Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Monograph
by
Major Walter E. Kretchilc
InfanQ'
KRETCHIK
11. Hcunlty ClASSlfltA lIUN 18. SltURllV ClAS5IFltA no 19. SlCURITY ClASSI'ltA TlOH 20. llMI r....liON 0' AIS UAtT
Of RI'ORf Of TillS 'AGI Of AIS TII"CT
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED u A
NS'. lS40·Q\·2BO·'j'jOO
SCHOOL OF RDVaNCED MILITQRY STUDIES
MONOGRRPH RPPROVRL
Rpproved by:
Monograph Director
COL Dennis W. Tighe MS
Director, School of
CO James R. McDonough, M d Qdvanced M i 1 itary
Studies
Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. Degree Program
Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
11 . GameTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Rppendixes:
R
8
.. Selected European Decision Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
U.S. Rrmy Wargaming Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
C. U.S. Rrmy Wargarne Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D. Wargaming Recording Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
E. .S. Rrmy Decision Matrix . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . 52
U
F . Weighting of Intelligence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . 53
G. Soviet Nomogram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
RBSTRRCT
t h e c h a i n o f e v e n t s t h a t o c c u r a s a u n i t e x e c u t e s a c o u r s e of
By u s i n g f r i e n d l y s t r e n g t h s and d i s p o s i t i o n s , enerny a s s e t s ,
p o s s i b l e f r i e n d l y and enemy c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , and a set
p i e c e of ground, wargaming a t t e m p t s t o f o r e s e e t h e a c t i o n ,
react ion, and c o u n t e r a c t i o n dynamics of a b a t t l e . 4
s h o u l d and c a n I do?"5
b a t t l e f i e l d t h e commander must f i r s t t h r o u g h l y u n d e r s t a n d a l i t h e
c h o o s e a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n from t h o s e o p t i o n s t h a t w i l l a l l o w him
t o b e s t accomplish h i s mission.7
Because I am n o t s u r e t h a t o u r wargaming p r o c e s s a c h i e v e s
a t t e m p t t o s o l v e t h a t problem by f i r s t examining t h e t h e o r e t i c a l
b a s i s f o r wargaming; t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n s h o u l d h e l p me d e t e r m i n e
criteria for analyzing the current wargaming methodology. Next,
wargaming.
Bore1 and John von Neumann. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
the field. 9
Zagare, "While poker and parchesi are games, so are wage bargain-
with your opponent, yon always win, lose, or draw. This concept,
12 rational actor is someone who looks out for his awn interests
wants, fails to define his goals, and does not seek the attain-
player can only move one piece per turn, his future moves can be
the child's garne of tag. The players execute the garne differ-
Intent ions, meanwhi la, are strategies that have already been
creates indicators that might cue an actor that his opponent has
made a decision to execute a strategy. The actor then formulates
mat ion, von Neumann and Morgenst ern recommend the maxi-min model.
this section.
defeat. 27
enemy w i l l try to do the same. Since he does not know what the
enemy intends to do, and vice versa, the friendly commander can
of his CDFIs has the best chance of success, because he lacks suf-
tive, the friendly commander scans his matrix looking for his
worst case result for each enemy COR. However, the friendly cum-
received reports that the enemy moved his command posts forward,
have led the friendly commander to assume that the enemy intends
optimistically selects, for each enemy CUR, a COR that will give
him his best "payoff. " The maximum value of each column is the
ing the "worst of the best" cases.30 The worst outcome the
and the recognit ion of friendly and erterny act ions (capabilities
decision-making process.
f o r many European armies between 1871 and 1914. The U.S. Rrmy
1910.37
this interwar period, however, the U.S. Army developed Field Man-
Since the end of World War Two, the German wargaming system
enemy Cons, and then reach decisions about how they would defeat
European methodology.
should be considered.
The 1984 FM 101-5 eliminates some prescribed requirements
detail.
the U.S. Rrmy, Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union. After a
mission and intent, and focus the staff for planning the mission.
This step ends when the staff briefs the commander about the cur-
ers whether or not the CORs are suitable and acceptable.52 This
step ends with the staff recommending CORs to the commander, who
given the current conditions. The "best" COR is the one that has
commander's approval.
now understand how a U.S. division commander makes his COR deci-
wargaming process and the role it plays today in the overall U.S.
decision-making process.
that are available for the mission are compiled for use in the
wargame.
niques: the avenue-in-depth, the belt, and the box. These meth-
explained in Rppendix C.
o Select a technique to record and display the results. ST
the enemy might react to each action, and then creating counter-
the entire friendly COR is analyzed. The staff then restarts the
Wargaming continues until all friendly and enemy CORs are ana-
ly zed. 57
cannot, agree, the chief of staff listens to the facts and decides
my three criteria.
friendly and enemy actions within the method (box, belt, avenue)
selected for organizing the area of operations. Furthermore, ST
estimating how the enemy might employ his forces within his caoa-
bilities.64 In this approach, the wargamer must think and act as
study. In Desert Storm, as the 3d Army 02 put it, " [Enemy3 tem-
So what can we expect from the G2? Most G2s are trained in
c a p a b i l i t i e s d u r i n g wargarning, t h e G2 u s u a l l y h a s t h e must t r a i n -
enemy a s s e t s and c a p a b i l i t i e s .
c h i e f nf s t a f f i n l i e u o f a 62. However, t h e S o v i e t c h i e f of
wargatning. 63
v i s u a l i z e moving t h e i r f o r c e s u s i n g maps o r o t h e r a i d s , d e t e r m i n e
tion.
execute it. 7Z
,
procedure (FSOP) but they usually include the commander's sit ua-
effect, capabilities describe "what the enemy can do, when and
where the enemy can do it, and in what strength the enemy can do
it. "76
ST 100-9 specifically notes that calculating friendly and
enemy capabilities is not precise because many factors are
unknown about bath opposing forces. For example, while the pro-
COR the enemy commander has chosen. How, then, does the friendly
ability. "78
tency, good judgment, and get enough rest to make logical deci-
COFI analysis upon enemy capabilities, and then wargarne all pos-
select &h optimum COG. On the other hand, if the friendly com-
"knows" what the enemy intends to do, and thus can better counter
an enemy move.
may simply run out of time. In those cases it appears the best
the German commander must accept risk. His staff continues, how-
case the commander is wrong. Once the commander makes the deci-
order. 85
The British commander's estimate of the situation is almost
and morale. The British commander and his 62 focus their efforts
information at hand.87
each COR against the enemy's most dangerous COA, and selects the
that is simple, fast, and makes the best use of terrain. Once
briefs his staff as to why he selected it. The staff then pro-
the Soviet Rrmy has either lost or retained. Thus, while this
ically. Nomograms, which are based upon World War Two statis-
of a nomogram is in Rppendix G.
the enemy's capabilities, and chooses the best option for accon-
greatly upon deducing enemy intent. The Soviets use their robust
enemy assets and deduce enemy capabilities; they then use mass to
To sum up, U.S. Flrmy wargaming does not meet this criterion
countries meet the criterion either, for the same reason. The
confirm enemy indicators, they may not have enough time. There-
disadvantage.
cess. 98
34
however, rely greatly upon experience and judgment. There-
the expected results are worth the estimated costs. If the CDR
under consideration is not feasible, the wargamer throws it out.
the wargamer do? The rule does not cover this situation.
W R comparison.
cess. 105
he faces.
comply with them. Wargamers must not only define unclear and
conflicting rules but, by being human, the wargamers are subject
their processes are probably no better than the U.S. Army's pro-
mentioning.
not speed up wargaming, per se, they might assist in rapidly per-
analysis.
My final conclusion is that U.S. army wargaming rules do not
Because they focus the intelligence effort, PIR rflust be more than
ones. Fourth, the U.S. Army school system should emphasize the
usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of
these he will adopt the fourth."lle Thus, no matter what the
for helping the commander cope with this "fog of war." However,
Enemy
.
Lnior
commander's
connpt
- O mtrmp .
htermtdiuu
miwon
- Economic condition of
c o m b 1 o p n t t o l u u-a
and . a i o p d l o c J makw
up of populatton
The division staff uses this sequence for any type of oper-
ation, but, as an example, I will use an attack. The staff
Segins by first visualizing the brigades and their subord~nate
battalions in their initial positions and then moving the repre-
sentative unit symbols on the map to the LD. The staff focuses
on those actions the subordinate units must take to accomplish
movement to the ID. The staff simultaneously considers all ele-
ments of the offensive framework (deep, close, rear, flank secu-
rity, and reserves to weight the main effort) and records all
actions taken by division and subordinate units across the
battlefield operating systems (command and control, maneuver,
fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare, mobility-
countermobility-survivability, combat service support, and air
defense) using a recording technique. Once each action is deter-
mined for moving to the LD, the second part of the sequence
begins--t he enemy react ion.
coun_
cont8Ct (LC), or in the covering force area; initial
penetration or initial contaei along the FEBA: anc:l
pillage of the re.lrve or commitment of •
_I:
..... This taehnique i. kiss timo consuming. An initial
_ption is mode lIIat the friendly units can handle
most of the situations on the battlehld and the
planner can focus on the most essential tasks. This
lachnique is useful Wlhe tasic i. e.g .. attack
or counte,ittack of a major enemy unit. This
techniQue is used when time .. extremely limited such
I I in a hasty attICk.
You may use these technique. separately or in
_ or you may use your own malhod.
48
appendix D. U.S. Rrmy Wargame Recording Techniques.
Reference: U n i t e d S t a t e s army Command and General S t a f f ColI ene
----- =-
S t u d e n t Text 100-9, T e c h n i q u e s and P r o c e d u r e s Fop Tact:=al Decl-
sionmakinq, 1331, pps. 4-4 t o 4-6.
swnteranack force. Dlv (4,will plan a counteranack to ieslr& anv force makina a sionific&t oenetrarion $0
lhii wet. As mis is the aiea where we feel me threat will more l h a i likelv come.-we a k well ~ i e ~ a r e ford 11bv
me n e d placement of me counterand force. The MBA d.vls~onWII s u b m me counteranack oy holatng me
shwlde~sof thm wnatranon. The penenallon mll be m a d so mat me dw (.) anacks me awtnem llank vn le
ma MBA dlv Nunu ~.ms. merratnn.
~ -. ~
At. Vle
~ ..c..
m l u a a n. at
.~ ~ .ma
t.. h.oneratoon
~ . corns
--.-- wl
...~defend dam -
- .ins
- FEBA
wih me h i B ~ dini the nollh, the coros counteranack force. div I.).in me center. and the seo mecn bde in the
~~~ ~
swm. Priority of engineer suppan to'me MBA div to prep&si6ons to hold me shoulders~b1 s mnetratlon.
then to ensure mobility of lhe counteranack force. Avn bde be prepared to suppon counteranack mlo Ob)
BLUE. ADA priority to proteclinp me move of the counteranack force. IEW assets confirm the commitment 01
ttn I h m t into Obj BLUE, idenbty any followon forces.
Flppendix D. U. S. Army Wargarae Recoraing Tschniques (cont inneo) .
WABOWBWORRBHEET
Cap D*law
CRITICAL WENT, Can(.# P- B*tUcB.lt 1
Rppendix D. U.S. Rrmy Wargarae Recording T e c h n i q u e s i c u n t i z u e d )
WlOHTING INDICATORS
O 8.6 mxaoutlon.
* tnoorery indsolslon.
0 I n c m l a t e or inaocurete intormatlon.
O l n b l g u l t y of the Indlcator l t e e l t .
O r i g i n o t thm Indlcator
.- -- -- - --
Analysts l d a n t l t y tha enmy's c a p s b l l l t y t o concantrats f l r a s of p o t a n t l a l
nuolasr d s l l v a r y s y s t w .
Othsr Indlcators
Figure 25. Graph for Determining the Required T i e , the Extent of the
Move, or the Troops*Marching Rate.
ENDNOTES
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 0-1 National Defense Dcc-
trine, Washington, D.C., initial draft, 1 Nov 1389, 1-18, and
CGSC ST 100-9, Tactical Decisionmakinq, p. 4-1.
4. Ibid, 4-1.
10. Ibid, 9.
11. Ibid, 7.
12. Ibid, 7.
14. Ibid, 8.
17. Martin Shubik, The Uses and Methods of Gaminq, (New York,
19751, 18.
18. Ibid, 10. Shubik.believes that chess and card games are
rigid because the rules are specified in advance. As such the
best game m v e for any given game turn is predictable due to the
limited number of possible choices.
Rb.oluto ab.olut-
UKortainty Certainty
Enemy C a p a 8 i l l t i . r - E n ~ y
Intmtiom
(-1 1 1
1
P
1
P
1
P P
1
P
IP I
P
I I I I*>
p . P P p
Ultra ~I.(~co utr.
Consorvat tw Point . Opt i m i . t I e
mini-llin Maxi-nin' Miniur -8‘1-a*
33. Staff of Strategy and Tactics, Mar Game Design, (New 'fork,
1977), 2.
34. Ibid, 2.
35. Ibid, 4.
36. Ibid, 5.
39. Ibid, 5.
40. Michel, 7.
42. Ibid, 6.
45. Ibid, 3.
46. Michel, 7.
48. Ibid, 8.
49. Ibid, 10.
61. I b i d , 4-10.
64. I b i d , 4-7.
Heinl, Robert Debs JR., The Dict ionarv of Militarv and Naval
Quotations, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1385.
Otstott, LTG Charles P., Hagan, BG(Fi) Craig R., and Richmond, M J
Melvin E., United States Rrmy. "Battle Rhythm: Division
Command and Control." Militarv Review (June 1930): 14-26.
Shubik, Martin., The Uses and Methods of Gaming. New York, NY:
Elsevier Scientific Publ ish;lng, Inc., 1975.
Staff of Strategy and Tactics. War Game Desion. New York, NY:
Sirnulat ions Publ icat ions, Inc., 1977.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 0-1. Basic National Defense
Doctrine. Washington, D.C.: initial draft, 1 November 1983. .
Field Manual 34-1, Intellisence and Electronic Warfare Oper-
ations. Washington, D. C: HQ Department of the Army, 1987.
Fallesen, Jon J., Michel, Rex R., and Carter, Charles F. JR.
Rnalvsis of Tactical Courses of Rction Usinn Structured
Procedures and Rutomated Rids. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Rrmy
Research Inst it ute, C19893.
--------------, fl
Enhancements. Empirical Validat ion. and Irflolications for Exper-
t ise Development. Burl ington, MR: RLPHRTECH, Inc, C l99@l.