地描述上帝在怎樣的意義上是一，在怎樣的意義上是三。所以我們不能
將三位一體教義在邏輯上的一致性表述清楚，並因而仍留下一些表面的矛盾。
The church has always made the claim that God is one and three in different
senses, and, as we saw in the earlier discussion, Van Til does not dispute this claim.
But he does claim that we do not know precisely how God is one and precisely
how he is three; so we cannot demonstrate the logical consistency of the doctrine.
For that reason, some appearance of contradiction remains.
「一個裝滿了水的桶子」的難題也是這樣，從一種意義上來說，上帝的榮耀不
能增添；但從另一種意義上來說，上帝又容許人增添祂的榮耀。由於我們根本
不充份知道上帝與宇宙歷史的關係，以致我們不能精確地描述不同層面的意
義。於是，表面的矛盾仍存在於上帝與宇宙歷史之間，在「上帝的預定」與「人
的真正選擇」這難題上，尤為顯著。
The same is true of the full bucket problem. God’s glory doubtless precludes
addition in one sense and permits it in another. But we do not know enough about
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God’s relation to history to define precisely what those sense are. Therefore,
apparent contradiction remains in God’s relation to history and specifically with
respect to divine foreordination and the genuineness of human choice.
范泰爾：在所有的啟示與所有的人類知識之間都有表面的矛盾
所有的《聖經》教訓都是表面矛盾的
我們的知識是類比的，因此必然是吊詭的
Van Til: There Is Apparent Contradiction in All Revelation
And in All Human Knowledge, In All Teaching in Scripture
Our Knowledge = Analogical, Therefore Must Be Paradoxical
既然在上帝的本性上（三位一體）有表面的矛盾，而在上帝與世界的基本關係
上又有表面的矛盾（一個裝滿了水的桶子），范泰爾就見到在所有的啟示與所
有的人類知識之間存在著表面的矛盾。「既然上帝是不能被人透知的，所以對
我們來說，在我們的認知過程中，肯定會感到矛盾的。我們的知識既是類比的
（被造者的知識），就必定會顯為吊詭的。」（DF1, 61）「我們雖絕不接受有
真正的矛盾，但對表面的矛盾這現象，卻會熱烈歡迎承認的。」（CGG, 9）「所
有的《聖經》教訓都是表面矛盾的。」[CGG, 142 (emphasis by Van Til)；參 DF2,
44-46]
Since there is apparent contradiction in the basic nature of God (the Trinity) and in
the fundamental relation of God to the world (the full bucket), Van Til sees
apparent contradiction in all revelation and in all human knowledge: “Now since
God is not fully comprehensible, to us we are bound to come into what seems to
be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore
must be paradoxical.” (DF1, 61.) “While we shun as poison the idea of the really
contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory.”
(CGG, 9.) “All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.” [CGG, 142
(emphasis by Van Til); cf. DF2, 44-46.]
有人猛烈批評范氏的立場；邏輯矛盾是太嚴重的問題了
克拉克是對的：《威敏斯特信仰告白》的確批准我們從《聖經》作邏輯推論
《聖經》若充滿矛盾，我們如何作推論？
Some Critique This View Harshly; Logical Contradiction = Serious Problem
Westminster Confession Does Authorize Us to Make Inferences from Bible
If Bible = Full of Contradictions, How Can We Make Inferences?
可以想像得到，有些基督徒會對范泰爾這些話猛烈批評。對於改革宗的基督徒
而言，在邏輯上矛盾是很嚴重的問題。克拉克引述《威敏斯特信仰告白》的話
是正確的，《威敏斯特信仰告白》的確授權我們對《聖經》作邏輯推論。但如
果《聖經》是充滿矛盾，即使是表面的矛盾，我們又怎能作出邏輯推論呢？
Understandably, some Christians respond to these statements very harshly. For
Reformed Christians, logical contradiction is a very serious matter. Clark is right in
citing the Westminster Confession as authorizing us to affirm the logical
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entailments of biblical teachings. But if the Bible is full of contradictions, even
apparent ones, how can we derive such entailments?
按邏輯原則，從矛盾的前提（premises）可以推出所有和任何的結論
Logic: From Contradictory Premises, Any/All Conclusions Validly Follow
Logic textbooks tell us that from contradictory premises, any and all conclusions
validly follow. Consider the following argument:
1. God is one. (Premise)
2. Either God is one or the moon is made of green cheese. (Follow from point 1 by
the logical operation called addition. If a statement is true, then the statement or
any other statement is true.)
3. God is not one. (Premise)
4. Therefore, the moon is made of green cheese. (Follows from points 2 and 3.
Since point 3 denies the first half of the “or” statement, the second half must be
true.)
《聖經》也不例外：（表面的）矛盾可以推出任何的結論
Same Thing With Scripture: (Apparent) Contradictions -> Any Deduction
This example shows how from contradictory premises (points 1 and 3 in this case)
any manner of nonsense will follow validly. (Any statement whatever could have
been substituted for “the moon is made of green cheese.”) Therefore, once we
allow that Scripture contains contradictory teachings, we must also admit that
anything at all may be validly deduced from Scripture. Indeed, if Scripture contains
even one contradiction, it implicitly teaches everything, and therefore nothing.
The presence of contradictions in Scripture would entirely invalidate the
statement of the Westminster Confession that the counsel of God is to be found in
the “good and necessary consequences” of Scripture as well as in Scripture’s
explicit statements. If there are contradictions in Scripture, then everything, and
therefore nothing, is “good and necessary consequence.”
當然，范泰爾沒有教導人說《聖經》是矛盾的；只是表面似乎如此
但是，我們會不會從表面矛盾的前提推出廢話來？
Of Course, CVT Doesn’t Teach Scripture = Contradictory; Only Apparently
But: Will We Draw Nonsense From Apparently Contradictory Premises?
范泰爾當然沒有教導人說《聖經》是矛盾的，他強調的正正相反。他只是說，
所有的《聖經》教訓都是表面矛盾的。但是當我們用邏輯來分析《聖經》時，
表面的矛盾與真正的矛盾一樣是難題。在上述的論據例子中，第一句和第三句
只是表面矛盾，這也是范泰爾論及三位一體時所聲稱的。然而，《聖經》卻真
的教導我們，上帝是一又是三。假如我們按《威敏斯特信仰告白》所言，從《聖
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經》作邏輯推論，我們會否也如上述的論據例子一樣，從表面矛盾的前提推出
廢話來？
Of course, Van Til does not teach that Scripture is contradictory – quite the
reverse. What he says, however, is that all Scripture is apparently contradictory.
However, apparent contradiction poses the same problems as real contradiction
for the logical analysis of Scripture. Let us say that in the illustrative argument
presented above, points 1 and 3 are only apparently contradictory, which is in fact
Van Til’s claim about the Trinity. Nevertheless, Scripture does teach that God is
one and that God is three. If we are to draw logical inferences from Scripture, as
the Westminster Confession prescribes, will we not find ourselves in the same
bind, deducing nonsense from apparently contradictory premises?
回答：避免建構這種的論據
Reply: Avoid This Kind of Construction
我們可以這樣回答：既然我們對上述論據例子中的第一句的「一」和和第三句
的「非一」的意義有點不清楚，我們就要避免建構這種的論據。用字的意義含
糊會使我們很難從這些前提推出合理的結論。
One reply might be this: since we know that there is some unclarity about the
sense of “one” and “not one” in points 1 and 3, we should simply avoid
constructing arguments of this kind. The ambiguity in the terms should make us
reluctant to draw any inferences at all from these particular premises.
但是，我們怎樣能從《聖經》作出任何的推論？
But: How Can We Make ANY Inference From Scripture?
假如「所有的《聖經》教訓都是表面矛盾的」，我們就不能從經文前提作出任
何的邏輯推論。而且，不單三位一體的教義有表面矛盾，其他的教義如上帝的
屬性和上帝與世界的整體關係都有表面矛盾，那麼，我們怎能從《聖經》的教
訓作出任何的邏輯推論呢？
But if “all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory,” then any logical
deduction from scriptural premises would seem to be ruled out. Since there are
apparent contradictions not only in the doctrine of the Trinity, but also in the
doctrine of the divine attributes and the doctrine of God’s overall relation to the
world, how can we draw any logical inferences at all from biblical teaching?
必須考慮范泰爾的「界限觀念」和「類比系統」的觀念
Consider CVT’s Concepts of “Limiting Concept” and “Analogical System”
要回答這些問題，我們將探討范泰爾的「界限觀念」和「類比系統」，這是下
一章的主題。
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To answer these questions, we will have to look into Van Til’s ideas of “limiting
concept” and “analogical system.” These will be the topics covered in the
following chapter.

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第十三章類比系統
THE ANALOGICAL SYSTEM
I. 類比系統
THE ANALOGICAL SYSTEM
范泰爾對「邏輯」和「建構思想系統」持積極態度
上帝對祂自己是徹底可知的；上帝是「絕對系統」
一切被造實存顯示上帝的計畫，因此，本質上是合理的（rational)
Van Til = Positive Toward Logic and Building Thought Systems
God = Comprehensible to Himself; God = Absolute System
All Created Reality Displays God’s Plan, Thus: Inherently Rational
For all of the problems Van Til raises about the use of logic, his overall attitude
toward logic and the building of intellectual systems of thought is remarkably
positive. God is “exhaustingly comprehensile to himself” (NS, 277) and can
therefore be described as an “absolute system.” (DF1, 61; cf. IST, 10.) Since he has
planned and controls all things, “All created reality displays this plan. It is, in
consequence, inherently rational.” (NS, 277.)
上帝是合理的，祂的知識是透知的知識，所以使人的合理性成為合法
我們是被造的，我們的知識不是透知的知識，卻仍是真的知識
我們對上帝的知識是「真」而「確實」的知識
God Is Rational, Has Exhaustive Knowledge – Vindicates Man’s Rationality
We = Creatures; Our Knowledge = Not Exhaustive, but Genuine
Our Knowledge of God = True, Certain
God’s rationality vindicates human rationality. His knowledge is exhaustive, and

his intention is for us to know him and the world. Since we are creatures, our
knowledge cannot be exhaustive, but it can be a genuine possession of the truth.
(DF1, 60-61; IST, 24, 164; NS, 277.) Our knowledge of God, in particular, is not only
true, but also certain, which is simply to say that God is clearly revealed in creation
and especially in ourselves. (IST, 114-15; CA, 13; NS, 278-79.)
《聖經》是內在一致的，是一個真理系統
上帝宣稱《聖經》是祂的話語
上帝是一致的；因此祂的自我啟示也必須是內在一致的
我們的論述也應該反映《聖經》的一致性
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Scripture = Internally Consistent, = System of Truth
God Identifies Scripture as His Word
He is Coherent; His Self-Revelation Must Be Internally Coherent
Our Formulations Should Reflect Scripture’s Consistency
As we have seen, Van Til regards Scripture as internally consistent, a system of

truth. And he also believes that our own formulations should reflect that
consistency. We should not affirm contradictory doctrinal formulations. Note the
following:
But I do, of course, confess that what Scripture teaches may properly be spoken of
as a system of truth. God identifies the Scriptures as his Word. And he himself, as
he tells us, exists as an internally self-coherent being. His revelation of himself to
man cannot be anything but internally coherent. When therefore the Bible
teaches that God controls by his plan whatever comes to pass, it does not also
teach that God does not control whatever comes to pass. If such were the case,
God’s promises and threats would be meaningless. (DF1, 205; cf. CTK, 38-39,
200-202; CGG, 76; IST, 251.)
矛盾的論述製造混亂
（范泰爾似乎說）「表面矛盾」同樣引致虛無（無意義）
范泰爾形容《聖經》對我們來說，有表面矛盾
因此我們需要作神學上的論述
《聖經》確實宣稱上帝掌控宇宙歷史
Contradictory Formulations Produce Chaos
(CVT Seems to Say) Apparent Contradictions Also Lead to Meaninglessness
CVT Is Referring to How the Bible Appears to Us – Thus
We Should Work on Theological Formulations
The Bible Does Say: God Controls Whatever Comes to Pass
In these passages, Van Til grants the logical point made in the last chapter, that
contradictory formulations produce intellectual chaos. And, indeed, he seems also
to be granting the point that apparent contradictions also lead to meaninglessness.
Surely Van Til intends by these statements to encourage us in the practical work of
theological formulation and communication. So he is speaking not only about the
Bible “in itself,” but also about how it appears to us. And as we come to read and
understand the Scriptures, we learn that God controls whatever comes to pass
and therefore does not fail to control his creation. Our understanding of divine
sovereignty logically justifies our denial of creaturely autonomy.
范泰爾是最有系統的思想家之一
他強調教義與教義之間的邏輯關係，這是十分罕見的！
有些教義是較為「核心」和「基要」的
VT = One of Most Systematic Thinkers
Emphasizes Logical Relationships Among Doctrines – Unsurpassed
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Some Doctrines = Central, Fundamental
We have also seen that in Van Til’s own theological formulations, he is one of the
most systematic of thinkers. He stresses logical relationships among doctrines
more than almost any other recent theologian. (Gordon Clark is, of course, an
exception.) He speaks of some doctrines as being “central” or “fundamental” to
others. (CA, 4; CTK, 12; DF1, 28, 59, 229; IST, 1, 29, 206; TJD, 76.)
范泰爾經常堅持：一項教義必然導致另一項教義
例如：上帝是自含的，因此，啟示必然是自我見證（自我證實）的
又如：上帝是三位一體；因此，人的知識必然是類比的
人的知識是真的，就是「因為」它是類比的（不是：雖是類比的，但仍是真的）
就是「因為」上帝的旨意是至高的存有與作為，人的存有與作為是真實的
CVT Constantly Insists: One Doctrine Follows Another Necessarily
If God = Self-Contained, Revelation Must be Self-Attesting
If God = Trinity, Man’s Knowledge Must Be Analogical
Man’s Knowledge is True Because (Not Despite That) It Is Analogical
Because God’s Will = Ultimate Being/Activity, Man’s Being/Action = Genuine
And what is often most striking about Van Til’s theology is that he constantly
insists that one doctrine necessarily follows from another. For example, if God is
self-contained, then revelation must be self-attesting. (DF1, 203; IST, 62; IW, 3,
36-37; CTK, 70.) If God is a Trinity, then man’s knowledge must be analogical. (SCE,
48, 97. I have traced the development of this argument in chaps. 5-10.) Man’s
knowledge is true “because,” not “in spite of” the fact that, it is analogical. (SCE,
48, 97. The “because, not in spite of” motif is frequent in Van Til’s writings.) Man’s
being and action are genuinely his own “because of” (again, not “in spite of”) “the
more ultimate being and activity on the part of the will of God.” (CA, 11.)
上帝是絕對的位格，因此，我們拒絕「決定主義」，也拒絕「非決定主義」
上帝是自存和聖潔的，因此，創造與墮落是歷史事實
上帝是自由的，這是必然的，因為祂的本性乃是如此
God = Absolute Person, Therefore: No Determinism, No Indeterminism
God = Self-Sufficient & Holy, Therefore: Creation & Fall = Historical
God = Free; This is Necessary, Because of God’s Nature
The absolute God, the absolute Christ, and the absolute Scriptures “go hand in
hand. We cannot accept one without accepting the others.” (CTETH, 28.) The
“absolute personality of God,” as we have seen, becomes the key to avoiding both
determinist and indeterminist errors. (SCE, 67-68; CTETH, 35, 48; DF1, 29, 59.)
Denial of the self-sufficient holiness of God entails denial also of the temporal
Creation and the historical Fall. (IST, 244.) “God is free not in spite of but because
of the necessity of his nature.” (IST, 177.) “Deny the doctrine of creation and you
have denied the Christian concept of God.” (DF1, 231.) The creation of man in
God’s image is at the same time a “presupposition of revelation” and a “corollary
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from the notion of an absolutely self-conscious God.” (IST, 63. Other examples of
Van Til’s strong insistence on relations of logical dependence among doctrines:
PDS, 35, 37; DF1, 202, 207, 267-269; SG, 63; IST, 139, 239; TJD, 118-119, 122; CTK,
47, 200; CGG, 65-68, 73; CA, 62, 73.)
基督教信仰的一致性：沒有其他美國神學家有這樣的深度
承認一項教義＝承認另一項/全套教義；否認一項＝否認另一項/全套教義
所有教義是相互依存；神學家應該發揮這些關係，會造就教會
No American Theologian = So Profound: Unity of Christian Faith
Affirm 1 Doctrine = Affirm Another/the Whole; Deny 1 = Deny Another/Whole
All Doctrines = Interdependent
Theologians Should Elaborate These Relationships = Edifying
No other American theological writer gives his readers such a profound sense of
the unity of Christian truth. Again and again, we learn that to affirm one doctrine
is to affirm another and to affirm the whole; to deny one doctrine is to deny
another and to deny the whole. All doctrines are interdependent; the whole
depends on the parts, and the parts depend on the whole. Other theologians
should give extended attention to these suggestions; each could be made the
subject of a treatise. Why is it that the self-contained nature of God implies that
his revelation be self-attesting? Van Til only sketches the reason; I tried to expand
that sketch a bit in a previous chapter. But it would be edifying for some
theologian to develop an extended analysis of this relationship.
現今世代是混雜思想的世代；
不可從不同神學選擇幾塊零碎項目，而造出新的神學
不同神學學派都有教義的「套餐」，用邏輯維繫
Our Age = Eclectic; Need to Emphasize Interconnections
We Cannot Concoct New Theologies by Mixing Bits from Theologies
Each School of Theology = A Constant “Package” of Doctrines
Packages = Held Together by Logic
In our eclectic age, it becomes all the more important to stress these
interconnections. It is important to show that we cannot concoct new theologies
by taking a bit of Lutheranism here, a touch of Calvinism there, an idea from
Arminius over here, and blending them together uncritically. It is no accident that
each of these schools of thought has maintained a fairly constant “package” of
doctrines down through the years. For the most part, such packages are held
together by logical bands, bands that eclecticism tends to ignore.
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不可過分強調「邏輯上的統一性」
傳統是要批判的，包括我們自己的傳統
Don’t Take “Logical Unity” Too Far
Be Critical of Traditions, Including Our Own
Of course, this concept of logical unity can be taken too far. We must also be
critical of the theological packages bequeathed to us by tradition, testing
everything by the Word of God. Theologians in the past have not been perfect
exegetes or perfect logicians. If we Calvinists, for example, are to be true to the
sola Scriptura of the Reformation, we must be prepared to criticize our received
doctrines by Scripture, even as Luther and Calvin did not hesitate to analyze
critically the theological traditions of their day. [Van Til suggests in IST, 4, that a
creed should never be revised in such a way as to “tone down” specific doctrines
into “vague generalites.” That may be a valid criticism in the case he cites, the
1925 credal revision in the United Presbyterian Church of North America. But it
would be wrong, I think, to adopt a general principle the idea that a creed should
never be revised in the direction of generality. Such a principle would mean that
once a church (say, the Roman Catholic Church) adopts a specific doctrinal
position, it may never change its mind. On the contrary, we must listen to
Scripture, whether it tells us to be more specific or calls us to abandon specific
positions previously held.] But such analysis may not ignore the logical
relationships of Scripture itself, many of which have been noted in our theological
traditions.
真正的長進：上帝是絕對，因此《聖經》是自證的
Real Growth: God Is Absolute, Therefore Scripture Is Self-Attesting
There is real growth in theological maturity when someone moves from saying
“God is absolute and Scripture is self-attesting” to saying “God is absolute and
therefore Scripture is self-attesting.” In that development there is growth in
insight, certainty, and power to communicate. We can grow much in this way by
reading Van Til.
范泰爾關注《聖經》中和神學中的邏輯關係，這是他主要強調的要點之一
但是他卻又說「所有的聖經教導都是表面矛盾」？
Van Til = Concerned About Logical Relationships in Scripture & Theology;
It is a Main Emphasis – Yet: “All Scripture = Apparently Contradictory”?
At any rate, it is plain that Van Til is not indifferent to logical relationships in
Scripture and in theology. Indeed, those logical relationships are among his main
emphases. That fact raises even more pointedly the problems we raised in the
preceding chapter: How can Van Til stress these logical relationships while also
asserting that “all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory”?
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范泰爾批判 Pieper 是「非理性主義者」
Pieper：上帝預旨一切，可是上帝的預旨又可以被抗拒
范泰爾：「上帝所啟示的，只能與祂的本性一致」
Van Til Critiques Francis Pieper: “Irrationalist:”
Pieper: God Decrees Everything, But His Decree Can Be Resisted
CVT: “Revelation Must be consistent With God’s Nature”
To bring this problem into sharper focus, consider Van Til’s critique of Francis
Pieper, a Lutheran dogmatician. Van Til calls Pieper’s approach “irrationalist”
because Pieper teaches that God decrees all things, yet that the divine decree can
be resisted. (CTK, 200. In context, Van Til also argues that Pieper is a rationalist,
because Pieper appeals to a logical principle higher than the counsel of God.) “God
can reveal only that which is consistent with his nature as a self-identified being,”
says Van Til. (CTK, 202.)
問題是：范泰爾怎麼能既維持表面上邏輯一致性，又容許表面上邏輯矛盾？
Question: How Can CVT Keep Apparent Logical Consistency,
While Allowing for Apparent Logical Contradiction?
Could not Pieper reply that his position, the position of Scripture as he sees it, is
only “apparently contradictory,” and therefore theologically permissible even on
Van Til’s terms? What, then, would make Pieper’s appeal to “apparent
contradiction” less legitimate than Van Til’s? In other words, how can Van Til insist
on maintaining apparent logical consistency when he makes such liberal allowance
for apparent logical contradiction? [I will leave it to the reader to evaluate in the
light of the above data this statement of John Robbins: “Nearly every reference to
logic in (Van Til’s) books is a disparaging reference. He continually criticizes,
belittles, and deprecates logic, not the misuse of logic, but logic itself.” Cornelius
Van Til: The Man and the Myth (Jefferson, Md.: Trinity Foundation, 1986), p. 23.
He follows this statement with all of two examples.]

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II. 基督徒的「界限觀念」
CHRISTIAN LIMITING CONCEPTS
康德思想中的「界限觀念」
「真理界」是人不可能認知的，但「真理界」是一「界限觀念」，阻止傲慢
Limiting Concept in Immanuel Kant
“Noumenal World:” Cannot Be Known By man, But
“Noumenon” = Limiting Concept – Curbs Pretentions of Sensibility
Van Til frequently speaks of “limiting concepts.” The phrase comes from the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant argued that the “noumenal world,” the world
as it really is apart from our experience, cannot be known by man, but that the
idea or concept of a noumenal world does have a legitimate purpose in human
thought; “The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the
function of which is to curb the pretentions of sensibility; and it is therefore only
of negative employment.” [Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1929), 272.]
康德：「界限觀念」沒有正面內容；「上帝」這名詞形容我們經驗的有限性
我們的經驗是有限的，好像被上帝限制一樣
Kant: Limiting Concept Has No Positive Content
The Term “God” Describes Limitedness of Our Experience
Our Experience is Limited, As If By God
In Kant’s thought, a limiting concept has no positive content. For Kant, “God” is a
limiting concept, and this means, not that God actually exists, but only that the
term God may properly be used in describing the limitedness of our experience.
For him, our experience is limited as if by God, whether God actually exists or not.
數學中的「界限觀念」，例如「無限」，是我們達不到的
我們可以不斷靠近這「界限」，但永不能達到它
有限數字中也有界限
“Limiting Concept” in Mathematics: e.g. Infinity: We Can’t Reach It,
We Approach This “Limit” Indefinitely without Reaching It
Also: Limits within Finite Numbers
Mathematicians speak of limits in similar ways. Mathematical infinity is a quantity

we cannot actually reach by counting finite numbers. It is a “limit” that we may
approach indefinitely without ever actually reaching it. There are also limits within
the system of finite numbers. The number one, for example, is the limit of the
148
series ½ + ¼ + 1/8. … The series approaches one without ever actually reaching it.
Unlike infinity and the God of Kant, the number one can be known actually to exist
in the finite world. But, like infinity and the Kantian God, it never becomes a
member of the series of which it is a limit. In some ways, however, we treat
mathematical limits as if they were the highest members of the series which they
limit.
范泰爾的「界限觀念」與世俗的相似，但卻不同
范泰爾的「界限觀念」有「好像」的特徵
它們給人現實世界的知識；不僅是抽象的觀念
CVT’S Limiting Concept: Similar But Different
It Has “As If” Character
They May Convey Knowledge of Real World; Not Merely Abstract
Van Til’s concept is a somewhat similar to the others I have mentioned, but also
significantly different from them. Van Til’s limiting concepts have an “as if”
character about them, but they may also convey knowledge of the real world,
unlike Kant’s limiting concept. They are not merely abstract, as are the limits of
mathematics: they can convey truth about concrete things, persons, and events.
Here is an example:
We have to speak as if sin would have destroyed the work of God. That was
certainly its ethical intent. But we know that that is not an ultimate metaphysical
possibility, for it was already, from all eternity, a part of the plan of God that sin
should be defeated through the work of Christ. (CGG, 199-200.)
范泰爾的關注：有人可能從「罪不可能破壞上帝的工作」這前提開始，
而作出錯誤的結論：罪在歷史中就不需要普遍恩典的約束
有些邏輯推論是可能的，但卻是錯誤的
CVT’S Concern: One May Start with Premise (Sin Can’t Destroy God’s Work)
& Deduce Wrongly: Sin Needs No Restraint in History
Some Logical Deductions Are Plausible But Badly Mistaken
Now Van Til’s concern is this: somebody might start with the premise that sin
cannot destroy the work of God, and then deduce from that premise the
conclusion that sin needed no common-grace restraint in history. Or, one might
start from the premise that sin is a serious threat to the fulfillment of God’s plan
and conclude that God did not foreordain sin’s defeat. Both of these logical
deductions are plausible, but both are badly mistaken, in Van Til’s view.
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由「上帝的主權」這前提而推論「人沒有責任」
這種推論是可能的，但卻是錯誤的
God’s Sovereignty -> Deny Man’s Responsibility (or vice versa) ?
Deductions Are Plausible, But Wrong
Or, to make it simpler: one might use the concept of divine sovereignty to deny
human responsibility, or vice versa. That sort of deduction is plausible to many;
both hyper-Calvinists and Arminians see these two concepts as opposed to one
another. The hyper-Calvinist opts for divine sovereignty and denies or
compromises human responsibility; the Arminian does the reverse.
范泰爾批判這些「推論主義」
基督教的思想不是「推論式系統」
弗蘭姆：所推出的結論不可與《聖經》的教導衝突
CVT Critiques These = “Deductivism”
Christian Thought Is Not “Deductive System”
Frame: Deductions Must Not Contradict Bible’s Teachings
Van Til disparages this sort of argument as “deductivism.” (CTK, 38; DF1, 204-205,
227; PDS, 123; IST, 257; CGG, 202.) The system of Christian thought is not a
“deductive” system, he says. To my knowledge, Van Til never defines “deductive”
in this sense, but evidently he means to say here (1) that we should not try to
develop a theological system by deducing everything from one “master-concept”
such as the sovereignty of God (SCE, 20; DF2, 7-8) and (2) that theology ought not
to make deductions from one or more doctrines, the conclusions of which
contradict other scriptural teachings. (See references in the previous notes; also
IST, 256; JA, 126.)
《聖經》每一個教義都是「界限」或「補充」觀念
神學家的任務：整合《聖經》教義的不同層面
Each Biblical Doctrine = Limiting/Supplementing Concept
Theologian Must Integrate Aspects of Bible Teaching
Rather, we should treat each biblical doctrine as a “limiting” or “supplementative”

concept. [He uses these two terms interchangeably. By the way, in this discussion I
am following Van Til and ignoring the philosophical distinction between concepts
and propositions (doctrines and teachings being groups of propositions). Most of
Van Til’s statements about concepts can be translated into language about
propositions and vice versa.] The theologian’s thinking should be always and only
an attempt to integrate the various aspects of biblical teaching. In doing so he is
deeply conscious of the fact that every “concept” he employs must be limited by
every other “concept” he employs, and that therefore his “system” is an effort to
restate in his confession the truth as it is in Jesus. (SCE, 20.)
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因此，當人把《聖經》內容（啟示）系統化時，
人的系統是服在《聖經》之下，不是獨立於《聖經》之外
基督教的「系統」概念與世俗現代哲學的「系統」不同
范泰爾稱這服在《聖經》之下的系統為「暗示方法」
Thus: When Man Makes System of Bible Content (Revelation),

This System = Subject to Scripture, Not Independent of It
Christian’s Idea of “System” = Different from “System” in Modern Philosophy
CVT Calls This “Method of Implication”
Therefore: “When man makes a ‘system’ for himself of the content of revelation
given him in Scripture, this system is subject to, not independent of, Scripture.
Thus the idea of system employed by the Christian is quite different from the idea
of system as employed in modern philosophy.” (CGG, 200. Interestingly, he cites
G.C. Berkouwer as one who has contributed to our understanding of Christian
limiting concepts. I would also note at this point that Van Til sometimes refers to
this method of returning over and over to Scripture as the “method of
implication.” This phrase comes from idealist philosophy, but Van Til criticizes the
idealist use of it. See SCE, 6-10, 200-201; JA, 302; CTETH, 203.)
我們的教義是靠近在上帝裏的「豐滿真理」
非基督徒的思想只是靠近一個「抽象的真理」
非基督徒至終是不可知論者
基督徒的觀念：上帝是可知的，但因為上帝是不可（透）知的，
我們對上帝的認識，不可能窮究祂存有的豐滿
Our Doctrines = Approximations to Truth’s Fullness in God
Non-Christian Thought: Approximation = To Abstract Truth,
Non-Christian = Ultimately Skeptic
Christian: God = Knowable, But Because God = Incomprehensible,
Our Knowledge Do not Exhaust Fullness of His Being
It follows that our doctrines are “‘approximations’ to the fullness of truth as it is in

God.” (CGG, 11) Van Til emphasizes that he is not speaking of approximations to
abstract truth, as in non-Christian thought. That concept of approximation is
based on an ultimate skepticism. The Christian view, rather, is based upon the
incomprehensibility of God. God is knowable, but, because he is incomprehensible,
our concepts do not exhaust the fullness of his being.
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那麼，基督徒的「界限觀念」是甚麼？
當我們使用這些觀念時，必須以其他觀念平衡之
《聖經》每一個教義，都必須從別的教義的角度理解
不然，我們就墮進「推論主義」，我們的結論會與《聖經》矛盾
What Are Christian Limiting Concepts?
When Using These Concepts, We Must Balance with Others
Each Scriptural Teaching Must Be Read in Light of Others
If Not: “Deductivism” – Conclusions Will Contradict Bible
What, then, are Christian limiting or supplementary concepts? From the above
descriptions – characteristically, Van Til gives no definition – I would say that these
are concepts which, to be properly understood and employed, must be balanced
by other concepts. In the theological case, the teachings of Scripture are limiting
concepts, because each must be read in the light of other scriptural teachings. If
we do not do that, we fall into the danger of “deductivism,” drawing conclusions
from one doctrine that might well contradict another biblical truth.
從《聖經》的教義來看《聖經》的教義：
這對我們作的邏輯推論有所約束
Reading Bible Doctrines in Light of Other Doctrines:
This Restrains Our Drawing of Logical Deductions
To read each biblical doctrine in the light of the others will sometimes restrain our
drawing of logical deductions. Van Til argues that if we understand divine
sovereignty in the light of human responsibility and vice versa, we will not draw
the inferences from these doctrines that are drawn by the hyper-Calvinists and the
Arminians. For the fully biblical doctrine of divine sovereignty does not contradict
the fully biblical view of human responsibility, nor the reverse.
這些考慮是否就排除所有邏輯推論？
范泰爾：不，他自己也作不少邏輯推論
Do These Considerations Rule Out Use of Logical Deductions?
CVT: No. He Does a Lot of It
But do these considerations rule out all use of logical deduction from biblical
premises? Van Til evidently did not think so, for he engaged in quite a bit of logical
deduction, as we have seen. However, to my knowledge, he never answered this
question explicitly, nor did he attempt to show that his own use of logical
deduction was not deductivist. I think, though, that the following explanation fits
in with his overall epistemology:
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弗蘭姆的解釋
Frame’s Explanation
Sometimes, when we interpret one doctrine in the light of the others, we are
restrained from making deductions that we might be tempted to make if we were
looking at each doctrine in isolation from the others. That is the case in Van Til’s
examples concerning divine sovereignty and human responsibility. But there are
other times, when that process of comparing doctrines motivates us toward
performing logical deductions. For example, when we understand the doctrine of
Scripture’s self-attestation in the light of God’s self-contained fullness, we learn
that indeed it is possible (with some additional premises) to deduce the former
from the latter. In these cases, indeed, we have an obligation to perform the
requisite deductions. Pieper’s refusal to draw the proper deductions from divine
sovereignty is, given Van Til’s exegesis, properly described as “irrational.” Van Til
would say to Pieper that if he had a fuller biblical understanding of divine
sovereignty and of the will of man, he would not hesitate to draw the same logical
inferences that Calvinists do.
類比系統並不排除邏輯推論
但邏輯推論必須受「謹慎而考慮上下文語境的解經」所管治
Analogical System = Not a System Devoid of Logical Inference
But Logical Inference = Governed by
Careful Interpretation of Scripture In Context
The analogical system, then, is not a system devoid of logical inference. It is rather
a system in which logical inference is governed by careful, contextual
interpretation of the Scriptures. Logicians all know that logical inferences will not
work if the meanings of crucial terms vary through the argument. Sound principles
of interpretation, therefore, are a necessary prerequisite for logical inference. It is
easy to come up with logical arguments that look plausible, even persuasive, but
which miss the nuances, or even the central points, of biblical teaching.

153
III. 又回到「表面矛盾」
APPARENT CONTRADICTION AGAIN
NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 13, pp. 169.)
We must return to the questions of the previous chapter. If we are to think

analogically, using Christian limiting concepts, we should not deduce from God’s
unity that he cannot be three, or vice versa. Nor should we reason that because
God has foreordained all things, finite beings cannot bring glory to him. Insofar as
these paradoxes influence everything we say about God and man, they inject
“apparent contradiction” into all of our theology.
從「上帝是一」我們可以作出很多推論，都不與「上帝是三位」衝突
We Can Make Deductions from God’s Unity
Which Do Not Compromise His Triune Nature
But we can make many deductions from God’s unity that do not compromise his
triune nature. For example, since the true God is one, and we must worship only a
true God, it follows that we must not worship many gods. And to reason that since
God foreordains all things, he foreordains the fluctuations of the stock market,
does not compromise the full bucket paradox.
承認有表面矛盾，不等於完全不可用邏輯
我們必須常常自問：
我的推論是否與「上帝的本性」和「創造主及被造物的關係」衝突？
有些推論會；有些不會
To Admit Apparent Contradictions = Not to Renounce All Use of Logic
Always Ask: Do Our Deductions Run Afoul of God’s Nature &
Creator-Creature Relationship?
Some Do; Some Don’t
Therefore, to acknowledge apparent contradictions is not to renounce all use of

logic. To be sure, we must always ask ourselves whether our attempts at logical
deduction run afoul of the general paradoxes pertaining to the divine nature and
the Creator-creature relationship. Some such attempts do; some do not. If we
have asked this question in a responsible way, then nothing prevents our free use
of logical deduction.
154
「解釋」在「邏輯推論」之前；同時，「邏輯」是「解釋」的一部分
No Surprise: Interpretation = Prior to Logical Deduction
Also: Logic = Part of Interpretation
It should surprise nobody that interpretation is in one sense prior to logical

deduction. (Of course, logic is also part of interpretation. The two disciplines are
mutually dependent.) Even the classical syllogism, “All men are mortal; Socrates is
a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal,” works only if the words of the premises are
taken in certain senses. It will not work, for example, if “man” in the second
sentence refers to a chess piece. In this respect, Van Til is not saying anything new
or profound.
這一點，對神學重要，對靈命也重要：我們必須不斷回到上帝的話
我們不會達到一個僅憑邏輯技巧建構的系統，而不問：上帝在《聖經》說甚麼？
The Point = Important for Theology; Also Important Spiritually
We Must Continue to Return to Word of God
We Never Reach a System Built Only with Logical Skills,
Without Asking: What Did God Say in Scripture?
Theologically and spiritually, however, the point is important. We must, as

theologians, continually go back to the Word of God, over and over again. We
never reach a point where we can construct a system through our logical skills
alone, without asking again and again, “What did God say in Scripture?”
155
IV. 多元視角主義
MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM
「多元視角主義」並不是范泰爾的用語（是弗蘭姆的用語）
范泰爾常把他的系統的不同層面聯繫起來，也把不同層面與整體聯繫起來
“Multiperspectivalism”: Not CVT’s term (Frame’s term)
CVT Relates System’s Aspects to One Another & to Whole
Another way to consider the logical structure of the analogical system is to think
of it as multi-perspectival. This is not Van Til’s term, but I consider it a good
description of Van Til’s typical way of relating various aspects of his system to one
another and to the whole. One element of the system is perspectivally related to
another or to the whole, when, upon reflection, it is seen to include the other, or
even to include the whole. Since many elements of the system have this
characteristic, the whole can be seen from various perspectives.
例子：啟示的四重屬性，每一項屬性都暗示其他三項
先驗與後驗思維；歸納與推理；理性、情感與意志；護教的起點、方法、結論
Examples: 4 Attributes of Revelation: Each Implies Others
A Priori and A Posteriori Reason; Induction and Deduction;
Intellect, Emotions and Will; Starting Pt., Method, & Conclusion of Apologetics
We have already seen a number of these relationships. In chapter 9, I presented

Van Til’s view of the four attributes of revelation, namely, necessity, authority,
clarity, and sufficiency. In Van Til’s analysis, each of these implies the others. Thus,
the four aspects constitute a whole which can be seen from any one of the four. In
chapter 10, we saw that Van Til makes similar points about a priori and a
posteriori reasoning, induction and deduction. Rather than seeing these as rigidly
distinct, as philosophers sometimes have, Van Til regards these as united in a
single act of interpretation. In chapter 11, we saw Van Til make a similar
suggestion about the relations between intellect, emotions, and will in human
psychology. He sees these as aspects of a unified human self, not as autonomous,
competing “faculties.” I sought, in response, to represent these even more
perspectivally, as “involved in one another” and quite inseparable, thus making
untenable the traditional concept of the primacy of the intellect. Later in this book,
we will see that in Van Til’s apologetic, the starting point, method, and conclusion
are involved in one another, creating an inevitable circularity. And in chapter 16,
we will see that in Van Til’s doctrine of common grace, “earlier” and “later” are
perspectivally related.
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范泰爾的各樣「多元視角主義」乃植根於其「三位一體論」
父、子、靈既是彼此參與，但每一個位格又是個別獨特的
Root of CVT’s Various Perspectivalisms = His Doctrine of the Trinity
Father, Son, Spirit = Mutually Involved; Yet Each = Distinct
The root of these perspectivalisms is Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity, which we
considered in chapter 5. Father, Son, and Spirit are “mutually involved,” without
losing their distinctness. Each embodies the complete divine essence, so each is
God from a particular perspective. Lest we embrace modalism, of course, it is also
important for us to say that the perspectives represent genuine eternal
distinctions within the one Godhead, not just the subjective viewpoints of those
who come to know God.
三一真神是「多元視角」，因此，世界也是「多元視角」
永恆的「一而眾」與時空的「一而眾」有關
世界的不同層面彼此反映、彼此連接、都反映世界的整體
Trinity = Perspectival; Thus, World = Perspectival
Eternal One-and-Many = Related to Temporal One-and-Many
World’s Aspects – Reflect, Connect with One Another; & Mirror the Whole
Since the Trinity is perspectival, the world is also. This is another way of stating
Van Til’s view of the relation between the eternal one-and-many and the temporal
one-and-many. The world, too, has many aspects that reflect one another,
connect with one another, and mirror the whole.
從消極方面而言：「視角主義」約束我們在三一真神裏尋找「絕對優先」
「視角主義」也約束我們在宇宙中尋找「絕對優先」
當然，上帝是絕對優先於世界，從預定、創造、護理、救贖可以看到
Negatively: Perspectivalism Discourages Us to Find Absolute Priorities
Among 3 Persons of Trinity, Or Among Elements of Universe
Of Course: God = Absolutely Prior to the World,
Embodied in Foreordiantion, Creation, Providence, Redemption
Negatively, perspectivalism discourages us from finding absolute priorities among

the divine persons, or among the elements of creation. Of course, there is an
absolute priority of God to the world, embodied in the concepts of foreordination,
Creation, providence, and redemption by grace. But Scripture warns us against
putting one person of the Trinity above another.
157
又要謹慎使用此原則，不要拒絕任何的優先
例如「聖父上帝」暗示某一種的優先性：「永恆中的不受生」
很難為此觀念下定義，但「父」在永恆裏是「子」的「父」
Use This Principle With Care: Don’t Reject Any Priority
“Father” Suggests Some Primacy: “Eternal Begetting”
Difficult to Define This Idea, But Father = FATHER to the Son in Eternity
One does have to employ this principle with some care, rather than unthinkingly
rejecting every sort of priority. The name Father does suggest some kind of
primacy of the first person to the others, which has been expressed theologically
by the concept of “eternal begetting.” This idea is very difficult to define, although
it is plain in Scripture that the Father is related to the Son as Father through all
eternity.
顯然，「子」在救贖計劃裏是從屬「父」，但在本體上並不低於父
子來到世界上，為要成就父的旨意，這是對的
Son = Economically Subordinate to Father, But Not Ontologically Inferior
The Son Comes to Do the Father’s Will = That’s Right
What is clear is that the economic subordination of the Son is not inappropriate to
his ontological status. Somehow, it is eternally right that the Son “comes to do the
Father’s will.”
可是，子的神性並不來自父（加爾文 autotheiotes）
Son Did not Derive Deity from Father (Calvin: autotheiotes)
Nevertheless, Christian theologians have always insisted that there is no eternal,

ontological subordination within the Trinity as to power or glory. All three persons
are fully God and share the divine lordship. Nor, as Calvin emphasized with his
doctrine of autotheiotes, is the deity of the Son derived from that of the Father.
Each of the persons is “in” the other two.
沒有哪一個「上帝的屬性」比其他的更優先
No Attributes of God = Prior to Any Other
And, in God, no attribute is prior to any other. Each belongs to all the others in the
unity of the divine essence.
同樣，宇宙中也沒有「絕對優先」的高低等級（駁斥新柏拉圖主義）
所有被造物在上帝面前，基本上是同等的，然而，卻有不同的角色與權柄
《聖經》關於權柄的教義，總是強調彼此負責，縱使角色有別
Also: No Priority/Hierarchy in Creation (contra Neo-Platonism)
All Creatures = Fundamentally Equal Before God;
158
Yes, Different Roles & Levels of Authority
Bible’s Doctrine of Authority Emphasizes Reciprocal Responsibility,
While Roles = Different
It is similar with creation. While Scripture does not entirely exclude priorities –
hierarchical relationships within the world – the general structure of creation is
not hierarchical (as in Neoplatonism and Scholasticism) but perspectival. All
creatures are fundamentally equal before God. God may give them different roles
and different levels of authority, but as the servants obey their masters, so the
masters serve their servants. It is remarkable how the biblical doctrine of authority
repeatedly emphasizes this reciprocal responsibility, while affirming genuine
distinctions of role: see Matthew 20:26-28; Romans 12:3-21; 1 Corinthians 7:1-4;
11:7-12; 12:1-14:39; Ephesians 4:1-13; 5:22-6:9; Colossians 3:18-4:1; 1 Peter
2:13-3:9.
太 20:26-28
26 只是在你們中間，不可這樣；你們中間誰願為大，就必作你們的用人；
27 誰願為首，就必作你們的僕人。
28 正如人子來，不是要受人的服事，乃是要服事人，並且要捨命，作多人的贖價。
羅 12:3-21
3 我憑著所賜我的恩對你們各人說：不要看自己過於所當看的，要照著神所分給各人信
心的大小，看得合乎中道。
4 正如我們一個身子上有好些肢體，肢體也不都是一樣的用處。
5 我們這許多人，在基督裏成為一身，互相聯絡作肢體，也是如此。
6 按我們所得的恩賜，各有不同。或說豫言，就當照著信心的程度說豫言，
7 或作執事，就當專一執事；或作教導的，就當專一教導；
8 或作勸化的，就當專一勸化；施捨的，就當誠實；治理的，就當殷勤；憐憫人的，就
當甘心。
9 愛人不可虛假；惡要厭惡，善要親近。
10 愛弟兄，要彼此親熱；恭敬人，要彼此推讓。
11 殷勤不可懶惰。要心裏火熱，常常服事主。
12 在指望中要喜樂，在患難中要忍耐，禱告要恆切。
13 聖徒缺乏要幫補；客要一味的款待。
14 逼迫你們的，要給他們祝福；只要祝福，不可咒詛。
15 與喜樂的人要同樂；與哀哭的人要同哭。
16 要彼此同心；不要志氣高大，倒要俯就卑微的人（人：或作事）；不要自以為聰明。
17 不要以惡報惡；眾人以為美的事要留心去作。
18 若是能行，總要盡力與眾人和睦。
19 親愛的弟兄，不要自己伸冤，寧可讓步，聽憑主怒（或作：讓人發怒）；因為經上記
著：主說：伸冤在我；我必報應。
20 所以，你的仇敵若餓了，就給他喫，若渴了，就給他喝；因為你這樣行就是把炭火堆
在他的頭上。
21 你不可為惡所勝，反要以善勝惡。
林前 7:1-4
1 論到你們信上所提的事，我說男不近女倒好。
2 但要免淫亂的事，男子當各有自己的妻子；女子也當各有自己的丈夫。
3 丈夫當用合宜之分待妻子；妻子待丈夫也要如此。
4 妻子沒有權柄主張自己的身子，乃在丈夫；丈夫也沒有權柄主張自己的身子，乃在妻
子。
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林前 11:7-12
7 男人本不該蒙著頭，因為他是神的形像和榮耀；但女人是男人的榮耀。
8 起初，男人不是由女人而出，女人乃是由男人而出。
9 並且男人不是為女人造的；女人乃是為男人造的。
10 因此，女人為天使的緣故，應當在頭上有服權柄的記號。
11 然而照主的安排，女也不是無男，男也不是無女。
12 因為女人原是由男人而出，男人也是由女人而出；但萬有都是出乎神。
林前 12:1-14:39
12:1 弟兄們，論到屬靈的恩賜，我不願意你們不明白。
12:2 你們作外邦人的時候，隨事被牽引，受迷惑，去服事那啞吧偶像，這是你們知道的。
12:3 所以我告訴你們，被神的靈感動的，沒有說耶穌是可咒詛的；若不是被聖靈感動的，
也沒有能說耶穌是主的。
12:4 恩賜原有分別，聖靈卻是一位。
12:5 職事也有分別，主卻是一位。
12:6 功用也有分別，神卻是一位，在眾人裏面運行一切的事。
12:7 聖靈顯在各人身上，是叫人得益處。
12:8 這人蒙聖靈賜他智慧的言語，那人也蒙這位聖靈賜他知識的言語，
12:9 又有一人蒙這位聖靈賜他信心，還有一人蒙這位聖靈賜他醫病的恩賜，
12:10 又叫一人能行異能，又叫一人能作先知，又叫一人能辨別諸靈，又叫一人能說方言，
又叫一人能繙方言。
12:11 這一切都是這位聖靈所運行、隨己意分給各人的。
12:12 就如身子是一個，卻有許多肢體；而且肢體雖多，仍是一個身子；基督也是這樣。
12:13 我們不拘是猶太人，是希利尼人，是為奴的，是自主的，都從一位聖靈受洗，成了一
個身體，飲於一位聖靈。
12:14 身子原不是一個肢體，乃是許多肢體。
12:15 設若腳說：我不是手，所以不屬乎身子；他不能因此就不屬乎身子。
12:16 設若耳說：我不是眼，所以不屬乎身子；他也不能因此就不屬乎身子。
12:17 若全身是眼，從那裏聽聲呢﹖若全身是耳，從那裏聞味呢﹖
12:18 但如今，神隨自己的意思把肢體俱各安排在身上了。
12:19 若都是一個肢體，身子在那裏呢﹖
12:20 但如今肢體是多的，身子卻是一個。
12:21 眼不能對手說：我用不著你；頭也不能對腳說：我用不著你。
12:22 不但如此，身上肢體人以為軟弱的，更是不可少的。
12:23 身上肢體，我們看為不體面的，越發給他加上體面；不俊美的，越發得著俊美。
12:24 我們俊美的肢體，自然用不著裝飾；但神配搭這身子，把加倍的體面給那有缺欠的肢體，
12:25 免得身上分門別類，總要肢體彼此相顧。
12:26 若一個肢體受苦，所有的肢體就一同受苦；若一個肢體得榮耀，所有的肢體就一同快樂。
12:27 你們就是基督的身子，並且各自作肢體。
12:28 神在教會所設立的：第一是使徒，第二是先知，第三是教師，其次是行異能的，再次是
得恩賜醫病的，幫助人的，治理事的，說方言的。
12:29 豈都是使徒麼﹖豈都是先知麼﹖豈都是教師麼﹖豈都是行異能的麼﹖
12:30 豈都是得恩賜醫病的麼﹖豈都是說方言的麼﹖豈都是繙方言的麼﹖
12:31 你們要切切的求那更大的恩賜。我現今把最妙的道指示你們。
13:1 我若能說萬人的方言，並天使的話語，卻沒有愛，我就成了鳴的鑼，響的鈸一般。
13:2 我若有先知講道之能，也明白各樣的奧祕，各樣的知識，而且有全備的信，叫我能彀
移山，卻沒有愛，我就算不得甚麼。
13:3 我若將所有的賙濟窮人，又捨己身叫人焚燒，卻沒有愛，仍然與我無益。
13:4 愛是恆久忍耐，又有恩慈；愛是不嫉妒；愛是不自誇，不張狂，
13:5 不作害羞的事，不求自己的益處，不輕易發怒，不計算人的惡，
13:6 不喜歡不義，只喜歡真理；
13:7 凡事包容，凡事相信，凡事盼望，凡事忍耐。
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13:8 愛是永不止息。先知講道之能終必歸於無有；說方言之能終必停止；知識也終必歸於
無有。
13:9 我們現在所知道的有限，先知所講的也有限，
13:10 等那完全的來到，這有限的必歸於無有了。
13:11 我作孩子的時候，話語像孩子，心思像孩子，意念像孩子，既成了人，就把孩子的事
丟棄了。
13:12 我們如今彷彿對著鏡子觀看，糢糊不清（原文作：如同猜謎）；到那時就要面對面了。
我如今所知道的有限，到那時就全知道，如同主知道我一樣。
13:13 如今常存的有信，有望，有愛這三樣，其中最大的是愛。
14:1 你們要追求愛，也要切慕屬靈的恩賜，其中更要羨慕的，是作先知講道（原文作：是
說豫言；下同）
14:2 那說方言的，原不是對人說，乃是對神說，因為沒有人聽出來。然而，他在心靈裏卻
是講說各樣的奧祕。
14:3 但作先知講道的，是對人說，要造就、安慰、勸勉人。
14:4 說方言的，是造就自己；作先知講道的，乃是造就教會。
14:5 我願意你們都說方言，更願意你們作先知講道；因為說方言的，若不繙出來，使教會
被造就，那作先知講道的，就比他強了。
14:6 弟兄們，我到你們那裏去，若只說方言，不用啟示，或知識，或豫言，或教訓，給你
們講解，我與你們有甚麼益處呢﹖
14:7 就是那有聲無氣的物，或簫，或琴，若發出來的聲音沒有分別，怎能知道所吹所彈的
是甚麼呢﹖
14:8 若吹無定的號聲，誰能豫備打仗呢﹖
14:9 你們也是如此。舌頭若不說容易明白的話，怎能知道所說的是甚麼呢﹖這就是向空說
話了。
14:10 世上的聲音，或者甚多，卻沒有一樣是無意思的。
14:11 我若不明白那聲音的意思，這說話的人必以我為化外之人，我也以他為化外之人。
14:12 你們也是如此，既是切慕屬靈的恩賜，就當求多得造就教會的恩賜。
14:13 所以那說方言的，就當求著能繙出來。
14:14 我若用方言禱告，是我的靈禱告，但我的悟性沒有果效。
14:15 這卻怎麼樣呢﹖我要用靈禱告，也要用悟性禱告；我要用靈歌唱，也要用悟性歌唱。
14:16 不然，你用靈祝謝，那在座不通方言的人，既然不明白你的話，怎能在你感謝的時候
說阿們呢﹖
14:17 你感謝的固然是好，無奈不能造就別人。
14:18 我感謝神，我說方言比你們眾人還多。
14:19 但在教會中，寧可用悟性說五句教導人的話，強如說萬句方言。
14:20 弟兄們，在心志上不要作小孩子。然而，在惡事上要作嬰孩，在心志上總要作大人。
14:21 律法上記著：主說：我要用外邦人的舌頭和外邦人的嘴唇向這百姓說話；雖然如此，
他們還是不聽從我。
14:22 這樣看來，說方言不是為信的人作證據，乃是為不信的人；作先知講道不是為不信的人
作證據，乃是為信的人。
14:23 所以，全教會聚在一處的時候，若都說方言，偶然有不通方言的，或是不信的人進來，
豈不說你們癲狂了麼﹖
14:24 若都作先知講道，偶然有不信的，或是不通方言的人進來，就被眾人勸醒，被眾人審明，
14:25 他心裏的隱情顯露出來，就必將臉伏地，敬拜神，說：神真是在你們中間了。
14:26 弟兄們，這卻怎麼樣呢﹖你們聚會的時候，各人或有詩歌，或有教訓，或有啟示，或有
方言，或有繙出來的話，凡事都當造就人。
14:27 若有說方言的，只好兩個人，至多三個人，且要輪流著說，也要一個人繙出來。
14:28 若沒有人繙，就當在會中閉口，只對自己和神說就是了。
14:29 至於作先知講道的，只好兩個人或是三個人，其餘的就當慎思明辨。
14:30 若旁邊坐著的得了啟示，那先說話的就當閉口不言。
14:31 因為你們都可以一個一個的作先知講道，叫眾人學道理，叫眾人得勸勉。
14:32 先知的靈原是順服先知的；
14:33 因為神不是叫人混亂，乃是叫人安靜。
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14:34 婦女在會中要閉口不言，像在聖徒的眾教會一樣，因為不准他們說話。他們總要順服，
正如律法所說的。
14:35 他們若要學甚麼，可以在家裏問自己的丈夫，因為婦女在會中說話原是可恥的。
14:36 神的道理豈是從你們出來麼﹖豈是單臨到你們麼﹖
14:37 若有人以為自己是先知，或是屬靈的，就該知道，我所寫給你們的是主的命令。
14:38 若有不知道的，就由他不知道罷！
14:39 所以我弟兄們，你們要切慕作先知講道，也不要禁止說方言。
弗 4:1-13
1 我為主被囚的勸你們：既然蒙召，行事為人就當與蒙召的恩相稱。
2 凡事謙虛、溫柔、忍耐，用愛心互相寬容，
3 用和平彼此聯絡，竭力保守聖靈所賜合而為一的心。
4 身體只有一個，聖靈只有一個，正如你們蒙召同有一個指望。
5 一主，一信，一洗，
6 一神，就是眾人的父，超乎眾人之上，貫乎眾人之中，也住在眾人之內。
7 我們各人蒙恩，都是照基督所量給各人的恩賜。
8 所以經上說：他升上高天的時候，擄掠了仇敵，將各樣的恩賜賞給人。
9 （既說升上，豈不是先降在地下麼﹖
10 那降下的，就是遠升諸天之上要充滿萬有的。）
11 他所賜的，有使徒，有先知，有傳福音的，有牧師和教師，
12 為要成全聖徒，各盡其職，建立基督的身體，
13 直等到我們眾人在真道上同歸於一，認識神的兒子，得以長大成人，滿有基督長成的
身量，
弗 5:22-6:9
5:22 你們作妻子的，當順服自己的丈夫，如同順服主。
5:23 因為丈夫是妻子的頭，如同基督是教會的頭；他又是教會全體的救主。
5:24 教會怎樣順服基督，妻子也要怎樣凡事順服丈夫。
5:25 你們作丈夫的，要愛你們的妻子，正如基督愛教會，為教會捨己。
5:26 要用水藉著道把教會洗淨，成為聖潔，
5:27 可以獻給自己，作個榮耀的教會，毫無玷污、皺紋等類的病，乃是聖潔沒有瑕疵的。
5:28 丈夫也當照樣愛妻子，如同愛自己的身子；愛妻子便是愛自己了。
5:29 從來沒有人恨惡自己的身子，總是保養顧惜，正像基督待教會一樣，
5:30 因我們是他身上的肢體（有古卷在此有：就是他的骨他的肉）。
5:31 為這個緣故，人要離開父母，與妻子連合，二人成為一體。
5:32 這是極大的奧祕，但我是指著基督和教會說的。
5:33 然而，你們各人都當愛妻子，如同愛自己一樣。妻子也當敬重他的丈夫。
6:1 你們作兒女的，要在主裏聽從父母，這是理所當然的。
6:2-3 要孝敬父母，使你得福，在世長壽。這是第一條帶應許的誡命。
6:4 你們作父親的，不要惹兒女的氣，只要照著主的教訓和警戒養育他們。
6:5 你們作僕人的，要懼怕戰兢，用誠實的心聽從你們肉身的主人，好像聽從基督一般。
6:6 不要只在眼前事奉，像是討人喜歡的，要像基督的僕人，從心裏遵行神的旨意。
6:7 甘心事奉，好像服事主，不像服事人。
6:8 因為曉得各人所行的善事，不論是為奴的，是自主的，都必按所行的得主的賞賜。
6:9 你們作主人的，待僕人也是一理，不要威嚇他們。因為知道，他們和你們同有一位主
在天上；他並不偏待人。
西 3:18-4:1
3:18 你們作妻子的，當順服自己的丈夫，這在主裏面是相宜的。
3:19 你們作丈夫的，要愛你們的妻子，不可苦待他們。
3:20 你們作兒女的，要凡事聽從父母，因為這是主所喜悅的。
3:21 你們作父親的，不要惹兒女的氣，恐怕他們失了志氣。
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3:22 你們作僕人的，要凡事聽從你們肉身的主人，不要只在眼前事奉，像是討人喜歡的，
總要存心誠實敬畏主。
3:23 無論作甚麼，都要從心裏作，像是給主作的，不是給人作的，
3:24 因你們知道從主那裏必得著基業為賞賜；你們所事奉的乃是主基督。
3:25 那行不義的必受不義的報應；主並不偏待人。
4:1 你們作主人的，要公公平平的待僕人，因為知道你們也有一位主在天上。
彼前 2:13-3:9
2:13 你們為主的緣故，要順服人的一切制度，或是在上的君王，
2:14 或是君王所派罰惡賞善的臣宰。
2:15 因為神的旨意原是要你們行善，可以堵住那糊塗無知人的口。
2:16 你們雖是自由的，卻不可藉著自由遮蓋惡毒，（或作：陰毒）總要作神的僕人。
2:17 務要尊敬眾人，親愛教中的弟兄，敬畏神，尊敬君王。
2:18 你們作僕人的，凡事要存敬畏的心順服主人；不但順服那善良溫和的，就是那乖僻的
也要順服。
2:19 倘若人為叫良心對得住神，就忍受冤屈的苦楚，這是可喜愛的。
2:20 你們若因犯罪受責打，能忍耐，有甚麼可誇的呢﹖但你們若因行善受苦，能忍耐，這
在神看是可喜愛的。
2:21 你們蒙召原是為此；因基督也為你們受過苦，給你們留下榜樣，叫你們跟隨他的腳蹤
行。
2:22 他並沒有犯罪，口裏也沒有詭詐。
2:23 他被罵不還口；受害不說威嚇的話，只將自己交託那按公義審判人的主。
2:24 他被掛在木頭上，親身擔當了我們的罪，使我們既然在罪上死，就得以在義上活。因
他受的鞭傷，你們便得了醫治。
2:25 你們從前好像迷路的羊，如今卻歸到你們靈魂的牧人監督了。
3:1 你們作妻子的要順服自己的丈夫；這樣，若有不信從道理的丈夫，他們雖然不聽道，
也可以因妻子的品行被感化過來；
3:2 這正是因看見你們有貞潔的品行和敬畏的心。
3:3 你們不要以外面的辮頭髮，戴金飾，穿美衣為妝飾，
3:4 只要以裏面存著長久溫柔，安靜的心為妝飾；這在神面前是極寶貴的。
3:5 因為古時仰賴神的聖潔婦人正是以此為妝飾，順服自己的丈夫，
3:6 就如撒拉聽從亞伯拉罕，稱他為主。你們若行善，不因恐嚇而害怕，便是撒拉的女兒
了。
3:7 你們作丈夫的，也要按情理（原文是知識）和妻子同住；因他比你軟弱，（比你軟弱：
原文作是軟弱的器皿）與你一同承受生命之恩的，所以要敬重他。這樣，便叫你們的
禱告沒有阻礙。
3:8 總而言之，你們都要同心，彼此體恤，相愛如弟兄，存慈憐謙卑的心。
3:9 不以惡報惡，以辱罵還辱罵，倒要祝福；因你們是為此蒙召，好叫你們承受福氣。
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這同樣適切於哲學上「形而上學」與「知識論」的問題
有關「事實與定律」：不要以「抽象的事實或定律」作開始或結束
這同樣適切於「邏輯與事實」或「理性與經驗」的關係
在人類的知識裏，主體、客體、準則是不能分割的
我們「對其一的認識」會影響我們「對其他的認識」
Philosophical Questions of Metaphysics & Epistemology
Facts & Laws – Don’t Start/End with Abstract Fact/Law
Logic and Fact, Reason and Experience
In Human Knowledge: Subject, Object, & Norm
Our Knowledge of One Affects Our Knowledge of the Others
It is also similar with philosophical questions of metaphysics and epistemology. As

we saw in our discussion of facts and laws, it is wrong to seek an absolute starting
point for human thought within the creation, apart from God’s revelation. Some
have sought this starting point in abstract law, others in abstract particularity. But
there is no pure law without particularity, or vice versa. Indeed, the concepts of
“pure law” and “pure particularity” are unintelligible. The laws are unintelligible
apart from the particulars; they are an aspect of the particulars – and vice versa.
The same is true for the relationships of logic to fact, or reason to experience. In
human knowledge, the subject, the object, and the norm are inseparable. Our
knowledge of one affects our knowledge of the others. (CTETH, 131, passim; CFC,
96; CC, 3:28; DF2, 67; IW, 23, 25.)
在范泰爾的基督教類比系統裏，並沒有絕對的起點或終點
唯一例外：整個系統乃服在上帝的啟示之下
相對於杜伊威德與加爾文主義哲學學派，范泰爾對「知識百科」並不執著
加爾文主義哲學學派認為「知識百科」是最重要的哲學問題
In CVT’s Christian Analogical System: No Absolute Beginning/Ending
Except: Whole System = Subordinate to God’s Revelation
CVT: Casual about “Encyclopedia”
Contra Dooyeweerd & “Calvinist Philosophy” School
“Calvinist Philosophy” School – Encyclopedia=Major Philosophical Problem
Thus, in Van Til’s concept of a Christian analogical system, there are no absolute
beginnings and endings, except for the subordination of the whole system to
God’s revelation. It is interesting that Van Til tends to be very casual about
matters of “encyclopedia,” the relationships between various intellectual
disciplines. Van Til’s Dutch predecessors and contemporaries, particularly Kuyper,
and even more Dooyeweerd’s school, were very meticulous in defining the exact
boundaries of every science. Dutch Christian philosophers have seemed to believe
that encyclopedia was the major philosophical problem – that once one
determines the precise subject matter for every science, one will have solved most
philosophical problems.
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范泰爾對「護教學」與「證據學」的區分也不執著
護教學與證據學是「不同視角」，「基督教有神論」是一整體
《聖經》對「宗教和倫理的教導」與「對物質宇宙的斷言」是不能分割的
辯護與正面宣稱、護教與神學都是並行的
護教學是「信差」和「探子」
凱伯用了三冊討論，范泰爾只用了三頁
CVT: Distinction between Apologetics & Evidences is Casual
Apologetics & Evidences = Perspectivally Related; Christian Theism = Whole
Religious & Moral Instructions of Bible & Bible on Physical Universe
Defense and Positive Statement, Apologetics and Theology:
Apologetics = Messenger Boy, Scout
Kuyper Did It in 3 Volumes, CVT Did It in 3 Pages
In the light of this background, Van Til’s attitude toward such questions seems
shockingly loose. He begins Christian Apologetics by defining the difference
between apologetics and evidences: apologetics deals primarily with theism, and
evidences with Christianity, but “the whole matter is a question of emphasis. That
the whole question can be no more than one of emphasis and never one of
separation is due to the fact that Christian theism is a unit. Christianity and theism
are implied in one another.” (CA, 1.)
It is a difference in “emphasis,” and only that, because the two disciplines are
perspectivally related in the unity of Christian theism as a whole. Similarly, you
cannot “separate the so-called religious and moral instructions of the Bible from
what it says, e.g., about the physical universe.” (CA, 2.) And “defense and positive
statement go hand in hand.” (CA, 3.) Apologetics and theology, too, are
interrelated. Theology consists mainly of positive statements and apologetics of
defense, but you really cannot do one without the other. Hence, “the place of
apologetics cannot be very closely defined.” (CA, 3.) The best we can do is to use
figures: the apologetics is a “messenger boy” who facilitates communication
between different theological disciplines. Or, he is a “scout,” “to detect in advance
and by night the location and, I possible, some of the movements of the enemy.”
(CA, 3.) But that is about as much as we can say. “This really completes the story
of Christian encyclopedia.” (CA, 3.) What took Abraham Kuyper three volumes to
describe, Van Til completes in three pages!
駁斥華爾非德：「護教學為整個神學架構建立根基」
范泰爾：護教學若要知道要為甚麼辯護，必須預設整個神學架構
Contra Warfield: “Apologetic Lays Theistic Foundation for Edifice of Theology”
CVT: Apologetics Presupposes Complete Edifice of Theology,
If It Knows What to Defend
And we can, of course, forget Warfield’s idea that apologetics must somehow lay
the theistic foundation before the edifice of Christian theology can be built. On
Van Til’s view, apologetics itself must presuppose the completed edifice of
theology if it is to know what it is to defend. (IST, 2-3. )
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同樣，神學是同時處理上帝、人與世界
「系統神學」在傳統上畫分不同部份只是「不同重點」
駁斥 Howe：不要過分強調「宣講」與「護教」的區分
And Theology Deals with God, Man, World Simultaneously
Traditional Divisions of Systematic Theology = Only “Difference in Emphasis”
CVT contra. Howe: Kergyma and Apologia = Not Sharply Distinct
Nor can theology deal with God without simultaneously dealing with the world
and with man; the traditional divisions of systematic theology are also only
“differences in emphasis.” (IST, 1-2.) And Van Til informs Frederick Howe in
Jerusalem and Athens that he does not care for Howe’s sharp distinction between
kerygma and apologia (preaching and defense), for the two are quite inseparable.
(JA, 445-452.)
與杜伊威德的分歧：杜氏把「純真經驗」與「理論思想」分割
范泰爾：兩者只是程度上不同
「神學」與「哲學」亦然：從「形而上學」或「知識論」開始，都無問題
Contra Dooyeweerd: Naïve Experience vs. Theoretical Thought?
Van Til: 2 Differ in Degree Only
Same with Theology and Philosophy
Begin with Metaphysics or Epistemology? Doesn’t Matter
Contra Dooyeweerd, the distinction between naïve experience and theoretical

thought, around which Dooyeweerd builds his entire system, should be regarded
as a difference in degree. (CC, 2:3, p. 6.) The same is true for theology and
philosophy. (SCE, 193; CTETH, 5.) It does not matter, he says, whether one begins
with metaphysics or epistemology. (SCE, 29, contra, Jim Halsey, who suggests in a
critique of my VTT that Van Til always insisted on beginning with metaphysics
rather than epistemology. See his “A Preliminary Critique of Van Til: The
Theologian,” WTJ 39 (1976): 120-136.)
有些教義比較關鍵，是基督教系統的中心
但有許多中心！例如人在歷史中墮落、上帝在時空中創造、預定、三位一體等
所有教義都以「視角」聯繫
每一教義提供一個「視角」來理解整個基督教系統
Some Doctrines = Central/Crucial to Christian System
Many Centers! E.g. Historical Fall; Temporal Creation; Predestination; Trinity
All = Perspectivally Related
Each Doctrine Provides a Perspective Which Whole of Christianity = Viewed
There are, of course, various doctrines that Van Til considers central or crucial to
the Christian system. However, these are indeed various; there are many
“centers”! The historical Fall is crucial to a sound theology. (IST, 29.) So is the
temporal Creation. (DF1, 229.) Predestination is the “central doctrine of the
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Reformation.” (TJD, 76.) The Trinity is the “heart of Christianity.” (DF1, 28.) But if
there are many centers, they would seem to be perspectivally related. Each major
doctrine provides a perspective in terms of which the whole of Christianity can be
viewed.
一個教義必須導致另一教義
基督教有神論的每一層面，都靠整個基督教有神論來理解
「起點」、「方法」與「結論」都彼此包含在內
One Doctrine Frequently Necessitates Another
Meaning of Each Aspect of Christian Theism Depends on Christian Theism As a
Unit
Starting Point, Method, Conclusion = Always Involved in One Another
Thus, one doctrine frequently necessitates another, as we saw early in this chapter.
In general, “a truly Protestant method of reasoning involves a stress upon the fact
that the meaning of every aspect or part of Christian theism depends upon
Christian theism as a unit. … [T]he whole claim of Christian theism is in question in
any debate about any fact.” (CA, 73.) Again, “The starting point, the method, and
the conclusion are always involved in one another.” (CA, 62.)
在上一節可見，「解釋」在「推論」之前；「推論」在「解釋」之前
在本節可見，「解釋」如何使「邏輯推論」合理
「視角主義」是《聖經》不同教義的邏輯架構
「視角關係」往往使「邏輯推論」合乎《聖經》的理
Interpretation = Prior to Inference; Inference = Prior to Interpretation
Here: How Interpretation Warrants Logical Inference
Perspectivalism = Logical Structure of Biblical Doctrines
Perspectival Relationships = (Often) Biblical Warrant for Logical Inferences
In the previous section, I emphasized that interpretation is in one sense prior to

inference (and of course, vice versa!). In this section, we are showing concretely
how interpretation warrants logical inference. Perspectivalism is the logical
structure of biblical doctrines, and perspectival relationships are frequently the
biblical warrant for logical inferences.
基督教的真理「系統」不是幾何學的推理系統
基督教的「系統」是上帝啟示的所有真理的「視角性整體」
每一項真理都預設其他真理，都意涵其他真理
這就是上帝的啟示的架構，因此，我們不需遲疑應用邏輯推論
不錯，《聖經》啟示包含一些表面上的矛盾；
可是：《聖經》也給予「邏輯推論」合理性
整個《聖經》真理的架構鼓勵我們作邏輯推論
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“System” of Christian Truth = NOT Deductive System (e.g. Euclid’s Axioms)
Christian “System” = Perspectival Unity of Revealed Truths
Each Truth Presupposes and Implies Others
This is Structure of God’s Revelation – Thus, We Use Logical Inference (Freely)
Yes, There Are Apparent Contradictions in Revelation;
But: Scripture Often Legitimates Logical Inference
Overall Structure of Biblical Truth Encourages Logical Inference
The “system” of Christian truth, therefore, is not a deductive system like Euclid’s
axioms, but a perspectival unity of various revealed truths, which on reflection can
be seen to presuppose and imply one another. As we see that this is indeed the
structure of God’s revelation, we lose that hesitancy about using logical inference
described in the previous section. Although there are apparent contradictions in
revelation, there are also many cases in which Scripture legitimates logical
inference, and the overall structure of biblical truth strongly encourages it.
基督教有神論是一個整體，是一致的，這非常造就我們
當我們看到一個教義如何來自其他教義，也引致其他教義，
我們更會體會上帝的智慧，我們會長進
每一個「教義之間的關係」都使我們更加認識每一個教義
范泰爾是重要的系統神學家（不僅是護教學家）
例如「否認創造」＝「否認上帝」
范泰爾留下巨大的神學遺產，留下研究的潛質，對教會非常有價值
Christian-Theistic System = One (Unity):Remarkably Edifies Us
When We See How Each Doctrine Follows from Others, Implies Others,
We Grow in Our Appreciation of God’s Wisdom
Each Inter-Doctrinal Relationship Teaches More About the Doctrines
Van Til = Important Systematic Theologian (Not Only An Apologist)
E.g. Denying Creation = Denial God
Van Til Leaves Huge Legacy of Theological Ideas with Potential Value to Church
Van Til’s emphasis on the unity of the Christian-theistic system is remarkably

edifying. We grow in our appreciation of God’s wisdom when we see how each
doctrine follows from and implies the others. Each of these inter-doctrinal
relationships teaches us something more about the doctrines so related. Thus,
Van Til’s importance as a dogmatician, even apart from his more specifically
apologetic ideas, should not be underestimated. A book could be written, for
example, about how the denial of Creation entails the denial of God. Van Til does
not belabor the point; he simply sets it before us. But if it is true, it is enormously
significant, for it would profoundly affect the way many people today think of
Creation and about God. Van Til does this sort of thing over and over again,
leaving an enormous legacy of theological ideas of enormous potential value to
the church.
168
「范泰爾的進路」與「近年來關於啟示的『中心焦點』的關注」的對照
主流（自由派）神學家摒棄《聖經》的權威，
於是尋求《聖經》裏面的一些「權威性」的東西（內容），
並把它與他們不能相信的《聖經》內容分開，稱之為《聖經》的「中心焦點」
不錯，有些正統思想家也想在《聖經》裏找出《聖經》強調的中心思想
總之，很多派別的「神學」都宣稱基督教真理有這樣或那樣的「中心性」
Van Til’s Approach vs. Emphasis on “Central Focus” of Christian Revelation
Since Mainstream Theologians Abandon Scripture Authority,
They Seek Something Authoritative IN Scripture –
To Separate It from Content of Scripture Which They Can’t Believe
This Authoritative Element = Called “Central Focus” of Scripture
Sure, Orthodox Thinkers Also Want to Identify Central Emphases of Scripture
Anyway: Many Theologies Claim “Centrality” of This or That in Christian Faith
Van Til’s approach also has another interesting ramification. In the last two
centuries, there has been much concern in theology over the “central focus” of
the Christian revelation. I suspect that the main reason for this is that since
scriptural authority in the orthodox sense has been abandoned by “mainstream”
theologians, they have sought to find something authoritative in Scripture that
they could separate from the content they deem unbelievable. They tend to call
that authoritative element of scriptural teaching the “central focus” of Scripture.
Of course, there has also been among orthodox thinkers a concern to identify the
central emphases of the Word of God. At any rate, many theologies have arisen
attempting to persuade us of the “centrality” of something or other in the
Christian faith. There have been theologians of the Word, of crisis, of personal
encounter, of divine acts, of history, of hope, of self-understanding, of celebration,
of covenant law, of doxology, and so on.
范泰爾：《聖經》有許多「中心性」的教義，彼此有「視角性」的關聯
上帝不是給我們一項真理，要求我們從這項真理推出所有其他教義
相反，上帝給我們一個複雜的啟示，有不同真理，構成一個一致的整體
我們不可挑一個教義而排除其他，而期待有足夠概念資源建構完整的神學
每一個教義都支持其他教義，亦必須導致其他教義（必須性）
Van Til: There Are Many “Central” Doctrines, Perspectivally Related
God Doesn’t Give One Axiom – We Deduce Everything Else From It
Rather, God Gives Us a Complex Revelation of Many Truths in Unity
We Can’t Pick One Doctrine, Set Aside Others, And Expect to
Have Enough Concepts (Resources) to Construct a Complete Theology
Each Doctrine Supports and Necessitates Other Doctrines
Van Til, however, reminds us that, as we saw above, there are many “central”
doctrines, perspectivally related. God does not give us a single axiom from which
everything else must be deduced; rather, he gives us a complex revelation of
many truths in unity. We cannot pick one doctrine out from the complex, set
others aside, and expect to have sufficient conceptual resources to construct a
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complete Christian theology. In Christianity, the “central” doctrines do not
become central by canceling out other scriptural teachings, as in the liberal
theologies. Rather, they undergird, support, and necessitate these other
doctrines.
一個真的「基督教真理系統」是可能的
但不是從人自主的思想而來，
以人的自主思維來挑選一個教義，在《聖經》啟示以外找自主的起點
真的基督教真理系統乃是從浸淫在《聖經》啟示的有機整體而來
The Possibility of a Genuine System of Christian Truth
It Doesn’t Come From Autonomous Reasoning
Autonomous Mind Picks/Chooses Doctrine,
Seeks Some Autonomous Starting Point Outside Biblical Revelation
System of Christian Truth Comes From Immersing in Organism of Revelation
We can see, now, concretely, how a genuine system of Christian truth is possible.
It does not come about through autonomous reasoning, which picks and chooses
among biblical doctrines and seeks some autonomous starting point outside
biblical revelation altogether. Rather, it comes from immersion in the organism of
revelation, an organism that presents apparent contradictions to our minds, while
also overwhelming us with its own logical unity.

[ CC = Christianity in Conflict ]
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第十四章證據
EVIDENCE
I. 證據
EVIDENCE
范泰爾的理性觀：批判賀治對理性在神學上的功能的三要點
CVT’s on Reason: Critiques Hodge’s 3 Points about Use of Reason in Theology
1. 理性的優先（參本書第十二章）
Primacy of Intellect
2. 邏輯（參本書第十三章）
Logic
3. 理性為上帝啟示的證據的審核者（參本書第十四章）
Reason As Judge of the Evidences of A Revelation
鄭重介紹：Thom Nataro, Van Til And The Use Of Evidence

Recommend: Thom Nataro, Van Til And The Use Of Evidence
In chapter 11, I began to analyze Van Til’s view of reason by discussing his critique
of Charles Hodge’s three points about the function of reason in theology. So far I
have discussed two of them, the primacy of the intellect (chap. 12) and logic (chap.
13). We must now move on to the third, “Reason as Judge of the Evidences of a
Revelation.” [IST, 41. I recommend Thom Notaro’s Van Til and the Use of Evidence
(Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980) as an excellent and fuller
discussion of this issue.]
在知識論中，「事實與定律」的關係可見於「邏輯與證據」的區別上
「邏輯」訂下人類思想（在最抽象的層面）的定律
「證據」是「邏輯」要處理的資料
「證據」為邏輯論證提供「前提」；而「邏輯」則為「用證據推論」提供規則
Facts and laws in epistemology = “logic and evidence”
Logic sets laws of man’s thought (at most abstract level)
Evidence = data, which logic deals with
Evidence supplies premises for logical arguments
Logic supplies rules for inference
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In chapter 5, we discussed the relationship between facts and laws. In
epistemology, that relationship is reflected in the distinction between logic and
evidence. Logic sets forth the laws of human thought at the most abstract level.
Evidence is the data with which logic deals. Evidence supplies the premises for
logical arguments, while logic supplies the rules of inference.
范泰爾：「邏輯」與「定律」關聯，而「證據」也與「事實」關聯
「邏輯」提供最廣泛的「思維定律」，這是宇宙最抽象的定律
邏輯指引我們的思維過程
「證據」指出經驗上的事實，作為我們推論（論證）的前提（premises）
Cvt: Logic Coordinated With Law, Evidence Coordinated With Fact
Logic Formulates Broadest Laws of Thought
Most Abstract Laws of the Universe
Logic Directs Us in Thinking Process
Evidence States Experiential facts = Premises in Argument
In Van Til’s thought, logic is coordinated with law, and evidence with fact. Logic
formulates the broadest laws of thought, which are also the most abstract laws of
the universe, so as to direct us in the thinking process. Evidence states the facts of
experience in such a way that they can serve as premises for arguments. So Van Til
regularly correlates evidence and fact, and in this chapter we will be discussing
both concepts. [Compare the discussion of facts and laws in chap. 5 (CVT).]
賀治：「判斷啟示的證據」是正當地使用理性
信心是「在足夠的基礎上理智領受真理」
《聖經》不要求人在不夠證據的情況下而去相信
Hodge: Judging Evidences of Revelation = Legitimate Use of Reason
Faith = Intelligently Receives Truth on Adequate Grounds
Scripture Never Demands Faith Without Adequate Evidence
Hodge says that it is a “legitimate use of reason” for it to “judge the evidences of
any revelation that comes to it.” Faith, he argues, is “an intelligent reception of
the truth on adequate grounds,” and Scripture never demands faith “except on
grounds of adequate evidence.” (IST, 41, quoting Hodge, Systematic Theology,
1:53.)
范泰爾有否向賀治提出異議？范泰爾的立場讓我們驚奇：
賀治沒有區分基督徒與非基督徒如何使用證據
Does Van Til Disagree With Hodge? Van Til Surprises Us:
Hodge Fails to Distinguish Between Christian & Non-Christian Use of Evidence
As I said in connection with Hodge’s view of logic, one who knows a little about
Van Til might expect him simply to disagree with Hodge at this point. It does not
sound Van Tillian to speak of reason “judging” revelation, either by logic or by
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evidence. Van Til’s position, however, is not so easily predicted. He does not
deny Hodge’s assertion. Rather, as in the case of logic, he criticizes Hodge for a sin
of omission – for failing to distinguish between Christian and non-Christian uses of
evidence.
范泰爾對證據抱積極態度，與賀治同意：
基督教的信仰是根據證據的，不是盲目的
基督教能滿足理性的每一個合理要求
Van Til = Positive Attitude to Evidence, Agrees With Hodge:
Christian Faith = Based on Evidence, Not Blind
Christianity Meets Every Legitimate Demand of Reason
In general, Van Til’s attitude toward evidence, like his attitude toward logic, is
quite positive. On the same page, Van Til speaks of “the truth for which Hodge is
contending,” suggesting that Hodge’s statement (considered apart from its
omission) is in itself true. He also agrees with Hodge’s successor, B. B. Warfield,
that “Christian faith is not a blind faith but is faith based on evidence.” (CTK, 250.)
He is even able to say that “Christianity meets every legitimate demand of
reason.” (CGG, 184.)
人人都可「從被造宇宙」和「從自己（上帝的形像）」認識上帝
對「上帝的存在」和「基督教有神論的真理」，都有「絕對確定的證據」
證據如此清楚，我們可以確實知道「上帝存在」
證據是確實的，不僅僅是「可能」或「或然率的可能」
All Know God From Creation, & From Self As God’s Image
There’s Absolutely Certain Proof For God’s Existence
And For the Truth of Christian Theism
Proof = So Clear, We Can Be Certain God Exists
Evidence = Certain, Not Merely Possible / Probable
Van Til believes that all people know God from the created world and from
themselves as God’s image (Rom. 1:18-21). With regard to the existence of God
and the truth of Christian theism, there is “absolutely certain proof.” (DF2, 103; CA,
64.) That proof is so clear that we can be certain of God’s existence. (IST, 114-115;
CA, 13; NS, 278-279.) The evidence itself is certain, not merely “possible” or
“probable.” (IST, 114-115; CA, 13; NS, 278-279.)
羅 1:18-21
20 自從造天地以來，神的永能和神性是明明可知的，雖是眼不能見，但藉著所造之物就可以
曉得，叫人無可推諉。
21 因為，他們雖然知道神，卻不當作神榮耀他，也不感謝他。他們的思念變為虛妄，無知的
心就昏暗了。
173
有一個能說服人的「上帝存在的論據」
所有事實都證明上帝，因為必須預設上帝，才能理解任何事實
There’s a Cogent “Theistic Proof”
Indeed: Every Fact Proves God, Because:
We Must Presuppose God to Understand Any Fact
There is a cogent “theistic proof.” (IST, 102-104, 196; DF1, 196; CTK, 292; CGG,
179-180, 191-195; SCE, 109-110.) Indeed, every fact proves God, since no fact can
be understood intelligibly without presupposing God. (IST, 14, 17.)
我們必須強調的這點，是向來被范泰爾的批判者所忽略的
他們說：范泰爾否認證據的合理性，並指范氏是「純粹唯信主義者」（fedeist）
「唯信主義」意指我們對上帝的認識是根據信心，絕沒有考慮證據或理性因素
這指控錯了！范氏同意賀治和華爾非德立場：基督教的信心是根據證據
而最根本（終極）的證據是「上帝的啟示」
We Must Stress This, For CVT’s Critics Persist to Ignore It
“CVT Denies Proof / Evidence = Legitimate = Pure Fideist”
Fideism: We Know God Based on Faith, Apart From Any
Evidence or Rational Consideration
No! CVT (w/ Hodge, Warfield): Christian Faith = Based on Evidence
Ultimately Based on Evidence of God’s Revelation
This point must be stressed, because critics of Van Til persist in overlooking it. It is
widely alleged that he simply denies the legitimacy of proof or evidence, resorting
to a pure fideism. (Fideism is the view that our knowledge of God is based on faith
apart from any evidence or rational considerations. Van Til, on the contrary,
agrees with Hodge and Warfield that Christian faith is based on evidence,
ultimately the evidence of divine revelation.)
賓諾克：范氏拒絕論證與證據，不能逃脫被指控為「唯信主義」
Clark Pinnock: Van Til Refuses Arguments & Evidence;
Van Til Cannot Escape Charge of Fideism
Clark Pinnock, for example, says, “Although the majority Christian view over the
centuries has been that Christian theism could be securely grounded by means of
rational arguments and empirical considerations, Van Til refuses to have anything
to do with it.” (JA, 421.) According to him, Van Til “cannot escape the charge of
fideism, the view that truth in religion is ultimately based on faith rather than on
reasoning or evidence.” (JA, 423; cf. p. 425.)
事實上，范泰爾強烈地批評唯信主義
在范氏《我為甚麼信上帝》的小冊裏，為「唯信主義的基督徒」向非信徒道歉
In Fact, CVT Strongly Criticizes Fideism
Apologizes to Non-Christian For Christians’ Fideism
174
In His Booklet, Why I Believe in God
In fact, Van Til has often spoken against fideism, in very strong terms. In his
evangelistic pamphlet Why I Believe in God, he apologizes to his unbelieving friend
for the fideistic approaches of some Christians:
In our great concern to win men we have allowed that the evidence for God’s
existence is only probably compelling. And from that fatal confession we have
gone one step further down to the point where we have admitted or virtually
admitted that it is not really compelling at all. And so we fall back on
testimony instead of argument. After all, we say, God is not found at the end
of an argument; He is found in our hearts. So we simply testify to men that
once we were dead, and now we are alive, and that once we were blind and
that now we see, and give up all intellectual argument.
Do you suppose that our God approves of this attitude of His followers? I do
not think so. … A testimony that is not an argument is not a testimony either,
just as an argument that is not a testimony is not even an argument. (P. 16; cf.
RP, 65-66; CTEV, 34-35. Notice the perspectival relationship between
argument and testimony.)
基督教的信仰不是盲目的，非基督徒的「信仰」才是！
基督教的信仰宣稱是理性的，且與事實相符
范泰爾經常鼓勵人研究基督教的信仰在科學和歷史上的證據
Christian Faith Isn’t Blind; Non-Christian “Faith” Is!
Christian Faith Claims to Be Rational, In Accord with facts
CVT Endorses Study of History & Science for Christianity
It is not Christian faith, but non-Christian “faith” that is blind. (PDS, 52; CGG, 184.)
Christian faith claims to be both rational and in accord with the facts. (JA, 20.) Van
Til often endorses detailed study of scientific and historical evidences for
Christianity. (DF1, 258; CTK, 293; CTEV, 64-65; IST, 146.)
很多人批評范泰爾是唯信主義，因為范氏批評某些傳統的「證據觀」
范泰爾不僅關注如何使用證據，還關注「證據哲學」
“CVT = Fideist”. For He Critiques Traditional Concepts of Evidence
CVT’s Concern = Use of Evidence & Philosophy of Evidence
People accuse Van Til of fideism because he criticizes certain traditional concepts
of evidence. As with logic, Van Til’s concerns pertain to both the “philosophy” and
the “use” of evidences.
175
范泰爾論賀治：「表面上」賀治「似乎」假設人人都同意理性和證據的本質，
但事實剛好相反，人們並不同意如何使用理性
范氏似乎並不確定應否這樣批評賀治；但因為問題重要，所以討論它
范氏同意賀治：理性有權判斷啟示的證據
范氏更關注賀治所疏忽的問題
CVT on Hodge: All Men In fact Disagree How to Use Reason
“On Surface” Hodge “Seems” to Say All Men Agree on Nature of Reason and
Evidence
CVT = Unsure That Should He Criticize Hodge on This?
But He Discusses It, Because Topic = Important
CVT Agrees: Reason Has Right to Judge revelation’s Evidences
Hodge’s Problem = Omission
In his discussion of Hodge, he says: “On the surface at least [Hodge’s] manner of
statement again seems to assume that all men, regenerate and non-regenerate,
agree on the nature of reason and evidence. But this is contrary to fact.” (IST, 41.)
In passing, let me note the qualifications “on the surface” and “seems.” It appears
that Van Til here is somewhat unsure that Hodge is actually subject to his criticism,
but that he chooses to discuss it anyway because of its importance. However, as
we have seen before, Van Til evidently does not want to take issue with Hodge’s
major and explicit point, that reason has the right to judge the evidences of
revelation. He is rather concerned with the omissions in Hodge’s discussion.
第一項疏忽乃在「證據的哲學」上
證據（與邏輯一樣）是建基於上帝的本性、祂的永恆計劃、創造與護理的作為
因為上帝是主權的上帝，所以祂在宇宙中及我們身上的所有作為都清楚啟示祂
First Omission: In “Philosophy of Evidence”
Evidence (Like Logic) – Grounded In God’s Nature,
Eternal Plan, Acts of Creation and Providence
God = Sovereign. Thus: All His Work Clearly Reveal Him:
All of Creation, Including Ourselves
The first omission is in the area of the philosophy of evidence. Like logic, evidence
is grounded in God’s nature, His eternal plan, and his creative and providential
activity. As we have seen, Van Til holds that because God is sovereign, he is clearly
revealed in all his works – in all of creation, including ourselves.
被造宇宙反映三位一體真神，事實與定律是相互有關的
「孤存事實」並不存在
「孤存事實」是指沒有被上帝預先解釋過的事實，因此是「沒有意義的」
「孤存事實」是一個純粹偶然的「宇宙」的成分
必須記得，范泰爾所謂的「孤存事實」不是指「客觀事實」
若把兩者混為一談，我們會誤以「主觀」來理解范氏立場；
我們也會誤用范氏的批判來針對「客觀」的支持者（范氏認為自己是客觀的）
176
Creation Reflects Trinity, Facts & Laws = Correlate
“Brute Fact” Doesn’t Exist
“Brute Fact” = Un-Interpreted by God, thus: meaningless
They Are Part of a Universe of Pure Chance
Remember, For CVT: Brute Fact = Not Objective Fact
If We Confuse 2, We Take CVT in Subjecive Sense;
And We May Be Tempted to Use CVT’s Critique Against “Objectivity”
CVT Asserts Objectivity
We have also seen that since the creation reflects the Trinity, facts and laws are
correlative. There are no “brute” facts. In Van Til’s vocabulary, “brute” facts are
facts un-interpreted by God and therefore meaningless, the constituents of a
universe of pure chance. (CTEV, 51. It is important that we keep Van Til’s
definition in mind. The phrase “brute fact” is sometimes used merely mean
“objective fact.” If we confuse the two definitions we will misunderstand Van Til,
taking him in a subjectivist sense. We may also be tempted to use his critique
against those who are merely using the phrase to assert objectivity, which, of
course, Van Til also wants to assert.)
哲學家和科學家有時會用「孤存事實」作為思想的基礎
因為他們想在上帝的啟示以外找到思想的起點
他們認為人類的思維是至高終極的，因此，不可能建基於上帝的先存思維
他們認為人類的思維必須建基於先於一切思維的事物，也就是建基於「事實」
這些「孤存事實」若能使思維合法，必須獨立於人類思維加於現實上的定律
但這種「孤存事實」是沒有意義的
Philosophers / Scientists Base Thought on “Brute Fact”
For They Want Starting Point Outside God’s Revelation
Human Thought = Ultimate
Thus: It = Based Not on God’s Prior Thought,
= Based on Something Prior to All Thought = Based on “Fact”
“Brute Facts” Must Be Independent of Laws Which Man Imputes on Reality
If They Can Justify Man’s Thought
But Such a Fact Is Meaningless
Philosophers and scientists have sometimes sought to base their thinking on

“brute fact,” because they have wanted to find a starting point for human thought
outside of God’s revelation. Since, on their view, human thought is ultimate, it
must be based, not on God’s prior thought, but on something prior to all thought,
namely fact. These brute facts must be utterly independent of the laws imputed to
reality by human thought, if they are to be the justification for human thought.
But such a fact is a meaningless fact, as we saw in our discussion of facts and laws
in chapter 5. (Cf. Van Til’s discussion in CTEV, 50-65; CGG, 1-9.)
177
相反，基督徒訴諸事實，但不是「孤存事實」
我們訴諸那些由上帝預先解釋過的事實
Christians Appeal to Facts, But Never Brute Facts
But: God-Interpreted Facts
On the contrary, Christians “appeal to facts, but never to brute facts. We appeal
to God-interpreted facts.” [CTEV, 57 (emphasis by Van Til). On the same page, Van
Til identifies this procedure with his method of “implication into God’s
interpretation.”]
范氏這樣提出事實和證據的「哲學」問題
我們不但堅持基督教是符合事實的，更要澄清「事實」是指甚麼意思
我們必須指出哲學性的問題
In This Way, CVT Raises Question of
“Philosophy of Fact” or “Philosophy of Evidence”
We Claim: Christian = Factual, But More:
We Clarify What We Mean By “Fact”
Must Face the Philosophical Question
It is thus that Van Til raises the question of the “philosophy” of fact and evidence.
We must, he says, not only claim that Christianity is factual, but also clarify what
we mean by fact. We must address the philosophical question. (Cf. DF2, 7-8; CTEV,
vii-ix.)
哲學性的問題對如何使用證據有其意涵，范泰爾說：
我看「歸納」和「分析」是同一解釋過程的成分
我會從歷史護教。雖然我不常做，因我神學院的同事做得比我好
所有聖經科、考古學、歷史的研究，都必然證實基督教的真理宣稱
但我除提出事實以外，必會向非基督徒的「事實哲學」提出挑戰
每一事實，因為它證明基督教的真理，因此是事實，也必然是事實
Philosophical Question – Implications For Evidence Uses. CVT Says:
Induction and Analysis = Part of One Process of Interpretation
I Would Engage in Apologetics From History
I Don’t Do It Often, For My WTS Colleagues Do It Better
Each Historical Study (Biblical Studies, Archaeology, General History)
Confirm Truth of Christianity’s Claims
But I Won’t Endlessly Discuss Fact
I Would Challenge Non-Christian’s Philosophy of Fact
Each Fact Is Fact, Must Be Fact, Because It Proves Christianity
The philosophical issue has implications for our use of evidences. Van Til says:
178
I see induction and analytical reasoning as part of one process of
interpretation. I would therefore engage in historical apologetics. (I do not
personally do a great deal of this because my colleagues in the other
departments of the Seminary in which I teach are doing it better than I could
do it.) Every bit of historical investigation, whether it be in the directly biblical
field, archaeology, or in general history, is bound to confirm the truth of the
claims of the Christian position. But I would not talk endlessly about facts and
more facts without ever challenging the unbeliever’s philosophy of fact. A
really fruitful historical apologetic argues that every fact is and must be such
as proves the truth of the Christian position. (CTK, 293.)
必須區分范泰爾「在哲學上的建議」和「在傳福音策略上的建議」
范氏的證據哲學是全然符合《聖經》的，也應作為基督徒的準則
稱之為「唯信主義」？那就是誤解了范泰爾，接受不信者「孤存事實」的立場
Distinguish:CVT’s Philosophical & Strategic Recommendations
CVT’s Philosophy of Evidence = Entirely Biblical = Normative For Christians
Call It “Fideistic”?
You Misunderstand CVT, Accept Unbelieving (Brute Fact) Alternative
It is important that we distinguish here between Van Til’s philosophical and his
strategic recommendations. His philosophy of evidence, I believe, is entirely
biblical and therefore normative for Christians. To call it “fideistic” is either to
misunderstand it or to accept the unbelieving (“brute fact”) alternative.
再者，這種「事實觀」必然導致「循環論證」（見後文）
可是基督徒不可否認：事實是事實，因為上帝說它們是事實
「事實」不是人類自主知識的某種至高終極的基礎
More Later: This View of Fact Leads to Circular Argument
But No Christian Denies: Facts Are What God Says They Are
Facts = Not Ultimate Ground for Autonomous Knowledge
There is, of course, more to be said about this issue. I shall discuss in a later
chapter the charge that this view of fact leads to circular argument. But no
Christian, certainly, can deny that the facts are what God says they are. No
Christian can properly think of facts as some sort of ultimate foundation for
would-be autonomous human knowledge.
范泰爾對傳福音策略的建議：不要不斷討論事實，而從不挑戰非信徒的哲學
CVT’s Strategic Recommendtion: Don’t Talk Endlessly About facts
And Not Challenge Non-Christian’s Philosophy
Van Til’s strategic recommendation is that we should not talk “endlessly” about
facts “without ever challenging the unbeliever’s philosophy.”
179
弗蘭姆：沒有人想要「不斷」地討論任何事！
而今天的急務是向非信徒思想的「方法論」提出挑戰
Frame: Nobody Wants to Talk Endlessly About Anything!
Crying Need Today:
For Serious Challenge to MethodologyIn Non-Christian Thought
Well, nobody wants to talk endlessly about anything! And it is certainly true that
the crying need today (as in Van Til’s time), in intellectual discussions, is for a
serious challenge to the basic methodology of unbelieving thought.
但不是所有基督徒都在這麼高超的理性水平上傳福音
有些慕道朋友並不能理解哲學性的問題
我們必須給每一位上大學課嗎？可能對一些人是需要，但不是每次都需要
有些人歸正是透過簡單的福音信息，例如論到基督復活的證據或個人的見證
Not All Christian Witnessing = On High Intellectual Level
Many Non-Christians = Not Capable of Understanding Philosophy
Must We Give Everyone a Philosophy Lesson?
Perhaps to Some; But Not Always Needed
Some = Converted by Simple Presentation
Through Evidences for Jesus’ Resurrection, or Personal Testimony
However, not all Christian witnessing is on such an exalted intellectual level. Many
people with whom we share Christ are not capable of understanding philosophical
issue. Must we give philosophical instruction to every unsophisticated inquirer?
Perhaps to some, but I do not think that is always necessary. Some people, after
all, are converted through relatively simple presentations of, say, the evidences of
Jesus’ resurrection, or even through a simple “testimony.”
若有人問我基督復活有甚麼證據，我會簡單地告訴他
他若提出知識論的問題（例如休謨所謂「永不夠見證證明超自然事件」）
我或會用「專有字眼」，或會用「簡單的比喻」來處理「事實哲學」
但不是每次傳福音都需要如此
《聖經》也不是用這方式來表達
If Someone Asks Me for Evidences for Resurrection, I Will Simply tell them
If He Raises Epistemological Objections (e.g. Hume’s),
I’ll Deal with Philosophy of Fact, Technically or Simply
But This = Not Necessary for Every Gospel Presentation
Bible Doesn’t Do It Explicitly
If someone asks me what evidences there are for the Resurrection, I will simply
tell him. If, then, he raises epistemological objections (such as Hume’s objection
that there can never be sufficient testimony to establish a supernatural event),
then I will try, either in technical language or by simple illustration, to deal with
180
the philosophy of fact. But that is surely not necessary for every presentation of
the gospel. Scripture itself does not do it in any explicit way.
范泰爾的同事也不是每次都處理「事實哲學」
CVT’s Colleagues Don’t Always Deal With Philosophy of Fact
Nor did Van Til’s colleagues, whom he commends in the above-quoted passage for
their work in historical apologetics. Members of Westminster’s biblical
departments, such as Robert Dick Wilson, Oswald Allis, Edward J. Young, Meredith
Kline, Ned Stonehouse, John Skilton – and, indeed, J. Gresham Machen – did
considerable work in historical apologetics, but rarely about the philosophy of
fact.
若范泰爾看到上述這三段文字，我不知道他會怎麼想？
他一般不注重這些「實際」問題
他的旨趣乃在他的年代的宏觀思想衝突，而不是個人談道的策略
不過，范泰爾常常作個人佈道
從范泰爾的宏觀觀點來看：
基督徒和非基督徒都要意識彼此在事實哲學上的重大分歧
What Would CVT Think of What I Just Wrote?
He Typically Doesn’t Think in “Practical Terms”
His Interest = Huge Intellectual Conflicts of His Time
Not Strategies for One-To-One Witnessing
But CVT Does Quite a Bit of One-To-One Witnessing
From CVT’s Macro Viewponit, He Sees:
Both Christians & Non-Christians Needed to be Aware of Philosophical
Differences of Fact issues
I am not sure what Van Til would have thought about the previous three
paragraphs. Typically, he did not think in such “practical” terms. He was interested
in the large-scale intellectual conflicts of his age, not in witnessing strategies for
one-to-one encounters (He did quite a bit of one-to-one witnessing, however.),
nor even in the detailed defense of the Bible. From his macrocosmic viewpoint, he
saw that both Christians and non-Christians needed to become aware of the great
philosophical differences over the issue of evidences.
不要在范泰爾的思想系統裏假設「宏觀與微觀」、「一般與個別」、
「寬闊的策略與爭辯的細節」之間有甚麼直接關聯
范泰爾對宏觀問題的看法是對的；世上是有兩種「事實哲學」的
Don’t Assume in CVT’s Thought, There’s Direct Correlation
Between Macro and Micro, General and Particular, Broad Strategy and Detail in
Argument
CVT Is Quite Right About Big Picture; There Are Two Philosophies of Fact
181
We should not assume in Van Til’s thought a direct correlation between
macrocosmic and microcosmic, general and particular, broad strategy and
argumentative detail. Van Til is quite right, at least, about the big picture. It is still
vitally important for us to communicate, to believer and unbeliever alike, that
there are two philosophies of fact, and that the unbelieving philosophy must not
be taken for granted.
范泰爾建議：不要分割「事實」與「意義」
有人提倡：我們可以證明上帝存在，而不首先設定怎樣的上帝存在
又有人嘗試證明基督復活的事實，而不討論其意義。
范泰爾顯然相信「事實與意義」、「事實與解釋」是關聯的，因此設定此規則
CVT Recommends: Do Not Separate Fact from Meaning
Some Argue: We Can Prove God Exists,
Without First Establishing: What Kind of God Exists
Others Try to Prove Fact of Christ’s Resurrection,
Without Discussing Meaning of Resurrection
CVT Evidently Believes in His Correlation of
Fact & Meaning, Fact & Interpretation, Thus This Rule
Another of Van Til’s recommendations for the proper use of evidences is negative:
do not separate fact from meaning. Some have argued that we can prove that God
exists without first establishing what kind of God exists. (SCE, 116-131; RP, 94-98.)
Others have tried to prove the fact of Christ’s resurrection without discussing its
meaning. (RP, 48.) Van Til evidently believed this rule followed from his correlation
of fact and meaning, fact and interpretation.
但若所有事實都有意義（的包袱），那麼，根本不可能分割事實與意義
我們不能論到「復活的事實」而完全沒有「復活的意義」在心中
也沒有人對「上帝」或「任何神明」完全沒有概念而嘗試證明祂的存在
所以，任何概念（如「上帝」、「復活」等）肯定有一些定義性的內容
But If All Facts Have Meaning, Impossible to Separate Fact from Meaning
We Can’t Mention “Fact of Resurrection” Without Meaning in Mind
No One Tries to Prove “God” / ”a god” Exists,
Without Some Idea of What He Is Trying to Prove
Concept Will Always Have Some Defining Content
But if all facts are laden with meaning, then it is simply impossible to separate fact
from meaning, no matter how much we may try. We cannot even talk about the
“fact of the Resurrection” without having some meaning in mind. A resurrection,
after all, is a resurrection, not a storm at sea. And nobody tries to prove the
existence of God, even the existence of “a god,” without having in mind something
of what he is seeking to prove. When somebody says he is proving that God exists
without defining what kind of God he is talking about, he is nonetheless trying to
prove the existence of a god, not the existence of unicorns; so the concept will
always have some defining content.
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同樣清楚的是：
沒有任何嘗試證明「上帝存在」或「耶穌復活」的論據能為「上帝」或「復活」
下一個徹底的定義
But Also Clear:
No Argument (for God, Resurrection) Will Exhaustively Define “God” or
“Resurrection”
On the other hand, it is also plain that no argument for God’s existence, or for
Jesus’ resurrection, will exhaustively define what is meant in the proof by “God” or
“resurrection.”
范泰爾拒絕理想（唯心）主義的立場：
我們若不對上帝完全認識，就根本不認識祂
范泰爾：我們對上帝和世界的知識是真的知識，雖然不是透知的知識
If Say: We Can’t Know God Without Knowing Everything about God
This Is “Idealism”; CVT Rejects It
CVT: Our Knowledge of God And World = True, Not Exhaustive
To say that we cannot know God without knowing everything about him is an
idealist notion which Van Til rejects. He insists that our knowledge, both of God
and the world, can be true, although it can never be exhaustive. (DF2, 43-44.)
因此，證明「上帝存在這件事」和證明「怎樣的上帝」兩者是程度上的不同
問題是：當證明 X 時，需要包含多少神學上對 X 的定義？
弗蘭姆：范泰爾沒有證實，在論證時，必須要有多少程度的定義
So Prove “That” God Exists & Prove “What” Kind of God
Difference = of degree
Issue: How Much Theological Definition of X Must Be Included In a Proof of X?
Frame: CVT Doesn’t Present Enough Argument to Require Particular Degree of
Definition Needed in Proof
So it seems that the emphasis on “that” and “what” is a matter of degree. The
argument seems to be about how much theological definition of x needs to be
included in a proof of x. In my opinion, Van Til does not present enough argument
to require a particular degree of definition in an apologetic proof.
可是，范泰爾所關注的是重要的，因為一個護教系統必須面對一個難題：
歷史上，護教者很難從證明「上帝存在」的結論論證到《聖經》中上帝的特性
But CVT’s Concern Has a Point, Apologists Must Face This:
In History, Hard to Reason from Theistic proof’s conclusion to specific character
of Christian God
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Nevertheless, there is certainly some point in Van Til’s concern here. Historically, it
has been difficult for apologists to reason from the general conclusions of the
theistic proofs to the specific, distinctive character of the Christian God. That
difficulty may not be evaded in a system of apologetics.
在進行一個「上帝存在」的論證時，不必證實整個《聖經》的上帝觀
但是在一個護教系統中，必須有足夠的基礎證實基督教的特點
這「足夠的基礎」訴諸《聖經》
One Theistic Proof Need Not Prove Entire Doctrine of God
But Among All Proofs And Arguments of an Apologetic,
Sufficient Basis to Establish Distinctives of Christianity = Needed
That “Sufficient Basis” = Appeal to Scripture
It is unnecessary, I think, for a theistic proof to establish the whole of the biblical
doctrine of God, but among all the proofs and arguments of an apologetic there
must be sufficient basis to establish the distinctives of the Christian position.
Otherwise, the apologetic is not worth its salt. Of course, that “sufficient basis”
might be an appeal to Scripture.
護教者必須注意：基督的復活不僅是「奇怪事件」
其神學解釋是關鍵的
《聖經》整體對復活的解釋（教義）並不是單根據一次的論證而建立起來
可是基督徒必須知道：非信徒如何能對復活的整體神學解釋得到認識？
Apologist Must Note: Christ’s Resurrection = More Than Strange Event
Its Theological Interpretation = Crucial
One Argument Can’t Prove Whole Interpretation of Resurrection
But Christian Must Understand:
How Non-Christian Can Find Out Full Content of Theological Interpretation?
And the apologist must also take account of the fact that the resurrection of Jesus
is more than a mere “strange event.” Its theological interpretation is crucial. The
whole biblical interpretation of the Resurrection is unlikely to be established by a
single argument. But the apologist must understand in his own mind at least how
the inquirer is to ascertain the full content of theological interpretation.
弗蘭姆呼籲范泰爾主義者（包括他本人）：
給予學生更多關於證據方面的訓練！范泰爾的方法鼓勵我們使用證據！
范泰爾一般不會教導學生如何具體使用證據
這是錯誤的；范氏的同事已作出某程度上的補救
牧師常常有機會回答問題，可應用證據來證實《聖經》的歷史性真理
不要錯過這些作見證機會！
Frame Appeals to Van Tillians (Include Himself):
Give Students Better Training in Evidences
CVT’s Method Encourages Use of Evidences
184
CVT Didn’t Teach Students How to Actually Do It
That’s a Mistake: CVT’s Colleagues Remedy It Somewhat
Pastors Often Get Opportunities to Present Evidences for Historical Truth of
Bible
Don’t Miss These Opportunities!
I would conclude this chapter by urging my fellow Van Tillian apologists, including
myself, to give students better training in Christian evidences than has usually
been the case in our circles. We have seen that Van Til’s method encourages,
rather than discourages, the use of evidence, although some of his language may
suggest otherwise. Typically, however, he did not give his students much
instruction in the actual, detailed evidences for Christianity. That, I am convinced,
was a mistake, even though that omission was partly remedied by the work of Van
Til’s colleagues. Pastors frequently get opportunities, in the form of direct
questions, to present evidences for the historical truth of Scripture. We should not
miss such opportunities for witness.

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第三部份范泰爾的知識倫理學
VAN TIL’S ETHICS OF KNOWLEDGE
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R Publishing, 1995, pp. 187-238.)
第十五章「勢不兩立」的概念
ANTITHESIS
I. 「勢不兩立」的概念
ANTITHESIS
在之前的篇章，我們探討過范泰爾「知識本體論」的觀念：
指出創造主與被造者之間的區分（基督教世界觀）如何影響人類知識
創造主與被造者之間的關係，在人類墮落後沒有改變
So Far: Metaphysics of Knowledge
How Creator-Creature Distinct Affects Knowledge
This Creator-Creature Relationship Did Not Change After the Fall
In the preceding chapters, we considered Van Til’s concept of the metaphysics of

knowledge. That is, we asked how the fundamental Christian worldview, the
Creator-creature distinction, affects human knowledge. Since this fundamental
metaphysical relationship was not changed by the Fall, I did not have to say much
about sin, except occasionally to contrast believing and unbelieving worldviews.
我們可以一方面同意范泰爾的知識觀，但另方面卻不同意他有關「墮落對思想
的影響」(noetic effects of sin）的觀點
第四至十四章談及上帝、三位一體、上帝的主權、人的責任、類比思維、啟示、
預設、人的理性、邏輯、證據各範疇，人若在這些範疇同意范泰爾的觀點，就
是范泰爾主義者，即使在其他問題上不完全同意范氏的立場
We Can Hold CVT’s View of Knowledge,
But Disagree With Him on Noetic Effects of Sin
Chapters 4-14: God, Trinity, Sovereignty, Human Duty, Analogical Reasoning,
Revelation, Presuppositions, Intellect, Logic, Evidence
If You Agree with CVT on These, You’re Van Tillian (Though You May Disagree in
Other Areas)
186
On this basis one can maintain a distinctively Van Tillian view of knowledge while
disagreeing substantially with his view of the noetic effects of sin. Chapters 4 to 14
include quite a lot of content: the doctrine of God, the Trinity, divine sovereignty,
human responsibility, analogical reasoning, revelation, presuppositions, intellect,
logic, evidence. Certainly anyone who largely accepts Van Tillian views in these
areas must be considered a Van Tillian, even if he differs from Van Til in other
areas.
雖然弗蘭姆欽佩范泰爾在「知識倫理學」上的洞見，但相對於「知識本體論」，
弗蘭姆會更多批判前者有關「罪與重生對人類知識影響」的觀點
Frame Finds Excellent Insights in Van Til’s Ethic Knowledge,
Effects of Sin & Regeneration on Human Knowledge
But Critical of CVT in This Latter Area
That is somewhat my own situation. I do find excellent insights in Van Til’s ethics
of knowledge, his view of the effects of sin and regeneration on human knowledge.
But I confess that I am rather more critical of him in this area than I was in the
area of the metaphysics of knowledge.
范泰爾論「罪與重生對知識的影響」：
信徒與非信徒的思想之間是「勢不兩立」的：
這立場將「信」與「不信」對立、將「信」與「妥協啟示真理」對立
「勢不兩立」立場的代表思想家：凱伯、梅欽、范泰爾
CVT on Relationship of Sin & Regeneration to Knowledge
CVT on “Antithesis” Between Believing & Unbelieving Thought (Belief & Unbelief
/ Compromise of Revelation) = Conspicuous
Kuyper, Machen, Van Til = Apostles of Antithesis
At any rate, we should now proceed to analyze his views regarding the relation of
sin and regeneration to human knowledge. The most conspicuous feature of Van
Til’s position is the “antithesis” between believing and unbelieving thought. We
saw in chapter 3 that Van Til is, following Kuyper and Machen, a kind of apostle of
antithesis. This antithesis is the diametrical opposition between belief and
unbelief and therefore between belief and any compromise of revealed truth.
「勢不兩立」是范泰爾最關注的題目之一，亦為他帶來最嚴厲的批判
在目前講求多元的神學氛圍下，很難跟隨范氏「勢不兩立」的立場，
在不同宗派傳統之間、自由派與保守派之間、基督教與其他宗教之間、信與不
信之間，劃分清楚的對立界線
Antithesis = A Major Concern for CVT, This Brought Him Most Severe Criticism
Present Theological Climate = Pluralistic,
Hard to Draw Lines to Support Van Til’s Antithesis:
Lines Between Denominational Differences, Liberal Versus Conservative,
Christianity Versus Other Religions, Belief Versus Unbelief
187
The concept of antithesis is one of Van Til’s major concerns, and it is the element
in his thought that has brought him the most severe criticism. In the present
pluralistic theological climate, it seems particularly difficult to draw lines sharply
enough to support Van Tillian talk of antithesis: lines between denominational
traditions, between liberal and conservative, between Christianity and other
religions, between belief and unbelief.
今天自由派神學已採納「普救論」，保守派基督徒則愈淡化自己的界線
我們必須像范泰爾那樣批判「遷就」的趨勢？
抑或是范泰爾阻礙了符合聖經的教會合一運動？
抑或真理在兩者之間？
Liberals Today Assume Univeralism,
Conservatives Tend to Play Down Differences Too
Is It Necessary to Repudiate Accommodation, Like CVT?
Did Van Til Prevent Biblical Ecumenism?
Or Is The Truth Somewhere in The Middle?
Universalism is taken for granted in contemporary liberal theology, and

conservative Christian thinkers, if not going that far, often tend nevertheless to
play down the differences between themselves and others. Is it necessary, or even
possible, to maintain Van Til’s emphasis in our time and to repudiate all these
tendencies toward accommodation? Or did Van Til overstate his case,
unnecessarily inhibiting biblical ecumenism? Or is the truth to be found
somewhere between these two evaluations?
研究「勢不兩立」時，應同時研究「普遍恩典」的教義
普遍恩典的教義指出：上帝在沒有重生的人身上約束罪
范泰爾：雖然非信徒帶著罪的影響，但仍會知道一些真理
「勢不兩立」的立場與「普遍恩典」的教義似乎互相對立和限制？
弗蘭姆：本章會探討「普遍恩典」的教義如何限制「勢不兩立」的立場
**「普遍恩典」幫助我們為「勢不兩立」作更好的定義
When We Study Antithesis, Study Common Grace Also
God Restrains Sin in The Unregenerate
CVT: Unbelievers Know Some Truth, Despite Sin & Effects
Antithesis & Common Grace: Opposed?
Frame: One Limits Other; Common Grace = Limit on Antithesis
**Common Grace Helps Better Define Antithesis
As we consider the matter of antithesis, we must simultaneously consider the

doctrine of common grace, which teaches that God restrains sin in the
unregenerate. On the basis of common grace, Van Til maintains that unbelievers
know some truth despite their sin and its effects. It might seem at first glance that
antithesis and common grace are opposed to one another, at least in the sense
that one limits the other. Whether or not that is the best way to look at it, it is
188
certainly true that there are temptations to imbalance on either side. In this
chapter, I shall discuss common grace as a limit on antithesis, or (perhaps better)
as a factor that helps us to define antithesis better. In the following chapter, I shall
discuss other aspects of common grace.
范泰爾論知識倫理學，探討墮落如何影響人的思想
罪人嘗試在上帝以外（在自己身上或在宇宙中）尋找真善美
並嘗試不考慮上帝來解釋任何事物
這是《羅馬書》第一章所言：墮落的人壓抑自己對上帝的知識，以謊言取代
CVT’s Ethics of Knowledge: How Fall Affects Thought
Sinner Seeks Truth, Good, Beauty Beyond God, Either In Himself or In Universe
He Tries to Interpret Everything Without Reference to God
Rom. 1: Fallen Man Suppresses What He Knows about God,
Exchanging truth for a lie
In his ethics of knowledge, Van Til seeks to describe concretely how the Fall affects
human thought. Sinful man, according to Van Til, “sought his ideals of truth,
goodness and beauty somewhere beyond God, either directly within himself or in
the universe about him.” (DF2, 15.) He “tried to interpret everything with which
he came into contact without reference to God.” (DF2, 47.) In this connection, Van
Til often refers to the process described in Romans 1: fallen man suppresses what
he knows to be true about God, exchanging it for a lie.
罪人不預設「上帝的啟示」是真理的終極準則
罪人預設「自己的自主」是存有與知識的終極原則（康德極力推動此觀念）
因此，墮落的人與上帝勢不兩立，與上帝的子民也勢不兩立
Non-Christian Doesn’t Presuppose Revelation As Ultimate Criterion of Truth
He Presupposes Autonomy = Ultimate Principle of Being & Knowledge (Kant)
Thus, Fallen Man Stands in Antithesis to God, God’s People
Instead of presupposing God’s revelation as the ultimate criterion of truth, the

sinner presupposes (as Kant advocated so clearly and explicitly) that his own
autonomy is the ultimate principle of being and knowledge. Thus, fallen man
stands in antithesis to God and to God’s people as well.
重生之後，人的意識「原則上」被恢復到亞當的意識的地位
既說「原則上」，就意味「相對的邪惡」還存在於那些原則上絕對良善的人
Regeneration: Man’s Consciousness “In Principle” =
Restored to Position of Adam’s Consciousness
“In Principle” Implies: The Relatively Evil Remains in Those
Who Are Absolutely Good in Principle
In regeneration, the human consciousness “has in principle been restored to the

position of the Adamic consciousness.” (DF2, 49.) The qualification “in principle”
189
implies that “the relatively evil” remains “in those who are absolutely good in
principle.” (DF2, 49.)
范泰爾：那些原則上邪惡的人，裏面也有「相對的良善」
范泰爾維護「普遍恩典」的教義
以下是「普遍恩典」對思想的影響（涵義）：
CVT: Relative Good = In Those Who’re Evil in Principle
CVT Defends Common Grace
Noetic Implications of Common Grace Are As Follows:
Van Til also asserts that there is “relative good in those who are evil in principle.”
(DF2, 50.) Thus, he defends the doctrine of common grace. The noetic implications
of common grace are as follows:
在歷史中，自然人（非信徒）並不完全意識到他的狀態
浪子不可能完全「關掉」父親的聲音
在他裏面有不同觀念之爭：「關於上帝的知識」與「自主的原則」對立
這自主的原則被普遍恩典所約束，因此，自然人每天所使用的觀念，
都與「關於上帝的知識」和「自主的原則」不完全一致
Natural Man = Not Fully Self-Conscious of His State
Prodigal Son Cannot Fully Turn Off Father’s Voice
Conflict of Notions in Him: Knowledge of God Versus Principle of Autonomy
Autonomy Principle Is Restrained by Common Grace
The Ideas He Daily Works Inconsistent With Both
But in the course of history the natural man is not fully self-conscious of his
own position. The prodigal cannot altogether stifle his father’s voice. There is
a conflict of notions within him. But he himself is not fully and
self-consciously aware of this conflict within him. He has within him the
knowledge of God by virtue of his creation in the image of God. But this idea
of God is suppressed by his false principle, the principle of autonomy. This
principle of autonomy is, in turn, suppressed by the restraining power of
God’s common grace. Thus the ideas with which he daily works do not
proceed consistently either from the one principle or from the other. (DF2,
170.)
出現一個嚴重的問題：
雖然范泰爾承認非信徒在普遍恩典的約束下，顯得模稜兩可
但他又經常聲稱非信徒完全不認識真理，完全不受普遍恩典的影響
留意以下的引述：
Problem:
CVT: Unbeliever’s Situation = Ambiguous,
But He Writes As If Unbeliever Knows No Truth At All,
190
Not At All Affected by Common Grace
Note These Quotations:
An important problem, however, emerges at this point. Although Van Til affirms
the ambiguity of the unbeliever’s notion under common grace, he nevertheless
often writes as though the unbeliever knows and affirms no truth at all and thus is
not at all affected by common grace. Note these statements:
自然人不可能願意遵行上帝的旨意，他甚至不能知道「善」是甚麼
Natural Man Can’t Will to Do God’s Will
He Doesn’t Even Know What Good Is
The natural man cannot will to do God’s will. He cannot even know what the
good is. (DF2, 54.)
基督徒與非基督徒之間不可能有共同的知識範圍
除非兩者同意「人性是甚麼」
Common Area of Knowledge Between Christian & Non-Christian Is
Impossible
Unless Christian & Non-Christian Agree What Is Human Nature
It will be quite impossible then to find a common area of knowledge between

believers and unbelievers unless there is agreement between them as to the
nature of man himself. But there is no such agreement. (DF2, 67.)
沒有基督教的亮光，人不可能對自己、世界、上帝有正確的觀念
因為罪，人對真理盲目，不論真理在哪裏出現
Without Christianity, Man Can’t Have Correct View of Self, World, God
Because of Sin, Man = Blind to Truth, Wherever Truth Appears
But without the light of Christianity it is as little possible for man to have the
correct view about himself and the world as it is to have the true view about
God. On account of the fact of sin man is blind with respect to the truth
wherever the truth appears. And truth is one. Man cannot truly know himself
unless he truly knows God. (DF2, 73.)
非信徒按照他的（不信的）假設來解釋所有事實與定律
Non-Christian Interprets All Facts & Laws in Terms of His assumptions
[The unbeliever] interprets all the facts and all the laws that are presented to
him in terms of [his unbelieving] assumptions. (DF2, 201.)
191
非信徒甚至認為基督教真理是沒有意義的，因為他預設「自主」與「偶然」
Non-Christian Finds Christian Truth = Meaningless
Due to His Assumptions of Autonomy and Chance
The unbeliever does not even find Christian truth to be meaningful: “It is precisely
Christianity as a whole, and therefore each of these doctrines as part of
Christianity, that are meaningless to him as long as he is not willing to drop his
own assumptions of autonomy and chance.” (DF2, 150.)
由於非信徒的墮落而排除所有一般概念，因此，我們能預測：
當基督徒提出護教論證時，非信徒會如何回應
非信徒必然拒絕基督徒的思路，並認為基督徒並沒有證明甚麼事
Since Non-Christian = Depraved, Doesn’t Know Any Notions,
We Can Predict His Response to Christian’s Apologetic Argument
He Will Refuse Christian’s Line of Reasoning
Christian Hasn’t Proved Anything
And since the unbeliever’s depravity excludes all common notions, we can be sure,
and can safely predict, what the unbeliever will do with an apologetic argument.
When a Christian presents the historical argument for the Resurrection, a
pragmatist philosopher, says Van Til, “will refuse to follow this line of reasoning.
Granted he allows that Christ actually rose from the grave, he will say that this
proves nothing more than that something very unusual took place in the case of
that man Jesus.” (DF2, 8.)
與賀治不同，范泰爾認為：罪人的理性「必然」錯誤地運作
他們「必然」把基督徒提出的證據和論證約化到自然主義的水平
弗蘭姆：注意這雙重的「必然」是范氏關於「勢不兩立」的極端宣稱
CVT Versus Hodge: Sinner’s Reason Inevitably Acts Wrongly
Will Always Reduce Arguments to Naturalistic Level
Frame: Note “Invariably” – CVT’s Extreme Statements
Contrary to Hodge, who speaks of “reason” as “something that seems to operate

rightly wherever it is found,” Van Til insists that “the ‘reason’ of sinful men will
invariably act wrongly. … The natural man will invariably employ the tool of his
reason to reduce these contents to a naturalistic level.” (DF2, 83.) Note here the
twofold “invariably.” (Cf. CTK, 297-298. For similarly extreme statements of the
antithesis, see DF1, 203, 228; IST, 14, 22, 56, 75, 146, 189; CTK, 262, 293.)
根據這極端的「勢不兩立」觀點，非信徒連一句正確的話都不能講！
信徒與非信徒之間根本不可能溝通！（似乎是這樣）
非信徒若不知道「善」是甚麼，他又怎能認識罪和認識自己需要基督的救恩？
由於真理是統一的，他既不能認識自己和上帝，因此，他根本甚麼都不認識！
192
他若甚麼都不知道，基督徒可如何向他們做見證？
基督徒為甚麼還要做見證？反正非信徒必然漠不關心！
On Extreme View: Unbelievers Can’t Utter a True Word!
Christian & Non-Christian Cannot Communicate! (It Seems)
If Non-Christian Doesn’t Know “Good,” How Can He Know Sin, Christ?
He Can’t Know Himself & God – He Can’t Know Anything!
If He Knows Nothing, How Can Christian Witness?
And Why Should Christian Witness? He Will Be Indifferent
On this extreme antithetical view, it would almost seem as if no unbeliever can

utter a true sentence. It would also seem as if no communication is possible
between believer and unbeliever. Unregenrate man cannot know what the good is,
so how can he understand sin and the need for redemption in Christ? Since he
cannot know his own nature, and cannot know God, and since truth is one, he
literally cannot know anything. But how does a Christian present a witness to
somebody who literally knows nothing? And why should we witness? For we can
be safely assured that the unbeliever will be quite indifferent to any facts we set
before him. Is there any role at all here for common grace to play?
弗蘭姆：范泰爾有時候似乎沒有意識到這難題，但有時意識到
最意識到的例子：《系統神學導論》頁 26-27
Frame: CVT Sometimes Sensitive to This Difficulty
But Sometimes He Seems Unaware of It
Peak of His Awareness: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, pp. 26-27
I believe that Van Til was at least sometimes sensitive to the difficulty of the
problem, though at many points in his writings he seems quite unaware of it. The
peak of his awareness of this issue can be found in An Introduction to Systematic
Theology, pages 26-27, where he uncharacteristically admits to having some
difficulty in formulation.
范泰爾：非信徒「到某一程度」有知識
這「從來是一個難題，不能滿意地解釋」
「我們只能圈住問題；真理在某一範圍裏」
「實際的情況是：真理與錯誤混雜」
非信徒認識上帝，因為按上帝的形像被造、對上帝的意識、普遍恩典的約束
CVT: Unbelievers Have Knowledge “True As Far As It Goes”
It “Has Always Been a Difficult Point”
“We Can’t Give Wholly Satisfactory Account”
“We Can Only Hem It in, Truth Lies Within Certain Area”
“Actual Situation: Truth Mixed with Error”
Somehow Natural Man Knows God, Recognizes God
Because: Image of God; Sense of Deity; General Grace
193
Here he concedes that the fact that unbelievers have knowledge that is “true as
far as it goes” “has always been a difficult point,” and he even adds: “We cannot
give any wholly satisfactory account of the situation as it actually obtains. … All
that we can do with this question as with many other questions in theology, is to
hem it in in order to keep out errors, and to say that truth lies within a certain
territory.” (IST, 26. Compare his statement on p. 25 that this is a matter of “great
complexity.”) His conclusion:
The actual situation is therefore always a mixture of truth with error. Being
“without God in the world” the natural man yet knows God, and, in spite of
himself, to some extent recognizes God. By virtue of their creation in God’s
image, by virtue of the ineradicable sense of deity within them and by virtue
of God’s restraining general grace, those who hate God, yet in a restricted
sense know God, and do good. (IST, 27. The last sentence of this quotation
would be clearer if it read: “… those who hate God nevertheless know him, in
a restricted sense, and do good.” On the “mixture” idea, cf. DF2, 170: “Thus
the ideas with which [the unbeliever] daily works do not proceed consistently
either from the one principle or from the other.”)
這「混雜」的論調會削弱「勢不兩立」的立場！
若是混雜，非信徒可能在某些事上與我們同意
我們怎能事先知道，他會在哪些事上同意，哪些事上不同意？
“Mixture” – Weak for Antithesis!
If Mixture, Unbeliever May Agree With Us About Something
We Can’t Know in Advance, What He Will Agree Or Disagree?
A “mixture”! But that view of the unbeliever’s mentality provides a rather weak
basis for all the strong antithetical language. If there is such a mixture, how can we
be so sure that the unbeliever might not agree with us, at times, about flowers
and trees, or even about the good, or the nature of man, or the existence of God,
or that the Resurrection was more than a “strange event?” How can we declare in
advance what the unbeliever will or will not agree with?
范泰爾意識到問題，卻沒有答案
范氏認為不僅僅是弔詭問題，並嘗試更具體地描述情況
但有很多不同的描述和解釋
弗蘭姆：這些不同的解釋彼此可能是「視角性關聯」
弗蘭姆：我們須拒絕范氏的一些模式，又修改他的一些模式
CVT = Aware of Problem, Doesn’t Know Solution
Not Just a Paradox; He Describes It More Concretely
Many Such Descriptions/Explanations, All Different
Maybe: These Are Perspectivally Related? (Frame)
Frame: Reject Some Models, Modify Some
194
As we have seen, Van Til is aware of this problem. His statements in An
Introduction to Systematic Theology, page 26, and The Defense of the Faith (rev.
ed.), page 170, indicate a certain agnosticism as to its precise solution. Yet he does
not leave this activity as a paradox, as he urges us to do in connection with other
matters. Rather, he tries to alleviate it by describing the situation more concretely,
using various concepts, illustrations, and images. (I suspect that his inner
perception of the issue varied considerably from time to time during his career.
The apparent agnosticism of IST, 26, and DF2, 170, is hard to reconcile with the
sense of assurance that permeates many of his discussions of this issue.) One
problem, however, is that there are quite a number of these explanations, and
they are rather different from one another. Van Til’s intent is that they should be
taken as supplementary, perhaps as perspectivally related to one another, though
he does not use that language. My evaluation is that, nevertheless, these
formulations are not altogether consistent with one another, and some of them
can be rejected on other grounds. Thus, if we are to build upon Van Til’s work, we
will have to adopt or modify some of these formulations and reject others.
五種「勢不兩立」說法：
極端性的、準則性的、處境性的、存在性的、實踐性的
5 Categories Antithetical Formulations:
Extreme, Normative, Situational, Existential, Practical
These formulations are strategies for reconciling antithesis with common grace. I
classify them in five categories: (1) extreme antithetical formulations, (2)
normative formulations, (3) situational formulations, (4) existential formulations,
and (5) practical formulations.

195
II. 極端性的「勢不兩立」說法
EXTREME ANTITHETICAL FORMULATIONS
極端性的「勢不兩立」說法：非信徒完全不認識真理，沒有甚麼可同意的。
Extreme Antithetical Formulations:
No Area of Agreement; Unbeliever Knows No Truth At All
We have already seen that Van Til often speaks in ways that suggest that the
unbeliever knows no truth at all and therefore has literally no area of agreement
with the believer. This extreme position is reflected in some of his strategies for
reconciling antithesis and common grace.
1. 「義務」與「實際知識」
Obligation Versus Actual Knowledge
非信徒有義務認識真理，但是事實上卻拒絕盡此義務
這是指「使人得救的知識」或「《羅馬書》1:21 的知識」？范氏說不清楚
非信徒若有義務去知道，而事實上不知道，他就等於「沒有知識」
Unbelievers Has Obligation to Know Truth,
But In Fact, Refuses to Fulfill Obligation
CVT = Unclear: Saving Knowledge? Or Roman 1:21 Knowledge?
If Non-Christian Obliged to Know, Doesn’t Know, He Has No Knowledge
Sometimes Van Til suggests that the unbeliever has an obligation to know the
truth, but in fact refuses to fulfill that obligation. The situation is “that all men
ought to see God in nature since he is clearly revealed there, but that only he
who is given the regenerate heart actually does see this to be the case.” [PDS,
72 (emphasis by Van Til).] This distinction should perhaps be taken to refer to
saving knowledge rather than to the knowledge referred to Romans 1:21, which
the unbeliever represses. In any case, it is rather unclear. If it refers to
common-grace knowledge, then it is inconsistent with Van Til’s insistence that
this knowledge is actual and not merely potential. If the unbeliever is obliged to
know, but does not actually know, then he has no knowledge.
2. 「啟示」與「解釋」
Revelation Versus Interpretation
上帝向全人類啟示，但非信徒每次都錯誤地解釋
God’s Revelation = Given to All; But
Unbeliever Always Interpret It Wrongly
196
Van Til sometimes asserts that divine revelation is given to all, but that the
unbeliever always interprets it wrongly. We have already seen this in earlier
quotations. Note also:
By using the term “general revelation” we emphasize the fact that this
revelation is accessible to all men and valid for all men even though only
believers interpret it truly. (IST, 75.)
非信徒一定根據自己自主的預設來解釋世界
Unbeliever Interprets World In Terms of Assumption of Autonomy
When the unbeliever interprets the world, he interprets it in terms of his

assumption of human autonomy. …
非信徒如同戴著黃色的眼鏡來看萬事，他對一切事物的解釋必然錯誤
Non-Christian Wears Yellow Glasses; Sees All Through These Glasses
His Interpretation of Everything = Unavoidably False Interpretation
The unbeliever is the man with yellow glasses on his face. He sees himself
and his world through these glasses. He cannot remove them. His
interpretation of himself and of every fact in the universe relating to
himself is, unavoidably, a false interpretation. [CTK, 258-259 (emphasis by
Van Til); cf. pp. 265, 301-302.]
「普遍恩典」只限於上帝提供了啟示
但對非信徒「解釋」啟示上，上帝沒有約束非信徒的罪性
Common Grace = Only That God Provided Revelation
God Doesn’t Restraint Sin in Non-Christian’s Interpretation
On this account, common grace, if there is any role for it at all, would be seen
only in God’s gracious provision of revelation. There is, evidently, no divine
restraint of sin in the unbeliever’s process of interpretation.
范泰爾沒有為「解釋」下定義；大概是廣泛的意義，指人對世界的認知
「在受造界的啟示」與「非信徒理解啟示的扭曲」形成對比
全然墮落意味著：非信徒的一切解釋必然導致錯誤（假）的結論
這並不是歷史上「全然墮落的教義」的一部分
也與范氏的「普遍恩典論」不一致
這講法沒有「真理與錯誤混雜」，而是「全然錯誤」
“Interpretation” = Not Defined; Broad: Understand the World
Revelation in Creation Vs Distortion When Unbeliever Understand Creation
197
Total Depravity → All Interpretation Is False Conclusions
This Is Not Part of Historical Doctrine of Total Depravity
It Is Inconsistent With CVT’s Doctrine of Common Grace
There Really Isn’t Mixture; All Is False
To my knowledge, Van Til never defines “interpretation,” but I gather he uses

the term fairly broadly to describe all of a person’s activity in his attempts to
understand the world. The contrast, then, is between the revelation inherent in
the creation and the distortion that enters whenever the unbeliever tries to
understand that creation. Van Til’s assertion that all the unbeliever’s efforts to
know (as all his efforts generally) are tainted by sin is simply an application of
his Reformed view of total depravity and thus may be accepted as cogent in the
present context. But does that depravity entail, as Van Til suggests, that all the
unbeliever’s interpretive activity results in false conclusions? To say that it does
is not part of the historic doctrine of total depravity, nor is it consistent with
Van Til’s own view of common grace. On this strategy, there is no “mixture,”
only unmitigated falsehood.
我們可否補救一下？可否說：非信徒在解釋上，「至終」是錯誤的？
或說：在哪一個程度上非信徒是「自我意識」的，就是錯誤的？
弗蘭姆論點：啟示與解釋的區分，不足描述勢不兩立與普遍恩典之關係
若不承認上帝約束非信徒，就等於不承認普遍恩典
Can We Patch Up this Strategy?
Can We Say: Non-Christian Interpretation = Incorrect on Ultimate Level,
Or Insofar as He Is Self-Conscious, Etc.?
Frame: Distinction Between Revelation & Interpretation
Not Sufficient To Describe Relation of Antithesis to Common Grace
If God Doesn’t Restrain Non-Christians, There Is No Common Grace
Of course, one can try to patch up this strategy by employing some of the
others listed below. One can say that the unbeliever’s interpretation is incorrect
on an ultimate level, or insofar as he is self-conscious, etc. My present point,
however, is that the distinction between revelation and interpretation is not in
itself sufficient to describe the relation of antithesis to common grace. Common
grace is not merely an objective revelation of God. Rather, it is, if anything, a
divine restraint upon the sinful activity of the unbeliever. In this context, it must
be a divine restraint upon the unbeliever’s sinful distortion of revelation. To
deny that restraint, as Van Til appears to do in the present context, is to deny
common grace itself.
3. 「形而上的情況」與「知識論的情況」
Metaphysical Versus Epistemological
非信徒和信徒如何在「度量衡」取得共識？
范泰爾：「量度」是人類的能力，沒有受墮落的影響，這是「形而上的情況」
198
這樣，上帝的普遍恩典保存「形而上的情況」，保存人的認知（解釋）能力
「勢不兩立」指人總是錯誤地使用他的天賦能力
How Can Unbelievers Agree with Believers as to Weights & Measures?
Weighing, Measuring = Created Human Capacities,
As such, Not Affected by the Fall
In This Case: Common Grace = God Preserves Metaphysical Situation,
Non-Christian’s Epistemic/Interpretative Powers,
Antithesis = Non-Christian Always Makes Faulty Use of Equipment
In The Defense of the Faith, Van Til asks how unbelievers can agree with
believers as to weights and measures. He answers:
If sin is seen to be ethical alienation only, and salvation as ethical

restoration only, then the question of weighing and measuring or that of
logical reasoning is, of course, equal on both sides. All men, whatever their
ethical relation to God, can equally use the natural gifts of God. … As far as
natural ability is concerned the lost can and do know the truth and could
contribute to the structure of science except for the fact that for them it is
too late. (DF2, 171.)
Here he argues that weighing and measuring are created human capacities and
that, as such, they are not affected by the Fall. This is similar to his illustration of
the buzz saw (DF2, 74.), which he uses to indicate that the unbeliever’s created
faculties (such as the logical faculty) may work very efficiently while working in
the wrong direction. On this analysis, common grace would be seen in God’s
preservation of the metaphysical situation, the unbeliever’s epistemic faculties,
and antithesis would be seen in that the unbeliever always makes a faulty use of
his created equipment. (I take the term “epistemological” here to be roughly
synonymous with the term “interpretive” discussed in the preceding section. I
believe also that the “psychological-epistemological” contrast found in CGG,
52-53, is more or less synonymous with the distinction under consideration.)
但這與范泰爾的立場衝突：
范泰爾強調不需要普遍恩典來保存形而上的具體情況
范泰爾：量度的能力是人的整體解釋行動的一個層面
因此，量度的能力並不獨立於「受墮落影響的解釋行動」
人類的解釋在甚麼程度上受墮落的影響，量度也在甚麼程度上受影響
But This Contradicts CVT:
CVT: Common Grace Is Not Needed To Preserve Metaphysical Situation
Weighing, Measuring = Part of Unified Act of Interpretation
Not Prior to/Independent from Interpretive Activity Affected by Sin
To the Extent That All Epistemic/Interpretive Activity Is Affected by Fall,
Weighing, Measuring Also Affected
199
However, this view contradicts Van Til’s emphasis elsewhere that common
grace is not needed to preserve the metaphysical situation, and is not the
source of the unbeliever’s natural knowledge of God. (CGG, 159.) And Van Til
also takes issue with Abraham Kuyper’s view of weighing and measuring by
saying, “Weighing and measuring are but aspects of one unified act of
interpretation.” (CGG, 44.) Therefore, weighing and measuring cannot be taken
as natural, metaphysical abilities that are somehow prior to and independent of
that interpretive activity which is affected by sin. To the extent that all
epistemic or interpretive activity is affected by the Fall, weighing and measuring
must also be affected.
4. 「形式」與「內容」
Form Versus Content.
范泰爾：非信徒的知識只是「形式上知道」
人類共通的客觀性知識僅是「形式上共通」而已
非信徒只在「形式上知道」真理，卻不知道其內容
CVT: Unbeliever’s Knowledge = “Formal”
General Objectivity Common to All = In Formal Sense Only
Non-Christian Can “Formally” Understand Truth,
Give “Formal Assent” to Truth/Argument…
Non-Christian Knows Form Only; Doesn’t Know Content
Often, Van Til describes the unbeliever’s knowledge as “formal.” In criticism of

C.S. Lewis’s concept of “the Tao,” an objective knowledge common to all men,
Van Til replies, “But surely this general objectivity is common to Christians and
non-Christians in a formal sense only.” (DF2, 59.) The non-Christian can
“formally understand” the truth (DF2, 74.), and even give “formal assent” to the
“intellectual argument for the existence of God.” (IST, 198.) But it is wrong to
say that the unbeliever has, concerning God, “correct notions as to content, not
merely as to form.” (CTK, 296; cf. IST, 194.)
范泰爾用「形式上」描述兩個人用同樣的字，卻各有不同意思，而互相誤會
「除非進行理論雙方瞭解彼此用字的意思，否則，不可能一起理論」
在這處引文中，范泰爾沒有用「形式上」這詞
雖然非信徒可以論證「神」的存在，但那不是《聖經》的上帝
信徒與非信徒對「靈魂」、「是／不是」、「至高（存有）」的理解都不同
CVT Uses “Formal” to Describe:
Using Same Words, Different Meanings, Leads to Misunderstanding
“No Intelligble Reasoning Unless Those Who Reason
Understand What They Mean by Their Words”
CVT Doesn’t Use “Formal” Here
Though Unbeliever Constructs Theistic Proof,
He’ll Prove Existence of god, Not Bible’s God
200
Believer & Unbeliever Differ on Meaning of “Soul”, “Is/Isn’t”, “Supreme”
Van Til uses the word formal to describe cases in which two people use the
same words, but with different meanings, and thus tend to misunderstand one
another. He points out that “there can be no intelligible reasoning unless those
who reason together understand what they mean by their words.” (DF2, 77. He
does not actually use the word formal in this context.) He adds that although
the unbeliever may actually construct theistic proofs, the god whose existence
he proves will always be something different from the God of Scripture. Indeed,
the unbeliever differs with the believer over the meaning of soul (CTK, 265-272),
the meaning of is and is not (IST, 37), and the meaning of supreme in the
phrase “supreme being.” (IST, 194.) As for miracle, there is “nothing but formal
agreement between the scientist and the Christian.” (IST, 114.)
范泰爾認為傳統護教者的錯誤在於：
他們不僅假設自然人能對人與世界作出正確的斷言
更假設他們這些斷言的意思與基督徒的意思是相同的
CVT: Traditional Apologist’s Error:
They Assume Natural Man Can Make Formally Correct Statements About Man
And Nature,
But Also Mean by These Statements What Christian Means
Traditional apologists err because “they attribute to the natural man not only
the ability to make formally correct statements about ‘nature’ or themselves,
but also to mean by these statements what the Christian means by them.” (IST,
113.)
結論：基督徒與非基督徒講的是完全不同的語言
雖然雙方用的字是一樣，但意義卻徹底不同
那麼，兩者之間如何能溝通？
Conclusion: Christian, Non-Christian Speak Entirely Different Languages
Both Use Same Words, But Meanings Are Radically Different
How Can Communication Be Possible?
Put all of these statements together, and the conclusion seems to be that
Christians and non-Christians speak entirely different languages. Although both
groups use words like God, soul, nature, miracle, self, and even is, the meanings of
these words differ radically between them. But how, then, is communication
possible between believers and unbelievers? If I say “Good morning” to you and
mean by that “Hooray for the San Diego Padres,” what have I communicated?
201
范泰爾：非信徒的知識不僅是「形式上知道」
范泰爾駁斥洛克的經驗主義
CVT Insists: Non-Christian’s Knowledge = Not Merely Formal

CVT Versus Lockean Empiricism
Indeed, Van Til himself insists that the unbeliever’s knowledge is not merely
formal. In a context which, oddly enough, directly adjoins one of the above
passages, he says this against Lockean empiricism:
人與生俱來對上帝的認識不僅是「形式上的知識」或「認知的潛能」
因為人被造成有理性的人，所以有認出啟示的能力
人的意識在深處被上帝（在人裏面和周圍的）啟示的內容攪動
所以人與生俱來對上帝的認識是「思想內容」的認識，不僅是形式上知道
有限的人的意識本身啟示上帝
Man’s Innate Knowledge of God = Not Merely Formal/Potential
Capacity to recognize Revelation, Because Man Is Created with Intellect
Man’s Consciousness Is Stirred to Depths by Revelation’s Content Within
Man, Around Man
Thus Innate Knowledge Deals with Thought Content,
Not a Mere Formality
Finite Man’s Consciousness Reveals God
Accordingly we cannot say that the innate knowledge of God in man is the
merely formal ability, the capacity of potentiality, in view of man’s creation as
an intellectual being, to recognize revelation if and when it comes. There can
be no finite human consciousness that is not stirred to its depths by the
revelational content within itself as well as about itself. Thus the innate
knowledge deals with a thought content, and not with a mere formality. The
finite human consciousness is itself revelational of God. (IST, 195; cf. p. 196,
where he makes some fairly tortuous distinctions in this regard.)
范泰爾是否一致？
是：非信徒有真的、上帝啟示的思想在他的知識裏
但只是在「形式上」表達這些思想
弗蘭姆：這個區分太表面了，范泰爾也沒有明確地作這樣的區分
總之，《聖經》並不支持這樣的區分
基督對法利賽人表達的話予以肯定，不僅指他們裏面的思想
保羅論及異教徒也是一樣
Is CVT Consistent?
Yes: Non-Christian Has True, Revealed Thought in His Knowledge
But Expresses It Only “Formally”
Frame: This Distinction = Artificial – CVT Never Makes It Explicitly
Hard to Support This Distinction From Bible
202
Christ Commends Pharisees’ Words – Not Just Inner Knowledge
Paul Speaks Similarly About Pagans
One might defend Van Til’s consistency at this point by saying that for him the
unbeliever has a true, revealed thought content in his knowledge, but never
expresses it in words except “formally.” However, that would be a highly artificial
distinction, one that Van Til, to his credit, never makes explicitly. (However, see
later discussion of Van Til’s half suggestions that the unbeliever’s knowledge is
somehow subconscious.) It would certainly be hard to justify from Scripture. Jesus,
for example, commends the words of the Pharisees in Matthew 23:2-3, not just
their inner knowledge, and Paul speaks similarly about pagans in Acts 17:28 and
Titus 1:12-13.
太 23:2-3
2 說：文士和法利賽人坐在摩西的位上，
3 凡他們所吩咐你們的，你們都要謹守遵行；但不要效法他們的行為；因為他們能說，不能
行。
徒 17:28
我們生活、動作、存留，都在乎他。就如你們作詩的，有人說：我們也是他所生的。
多 1:12-13
12 有革哩底人中的一個本地先知說：革哩底人常說謊話，乃是惡獸又饞又懶。
13 這個見證是真的。所以，你要嚴嚴的責備他們，使他們在真道上純全無疵，
范泰爾堅持：非信徒「真正擁有」上帝啟示的知識
因此，弗蘭姆拒絕范泰爾所有的「極端性的勢不兩立的說法」
若這些極端說法是正確，那麼，「非信徒真正認識上帝」將不能成立
若非信徒真正認識上帝（雖被他們的罪性壓抑），我們須有更好的解釋
Cvt Insists: Unbeliever Is In “Actual Possession” of Revealed Knowledge
Thus Frame Rejects All CVT’s “Extreme Antithetical Formulations”
If Any Extreme Antithetical Formulations Is True,
“Unbeliever Actually Knows God” Cannot Be Maintained
If Unbeliever Truly Knows God (Though Suppressed by Sin),
We Need to Say More
It is this insistence of Van Til that the unbeliever is in “actual possession” of

revealed knowledge (CGG, 173; cf. DF2, 91-92) that leads me to reject all of these
“extreme antithetical formulations,” at least in their obvious senses. For if any of
these formulations is true, then it cannot be maintained that the unbeliever has
an actual knowledge of God. To have knowledge, it is not enough to be exposed to
revelation, to have efficient epistemic capacities, or to be able to speak with
formal correctness. Subhuman creatures are exposed to revelation, animals and
computers have efficient epistemic capacities, and parrots can speak with formal
correctness. But none of these has a knowledge of God in the sense of Romans 1.
We must say something more about the unbeliever if we are to credit him with a
genuine knowledge of God (even a knowledge suppressed by sin).
203
弗蘭姆：將指出范泰爾為何喜歡這些極端的說法，這些斷言也可以是「對」的
不過，護教者總要避免用這些極端的說法
Frame: Indicate Why Does CVT Like to Talk This Way? These Can Be True
Anyway, Apologists Should Avoid Talking This Way
I shall try later to indicate why I think Van Til was so fond of these extreme
formulations. I shall also indicate a certain sense in which these formulations can
be judged true, though nevertheless misleading. All in all, however, I believe that
apologists should avoid this sort of formulation.

204
III. 準則性的說法
NORMATIVE FORMULATIONS
「勢不兩立」指兩個原則彼此相爭
非信徒原則上已賣給魔鬼；信徒屬上帝。但兩者的效忠都不完美：
信徒裏有「老我」纏住；非信徒裏也有「上帝的意識」纏住他
這是一種攪亂主要生命方向的勢力
Antithesis = Opposition Between 2 Principles at War
Unbeliever Is in Principle Sold Out to Satan; Believer Belongs to God
But Neither’s Loyalty Is Perfect
Christian’s “Old Man” Weighs Him Down,
And Natural Man’s Sense of Deity Weighs Him Down
A Distraction From Main Direction of Life
Van Til often expresses the antithesis as an opposition between “two principles”
at war with one another. (DF2, 209.) The unbeliever is in principle sold out to
Satan; the believer belongs to God. But neither is perfect in his allegiance: “As the
Christian has the incubus of his ‘old man’ weighing him down and therefore
keeping him from realizing the ‘life of Christ’ within him, so the natural man has
the incubus of the sense of deity weighing him down and keeping him from
realizing the life of Satan within him.” (IST, 27. In response to John Murray’s
criticism, Van Til came to abandon this idea as a theological formulation, but it still
serves as a good illustration of how Van Til understood the nature of the
unbeliever’s knowledge of God. It is, to the unbeliever, as sin is to the believer, a
distraction from the main direction of his life.)
因此，人在甚麼程度上意識自己的基本效忠，他就在凡事上效忠或抵擋上帝
Thus Insofar As Man Is Aware of Basic Loyalty,
He Is Wholly for God or Wholly Against God
Therefore, “insofar as men are aware of their basic alliances, they are wholly for or
wholly against God at every point of interest to man.” (IST, 29.)
「在甚麼程度上」：這在范泰爾的準則性說法上是關鍵性的
這些說法說明，「勢不兩立」是指兩個原則、系統、效忠、準則
非信徒「在甚麼程度上效忠他們的基本原則」，就在那程度上敵對基督教
但非信徒在甚麼程度上用他的原則來解釋宇宙，他在一切事上都說錯
“Insofar” = Crucial to CVT’s Normative Formulations
Here Antithesis = Between 2 Principles/Systems/Allegiances, Norms
Unbelievers = Against Christianity “Insofar As” True to Their Principle
205
But to Extent That Unbelievers Interprets Nature according to His Adopted
Principles, He Doesn’t Speak Truth on Anything
That “insofar” is crucial to what I am calling Van Til’s “normative” formulations. In

these formulations, the antithesis is essentially between two “principles,”
“systems,” “allegiances,” or “norms.” Individual unbelievers are opposed to
Christianity only “insofar as” they are true to their “principle.” Note: “But to the
extent that [the unbeliever] interprets nature according to his adopted principles,
he does not speak the truth on any subject.” [IST, 113 (emphasis mine).]
范泰爾駁斥 S.J. Ridderbos 沒有分辨：

「自然人因為被造而來的知識」與「自然人因為自主而有的知識」
人不能完全認真地使用自主原則來抵擋真理
CVT Criticizes S. J. Ridderbos Fails to Distinguish:
Natural Man’s Knowledge From Creation &
Natural Man’s Knowledge Implied in Autonomy
Man Can’t Take Autonomy 100% Seriously to Oppose Truth
Van Til criticizes S.J. Ridderbos because he fails to distinguish
clearly between the knowledge of the natural man that comes from his
creation and his knowledge as it is implied in the idea of autonomy. He thinks
it is a mistake to distinguish between common notions derived from the
image of God in man and common notions that proceed from the idea of
autonomy. Thus he cannot take the principle of autonomy in its full
seriousness of opposition to the truth. (DF2, 170.)
「自主」是非信徒的原則
他若完全與此原則一致，他對甚麼都沒有知識
Autonomy = Unbeliever’s Principle
Insofar As He Is True to This Principle, He Knows Nothing Truly
Autonomy is the unbeliever’s “principle.” Insofar as he is true to that principle,

says Van Til, he knows nothing truly.
This kind of formulation is very important in Van Til’s thought. When I was his
student, I wrote a paper quoting and criticizing what seemed to me to be rather
extreme expressions of antithesis in his writings. Alongside my quotations, Van Til
wrote several times in the margin “according to their principle,” “in their
systems,” etc. Note: “And it is of these systems of their own interpretation that we
speak when we say that men are as wrong in their interpretation of trees as in
their interpretation of God.” (IST, 84.)
206
這種使「勢不兩立」與「普遍恩典」連接的策略，與極端性的說法很不同
準則性的說法並不認為：
信徒與非信徒講的是兩種完全不同的語言
也不認為非信徒的解釋必然導致錯誤的結論
也不認為非信徒所講的一切，都僅是「形式上」正確
This Strategy to Reconcile Antithesis with Common Grace
Is Very Different From Extreme Antithesis Formulations
Normative Formulations Doesn’t Suggest:
Believer & Unbeliever Speak Different Languages
Or All Unbeliever’s Interpretation Leads to False Conclusions
Or Unbeliever Won’t Utter a True Word Except “Formally”
It should be noted, however, that this strategy for reconciling antithesis and
common grace is very different from those extreme antithetical approaches noted
in the previous section. Under the normative approach, there is no suggestion that
the believer and unbeliever are speaking different languages, or that all the
unbeliever’s interpretive activity will lead to false conclusions, or that the
unbeliever will never utter a true sentence except “formally.”
范泰爾在這裏指出非信徒可能同意很多基督教真理
按準則性的說法，我們只須堅持：
當非信徒講基督教真理時，他與自己的原則並不一致
Here CVT: Unbeliever May Agree with Many Christian Truths
Normative Formulations Require:
When Unbeliever Speaks Such Truth, He Is Inconsistent with His Own Principle
Rather, Van Til recognizes quite explicitly here that the unbeliever may well grant
many truths of Christianity. All that antithesis requires in this strategy is that when
the unbeliever speaks such truth, we should regard him as inconsistent with his
own principle.
弗蘭姆：非信徒誠然是不一致的
范泰爾：「非基督徒不可能發現真理」，這是荒謬的說法
按準則性的說法，我們的意思只是：
非基督徒永不能一致地使用自己的原則，因此，也永遠沒有一致地使用它
Frame: Unbeliever Is Indeed Inconsistent
CVT: “Unbeliever Cannot Discover Truth” = Absurd
According to Normative Formulations, We Only Mean:
Non-Christian Can Never Use Methods Consistently,
So He Never Uses Them Consistently
And the unbeliever is indeed inconsistent. To the objection that Van Til is denying
that the unbeliever can discover truth, he replies, “We mean nothing so absurd as
that. The implications of the method here advocated is simply that non-Christians
207
are never able and therefore never do employ their own methods consistently.”
(Ibid., 103; cf. pp. 173-75; IST, 27, 60.)
根據準則性的說法，「勢不兩立」並沒有消失
「勢不兩立」警告我們：對非信徒須有很現實的看法
非信徒按照他反對基督教的基本預設來運作，並極力從他的預設來解釋一切
當他面對一些讓他不舒服的基督教真理時，
他就傾向扭曲、壓抑、否認、把它放在自己的系統來轉變它、或改變話題
According to Normative Formulations: Antithesis = Not Dead
Antithesis Warns: Don’t Assume Too Much About Unbeliever
Unbeliever Operates with Basic Assumption Opposite to Christian’s
He Strongly Motivated to Interpretation All According to His Presupposition
So When Unbeliever Discovers a Bit of Uncomfortable Truth,
He Inclined to Twist, Suppress, Deny, Domesticate it,
Or Change the Subject (Ignore It)
This formulation does not make the antithesis a dead letter. Certainly the concept
of antithesis has the very practical function of warning apologists not to assume
too much about the unbeliever. He is operating on a basic assumption or
presupposition opposite to that of the Christian. And the unbeliever has a strong
motivation to interpret all of reality according to his own presupposition. Thus,
when the unbeliever finds in his own thinking some uncomfortable bit of Christian
truth, his inclination will be somehow to twist it, suppress it, deny it, domesticate
it, or simply change the subject.
「準則性的說法」比「極端性的說法」更符合《聖經》，但需要補充
上帝要求人尊崇祂為一切知識最終極的來源和最高的準則
罪的本質，就是否認上帝應有這樣的尊崇
非信徒用自己的言語和思想來拒絕尊崇上帝，因而有「勢不兩立」
但是信徒與非信徒都不完全一致
Normative Formulations = Much More Biblical Than Extreme Formulations
But Normative Formulations Needs to Be Supplemented
God Expects Us to Honor Him As Ultimate Source/Norm of Knowledge
Nature of Sin = To Deny Such Honor to God
Unbeliever Denies God’s Honor with Words and Thoughts, Thus – Antithesis
But Believer and Unbeliever Are Not Fully Consistent
I believe that this formulation is much more scriptural than those listed in the first
section, although we shall see in subsequent sections that it needs to be
supplemented. As Van Til establishes in his metaphysics of knowledge, God
expects us to honor him as the ultimate source and standards of knowledge. The
nature of sin is to deny such honor to God. The unbeliever seeks, through his
words and thoughts, to deny God’s rightful honor. Thus there is antithesis. But
there is no need to assume that either believer or unbeliever is fully consistent
with his principle. Rather, the opposite is the case.
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準則性的說法產生重要後果：我們不能預測非信徒對護教的回應（傳統或范式）
范泰爾：一般來說，我們能預測非信徒的回應，例如他必然拒絕復活的證據
但從「準則性」來理解「勢不兩立」時，事情不一定這樣發生
Normative Formulations Has Important Consequences:
We Cannot Predict Unbeliever’s Response to Apologetic (Traditional or Van
Tillian)
CVT: Unbeliever’s Response = Generally Predictable
E.g.: Unbeliever Will Necessarily Reject Evidences for Resurrection
But on Normative Interpretation of Antithesis: May Be Not So
This formulation has some significant consequences. On this formulation, as

opposed to the extreme antithetical formulations, we cannot predict the response
of the unbeliever to an apologetic, whether that apologetic be traditional or Van
Tillian. As we have seen, Van Til always thought that the unbeliever’s response
was in general predictable. He insisted, for example, that the unbeliever will
necessarily reject the evidences for the Resurrection. But that may not be so on a
normative interpretation of the antithesis.
1. 非信徒在那次的對話中可能不一致，因而對復活的證據表示同意
范泰爾：沒有重生的生命可對某些正統教義同意，例如法利賽人、撒但
Unbeliever May Be Inconsistent In That Situation,
Thus Will Agree with Evidential Arguments
CVT: Un-Regeneracy = Compatible with Certain Amount of Orthodox
Doctrine – e.g. Pharisees, Satan
For one thing, the unbeliever may simply be inconsistent in such a situation, and
because of that inconsistency he may grant the evidential arguments. (We shall
see, and Van Til recognized this, that unregeneracy is compatible with a certain
amount of doctrinal orthodoxy, the Pharisees and Satan being cases in point.)
2. 特殊恩典可能介入：聖靈可能選擇在那次護教對話中重生那個人
Special Grace May Intervene:
Holy Spirit May Choose to Regenerate a Person on Such an Occasion
For another thing, of course, special grace may intervene: the Holy Spirit may
choose to regenerate a person on the occasion of such an apologetic
presentation.
順便一提：范泰爾常常用「罪對理性的影響」來說明：
基督徒護教者不應只提供證據，而必須提供一個超然、預設性的論證
By The Way: CVT Often Uses Noetic Effects of Sin to Show:
Christian Apologist Shouldn’t Just Present Evidence;
Must Present Transcendent, Presuppositional Argument
209
A somewhat parenthetical observation: Van Til often uses the noetic effects of sin
to show that the Christian apologist should always go beyond the presentation of
evidence and present a transcendental, presuppositional argument.
范泰爾堅稱：非信徒必然壓制證據，所以我們必須提供證據以外的論證
弗蘭姆：我相信我們必須用超然的論證
我接受范泰爾對超然論證的其他支持（理由），但卻不接受這項支持（理由）
我們不知道非信徒會否拒絕證據
罪會導致非信徒壓抑超然論證，正如導致他們壓抑證據一樣
CVT Contends: Unbeliever Always Represses Evidence,
So We Must Present Something Other Than Evidence
Frame: I Do Believe In Use Of Transcendental Arguments,
I Accept CVT’s Other Justifications for It,
But I Don’t Accept This Justification for It
We Don’t Know for Sure: Unbeliever Will Reject the Evidence
Sin May Lead Unbeliever to Repress Transcendental Argument: Just As Likely
His contention is that the unbeliever will always repress the evidence, and so
something other than evidence must also be presented. Although I do believe in
the use of transcendental arguments [see chap. 23 (CVT)], and I accept some of
Van Til’s other justifications for it, I do not defend it on this particular ground. We
do not know for sure that the unbeliever will reject the evidence. And sin may lead
the unbeliever to repress the force of a transcendental argument just as much as
it leads him to repress evidence.

210
IV. 處境性的說法
SITUATIONAL FORMULATIONS
Another type of Van Tillian strategy for reconciling antithesis with common grace
is represented by the following:
宇宙是由上帝創造和掌管的，
因此，非基督徒哲學家不可能設計一套對宇宙的解釋，
是完全令人滿意的（連令他自己滿意也不可能）
God Created Universe, Sustains It by Providence
Thus Impossible for Non-Christian Philosopher to Give System of
Interpretation of Universe Which Completely Satisfies (Even to Himself)
It should be remembered that the universe has actually been created by God
and is actually sustained by his providence. This precludes the possibility of
any non-Christian philosopher, however profound, offering a system of
interpretation of the universe that would seem satisfactory even to himself.
(IST, 75. In this connection, he refers to Job 28:12-14, 20-22.)
伯 28:12-14, 20-22
12 然而，智慧有何處可尋﹖聰明之處在哪裏呢﹖
13 智慧的價值無人能知，在活人之地也無處可尋。
14 深淵說：不在我內；滄海說：不在我中。
20 智慧從何處來呢﹖聰明之處在哪裏呢﹖
21 是向一切有生命的眼目隱藏，向空中的飛鳥掩蔽。
22 滅沒和死亡說：我們風聞其名。
事實是非信徒對真理的壓抑，本身也有限制
Unbeliever’s Suppression of Truth = Limited in Nature of Case
Here, the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth is limited in the very nature of the
case.
這是天父世界；任何不信的系統都不可能作出足夠的解釋
這種系統肯定產生問題，最主要的問題就是它必然錯過最明顯的事實！
那就是宇宙清楚顯明（啟示）上帝！
This Is God’s World; No Unbelieving System Can Adequately Account for It
Such Systems Will Generate Problems
Main Problem: It Misses the Most Obvious Thing!
God Is Clearly Revealed in The Universe!
211
Since this is God’s world, no unbelieving system can adequately account for it;
such a system, therefore, will of its own nature generate problems. The main
problem, of course, is that it will miss what is obvious, since God is clearly revealed
in creation.
范泰爾：就算非基督徒否認上帝，他也得首先預設上帝
除非他先預設（肯定）上帝，否則，不可能否認上帝
「預設」的意思：非信徒按著本性「對上帝的知識」不能完全被壓抑
這「知識」影響非信徒的思想和言語
若沒有上帝，任何的否認是沒有意義的
非信徒就像一個孩子坐在爸爸膝上，拼命打爸爸的臉
CVT: Even When Non-Christian Negates God, He Presupposes God
He Cannot Deny God Unless He First Affirms God
“Presuppose” Here Means:
Unbeliever’s Natural Knowledge of God Cannot Be Entirely Suppressed
This Knowledge of God Influences His Thoughts & Words
Apart from God, Denials Are Meaningless
Unbeliever Is Like A Child Slapping Father, While on His Lap
Together with this, we should note Van Til’s statement that “even in [the
non-Christian’s] virtual negation of God, he is still really presupposing God. … [H]e
cannot deny God unless he first affirms him, and … his own approach throughout
its history has been shown to be destructive of human experience itself.” (CTK, 13.)
Here the word “presupposing” is used with a meaning different from Van Til’s
usual concept of presupposition. Usually Van Til uses presupposition to indicate
the fundamental religious direction of a person’s thought. Here it cannot mean
that. However, it does mean at least that the unbeliever’s natural knowledge of
God cannot be entirely suppressed. Nor does it fail to influence the unbeliever’s
explicit thoughts and words. One cannot deny God without affirming him, because
apart from God denials are meaningless. So, to use Van Til’s frequent illustration,
the unbeliever is like a child slapping her father while being supported by his lap.
(JA, 98, and elsewhere.)
范泰爾沒有說，非信徒試圖建構的「無神論世界觀」會產生怎樣的問題？
當非信徒的「反對有神論」不一致的時候，必然會肯定真理
非信徒會看到這些不足，因為他的系統令他不滿意
Which Problems Will Be Generated? CVT Doesn’t Say
When Unbeliever’s Antitheism Is Inconsistent,
By Logical Necessity, Truth = Affirmed Somehow
Unbeliever Can See This Inadequacy, System Doesn’t Satisfy Him
Although Van Til does not enumerate here the specific types of problems that
inevitably arise from an attempt to construe the world nontheistically, we may
assume that they include inconsistencies (as we saw earlier), factual inaccuracies,
212
existential dissatisfactions, etc. Where the unbeliever’s antitheism is inconsistent,
there is by logical necessity some affirmation of the truth, for the contradiction of
antitheism is theism. Whatever may be the type of inadequacy, Van Til tells us
here that the unbeliever himself is capable of recognizing that inadequacy to some
extent, for his system will not “seem satisfactory even to himself.”
既然范泰爾承認非信徒能有這種不足的自覺，這就與他的極端性說法矛盾
「處境性的說法」與「準則性的說法」比較相符
處境性與準則性的說法都指出：
第一，非信徒思想的缺欠不僅是邏輯上的不一致
These Insights Contradicts Extreme Formulations
Situational Formulations Are Compatible With Normative Formulations
In Both We See:
First, Unbeliever’s Thought = Deficient in More Than Logically Inconsistent
When Van Til recognizes such insight in the unbeliever, he is, as in the normative
formulations, contradicting his own more extreme antithetical formulations. The
situational formulations are, however, compatible with the normative ones. In
both of them we have a picture of the unbeliever attempting to understand reality
apart from God, and yet failing to do so. The situational formulations add to the
normative, first, that the unbeliever’s thought is deficient in more than logical
consistency.
第二，這些缺欠不僅是偶然的，不僅因爲非信徒理智不行
而是必然的，因爲處境情勢是如此，非信徒的系統不足以描述上帝和世界
第三，正如非信徒的墮落影響他所作和所說的一切
普遍恩典也影響他所作和所說的一切
Second: Deficiencies Not Merely Accidental,
Not Simply Result of Unbeliever’s Intellectual Failures
Necessitated by Very Nature of Situation
Unbelieving System Can’t Adequately Describe God & World
Third: Unbeliever’s Depravity Affects Everything He Does & Says,
Common Grace Also Affects Everything He Does & Says
Second, they add that these deficiencies are not merely accidental or simply the
result of the unbeliever’s intellectual failures. Rather, they are necessitated by the
very nature of the situation. An unbelieving system cannot adequately describe
God and his world. Third, they add that just as the unbeliever’s depravity affects
everything that he thinks and says, so does common grace.
因爲第三點，在非信徒的意識中，真理和虛假的關係是吊詭的
不僅是「非信徒的錯誤斷言」表明墮落對理性的影響，
「非信徒的正確斷言」也表明普遍恩典的影響
213
墮落在非信徒所作的一切上顯明和運作，其範圍是完全的（完全墮落）
普遍恩典也在非信徒所作的一切上顯明和運作，
因為非信徒所想和所說的一切都「預設」真理
Because of 3rd point:
Relation Between Truth & Falsehood in Unbeliever’s Consciousness =
Paradoxical
Not just: Unbeliever’s False Assertions Show Noetic Effects of Sin, & Their True
Assertions Show Common Grace
Depravity Attaches to Everything Unbeliever Does
Depravity = Total in Extent
Common Grace Attaches to Everything
Because Everything Unbeliever Thinks & Says “Presupposes” Truth
Because of the third point, the relationship between truth and falsehood in the
unbeliever’s consciousness is somewhat paradoxical. It is not simply the case that
the false assertions of unbelievers manifest the noetic effects of sin, and that their
true assertions manifest common grace. Depravity attaches to everything the
unbeliever says and does, for depravity is total in its extent. And common grace
also attaches to everything, for everything the unbeliever thinks and says
“presupposes” truth in the atypical sense noted above.
準則性的說法：
鮮明對照「非信徒對啟示的否認」與「他對啟示的不一致的肯定」
處境性的說法：
非信徒不僅在某些斷言上不一致，他整個思想也不一致
他所想和所說的一切都「預設」他所否定的真理
Normative Formulations Alone:
Distinguish Sharply Between Unbeliever’s Denials of Revelation &
His Inconsistent Affirmations of It
Situational Formulations:
Unbeliever Is Not Only Inconsistent in Some Assertations,
But in His Thought as A Whole
Everything He Thinks & Says “Presupposes” Truth,
Which All His Thought Tries to Deny
The normative formulation alone might encourage us to distinguish sharply

between the unbeliever’s denials of revelation, which reflect depravity, and his
inconsistent affirmations of it, which reflect common grace. On the situational
formulation, however, the unbeliever is not only inconsistent in certain assertions
he makes, but in his thought as a whole. For everything he thinks and says
“presupposes” a truth that all his thought seeks to deny.

214
V. 存在性的說法
EXISTENTIAL FORMULATIONS
范泰爾探究非信徒的內心
CVT Examines Unbeliever’s Heart Condition
Still another approach to the relationship between antithesis and common grace is
found in Van Til’s examination of the unbeliever’s heart condition. Consider the
following:
知識的問題歸根是「倫理問題」
對上帝有（理論上的）正確知識而不愛上帝，這是可能的，魔鬼就是這樣
《聖經》：「認識上帝」指認識和愛上帝
Question of Knowledge = Ethical at Root
Possible to Have Theoretically Correct Knowledge About God,
And Not Love God – E.g. The Devil
Bible: Know God Truly = Love God
The question of knowledge is an ethical question at the root. It is indeed

possible to have theoretically correct knowledge about God without loving
God. The devil illustrates this point. Yet what is meant by knowing God in
Scripture is knowing and loving God: this is true knowledge of God: the other
is false. [DF2, 17 (emphasis by Van Til).]
認識上帝不僅是理性上的事，也包括愛，這與重生的「感情層面」有密切關係
重生導致整個人的「正確知識」和「正確感情」
「正確知識」和「正確感情」不是互為因果
Knowing God = Not Just Intellectual; Includes Love
Related To Emotional Component of Regeneration
Regeneration Secures Right Knowledge & Right Feeling
Right Feeling = Not Effect of Right Knowledge
Right Knowledge = Not Effect of Right Feeling
Knowing God, then, is not merely an intellectual matter. It includes love; it is also
closely connected with the emotional component of regeneration. Notice how
Van Til uses Charles Hodge’s exegesis of Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10:
“Regeneration secures right knowledge as well as right feeling; and right feeling is
not the effect of right knowledge, nor is right knowledge the effect of right feeling.
The two are inseparable effects of a work which affects the whole soul.” [DF2, 75.
Here Van Til is quoting Hodge’s Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
215
1952), 3:36. Cf. our discussion in chap. 11 of this book (CVT) and my perspectival
treatment of intellect, will, emotions, and other human faculties in DKG, 335-340.]
弗 4:24
並且穿上新人；這新人是照著神的形像造的，有真理的仁義和聖潔。
西 3:10
穿上了新人。這新人在知識上漸漸更新，正如造他主的形像。
因此，勢不兩立是指「重生的好的心」與「未重生的壞的心」對立
范泰爾：這是倫理上的問題
非信徒的行爲：不是爲上帝的榮耀（處境），不是基於《聖經》的準則（準則），
不是由信心所推動（存在）
這都與「知識」相關，可見「理性本身是倫理性的」
尋求知識必須有正確的目標、準則、動機，才是真知識；知識與愛不可分割
Thus Antithesis = Good Heart Versus Bad Heart
CVT: It Is Ethical Issue
Unbeliever’s Works:
Not to God’s Glory (Situational), Not Based on Bible’s Stand (Normative),
Not Motivated by Faith (Existential)
“The Intellectual Itself Is Ethical”
Seek Knowledge with Proper Goal, Standard, Motive If It Is True Knowledge
Knowledge & Love = Inseparable
Therefore, the antithesis is regeneracy versus unregeneracy, a good heart versus a

bad one – and that, Van Til always insists, is an ethical issue. As he explains in
Christian Theistic Ethics, the works of the unbeliever are not done to the glory of
God, based on the scriptural standard, and motivated by faith. So it is with
knowledge, for, in his view, “the intellectual itself is ethical.” (DF2, 46.) Knowledge
itself must be sought with the proper goal, standard, and motive if it is to be true
in the fullest sense. Recall Van Til’s statement, quoted earlier, that knowledge and
love are not separable.
非信徒可能講述許多事，信徒不能找出錯處，但這些話來自內心邪惡的動機
非信徒可能說出真理，卻以生命否定它
法利賽人的生命＝否定真理的最邪惡的方法
Unbeliever May Say Something, Believer Can’t Find Fault
But These Spring From Sinful Motives in Heart
Unbeliever Speaks Truth, & Falsifies It by His Life
Pharisees’ Lives = Most Devilish Falsifications of Truth
So, the unbeliever may say many things that in themselves the believer cannot
find fault; but those things, like all the words of sinful man, spring from sinful
motives within. Even the Devil has knowledge after a fashion, as we have seen.
The unbeliever, like his father, the Devil, speaks the truth, but falsifies it by the
216
way he lives: “Formal assent to the intellectual argument for Christianity, and
pharisaical punctiliousness in living up to the form of the law, are in themselves
perhaps the most diabolical falsification of the truth.” (IST, 198.)
范泰爾：非信徒可以在「理智上同意」基督教的真理
有些非信徒，如法利賽人和魔鬼，可以相當「正統」！
CVT: Unbeliever Gives “Intellectual Assent” to Truths of Christianity
Pharisees, Devil = Quite Orthodox!
Van Til often speaks of the unbeliever giving “intellectual assent” to the truths of
Christianity: “We may hold that [the children of Cain] ‘knew’ the truth
intellectually as fully as did the children of God.” (IST, 78; cf. DF2, 299; CTK, 19,
226, 292.) Evidently, some unbelievers, like Pharisees or the Devil, can be quite
orthodox!
我們會這樣誤解：非信徒在理性上接受基督教，卻在道德上（心裏）反對
他們的問題「不是理性上的，而是道德上的」
范泰爾：對，非信徒的墮落是在道德範圍，而不是在形而上範圍
Wrong View: Unbeliever Accepts Truth Intellectually, But Morally Opposes It
Their Problem = “Not Just Intellectual, But Moral”
CVT: Yes, Unbeliever’s Depravity = In Ethical Realm, Not Metaphysical
We might be inclined here toward a formulation like the following: Unbelievers

may accept the truth intellectually, but are morally opposed to it. Their problem is
“not intellectual but moral.” This is the way Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley
formulate the noetic effects of sin in their Classical Apologetics. [(Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1984), 52; cf. my critique in “Van Til and the Ligonier Apologetic,” WTJ
47 (fall 1985): 279-299, reprinted in my AGG, 219-243, and in appendix A of this
volume.] Certainly there is much truth in this formulation. Van Til would agree
with its intention to place the unbeliever’s depravity in the ethical, rather than the
metaphysical, realm. The buzz saw illustration mentioned earlier teaches that the
intellectual capacities of the unbeliever as such may work quite efficiently. Sin
does not destroy them physically or metaphysically; rather, it keeps them from
operating in the right direction.
However, Van Til also says,
但是罪不僅僅牽連人的意志，也牽連人的理性；罪牽連人的每一層面
在人的每一種關係中，他的反應都是倫理性的；理性本身是倫理性的
But Sin Not Only Involves Man’s Will & Not His Intellect
Sin Involevs Man’s Every Aspect
In Man’s Every Relation, His Reactions = Ethical
The Intellectual Is Ethical
217
When we say that sin is ethical we do not mean, however, that sin involved
only the will of man and not his intellect. Sin involved every aspect of man’s
personality. All of man’s reactions in every relation in which God had set him
were ethical and not merely intellectual; the intellectual itself is ethical. (DF2,
46.)
「人的邏輯能力」不可與「他的道德能力」分割
不能說：人雖在道德上不願意服事上帝，但是理性上仍能正確認識上帝
雖然撒但認識上帝，但牠卻沒有真正認識上帝
撒但自以為能打倒上帝，卻沒有真正認識上帝是不能被打倒的
Logical Powers Can’t Be Separate from Moral Powers
Man Isn’t “Morally Unwilling, But Intellectually Right”
Satan Knows God, But He Doesn’t Know God
Satan Thinks He May Overthrow God,
He Knows All Too Well That God Cannot Be Overthrown
Similarly: “It will not do to separate the logical powers of man from his moral
powers and say that though man is morally unwilling to serve God, he can
intellectually know God aright.” (IST, 92.) In this context, he concedes that in
one sense Satan and human sinners like Cain know God very well: “But herein
exactly lies the contradiction of Satan’s personality that though he knows
God he yet does not really know God. His very intellect is devising schemes by
which he thinks he may overthrow God, while he knows all too well that God
cannot be overthrown.” (IST, 92)
「存在性的說法」與「處境性的說法」一樣，是吊詭的
非信徒的人格不可分開，不是說某一部分被墮落影響，其他沒有被影響
墮落沒有毀滅非信徒的理性能力
但是，非信徒的一切理性思考都是以罪人身份作的
同樣，非信徒的一切理性思考都反映普遍恩典
Existential Formulation (Like Situational Formulation) = Paradoxical
Unbeliever’s Personality Can’t Be Divided – All Portions = Affected by The Fall
Sin Doesn’t Destroy Our Rational Capacity
But in All Unbeliever’s Reasoning, He Acts As A Sinner
And in All Unbeliever’s Reasoning, He Reflects Common Grace
Thus, like the situational formulation, the existential formulation is paradoxical.

We cannot neatly divide the personality of the unbeliever into one portion that is
affected and another that is unaffected by the Fall. To be sure, sin does not
destroy our rational capacity to formulate propositions and make inferences;
review in this connection chapters 12 and 13. Unbelievers may and often do
exceed believers in those capacities. But in all the unbeliever’s assertions and
reasoning, he acts as a sinner – and, in all his assertions and reasoning, he reflects
God’s common grace.
218
非信徒在某一種意義上認識上帝，同時又在另一種意義上不認識上帝
要定義和識別這兩種意義，都不容易
「撒但的例子」最有幫助：聰明與愚蠢互動（這只能從《聖經》的記載可見）
Unbeliever Knows God in One Sense,
At Same Time, He Doesn’t Know God in Another
Hard to Define & Distinguish This 2 “Senses”
Most Helpful = Satan’s Example
Brilliance & Stupidity in Interplay (Describe by Bible Only)
At the same time, the unbeliever knows God in one sense and fails to know God in
another. The two senses of knowledge here are difficult to define and distinguish.
(For an attempt to do this roughly and approximately, see DKG, 49-61.) Perhaps
the most helpful elucidation of this distinction is for us, with Van Til in the
preceding quotation, simply to observe the biblical figure of Satan: brilliant and
knowledgeable, but brought by his sinful hatred into a hopelessly stupid project,
the project of trying to overthrow the kingdom of the living God. The interplay of
his brilliance and stupidity is exceedingly difficult to describe, except by the
narratives of Scripture and history. But it rings true. We have all known brilliant
people who have in this way made fools of themselves. Satan is like them, to the
nth degree, and non-Christians in general are like him in turn.
撒但與非信徒之間有重要的差異；非信徒之間也有差異
其中一種差異是「自我意識」的不同，這因教育與歷史背景而異
Satan & Unbeliever: Important Differences; Different Between Unbelievers
One Difference = In Self-Consciousness
Self-Consciousness = Function of Learning & History
Of course, there are important differences between Satan and human unbelievers
and between some unbelievers and others. One difference to which Van Til often
refers is a difference in self-consciousness. “There is therefore a gradation
between those who sin more and those who sin less self-consciously.” (CTK, 46.)
Self-consciousness in this sense is sometimes a function of learning: unbelievers
tend to be more explicitly antagonistic to Christianity when they are
philosophizing than when they are speaking from common sense. (DF2, 82.)
Sometimes it is also a function of historical differentiation:
保羅：沒有聽過福音者是「無知」
犯罪有「較高自我意識」與「較低自我意識」的不同等級
有些人較靠近上帝的超自然啟示，有些人則較遠
弗蘭姆不同意范泰爾有關「清晰分辨」的講法
Paul: Some Didn’t Hear Gospel = “Ignorant”
A Gradation in More/Less Self-Consciously Sinners
Some Are Closer to Supernatural Revelation, Some Further
Frame Versus CVT: Clear “Differentiation”
219
Paul speaks of the ignorance of men to whom the gospel has not been
preached. There is therefore a gradation between those who sin more and
those who sin less self-consciously, as some are closer and others are further
removed in history from the original direct supernatural revelation of God to
men. (CTK, 46. Cf. the account in CGG of the process by which unbelievers
and believers become more and more clearly differentiated from one
another as history progresses to it consummation. I confess I have
reservations about the scripturality of this theological construction, which I
will note in the following chapter. But I do not doubt that people repress the
truth with different degrees of self-consciousness.)
弗蘭姆：這「存在性的說法」與「準則性的說法」重疊
范泰爾在這裏所謂的「自我意識」與「系統、原則」是同義
非信徒「在他的系統裏」壓抑真理＝「有高度的知識論自我意識」來壓抑真理
Frame: Here, Existential Formulations & Normative Formulations Overlap
“Self-Consciousness” & “Systems, Principles” = Equivalent
Suppressing Truth “In His System” =
Being Epistemologically Self-Conscious In Suppression
Here the normative and existential formulations overlap. Here Van Til speaks of
“self-consciousness.” Earlier we saw that he often speaks of the “systems” or
“principles: of the unbeliever being the specific locus of noetic sin. I take it that
these formulations are pretty much equivalent: see Van Til’s own equation of
them in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, pages 83-84. To say that the
unbeliever’s suppression of the truth is “in his system” or “insofar as he is true to
his principle” is the same as saying “to the degree that he is epistemologically
self-conscious.”
罪仍然影響那些「自我意識」沒有那麼高、思想沒有那麼「系統」的人
他們有知識而沒有愛心：這是理性犯罪的核心
Sin Still Has Effect on “Unself-Conscious” People or Unsystematic Thinkers
We Still Find Their Knowledge without Love: Heart of Noetic Sin
Still, this is not to say that sin has no effects upon people who are relatively
unself-conscious or relatively unsystematic in their thought. For in such people we
still find knowledge without love, which is the heart of noetic sin.
范泰爾有時用「自我意識」指心理方面的意思：
指非信徒的真理知識是「潛意識」的知道
非信徒「在內心的深處」或「不自願地」認知真理
但范泰爾也說：不要過份強調「前意識」與「自我意識」的區別
CVT Sometimes Uses “Self-Conscious” In Psychological Sense:
Unbeliever’s Knowledge of Truth = Unconscious or Subconscious
220
What Is Deep Down in The Heart of Unbeliever
Unbeliever “Involuntarily” Recognizes Truth
But Don’t Stress “Pre-Conscious” Versus “Self-Conscious” Action
Van Til occasionally uses formulations that press the concept of self-consciousness
in a psychological direction, as if the unbeliever’s knowledge of the truth were
unconscious or subconscious. For example, “[The Reformed apologist] must seek
his point of contact with the natural man in that which is beneath the threshold of
his working consciousness, in the sense of deity which he seeks to suppress.” [DF2,
98. Van Til frequently appeals to what is “deep down” in the heart of the
unbeliever (pp. 94, 231). Cf. also his emphasis on the “involuntary” nature of the
unbeliever’s recognition of truth, as in IST, 88.] However, Van Til also writes, “We
should, however, be on our guard not to make too much of the distinction
between preconscious and self-conscious action. … [as if intuition] were
something quite different and something more elemental than ratiocination.” (IST,
90.)
范泰爾並不堅持：我們與非信徒同意的，僅限於潛意識裏的信念
范泰爾：非信徒的「自我意識」指他們的用意和老練，不是指他是否察覺
墮落與普遍恩典都明顯影響到每一個的意識層面
CVT Doesn’t Insist:
All Our Agreements with Unbelievers = Limited to Subconscious Beliefs
CVT: Self-Consciousness Refers to Unbelievers’ Intentions & Sophistication,
Not His Psychological Awareness
Depravity & Common Grace = At All Levels of Psychological Consciousness
In general, Van Til does not insist that all of our agreements with unbelievers must
be limited to their subconscious beliefs. Rather, when he talks about an
unbeliever’s level of self-consciousness, he is talking about the unbeliever’s
intentions and sophistication, not his psychological self-awareness. Depravity and
common grace are both displayed at all levels of psychological consciousness, as is
clearly implied by the normative and situational formulations.
墮落與普遍恩典都涉及整個人的事實
因此，范泰爾喜歡用「極端性的說法」
墮落若涉及整個人，信徒與非信徒的共同點必然也有分歧
Depravity And Common Grace = Pervasive Realities
Thus CVT Loves Extreme Antithetical Formulations
If Depravity Is Pervasive, No Commonality without Difference
Depravity and common grace are both pervasive realities. That being so, we can
understand why Van Til makes use of extreme antithetical formulations. If
depravity is pervasive, it will not do to suggest without qualification that the
unbeliever knows a collection of truths that he holds in common with the believer.
There is no commonality without difference.
221
但「極端性的說法」也有不足，必須予以適度的限制：
But Extreme Antithetical Formulations = Inadequate without Qualification
第一：「極端性的說法」指非信徒的每一句話都說錯
但其實墮落的運作是多樣性的：
非信徒可能不同意《聖經》；可能虛偽地同意，但內心不願意愛上帝和服事祂
First: Unbeliever Doesn’t Err in Every Statement
Depravity Works in Various Ways
Unbeliever May Disagree with Bible;
Or Agree Hypocritically - There’s No Love in Heart, Not Willing to Serve God
On the other hand, we can also understand why the extreme antithetical
formulations are inadequate without considerable qualification. First, they suggest
that the unbeliever errs literally in every statement he makes. As we have seen,
depravity does not necessarily work that way. It works in various ways. Sometimes
it does lead unbelievers literally to deny the teachings of Scripture. Sometimes,
however, it leads them to affirm those teachings hypocritically – without love,
without a heart to serve God.
第二：「極端性的說法」指「墮落的理性層面」都在於「直接斷言」
但其實也涉及整個人的「生命方向」
Second: Those Formulations Suggest
Depravity’s Intellectual Aspect = Always in Discreet Statements,
Not in Life’s Direction
Second, those formulations suggest that the specifically intellectual aspects of

human depravity always appear in the discreet statements that the unbeliever
makes, rather than in the direction of his entire life.
第三：「極端性的說法」只強調非信徒「否認」真理
但其實，在某層面上非信徒仍可算是「肯定」真理
非信徒的「否認」和「肯定」都是不一致的：
非信徒會說出真理，又帶著虛妄（準則性的說法）
非信徒會預設真理，只是這真理卻是他要否定的（處境性的說法）
非信徒會在理性上認知真理，只是會對真理作出愚妄的反應（存在性的說法）
Third: These Formulations Didn’t Convey
When Unbeliever Denies Truth, He Is Affirming It Also
His Denial & Affirmation = Inconsistent:
Conveys Truth & Error (Normative)
Presupposes The Truth Which All His Thought Tries to Deny (Situational)
Recognizes Truth Intellectually, But Responds to It Foolishly (Existential)
222
Third, they fail to convey that the unbeliever’s very denial of the truth is in some
respect an affirmation of it. It is inconsistent and therefore conveys truth along
with error (normative formulation); it presupposes the truth (situational); it
recognizes the truth intellectually while responding to it foolishly (existential).

223
VI. 實踐性的說法
PRACTICAL FORMULATIONS
范泰爾對非信徒的看法是非常複雜的
在他「極端性的說法」裏，似乎否認這複雜性
但我們若要建造在范泰爾的根基上，必須認清此複雜性
非信徒既是複雜的，我們應如何準備自己作護教對談？
CVT’s View of Unbeliever = Very Complex
He Denies This Complexity in Extreme Formulations
But We (Van Tillians) Must Take Complexity into Account
How Do We Prepare for Apologetic Encounters?
We have seen that Van Til’s view of the unbeliever is actually very complex. He
appears to deny this complexity in his extreme antithetical formulations, but we
certainly must take them into account if we are to build well on his foundation.
Bearing this complexity in mind, how shall we prepare ourselves practically for
apologetic encounters? What should we expect of the unbeliever?
范泰爾指我們能預測非信徒對護教挑戰的反應，弗蘭姆並不同意
弗蘭姆：這種預測是不可能的
還有特殊恩典可能介入，使非信徒歸正（信心與悔改）
CVT: We Can Predict Unbeliever’s Response to Apologetic Challenge
Frame: Such Prediction = Impossible
Also: Special Grace May Intervene, Brings Conversion
I questioned earlier Van Til’s assertion that we can predict how the unbeliever will
respond to an apologetic challenge (e.g., by twisting the evidence for the
Resurrection into a naturalistic scheme). I believe it is evident now that no such
prediction is possible. The unbeliever may or may not twist the evidence in this
way. He may confess that Jesus is risen, but do so hypocritically or with hatred of
the God who so triumphed over his lord, Satan. These are alternatives within the
sphere of common grace. We should recognize also that special grace may
intervene and use the presentation of such evidences to bring conversion. Thus,
the actual response of the unbeliever to an apologetic argument is quite
unpredictable.
224
范泰爾的「實踐性的說法」：實際情形是敞開而富彈性
在非信徒的思想中，真理與錯誤混雜
非基督徒的斷言並不一致
CVT’s Practical Formulations – Situation = Open, Flexible

In Unbeliever’s Mind: Mixture of Truth And Error
Non-Christian’s Statements = Inconsistent
Van Til’s most practical formulations, then, are formulations that (contrary to the
extreme antithetical formulations) leave the situation fairly open and flexible. I
referred earlier, for example, to his assertion that there is a “mixture” of truth and
falsehood in the unbeliever’s mentality. The non-Christian’s statements “do not
consistently proceed from the one principle or the other.”
范泰爾忠告：不要假設非信徒能在每一問題上作出「基本」正確的判斷
范泰爾：非信徒錯誤地聲稱能在人類經驗的某些範圍作出「基本」正確的解釋
范泰爾爲甚麼用「基本」等這些含糊的字詞？
CVT Advises:
Don’t Assume Unbeliever Can Form A Basically Proper Judgment on Any
Question
CVT States:
Unbeliever Is Mistaken to Claims He Can Interpret Some Experience Essentially
Correct
Why Does CVT Use Vague Words: “Basically”, ” Essentially” Etc.?
In the same vein, Van Til often urges apologists to avoid the assumption that the
unbeliever can form a “basically proper judgment on any question.” (DF2, 83.) He
states that, on a biblical epistemology, the unbeliever’s “claim to interpret at least
some area of experience in a way that is essentially correct, is mistaken.” (DF2, 93.)
“Basically” and “essentially” seem like rather vague terms. In a thinker as
conscious of principle as Van Til, one would not expect to find that sort of
vagueness. We ask, Are the unbeliever’s judgments proper or improper? When
the issue is principial, how can we introduce terms that suggest differences of
degree? (Cf. also IST, 32: “Formally and incidentally, [unbelievers] have said many
things that are true.” We discussed “formally” earlier. “Incidentally” suggests that
the unbelievers speak truths, but not on the main drift of a topic of conversation.)
范泰爾的確用了這些含糊的字詞，我們就不要再追究下去
非信徒會講出真理，但是他們對世界的認識「基本上」是錯誤的
「基本上是錯誤」不能以一種純粹概念的方式來說明
But CVT Does Use Vague Terms: Just Leave The Matter
Unbeliever Sometimes Speak Truth,
But Their Overall Understanding of World = Basically Wrong
“Basically Wrong” Can’t Be Demonstrated in A Purely Conceptual Way
225
But Van Til does use such terms, and perhaps that is where we should leave the
matter for practical purposes. Unbelievers do speak truth sometimes, but their
overall understanding of the world is “basically” wrong. Nor can this basic
wrongness always be demonstrated in a purely conceptual way. Is Einstein’s
relativity theory wrong because it was devised by a non-Christian? Is it “basically”
wrong? To say so without further explanation would be misleading.
非信徒的「錯」是因爲「心錯了」；「錯的心」用不同方法和概念來表達
Unbeliever = Wrong, Because His Heart = Wrong
Wrong Heart Expresses Through Different Ways, Concepts
The wrongness of an unbeliever’s mentality is essentially a wrongness of the heart,

and that wrongness of the heart may be expressed actively and conceptually in
various ways. A non-Christian scientist may discover facts and report them
accurately; the wrongness of his perspective may appear in his use of those facts,
or in his inner motivation for discovering them, rather than in his statement of
them. His theory as such may be “basically right,” although his overall outlook on
life will be “basically wrong.”
信徒可以預期到非信徒用某種方法來壓抑上帝的真理，因此：
非信徒的生命組合是錯誤的、不智慧的；
但是壓抑的方法很多
我們不能預測一次護教對談的結果如何；
必須處理每個人的需要、關注、興趣、難題
Believer Should Expect to Find Unbeliever Represses Truth of God
In One Way or Another, So That:
Overall Configuration of Life = Wrong, Wrongheaded
But Repression Takes Many Forms
Can’t Predict How An Apologetic Encounter May Go
Deal with Each Person’s Needs, Concerns, Interests, Problems
When the apologist approaches an unbeliever, he should expect to find one who
represses the truth of God in one way or another, so that the overall configuration
of his life is wrong and wrongheaded. But the specific forms that this repression
takes are so many and so varied that it is not possible to predict just how an
apologetic confrontation will go. To use a currently popular phrase, apologists
must therefore be “person variable.” It must deal with each inquirer according to
his own special needs, concerns, interests, and problems.
范泰爾：我們可以預測護教對談的結果
但是他也意識到非信徒的複雜性，這與「能預測」並不符合
CVT: We Can Predict Course of Encounters
But His Account of Complexity of Unbeliever Can’t Be Reconciled with Such
Predictability
226
Van Til himself thought it was possible to predict the course of such encounters.
But his own account of the complexities of the unbeliever’s consciousness cannot
be reconciled with such predictability.
可能，范泰爾並沒有他的某些說法那麽強硬？
弗蘭姆當范泰爾的學生時，曾問老師應否按字面來理解他的「勢不兩立」主張？
范泰爾回答＝常識性
Maybe, CVT = Not So Rigid!
Frame (As Student) Pressed CVT on Literal Force of Antithesis
CVT’s Reply = Common-Sense Type
And it may be that he was actually not so rigid on this question as some of his
formulations might suggest. As a student, I used to press him on the literal force of
his view of antithesis. It seemed to me then that a literal account of it (e.g., “We
may never agree with an unbeliever”) would require all sorts of absurdities. Van
Til would not even have the right, for example, to accept Hume’s critiques of some
of Butler’s arguments, which he certainly wanted to do. When I raised this issue,
Van Til’s replies to me were always of a rather commonsense variety. Of course,
he said, we can agree with Hume, or Kant, or Plato, or Aristotle, about this or that,
but not about their “basic” ideas. He was not hesitant to express agreement with
unbelievers on various points, such as the importance of the one-and-many
problem. (DF2, 24.) He could even speak of “the lofty ethics of idealism” (DF2, 64;
CTETH, 59), and he speaks of how we should “apply the method of idealist
logicians in a way that these idealist logicians, because of their own anti-Christian
theistic assumptions, cannot apply it” (DF2, 115-116; cf. IW, 18), thus implying
some level of agreement with the idealists as to how concepts cohere in a system
of thought. He could praise elements of the secular writers Kroner and Jaeger
(CTETH, 219). He could agree with the secular scientists about “details” (CTEV, 64,
114; PR, 1, 69. 71. Note PR, 78-80, where he struggles for words to articulate this
distinction). Non-Christians, he says, can teach much that is good, right, and true.
(ECE, 83; but on p. 202 he says that no teaching is possible except in Christian
schools!) Modern theologians have even made great contributions to biblical
studies. (TJD, 23; cf. also Gordon Lewis’s comments in JA, 352-354.) Nor was Van
Til embarrassed to speak of “a certain admission on the part of the sinner that his
own gods do not meet the needs of his intellect, his emotions or his will.” (IST,
120.)
但范泰爾認爲「哲學家的基本架構」與「基督教」是勢不兩立的
范泰爾對弗蘭姆挑戰：有哪位非基督徒哲學家會達到「有神論的世界觀」？
的確一個都沒有
But Philosophers’ Basic Structure = Antithetical to Christianity
CVT: Did Any Non-Christian Philosopher Attain Theistic Worldview? Not One
227
But Van Til felt that the “basic” structure of these philosophers was antithetical to
Christianity, and he presented cogent argumentation to show that that was so. He
would challenge me to find one case in the history of non-Christian philosophy in
which someone attained an authentically theistic worldview. I was, of course,
unable to produce any examples.
范泰爾：事實上，墮落產生一些思想系統，在重要關頭上否認《聖經》真理
法利賽人微妙地壓抑真理，但這種人不多
CVT’s Point: Empiricially, Depravity Tends to Produce
Systems of Thought – Deny Biblical Truth Significantly
Pharisees Repress Truth Subtly: This Isn’t Frequent
His point seemed to be, not some rigid conviction that we must never agree with
unbelievers on any proposition, but rather the empirical observation that, as a
matter of fact, depravity tends to produce systems of thought that deny biblical
truth in significant ways. Perhaps there are a few unbelievers, such as the
Pharisees may have been, who repress the truth more subtly than that, devising
intellectual systems that actually affirm biblical truth, but who hold that truth
hypocritically. That is possible, and it may have happened, but we must agree that
it does not happen very often.
范泰爾談到「勢不兩立」時非常強硬，但當他用此觀念時卻很有彈性
我們在實踐上也應如此
CVT’s Antithesis Talk Sounds Rigid,
But His Use of The Concept = Fairly Flexible
We Should Do The Same in Practice
I would suggest that although Van Til’s talk of antithesis often appears very rigid
(perhaps necessarily so, since we are talking about differences in “principle”), his
use of the concept was fairly flexible. Following the example of his practice rather
than of his more extreme formulations, we may (and, in my judgment, should) do
the same.

228
VII. 結論
CONCLUSION
范泰爾用五種說法來形容「勢不兩立」與「普遍恩典」的關係
他的「極端性的說法」不是范泰爾最好的概念，不代表他思想的全部
弗蘭姆：在護教時，不要用它
CVT: 5 Ways to Describe relation of Antithesis & Common Grace
Extreme Formulations = Not CVT at Best, In Entirety
Don’t Use in Encounters
Thus far, I have discussed five ways in which Van Til describes the relation of
antithesis and common grace. Putting together what we have learned, I would
suggest that the extreme antithetical formulations with which his thought is most
commonly identified and for which it is most commonly criticized do not represent
him at his best or at his most typical. Nor do they represent the full complexity of
his thinking on these subjects. Indeed, it would, I believe, be very wrong for us to
go into apologetic encounters taking these statements literally and acting on the
basis of them.
顯然，范泰爾喜歡他的「極端性的說法」，且講得最出色
爲甚麽？因爲他自認是凱伯與梅欽的繼承人
覺得自己有責任將「勢不兩立」的精神推介給教會
CVT Likes His Extreme Formulations, Most Eloquent
Why? He Sees Himself Heir to Kuyper & Machen,
Feels Duty to Promote Antithesis in Church
No doubt Van Til himself was fond of his more extreme antithetical formulations.
To those he devoted his greatest eloquence, his greatest illustrative cleverness
(the buzz saw, the man made of water, the jaundiced eye). Why? In my view, he
saw himself as the heir to Kuyper and Machen, and he felt responsible to maintain
the mentality of antithesis in the Machen movement and promote it throughout
the larger church.
范泰爾最關注的是：信徒對不信的「敵對意識」減弱，不夠鮮明
范泰爾有關「勢不兩立」的準則性、處境性、存在性、實踐性說法更仔細分析
「墮落是涉及全人的」，這正好引證他的「極端性的說法」
Greatest Concern: Sense of Opposition to Unbelief May Lose Its Sharpness
His More Careful Analyses of Antithesis: Depravity = Comprehensive
Justified His Extreme Formulations
229
His greatest concern was that that sense of opposition to unbelief might lose its
sharpness. Further, his more careful analyses of antithesis (normative, situational,
existential, and practical) did warrant the view that the effects of depravity upon
the unbeliever were comprehensive, so that it could be said that in one sense the
unbeliever “knows nothing truly.” He very likely felt that these considerations
justified his extreme formulations.
但是，雖然罪在理性上的影響是涵蓋全人的
我們還須注意這些影響的本質，不可過份簡化
范泰爾也承認這點，只是在他的「勢不兩立」的說法中不一定常反映這洞見
But, Although Noetic Effects of Sin = Comprehensive,
Pay Attention to Nature of Those Comprehensive EffectsDon’t Be Simplistic
CVT Recognized That, But His formulations Do Not Always Reflect
But, as we have seen, although the noetic effects of sin are comprehensive, we
must give attention to the nature of those comprehensive effects. It is simplistic to
hold that they amount to a propositional falsification of the unbeliever’s every
utterance. Van Til recognized that in his better moments, but his formulations do
not always reflect that level of insight.
我們身爲范泰爾主義者，不要淡化范泰爾的「勢不兩立」，以強調普遍恩典觀
We Vantillians: Don’t De-Emphasize CVT’s Antithesis,
In Order to Emphasize His Doctrine of Common Grace
The point is not that we (that is, we Van Tillians) must deemphasize Van Til’s
doctrine of antithesis in favor of his doctrine of common grace. To do that would
be to rob Van Tillian thought of all its distinctiveness.
反之，要全面理解和使用范泰爾「勢不兩立」的整體觀念
在我們的護教實踐上，不要按字面來理解范氏的「極端性的說法」
這樣做，會削弱范泰爾在這方面的教導，把「勢不兩立」限制在理性和命題上
Rather: Understand & Use CVT’s Antithesis in Full
Don’t Practice Apologetics Which Takes His Most Extreme Formulations at Face
Value
This Weakens CVT’s Teaching,
Because It Limits Antithesis to Intellectual/Propositions
Rather, what we must do is to understand and make use of the full dimension of
Van Til’s thinking about the antithesis, rather than practice a “Van Tillian
apologetics” that simply takes his most extreme formulations at face value. Such
extreme and literalistic uses of Van Tillian antithesis actually tend to weaken Van
Til’s teaching in this area, for they tend to describe “antithesis” largely in
intellectual terms, as if it were merely about one group of propositions logically
contradicting another.
230
范泰爾的「勢不兩立」不單涉及人的理性，而是涵蓋全人的生命、國度的交戰
罪使人的理性和整個生命拜偶像
CVT’s Antithesis: Far More Than That
It’s About Whole Life of Man, Conflict of Ages
Sin Places Intellect & All The Rest of Life at Service of Idol
In fact, Van Til’s “antithesis” is far more than that. It is a teaching about the whole
life of man, believing and unbelieving, about the conflict of the ages between the
kingdom of God and the kingdom of the Wicked One. This conflict embraces the
intellect, but it also embraces every other area of human life. And we do not
adequately see how the antithesis affects the intellect until we see how sin places
the intellect, together with all the rest of life, into the service of an idol.
當我們明白「勢不兩立」的完整面貌時，就會更全面理解「鴻溝」的正確說法
「基督教」與「不信」之間的確有著「鴻溝」
但「改革宗」與「其他信徒」之間是否也有「鴻溝」？
弗蘭姆：使用「鴻溝」這些字眼，我比范泰爾更保守
主要的「勢不兩立」是在「信」與「不信」之間
When We Understand Antithesis in Full,
We See: Legitimate to Speak of “Great Gulf”
There’s “Great Gulf” Between Christianity & Unbelief
But Is There “Great Gulf” Between Reformed & Other Christians?
Frame: I’d Be More Conservative Than CVT Was with This Kind of Language
Chief Antithesis Is Between Belief and Unbelief
When we understand the antithesis in its full dimensions, we see more fully the
legitimacy of the “great gulf” language in certain contexts. To be sure, there is a
great gulf between Christianity and unbelief, and between authentic Christianity
and deformations of it. Is there also a “great gulf” between Reformed Christians
and non-Reformed Christians, or between Van Tillian apologists and non-Van
Tillian apologists? I confess I would be more conservative than Van Til was with
this kind of language, maintaining that the chief antithesis is between belief and
unbelief as such rather than between varieties of belief or various formulations of
the truth.
例如：「阿米念主義的護教學」與「改革宗的護教學」共通點比分歧多
「勢不兩立」是「心」的問題；改革宗與阿米念弟兄姐妹是「一條心」
E.g. Arminian Apologetic: More In Common with Reformed
Antithesis = Issue of Heart
Reformed & Arminian Brothers/Sisters = of One Heart
Arminianism and non-Van Tillian systems of apologetics are erroneous in some

measure, I would say, but they have much in common with the Reformed faith at
231
the deepest level. Thus, we should not criticize them in the same terms that we
use to criticize unbelief.
Do Reformed believers really have “no fundamentals in common” with Arminian

Christians like Stuart Hackett? (Recall our discussion of this in chap. 3. We shall see
other examples of this extreme language in chaps. 22, 25, and 27.) In my view,
statements like this are unwise and untrue if taken in their natural meaning. The
issue of antithesis is essentially an issue of the heart, and I am confident that
Reformed believers are, in general, of one heart with their Arminian brothers and
sisters.
弗蘭姆：范泰爾有時忘記「勢不兩立」是關於「人的心」的教義
范泰爾錯了：以爲可以完全在觀念的對立上找到「勢不兩立」
每一個人的「內心狀態」與「他用言語作的信仰告白」之間的關係是很複雜的
Frame: CVT Sometimes Forgot:
His Doctrine of Antithesis = Doctrine About Human Heart
CVT Was Wrong:
He Could Identify Antithesis Exhaustively with Various Conceptual Oppositions
Precise Relationship Between Heart & Verbal Confession = Complex
The problem is this: Van Til sometimes forgot that his doctrine of antithesis was a
doctrine about the human heart. He sometimes thought that he could identify it
exhaustively with various conceptual oppositions. In this belief he was wrong. If
we are to maintain fully Van Til’s “presuppositionalism of the heart” in our own
day, we must avoid such confusion. (See my AGG, 57-88, where I attempt to show
some other ways in which Van Til confuses heart-attitudes with propositional
formulations.) Of course, I am not saying that one’s doctrine has nothing to do
with the condition of one’s heart. Doctrine proceeds from the heart, as do all of
our words (Matt. 12:34). But, as we have seen, the precise relationship between
heart condition and verbal confession in individual cases is rather complex.
馬太福音 12:34
毒蛇的種類！你們既是惡人，怎能說出好話來呢﹖因為心裏所充滿的，口裏就說出來。
有些人認爲：范泰爾的思想禁止我們從非信徒或非改革宗信徒學習任何事
Some Think: Van Til’s Thought Forbids Us To Learn Anything From Unbelievers or
Non-Reformed Christians
The notion is abroad in some circles that Van Til’s thought forbids us to seek to
learn anything at all from unbelievers, or even from non-Reformed Christians.
(Understandably, this sort of view is not usually found in print, but I think many
readers will recall private conversations and presbytery speeches to this effect.
For one published example, see the exchange between William Dennison, the late
William White, and myself, in Journey, September-October 1987; March-April,
May-June, and July-October 1988; January-February 1989.) Van Til’s extreme
232
antithetical formulations do give some aid and comfort to that position. I take it,
however, that my analysis decisively refutes such applications of Van Til’s thought.
范泰爾承認：他本身從非信徒和非改革宗思想家學到很多東西
不要死硬地應用范泰爾有關「勢不兩立」較極端的斷言
CVT Learned Much From Non-Christian & Non-Reformed Thinkers
Don’t Apply CVT’s Extreme Statements in Wooden Way
Van Til himself learned much from non-Christian and non-Reformed thinkers, and
he taught his students to do the same. Wooden application of Van Til’s more
extreme antithetical statements misses entirely the subtlety of Van Til’s teaching.
不要從范泰爾著作中取用那些最沒有《聖經》根據的話作為出發點
Don’t Start with CVT’s Words Least Defensible (With Bible)
We ought not to take as our starting point those statements of Van Til which are
least defensible scripturally and which contradict Van Til’s own fuller formulations.
當今的世代需要更多（而不是更少）意識「勢不兩立」
將焦點放在范泰爾的教導對我們是多麽豐富
Our Time Needs More (Not Less) Antithesis
Focus on CVT’s Richness
Still, in my view, the great need in our time is for more, not less, recognition of
antithesis. Here, Van Til can continue to make an important contribution to
Christian thought, as long as we focus on the richness of his teaching rather than
carelessly repeating his more colorful formulations.

233
第十六章普遍恩典
COMMON GRACE
I. 普遍恩典
COMMON GRACE
「普遍恩典」是「勢不兩立」的限制
普遍恩典給非信徒真正的上帝的知識，這知識不能使他們得救
非信徒的罪就是抗拒這知識；這知識令他負責任，無可推諉
Common Grace – Limit to Antithesis
Common Grace Gives Unbeliever Non-Saving, Genuine Knowledge of God
Unbeliever Sins Against This Knowledge, It Renders Him Responsible
In the preceding chapter, I discussed common grace as a limit to antithesis.

Common grace is that which gives to the unbeliever a non-saving, but nonetheless
genuine knowledge of God. It is that knowledge against which he sins and which
therefore renders him responsible for his actions.
「普遍恩典」是范泰爾思想中重要的焦點；還有很多內容
「普遍恩典」是范泰爾的歷史哲學
Common Grace = A Major Focus In CVT; There’s Much More
Common Grace = CVT’s Philosophy of History
There is, however, much more to the doctrine of common grace, which was a
major focus of Van Til’s interest. His doctrine of common grace was in effect his
philosophy of history. We must, therefore, look at that doctrine more
systematically.
加爾文發展普遍恩典的教義，爲要指出：
沒有重生、完全墮落的罪人，仍能行善
最好的解經研究：慕理 1942 文章（《慕理文集》第二卷，頁 93-119）
凱伯三卷巨作 De Gemeene Gratie：荷蘭文，沒有英譯本
凱伯引發荷蘭改革宗圈子內的爭辯，例如：北美「基督教改革宗」宗派（CRC）
Calvin Developed Doctrine of Common Grace to Show:
Unregenerate, Totally Depraved Sinners Could Do Good
Best Exegetical Study: John Murray, 1942 (Volume 2, pp. 93-119)
Abraham Kuyper’s 3 Volume De gemeene gratie – In Dutch Only
Kuyper Sparks Debate Among Dutch Reformed, E.g. CRC
234
The doctrine of common grace was developed by John Calvin to show how
unregenerate, totally depraved sinners could do things that were good for human
society. [For Calvin’s views, the standard study is Herman Kuiper, Calvin on
Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Smitter, 1928). In my opinion, the best exegetical
study of the doctrine available in English is John Murray’s 1942 essay, “Common
Grace,” reprinted in Collected Writings of John Murray, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Banner
of Truth, 1976-82), 2:93-119.] Abraham Kuyper wrote a three-volume work on the
subject, De Gemeene Gratie, still untranslated into English. Kuyper’s influence
provoked a lively debate over the subject in Dutch Reformed circles; there has
been no comparable discussion in English-speaking Presbyterian churches.
范泰爾所屬的基督教改革宗（CRC）爲「普遍恩典」爭辯了一段時期
Hoeksema, Danhof 等牧師不承認有普遍恩典：
上帝不可能對祂沒有揀選的人有施恩典的心意
而日光、雨水等不算恩典（Favor）
1924 基督教改革宗總會「（等於）定」Hoeksema, Danhof 的觀點爲異端
CVT Belongs to CRC Until 1936
CRC Controversy Concerning Common Grace
Herman Hoeksema And Danhof Deny Common Grace:
Inconceivable: God Graciously Inclined to Non-Elect
Rain, Sunshine Are Not Evidences of God’s Favor
1924 CRC Kalamazoo Synod “Virtually Condemned” Hoeksema & Danhof’s View
The Christian Reformed Church, of which Van Til was a member until 1936, went
through a period of serious controversy concerning common grace. A number of
ministers, including the brilliant dogmatician Herman Hoeksema, denied the
existence of common grace. Van Til explains: “Hoeksema and Danhof argue that it
is inconceivable that God should be in any sense, and at any point, graciously
inclined to those who are not his elect. The wicked do, to be sure, receive gifts
from God. But rain and sunshine are not, as such, evidences of God’s favor.” (CGG,
18.) In 1924, the denominational Synod, meeting at Kalamazoo, Michigan,
“virtually condemned” (CGG, 18.) the views of Hoeksema and Danhof by affirming
three points of doctrine. Van Til includes the text of these in Common Grace and
the Gospel, pages 19-22. They may be summarized as follows:
1924 總會立場的三要點
1924 CRC Kalamazoo Synod – 3 Points
1. 上帝有「某一種的恩惠」，是一般性地施予祂所有的被造物
God Has “Favor” Shown To All
There is a “certain favor or grace” of God which he shows to his creatures in

general.
235
2. 上帝約束罪
God Restrains Sin
God restrains sin in individuals and in society.
3. 上帝賜能力給沒有重生的人，可以做出對人有益的「善事」
God Enables Unregenerate to Do “Civic Good”
God enables the unregenerate to perform “civic good,” that is, things that
promote the welfare of others.
當時范泰爾還太年輕，但這爭辯引發他多次在這題目上思想和寫作
在爭辯的雙方范泰爾都有朋友，范氏嘗試超越雙方的標準立場
范氏要在神學理解上尋求進步，目標是對雙方的立場進行系統而批判性的分析
At Time, CVT = Too Young, But
Debate Stimulated Him to Comment Frequently on It
He Had Friends on Both Sides, He Tried to Go Beyond Standard Positions
Make Real Progress in Theological Understanding
Goal: Give Systemic, Critical Analysis of Both Sides
Van Til was too young to be a major participant in the discussions of the early
1920s, but the debate did stimulate him to comment frequently on the issue in
later years. He had friends on both sides of the controversy and he regretted the
divisiveness of it. He sought in his writings to get beyond the standard positions on
either side and to make some real progress in theological understanding. (Note his
comments in CGG, 12-13. His goal was to provide sympathetic, critical analysis of
both sides.) In this effort he acknowledged the value of contributions by S.G. De
Graaf and Klaas Schilder, with some criticisms of the latter. (CGG, 23-29.)
范氏的小冊子《普遍恩典》很難讀；比較和對照多位思想家的觀點
CVT’s Booklet Common Grace = Hard to Follow
Compares, Contrasts Between Many Thinkers
Van Til’s booklet Common Grace, subsequently published as the first three
chapters of the collection Common Grace and the Gospel, is rather difficult to
follow. There are all sorts of comparisons and contrasts between Calvin, Pighius,
Kuyper, Bavinck, Schilder, Hepp, Hoeksema, De Graaf, Greydanus, and Zwier, and
many digressions and excursuses about science, theistic proofs, apologetic
methodology, paradox, logic, analogical thinking, and so on, some of which I refer
to elsewhere in this volume.
236
弗蘭姆：在這裏，總結范泰爾的提議
范泰爾強調：共相與事實的相關性，反映三位一體上帝
這相關性導致：事實有意義，意義有事實性，這包括歷史事實
Frame: Here, Summarize CVT’s Proposal
CVT Stresses: Correlativity of Universals & Facts, Reflecting Trinity
Granted This Correlativity: Facts = Meaningful, Meanings = Factual
Include Historical Facts
I will bypass most of this here and attempt to summarize and evaluate the main
thrust of Van Til’s proposal. That proposal begins with an emphasis upon the
correlativity of universals and facts in the world, reflecting the Trinity. Granted
such correlativity, the facts are meaningful and the meanings are factual. This is
true also of historical facts, facts about moments in time. “Because of this
correlativity there is genuine progress in history; because of it the Moment has
significance.” (CGG, 64.)
因此，若要在討論上求進步，必須更認真地正視「時間」
必須強調「較早」與「較晚」
爭辯的每一方都是加爾文主義者，都相信：人的最後結局都已預定
Thus, to Make Progress, We Must Take Time More Seriously;
Must Stress The Earlier & The Later
All Parties in Debate = Calvinists, All Believe:
Final Destinies of Men = Settled Eternally
Therefore, “to make progress in our discussion we must, it seems, learn to take
time more seriously than we have done.” (CGG, 64.) We should do this by
“stressing the idea of the earlier and the later.” [CGG, 72 (emphasis by Van Til).]
All parties to the debate are Calvinists and therefore agree that the final destinies
of men are settled eternally in the counsel of God.
但問題是：歷史上（事實）有意義否？分歧在此
問題：我們對時間（較早）的理解，應受永恆（未來、較晚）的影響嗎？
范泰爾：我們應該更多強調「較早」的概念（林慈信：即歷史事實的真實性）
But The Difference Is: In History (Fact) Meaningful?
How Much Should Time/Facts Be Ruled by Eternity/Later
CVT: We Should Stress More The Notion of The Earlier (History)
But, he continues, “The difference obtains with regard to the meaning of the
historical. And here the problem is, more specifically, to what extent we should
allow our notion of the earlier to be controlled by our notion of the later. We think
that the notion of the earlier must be stressed more than has been done.” (CGG,
72)
237
「受較晚所控制」意指上帝對某人的恩寵，完全由這人（預定的）命運決定
一人若至終得救，上帝在時間中爲他所做的，都是恩典，預備他得救
一人若至終沉淪，上帝在時間中爲他所做的，都是忿怒，預備他定罪
上帝在歷史中的作為只是預備各人進入永恆
“To Be Controlled by Later” Is to Say:
God’s Favor to Someone = Exclusively Determined by
That Person’s Forordained Final Destiny
If One Is Finally Saved, All God Does for Him = Favor
If One Is Finally Lost, All God Does For Him = Wrath
All God Does = Prepare Man for Eternity
To be “controlled by our notion of the later” is to say that God’s favor to someone
is determined exclusively by that person’s foreordained final destiny. On this view,
if a person is finally saved, then everything God does for him in history is favor, for
in every event God is preparing the way for that person’s final salvation. But if the
individual is finally lost, then everything God does for him during his life is wrath:
in history God does nothing but prepare that person for his final condemnation.
弗蘭姆：不無道理
上帝與祂的計劃既是不改變的，因此，祂對個別的人的態度不改變也是合理的
上帝在歷史上所作的一切，都預備祂的永恆計劃得以達成（Consummation）
視上帝對選民的態度是「恩惠」、對非選民的態度是「忿怒」，這是合理的
Frame: A Certain Logic Here
Sure, God & God’s Plan Don’t Change
So, His Attitude to Individual Doesn’t Change: Reasonable
All God Does in History Helps Realize Consummation
Reasonable: God’s Attitude to Elect = Favor; Others = Wrath
There is a certain logic about this. Certainly God and his plan are unchanging; thus,
it seems to make sense to picture his attitude toward each individual as
unchanging as well. And certainly everything that God does in history helps to
realize the consummation of his plan, including the blessedness of the elect and
the eternal punishment of the lost. Thus, it makes good sense to see God’s
attitude throughout history toward the elect as favor and toward the non-elect as
wrath.
但是這種想法並不符合《聖經》
《聖經》的確說：上帝施恩典和憐憫給整個被造界
因此，上帝對非選民也施予了某些恩典
But This Way of Thinking = Unbiblical
Bible Does Say: God Shows Mercy & Kindness to All Creation
Thus, God Shows Some Favor to Non-Elect
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But there is something scripturally wrong with this way of thinking. For Scripture
does speak of God showing mercy and kindness to all his creation. [Van Til deals
with four significant passages in CGG, 29-33; cf. Murray’s more elaborate
treatment in “Common Grace” (John Murray’s 1942 essay, “Common Grace,”
reprinted in Collected Writings of John Murray, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth,
1976-82), 2:93-119.).] Therefore, his treatment of the non-elect is at least in some
respect favorable.
《聖經》也記載了從「忿怒」到「恩典」的轉換點
上帝對亞當的忿怒是真正的忿怒；在基督裏，「忿怒」轉爲「恩典」
Bible Records Transitions in History Between Wrath & Grace
Wrath to Adam = Genuine; In Christ, Transition From Wrath to Grace
Scripture also speaks of transitions in history between God’s wrath and his grace.
All are genuinely lost in Adam, under a “common curse.” That wrath of God is
genuine wrath, so genuine that only the death of Christ could satisfy it. (CGG, 31.)
In Christ, that wrath is genuinely averted, and there is a transition from wrath to
grace. Similarly, the wicked are under God’s favor in Adam, and in the Fall they go
through a transition – in this case from favor to wrath. But that wrath is not wholly
unmixed until the Last Judgment, which is their historical transition to unmitigated
wrath.
范泰爾：不錯，歷史是由「後來（較晚）」控制
不論得救或滅亡的人都走過歷史，直到最後結局
但是：歷史中還是有「忿怒」與「恩典」之間真正的互換
CVT: Yes, History = Controlled by “Later”
All (Saved & Lost) Move through History to Final Destiny
But: There Are Genuine Transitions in History
Van Til does not entirely deny the view of history that is “controlled by the later.”
It is true, he says, that both the saved and the lost are moving through history
toward their final destiny. (CGG, 31-32.) But he resists drawing from this view the
conclusion that there are no genuine transitions in history, and therefore that
there is never any divine wrath upon the elect or favor upon the lost.
范泰爾將此問題與「水桶滿水」的問題連接
上帝的計劃是涵蓋萬有的，但歷史仍然有意義
萬事都事先決定好，但萬事都未定局，直到事情具體發生
歷史上有「起伏」，從上帝永恆計劃到萬物終局的路不是一條直線
上帝向選民施行「暫時的」、卻是「真的」忿怒
上帝向非選民施行「暫時的」、卻是「真的」恩寵
CVT Relates Issue to Full Bucket Problem
Issue: God’s Plan = Exhaustive, Yet History = Significant
239
Everything = Decided in Advance,
But Nothing Is Settled Until It Actually Happens
There Are “Downs And Ups” in History,
Road From God’s Plan to Consummation = Not Straight Line
There’s Temporary, Yet Real Wrath on Elect
There’s Temporary, Yet Real Favor on Reprobate
It is not surprising that Van Til relates this issue to the full bucket problem that we
considered earlier. (CGG, 10.) For the essence of the full bucket problem is that
“God’s plan is exhaustive, yet history is significant.” Everything is settled in
advance, but nothing is settled until it actually happens. Everything is worked out
in advance, but in history there are “downs and ups.” (CGG, 31.) The road from
God’s plan to its consummation is not a straight line. There is temporary, yet real,
divine wrath upon the elect, and similar favor to the reprobate.
那麼，是否意味著：上帝有改變，上帝的計劃有改變？
范泰爾沒有直接回答，可是傳統改革宗的答案是：
上帝不改變，但是因著被造物的改變，上帝與他們的關係就有改變
Does This Mean: God Changes, God’s Plan Changes?
CVT: No Specific Answer, But Tradition Reformed Answer:
God Does Not Change, But As Creatures Change,
God’s Relationship to Creatures Change
Does this mean that God and his plan do change, after all? Van Til does not deal
with that question specifically, but the theological tradition (doubtless supported
by Van Til) would say this: God does not change, but as creatures change, his
relation to them changes. In the sunlight, a man receives the warmth of the sun;
away from the sunlight, he does not. The change is not a change in the sun, but in
the man. Similarly, God is unchanging in himself, but he can be said to change in
relation to his creatures.
上帝的計劃不改變，但上帝的計劃預定了改變
世界裏的改變都是上帝計劃的一部分，都是由上帝預先定了
上帝的計劃不改變，但上帝有一個預定改變的計劃
上帝不變的計劃包含了改變
God’s Plan Does Not Change, But God’s Plan Determines Changes
Changes in World = Part of God’s Plan, God-Foreordained
God’s Plan Doesn’t Change; God Has A Plan For Change
God’s Unchanging Plan Includes Change
As for the plan of God, it does not change, but it determines changes. The changes
in this world are part of God’s plan, foreordained by God. It is not that God’s plan
is changing, but rather that God has a plan for change. God’s unchanging plan
includes change.
240
有吊詭：上帝沒有告訴我們，祂不變的計劃爲甚麼要包含改變
祂的計劃爲甚麼必須包含時間和改變？
既然一切都已在永恆中預定了，歷史漫長的變動對上帝又有甚麼重要性？
There’s Paradox
God Didn’t Tell Us Why His Unchanging Plan Includes Change
Why Should His Plan Include Time & Change?
What Importance Can Long History of Change Have For God?
Yet there is a paradox, in the sense that we discussed in chapters 12 and 13. For
God has not told us why his unchanging plan includes change. Why should it
include time and change? Why should God not simply wrap up everything in a
moment? What importance can this long history of change have for God, for
whom everything is eternally settled?
總之，「上帝永恆的計劃」並不意味著「歷史沒有意義」
反之，歷史有意義，恰恰因爲上帝不變的計劃（不是雖有計劃，還是有意義）
改變和轉變是真的、有意義的，因爲上帝計劃好它們是真的、有意義的
Anyway: God’s Plan Doesn’t Render History Meaningless
History = Meaningful Because of (Not Despite) God’s Counsel!
Change & Transition = Real, Significant,
Because God Planned That They Be Real, Significant
In any case, the divine plan does not render history meaningless. Rather, “history
has meaning, not in spite of, but because of, the counsel of God who controls
whatsoever comes to pass.” (CGG, 73.) Change and transition are real and
significant, because God has planned for them to be real and significant.
雖然「歷史由後來（較晚）控制」有其價值
但卻錯過了「忿怒」與「恩典」之間真正的互換
范泰爾：「較早」觀念應（比改革宗到目前爲止）更被強調
弗蘭姆：上帝同樣關注開始、中間、與結局，像人類作家寫書和作曲一樣
上帝不僅關注歷史的結局，也關注整個歷史的過程
While View of History “Controlled by Later” Has Value,
It Misses Important Wrath-To-Grace Transitions
CVT: “Earlier” Idea Must Be Stressed More Than Before
Frame: God Cares About Beginnings & Middles As Much As Ends
Like A Human Composer/Novelist
God = Interested in Whole Historical Process, Not Only The Consummation
So, while the view of history “controlled by the later” has some value, it misses the
important transition from wrath to favor and from favor to wrath. Van Til,
therefore, suggests “that the notion of the earlier must be stressed more than has
been done heretofore.” (CGG, 72.) The idea here seems to be, to use my terms
241
rather than Van Til’s, that God is as much concerned with beginnings and middles
as with endings, somewhat like a human composer or novelist. God is interested
in the whole historical process, not only with the consummation.
因此我們必須肯定：上帝創造亞當時對人類的愛是「真實的愛」
上帝在人類墮落後對人類的忿怒是「真實的忿怒」
上帝在歷史中賜予非選民的美好禮物（恩寵）是「真實的恩寵」
「救贖」是在歷史上從「忿怒」到「恩典」的真實轉折點
Thus We Must Affirm:
God’s Love for Mankind, at Adam’s Creation = Genuine love
God’s Wrath on Mankind After Fall = Genuine Wrath
God’s Good Gifts to Reprobate in History = Genuine Favor
Redemption = Real Transition In History From Wrath to Grace
Therefore, we must affirm that his love for the whole human race at its creation in
Adam was a genuine love, that his wrath upon humanity following Fall was a
genuine wrath, that his good gifts to the reprobate in history are a genuine divine
favor, and that redemption is a genuine transition in history from wrath to grace.
范泰爾常常用 Berkhouwer 的觀察來批判巴特：

在巴特的思想中，歷史上沒有從「忿怒」到「恩典」的轉折點
這一點，是范泰爾對巴特最基本的批判
CVT Criticizes Barth Often, Using Berkouwer’s Observation:
Barth Has No Transition From Wrath to Grace in History
This Is CVT’s Most Fundamental Criticism of Barth
[It is interesting that Van Til frequently criticizes Barth in terms of Berkouwer’s
observation that for Barth there is no “transition from wrath to grace in history.” It
might be said that that is Van Til’s most fundamental criticism of Barth; see our
discussion in chap. 26 (CVT).
范泰爾沒有指責 Hoeksema 是巴特主義著，但卻認真正視「歷史的轉折點」

CVT Doesn’t Charge Hoeksema = A Barthian
But: CVT Takes “Transition” Issue Very Seriously
Van Til does not charge Hoeksema with being a Barthian, but he clearly takes this
issue of transition very seriously.]
注意：范泰爾講「相對」
不要放棄「較後」觀點，以「較早」取代之；乃要多強調「較早」的觀點
兩個觀點相輔相成
242
Note: CVT Talks of “Degree”
Don’t Abandon “Later” Perspective & Replace with “Earlier”
Rather: Stress “Earlier” More
2 Perspectives Supplement One Another
Note that Van Til here uses the language of degree. It is not that we should simply
abandon the perspective (as we might call it) of “the later” and replace it entirely
with “the earlier.” Rather, he says, the earlier “must be stressed more.” It is a
matter of stress, of emphasis. The two perspectives supplement one another.
范泰爾同意巴文克：根據《聖經》觀點
「墮落前主義」與「墮落後主義」都不足夠
墮落前主義：差不多否認「歷史中的次因」
墮落後主義：有時否認「上帝計劃是萬事的第一和至終成因，且控制一切有限
成因」
范泰爾：這些立場本身沒有錯，乃錯在它們「有時會導致」的後果
CVT Agrees with Bavinck: According to Bible
Neither Supralapsarianism Nor Infralapsarianism Is Adequate
Supralapsarianism Almost Denies Secondary/Historical Causes
Infralapsarianism Sometimes Can Deny God’s Plan As First/Ultimate Cause As
Controlling All Finite Causes
CVT: Wrong Is What These Positions Sometimes “lead to”
Van Til agrees with Bavinck that neither supralapsarianism, which stresses the
later perspective, nor infralapsarianism, which stresses the earlier, is in itself
scripturally adequate. Supralapsarianism “led to a virtual denial of second or
historical causes,” while infralapsarianism “led, sometimes, to a virtual denial of
God’s plan as the first or last ultimate cause as controlling all finite causes.” (CGG,
146.) These positions are not wrong in themselves; Van Til knew of writers on both
sides whom he would not have wished to criticize in this way. What is wrong, he
says, is what these positions sometimes “lead to,” particularly in extreme
formulations like those of Hoeksema.
范泰爾勸告：
要效法巴文克，不要在「墮落前主義」與「墮落後主義」之間作選擇
反之，在「較早」與「較晚」觀點之間取得平衡
弗蘭姆：我們是能夠取得這種平衡的，因為兩者在本質上並不矛盾
CVT: Follow Bavinck,
Resist Choosing Between Supralapsarianism & Infralapsarianism
Rather: Keep “Earlier” & “Later” Perspectives in Balance
Frame: This Balance Is Possible to Achieve
2 Positions = Not Inherently Contradictory
Van Til recommends that we follow Bavinck and resist choosing between supra-
and infralapsarianism. Instead, he believes, we should keep the earlier and the
243
later perspectives in balance. In my own view, and I think in Van Til’s as well, this
balance is not impossible to achieve, for the two positions are not inherently
contradictory.
墮落前主義：上帝在世界裏所作的一切，都完成祂的旨意（揀選）
墮落後主義：當上帝在歷史中完成祂的旨意（揀選）時，有真正的轉變，
而上帝的計劃包含這些轉變
Supralapsarianism: All God Does in World Advances Purpose/Election
Infralapsarianism: As God Advances Purpose/Election in History,
There Are Real Transitions & Changes, And God’s Plan Includes These
Supralapsarianism says that everything God does in the world advances the
purposes of election. Infralapsarianism says that as God advances the purposes of
election in history, there are real transitions and changes, and God’s plan includes
those as well.

244
II. 福音白白的呼籲（邀請）
THE FREE OFFER OF THE GOSPEL
如何描述普遍恩典，又強調「較早」？
第一：強調人類在亞當裏與亞當認同（合而爲一），上帝愛祂所造的人類
第二：在墮落後，人類與亞當認同，都在上帝的忿怒之下
How to Describe Common Grace – & Emphasize “Earlier”?
First: Emphasize Mankind = One in Adam, &
God Loves Mankind As His Creatures
Second: After Fall, Mankind = One in Adam Under Wrath
But how can we describe common grace in a way that emphasizes “the earlier”?
First, it will emphasize human solidarity in Adam and God’s love for the human
race as his creatures. It will also emphasize the solidarity of the human race under
God’s wrath following the Fall.
范泰爾：「普遍」之後，是「有條件的」
歷史是一個「區分過程」，選民與非選民之間的「普遍」是一「界限觀念」
這「普遍性」是暫時的
背後：上帝的「似乎是如此」
CVT: After The Common, Comes The Conditional
History = A Process of Differentiation
What Is Common Between Elect & Reprobate = Always A Limiting Concept
Common for The Time Being
In The Back: God’s “As If”
Van Til continues: “But after the common, in each case, comes the conditional.
History is a process of differentiation. Accordingly, the idea of that which is
common between the elect and the reprobate is always a limiting concept. It is a
commonness for the time being. There lies back of it a divine as if.” [CGG, 74
(emphasis by Van Til).]
范泰爾所謂「有條件」指對一般性人類（包括選民及非選民）誠懇地提供救恩
Hoeksema 與反對者曾辯論「福音白白的呼籲」
與克拉克的辯論中也提到這點
克拉克不太願意說福音向人類發出「誠懇」的呼籲
因爲阿米念主義者也用這種詞匯來反對加爾文主義的揀選觀
CVT’s “Conditional” = A Well-Meant Offer of Salvation
To a Generality of Men (Include Elect & Non-Elect)
Free Offer = Debated Between Hoeksema & Opponents
245
Also Discussed in Clark Controversy
Clark = Reluctant to Say “Sincere” General Gospel Offer
Because Arminians Use This Vocabulary to Oppose Calvinistic Election
By “the conditional” Van Til means “a well-meant offer of salvation to a generality

of men, including elect and non-elect.” (CGG, 75.) The free offer of the gospel was
also a matter of debate between Hoeksema and his opponents. It was also
discussed in the Clark controversy; evidently Clark was reluctant, during his
theological examination, to accept the terminology of a “sincere” general gospel
offer, recognizing that that terminology had been used by Arminians to oppose
the Calvinistic view of election. (See Answer, 38-39.)
裁判員恐怕克拉克是極端的加爾文主義者
恐怕克拉克否認福音對人類一般性的呼籲（general gospel offer）的合理性
弗蘭姆：克拉克的答辯是足夠的
Complainants Fear:
Clark Was Hyper-Calvinistic, Denying Legitimacy of a General Gospel Offer
Frame: Clark’s Answer = Sufficient
The complainants feared that he was hyper-Calvinistic, denying the legitimacy of a

general gospel offer. In my estimation, the reply of the Answer was sufficient.
信正長老會大會的《報告書》包含一份非常有用的分析：
慕理和 Stonehouse 的《福音白白的呼籲》（Free Offer of the Gospel）
OPC General Assembly’s Report Included a Very Useful Analysis:
Murray & Stonehouse’s “Free Offer of the Gospel”
But the General Assembly’s Report included a very useful analysis entitled “The
Free Offer of the Gospel,” authored by John Murray with some assistance from
Ned B. Stonehouse. [This was published in the Minutes of the Fifteenth General
Assembly of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1948) and later as a pamphlet. It
can also be found in Murray, Collected Writings, 4:113-132.]
范泰爾的解經立場與慕理一致，不過，他卻增添了一些微妙的意思
CVT’s Exegesis Agrees with Murray & Stonehouse
But His Discussion Adds Nuances
Van Til’s exegetical position is essentially in agreement with this article, but his
discussion of the subject adds some conceptual nuances:
傳道者可否事先知道誰是選民，誰不是？
我們能否事先知道某人不是選民，又告訴他，上帝不喜悅他滅亡?
這種想法忘記：「較早」與「較晚」的不同！
246
Does Preacher Already Know Who Are Elect, Who Aren’t?
Can We Approach Individual Whom He Knows Is Reprobate,
& Tell Him, God Has No Pleasure In His Death?
This Forgets: Earlier/Later Difference!
[Valentine] Hepp speaks as though it were already known who are and who
are not elect. He speaks as though a preacher may approach a certain
individual whom he knows to be reprobate, and tell him God has no pleasure
in his death. But this is to forget the difference between the earlier and the
later.
福音的一般性宣講是面向「一般的罪人」而講的
在上帝的意念中，這些「一般的罪人」當然會區分「選民」與「非選民」
但是在他們悔改或拒絕之前，都是「一般的罪人」
若忘記這點，就等於跑在上帝的時間表前面
General Presentaion = To Sinners As a Generality
To Sinners – In God’s Mind, Differentiated As Elected & Reprobate
But Before Repentance/Rejection, Sinners = a Generality
If We Forget This, We Are Moving Ahead of God’s Calendar
The general presentation comes to a generality. It comes to “sinners,”

differentiated, to be sure, as elect and reprobate in the mind of God, but yet,
prior to their act of acceptance or rejection, regarded as a generality. To
forget this is to move the calendar of God ahead. (CGG, 75-76.)
范泰爾：福音的呼籲是「有條件的」；當然，上帝的揀選是「無條件的」
但是「上帝無條件的計劃」並不與「人的責任」衝突
上帝成就祂永恆而無條件的計劃，一部分透過有限的次因
CVT: Gospel Offer to All = Conditional
Yes, God’s Election = Unconditional
But God’s Unconditional Purpose Consistent with Man’s Responsibility
God Achieves Eternal Purposes Partly Through Finite, Secondary Causes
Van Til then goes on, in a discussion of the Calvin-Pighius controversy, to

emphasize that the gospel offer to all men is conditional. Of course, God has
unconditionally elected those whom he intends to save. But God’s unconditional
purpose is not inconsistent with human responsibility. God achieves his eternal
purposes in part through finite, secondary causes.
上帝定旨目標，也定旨方法：包括人對福音呼籲的回應（即：信心）
若沒有這些方法，則沒有救恩
人的信心回應是一個「歷史上的轉折點」（見上文）
God Ordains Ends, But God Also Ordains Means, Include:
Man’s Faith Response to Gospel Offer
247
Without These Means, There Is No Salvation
Faith-Responses = a “Historical Transition” (See Above)
He ordains means as well as ends, and those means include human

faith-responses to the gospel offer. Apart from such means, there is no salvation.
Faith-responses are among the historical transitions that we emphasized earlier.
范泰爾似乎認爲：人對福音的拒絕和接納都是重要的歷史轉折點
在人接受或拒絕福音之前，不能分辨「選民」與「非選民」
It Seems: CVT Regards Rejection & Acceptance of Gospel As a Significant
Historical Transition
Before Acceptance/Rejection, Elect/Non-Elect = Not Differentiated
From the passage quoted immediately above, it appears that Van Til regards not
only acceptance of the gospel (i.e., saving faith), but also rejection of it, as a
significant historical transition. Before that acceptance or rejection, elect and
non-elect are not differentiated from one another. Differentiation comes with
their conscious response to the gospel. The actual preaching of the gospel
assumes, then, a non-differentiated situation, and therefore it is directed equally
to all.
弗蘭姆批判范泰爾
范泰爾說的對：必須正視「歷史」和「歷史中的轉折點」
「信主」是人生的重要的轉折點
Frame Critiques CVT
CVT Is Right: Take History & Historical Transitions Seriously
Coming to Saving Faith = a Significant Historical Transition in an individual life
At this point I begin to have problems with Van Til’s analysis. Doubtless he is on
solid biblical ground when he tells us to take history seriously and to recognize the
earlier as well as the later. Certainly any analysis of common grace must take
account of genuine historical transitions and therefore recognize the importance
of secondary causes as well as ultimate divine causes. Coming to saving faith is
always a significant historical transition in the life of an individual.
但非信徒拒絕福音，並不是重要的轉折點
But Unbeliever’s Rejection of Gospel = Not Significant Transition
But what do we make of the unbeliever’s rejection of the gospel? Is that, as Van Til
suggests, a historical transition of similar magnitude? It certainly is a significant
event in the unbeliever’s life history. Rejection of God’s Word can lead to
hardening, according to Isaiah 6:9-10 and the allusions to that passage elsewhere
in Scripture. (Matt. 13:13-15; Mark 4:12; Luke 8:10; John 12:40; Acts 28:26-27;
Rom. 11:8). Yet it is not a spiritual reversal, as is faith. Faith marks a transition
248
from wrath to grace, but rejection of the gospel is only a transition from wrath to
more wrath.
賽 6:9-10
9 他說：你去告訴這百姓說：你們聽是要聽見，卻不明白；看是要看見，卻不曉得。
10 要使這百姓心蒙脂油，耳朵發沉，眼睛昏迷；恐怕眼睛看見，耳朵聽見，心裏明白，回轉
過來，便得醫治。
太 13:13-15
13 所以我用比喻對他們講，是因他們看也看不見，聽也聽不見，也不明白。
14 在他們身上，正應了以賽亞的豫言，說：你們聽是要聽見，卻不明白；看是要看見，卻不
曉得；
15 因為這百姓油蒙了心，耳朵發沉，眼睛閉著，恐怕眼睛看見，耳朵聽見，心裏明白，回轉
過來，我就醫治他們。
可 4:12
叫他們看是看見，卻不曉得；聽是聽見，卻不明白；恐怕他們回轉過來，就得赦免。
路 8:10
他說：神國的奧祕只叫你們知道；至於別人，就用比喻，叫他們看也看不見，聽也聽不明。
約 12:40
主叫他們瞎了眼，硬了心，免得他們眼睛看見，心裏明白，回轉過來，我就醫治他們。
徒 28:26-27
26 他說：你去告訴這百姓說：你們聽是要聽見，卻不明白；看是要看見，卻不曉得；
27 因為這百姓油蒙了心，耳朵發沉，眼睛閉著；恐怕眼睛看見，耳朵聽見，心裏明白，回轉
過來，我就醫治他們。
羅 11:8
如經上所記：神給他們昏迷的心，眼睛不能看見，耳朵不能聽見，直到今日。
范泰爾似乎說：在非信徒拒絕福音之前，是中立的
CVT Seems to Say: Unbeliever = Spiritaully Neutral Until Rejection of Gospel
Van Til almost suggests in the quoted passage that the unbeliever is spiritually
neutral until his rejection of the gospel definitively places him in Satan’s camp.
That, of course, is certainly not Van Til’s view, but it is hard to make sense of this
particular formulation on any other supposition.
弗蘭姆：福音並不是對「一般人類」傳講，而是對「個別的人」傳講
他們不單是暫時沒有被區分，而是已經在上帝的忿怒之下
上帝對這些人說：祂不喜悅他們滅亡
弗蘭姆：范泰爾在這一點上，並不正視歷史
Frame: Gospel = Not Addressed to Generality, But to Particular People
They Are Not As Yet Undifferentiated, They Are Already Under God’s Wrath
God Says to These People, He Does Not Desire Their Death
Frame: CVT Does Not Take History Seriously Here
249
The fact is that the gospel is not addressed to a “generality,” but to particular
people. And these people are not merely “as yet undifferentiated,” but are
already really under God’s wrath. It is to those actual individuals that the promises,
offers, commands, and invitations of the gospel come. [Van Til, citing Calvin,
rightly denies any significant difference between these (CGG, 77).] And it is to
them that God says that he does not desire their death. On this point, Hepp is
right and Van Til wrong. Here I believe that Van Til fails, despite his best intentions,
to take history seriously.
福音的呼籲反映上帝對整個人類的心意：上帝愛在亞當裏的全人類
Gospel Offer Reflects God’s General Intention For Mankind:
God Loves Entire Human Race In Adam
It is certainly true that the universality of the gospel offer reflects God’s general
intentions for the human race. It certainly does reflect God’s love for the whole
human race in Adam and his desire to reestablish that race in Christ as its new
head. “God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son” (John 3:16). But it also
expresses his desires for individuals.
約 3:16
神愛世人，甚至將他的獨生子賜給他們，叫一切信他的，不至滅亡，反得永生。
對於那些上帝沒有揀選拯救的人，上帝能否願意他們得救？
事實是：在歷史上，上帝表達祂願意一些事，但那些事根據祂永恆定旨是不會
發生的
Can God Desire Salvation of Those He Didn’t Elect to Save?
Fact Is: Through History, God Expresses Desire For Things Which Do Not Happen
According to His Eternal Plan
Some have objected that God cannot sincerely desire the salvation of one whom
he has not determined to save. But that objection fails the test of historical
seriousness. The fact that throughout the history of revelation God expresses
desires for things that, according to his eternal counsel, do not take place. God did
not want Cain to kill his brother, but he ordained that he would do so. He did not
want Israel to worship idols, but he foreordained that they would.
神學家區分「上帝永恆的旨意」與「上帝啟示的旨意」
它們代表上帝心中的不同部門
范泰爾：還是有奧秘。上帝是一，祂的心意也是一
這裏，我們必須應用范泰爾的「吊詭」和「類比思維」
Theologians: God’s Decretive Will Versus Preceptive Will
Representing Different Sectors of God’s Psychology
CVT: But This Leaves Mystery. God = one; His Mind = one
250
We Must Apply CVT’s “Paradox” & “Analogical Thinking”
To deal with such matters, theologians have distinguished between God’s

decretive and preceptive wills: the decretive will controls all things; the perceptive
will expresses God’s commands and preferences to rational creatures. Both can be
described as God’s “desires,” but they somehow represent different sectors of the
divine psychology. This distinction can be useful, but, as Van Til would say, it
leaves much mystery. God is, after all, one. His mind is not neatly divisible into
psychological compartments. To say the least, it is not clear how God would want,
and at the same time not want, sin to enter the world. Here we must invoke Van
Til’s doctrines of paradox and analogical thinking. But, as Van Til often tells us, we
should not deny one side of the paradox in order to embrace the other side, for
Scripture clearly teaches both.
范泰爾是否預設：上帝不願意那些真實沒有被上帝揀選者得救？
上帝只願意泛泛的人類（包括選民與非選民）得救？
這假設不合《聖經》；范氏違反了自己的原則
Does CVT Assume:
God Doesn’t Desires Salvation of an Actually reprobate person
God Only Desires a General Mankind (Elect + Non-Elect Together)?
This Assumption Is Unbiblical; CVT Violates His Own Principle
In his strange idea of preaching the gospel freely to a “generality,” Van Til himself
seems to have violated his own principle. He evidently resorts to this formulation
on the grounds that God could not desire the salvation of an actual reprobate
person, only of a generality including elect and reprobate together. But that
assumption is unbiblical and quite unnecessary if we follow Van Til’s earlier advice
and take seriously the transitions of history. Following the transition of the Fall
and preceding the transition of the Last Judgment, God wants all individuals to
repent, whether or not he has foreordained for them to do so.
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III. 丹雅各的批判
DAANE’S CRITIQUE
丹雅各對范泰爾的批判顯得「怪異」
Daane’s Critique of CVT: Bizarre
It is interesting to note that Van Til’s doctrine of common grace has been
subjected to two book-length critiques – exceeding by far the critical analysis
available on any other aspect of his teaching. Later we will look at Gary North’s
Dominion and Common Grace; here we will briefly consider James Daane’s A
Theology of Grace.
Daane’s book is very thorough and ingenious, but in the final analysis it is rather
bizarre. Daane was originally impressed with Van Til’s emphasis “upon the
necessity of taking time and dates seriously in our doctrine of common grace, and
because of his emphasis on the equal ultimacy of universality and particularity in
the principle of the ontological trinity.” [Daane, A Theology of Grace (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1954), 7.] He published two articles supporting Van Til’s ideas, but then
had second thoughts. In the book, he claims to have “laid bare” the “philosophical
categories” underlying Van Til’s formulations. (Daane, A Theology of Grace, 8.)
丹雅各用（他認爲）范泰爾批判別人的方法來批判他
Daane Gives CVT His Own Medicine
Van Til has sometimes been accused of criticizing others unfairly on the basis of
his speculative reconstructions of philosophical categories supposedly underlying
their thought. [See, e.g., G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 386.] If those accusations are true,
then in A Theology of Grace Daane has given Van Til a dose of his own medicine!
He takes Van Til’s talk about generalities and so on to reflect philosophical
idealism and various dialectics between being and nonbeing. He focuses much
attention on this text from Van Til: “If we make the earlier our point of departure
for the later, we begin with something that believers and unbelievers have in
common. That is to say, they have something in common because they do not yet
exist. Yet they do exist. They exist in Adam as their common representative.” (CGG,
72.)
252
丹雅各抓住范泰爾的一句話：他們的共同點，就是他們還沒有存在
丹雅各：范泰爾認爲普遍恩典是給不存在的人的
Daane Pounces on the Clause “Because They Do Not Yet Exist”
Daane: For CVT, Common Grace = to Non-Existent People
Daane pounces on the clause “because they do not yet exist” and belabors it over
and over again throughout his book. He construes Van Til’s position to be that:
“the only thing that the elect and reprobate have in common – without a
difference – is their non-existence.” [Daane, Theology of Grace, 21 (emphasis by
Van Til).] Their commonality, therefore, is supratemporal and mystical. Even Adam
himself “does not exist” as a historical figure. Van Til reduces Adam, says Daane,
to a mere generality. (Daane, Theology of Grace, 39-42.) Common grace is given
only to nonexistent people; once they come to exist, there is no common grace. As
Van Til criticizes Hoeksema and Barth for denying any real significance to historical
events, so Daane makes the same charge against Van Til.
弗蘭姆：顯然，這不是范泰爾的立場
可是：范泰爾不應該講一些「聰明」的話
Frame: CVT Plainly Doesn’t Believe That!
But: CVT Shouldn’t Make Cute Remarks
I said that Daane’s critique was rather bizarre. That should be plain to anybody
who has even a slight knowledge of Van Til’s writings. His emphasis on the actual
historical existence of Adam and the significance of redemptive events in history
requires no documentation.
I do think that the sentence about nonexistent people in Adam could have been
better formulated. Certainly it is true in one sense. When we were judged in Adam,
we did not exist as distinct individuals. And it is true that people who do not exist
have their nonexistence in common! But that is really irrelevant to Van Til’s
argument, and, cute as the point is to philosophical readers,* he should never
have made it. The commonness of common grace, for Van Til, is not based upon
the nonexistence of individuals in Adam; rather, as Van Til hastens to add, it is
based on their common existence in Adam as their representative and their
continued existence through the temporal transitions of history.
*(I believe that Van Til was often led astray by the opportunity to employ a cute
but misleading phrase or a fetching illustration. We saw that tendency in the
extreme formulations of antithesis discussed in the previous chapter.)
253
范泰爾：「普遍（一般）人類」不是很好的說法
“Generality” – An Unfortunate Formulation
Van Til’s talk about “generalities” is also unfortunate, as I indicated earlier in this
chapter,* and it is contrary to the main thrust of his book. His main argument is in
essence a plea for the importance of historical particularities, not generalities, and
for the importance of temporal transitions.
*(Of course, as I said, there are “general” facts about the human race that are
relevant to the doctrine of common grace.)
丹雅各對范泰爾的讚揚：比較合理
Daane’s Earlier Compliments About CVT = More Sound
Daane’s first thoughts about Van Til’s Common Grace were far sounder than his
second thoughts. Van Til’s utterances about nonexistence and generalities are
unfortunate lapses, not keys to the discovery of vast ranges of heresy in his
thought. Daane makes the mistake of elevating jokes, obiter dicta, and
unfortunate misstatements to the status of programmatic pronouncements. Then
he rather violently forces everything else Van Til says into the mold of this alleged
philosophical program. Daane’s remarkable performance illustrates the need for
more sense of proportion – and more sense of humor (with which a sense of
proportion is closely linked) – in Reformed theology.
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IV. 區分過程
THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATION
范泰爾：上帝在歷史上總是增加忿怒，減少普遍恩典
CVT: In History, God Always Increases Wrath,
Decreases Common Grace
The next step is understanding Van Til’s view of common grace is to observe the
direction in which the process of differentiation is moving:
All common grace is earlier grace. Its commonness lies in its earliness. … It
pertains to all the dimensions of life but to all these dimensions ever
decreasingly as the time of history goes on. At the very first stage of history
there is much common grace. There is a common good nature under the
common favor of God. But this creation-grace requires response. It cannot
remain what it is. It is conditional. Differentiation must set in and does set in.
It comes first in the form of a common rejection of God. Yet common grace
continues; it is on a “lower level” now; it is long-suffering that men may be
led to repentance. … Common grace will diminish still more in the further
course of history. With every conditional act the remaining significance of the
conditional is reduced. God allows men to follow the path of their self-chosen
rejection of him more rapidly than ever toward the final consummation. God
increases His attitude of wrath upon the reprobate as time goes on, until at
the end of time, at the great consummation of history, their condition has
caught up with their state. (CGG, 83. He adds that the reverse is true for the
elect: an increase of divine favor, perfected at the consummation.)
弗蘭姆重譯
Frame’s Paraphrase
To paraphrase: God’s favor to the non-elect diminishes over time, becoming

non-existent at the final judgment. This happens because, as history progresses,
the non-elect become more and more hardened in their wickedness. They become
more and more like the perfectly wretched souls in hell that they finally will be.
Each time they reject God’s revelation, they place themselves more decisively
upon that path. Toward the end there will be an acceleration of apostasy.
255
弗蘭姆：從《聖經》可見，人的有些決定，會使他的心更剛硬
但不能證明，在歷史上，上帝對非選民的忿怒增加、恩惠減少
Frame: Scripturally True, Some Decisions Further Hardens Hearts
But Cannot Prove: In History, God’s Wrath Increases,
And God’s Favor to Reprobate Decreases - Consistently
It is scripturally true, as I indicated in my earlier citation from Isaiah 6 and its New
Testament allusions, that some human decisions bring hardening. There are
downs and ups, as Van Til says, but that does take place. But I doubt if it can be
established scripturally that throughout history there is an increase in wickedness
and hence a gradual decline of divine favor to the reprobate. For one thing, God’s
favor to the wicked, his common grace, exists in spite of their sin. It exists to some
extent as a witness against them. So sin, in and of itself, does not diminish or
extinguish common grace. There is no reason to suppose that there is an inverse
relationship between the amount of sin in the world and the amount of divine
favor to the reprobate (if such things could even be quantified!).
弗蘭姆：世界真的越來越邪惡嗎？歷史有「起伏」，不是線形直線
Frame: Is World Really Becoming More Wicked?
There Are Up’s And Down’s in History; Not Straight Line
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the world is becoming more and more

wicked as the result of a divinely ordained “process of differentiation.” That is, of
course, the position of some traditional eschatological viewpoints, but it is by no
means generally accepted in Reformed theology.
Apart from theological positions about the end times, can we really say with
confidence that there is more wickedness in the world today than, say, during the
period of the fall of Rome? And are we sure that God is less gracious to the wicked
today than he was then? A case could be made for saying that God is more
long-suffering in his dealings with the wicked today than he has ever been, and
that he gives more good gifts than ever to those who hate him.
I do think Van Til is right to say that common grace is “earlier” in that it derives
from a historical situation prior to the Final Judgment, ultimately from God’s good
creation of Adam. At all points in history, it takes account of the unfinished nature
of God’s plan. However, I do not see in Scripture any smooth historical continuum
from the Fall to perdition. Rather, as with the redemption of the elect, there
seems to be a rich drama of ups and downs.
256
V. 諾德的批判
NORTH’S CRITIQUE
諾德：《普遍恩典》是范泰爾最差的一本書，且往往離題
North: Common Grace = CVT’s Worst Book
Cluttered With Extraneous Material
The second book-length critique of Van Til’s doctrine of common grace is Gary
North’s Dominion and Common Grace. [Tyler, Tex.: Institute for Christian
Economics, 1987. As I indicated in chap. 2 (CVT), North dedicated this book to me,
with a slightly ironic inscription. I mention this again so that the reader may make
an informed judgment as to possible bias on my part.] North is one of the leading
theonomist or Christian reconstructionist writers, and, like others in that school,
quite Van Tillian in his epistemology. Yet he regards Common Grace as “without
question the worst book [Van Til] ever wrote. It is also one of the most confusing
books he ever wrote, granted the relative simplicity of the topic.” (Dominion and
Common Grace, 9.) This confusion, North thinks, is partly for the stylistic reasons
we noted in chapter 2. Van Til’s Common Grace is “cluttered up with extraneous
material.” (Dominion and Common Grace, 14.) The clutter, especially the
preoccupation with epistemology and other philosophical issues, steers Van Til
away from the main issue, which, in North’s view, is eschatology. (Dominion and
Common Grace, 15.)
諾德否認上帝對非選民表達恩寵（Favor），那只是上帝賜予選民恩寵的滿溢
North Denies God Shows Favor To Reprobate
Just The Overflow from the Favors God Gives to His Own People
North simply denies the first point of the Kalamazoo Synod, that God shows
“favor” to the reprobate. North believes that God hates them throughout history,
with perfect hatred, “without compromise or shadow of turning.” (Dominion and
Common Grace, 18.) What of the biblical passages that suggest otherwise?
“Without exception, they refer to gifts of God to the unregenerate. They do not
imply God’s favor.” (Dominion and Common Grace, 20.) God gives them “favors,”
not “favor.” Why does he give favors to people he hates? These favors are the
overflow from the favors God gives to his own people, the “crumbs that fall from
the master’s table that the dogs eat.” (Dominion and Common Grace, 6, citing
James Jordan.) Nevertheless, God has a distinct purpose in permitting this
overflow: “God gives ethical rebels enough rope to hang themselves for all
eternity.” [Dominion and Common Grace, 29 (emphasis by Van Til).]
257
In this sense, even Satan receives common grace, a conclusion that is impossible
on the traditional understanding. God gives to Satan gifts and powers that will in
time lead to his more severe condemnation. Of course, for him there is no “free
gospel offer.” (Dominion and Common Grace, 34-46.)
諾德認爲，選民與非選民的區分是在歷史終結時發生，不在歷史中發生
教會在歷史上越來越勝利（後千派）
North on Differentiation: It Occurs at End of History
Church in History = Increasingly Victorious (Post-Millennial)
As for the process of differentiation, North cites the parable of the wheat and the
tares to emphasize that the separation of saved and lost occurs at the end of
history, not within it. The course of history, he argues, is postmillennial, not
amillennial, as Van Til assumes. Therefore, the church will experience eventual
victory through history, rather than progressive defeat, though the progress does
not follow a “straight line.” (Dominion and Common Grace, 100-103.) North
accuses Van Til of an implicit contradiction: as an amillennialist, he believes that
the wicked will be victorious over the course in history, but how can they be
victorious if the gifts of common grace are gradually withdrawn? (Dominion and
Common Grace, 85-87.)
諾德：范泰爾過份專攻知識論，他應該專攻倫理學
North: CVT Focuses on Epistemology; But He Should Focus on Ethics
North thinks Van Til’s discussion is centered too much on epistemology, when the
most important issues are ethical. God gives unbelievers good gifts of knowledge,
but they are ethically unable to make the best use of those gifts. That is why
they will be defeated, not only in the final judgment, but in history as well.
(Dominion and Common Grace, 103-111.)
福音廣傳的時候，上帝的律法越來越統治人類社會
As Gospel Spreads, God’s Law Rules Society More
More significantly, as the gospel goes through the earth, North says, God’s law
comes to rule society, and that brings benefits to believers and unbelievers alike.
Unbelievers cannot make the best use of those benefits, so they will in time be
defeated, after a brief final period of rebellion. But they enjoy its blessings for a
time. Indeed, those blessings increase as the gospel gains ground. Therefore, on
North’s view, common grace is not earlier, but later grace – “future grace.”
(Dominion and Common Grace, 98.)
258
諾德提出的一些問題，對我們有幫助
如何解釋：上帝賜給非信徒一些恩賜和能幹？
諾德作出重要的解釋：上帝給非選民「剩餘」的恩典
North Raises Questions: Helpful

How to Explain: God Gives Gifts/Powers to Unbelieves?
North: God Gives “Crumbs” (Overflow) to Non-Elect
North’s analysis of the issue is helpful in raising some additional issues. Certainly,
some account must be given of the powers God gives to unbelievers, by which
they accomplish their sinful purposes in history. North’s account focuses on that
question, while Van Til largely ignores it. And North also makes the important
point that at least many of the benefits given to the reprobate are a kind of
“overflow” from the blessings given to the righteous.
弗蘭姆：諾德的「恩寵觀」顯得含糊
上帝的確向非選民表達恩典（心意）
Frame: North’s “Favor” Is Confusing
God Does Express Favor/Disposition to Non-Elect
However, in my view, North’s discussion of “favor,” like many other discussions of

it, is somewhat confused because of ambiguities in the term. Favor can refer to a
kindly disposition, or it can refer to advocacy, as in “I favor the Republican
candidates.” God never favors the wicked in the sense of advocating their
purposes or desiring them to accomplish their goals. God does, however, have a
kindly disposition toward all his creatures, as is plain in Psalm 145:9 and Matthew
5:43-48. These passages do not refer only to divine gifts, they also refer to the
divine disposition underlying the gifts. And, as we have seen, God does have a
genuine desire that the wicked be saved.
The first point of the Kalamazoo Synod uses favor, I think, in the sense of “kindly
disposition,” rather than in the sense of “advocacy.” It is the concern of kindly
disposition that Van Til endorses. North has not given us any reason to reject it.
詩 145:9
耶和華善待萬民；他的慈悲覆庇他一切所造的。
太 5:43-48
43 你們聽見有話說：當愛你的鄰舍，恨你的仇敵。
44 只是我告訴你們，要愛你們的仇敵，為那逼迫你們的禱告。
45 這樣就可以作你們天父的兒子；因為他叫日頭照好人，也照歹人；降雨給義人，也給不義
的人。
46 你們若單愛那愛你們的人，有甚麼賞賜呢﹖就是稅吏不也是這樣行麼﹖
47 你們若單請你弟兄的安，比人有甚麼長處呢﹖就是外邦人不也是這樣行麼﹖
48 所以，你們要完全，像你們的天父完全一樣。
259
「較早」與「較晚」：詞匯上的混亂
范泰爾和諾德分別回答不同的問題
“Earlier” Versus “Later”: Terminological Confusion
Van Til and North Are Answering Different Questions Here
As for “earlier” and “later,” again there seems to be some terminological

confusion. Van Til and North are answering different questions here. Van Til asks
why God would wish to give anything good to reprobate sinners who ultimately
desire only hell. He answers that God loves the whole human race in Adam and
recognizes that their progressive depravity has not reached its conclusion. North
asks a different question, namely, how do the reprobate gain the gifts they have?
He answers that they receive the overflow from the blessings God gives to the
church. But the two concepts are not logically incompatible. It may well be the
case both that God is motivated as Van Til describes, and that blessings are given
to the reprobate in the way that North describes.
「後千禧年主義」與「無千禧年主義」的結合
Combine Post-Millennialism with A-Millennialism
As for postmillennialism and the church’s victory in history, I shall not try to solve
that question here. The topic warrants further study! I do agree with North that
there is no straight-line progress in history from the Fall to the Last Judgment.*
(*Since you asked, my view is that, as the amillennialists teach, the period
between Christ’s resurrection and his return is a time for Christians to suffer in
persecution and poverty. However, it is also, as the postmillennialists teach, a time
in which the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church, which grows through
history both in numbers and in social influence. Scripture and history both warrant
that twofold viewpoint upon this age. Is there truth in premillennialism? Well, this
age is also, perhaps preeminently, a time of waiting for Jesus. And the Last
Judgment might take a thousand years.)
不少作者批判范泰爾的普遍恩典觀
Many Criticize CVT on Common Grace
Many others have criticized Common Grace. James Oliver Buswell’s and Floyd
Hamilton’s objections are discussed in A Christian Theory of Knowledge. Van Til
responds to many criticisms by Christian Reformed writers in the original edition
of The Defense of the Faith. We must, however, move on to other subjects.
260
第十七章理性主義與非理性主義
RATIONALISM AND IRRATIONALISM
I. 理性主義與非理性主義
RATIONALISM AND IRRATIONALISM
弗蘭姆：總結我對范泰爾的批判
Summary of My Critique of CVT
We have explored Van Til’s view of the antithesis between believer and unbeliever
and the ways in which he qualifies that view by means of his doctrine of common
grace. My critique may be summarized in this way: (1) Van Til often exaggerates
the epistemological implications of the antithesis beyond what is warranted by his
own doctrine of common grace. (2) His doctrine of common grace, while insightful,
(a) compromises its historical focus in its notion of a gospel offer addressed to a
“generality,” and (b) includes an unbiblically rigid concept of progressive
differentiation (between the elect and the nonelect) down through history. I have
also argued that Van Til exaggerates the predictability of the unbeliever’s
responses to Christian witness. God’s sovereignty in both common and special
grace makes it more difficult than Van Til thinks to know exactly how every
unbeliever will respond to a given testimony.
非信徒是如何思想的？作一些概括性的分析是有用的
人類追求自主，是否必然導致某些理性上的堅持（委身）？
范泰爾：這種的概括總論是可能的
How Do Non-Believers Think? Helpful to Generalize
Does Quest for Autonomy Lead to Certain Intellectual Commitments?
CVT: Such Generalization = Possible
Nevertheless, it will still be useful to make at least some rough generalizations as

to how unbelievers think. Or, more precisely, we may ask what a thoroughly
unbelieving epistemology would be like – granted, of course, that no unbeliever is
ever perfectly consistent in his unbelief. Does the quest for autonomy lead
naturally to certain kinds of intellectual beliefs and commitments? And do those
beliefs play a dominant role in the history of unbelieving thought?
Van Til thinks it is possible to make a general characterization of unbelieving

thought. That might seem to be an unrealistic expectation; after all, non-Christian
thought takes so many different forms. Some non-Christians are rationalists and
261
others are irrationalists, in addition to mystics, religious, irreligious, skeptical,
dogmatic, sophisticated, unsophisticated, monists, pluralists, pantheists, deists,
and so on. There have been a great number of philosophical, religious, scientific,
political, economic, and other systems and nonsystems in the history of
non-Christian thought.
《聖經》支持范泰爾的「非信徒思維的一般架構」
非信徒至少在一件事上顯得一致：非信徒壓抑上帝的啟示
非信徒在不信（上帝和《聖經》的教導）上是團結一致的
Bible Supports CVT’s “General Structure of Unbelieving thought”
Unbelievers Suppress God’s Revelation: They Unite in Unbelief
Nevertheless, Scripture does warrant Van Til’s attempt to define a general

structure for unbelieving thought. For all their diversity, unbelievers are at least
united in one thing: their desire to repress the truths of divine revelation (Rom.
1:18-32). That is, they are united in their unbelief, united in holding, at some level
of their consciousness, beliefs that are opposite to the teachings of Scripture.
羅 1:18-32
20 自從造天地以來，神的永能和神性是明明可知的，雖是眼不能見，但藉著所造之物就可以
曉得，叫人無可推諉。
21 因為，他們雖然知道神，卻不當作神榮耀他，也不感謝他。他們的思念變為虛妄，無知的
心就昏暗了。
22 自稱為聰明，反成了愚拙，
23 將不能朽壞之神的榮耀變為偶像，彷彿必朽壞的人和飛禽、走獸、昆蟲的樣式。
24 所以，神任憑他們逞著心裏的情慾行污穢的事，以致彼此玷辱自己的身體。
25 他們將神的真實變為虛謊，去敬拜事奉受造之物，不敬奉那造物的主；主乃是可稱頌的，
直到永遠。阿們！
26 因此，神任憑他們放縱可羞恥的情慾。他們的女人把順性的用處變為逆性的用處；
27 男人也是如此，棄了女人順性的用處，慾火攻心，彼此貪戀，男和男行可羞恥的事，就在
自己身上受這妄為當得的報應。
28 他們既然故意不認識神，神就任憑他們存邪僻的心，行那些不合理的事；
29 裝滿了各樣不義、邪惡、貪婪、惡毒（或作：陰毒），滿心是嫉妒、兇殺、爭競、詭詐、
毒恨；
30 又是讒毀的、背後說人的、怨恨神的（或作：被神所憎惡的）、侮慢人的、狂傲的、自誇
的、捏造惡事的、違背父母的。
31 無知的，背約的，無親情的，不憐憫人的。
非信徒的哪些信念與《聖經》的世界觀衝突？
問題的癥結：人要自主（自宰），否定上帝的主權管治
人設立自己作一切斷言的最後參考點
人是一切真假、對錯的最高標準
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What Beliefs Contradict Bible’s Worldview?
Heart of Matter: Man Wants to Be Autonomous
Man Himself = Final Reference Point in All Predication
Man = Ultimate Standard of True/False, Right/Wrong
So one way to determine the general structure of unbelieving thought is simply to

determine what beliefs are directly contradictory to the Christian worldview. Chief
among these would be the denial that the biblical God is the sovereign ruler of all
things and the supreme authority over human thought and life. As Van Til puts it:
“Here is the heart of the matter: through the fall of Adam man has set aside the
law of his Creator and therewith has become a law unto himself. He will be subject
to none but himself. He seeks to be autonomous. … He makes himself the final
reference point in all predication.” (CTK, 42.)
He sets himself up as “the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of the true and
false.” (CTK, 47.) We should note, however, that Van Til qualifies these statements
by adding that God (in his common grace) restrains the unbeliever’s purposes, so
that “he cannot carry out his principle to its full degree.” Therefore, unbelievers
“can yet discover much truth.” (CTK, 43-44.)
范泰爾：人若不信服《聖經》的上帝，宇宙就是沒有意義的，
連上帝也不認識宇宙，宇宙一切都是偶然而來的
If One Denies Biblical God, Universe = Meaningless
God Doesn’t Know Universe; All – By Chance
Van Til holds that to deny the biblical God is to hold that the universe is ultimately
meaningless – the product of chance, or “pure contingency.” If God exists at all,
the world is as mysterious to him as it is to us. In the Fall, Eve, then Adam,
questioned whether God really knew the truth about the forbidden tree:
亞當引進「歸納法思維」：上帝也尚未知道，這是徹底的非理性主義
Adam Introduces “Inductive Method”:
God Also Doesn’t Know Yet, This = Utter Irrationalism
No one had as yet had any experience with eating of this tree; there were no
inductively gathered records to indicate even as much as a tendency to evil
being involved in the use of the fruit of this tree. It was the “inductive
method,” with its assumptions of ultimate mystery involved in pure
possibility, that Adam introduced. This was utter irrationalism. It was
therefore by implication a flat denial of God’s being able to identify himself. It
was in effect a claim that no one, neither God nor man, can really know what
he is or who he is. How could there by any ultimate or final distinction or
preference made in an ocean of Chance? (CTK, 48.)
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「非信徒思維的一般架構」包括一種終極的「知識論的非理性主義」
一切都約化爲「偶然」
General Structure of Unbelieving thought Includes
Ultimate Epistemological Irrationalism
Reality = Reducible to Chance
Therefore, the general structure of unbelieving thought includes an ultimate

epistemological irrationalism, correlated with a metaphysic in which reality is
reducible to chance.
但是，墮落有另一面：
Other Side of Fall:
“But there is another side to the story of the fall of man,” continued Van Til:
人知道！宇宙對人、對上帝都是可知的
這是「徹底的理性主義」：
人並不需要按照上帝的話生活
人與上帝都能用自己思想裏的「理性定律」來釐定「存有的定律」
Man Does Know! Reality – Knowable to Man And God Alike
Utter Rationalism:
Man Need Not Live by God’s Word
Both Man And God Can Assert Laws of “Being”
With Laws of Rationality – In His Mind
How could man be sure that he could safely ignore the command of God?
How did he presume to know that God did not know what would come to
pass should he eat of the forbidden tree? If there was to be any seeming
sense to such an action, it would have to be on the assumption that man
himself knew that the evil threatened would not take place. Satan told man
that the issue would be quite otherwise than God said it would be. He said
that God knew that it would be otherwise. Satan suggested that God too
knew that man would be as God, knowing good and evil if man should eat of
the tree. Reality, said Satan in effect, is wholly lit up, lit up for the “creature”
as well as for the “Creator.” Man therefore does not need to live by the
authoritative assertions of the Creator. He can discover by his own
independent inspection, by Wesensschau, what will take place in the course
of time. Man as well as God can ascertain the laws of being by means of the
laws of rationality in his mind. …
264
當人拒絕上帝的約和上帝的吩咐時，
人同時成爲「理性主義者」和「非理性主義者」
When Man Rejects God’s Covenant (Requirements),
Man Becomes A Rationalist and An Irrationalist
It was thus that man, in rejecting the covenantal requirement of God became
at one and the same time both irrationalist and rationalist. These two are not,
except formally, contradictory of one another. They rather imply one another.
Man had to be both to be either. (CTK, 48-49. Van Til’s treatment of the same
topic in DF2, 123-28, is a useful supplement to his discussion in CTK.)
一而眾：對上帝而言，「一」和「眾」都是終極的
因此，宇宙中「一」和「眾」都是終極的
「一」不是抽象的「存有」或抽象的「非存有」
沒有「純抽象理念」或「孤存事實」
One-and-Many: Unity & Diversity = Both Ultimate to God,
Thus Both One and Diversity = Ultimate in Creation
“One” Isn’t an Abstract “Being” or Abstract “Non-Being”;
Not “Pure Concept” Nor “Brute Fact”
The reader might usefully compare the above discussion with our exploration in
chapter 5 of the implications of the doctrine of the Trinity. There I mentioned Van
Til’s view that the Trinity solved the “problem of the one and the many,” the
problem of the relation of universals to particulars. Van Til says that because unity
and diversity are equally ultimate to God, they are also equally ultimate in the
creation. There is no “ultimate matter,” “pure particularity,” or “brute fact”
underlying and therefore un-interpreted by any conceptual thought. Nor is there
any “pure concept” that exists apart from any particular applications of it.
Non-Christian thought, lacking belief in the biblical God, seeks absolutes
elsewhere, either in the purely abstract concept or in the purely abstract
particular or both. We may relate that discussion to the present one by saying that
for Van Til the search for utterly abstract concepts represents the rationalist
impulse; the search for utterly un-interpreted brute facts represent the
irrationalist impulse.
在歷史上的希腦哲學界，所有「理性主義者」都是「非理性主義者」
而所有的「非理性主義者」都是「理性主義者」
In Philosophy, All Rationalists = Irrationalists, All Irrationalists = Rationalists
Van Til analyzes the history of non-Christian thought, particularly Western

philosophy, in these terms: “In ancient philosophy the rationalistic motif seemed
to dominate the scene; in modern times the irrationalistic motif seems to be
largely in control. But the one never lives independently of the other.” (CTK, 50.)
265
In Greek philosophy, we find some figures, like the Sophists, who were
predominantly irrationalistic; yet the Sophists’ insistence that “man is the measure
of all things” shows their rationalistic side, and Plato was able to show that their
skepticism was itself a dogmatic assertion, offered as a sure, universal truth.
Others, like Parmenides, sought to understand everything in terms of timeless
logic, but he need to resort to mythology to explain the “illusions” that did not
cohere with his rationalistic worldview. The irrationalistic Sophists were also
rationalists; the rationalistic Parmenides was also an irrationalist.
柏拉圖是「理性主義者」：我們能認識理念世界
柏拉圖也是「非理性主義者」：我們不能認識感官世界
Plato = Rationalist: We Can Know World of Ideas
Plato = Irrationalist: We Cannot Know Sense Experience
Plato combined these motifs explicitly. He was rationalistic about our knowledge
of the world of forms or ideas, yet irrationalistic about our knowledge of the world
of sense experience. His problem was in fitting the two worlds together. Van Til
offers an interesting and, I think, profound analysis of Plato’s vacillations between
the two motifs. (SCE, 24-43.) The same critique bears upon Aristotle. For him, form
and matter are not found in different worlds, as in Plato, but rather are
complementary aspects of the world in which we now live. But, like Plato,
Aristotle understood form and matter antithetically; as pure universality and pure
particularity. Thus, their relationship is as problematic as that of Plato’s two
worlds.
阿奎那結合「新柏拉圖主義」與「亞里斯多德的哲學」於基督教信仰
范泰爾一般都透過「阿奎那的經院哲學」來批評天主教
Aquinas Combines Neo-Platonism & Aristotle with Christianity
CVT Criticizes Catholic Church Through Aquinas’ Scholasticism
The medieval theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas, whose thinking had
official status in the Roman Catholic Church for many centuries, adopted an
epistemology based in part upon Neoplatonism and Aristotle. Van Til attributes to
that compromise many of the doctrinal and apologetic errors of the Roman
Catholic tradition. [Van Til discusses Roman Catholicism and its traditional
Scholastic philosophy often in his writings. See my discussions in chaps. 19 and 25
(CVT).]
現代的理性主義者：笛卡兒、斯賓挪莎、萊布尼茲
現代的非理性主義者：洛克、伯克萊、休謨
Modern Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz
Modern Irrationalists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume
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Van Til finds rationalism emphasized in the modern era by Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibnitz, but from an irrationalistic basis. The opposite is true of Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume.
康德、黑格爾
Kant, Hegel
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), like Plato, sought to develop a view point that did
equal justice to both motifs. In order to accomplish this, he set up a division
between two realms: the “noumenal” realm, of which nothing can be known by
man, and the “phenomenal” realm, in which autonomous reason reigns supreme.
Kant was, in other words, irrationalistic about the nouemena and rationalistic
about the phenomena. In attempting to reconcile the concerns of rationalism and
irrationalism, he advocated human autonomy even more explicitly and
consistently than did his predecessors. The human mind became the source of the
categories that supply the structure of the phenomenal world. (SCE, 103-115.) In
Kant, Van Til finds a key to all the more recent philosophies.* Modern theology, as
well – both liberal and neo-orthodox – is essentially Kantian: Barth’s Geschichte is
Kant’s noumenal realm. (See NM, CB, and TG.)
*[Van Til discusses the idealist philosophy of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet,

Pringle-Pattison, and others at great length, reflecting his doctoral studies in that
field: see CI and SCE, 114-182. Nevertheless, he evidently believed that Kant’s
thought was more significant than idealism as an intellectual turning point.
Idealism and pragmatism, he wrote, “are both elaborations of Kant’s creativity
theory of thought which has set up the temporal categories as the ultimate
standard of interpretation” (SCE, 114). Idealism is “built upon the same Kantian
presuppositions” (SCE, viii).]
In later chapters we will look more closely at Van Til’s critiques of various thinkers.
My purpose here has been to present his overall approach in broad strokes. In my
view, Van Til’s analysis of the history of non-Christian thought in terms of
rationalism and irrationalism, together with its theological justification, is one of
his best accomplishments. It is scripturally based in its accurate account of the
Christian worldview and the unbeliever’s negation of it. It is confirmed by analysis
of the secular texts themselves. And it gives to the Christian a wonderful insight
into the structure and dynamics of intellectual movements. [These ideas can be
fruitfully applied to disciplines other than philosophy. Cf. Rousas Rushdoony on
politics in JA, 339-348, and the various essays on mathematics, education,
psychology, history, economics, etc., in G. North, ed., Foundations of Christian
Scholarship (Vallecito, Calif.: Ross House Books, 1976).] This insight is immensely
important both to the task of interpretation and to the work of apologetics.
267
范泰爾提供視角來分析思想史的轉變
例如「後現代主義」放棄線形的客觀思維
CVT Gives Perspective to View Changes in History of Thought
E.g. Postmodernism Abandons Linear/Objective Thought
Van Til’s analysis provides a good perspective from which to understand the twists
and turns of the history of thought. Every several years, one hears the claim that
contemporary thought has become radically different from anything that has gone
before. The latest claim of this sort is made for “postmodernism.” We are told that
thirty years ago or so, our culture rejected the rationalistic assumptions of the
Enlightenment and came to recognize that “linear, scientific, objective” thinking is
largely an expression of bias. Therefore, contemporary postmodern thought
rejects all the assurances of the past and opens itself up to various non-Western,
non-linear influences, such as Eastern religions, occultism, and so on. It
“deconstructs” language to lay bare its essential use – not as a means of rational
communication from one mind to another, but as a means of social power, to
control and oppress.
基督徒恐慌！新挑戰需要新回應？
Christians Panic: New Challenges Call for New Response?
When the molders of opinion announce such radical changes in the intellectual
climate, Christians often wonder how they can deal with this new challenge to
their faith. Evangelical leaders argue that some utterly new approach is needed.
Christians need to prepare for dialogue by reading all the new literature, seeing all
the new plays, listening to all the new music, and so on.
范泰爾：基督徒需要認識思想和文化
不過，不必恐慌，「新思維」其實如伊甸園一樣古老
CVT: Christians Should Be Well Informed About Thought & Culture
But Don’t Panic! “New Thinking” As Old As Garden of Eden
Van Til always endorsed the idea that Christians, or at least the apologists among
them, should be well informed as to what is going on in the intellectual and
cultural world. But he also comforted us by saying that there is no need to panic.
Were he alive today, he would say that the “new thinking” of our time is really
nothing drastically different from what has been going on since the Garden of
Eden. Essentially, it is rationalism and irrationalism. The latest contemporary ideas
are essentially no different from those of the ancient Greeks, the modern
rationalists and empiricists, Kant, Hegel, and the others. Postmodernism, insofar
as it is really a change from what has gone before, is a shift from a rationalistic to
an irrationalistic impulse. Its rejection of “linear objectivity” is something we have
seen before, among the Greek Sophists, in Hume’s critique of objectivity, in Kant’s
critique of metaphysics, and in Hegel’s attempt to achieve truth through negation
and synthesis.
268
范泰爾對哲學歷史的分析，比薛華更準確（薛華也對我們有幫助）
CVT’s Analysis of History of Philology:
More Accurate Than Schaeffer (Though Schaeffer = Helpful)
In this respect, Van Til’s analysis of the history of philosophy is more accurate, and,
I think, more profound, than that of his student Francis Schaeffer, though there is
much profitable teaching in Schaeffer’s thought [see chap. 28 (CVT)]. Schaeffer
argues that the Greek philosophers believed in objective truth, and that that
conviction pervaded Western philosophy until the coming of Hegel, who taught
that truth and falsity could somehow be combined dialectically to achieve a
supra-logical level of insight. After that, says Schaeffer, Western culture “escaped
from reason,” despairing of ever discovering “true truth.” [Schaeffer, The God
Who Is There (Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1968), 1-29.]
「古希臘哲學」與「現代哲學」同樣是「非理性主義」
「古希臘的理性主義」也沒有提供真正的客觀性
Greek Philosophy Is As Irrationalistic As Moderns
Greek Rationalism Doesn’t Give True Objectivity
Van Til, on the contrary, finds the Greeks just as irrationalistic as the moderns. The
Sophists’ “man is the measure,” Heraclitus’ “everything flows,” Plato’s “realm of
opinion,” Aristotle’s “prime matter,” the Gnostic realm of error – all are, to Van Til,
classic treatments of the irrationalist impulse – which, to be sure, was combined in
their thought with the rationalist impulse. But, says Van Til, even Greek
rationalism did not possess the sort of objectivity that Christians should applaud.
Greek rationalism was based on human autonomy, and therefore on empty
concepts rather than the riches of divine revelation.
與薛華不同，范泰爾沒有讚揚古希臘哲學的客觀性
范泰爾也不認爲黑格爾轉向非理性主義（主觀性／主體性）
CVT: Unlike Schaeffer; CVT Did Not Praise Greek Objectivity
CVT Didn’t See Hegel Shifting to Irrationalism
Unlike Schaeffer, therefore, Van Til did not commend the objectivity of the Greeks;
nor did he see some drastic shift to irrationalism in the philosophy of Hegel. Plato
was both a rationalist and an irrationalist, and so was Hegel. The differences
between the two were differences in detail and historical perspective, not
differences in underlying commitment.
269
不要怕任何「文化變遷」！不需要重新學習「護教學」
Take All Cultural Change in Stride. Don’t Be Afraid!
No Need to Re-Learn Apologetics
Van Til, therefore, gives us the courage to take “cultural sea-change” in stride, not
to be terrified by every new ideology that comes down the pike. In a fundamental
sense, there is nothing new under the sun. And students who learn their
apologetics from Van Til, if they learn it well, will be prepared for the next
development when it comes; they will not have to learn their apologetics all over
again.
弗蘭姆：不要僵硬地使用這分析法
不要把所有非信徒的思想，都用「理性／非理性主義」的辨證來解釋
因為有時候，非信徒會具有完全不同的性質
他們雖是非信徒，但有時也會「逆其本性地」發現真理
Frame: Avoid Using This Analysis in Wooden Way
Don’t Explain Everything Non-Christian Says Exhaustively
By Rationalist-Irrationalist Dialectic
Sometimes, What Unbeliever Says Have Different Character
Unbelievers May Discover Truth “In Spite of Themselves”
My only caveat is that we should avoid using this analysis in a wooden way,
insensitive to the diversity among non-Christian thinkers. Nor should we assume
that everything in non-Christian thought can be exhaustively explained by the
rationalist-irrationalist dialectic. Once we are aware of this apologetic tool, we
may be tempted to mechanically categorize everything in a philosopher’s thought
as either rationalism or irrationalism. But some assertions by unbelievers may
have a different character entirely. As Van Til notes in his more moderate
formulations, unbelievers do sometimes discover and acknowledge truth “in spite
of themselves.” We must not routinely reject everything they say. Rather, we must
be sensitive to distinguish between the ideas they have learned from God’s
revelation and the ideas they are using to suppress that revelation.
情況複雜：
非信徒的話可以同時反映「對上帝啟示的洞見」與「壓抑啟示」
例如柏拉圖
Situation = Complicated
Unbeliever’s Words Can Reflect Insight into Revelation
And Reflect Suppression of Revelation at Same Time
E.g. Plato
Indeed, there is a certain complication here: a thinker’s words often reflect both
revelational insight and suppression of the truth at the same time. When Plato
says that the real world is rationally apprehensible, he is expressing revealed truth.
The world is rationally knowable, first to God, then to us by revelation. But he is at
270
the same time expressing his own rational autonomy, for the process of rational
apprehension to Plato is far different from that of biblical analogical thinking. It
would be wrong to disagree with Plato merely because he is an unbeliever; to do
so would be an instance of the genetic fallacy, i.e., judging something on the basis
of its origin. On the other hand, it would be equally wrong to think that this
statement in no way expresses Plato’s suppression of the truth.
非信徒可以有洞見
范泰爾的「理性主義與非理性主義」的分析是強而有力的護教工具
Unbelievers Have Insight
CVT’s Rationalist-Irrationalist Analysis = Powerful Apologetic Tool
As we saw in chapter 15 (CVT), Van Til does acknowledge that unbelievers have
insight, even though at times his extreme formulations of the antithesis and his
exaggeration of the predictability of non-Christian thought come dangerously
close to the genetic fallacy. On the whole, however, his rationalist-irrationalist
analysis of non-Christian thought is a powerful apologetic tool.

[ CI = Christianity and Idealism ]
[ NM = The New Modernism ]
[ CB = Christianity and Barthianism ]
271
附錄一作業
ASSIGNMENT
1. 本體論是處理甚麼問題的？知識論是處理甚麼問題的？（不超過 35 字）
What question does metaphysics deal with?
What question does epistemology deal with it? ( 35 words or less)
2. 簡單地說出基督教（基督徒）的知識論。（100-150 字）
Briefly state the Christian’s epistemology. (100-150 words)
3. 知識本體論是處理甚麼的？（不超過 20 字）
What does the metaphysics of epistemology deal with? (20 words or less)
4. 簡單的對照：（一）「上帝是自含的」（解釋這句話的意思）；（二）「其
他的宗教、哲學等思想系統裏都有一個自含的東西」。（100-150 字）
Briefly contrast: [1] “God is self-contained” (explain this statement); and [2]
“there is something which is self-contained in every religion, philosophy or
system of thought.” (100-150 words)
5. 爲甚麼所有的、古今中外的哲學都是抽象的？爲甚麼《聖經》的世界觀（《聖
經》的本體論與知識論）是具體的？「具體」這詞是甚麼意思？「抽象」這
詞是甚麼意思？（100-150 字）
Why is it that, all philosophies, Asian or western, ancient or modern, are all
“abstract”? Why is it that the Bible’s worldview (metaphysics and epistemology)
is “concrete”? What does the word “concrete” mean? And what does the word
“abstract” mean? (100-150 words)
6. 爲甚麼當人採納一個不符合《聖經》的思想系統，而用「延伸法」或「否定
法」去尋找自含者（絕對真理）的時候，結果所找到的，只不過是虛空？要
怎樣開始尋找，才具體，才不會達致虛空？（請記起：Fido 這條狗的比喻）
（100-150 字）
Why is it that, if one follows a system of thinking (worldview) which is NOT
according to the Bible, and uses either extrapolation or negation to try to find
something which is self-contained (i.e., absolute truth), the result of this search is
merely “emptiness” (nothingness)? Instead, how should one begin this search, so
that one’s thinking will be concrete, and NOT arrive at emptiness? (Remember
the example of Fido the dog) (100-150 words)
7. 解釋：只有《聖經》中的上帝才是絕對而有位格的。
這樣的上帝有資格做甚麼？
其他宗教、哲學系統裏的「絕對」（自含）者又如何？它們沒有資格做甚麼？
（100-150 字）
272
Explain: Only the God who revealed himself in the Bible is absolute, and is also
personal. What is this kind of God qualified to do? What about all the
“self-contained/absolute” ones in all other systems of religion and philosophy?
What are these NOT qualified to do? (100-150 words)
8. 用「共相」和「殊相」這兩個名詞來解釋：「一而眾」這個課題是處理甚麼
問題的？基督徒如何解決「一而眾」的問題？（100-150 字）
Use the terms “universal” and “particular” to explain: What question does “the
one-and-many problem” address? What is the Christian’s solution of this
problem? (100-150 words)
9. 若要在科學上把事實和定律連接起來，必須先做甚麼？在非基督徒的科學（世
界觀）中，事實和定律的本質是甚麼？（100-150 字）
If we are to link up facts and laws in science, what must we first do? What is the
nature of the facts and laws in a non-Christian’s science (worldview)? (100-150
words)
10. 一個基督徒若相信上帝的主權（包括預定），應該是怎樣的一個人？過著怎
樣的生活？（100-150 字）
If a Christian believes in the sovereignty of God (including predestination), what
kind of person should he/she be? What kind of life should he/she lead? (100-150
words)
11. 「因為上帝需要人，又需要人去愛祂和敬拜祂，所以才創造了人。」這話對
嗎？請解釋。並解釋「相互依存主義」。（100-150 字）
Is it true that God needs man, and God needs man to love and worship him,
therefore He created man? Explain. Explain the word “correlativism.” (100-150
words)
12. 簡單地解釋：上帝是獨一的（singular and one)；又是單一或簡一的（simple and

one）。
我們談論上帝時，不可以怎樣說？
Joel Olsteen（美國最大的教會的牧師）在 CNN 接受訪問時所犯的錯誤是甚麼？
（100-150 字）
Briefly explain: God is singular and one; and God is simple and one.
When we talk about the God of the Bible, what mistake must we avoid?
What mistake did Joel Olsteen (pastor of the largest church in the USA) make on
CNN, when interviewed by Larry King? (100-150 words)
13. 解釋：上帝不是邪惡與苦難的創始者（作成者、成因）。
解釋：上帝是邪惡與苦難的創始者（作成者、成因）。
解釋：這兩句話都是對的。（100-150 字）
Explain: God is not the author/cause of evil/suffering.
Explain: God is the author/cause of evil/suffering.
Explain why both of these statements are true. (100-150 words)
273
14. 解釋：原本的思想、副本（抄本）的思想、類比的思想。
解釋：「根據上帝的思想而思想」是一事實，也是上帝的要求。（200 字）
Explain: archetypal thinking, ectypal thinking, and analogical thinking.
Explain: “To think God’s thoughts after God” is a fact, and is also required by God.
(200 words)
15. 基督徒可以用邏輯嗎？解釋。（100-150 字）
Can Christian use logic? Explain. (100-150 words)
16. 扼要地說出：賀治認爲邏輯有哪三樣功能？范泰爾爲甚麼不完全反對賀治的
說法？范氏的回應是甚麼？（100-150 字）
Briefly list: the three functions of logic which Charles Hodge lists.
Why doesn’t Van Til totally disagree with Hodge? What does he do instead?
(100-150 words)
17. 「類比系統」全章的要點是甚麼？回答這條問題時，要用「界限觀念」這名
詞。（100-150 字）
Explain the main point in the chapter on “the analogical system”, using the words
“limiting concept.” (100-150 words)
18. 解釋：「理性主義和先驗」與「經驗主義與後驗」。（100-150 字）
Explain: rationalism and the a priori; and empiricism and the a posteriori.
(100-150 words)
19. 康德在哲學歷史中（特別是知識論）有甚麼重要性？
解釋：康德後的所有哲學家都降服了康德，范泰爾除外。（100-150 字）
What is the significance of Immanuel Kant in the history of philosophy (esp.
epistemology)? Explain: All philosophers after Kant surrendered to him, except
Cornelius Van Til. (100-150 words)
20. 你從本課程學到甚麼？你上了這課程，包括做這次的作業，有甚麼感受？
（100-150 字）
What did you learn from this course?
How do you “feel” about taking this course and doing this assignment? (100-150
words)
21. 列出普遍啟示的四項屬性，並加以解釋。（200 字）
List the four attributes of general revelation, and explain each. (200 words)
22. 「普遍啟示」與「特殊啟示」之間有哪幾方面的關係？（100-150 字）
What are the relationships between general revelation and special revelation?
(100-150 words)
23. 列出並簡單解釋「視角主義」一段所提到的九種知識。（100-150 字）
List, and explain briefly, the nine kinds of knowledge in “perspectivalism.”
(100-150 words)
274
24. 解釋：「《聖經》的概念」與「《聖經》的範圍」。（100-150 字）
Explain: “the idea of Scripture” and “the scope of Scripture.” (100-150 words)
25. 解釋：「上帝使一般的顯爲一般，好叫特殊的顯爲特殊。」
或「上帝使自然的顯爲自然，好叫超自然的顯爲超自然。」（100-150 字）
Explain: God made the ordinary to be ordinary, so that the extraordinary be
extraordinary.
(Or God made the natural to be natural, so that the supernatural appears to be
supernatural.) (100-150 words)
26. 「普遍啓示」是指甚麼？它足夠嗎？它的目的是甚麼？（100 字）
27. 解釋「上帝是自含豐滿，也是絕對位格」。（100 字）
28. 解釋「事實與定律之間的關係」。（100 字）
29. 解釋「類比的知識」。（100 字）
275
附錄二引用范泰爾和弗蘭姆著作簡寫一覽表
[ CB = Christianity and Barthianism ]
[ CC = Christianity in Conflict ]
[ CI = Christianity and Idealism ]
[ GH = The God of Hope ]
[ ICG = The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel ]
[ NM = The New Modernism ]
[ WIB = Why I Believe in God ]
[ WSA = Who Do You Say That I Am? ]

276

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歸正護教學：

第四章 上帝：自含豐滿與絕對位格 .......................................................... 9

II. 上帝，自含的豐滿 ............................................................................................... 12

III. 上帝，絕對的位格 .............................................................................................. 20

第五章 三位一體 ........................................................................................... 26

III. 「一而眾」的問題 .............................................................................................. 31

IV. 宇宙中的事實和定律 .......................................................................................... 40

第六章 上帝的主權 ...................................................................................... 43

II. 決定論與人的自由 ............................................................................................... 45

III. 邪惡的問題 ........................................................................................................... 51

第九章 上帝的啟示 ...................................................................................... 67

II. 普遍啟示 ................................................................................................................ 69

III. 視角主義 ............................................................................................................... 76

VI. 《聖經》的原本 .................................................................................................. 89

VII. 《聖經》的範圍 ................................................................................................. 92

第十章 預設的問題 ...................................................................................... 94

II. 預設的意義 .......................................................................................................... 103

III. 一些對「預設」的誤會 .................................................................................... 106

IV. 「非終極的預設」與「終極的預設」........................................................... 108

第十一章 理性的優先性 ...........................................................................110

I. 理性的優先性 ....................................................................................................... 110

II. 弗蘭姆的檢討 ...................................................................................................... 117

第十三章 類比系統 ....................................................................................142

I. 類比系統 ............................................................................................................... 142

II. 基督徒的「界限觀念」 ..................................................................................... 148

III. 又回到「表面矛盾」 ........................................................................................ 154

IV. 多元視角主義 .................................................................................................... 156

第三部份 范泰爾的知識倫理學....................................... 186

第十五章 「勢不兩立」的概念 ..............................................................186

I. 「勢不兩立」的概念 .......................................................................................... 186

II. 極端性的「勢不兩立」說法 ............................................................................. 196

III. 準則性的說法..................................................................................................... 205

IV. 處境性的說法 .................................................................................................... 211

V. 存在性的說法 ..................................................................................................... 215

VI. 實踐性的說法 .................................................................................................... 224

第十六章 普遍恩典 ....................................................................................234

I. 普遍恩典 ............................................................................................................... 234

II. 福音白白的呼籲（邀請） ................................................................................. 245

III. 丹雅各的批判..................................................................................................... 252

IV. 區分過程............................................................................................................. 255

第十七章 理性主義與非理性主義 .........................................................261

I. 理性主義與非理性主義 ...................................................................................... 261

附錄一 作業 ...................................................................... 272

附錄二 引用范泰爾和弗蘭姆著作簡寫一覽表 ............... 276

THE APOLOGETICS OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL

AS INTERPRETED BY JOHN M. FRAME

CORNELIUS VAN TIL: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS THOUGHT

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY SAMUEL LING

[ DF1 = The Defense of the Faith, 1st edition ]

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

6. 所有非基督教思維 = 抽象共相 ＋ 抽象殊相

[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]

[ CTETH = Christian Theistic Ethics ]

有一次，范氏顯然想進一步去訴諸上帝的奧秘。當他回應 Buswell 的批判時，

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

我們在這裏可以問（雖然 Weaver 並沒有問）：范泰爾是否曾經討論過「用

[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]

范泰尔护教学中级课程：基督教的知识论201411

范泰尔护教学中级课程：基督教的知识论201411

第四章上帝：自含豐滿與絕對位格 .......................................................... 9

第五章三位一體 ........................................................................................... 26

第六章上帝的主權 ...................................................................................... 43

第九章上帝的啟示 ...................................................................................... 67

第十章預設的問題 ...................................................................................... 94

第十一章理性的優先性 ...........................................................................110

第十三章類比系統 ....................................................................................142

第三部份范泰爾的知識倫理學....................................... 186

第十五章「勢不兩立」的概念 ..............................................................186

第十六章普遍恩典 ....................................................................................234

第十七章理性主義與非理性主義 .........................................................261

附錄一作業 ...................................................................... 272

附錄二引用范泰爾和弗蘭姆著作簡寫一覽表 ............... 276

6. 所有非基督教思維 = 抽象共相＋抽象殊相