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About the Author
Vinay Kumar (VKR) graduated from IIT Delhi
in Mechanical Engineering.
Presently, he is Director of VKR Classes,
Kota, Rajasthan.
Third Edition
Vinay Kumar
B.Tech., IIT Delhi
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Differential Calculus for JEE Main & Advanced, 3/e
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PREFACE
T his book is meant for students who aspire to join the Indian Institute of Technologies (IITs) and various other engi-
neering institutes through the JEE Main and Advanced examinations. The content has been devised to cover the syllabi
of JEE and other engineering entrance examinations on the topic Differential Calculus. The book will serve as a text book
as well as practice problem book for these competitive examinations.
As a tutor with more than eighteen years of teaching this topic in the coaching institutes of Kota, I have realised
the need for a comprehensive textbook in this subject.
I am grateful to McGraw-Hill Education for providing me an opportunity to translate my years of teaching experience
into a comprehensive textbook on this subject.
This book will help to develop a deep understanding of Differential Calculus through graphs and problem solving.
The detailed table of contents will enable teachers and students to easily access their topics of interest.
Each chapter is divided into several segments. Each segment contains theory with illustrative examples. It is followed
by Concept Problems and Practice Problems, which will help students assess the basic concepts. At the end of the theory
portion, a collection of Target Problems have been given to develop mastery over the chapter.
The problems for JEE Advanced have been clearly indicated in each chapter.
The collection of objective type questions will help in a thorough revision of the chapter. The Review Exercises
contain problems of a moderate level while the Target Exercises will assess the students’ ability to solve tougher problems.
For teachers, this book could be quite helpful as it provides numerous problems graded by difficulty level which can be
given to students as assignments.
I am thankful to all teachers who have motivated me and have given their valuable recommendations. I thank my
family for their whole-hearted support in writing this book. I specially thank Mr. Devendra Kumar and Mr. S. Suman for
their co-operation in bringing this book.
Suggestions for improvement are always welcomed and shall be gratefully acknowledged.
Vinay Kumar
CONTENT
About the Author ii
Preface v
CHAPTER 1 LIMITS 1.1 – 1.178

1.1 Introduction 1.1
1.2 Concept of Infinity 1.7
1.3 Theorems on Limits 1.11
1.4 One-sided limits 1.14
1.5 Determinate and Indeterminate Forms 1.20
1.6 Factorisation and Cancellation of Common Factors 1.23
1.7 Rationalization 1.27
1.8 Limit Using Expansion Series of Functions 1.29
1.9 Standard Limits 1.33
1.10 Algebra of Limits 1.45
1.11 Limits when x → ∞ 1.48
1.12 Asymptotes 1.56
1.13 Limit of a Sequence 1.61
1.14 Limits of Forms (0 x ∞) and (∞ – ∞) 1.65
1.15 Limits of Forms 0 and ∞
0 0
1.71
∞
1.16 Limits of Form 1 1.73
1.17 Sandwich Theorem / Squeeze Play Theorem 1.77
1.18 L’ Hospital’s Rule 1.82
1.19 Geometrical Limits 1.96
1.20 Miscellaneous Limits 1.99
Target Problems for JEE Advanced 1.104

Things to Remember 1.114

Objective Exercises 1.116

Review Exercises for JEE Advanced 1.126

Target Exercises for JEE Advanced 1.127

Previous Year’s Questions (JEE Advanced) 1.129

Previous Year’s Questions (JEE Main Papers) 1.131

Answers 1.133

Hints & Solutions 1.140

viii | Content
CHAPTER 2 CONTINUITY OF FUNCTIONS 2.1 – 2.98

2.1 Definition of Continuity 2.1
2.2 Continuity in an Interval 2.10
2.3 Classification of Discontinuity 2.20
2.4 Algebra of Continuous Functions 2.27
2.5 Properties of Functions Continuous on a Closed Interval 2.33
2.6 Intermediate Value Theorem (I.V.T.) 2.37







Answers 2.70


CHAPTER 3 DIFFERENTIABILITY 3.1 – 3.116
3.2 Differentiability 3.6
3.3 Reasons of Non-differentiability 3.11
3.4 Relation between Continuity and Differentiability 3.13
3.5 Derivability at Endpoints 3.19
3.6 Differentiability over an interval 3.20
3.7 Alternative limit form of the Derivative 3.26
3.8 Derivatives of Higher Order 3.33
3.9 Algebra of Differentiable Functions 3.36
3.10 Functional Equations 3.40







Answers 3.74


CHAPTER 4 METHODS OF DIFFERENTIATION 4.1 – 4.120
4.2 Derivative using First Principles (ab initio) Method 4.1
Content | ix
4.3 Derivative of Standard Functions 4.3

4.4 Rules of Differentiation 4.4
4.5 The Chain Rule 4.9
4.6 Logarithmic Differentiation 4.15
4.7 Derivative of Inverse Functions 4.19
4.8 Parametric Differentiation 4.24
4.9 Differentiation of Implicit Functions 4.25
4.10 Differentiation by Trigonometric Substitution 4.33
4.11 Derivatives of Higher Order 4.37
4.12 Successive Differentiation 4.46
4.13 Derivative of a Determinant 4.48
4.14 Properties of Derivative 4.51
4.15 L’Hospital’s Rule 4.56







Answers 4.80


CHAPTER 5 TANGENT AND NORMAL 5.1 – 5.94
5.2 Rate Measurement 5.1
5.3 Approximation 5.7
5.4 Error 5.9
5.5 Tangent and Normal 5.11
5.6 Tangent to Parametric curves 5.20
5.7 Angle of Intersection 5.26
5.8 Common Tangents 5.30
5.9 Length of Tangent 5.35






Answers 5.55


x | Content
CHAPTER 6 MONOTONICITY 6.1 – 6.100

6.1 Definitions 6.1
6.2 Monotonicity over an Interval 6.4
6.3 Critical Point 6.15
6.4 Intervals of Monotonicity 6.17
6.5 Monotonicity in Parametric Functions 6.24
6.6 Algebra of Monotonous Functions 6.24
6.7 Proving Inequalities 6.27
6.8 Concavity and Point of Inflection 6.35







Answers 6.64


CHAPTER 7 MAXIMA AND MINIMA 7.1 – 7.200
7.2 Concept of Local Maxima and Local Minima 7.1
7.3 Fermat Theorem 7.4
7.4 The First Derivative Test 7.7
7.5 The First Derivative Procedure for Sketching the Graph of a Continuous Function 7.15
7.6 Second Derivative Test 7.18
7.7 Higher Order Derivative Test 7.23
7.8 Extrema of Parametric Functions 7.25
7.9 Operations on Functions having points of Extrema 7.26
7.10 Global Maximum and Minimum 7.28
7.11 Boundedness 7.40
7.12 Algebra of Global Extrema 7.42
7.13 Miscellaneous Methods 7.44
7.14 Optimisation Problems 7.49
7.15 Asymptotes 7.70
7.16 Points of Inflection 7.75
7.17 Curve Sketching 7.77
7.18 Isolation of Roots 7.85
7.19 Rolle’s Theorem 7.89
Content | xi
7.20 Deductions of Rolle’s Theorem 7.95

7.21 Lagrange’s Mean Value Theorem 7.98
7.22 Corollaries of LMVT 7.104
7.23 Related Inequalities 7.106
7.24 Cauchy’s Mean Value Theorem 7.112







Answers 7.144


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1
CHAPTER
Limits
We denote neighbourhoods by N(a), N1(a), N2(a), etc.

1.1 Introduction
Since a neighbourhood N(a) is an open interval symmetric
Let us introduce the notion of limit of a function which plays about a, it consists of all real x satisfying a – δ < x < a + δ for
an important role in mathematical analysis and the study some δ > 0. The positive number δ is called the radius of the
of calculus. The concept of limit of a function is one of the neighbourhood.
fundamental ideas that distinguishes calculus from algebra
We designate N(a) by N(a, δ) if we wish to specify its radius.
and trigonometry. The inequalities a – δ < x < a + δ are equivalent to –δ < x – a
We use limits to describe the way a function f varies. Some < δ, and to |x – a| < δ. Thus, N(a, δ) consists of all points x
functions vary continuously i.e. small changes in x produce whose distance from a is less than δ.
only small changes in f(x). Other functions can have values
that jump or vary erratically. Meaning of x → a
Sometimes we face with problems whose solutions involve the The symbol x → a is called as 'x tends to a' or 'x approaches a'.
use of limits. According to a formula of geometry, the area of It implies that x takes values closer and closer to 'a' but not 'a'.
a circle of radius r is πr2. How is such a formula derived? The
usual way is to inscribe regular polygons in the circle, find
the areas of these polygons, and then determine the “limiting
value” of these areas as the number of sides of the polygons Sometimes we need to consider values of x approaching 'a'
increase without bound. Thus, even such seemingly simple from only one side of 'a'.
formula as that for the area of a circle depends on the concept If x approaches 'a' from the left of 'a' then we use the symbol:
of limit for its derivation. x → a– or x → a – 0.
We also use limits to define tangent to graphs of functions. Similarly, if x approaches 'a' from the right of 'a' then we use
This geometrical application leads to the important concept of the symbol : x → a+ or x → a + 0.
derivative of a function, which quantifies the way a function's
value changes.
The need for evaluating the limit of a function arises in science
and engineering when we come across situations where a Limit of a Function
function (denoting a physical quantity) is not defined at x = a, Let us consider a function y = f(x) of a continuous variable x.
however the value of the function as x takes values very very Suppose that the independent variable x approaches a number
close to ‘a’ symbolize a useful physical quantity, for example 'a'. This means that x is made to assume values which become
instantaneous velocity, acceleration etc. arbitrarily close to 'a' but are not equal to 'a'. To describe such a
situation we say that x tends to 'a' or x approaches 'a' and write
Neighbourhood of a Point x → a. If there is a number  such that as x approaches 'a',
Any open interval containing a point a as its midpoint is called either from the right or from the left, f(x) approaches , then
a neighbourhood of a.  is called the limit of f(x) as x approaches 'a'.
1.2 Differential Calculus for JEE Main and Advanced
Informal Definition of Limit differing by little from zero. It is not a statement about the value
Let f(x) be defined on an open interval about 'a', except possibly of f(x) when x = 0. When we make the statements we assert
at 'a' itself. If f(x) gets arbitrarily close to  for all x sufficiently that, when x is nearly equal to zero, f(x) is nearly equal to . We
close to 'a', we say that f approaches the limit  as x approaches assert nothing about what happens when x actually equal to 0.
'a', and we write
lim f ( x ) . Caution
x a
(the abbreviation "lim" means "limit")

A wrong statement about limits :
It is evident that if a function has a limit for x → a, this limit is The number  is the limit of f(x) as x approaches a if f(x) gets
unique, since the values of the function corresponding to the closer to  as x approaches a.
values of x approaching 'a' must become arbitrarily close to Consider f(x) = x + [x] +1 at x = 0.
a constant and hence cannot be simultaneously close to more As x approaches 0, the function f(x) gets closer to
than one constant number. 1/2, from both sides but 1/2 is not the limit because f(x) does
An alternative notation for lim f ( x )  is f(x) →  as x → a not get arbitrarily close to 1/2. For example the function cannot
x a
attain 0.4995 or 0.5002 by using x sufficiently close to 0.
which is usually read as "f(x) approaches  as x approaches a".
Suppose we are asked to sketch the graph of the function f
Study Tip x3 − 1
given by f(x) = , x ≠ 1.
x −1
1. A number  is said to be a limiting value only if it is finite
and real, otherwise we say that the limit does not exist or For all values other than x = 1, we can use standard curve-
dne (for brevity). sketching techniques. However, at x = 1, it is not clear what
to do. To get an idea of the behaviour of the graph of f near
2. Note that 'a' need not be in the domain of f.
x = 1, we can use two sets of x-values – one set that approaches
Even if 'a' happens to be in the domain of f, the 1 from the left and one set that approaches 1 from the right, as
value f(a) plays no role in determining whether shown in table.
lim f ( x ) . It is only the behaviour of f(x) for x
x a
near a that concerns us.
3. We also note that the three statements,
lim f(x) = , lim (f(x) – ) = 0, lim | f(x) –  | = 0, are all
x →a x →a x →a
equivalent.
x
Let us consider the function f(x) = .
x
This function is equal to 1 for all values of x except x = 0.
It is not equal to 1 when x = 0; it is in fact not defined at x = 0. When we plot these points, it appears that the graph of f is a
parabola that has a hole at point (1, 3), as shown in the figure.
For when we say that f(x) is defined for x = 0 we mean that we
Although x cannot equal 1, we can move sufficiently close to
can calculate its value for x = 0 by putting x = 0 in the formula
1, and as a result f(x) moves arbitrarily close to 3.
which defines f(x). In this case we cannot. When we put x = 0
in f(x) we get 0/0, which is meaningless. Using limit notation, we write lim f(x) = 3.
x→1
x
Thus f(x) = is a function which differs from y = 1 solely in It is read as "the limit of f(x) as x approaches 1 is 3."
x
that it is not defined for x = 0.
x
We have lim
x→0
= 1, since x/x is equal to 1 so long as x differs
x
from zero, however small the difference may be.
On the other hand there is of course nothing to prevent the
limit of f(x) as x tends to zero from being equal to f(0), the
value of f(x) for x = 0.
Thus if f(x) = x, then f(0) = 0 and lim
x →0
f ( x ) = 0.
Note: That the statement lim f ( x ) =  is a statement

x →0
about the values of f(x) when x has any value distinct from but
Limits 1.3
x 2 − 3x + 2 x3 − 1 ( x 2 + x + 1)( x − 1) x2 + x + 1
Example 1: Evaluate lim = = .
x→2 x−2 x2 −1 ( x + 1)( x − 1) x +1
Solution: Consider the function f defined by So the behaviour of (x3–1)/(x2–1) for x near 1, but not equal to
x 2 3x 2 x2 + x + 1
f(x) = ,x≠2 1, is the same as the behaviour of .
x +1
x2
The domain of f is the set of all real numbers except 2, which x3 − 1 x2 + x + 1 .
lim = lim
has been excluded because substitution of x = 2 in the expression x →1 x 2 −1 x →1 x +1
0
for f(x) yields the undefined term .
0 Now, as x approaches 1, x2 + x + 1 approaches 3 and x + 1
On the other hand, x 2 – 3x + 2 = (x – 1) (x – 2) and
( x − 1)( x − 2) x2 + x + 1 3
f(x) = = x – 1, provided x ≠ 2
approaches 2. Thus, lim = , from which it
x−2
x →1 x +1 2
....(1) x3 − 1 3
The graph of the function y = x – 1 is a straight line L; so the follows that lim = .
x →1 x 2 − 1 2
graph of f(x) is the line L with a hole at the point (2, 1).
We can also express this as follows:
x3 − 1 3
As x → 1, 2 → .
x −1 2
Example 3: Find the limit of the function
x + 1 , x < 0
f (x) =  as x→ 0.
2 − x , x ≥ 0
Solution: Using the graph of y = f(x), we see that the
function approaches 1 as x approaches 0 from the left of 0. Also
the function approaches 2 as x approaches 0 from the right of 0.
Although the function f is not defined at x = 2, we know its

behaviour from values of x near 2. The graph makes it clear
that if x is close to 2, then f(x) is close to 1. In fact, the values of
f(x) can be brought arbitrarily close to 1 by taking x sufficiently
close to 2.
x 2 − 3x + 2
We express this fact by writing lim = 1, which
x→2 x−2
Since the function does not approach the same level from both
x 2 3x 2
means that the limit of is 1 as x approaches 2. sides of x = 0, lim f ( x ) does not exist.
x2 x →0
x3 −1
Example 2: Let f(x) = 2
x −1
. How does f(x) behave
Formal Definition of Limit
when x is near 1 but is not 1 itself ? The conceptual problems in trying to give an exact meaning
Solution: There are two influences acting on the fraction to the expression lim f(x) = b revolve around phrases such as
x →a
(x3 – 1)/(x2 – 1) when x is near 1. On the one hand, the numerator “arbitrarily close,” “sufficiently near,” and “arbitrarily small.”
x3 –1 approaches 0; thus there is an influence pushing the After all, there is a no such thing in any absolute sense as a small
fraction towards 0. On the other hand the denominator x2 –1 positive real number. The number 0.000001 is small in most
also approaches 0; division by a small number tends to make a contexts, but in comparison with 0.000000000001 it is huge.
fraction large. How do these two opposing influences balance However, we can assert that one number is smaller than another.
out?
Moreover, the actual closeness of one number x to another number
We rewrite the quotient (x3 – 1)/(x2 – 1) as follows: When x ≠ 1, a is just the distance between them : it is |x – a|. One way to say that
we have a function f takes on values arbitrarily close to a number  is to
1.4 Differential Calculus for JEE Main and AdvancedTelegram @unacademyplusdiscounts
state that, for any small positive real number ε, there are numbers In Figure 2 the vertical band shown is not narrow enough
x such that | f(x) –  | < ε. We are stating that no matter what to meet the challenge of the horizontal band shown. But the
positive number ε is selected, 10–7, or 10–17, or 10–127, there are vertical band shown in Figure 3 is sufficiently narrow.
numbers x so that the distance between f(x) and  is smaller
than ε.
ε − δ definition
Let f be a function defined on an open interval containing a
except possibly at a and let  be a real number. The statement
lim f(x) =  means that for each ε > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such
x →a
that if 0 < |x – a| < δ, then |f(x) – | < ε.
The inequality 0 < |x – a | that appears in the definition is just
a fancy way of saying “x is not a.” The inequality |x – a | < δ
asserts that x is within a distance δ of a. The two inequalities Figure 1
may be combined as the single statement 0 < |x – a| < δ,
which describes the open interval (a–δ, a + δ) from which a
is deleted.
Here we wish to say that f(x) is arbitrarily close to  whenever x
is sufficiently close, but not equal to a. What does “sufficiently
close” mean? “ The answer is this : If an arbitrary ε > 0 is
chosen with which to measure the distance between f(x) and ,
then it must be the case that there is a number δ > 0 such that
whenever x is in the domain of f and within a distance δ of
a, but not equal to a then the distance between f(x) and  is
less than ε. Figure 2
This is illustrated on the graph of the function y = f(x) as shown
in the figure. Since from the inequality |x – a| < δ there follows
the inequality |f(x) – l| < ε, this means that for all points x that
are not more distant from the point a than δ, the points M of
the graph of the function y = f(x) lie within a band of width 2ε
bounded by the lines y = –ε and y =  + ε.
Figure 3
Example 4: Prove that lim (3x + 1) = 7.

x→2
Solution: Let an arbitrary ε > 0 be given. For the
inequality |(3x + 1) – 7| < ε to be fulfilled it is necessary to
have the following inequalities fulfilled :
First ε > 0 is chosen arbitrarily. There must then exist a number ε ε ε
|3x – 6| < ε, |x – 2| < , – <x–2<
δ > 0 such that whenever x lies in the interval (a – δ, a + δ), 3 3 3
and x ≠ a then the point (x, f(x)) lies in the shaded rectangle. Thus, given any ε, for all values of x satisfying the
In other words, ε is the challenge. The response is δ. Usually, ε
inequality |x – 2| < = δ, the value of the function 3x + 1 will
the smaller ε is, the smaller δ will have to be. The geometric 3
significance of the definition is shown in the Figure 1. The differ from 7 by less than ε. And this means that 7 is the limit
narrow horizontal band of width 2ε is again the challenge. of the function as x → 2.
The response is a sufficiently narrow vertical band, of width
Example 5: Examine the limit of the function
2δ, such that the part of the graph within that vertical band
(except perhaps at x = a) also lies in the challenging horizontal x2 −1
y= as x tends to 1.
band of width 2ε. x −1
Limits 1.5
Solution: The function is defined for every value of x Example 6: Consider the function
x2 −1
other than 1 and y = = x + 1, when x≠1.  x 2 + 1,
 x≥0
x −1 g(x) =  lim g(x) ≠ 1.
. Prove that x→0
Firstly consider the behaviour of the values of y for values of 
 − ( x 2
+ 1), x < 0
x greater than 1. Clearly, y is greater than 2 when x is greater
Solution To do this, we must establish the negation of
than 1.
the limit condition. There is an ε > 0 such that, for any δ > 0,
If, x, while remaining greater than 1 takes up values whose there is a number x in the domain of a g such that 0 < |x| < δ
difference from 1 constantly diminishes, then y, while and |g(x) – 1| ≥ ε. There are many possible choices for ε. To be
remaining greater than 2, takes up values whose difference 1
from 2 constantly diminishes also. specific, take ε = . We must now show that for every positive
2
In fact, difference between y and 2 can be made as small as we number δ, there is a nonzero number x in the open interval
like by taking x sufficiently near 1. (–δ, δ), such that the distance between g(x) and 1 is greater
1 δ
For instance, consider the number .001. Then than or equal to . See figure. Take x = – . This number is
2 2
|y – 2| = y – 2 = x + 1 – 2 < .001 ⇔ x < 1.001.
nonzero, lies in (–δ, δ), and furthermore
Thus, for every value of x which is greater than 1 and less than
1.001, the absolute value of the difference between y and 2 is
 δ δ2
g(x) = g  −  = – – 1 < – 1.
less than the number .001 which we had arbitrarily selected.  2 4
Instead of the particular number .001, we now consider any 1
Hence |g(x) – 1| > 2 ≥ .
small positive number ε. Then 2
y – 2 = x – 1 < ε ⇔ x < 1 + ε.
Thus, there exists an interval (1, 1 + ε), such that the value of
y, for any value of x in this interval, differs from 2 numerically,
by a number which is smaller than the positive number ε,
selected arbitrarily.
Thus, the limit of y as x approaches 1 from the right is 2 and
we have lim y = 2.
x→1+
We now consider the behaviour of the values of y for values of
x less than 1. When x is less than 1, y is less than 2.
If, x, while remaining less than 1, takes up values whose
difference from 1 constantly diminishes, then y, while
remaining less than 2, takes up values whose difference from
2 constantly diminishes also. Notice in the definition that the hypothesis 0 < | x – a | simply
Let now, ε be any arbitrarily assigned positive number, however means x ≠ a. This condition releases the point of approach
small. We then have, a from the responsibility of having any image at all; and
even if there is an image f(a) the condition | f(a) –  | < ∈
|y – 2| = 2 – y = 2 – (x + 1) = 1 – x < ε is allowed to fail. Briefly, the idea of limit discounts what
so that for every value of x less than 1 but > 1 – ε, the happens precisely at a, but is vitally concerned with images of
absolute value of the difference between y and 2 is less than the "neighbours" of a.
the number ε. There is no practical need of applying ∈−δ definition
Thus, the limit of y, as x approaches 1, from the left is 2 and everywhere since it involves lengthy and complicated
lim y = 2.
we write x→ calculations. We shall later on derive some simple rules for
1 −
finding limits.
Combining the conclusions arrived at in the last two cases, we
see that corresponding to any arbitrarily assigned positive Example 7: Let the function f be defined as follows:
number ε, there exists an interval (1 – ε, 1 + ε) around 1, such  1
f   = 1 for every nonzero integer n,
that for every value of x in this interval, other than 1 where  n
the function is not defined, y differs from 2 numerically by a f(x) = x for every other real number x. Prove that
number which is less than ε, i.e., we have | y – 2 | < ε for lim f(x) does not exist.
any x, other than 1, such that |x – 1| < ε. x→0
1.6 Differential Calculus for JEE Main and Advanced
Solution: The graph of f is the line y = x, with the There can, therefore, exist no number which differs from sin
exception that when x = 1/n, n a nonzero integer, y = 1. It is 1/x by a number less than an arbitrarily assigned positive
shown in the figure. number for values of x near 0. Hence lim (sin 1/x) does
x→0
Since f(0) = 0 and f(x) is close to 0 when x is close to 0, x ≠ not exist.
 2 1
1/n, we might suspect that lim f(x) = 0.  x sin , x ≠ 0
x→0 Example 9: f(x) =  x as x→ 0.

1 , x=0
Solution: The function oscillates between the graphs
of y = –x2 and y = x2. As x approaches closer and closer to
zero from either side, the two functions approach 0, and hence
f(x) → 0 as x→ 0.
Example 10: Find the limit of the function
x , x ∈Q
f (x) =  as x→ 2 and x→ 4.
 4 − x , x ∉Q
Solution: We draw the rough sketch of y = f(x).
However, this is not correct. For if we take the neighbourhood

N = (–1/2, 1/2) of 0, there is no deleted neighbourhood D = (-δ, 0)
∪ (0, δ) of 0 such that f(x) is in N for every x in D.
We can always find a positive integer n such that 1/n < δ and for
this number f(1/n) is not in N since f(1/n) = 1. In a similar way,
we can show that lim f(x) is not equal to any other number.
x→0 If x approaches 2 by taking rational values, then the function
Therefore, this limit does not exist. f(x) approaches 2 using y = x. And if x approaches 2 by taking
Example 8: Prove that lim (sin 1/x) does not exist. irrational values, then the function f(x) also approaches 2 using
x→0
y = 4 – x. Hence, the limit of f(x) as x→ 2 is 2.
Solution: The graph of y = sin 1/x is drawn below.
lim f ( x ) = 2
x →2
However, if x approaches 4 by taking rational values, then the

function f(x) approaches 4 using y = x. And if x approaches 4
by taking irrational values, then the function f(x) approaches 0
using y = 4 – x. Since the function does not approach the same
level, the limit lim f ( x ) does not exist.
x →4
There are many such interesting functions that have unusual
The function oscillates between –1 and 1 more and more limit behaviour. An often cited one is the Dirichlet function
rapidly as x approaches closer and closer to zero from either side.
0, if x is rational
If we take any interval containing 0, however small it may be, f(x) = 
then for an infinite number of points of this interval the function 1, if x is irrational.
assumes the values 1 and –1. This function has no limit at any real number.
Practice Problems A

1. For the function graphed here, find the following limits:
Limits 1.7
(i) lim f(x) (ii) lim f(x) x if x is rational

x→2 x→1 5. Let f(x) = 
2. For the function graphed here, find the following limits: − x if x is not rational
(a) Does limx→1 f(x) exist ?
(b) Does limx→ f(x) exist ?
(c) Does limx→0 f(x) exist ?
(d) For which numbers a does limx→af(x) exist?
 x 2 if x is an irrational number
6. Let f(x) =  .
1 if x is an rational number
(i) lim f(x) (ii) lim f(x) (iii) lim f(x)
x→−2 x→0 x→−1
Prove that f(x) has a limit at the points x = 1 and
3. If lim f(x) = 5 must f be defined at x = 1 ? x = –1 and does not have a limit at other points.
x→1
If it is, must f(1) = 5 ? Can we conclude anything about 7. Find lim cot −1 x 2 .
the values of f at x = 1 ? Explain. x→0
4. If f(1) = 5, must lim f(x) exist ? If it does, then must lim sin 2 x
x→1 x→1 8. Find lim .
x→0 cos x
f(x) = 5? Can we conclude anything about lim f(x)?
x→1 9. Find lim cos π/x.
x→0
the corresponding values yn of the function become arbitrarily

1.2 Concept of Infinity close to the number .
Suppose that n assumes successively the values 1, 2, 3,.... Then Let us consider a function of an integral argument. Usually
as n gets larger and larger and there is no limit to the extent such an argument is denoted by the letter n and the values of
of its increase. However, large a number we may think of, a the function by some other letter supplied with a subscript
time will come when n has become larger than this number. indicating the value of the integral argument. For instance, if
It is convenient to have a short phrase to express this unending y = f(n) is a function of the integral argument n we write yn =
growth of n and we shall say that n tends to infinity, or n → ∞, f(n). Given such a function, we say that the values
When we say that n ‘tends to ∞’ we mean simply that n is y1 = f(1), y2 = f(2), .... , yn = f(n), .....,
supposed to assume a series of values which increase beyond assumed by the function form a sequence.
all limit.
If there is a sequence y1, y2, y3, ...., this assigns, to every natural
There is no real number ‘infinity’. This implies that the equation
n = ∞ is meaningless. A number n cannot be equal to ∞, because number n, a value yn = f(n). For instance, the terms of the
‘equal to ∞’ means nothing. So far in fact the symbol ∞ means
1 1 1
nothing at all except in the one phrase ‘tends to ∞’, the meaning geometric progression , , .... are the subsequent values
2 4 8
of which we have explained above. Later on we shall learn how
1
to attach a meaning to other phrases involving the symbol ∞, of the function f(n) = .
but we bear in mind 2n
We now discuss the question ‘what properties has f(n) for
(i) that ∞, by itself means nothing, although phrases
sufficiently large values of n ?’ i.e. ‘how does f(n) behaves as
containing it sometimes mean something,
n tends to ∞ ?’
(ii) that in every case in which a phrase containing the symbol
It may occur that, as n increases, the values yn = f(n) become
∞ means something it will do so simply because we have
arbitrarily close to a number . Then we say that the number  is
previously attached a meaning to this particular phrase by
the limit of the function f(n) of the integral argument n or that the
means of a special definition.
sequence y1, y2, .... , yn, .... has the limit , as n → ∞, and write
Limit of a Sequence lim f (n )  or lim y n 
n n
Definition A number  is said to be the limit of the function
y = f(n) of the integral argument n or the limit of the sequence Consider the function 1/n for large values of n. Instead of
y1, y2, ...., yn, if for all sufficiently large integral values of n saying ‘1/n is small for large values of n’ we say ‘1/n tends
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of the other members of our social whole. To realise your own ends,
you have to take note of the partly coincident, partly conflicting, ends
of your social fellows, precisely as you have to take note of your
own. You cannot come to the knowledge of the one without coming
by the same route and in the same degree to the knowledge of the
other. Precisely because our lives and purposes are not self-
contained, self-explaining wholes, we cannot possibly know our own
meaning except in so far as we know the meaning of our immediate
fellows. Self-knowledge, apart from the knowledge of myself as a
being with aims and purposes conditioned by those of like beings in
social relations with myself, is an empty and senseless word.
The recent psychological studies of the part which imitation plays
in all learning make this result still more palpably manifest. For they
reveal the fact that, to an enormous extent, it is by first repeating
without conscious aim of its own the significant purposive acts of
others that a child first comes to behave with conscious significance
itself. It is largely by learning what others mean when they utter a
word or execute a movement that the child comes to know his own
meaning in using the same word or performing the same movement.
Thus we may confidently say that the reality of purposive significant
experience which is not my own is as directly certain as the reality of
my own experience, and that the knowledge of both realities is
inevitably gained together in the process of coming to clear insight
into my own practical aims and interests. The inner experience of my
fellows is indubitably real to the same degree as my own, because
the very existence of my own purposive life is meaningless apart
from the equal existence of theirs.[122]
§ 4. We may now apply the results obtained in the previous
section to the general question as to the “independent” existence of
the physical order. In doing so we observe two consequences of the
highest importance. (1) Now that we have found that at least a part
of that order, namely, the bodies of our fellow-men, are not mere
complexes of presentations in our own experience, but have a
further existence as themselves experiencing subjects, and are so
far “independent” of their actual presentation in our own experience,
we can no longer conclude, from the dependence of the physical
order for its sensible properties upon presentation to ourselves, that
it has no further existence of its own. If one part of that order, which
as presented stands on the same footing with the rest, and is, like it,
dependent on presentation for its sensible properties, is certainly
known to be more than a mere presentation-complex, the same may
at least be true of other parts. We can no longer assert of any part of
the physical order, without special proof, that its esse is merely
percipi.
We may go a step further. Not only may other parts of the physical
order possess a reality beyond the mere fact of being presented to
our sense-perception, but they must. For (a) we have to take note,
for the obtaining of our own practical ends, of the factors in our
material environment precisely as we have to take note of the
purposive behaviour not our own which forms our social
environment. Just as our own inner life has no coherent significance
except as part of a wider whole of purposive human life, so human
society as a system of significant conduct directed to the attainment
of ends, cannot be understood without reference to its non-human
surroundings and conditions. To understand my own experience,
reference must be made to the aims, ideals, beliefs, etc. of the social
whole in which I am a member; and to understand these, reference
has again to be made to geographical, climatic, economical, and
other conditions. Thus of the physical order at large, no less than of
that special part of it which consists of the bodies of my fellows, it is
true to say that its existence means a great deal more than the fact
of its presentation. Unperceived physical existence must be real if I
am myself real, because my own inner life is unintelligible without
reference to it.
(b) This conclusion is further strengthened by the evidence
supplied by the various sciences, that human life forms part of a
great system characterised by evolution or development. If one part
of a connected historical development is more than a complex of
presentations, the other stages of that development cannot possibly
be mere presentation-complexes. Against any “Idealism” which is
mere Subjectivism or Presentationism calling itself by a less
suspicious name, it would be a sound and fair argument to contend
that it reduces evolution to a dream, and must therefore be false.[123]
It cannot, then, be true of the physical order as a whole, that it has
no reality beyond the fact of its presentation to my senses. Elements
in it not so presented must yet have reality, inasmuch as my own
inner life requires the recognition of their reality as a fundamental
condition of the realisation of my own “subjective” ends. As the facts
of hallucination, “suggestion,” and subjective sensation show, what
appears to us as an element in the physical order may sometimes
have no reality beyond the fact of its appearance; there may be
presented contents of which it would be true to say that their esse is
percipi. But the very possibility of distinguishing such hallucinatory
presentations from others as illusory, is enough to prove that this
cannot be true of the whole physical order. It is precisely because
physical existence in general is something more than a collective
hallucination, that we are able in Psychology to recognise the
occurrence of such hallucinations. As has been already observed,
you are never justified in dismissing an apparent fact of the physical
order as mere presentation without any further reality behind it,
unless you can produce special grounds for making this inference
based upon the circumstances of the special case.
(2) The second important consequence of our previous conclusion
is this,—We have now seen what was really meant, in the crucial
case of our fellow-men, by maintaining an existence “independent” of
the fact of presentation to our sense-organs. Their “independent”
existence meant existence as centres of experience, as feeling,
purposive beings. The whole concept of “independent” existence
was thus social in its origin. We have also seen that the grounds on
which an “independent” existence must be ascribed to the rest of the
physical order are essentially of the same kind as those on which we
asserted the “independent” existence of our fellow-men. It appears
patent, then, that “independent” existence must have the same
general sense in both cases. It can and must mean the existence of
centres of sentient purposive experience. If we are serious in holding
that the esse of the physical order, like that of ourselves and our
fellows, is not mere percipi, we must hold that it is percipere or
sentire. What appears to us in sense-perception as physical nature
must be a community, or a complex of communities of sentient
experiencing beings: behind the appearance the reality[124] must be
of the same general type as that which we, for the same reasons,
assert to be behind the appearances we call the bodies of our
fellows.
This conclusion is not in the least invalidated by our own inability
to say what in particular are the special types of sentient experience
which correspond to that part of the physical order which lies outside
the narrow circle of our own immediate human and animal
congeners. Our failure to detect specific forms of sentience and
purpose in what we commonly call “inorganic” nature, need mean no
more than that we are here dealing with types of experience too
remote from our own for detection. The apparent deadness and
purposelessness of so much of nature may easily be illustrated by
comparison with the apparent senselessness of a composition in a
language of which we are personally ignorant. Much of nature
presumably appears lifeless and purposeless to us for the same
reason that the speech of a foreigner seems senseless jargon to a
rustic who knows no language but his own.
It would be easy, but superfluous, to develop these ideas more in
detail by the free use of imaginative conjecture. The one point of vital
principle involved is that on which we have already insisted, that
existence “independent” of sense-perception has only one intelligible
meaning. Hence it must have this same meaning whenever we are
compelled to ascribe to any part of the perceived physical order a
reality which goes beyond the mere fact of its being perceived. The
assertion that the physical order, though dependent for its perceived
qualities upon the presence of a percipient with sense-organs of a
particular type, is not dependent on any such relation for its
existence, if it is to have any definite meaning at all, must mean for
us that that order is phenomenal of, or is the appearance to our
special human sense-organs of, a system or complex of systems of
beings possessing the same general kind of sentient purposive
experience as ourselves, though conceivably infinitely various in the
degree of clearness with which they are aware of their own
subjective aims and interests, and in the special nature of those
interests.
§ 5. We may end this chapter by drawing certain conclusions
which follow naturally from the acceptance of this doctrine. (1) It is
clear that the result we have reached by analysis of what is implied
in the “independent” existence of the physical order agrees with our
previous conclusions as to the general structure of Reality. For we
saw in our last Book that it seemed necessary to hold not only that
Reality as a whole forms a single individual experience, but also that
it is composed of members or elements which are themselves
sentient experiences of varying degrees of individuality. And in our
discussion of the unity of the thing we saw reason to hold that
nothing but a sentient experience can be individual; thus we had
already convinced ourselves that if there are things which are more
than complexes of presentations arbitrarily thrown together for the
convenience of human percipients in dealing with them as unities,
those things must be sentient experiences on subjects of some kind.
We have now inferred from the actual consideration of the physical
order that it does, in point of fact, consist of things of this kind. Our
result may thus be said to amount in principle to the logical
application to physical existence of the previously ascertained
conclusion, that only what is to some degree truly individual can be
real.
It is interesting to contrast with this consequence of our
metaphysical attempt to interpret the course of physical nature, the
result which inevitably follows from consistent adherence to the
procedure of descriptive science. The whole procedure of descriptive
science depends upon our willingness to shelve, for certain
purposes, the problem wherein consists the reality of the physical
order, and to concentrate our interest upon the task of adequately
and with the greatest possible economy of hypothesis describing the
system of presented contents in which it reveals itself to our senses.
For purely descriptive purposes, our sole interest in the physical
order is to know according to what laws of sequence one presented
content follows upon another. Hence, so long as we can establish
such laws of connection between presented contents, it is for purely
scientific purposes indifferent how we imagine the Reality in which
the sequence of presentation has its ground. Whether we think of it
as a system of finite subjects, the will of a personal Deity, a complex
of primary qualities, or an unknown substratum, or whether we
decline to raise any question whatever about the matter, the results
are the same, so long as our sole object is to exhibit the sequence of
presented sense-contents as regulated by laws which admit of
calculation. Science can go its way in entire indifference to all these
alternative metaphysical interpretations of the Reality which is
behind the phenomenal order.
The logical consequence of this absorption in the problem of
describing the phenomenal sequence of events, apart from inquiry
into their ground, is that the more thoroughly the task is carried out
the more completely does individuality disappear from the physical
order as scientifically described. Everyday thought looks on the
physical order as composed of interacting things, each of which is a
unique individual; current science, with its insistence on the uniform
behaviour of the different elements of the material world, inevitably
dissolves this appearance of individuality. In the more familiar atomic
theories, though the differences between the behaviour of the atoms
of different elements are still retained as ultimate, the atoms of the
same element are commonly thought of as exact replicas of each
other, devoid of all individual uniqueness of behaviour. And in the
attempts of contemporary science to get behind atomism, and to
reduce all material existence to motions in a homogeneous medium,
we see a still more radical consequence of the exclusive adoption of
an attitude of description. Individuality has here disappeared entirely,
except in so far as the origination of differential motion in a perfectly
homogeneous medium remains an ultimate inexplicability which has
to be accepted as a fact, but cannot be reconciled with the
theoretical assumptions which have led to the insistence upon the
homogeneity of the supposed medium.
The logical reason for this progressive elimination of individuality
from scientific descriptions of the processes of the physical order
should now be manifest. If all individuality is that of individual
subjects of experience, it is clear that in disregarding the question of
the metaphysical ground of the physical order we have already in
principle excluded all that gives it individuality from our purview; the
more rigorously logical our procedure in dealing exclusively with the
phenomenal contents of the physical order, the less room is left for
any recognition of an element of individuality within it. Our purpose to
describe the phenomenal logically involves description in purely
general terms. It is only when, in Metaphysics, we seek to convert
description of the phenomenal into interpretation of it as the
appearance to sense of a more ultimate Reality, that the principle of
the individuality of all real existence can come once more to its
rights.
(2) It is perhaps necessary at this point to repeat, with special
reference to the interpretation of the physical order, what has already
been said of all interpretation of the detail of existence by reference
to its ground. We must be careful not to assume that lines of division
which we find it convenient for practical or scientific purposes to
draw between things, correspond to the more vital distinctions
between the different individual subjects of experience which we
have seen reason to regard as the more real existences of which the
physical order is phenomenal. This is, e.g., an error which is
committed by confident theories of the animation of matter which
attribute a “soul” to each chemical atom. We must remember that
many of the divisions between things which we adopt in our
descriptive science may be merely subjective demarcations,
convenient for our own special purposes but possibly not answering
to any more fundamental distinctions founded on the nature of the
realities of the physical order themselves. It does not in the least
follow from our view of nature as the manifestation to our senses of a
system of sentient individuals, that the relations between those
individuals are adequately represented by the relations between the
different factors of the material world as it is constructed in our
various scientific hypotheses.
Thus, e.g., our own self-knowledge and knowledge of our fellows
show that in some sense there is a single experience corresponding
to what, for physical science, is the enormous complex of elements
forming the dominant centres of the human nervous system. But
apart from our direct insight into human experience, if we only knew
the human nervous system as we know a part of inorganic nature,
we should be quite unable to determine that this particular complex
was thus connected with an individual experience. In general we
have to admit that, except for that small portion of physical nature in
which we can directly read purposive experience of a type specially
akin to our own, we are quite unable to say with any confidence how
nature is organised, and what portions of it are “organic” to an
individual experience. This caution must be constantly borne in mind
if we are to avoid the abuse of our general theory of the meaning of
the physical order in the interests of “spiritualistic” and other
superstitions. It may also serve to guard against over-hasty
“Philosophies of Nature,” like those of Schelling and Hegel, which
start with the unproved assumption that approximation to the human
external form of organisation is a trustworthy indication of the degree
in which intelligent experience is present in physical nature.
(3) One more point may receive passing notice. It is clear that if
physical nature is really a society or a number of societies[125] of
experiencing subjects, we must admit that, from the special
character of our human experience with its peculiar interests and
purposes, we are normally debarred from social communion with any
members of the system except those who are most akin in their
special type of purposive life to ourselves. Of the vast majority of the
constituents of the physical order it must always be true that, while
we may be convinced, on grounds of general metaphysical theory,
that they possess the character we have ascribed to them, we have
no means of verifying this conclusion in specific cases by the actual
direct recognition of the individual life to which they belong, and
consequent establishment of actual social relations with them. Yet it
does not follow that we are always absolutely debarred from such
direct social relations with extra-human sentient life. The “threshold
of intercommunicability” between physical nature and human
intelligence may conceivably be liable to fluctuations under
conditions at present almost entirely unknown. Conceivably the type
of experience represented in literature by the great poets to whom
the sentient purposive character of physical nature has appealed
with the force of a direct revelation of truth, and known in some
degree to most men in certain moods, may depend upon a
psychological lowering of this threshold. It is thus at least a
possibility that the poet’s “communion with nature” may be more than
a metaphor, and may represent some degree of a social relation as
real as our more normal relations with our human fellows and the
higher animals. It may be true that in the relations of man with
nature, as in his relations with man, it is the identity of purpose and
interest we call love which is the great remover of barriers.
(4) It should hardly be needful to point out that such a view of the
meaning of nature as has been defended in this chapter is in no way
opposed to, or designed to set artificial restrictions on, the unfettered
development of descriptive physical science. Whatever our view of
the ultimate nature of the physical order, it is equally necessary on
any theory for the practical control of natural processes in the service
of man to formulate laws of connection between these processes.
And the work of formulating those laws can only be satisfactorily
done when the analysis of the physical order as a system of sense-
contents is carried on with complete disregard of all metaphysical
problems as to its non-phenomenal ground. It would not even be
correct to say that, if our metaphysical interpretation is valid, the view
of nature presented in descriptive physical science is untrue. For a
proposition is never untrue simply because it is not the whole truth,
but only when, not being the whole truth, it is mistakenly taken to be
so. If we sometimes speak in Philosophy as though whatever is less
than the whole truth must be untrue, that is because we mean it is
untrue for our special purposes as metaphysicians, whose business
is not to stop short of the whole truth. For purposes of another kind it
may be not only true, but the truth.[126]
Our metaphysical interpretation of the physical order is no more
incompatible with full belief in the value and validity for their own
purposes of the results of abstract descriptive science, than the
recognition of the singleness and purposiveness of a human
experience with the equal recognition of the value of physiological
and anatomical investigation into the functions and mechanism of
the human body. Of course a man, as he really exists, is something
quite different from the physiologist’s or anatomist’s object of study.
No man is a mere walking specimen of the “human organism”; every
man is really first and foremost a purposive sentient agent. But this
consideration in no way affects the practical value of anatomical and
physiological research into the structure of the man as he appears in
another man’s system of sense-presentations. What is true in this
case is, of course, equally applicable in all others.
We have yet to discuss the most serious stumbling-block in the
way of the idealist interpretation of nature, the apparent conformity of
its processes to rigid laws of sequence, which at first sight might
seem to exclude the possibility of their being really the acts of
purposive subjects. This difficulty will form the topic of our
succeeding chapter.
Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chap. 22;

L. T. Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, pt. 3, chap. 3; H. Lotze,
Metaphysic, bk. ii. chaps. 5, 6; H. Münsterberg, Grundzüge der
Psychologie, i. pp. 65-92; K. Pearson, Grammar of Science, chap. 2
(The Facts of Science), 8 (Matter) [mainly written from the
“phenomenalist” standpoint, but with unconscious lapses into a more
materialistic view]; J. Royce, Nature, Consciousness, and Self-
Consciousness” (in Studies of Good and Evil); The World and the
Individual, Second Series, Lect. 4; J. Ward, Naturalism and
Agnosticism, Lects. 1-5, 14, 19. Of the older philosophical literature,
Descartes, Meditation 6; Leibnitz, Monadology and New System;
Locke, Essays, bk. iv. chap. 11; Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism,” in the
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, in addition to the
already cited works of Berkeley will probably be found most
important.
119. This definition of the physical order approximates very closely

to that adopted by Prof. Münsterberg in his Grundzüge der
Psychologie, vol. i. pp. 65-77. Prof. Münsterberg defines a physical
fact as one which is directly accessible to the perception of a plurality
of sentient individuals, as opposed to the psychical fact which can be
directly experienced only by one individual. It must be remembered,
of course, that my body as directly experienced in “common
sensation” and “emotional mood” belongs to the psychical order. It is
only my body as perceptible by other men that is a member of the
physical order.
120. Cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chap. 22, pp. 260-267
(1st ed.). The attempts which have been made to exempt “primary”
qualities from this relativity do not seem to demand serious criticism.
The argument in the text applies as directly to extension and shape
as to colour or smell. It is not defensible to contend, as Mr.
Hobhouse does, that qualities, whether primary or secondary,
depend on the percipient organ only for their perception, not for their
existence. The contention rests upon taking two aspects of
experience which are always given together, the that and the what of
a sense-content, and arguing that because these two aspects of a
single whole can be distinguished, therefore the one can exist in
actual separation from the other. It would be quite as logical to infer
by the same method and from the same premisses that there can be
a perceptive state without any content, as that the contents can exist
as we know them, apart from the state.
121. See particularly the detailed statement of his contention and
the elaborate examination of objections in the Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous, which form a commentary on the
briefer exposition of Principles of Human Knowledge, §§ 1-134.
122. See the fuller exposition of this line of argument in Royce,
Studies in Good and Evil, essay on “Nature, Consciousness and
Self-Consciousness,” to which I am largely indebted throughout the
present chapter, and for a detailed criticism of the alleged
“analogical” inference the closely related reasoning of my own essay
on “Mind and Nature” in International Journal of Ethics, October
1902. The similar but briefer criticism in Royce, The World and the
Individual, Second Series, lecture 4, “Physical and Social Reality,” p.
170, I had not had the opportunity to study when the above was
written. For the whole subject of imitation, see in particular Professor
Baldwin’s Mental Development in the Child and the Race.
123. For a study of the significance of the “partial independence”
of the physical world on my will as a factor in producing belief in its
“external reality,” see Stout, Manual of Psychology,3 bk. iii. pt. 2,
chaps. 1-2, “The Perception of External Reality.”
124. The doctrine of degrees of reality must be borne in mind
throughout this discussion. The reality of which the physical order is
phenomenal may itself be phenomenal of a higher reality.
125. Societies would be the more natural supposition. We have no
reason to deny that the various types of non-human intelligence may
be cut off from social intercourse with each other, as they are from
intercourse with ourselves.
126. That is, there are degrees of truth as well as of reality, and
the two do not necessarily coincide. The degree of truth a doctrine
contains cannot be determined apart from consideration of the
purpose it is meant to fulfil. For the special purposes of Metaphysics,
the purpose of thinking of the world in a finally consistent way,
whatever is not the whole truth is untrue. But what the metaphysician
regards as the lesser truth may be the higher truth relatively to other
purposes than his own. Compare the doctrine of Dr. Stout’s essay on
“Error” in Personal Idealism.
CHAPTER III
THE MEANING OF LAW

§ 1. The popular conception of the physical order as exhibiting a rigid mechanical
conformity to general laws, conflicts with our metaphysical interpretation. § 2.
Our interpretation would, however, admit of the establishment of averages or
approximately realised uniformities by the statistical method, which deals with
occurrence en bloc to the neglect of their individual detail. § 3. “Uniformity” in
nature is neither an axiom nor an empirically verifiable fact, but a postulate. A
consideration of the methods actually employed for the establishment of such
uniformities or “laws” of nature shows that we have no guarantee that actual
concrete cases exhibit exact conformity to law. § 4. Uniformity is a postulate
arising from our need of practical rules for the control of nature. It need not for
this purpose be exact, and in point of fact our scientific formulae are only
exact so long as they remain abstract and hypothetical. They do not enable us
to determine the actual course of an individual process with certainty. § 5. The
concept of the physical order as mechanical is the abstract expression of the
postulate, and is therefore essential to the empirical sciences which deal with
the physical order. § 6. Consideration of the character of genuine machines
suggests that the mechanical only exists as a subordinate aspect of
processes which, in their full nature, are intelligent and purposive.
§ 1. In our view of the underlying reality of the physical order, as

explained in the last chapter, we have scarcely gone further, except
in the explicitness of our phraseology, than we should be followed by
many who profess a complete disbelief in metaphysical construction
and an exclusive devotion to positive natural science. From the side
of positive science we have often been reminded that no hard-and-
fast line can logically be drawn between the organic and the
inorganic, that we are not entitled to assume that the continuity of
evolution ceases when we are no longer able to follow it with our
microscopes, that we are, with the eye of scientific faith, to discern in
the meanest particle of matter the “promise and potency” of all life,
and so forth. All which statements seem to be confused ways of
suggesting some such conception of the physical order as we have
attempted to put into more precise and logical form. It is not until we
come to deal with the problem indicated by the title of this chapter
that our most serious difficulties begin. We have to face the
objections which may be urged against our view of the physical order
on the strength of the principle known in inductive Logic as the
“Uniformity of Nature.”
The events of the physical order, it may be urged, cannot be
expressions of the more or less conscious purposes and interests of
individual centres of experience, and that for a simple reason. How a
purposive agent will behave is always a mystery, except to those
who actually understand his purposes. It is impossible, apart from
actual insight into those purposes, to infer from the mere
examination of his past behaviour what his behaviour in the future
will be. For the special characteristic of purposive action is its power
to find new ways of response to stimulus. Hence it is that we rightly
regard the power to learn by experience, that is, to acquire more and
more appropriate reactions to stimulus, as the test of a creature’s
intelligence. Where there is no progressive adaptability there is no
ground to assume intelligence and purpose. Hence again the
impossibility of calculating beforehand with any certainty what course
the behaviour of an intelligent being will take, unless you are actually
aware of the purposes he is seeking to realise.
Now, except in the case of the organic world, it may be urged, we
do not find progressive adaptability in Nature. The inorganic
constituents of the physical order always react with absolute
uniformity in the same way upon the same environment. Their
behaviour exhibits absolutely undeviating conformity to general
routine laws of sequence, and can therefore be calculated
beforehand, provided that the resources of our mathematics are
adequate to deal with the problems it presents, with absolute
exactitude and certainty. That this routine uniformity exists in
physical nature is, in fact, a fundamental principle in the logic of
inductive science. Every indication of sentience and purpose is thus
absent from physical nature, outside the world of living organisms; it
is a realm of rigid conformity to laws of sequence. And these
sequences, because absolutely without exception and incapable of
modification, are purely mechanical, i.e. non-purposive and non-
intelligent. Nature is, in fact, a complicated mechanism, in which
every event follows from its conditions with undeviating necessity.
Views of this kind are often supposed to be logically necessitated
by the principles of physical science. It is manifest that if they are
sound our whole preceding interpretation of the physical order is
invalidated. For this reason, as well as because of the far-reaching
consequences often drawn from them as to human freedom and
moral responsibility, it will be necessary to examine their foundation
in some detail.
§ 2. The main problems confronting us in this examination will then
be—(1) How far is calculable uniformity of sequence really
incompatible with the presence of purpose and intelligence? (2)
Have we any real ground for ascribing such uniformity to the actual
sequences of physical nature? (3) if not, What is the real logical
character of the principle of the so-called uniformity of nature? (4)
and What amount of truth is contained in the conception of the
physical order as a mechanism? Into the problem suggested by the
popular contrast between the necessity of mechanical sequence and
the freedom of purposive action, it will be needless to enter at any
length. For, as we saw in dealing with the popular view of necessary
causal relation, the necessity of a mechanical sequence is a purely
subjective and logical one. The sequence is necessary only in the
sense that we are constrained, so long as we adhere to the purpose
of thinking logically, to affirm the consequent when we affirm the
antecedent. True necessity is always compulsion, and therefore, so
far from being opposed to purposive action, can only exist where an
actual purpose is overruled or thwarted.[127] So long as we are
dealing solely with phenomenal sequence in the physical order,
necessity is a mere anthropomorphic name for routine undeviating
uniformity of sequence.
(1) Calculable Uniformity and Intelligent Purpose. It is sometimes
assumed that all successful prediction of a thing’s behaviour is
incompatible with the ascription of intelligence or purpose to the
thing. Thus it has been argued, and continues to be argued in moral
philosophy of a popular type, that if we are intelligent beings with
purposes of our own, it must always be impossible for an onlooker to
predict how we shall behave in circumstances which have not yet
arisen. This extreme view of the incompatibility of calculability with
intelligent purpose, however, manifestly rests on a double confusion.
To begin with, those who assert this view commonly make the
mistake of supposing that prediction of the future stands somehow
on a different logical level from calculation of the past from present
data. Prediction of my future behaviour is supposed somehow to
conflict with my character as a purposive being in a way in which
inference as to my past behaviour does not. This is, of course, an
elementary fallacy in Logic. The conditions required for the
successful inference of the absent from the present are identical in
the two cases, as we have already seen in dealing with the problems
of Causality. Precisely the same kind of insight is requisite to judge
how a given man must have behaved in a certain situation in his past
history as are needed to determine how he will behave in a situation
which is yet to arise. We may thus dismiss from consideration the
special case of prediction, and confine ourselves to the general
question, how far the general calculability of the course of a process
is incompatible with its purposive and intelligent character.
An answer to this question is at once suggested by reflection upon
our ordinary attitude towards such attempts to calculate the course
of our own behaviour.[128] It is by no means every such calculation
that we resent. So far from being affronted by the assumption that
our conduct exhibits sufficient uniformity to admit of calculation, we
expect our personal friends to have sufficient reliance on its
uniformity to assume with confidence that we shall certainly do some
things and refuse to do others, that we must have acted in certain
ways and cannot have acted in others. “You ought to know me better
than to suppose me capable of that” is between friends a tolerably
keen expression of reproach, “I know I can count on you to do it,” a
common expression of confidence. On the other hand, we should
certainly resent the assumption on the part of a comparative stranger
of such a knowledge of our character as would warrant confident
calculation of our conduct, and if the calculation was avowedly drawn
not from personal knowledge at all, but from general propositions of
Psychology or Anthropology, we should pretty certainly feel that a
more than accidental success threatened our moral individuality.
Now, what is the explanation of this difference of feeling?
Manifestly it must be sought in the great difference between the
grounds on which the calculation is based in the two cases. In the
first case we expected and welcomed the calculation, because we
felt it to be founded upon our friend’s personal acquaintance with the
guiding interests and purposes of our life; it was an inference based
upon insight into our individual character. In the other case we
resented the success of the calculation, because we assumed it to
be made in the absence of any such personal insight into our
individual purposes and interests, on the basis of mere general
propositions about human nature. We rightly feel that the regular
success of calculation of this second sort is inconsistent with the
ascription of any reality to our individual character. If all our actions
can be calculated from general theorems in a science of human
nature, without taking individual purpose into account, then the
apparent efficacy of individual interests and purposes in determining
the course of our history must be an empty illusion; we cannot be
truly intelligent agents, seeing that we never really do anything at all.
Thus we see that it seems necessary to draw a marked distinction
between two types of calculability. Calculation based on insight into
individual character and purpose is so far from being inconsistent
with purposiveness and intelligence, that the more coherent and
systematic the purposes by which a life is controlled, the more
confident does such calculation become. Calculation without such
special knowledge, and based upon mere general propositions, on
the other hand, cannot be regularly successful where one has to
deal with the behaviour of individual purposive beings.[129]
Now, the difficulty as to our interpretation of the physical order as
the presentation to our sense of a system of intelligent purposive
beings, is that the successes of physical science seem at first sight
to show that just this “mechanical” calculation of the course of events
from observed sequence, without insight into underlying individual
purpose, is possible when we are dealing with physical nature. For,
on the one hand, we ourselves admitted that if physical nature is
permeated by individual purposes, we do not know what those
purposes in detail are; and, on the other, it is undeniable that
physical science, which systematically disregards their presence,
has been signally successful in the past, and may be expected to be
even more successful in the future, in detecting uniformities in
physical nature, and so submitting it to exact calculation. Hence it
might be thought that the actual success of the empirical sciences
cannot be reconciled with the principles of our metaphysical
interpretation of the course of nature.
We must, however, draw a very important distinction. There is one
method by which uniformities of a certain kind can be detected in the
behaviour of purposive intelligent beings, without insight into the
nature of their individual purposes—the method of statistical
averages. Thus, though it would be quite impossible to say with
certainty of any individual man that he will shoot himself or will get
married, except on the strength of insight into his individual character
and interests, we find by experience that it is possible to say, within a
certain narrow range of error, what percentage of Englishmen will
shoot themselves or will get married in the year. The percentage is,
of course, rarely or never precisely realised in any one year, but the
longer the period of years we take for examination, the more exactly
do the deviations from the average in individual years compensate
one another. The explanation is, of course, that on the whole the
incentives to marriage or suicide, in a reasonably stable state of
society, remain constant from year to year, so that by taking an
average of several years we can eliminate results which are due to
individual peculiarities of temperament and situation, and obtain
something like a measure of the degree in which the general
conditions of social existence impose a certain common trend or
character on the interests and purposes of individuals.
Two things are at once noticeable in connection with all
uniformities obtained by the method of averages. One is that the
result formulated in the statistical law is always one to which the
actual course of events may reasonably be expected to conform
within certain limits of deviation, never one to which we have a right
to expect absolute conformity. Not only is the actual number of
marriages, e.g., in any one year, usually slightly above or below the
average percentage computed, e.g., for a ten years’ period, but as
we compare one longer period with others, the average percentage
for the longer period itself fluctuates. It is only in the “long run,” that
is, in the impossible case of the actual completion of an interminable
series, that the computed average would be exactly realised. As
every one who has to deal with averages in any form knows, precise
realisation of the computed average within a finite series of cases
would at once awaken suspicions of an error somewhere in our
calculations. Thus the uniformities of this kind are never absolutely
rigid; they are ideal limits to which the actual course of events is
found to approximate within certain limits of divergence.
The second point is that the existence of such a uniformity never
affords logical ground for confident affirmation as to the actual event
in a particular concrete case. To revert to our illustration, just as we
have no right to infer from the approximately constant percentage of
marriages per year in a given society, that this precise percentage
will be realised in any one special year, so we have still less right to
infer that a particular member of that society will or will not marry.
Nothing but insight into the character, situation, and interests of this
special member of society can give me the right to judge with
confidence how he will actually behave. Similarly, it is possible to say
within certain limits of error how many persons over sixty years of
age may be expected to die in the next twelve months, but it would
be the height of logical presumption to infer that a particular man will
die during the year, except on the strength of special information
about his pursuits, habits, and general state of health.[130] Thus our
general conclusion must be, that calculation and the establishment
of uniformities is possible, without insight into individual purpose, but
that the uniformities thus obtained are always variable and
approximate, and afford no safe ground for inference as to special
concrete cases.
§ 3. (2) Uniformity in Physical Nature. The existence of
ascertainable uniformities in physical nature, then, will not conflict
with our general interpretation of the physical order, provided that
these uniformities are of the type just illustrated by reference to
ordinary social statistics. On the other hand, the exact and rigid
conformity of the actual course of concrete events with such uniform
general “laws,” would certainly be inconsistent with the presence of
teleological adaptation to ends. A reign of rigid routine conformity to
general law cannot co-exist with individual purposive life. Now, it is
commonly assumed, and we shall shortly see that the assumption is
both necessary and justified as a practical methodological postulate,
that the “reign of law” in physical nature is absolute. But are there
any grounds for recognising this assumption as more than a possibly
unrealised postulate made for human practical purposes? I think it is
easy to show that there are none whatever, and that the conception
of a nature devoid of purpose and sentience, and swayed absolutely
by mechanical “laws,” is simply a metaphysical nightmare of our own
invention.
To begin with, it is clear that the undeviating conformity of the
actual course of any concrete process to scientific “law” cannot be
verified as an empirical fact by observation or experiment. For in no
observation or experiment can we ever deal with the whole of any
concrete actual event or process. We have always, for the purposes
of our observation, to select certain of the general aspects of the
process, to which we attend as the “relevant factors” or “conditions”
of the result, while we disregard other aspects as “immaterial” or
“accidental” circumstances. And this artificial abstraction, as we saw
in discussing Causality, though indispensable for our practical
purposes, is logically indefensible. Again, within the aspects selected
for attention, all that experiment can establish is that the deviation
from uniform law, if there is any deviation, is not sufficiently great to
affect our measurements and calculations. But how far our standards
of measurement are from rigid precision may be readily learned from
the chapter on physical standards in any good work on the logic of
the inductive sciences.[131] Our failure to detect deviation from law is
absolutely worthless as evidence that no deviation has taken place.
Thus, if the absolute uniformity of natural processes is more than a
practical postulate, it must be an axiom, that is, it must be implied in
the very notion of those processes as elements in a systematic
whole. But it should at once be clear that we have no more ground
for asserting such uniformity as an axiom, than we had for treating
the causal postulate as axiomatic. It is by no means implied in the
concept of a systematic whole that its parts shall be connected by
uniform law. For the unity of the system may be teleological, that is,
the parts may be connected by the fact that they work together to
realise the same end, to execute the same function. In that case the
behaviour of any one part will depend on the demands laid upon it by
the plan which the working of the system fulfils. As these demands
vary from time to time, the behaviour of the part under consideration

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CHAPTER 1 LIMITS 1.1 – 1.178

CHAPTER 2 CONTINUITY OF FUNCTIONS 2.1 – 2.98

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4.3 Derivative of Standard Functions 4.3

CHAPTER 6 MONOTONICITY 6.1 – 6.100

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7.20 Deductions of Rolle’s Theorem 7.95

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We denote neighbourhoods by N(a), N1(a), N2(a), etc.

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(the abbreviation "lim" means "limit")

Note: That the statement lim f ( x ) =  is a statement

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Although the function f is not defined at x = 2, we know its

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Example 4: Prove that lim (3x + 1) = 7.

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However, this is not correct. For if we take the neighbourhood

However, if x approaches 4 by taking rational values, then the

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(i) lim f(x) (ii) lim f(x) x if x is rational

the corresponding values yn of the function become arbitrarily

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Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chap. 22;

119. This definition of the physical order approximates very closely

THE MEANING OF LAW

§ 1. In our view of the underlying reality of the physical order, as

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