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S VOL. I I
Facets of India’s Economy and Her Society
Volume II
‘Professor Raghbendra Jha is the right scholar and economist to take readers through the
development of the Indian economy. Readers will be in good hands.’
—Edmund Phelps, Columbia University, USA,
winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Economics
‘This two-volume study on India’s economy and society by Professor Raghbendra Jha
skilfully combines high quality analytical scholarship, and nuanced exposition of empiri-
cal evidence to bear on India’s development policies and challenges. As linking of econ-
omy and society is increasingly recognised as essential for addressing policy challenges
by the current phase of globalisation, this study should be valuable not just for those
studying India, but also for those interested in global developments.’
—Mukul Asher, National University of Singapore, Singapore
‘Over the years, I have benefited from reading the works of Professor Raghbendra Jha,
and from teaching from them. I enthusiastically recommend these two volumes to you.’
—Raaj Kumar Sah, University of Chicago, USA
‘It is perhaps the best and most scholarly contribution to understanding the Indian econ-
omy and society. Its rich historical perspective and a profound understanding of how India
has evolved into a major economic power set standards of scholarship and analytical rigour
that will be hard to surpass.’
—Raghav Gaiha, University of Manchester, UK
‘India is critical for the world. Knowing India is vital. This book is a tour-de-force review
of the fundamental topics on the Indian political economy and society that are relevant
for any committed social scientist to be aware of. Raghbendra Jha is one of the lead-
ing contemporary India scholars globally, and he has conscientiously put together the
materials in a careful and structured way that will find substantial and immediate user
acceptance worldwide.’
—Sumit K. Majumdar, University of Texas at Dallas, USA
Raghbendra Jha
Facets of India’s
Economy and Her
Society Volume II
Current State and Future Prospects
Raghbendra Jha
Arndt-Corden Department of Economics
Australian National University
Acton, Australia
These two volumes cover aspects of Indian economy and society. They
take a long view of both and try to position them on a broad cultural and
historical canvas. These are the most important characteristics that distin-
guish this work from the vast amount of literature that exists on India.
India has a continuing cultural history spanning about 7000 years.
The whole country shares some key beliefs and practices that have sur-
vived internal challenges and encounters with hostile external civiliza-
tions over several millennia. In the process, a composite culture has also
grown, testifying to India’s ability to absorb and assimilate external ideas
and practices in a largely peaceful manner, even when those ideas and
practices are imposed in aggressive fashion.
Even since attaining Independence on August 15, 1947, and declaring
itself a democratic republic on January 26, 1950, India has faced a mul-
titude of problems of a scale and intensity that would test the most
mature of societies. These challenges included intense mass poverty and
hunger; poor literacy and lack of education in the population; the task of
uniting a country with scores of languages and ethnicities ruled by differ-
ent entities for decades; and the persistent threat of external aggression,
to name just a few. At a deeper level, India has had to regain its self-
confidence and rediscover its ancient cultural moorings in order to define
the kind of nation it wants to be in the future. Unlike India’s large and
vii
viii Preface
powerful neighbor to the north, the country chooses to address its chal-
lenges within a pluralistic democratic framework.
The present work is an attempt to give an account of how India has
been meeting these challenges and how things are expected to evolve in
the future. This is a hopelessly difficult task to accomplish in its entirety
within the confines of two volumes; therefore, I concentrate on key
aspects of India’s economy and society, hence the title of the book. These
volumes constitute a narrative—my narrative—on India’s economic and
social development, and do not profess to be complete or exhaustive.
They are meant to introduce the reader to the vast amount of literature
on this subject. That said, these volumes are written on a simple level,
which students (both graduate and undergraduate) of social sciences and
also the general reader can use to learn about India.
The selection of topics has been made with this in mind. This work has
been divided into two volumes. Volume I is entitled Facets of India’s
Economy and Her Society: Recent Economic and Social History and Political
Economy. Part I, of volume I is entitled “India’s Economy in Historical
and Spatial Perspective.” This presents a long view of the performance of
the Indian economy, and then discusses key aspects of India’s population,
land and labor. It then discusses human development in India. The
impact of Muslim rule is considered, after which the state of the Indian
economy under British rule is discussed. The shape of the Indian econ-
omy and society were deeply affected by India’s struggle for freedom, so
one chapter is devoted to providing an account of India’s struggle for
freedom.
Part II, called “Basic Structure of India’s Governance” contains two
chapters dealing with India’s political economy. The first deals with the
Indian Constitution and basic structure of governance whereas the sec-
ond provides a brief overview of major economic and political develop-
ments in independent India.
Volume II, entitled Facets of India’s Economy and Her Society: Current
State and Future Prospects, has three parts. Part I, “Principal Sectors of the
Indian Economy,” contains three chapters. These discuss, seriatim, the
performance and prospects for India’s agriculture, manufacturing and
services sectors.
Preface
ix
xiii
xiv Contents
Index 285
List of Tables
xvii
xviii List of Tables
Table 2.1 Annual average growth rates for major sectors and GDP (%) 38
Table 2.2 Annual GDP growth rates in manufacturing 40
Table 2.3 Manufacturing as a share of GDP and growth rates: India
and other select countries 42
Table 2.4 India’s manufacturing sector in comparative perspective for
201043
Table 2.5 Manufacturing GDP by sector and employment projections 45
Table 2.6 Number of central government enterprises and total invest-
ment therein 48
Table 2.7 Shares of states in total employment/output in the organized
manufacturing sector 51
Table 2.8 Employment across various sectors, employment elasticity,
CAGR, share of employment and GVA: 1999–2000,
2004–05, 2009–10 54
Table 3.1 Share of services sector in GDP and employment 64
Table 3.2 Decadal averages of values of constituents of services and
their shares in GVA (real magnitudes at 2004–05 prices) 65
Table 3.3 Share and growth of India’s services sector in recent years
(GVA at basic price) 67
Table 3.4 Recent employment performancet of the services sector 69
Table 3.5 India’s services-sector performance in cross-national
perspective74
Table 3.6 Evolution of components of the Knowledge Economy in
selected countries: 1995, 2000, 2012 78
Table 4.1 India: exports, imports, trade and current account balance
as share of GDP (%) 88
Table 4.2 Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products (%) India 92
Table 4.3 Effective tariff rates by sectors (most favored nations)
2010–11 and 2014–15 94
Table 4.4 Share of manufacturing in India’s merchandise exports and
imports (%) 95
Table 4.5 India’s share of high-technology items in manufacturing
exports (%) 96
Table 4.6 India’s NEER and REER, 36 country trade-based weights 97
Table 4.7 Trends in India’s integration with the international economy
(percentage of GDP) 98
Table 4.8 India: FII (real terms with 2010 as base, rupees crore) 103
Table 4.9 India: Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 103
List of Tables
xix
there was a drought in 1972–73 when foodgrain output fell sharply and
led to a drop in food procurement. An additional shock at that point was
the quadrupling of international oil prices, which led to a sharp increase
in the cost of production of fertilizers. Hence, fertilizer subsidies had to
rise sharply. This period was also marked by an extension of HYV seeds
to include rice, with considerable potential for spreading into the eastern
states. In the absence of irrigation networks, water for the new varieties of
rice seeds came from boring wells. Between 1972–73 and 1979–80 there
was a healthy growth of 3.1% per annum in the output of foodgrain and
a 2.5% growth in yield so that the fear in 1972–73 of food insecurity
reappearing receded. This was also a period showing a spectacular drop in
rural poverty from 56% to 50%, illustrating, once again, that in a coun-
try with mass poverty in the rural sector, enhanced agricultural growth
leads to greater poverty reduction.
The third phase of agricultural growth in India was from 1981 to 1990.
There was a consolidation of India’s self-sufficiency in foodgrain with rice
output at 63.8 million tonnes and wheat output at 47 million tonnes in
1986. The country was able to build up a buffer stock of 25.4 million
tonnes of grain so that there was no loss of life from starvation during the
particularly severe drought of 1987. HYV technology, particularly for
rice, spread eastwards toward West Bengal and Bihar. However, by 1985,
the possibility of increase in yield through HYV plateaued.
Throughout this period, international trade in agricultural products
was more or less forbidden and there were widespread controls on pric-
ing, movement and private trading of agricultural produce. The latter led
to the phenomenon of a lack of market integration in agricultural mar-
kets in India, which led to their isolation meaning that a local scarcity
could not send the right signal to other markets to help fill the gaps in
supply. A large volume of literature has grown up around this theme. For
instance, Jha et al. (2005) have shown that wholesale rice markets within
states tend to be integrated with each other, whereas markets across dif-
ferent states are not.
Another important characteristic of these three periods was that there
was rampant protectionism in industry. Hence, terms of trade were biased
against agriculture.
Introduction and the State of Indian Agriculture 7
Fan et al. (2008) consider the period 1991 to the present to be the
fourth phase of agricultural reforms. In 1991, major reforms were initi-
ated (vol. I Chap. 8). As part of these reforms the Indian economy was
opened up to the forces of globalization and the tariffs on imports were
reduced—a trend that has persisted. Landes and Gulati (2004) identify
two beneficial consequences of the off-farm sector reforms. First, higher
rates of growth induced by the reforms led to increased demand for agri-
cultural products, particularly food. Second, the lowering of tariffs meant
that the terms of trade between agriculture and industry, which had hith-
erto been biased against agriculture, were finally moving in favor of agri-
culture. This meant that agriculture could now trade with the rest of the
economy on more favorable terms. As a consequence, agricultural growth
went up. However, poverty reduction was not as significant as in the
1980s because this period also saw fiscal contraction, which had a delete-
rious effect on poverty reduction. Agricultural growth also slowed (Gulati
and Ganguly 2010).
If we examine figures for growth in yield over the 1980s, 1990s and
2000–13 we find that growth in rice yield was at its highest in the 1980s
as this was the period in which HYV technology spread to the eastern
part of the country where much rice is grown. This yield fell by more
than 50% in the 1990s and rose only marginally in the last period con-
sidered. The yield of wheat followed a similar pattern. The yields of coarse
cereals picked up only in the last period considered here. Yields for pulses
and oilseeds have been quite modest and rose above 2% only in the last
period. Total foodgrain yield growth was less than 2% in the first and last
periods being considered here. The yield of a cash crop such as cotton
grew in spectacular fashion in the first and, in particular, the last period.
This was probably in response to favorable demand conditions, particu-
larly in international markets.
Hence, since the 1980s, Indian agriculture has been experiencing
steady but unremarkable progress. However, it has not yet been able to
become a leading sector for sustained economic growth in India. As a
consequence, some long-term structural problems persist in Indian agri-
culture.1 These are discussed in Sect. 1.3. Section 1.4 discusses some
key reasons why these problems persist 70 years after Independence.
8 R. Jha
The first basic problem facing Indian agriculture is the low yield of its
agricultural land in comparison to that of other major country groups as
well as India’s own requirements for food. Since land is the scarce factor
in India and labor is the plentiful factor, it is the output per unit land
rather than per laborer that is crucial to ascertaining productivity.
As indicated in Table 1.1, the net sown area grew from 118.8 million
hectares in 1950–51 to a peak in 1990–91 and has since then stabilized
at about 140.0 million hectares.
The proportion of total land under forests has gone up quite substan-
tially and area under non-agricultural use has nearly tripled, signaling
rapid urbanization.
Cereal yield from cultivation of land has been rising and the average
yield for 2010–14 was three times that for 1961–69. Table 1.2 reports
average cereal yield (kilograms per hectare) in India compared to select
UN Classification country groups: least developed countries, low- and
middle-income countries—the group in which India currently sits—and
high-income countries for select time periods. India’s yield was very low
in the 1960s. It improved somewhat in the 1970s and increased more
sharply in the 1980s (in response to the adoption of Green Revolution
technologies). Average yield during the 1990s also shows a large increase,
whereas subsequent increases have been more moderate.
During the 1960s, India’s cereal yield was the lowest in its group. The
yield improved in the 1970s to overtake that of the least developed coun-
tries and stayed above those levels throughout. However, cereal yield per
hectare in other low and middle-income countries, has always been
higher than that in India. The yield in high-income countries was more
Table 1.1 All India land use (million hectares)
Land use classification 1950–51 1960–61 1970–71 1980–81 1990–91 2000–01 2004–05 2008–09* 2009–10*
Forests 40.5 54.1 63.9 67.5 67.8 69.8 70.0 70.0 70.0
Non-agricultural uses 9.4 14.8 16.5 19.7 21.1 23.8 24.8 26.1 26.2
Barren and uncultivable land 38.2 35.9 28.2 19.7 19.4 17.5 17.5 16.8 16.8
Permanent pastures and 6.7 14.0 13.3 12.0 11.4 10.7 10.5 10.2 10.2
other grazing land
Land under miscellaneous 19.8 4.5 4.3 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
tree, crops and groves
Cultivable wasteland 22.9 19.2 17.5 16.7 15.0 13.6 13.3 12.8 12.9
Fallow land 28.1 22.8 19.9 24.8 23.4 25.0 25.7 24.5 26.2
Net sown area 118.8 133.2 140.3 140.0 143.0 141.3 140.6 141.9 140.0
Source: Compiled from Compendium of Environment Statistics India, 2011, Central Statistical Office (CSO), Ministry of
Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India; Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2012, Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India, and other sources
Notes: *Provisional; net sown area represents the total area sown with crops and orchards, with the area sown more
than once in the same year counted only once; barren and uncultivable land includes all land covered by mountains
and deserts, which cannot be cultivated except at exorbitant cost; cultivable wasteland includes land available for
cultivation, but not cultivated for the last five or more years
Introduction and the State of Indian Agriculture
9
10 R. Jha
Table 1.2 Average yield of cereals: India and select country groups (kilograms/
hectare)
1961–69 1970–80 1981–90 1991–99 2000–09 2010–14
India 959.89 1212.65 1621.81 2137.21 2431.41 2898.32
Least developed 1085.35 1176.55 1342.41 1390.05 1696.75 2010.55
countries
Low and middle 1270.31 1662.82 2205.32 2457.16 2813.89 3289.89
countries
High income 2518.63 3166.03 3771.86 4353.12 4912.11 5424.13
countries
Source: Author’s computation based on data from World Development
Indicators 2017, World Bank
than twice that of India until 2000–09. During 2010–14 this was just
less than double that of India.
From the national accounts and census figures we know that agricul-
ture’s share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than 15%, whereas
more than 60% of the population rely on agriculture and allied activities
for their livelihood. As long as this excessive dependence of the popula-
tion on the agricultural sector persists, significant improvements to India’s
poverty and deprivation problems cannot be had. This needs to be done
through a combination of movement of labor out of agriculture and an
increase in agricultural yield.
It should be noted, however, that there are wide variations in the share
of agriculture in Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) across various
states of India. According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2016), in
2015–16 agriculture’s share in Arunachal Pradesh’s GDP is more than
30%, whereas it ranges between 20 and 29% in Andhra Pradesh, Assam,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur,
Nagaland, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tripura and Uttar Pradesh; between 15
and 19% in Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and
Meghalaya; and less than 15% in Goa, Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra,
Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Tamil Nadu, Mizoram, Odisha, Telangana and
West Bengal. Thus, the low share of agriculture in aggregate GDP is
largely because of latter group of states. For 2012–13 the yields (kilo-
grams per hectare) for rice for select various states were: West Bengal
(2755), Uttar Pradesh (2459), Punjab (3989), Andhra Pradesh (3126),
Introduction and the State of Indian Agriculture 11
Table 1.3 Growth of yield of foodgrain (kilograms/hectare) per cent per year
Total Total
Rice Wheat Coarse cereals Pulses foodgrain
Year (%) (%) cereals (%) (%) (%) (%)
1950s 4.30 2.08 3.01 3.27 1.45 2.89
1960s 1.91 5.25 1.30 2.33 2.60 2.41
1970s 0.73 2.02 1.68 1.62 −2.57 1.18
1980s 5.45 4.17 4.01 4.74 4.02 4.62
1990s 1.36 2.87 2.03 2.38 1.82 2.43
2000s to 1.79 0.09 4.74 1.64 0.59 1.32
2007–08
1950–51 to 2.59 2.85 2.72 2.69 1.34 2.51
2007–08*
Source: Author’s computation based on data from Handbook of Statistics on the
Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India
Note: *To 2007–08
12
R. Jha
Table 1.4 Growth of yield of non-foodgrain (kilograms/hectare) per cent per year
Oilseeds
Rapeseed Cotton Jute &
Groundnut and mustard Soyabean Total Sugarcane Tea Coffee (Lint) Mesta Tobacco
(%) (%) (%) # (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1950s −0.06 0.72 0.23 1.26 0.28 0.34 0.30
1960s 1.39 5.81 1.96 3.62 4.82 1.77 0.94
1970s 3.35 0.48 7.95 0.77 0.19 2.40 4.21 3.99 0.71 3.34
1980s 3.60 8.17 5.44 4.72 3.03 1.40 4.92 5.86 4.04 2.75
1990s −0.29 2.96 4.68 1.77 0.85 0.32 7.12 −0.53 1.16 −0.73
2000s 16.64 1.61 2.91 5.47 −0.49 −0.35 −2.55 11.27 1.72 2.47
1950–51 3.74 3.40 5.30 2.42 1.48 0.97 3.73 4.11 1.64 1.48
to
2007–08
Source: Author’s computation based on data from Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India
Introduction and the State of Indian Agriculture 13
Table 1.5 Production of foodgrain and other major crops (million tonnes, unless
otherwise stated)
2014–15
(advanced
2004–05 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 estimates)
Rice 83.1 96.0 105.3 105.2 106.7 104.8
Wheat 68.6 96.0 105.3 105.2 106.7 104.8
Coarse cereals 33.5 43.4 42.0 40.0 43.3 41.8
Total cereals 185.2 226.3 242.2 238.8 245.8 235.5
Pulses 13.1 18.2 17.1 18.3 19.3 17.2
Foodgrain 198.4 244.5 259.3 257.1 265.0 252.7
Oilseeds 243.5 324.8 298.0 309.4 327.5 266.8
(100,000
tonnes)
Sugarcane 2370.9 3423.8 3610.4 3412.0 3532.4 3593.3
(100,000
tonnes)
Jute and mesta 102.7 106.2 114.0 109.3 116.9 114.5
(10,000 bales
of
180 kilograms
each)
Source: Author’s compilation with data from the Ministry of Agriculture (2016)
total foodgrain has grown at only 2.51% per annum. Since the 1980s the
growth in yield of key foodgrain like rice and wheat and even total cereals
dropped considerably.2
In contrast, as Table 1.4 shows, the growth in the yields of non-
foodgrain, particularly groundnut, rapeseed and soyabean has been high.
Sugarcane growth has been sluggish and coffee and cotton have recorded
impressive yield growth. Table 1.5 indicates levels of production of
foodgrain and other major crops since the turn of the century, whereas
Table 1.6 presents the corresponding long-term picture for a broad range
of agricultural products.
Although foodgrain production has increased over time, its per capita
availability has not increased at the same rate. According to the Ministry
of Agriculture, per capita daily availability of foodgrain was 444 g in
2009, falling to 437.1 g in 2010 (because of drought), rising to 453.6 g
in 2011, falling to 450.3 g in 2012 and rising on the back of a good har-
vest to 510.3 g in 2013.3
14 R. Jha
Thus, India’s agricultural performance has been less than robust. Food
availability in the country has gone up but that, of course, does not mean
that high nutritional standards have been achieved for the people.
Over the 60 years from 1950–51 to 2010–11 agricultural production
in India has recorded growth across a wide range of outputs. Foodgrain
output increased fivefold, milk showed more than a sevenfold increase,
fish increased by more than tenfold, and eggs showed a more than 30-fold
increase. In the 20 years between 1990–91 and 2010–11 the production
of fruit and vegetables has nearly tripled. All this growth has outstripped
population growth, which has more than tripled over the 60-year period.
Hence, assuming that distribution channels are working efficiently, the
availability of agricultural output has improved over time.
However, sustained growth, even at these rates, is contingent on a
number of policy measures—in particular rapid technological progress in
parts of eastern India. East and central India need to have their own fully
fledged Green Revolution. The existence and aggravation of the problem
of subsistence farming discussed below, is an impediment to progress.
workers) from agricultural workers who are not cultivators. Table 1.10
makes this distinction explicit. The total number of workers in the agri-
cultural sector is classified into two main categories as a percentage of the
total labor force: cultivators and agricultural (landless) laborers.
Over the period 1961–2011 the proportion of the population who are
agricultural workers declined, essentially because the proportion of culti-
vators has fallen. The proportion of agricultural laborers has risen from
19.56% in 1961 to 30.00% in 2011.
Against this background it stands to reason that there would be wide-
spread poverty and under-nutrition in rural India. We illustrate this point in
Table 1.11, which provides an overview of the poverty and nutritional pro-
files of small farmers (those owning less than 2 hectares each) for some
Indian states and the country as a whole. The figures are based on household
Table 1.11 Poverty and nutritional profile of small farmers in India in 1993–94 and 2004–05
18
small farmers households in percentage of rural small farmers households in percentage of rural
State/all India in 1993–94 1993–94 households in in 2004–05 2004–05 households in
(column 1) (column 2) (column 3) 1993–94 (column 4) (column 5) (column 6) 2004–05 (column 7)
Andhra 89.27 91.07 91.05 90.48 91.88 90.95
Pradesh
Arunachal 86.20 94.06 87.57 78.17 77.17 82.73
Pradesh
Assam 79.83 84.95 81.75 77.59 90.53 80.83
Bihar 87.42 90.08 90.68 91.34 97.65 93.54
Jharkhand 87.92 90.83 89.13
Goa 97.70 100.00 98.99 97.34 100.00 95.56
Gujarat 87.02 86.60 88.19 87.72 92.94 89.61
Haryana 87.31 88.82 93.61 89.11 98.04 94.84
Himachal 84.32 89.48 89.24 90.30 94.74 93.08
Pradesh
Jammu and 74.76 70.46 89.58 87.17 91.07 91.61
Kashmir
Karnataka 83.68 82.42 87.68 85.57 87.12 86.52
Kerala 95.35 98.57 97.07 96.07 98.94 97.67
Madhya 79.93 81.18 85.87 79.47 81.96 81.07
Pradesh
Chattisgarh 82.83 83.97 85.72
Maharashtra 83.82 85.07 85.92 84.64 87.33 86.57
Manipur 81.44 74.17 85.96 84.97 69.30 84.93
Meghalaya 80.78 81.66 81.20 81.91 75.35 82.02
Mizoram 66.14 74.41 67.91 81.64 90.27 82.39
(continued)
Table 1.11 (continued)
Percentage of Small farmers Percentage Small farmers
rural as a Small and calorie- of rural as a Small and calorie-
households percentage of deficient farming households percentage of deficient farming
who were rural poor house-holds as a who were rural poor households as a
small farmers households in percentage of rural small farmers households in percentage of rural
State/all India in 1993–94 1993–94 households in in 2004–05 2004–05 households in
(column 1) (column 2) (column 3) 1993–94 (column 4) (column 5) (column 6) 2004–05 (column 7)
Nagaland 49.41 100.0 65.47 74.50 84.76 79.24
Orissa 85.75 87.47 90.13 86.92 87.85
Punjab 89.17 98.53 95.85 92.63 98.93 96.61
Rajasthan 81.27 80.23 89.59 82.64 85.59 86.83
Sikkim 81.38 88.38 81.51 94.99 100.00 94.10
Tamilnadu 92.78 95.05 93.33 93.98 95.52 93.55
Tripura 88.23 94.81 88.15 95.00 98.31 94.79
Uttar Pradesh 84.96 87.91 90.61 87.66 93.31 91.04
Uttaranachal 94.46 96.96 96.90
West Bengal 92.39 96.74 95.99 94.34 97.66 95.19
Andaman and 91.55 100.00 90.80
Nicobar
Islands
Chandigarh 97.38 100.00 99.07
Dadar and 87.06 87.40 83.34 84.07 84.88 73.30
Nagar Haveli
Daman and 95.31 100.00 94.13 96.86 94.68
Diu
Delhi 98.14 100.00 100.00 98.93 100.00 100.00
Introduction and the State of Indian Agriculture
Source: Author’s calculations are based on NSS data for 50th round (1993–94) and 61st round (2004–05) for rural India
20 R. Jha
data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) for the 50th and 61st rounds
for 1993–94 and 2004–05 respectively.
A very large proportion of households belong to the category of small
farmers (column 7). For the country as a whole, the proportion was
86.52% in 1993–94 (column 2), which rose to 88.19% in 2004–05 (col-
umn 5). In many states this was near and even above 90% in both time
periods. What is important to note is that the proportion of poor small
farming households as a proportion of the total number of rural house-
holds was even higher (88.54% for 1993–94 as shown in column 3 and
91.42% in 2004–05 as shown in column 6) than the share of small farm-
ing households in the total number of rural households.5
Furthermore, this proportion has increased between 1993–94 and
2004–05. Similarly, small farming households constituted a higher pro-
portion of nutritionally deficient rural households (90.23% in 1993–94
as shown in column 4 and 90.05% in 2004–05 as shown in column 7)
than the proportion of small farming households in the total rural popu-
lation in 1993–94 and 2004–05. Once again this proportion has increased
between 1993–94 and 2004–05. In the case of the incidence of poverty
as well as that of undernutrition there are some regional differences, but
the broad conclusions remain the same.
Thus, there is a social and economic crisis of sorts brewing in India’s
agricultural sector. Cereal yields are below those of many countries and
are not growing particularly rapidly and agricultural landholdings are
getting increasingly fragmented (and being rendered unviable) with large
numbers of farmers holding less than 1 hectare of land, with many com-
ing from the weaker sections of society (SC and ST households).6
₹ 2.75 paise for every kilowatt hour consumed. The subsidized electricity
led to excessive use of groundwater for irrigation, which contributed to a
substantial drop in the water table in some parts of the country. Irrigation
subsidies grew at 20% in the 1960s, 10% in the 1970s, 5% in the 1980s
and 1% in the 1990s. The most important point to take away from
Table 1.13 is that current subsidies have been rising steadily (although
they are well below World Trade Organization (WTO) mandated levels
and the levels in Europe and other developed countries). Combining this
with the information in Table 1.13 it is clear that there is greater emphasis
on short-term increases in revenue/output as opposed to long-term gains.
These are two important reasons why Indian agriculture is facing a con-
tinuing crisis despite registering substantial progress.
There is, therefore, a need to rationalize current subsidies and acceler-
ate investment in agriculture. These steps, together with faster develop-
ment of HYV seed suited to eastern parts of the country will lead to a
new Green Revolution in these areas. This will increase yields, raise pro-
ductivity and farmer profits. The current government has as one of its
24 R. Jha
states. More than anything else, this is dues to a lack of access to credit
rather than a lesser need to borrow on the part of small farmers.
Government of India (2007, 2009) and Mehrotra (2011) indicate strong
regional inequalities in credit offtake. The share of credit disbursed in the
eastern region of the country was much lower than its share in gross
cropped area, whereas the southern region with a good banking system
had a much larger share of credit and this was spread over a much larger
number of bank branches/borrowers. Credit disbursal also has a strong
seasonal component with much of the lending concentrated in March,
with some in January and February. Since this does not coincide with the
planting season it would appear that these disbursals had little to do with
the timing of actual agricultural operations and more to do with lending
out funds before the end of the financial year, March 31st.
Mohan and Ray (2017) show the overwhelming dependence of the
Indian farmer on non-institutional credit, although this dependence has
reduced over time. They show that in 2002, for which farmer debt figures
are reported in Table 1.14, only 57.1% of the credit in the rural sector
came from institutions. Cooperative societies and commercial banks
were the major contributors and it is highly likely that farmers with large
landholdings were the major beneficiaries. So far as non-institutional
sources of credit are concerned, professional moneylenders were the
major source of credit. Most of the small farmers accessing credit would
have approached these moneylenders.
Over time, however, as Mohan and Ray (2017) indicate, there has
been an improvement in the composition of credit toward institutional
sources. In 1951 a staggering 92.8% of rural credit came from non-
institutional sources, but this had climbed down to 36% in 1991,
although it picked up again marginally in 2002, falling slightly in 2012.
This structure of rural credit has had its share of problems. For one,
small farmers have often had great difficulty in paying off their debts. As
a result, several farmers, particularly those facing long periods of drought,
experience serious problems with indebtedness. Indeed large numbers of
them have committed suicide in the face of such debt. These farmer sui-
cides are a serious policy as well as a human-welfare challenge. Press
reports indicate that there were 8000 such suicides in 2015, a particularly
bad year because of widespread drought.8 As already noted, small farmers
Introduction and the State of Indian Agriculture 27
Rose had been a few weeks at the Fifields, long enough to learn
the family ways, so that Miss Fifield felt she could leave home for a
long-planned visit. It was a stormy day, and Mrs. Patience suddenly
exclaimed, “I wonder who can be coming this way in such a hurry?
Why, I believe—yes, it is Rose, running as fast as she can. I hope
Eudora is not sick.”
Almost as she spoke the door opened and Rose rushed in, snow-
powdered and breathless; her hat blown partly off, her face wet with
tears as well as snow flakes, and her voice broken and thick with
sobs, as without giving time for any questions she burst out:
“You said it was a leading of Providence for me to go to the
Fifields’. But it wasn’t; and he says he will have me put in jail if I don’t
tell where the money is. And how can I tell when I don’t know?
Maybe God cares for some folks, but I’m sure He doesn’t for me or I
wouldn’t have so much trouble. I wish I was dead, I do!” and flinging
herself down on the well-worn lounge she buried her face in the
pillow and burst into a storm of sobs.
What did it all mean? They were equally perplexed by the mystery
and distressed by Rose’s evident grief. Mrs. Patience drew off her
things and tried to calm her with soothing words; Miss Silence
brought the camphor bottle—her remedy for all ills. But Rose only
cried the harder till Mrs. Blossom kindly, but with the authority that
comes of a calm and self-controlled nature, said, “Rose, you must
stop crying, and tell us what is the trouble.”
Then choking back her sobs Rose lifted her tear-swollen face and
exclaimed, “Oh, Mrs. Blossom, Mr. Fifield says I have taken a
hundred dollars! A hundred dollars in gold! And I don’t know one
thing more about it than you do, but he won’t believe me, and he
calls me a thief, and everybody will think I am awful, when I want to
be good, and was trying so hard to do my best. What shall I do?” and
she wrung her hands with a gesture of utter despair.
Further questioning at last brought a connected story, from which it
appeared that Nathan Fifield had a hundred dollars in gold, that from
some whim he had put for safe keeping in the parlor stove. That
morning, going around the house to tie up a loose vine, he had
glanced through the parlor window and seen Rose at the stove with
the door open. And when, his suspicion aroused, he had looked for
the money it had been to find it gone, and at once had accused Rose
of the theft.
“And he says I showed guilt when I saw him,” Rose wailed, “and I
did start, for I was frightened to see a face looking in at the window,
and with the snow on the glass I didn’t know at first who it was.”
“But what were you in the parlor, and at the stove for?” questioned
Mrs. Blossom.
“I was dusting the front hall and the parlor. Miss Fifield sweeps the
parlor once a month and I dust it every week, though I don’t see the
need, for those are all the times anybody ever goes into it. Some
feathers came out of the duster, it’s old and does shed feathers, and
I had opened the stove door to throw them in. I didn’t know there
was ever any money in a little leather bag in there; I never dreamed
of such a thing. And if I had I shouldn’t have touched it. Madam
Sharpe always trusted me with her purse, and I never took a penny
from her. I’m not a thief, if he does say that I am. But they won’t
believe me. Miss Eudora is just as certain, and I shall have to go to
jail, for I can’t tell where the money is.”
“Poor child!” and Grandmother Sweet stroked the head that had
gone down in Mrs. Patience’s lap. “It is borne on my mind,” and she
glanced around the little group, “that Rose is wholly innocent, and
that mindful of her youth and inexperience it were well for some of us
to see Neighbor Fifield if an explanation of the mystery cannot be
found.
“No,” with a wave of her hand, as both of her granddaughters
made a motion to rise, “Silence, thee is apt to be hasty and might
say more than was seemly; and Patience, thee inclines to be timid,
and might not say as much as was needful. Thy mother is the one to
go; she has both prudence and courage.”
“Oh, how good you are to me!” Rose exclaimed. “And never so
good as now! I thought you would believe me, I just felt it would kill
me if you didn’t, and now that I know you do I won’t be afraid of
anything.”
Mrs. Blossom was already wrapping herself in her cloak. “Come,
Rose, put on your things; the sooner this is sifted the better,” and
Rose, as many another had done before her, felt a new comfort and
strength in Mrs. Blossom’s strength.
They found Mr. Fifield and his sister hardly less excited than Rose.
“You cannot regret, Mrs. Blossom, any more than I do, this most
distressing occurrence,” and Mr. Nathan rubbed his flushed bald
head with his red silk handkerchief. “I would rather have given the
money twice over than have had it happen. But I must say that it is
no more than I expected when my sisters persisted, against my
judgment, in bringing into the house a girl of whose ancestors they
knew nothing, and who most likely is the child of some of the foreign
paupers who are flooding our shores. I’m sorry, though not surprised,
that it has ended as it has.”
Mr. Nathan was really troubled and sorry, as he said, but he could
not help a spark of self-satisfaction that he had been proven in the
right and his sisters in the wrong. As for Miss Eudora, keenly
mortified at the turn matters had taken, her former friendliness to
Rose only increased her present indignation.
“It’s not only the loss of the money,” she exclaimed, “but the
ingratitude of it, after all our kindness to her, and I gave her my pink
muffler; she never could have done what she has if she had not
been really hardened.”
“But what proof have you that she took the money?” asked Mrs.
Blossom. “As you say she is a stranger to us all, a friendless,
homeless orphan, whose condition is a claim to our charity as well
as our generosity.”
“Proof,” echoed Mr. Nathan. “Pretty plain proof I should call it, and
I’ve served three terms as Justice of the Peace. Last Saturday the
money was safe in its place of concealment. This morning I
surprised her there and her confusion on discovery was almost
evidence enough of itself. When I look for the package it is gone,
and during this time not a soul outside the immediate family has
been in the house. I regret the fact, but every circumstance points to
her as the guilty one.”
“For all that,” Mrs. Blossom’s voice was calmly even, “I believe
there is some mistake. At the Refuge they told Patience they had
always found her truthful and honest, and while she was with us we
never saw anything to make us doubt that she was perfectly trusty. I
did not even know of her meddling with what she ought not to.”
“Oh, she’s a sly one,” and Mr. Nathan rubbed his head harder than
before. “She has taken us all in—and that includes myself, and
inclines me still more to the belief that this is not her first offence;
and also to the opinion that she should be promptly dealt with.”
“At the same time I hope,” urged Mrs. Blossom, “that you will do
nothing hastily. Imprisonment is a terrible thing for a young girl like
Rose, and might blast her whole life. Time makes many things clear,
and it is always better to err on the side of mercy than of justice.”
“Certainly, certainly. And I do not know,” lowering his voice so it
might not reach Rose, “that I should really send her to jail; but the
law—” and he waved his hand with his most magisterial air, “the law
must be a terror to evil-doers. If not, what is law good for? We might
as well not have any, and my social as well as my official position
demands that I enforce it.”
“And she deserves to be well punished, if ever any one did.” Miss
Eudora gave an indignant shake to her curls as she spoke. “And I
was just thinking of giving her the blue cashmere I had when I went
to Albany. Jane is always complaining of what she calls my ‘shilly-
shally’ ways, and finding fault with my lack of decision, and I feel that
at whatever cost to myself I must be firm in this. Though nobody
knows what a shock it has been to my nerves.”
“Besides,” triumphantly added Mr. Nathan Fifield, who felt that he
was on the defensive before Mrs. Blossom, and holding up as he
spoke an old-fashioned, richly chased gold locket, “here is further
evidence. While Rose was gone Eudora made an examination of her
effects and this is what she found concealed in a pincushion. Now I
leave it to you if it looks reasonable that a child in her position would
have a valuable trinket like that; or if she had, would keep it hidden?”
When they entered the house Mrs. Blossom had told Rose to stay
in another room, but through the partly opened door she caught a
glimpse of the locket as it swung from Mr. Nathan’s fingers.
“That is mine!” she cried, darting in. “My very own, and it was my
mother’s. What right have you with it, I should like to know? And why
isn’t it stealing for you to go and take my things?”
“Hush, Rose!” Mrs. Blossom reproved. And then her faith in Rose
a little shaken in spite of herself, “If the locket is yours, as you say,
why did you never tell us about it? And why did you hide it so?”
“Why, I never once thought of it,” she answered, looking frankly up
at Mrs. Blossom. “I don’t think the locket is pretty at all, it is so queer
and old-fashioned, and I don’t even know whose picture is inside. All
the reason I care for it is because it was my mother’s. And I sewed it
up in that pincushion, which one of the teachers at the Refuge gave
me, because I was afraid if Mrs. Hagood saw the locket she might
take it away from me.”
“I wonder if this could have been her mother’s father,” for Mrs.
Blossom’s mind at once turned to the subject she had thought of so
often—that of Rose’s family.
“There was a chain to the locket once, but I broke and lost that. I
remember that mamma used sometimes to let me wear it, and it
seems to me she said it was Uncle Samuel’s picture, but I’m not
sure.”
“It certainly is a good face.” And Mrs. Blossom held out the open
locket to Miss Eudora, who as she took it let it drop from her fingers
that the unwonted excitement had made tremulous. In striking the
floor a spring was pressed to a compartment behind the picture, and
as Mr. Nathan Fifield stooped to pick it up a piece of closely folded
paper fell out.
Mrs. Blossom hastily spread this out, and found it the marriage
certificate of Kate Jarvis and James Shannon, dated at Fredonia, N.
Y., some sixteen years before. “Here is a clue to Rose’s family,” she
exclaimed, as they all clustered about the bit of time-yellowed paper,
forgetting for the moment the cloud that rested so heavily over Rose.
“It surely should be,” responded Mr. Nathan.
“I shall write to Fredonia at once,” continued Mrs. Blossom. “And
as the minister whose name is signed may in the meantime have
died or moved away, my best course would be to write first to the
postmaster for information, would it not?”
“Here is a clue to Rose’s family.”—Page 216.