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NEW DIRECTIONS IN EAST ASIAN HISTORY
The League of Nations

and the East Asian
Imperial Order, 1920–1946
Harumi Goto-Shibata
New Directions in East Asian History
Series Editors
Oliviero Frattolillo
Roma Tre University
Rome, Italy
Yuichi Hosoya
Keio University
Tokyo, Japan
Antony Best
London School of Economics
London, UK
This series addresses the ways in which history influences the political,
economic and social development of East Asia, a region which now plays
a pivotal role in our world’s multipolar international system. The series
provides new perspectives on East Asia’s distinctive economic and political
situation through the lens of 20th century history, with a particular focus
on Pre-War and Cold War periods. It argues the need to re-examine the
history of East Asia and provide new historical approaches to a vibrant
and constantly changing region.
Highlighting that history is at the root of many modern day conflicts
in Asia, this series provides a global forum for rigorous academic research
and timely debate by scholars worldwide, and showcases significant new
research on East Asian history and politics in the contemporary era.
The series will appeal to specialists in the history and politics of
Asia; international history; scholars of modern and contemporary Japan,
Chinese and Korea as well as international relations.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15870
Harumi Goto-Shibata
The League
of Nations
and the East Asian
Imperial Order,
1920–1946
Harumi Goto-Shibata
University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan
ISSN 2522-0195 ISSN 2522-0209 (electronic)

New Directions in East Asian History
ISBN 978-981-15-4967-0 ISBN 978-981-15-4968-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4968-7
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

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Cover illustration: Alois Derso and Emery Kelen’s cartoon of the League of Nations.
Naotake Sato of Japan as a squirrel is playing golf at the bottom left side. From Le
Testament de Genève (Geneva, 1931). Reproduced by permission of Princeton University
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Acknowledgments
This book is the product of my research leave from autumn 2018 to spring
2019. I spent most of this time writing the draft. I am enormously grateful
to Patricia Clavin and Henrietta Harrison for their precious time and
advice. I would also like to extend my profound thanks to my colleagues at
University of Tokyo, especially Tetsuya Sakai, Shin Kawashima, Yasutaka
Ichinokawa, Masami Nakao, Hiroyuki Ogawa and Nahoko Miyamoto
Alvey for their support and understanding; and also to Antony Best,
Olivielo Frattolillo and Yuichi Hosoya for including this book in their
new series.
Parts of the archival research on which this book is based started nearly
twenty years ago. I have been extremely fortunate to have very good
mentors and friends. I am tremendously indebted to Ian Nish, Yoichi
Kibata, Jane Garnett, John Darwin, Ann Waswo and Steve Tsang. Special
thanks are due to Naoko Shimazu, Hatsue Shinohara, Tomoko Akami,
Ken Ishida, Sochi Naraoka, Ryo Ikeda and Kayo Takuma (nee Yasuda) for
inspiring me intellectually; to Masaya Inoue and the steering members of
the Japan Association of International Relations for giving me the oppor-
tunity to present a paper at the commemorative 60th annual convention;
to Asahiko Hanzawa and Mika Inoue for organizing the colloquia on
the history of the United Nations; to Roger Goodman, Victoria Forster,
Vandana Desai, Sho Konishi and Chika Tonooka for making my stay in the
U. K. pleasant and comfortable; and to the members of Global History
Collaborative for arranging a workshop at Princeton.
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Profound thanks are also due to archivists and libraries for their assis-
tance and for permission to cite the materials they hold in their care.
The archival research was supported by JSPS Grants-in Aid for Scien-
tific Research, Numbers JP13610443, JP18520556 and JP22530150. I
would also like to express my gratitude to Oxford University Press and
Cambridge University Press for their permission to reprint my journal
articles; to the team at Palgrave Macmillan for efficiently bringing this
book to publication.
My family has supported me in numerous ways. Without the support
and understanding of Emily Ayako Sato, Hideaki and Kyoko Goto, I
could not have found time to do any research and to write even a word.
Betty, Shingo, Hikaru, Akiko and Chiaki have always been the source
of my joy and happiness. Last but not least, thank you, Mark Makoto
Shibata. I dedicate this book to you.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Part I The League of Nations as Forums and Actors
2 Social and Humanitarian Issues of the League

of Nations 17
The Emergence of Social and Humanitarian Issues
in the Covenant of the League 17
Japan’s Participation in the League of Nations 24
The League’s Arrival in East Asia 33
3 Challenging the Imperial Order: Control of Opium 43

Setting the Scene—Until the First World War 44
Establishing the OAC 47
The OAC at Work on East Asian Questions 51
The Participation of the United States 54
The Geneva Opium Conference 56
Change in the Opium Policies in the British Empire
and the Commission of Enquiry 61
Lack of Reforms in the Japanese Empire 64
The Bangkok Conference and Further Reforms 66
The Impact of the OAC and Its Limits 69
vii
viii CONTENTS
4 Expanding the Range: Japan’s Reaction

to the Technical Co-operation with China 79
The Developmental Phase 80
Co-operation in Flood Relief 89
The Manchurian Crisis 93
How to Finance the Co-operation 96
Technical Co-operation Politicized 102
5 The TWC as Another Forum and Women 111

The TWC and the Commission of Enquiry 112
Russian Women Refugees in China and the Remaining
Imperial Order 114
Difficulties in Solving the Problem 116
The Lack of Financial Resources 120
The TWC as Another Forum 122
Part II Contested Power and Authority
6 Japan’s Withdrawal and China’s Request for a Seat

on the Council 129
Trying to Continue Partial Co-operation 130
China’s Failure to Be Re-elected to the Council 139
Enter the Soviet Union 141
China’s Aspiration to Be a Permanent Member 142
Japan’s Formal Departure 145
A New Non-permanent Seat for an Asian State 147
7 Who Controls the Co-operation?: Technical

Co-operation after the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
War 157
The TCC in 1936 158
Technical Co-operation after the Outbreak
of the Sino-Japanese War 162
Continuing for the Second Year 167
Who Controls the Co-operation? 170
Aid to China 175
The League or the Local Authorities 179
CONTENTS ix
8 The Question of Empires: Co-operation

in the Yunnan–Burma Borderland in 1939 187
The South-Western Part of China 188
Robertson’s Epidemiological Survey on the Burma Road 189
Co-operation or Intervention 194
The End of the Technical Co-operation 197
9 The Limits of the League’s Control of Opium 205

To the United States 206
The Declaration of the British and the Dutch Governments
in November 1943 207
Examining the Application of the New Policy 212
Prepared ‘Policy as Regards Opium in Burma’ and Its
Limits 215
The League of Nations and the Question of Opium Eating 218
10 East Asia in the Architecture of the Post-War World:

From the League to the UN Economic and Social
Council 223
The Bruce Report 224
Rajchman’s Plan for the United Nations Health
Organization 227
Establishing the ECOSOC 229
Establishing the CND 233
The Prospect of the CND and Burma’s New Policy 237
The Experience of the League of Nations 242
11 Conclusion 249
Achievements and Continuities 249
Discontinuities and a New Departure 252
Bibliography 257
Index 283
Abbreviations
BDFA British Documents on Foreign Affairs

BL British Library
CND Commission on Narcotic Drugs
DBFP Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939
DBPO Documents on British Policy Overseas
DSB Drug Supervisory Body
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
ILO International Labour Organization
JACAR Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives
of Japan
JFMA Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives
LN League of Nations
LNA League of Nations Archives
LNHO League of Nations Health Organization
LNOJ League of Nations Official Journal
NGB Nihon Gaikō Bunsho [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy]
NGB, 1-2-2 NGB, Showa ki 1, dai 2 bu, dai 2 kan [Showa Era 1, Part 2,
Vol. 2]
NGB, 2-1-3 NGB, Showa ki 2, dai 1 bu, dai 3 kan [Showa Era 2, Part 1,
Vol. 3]
NGB, 2-2-2~5 NGB, Showa ki 2, dai 2 bu, dai 2 kan ~ dai 5 kan [Showa
Era 2, Part 2, Vols. 2~5]
NGB, M-1-3 NGB, Manshū Jihen, dai 1 kan, dai 3 satsu [Manchurian
Incident, Part 1, Vol. 3]
xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS
NGB, M-2-2 NGB, Manshū Jihen, dai 2 kan, dai 2 satsu [Manchurian
Incident, Part 2, Vol. 2]
NGB, M-3 NGB, Manshū Jihen, dai 3 kan [Manchurian Incident, Part
3]
NGB, M-bekkan NGB, Manshū Jihen, bekkan [Manchurian Incident, extra
volume]
OAC Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other
Dangerous Drugs
ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online edition
PCOB Permanent Central Opium Board
TCC Council Committee on Technical Co-operation between the
League of Nations and China
TNA The National Archives, Kew
TWC Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and Children
Notes on Japanese and Chinese Names
When Japanese language works are cited in the footnotes, surnames

precede given names following East Asian practice. Chinese words are
basically transliterated using the Pinyin system of romanization. Some
names of people are, however, more widely known in their former usage,
such as Chiang Kai-Shek and T. V. Soong. In addition, as this book deals
with the period before 1949, there were some people who often used their
English names, such as Wellington Koo and Victor Hoo. In these cases,
Pinyin transliteration is shown in the first instance only. The example is
‘V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun)’. In Pinyin transliteration, surnames
precede given names.
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The League of Nations and East Asia—what do you associate this with?
Most probably the Manchurian Crisis; the impact of which was over-
whelming. At the same time, it should be noted that there was a lot
more to the League of Nations and East Asia than the Crisis. This book
uncovers the League’s works in East Asia in social, economic and human-
itarian fields, and examines their impact on the international relations in
the region.
After the calamities of the First World War, the League of Nations was
established to prevent further international conflict. As the United States
did not become its member, the League’s influence was limited. It failed
in its primary objective and could not prevent the Second World War, so
that it was reviled and neglected for a very long time.
In the twenty-first century, however, interest in the League of Nations
has revived and is flourishing. One of the reasons is that it is now recog-
nized that the League was more than a collective security arrangement.
The League had a very wide spectrum of economic, social and other tech-
nical activities, and it accomplished quite a lot in these fields. It laid ‘the
foundation for the institutions of global governance we have today’.1
For example, Patricia Clavin has shown the growing importance of the
League’s undertakings in economics in her Securing the World Economy.
She has also shown the continuity of people and their works into the
period of the United Nations.2
© The Author(s) 2020 1

H. Goto-Shibata, The League of Nations and the East Asian
Imperial Order, 1920–1946, New Directions in East Asian History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4968-7_1
2 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
Remarkably, such works of the League were not limited to Europe.

Sunil S. Amrith’s Decolonizing International Health shows that the
League collected information on diseases in South and Southeast Asia.3
The League also sent missions to Asia to investigate the trafficking in
opium and the situation of women and children. Based on the informa-
tion it collected, it endeavoured to solve these problems, or at least to
mitigate them.
Despite its efforts and achievements, the League’s social and technical
works in East Asia have fallen into almost complete oblivion. Existing
studies on the League of Nations mainly analyse its works in Europe.
Although Europe was indeed at the centre of the League’s attention and
activities, the founding fathers of the League aimed to make it more
global and universal. Europe could not leave other parts of the world
completely outside the system. East Asia was also included in it. The
region was by no means free from the impact of the League of Nations.
Susan Pedersen is another person who has led the study of the League
of Nations. In her extensive review of the previous studies on the League
of Nations published in 2007, she divided the League’s works into three
categories. Her major work on the League, The Guardians, has exam-
ined the work of the Permanent Mandate Commission, and has shown
that the imperial order was gradually transformed through the apparatus
and the publicity that the mandates system brought into being.4 In the
introduction of The Guardians, Pedersen introduced the work of William
Rappard, Swiss director of the Mandate Section of the League Secretariat.
Rappard’s work is based on his lecture given in the United States in
1925. He started by elucidating ‘Three Leagues in One’. Those three
were a League to outlaw war, a League to execute the peace treaties,
and a League to promote international co-operation. The first, outlawing
war, is related to the primary objective of the League. The second is
related to the mandates systems and the minorities question. The third
covers a wide field. When the League was established, issues in this third
group were considered marginal. Only Article 23 out of the twenty-six
articles touched upon them. There were, however, those who consid-
ered that ‘the main purpose of the League, the prevention of war, could
perhaps be more readily and more effectively served by the consolidation
of peace’. The international co-operation was for the purpose of consoli-
dating peace, and this third League expanded over time. It came to cover
various activities. Rappard wrote in 1925, ‘[i]ts activities – economic,
social, political, hygienic, intellectual, moral – are so extraordinarily varied
1 INTRODUCTION 3
that it is not easy even to classify them.’5 David Mitrany, a political scien-
tist, had these operations and people making them work in mind when
he crafted his functionalist theory.6
This book concerns this third category: the League to promote inter-
national co-operation. It extends the analysis of the League of Nations
to East Asia, examining its social and humanitarian works, which have
been neglected. As it was impossible to separate those works from existing
economic agreements made by the countries, this book also touches upon
economic issues.
Even when historians included East Asia in their analyses of the League
of Nations, they hitherto tended to focus on the moment of crisis, namely
the Manchurian Crisis. Nobody denies its significance, but more light
should be shed on the League of Nations and East Asia, and on various
aspects. Otherwise, our understanding of the period remains too simple
and superficial. The League’s social and other technical works are signifi-
cant as such. In addition, they were closely related to the development
in international relations in the region. Rappard was quite optimistic
in 1925. He considered those technical works non-political. However,
Edward Hallett Carr wrote in his The Twenty Years’ Crisis as follows:
When states co-operate with one another to maintain postal or transport

services, or to prevent the spread of epidemics or suppress the traffic in
drugs, these activities are described as ‘non-political’ or ‘technical’. But as
soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power
of one state in relation to another, the matter at once becomes ‘political’.7
As Carr pointed out, technical works often turned out to be highly polit-
ical. They were also related to the rise and fall of power and authority
of countries. Still, just as East Asia has remained in the shadows in the
previous studies of the League of Nations, the League has been almost
completely overlooked in the study of the international history of East
Asia, except its involvement in the Manchurian Crisis. The works by Ian
Nish and Thomas Burkman are superb, but neither of them takes social
and other technical issues into consideration.8 This book is at the inter-
section of the study of the League and that of the international history of
East Asia, and aims to advance both.
More specifically, this book takes up several issues which the League
tackled in East Asia: namely the control of trafficking in opium, and tech-
nical co-operation with China. The control of the traffic in drugs was
4 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
directly mentioned by Carr in the above quote. It was also one of the
most difficult problems for Japan in the League.9 Technical co-operation
with China developed from the works in the field of health, which was
also mentioned by Carr. It later developed into a wide-ranging project.
This book also deals with the issue of assisting Russian women refugees
in China, because this, as well as the control of opium trafficking, devel-
oped from the work based on Article 23 (c) of the League’s Covenant. In
addition, the same individuals such as Dame Rachel Crowdy (1884–1964)
were involved in the two issues. Crowdy was the highest-ranking woman
in the League Secretariat, and was the chief of the Social Questions and
Opium Traffic Section. She also offered a link between the League and
voluntary organizations.10 After she left the League, she visited Japan and
Manchuria twice, in 1931 and 1934.
This book argues that the League achieved quite a lot in the field of
social and technical works; and that those works came to challenge the
existing imperial order in East and Southeast Asia, although to do so was
by no means the intention of the founding fathers of the League. One
point to be remembered is that, different from Europe, the First World
War did not change East Asia very much. Empires firmly remained in the
region. Britain and France, the mainstays of the League of Nations, were
empires with considerable interests in East and Southeast Asia. In her
study on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Tomoko Akami has pointed
out that the Great Powers which promoted internationalism in the inter-
war period were at the same time empires.11 In addition to Britain and
France, the Netherlands ruled the Dutch East Indies, while Macao was
the colony of Portugal. Japan was also an empire, and it maintained
various interests in China. Furthermore, China itself had an imperial face,
although its semi-colonial status in the inter-war period is usually empha-
sized. The Republic of China inherited the territory of Qing which was
a land-based empire. Qing had conquered Xinjiang in the eighteenth
century and ruled the indigenes in Yunnan. I regard this international
order consisting of these empires to be the imperial order. Neither the
empires nor the League of Nations intended to change the existing order
of the region. They were rather ‘the guardians’ of the order.12 They
intended to maintain the status quo.
If the League did not have the intention to change the imperial order,
how did its works come to challenge this order? First, there were various
problems to be solved in the region and they were entangled in the
existing order. Trying to solve them from a universal perspective resulted
1 INTRODUCTION 5
in criticizing imperial practices. Secondly, once established, the League

gained its own momentum. It did not remain a mere gathering of repre-
sentatives of the powers. It set up various committees where not only
states’ representatives but also experts participated. Their works were
supported by international civil servants of the Secretariat. Those experts
and members of the Secretariat were not necessarily from traditional
major powers. New figures entered into the semi-diplomatic world.
Those from small and newly independent countries acquired oppor-
tunities to work in faraway places such as China for the first time. The
country was especially attractive to them. Its sheer size and ancient history
provoked awe. As it was not a colony, it was open to the activities of
the League of Nations. Furthermore, the League meetings were usually
open, and journalists and the representatives of various voluntary organi-
zations (today’s non-governmental organizations), came to observe the
arguments there. The outcome of the discussions and publicity went
beyond the control of the League itself and even that of the mightiest
empires.
The League’s Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other
Dangerous Drugs (Opium Advisory Committee, hereafter the OAC) was
one of those committees. Efforts to control opium had been made since
the beginning of the twentieth century. The first international commis-
sion to eradicate opium was held, at an American initiative, in Shanghai in
February 1909. The Shanghai Commission could not make any binding
decisions, so The Hague Conference was held from November 1911.
The League succeeded this regulatory work. It started trying to solve
the problem of opium trafficking and smoking. The point is that opium
was one of the old questions of the empires in East and Southeast Asia.
Opium supported the financial basis of the colonies in the East: not only
the colonies of Britain, but also those of France, Japan and the Nether-
lands. In the nineteenth century, when a solid tax-collecting system had
not yet been established, opium was a valuable (in some colonies almost
the sole) source of revenue. This fact was long known only within each
empire, and only among a limited number of people. The OAC, however,
internationalized the issue, just like the Permanent Mandate Commis-
sion closely examined by Pedersen. The issue of opium could no longer
be dealt with merely within the national or imperial realm. The inter-
national pressure was useful in monitoring the behaviour of even great
6 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
powers.13 As a result of reforms, revenues decreased, while expendi-

ture on local residents’ welfare increased. Curbing opium trafficking and
smoking unintentionally shook the financial foundations of the empires.
Different from the regulatory works specified by Article 23 (c), tech-
nical co-operation with China was not envisaged when the League’s
Covenant was adopted. The range of the League’s works was expanded
after the organization was established. The idea for the co-operation
with China grew out of personal initiatives, especially that of Dr Ludwik
Rajchman, the extremely capable director of the Health Section of the
Secretariat. The co-operation started in the field of health, and devel-
oped into a wide-ranging project. If successfully carried out, technical
co-operation would have improved the situation of China and strength-
ened the country. It was a pioneering effort in establishing international
aid for developing countries. The value of co-operation was widely recog-
nized. The timing was, however, not ideal. Co-operation between the
League and China began when Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated. It
politicized. Japan’s anxiety and dissatisfaction with the League were
strengthened by this co-operation. The point here was how to finance the
co-operation. It became a contentious issue. The Chinese and Rajchman
had to overcome the existing financial agreement made by the powers,
most of which were at the same time empires. The technical co-operation
also challenged the existing imperial order.
Meanwhile, there were various opinions on the League in China.
Although China was an obvious beneficiary of the technical co-operation,
the country was not united in welcoming the arrival of internation-
alism embodied in the League of Nations. Some, especially those who
were educated in the West, were keen on the League, while others
wondered whether the League’s works in China might turn out to
be another form of foreign intervention and control, infringing upon
China’s sovereignty. Co-operation was sometimes considered to be like
an imperialist intervention.
Let us review the League’s structure. The main elements were the
Council, the Assembly and the Secretariat. As it turned out that the
United States did not participate in the League, the Council initially
consisted of four permanent members, namely Britain, France, Italy and
Japan, and four non-permanent members elected by the Assembly. After
the signing of the Locarno treaties, Germany was accepted into the
League in 1926, becoming a permanent member of the Council. It
declared, however, its withdrawal from the League in October 1933.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
By that time, Japan had also declared its intention to withdraw. The
rise of Nazi Germany resulted in the USSR joining the League in
September 1934, and it was a permanent member until December 1939.
Meanwhile, many countries including China considered the position
of non-permanent member as a symbol of international status.14 The
number of non-permanent members was increased to six in 1922, nine
in 1926, ten in 1933 and eleven in 1936. The Council usually met four
to five times per year, and more often during emergencies.
The first Assembly was held from November to December 1920. From
September 1921 onwards, the Assembly met once per year. Both the
Council and Assembly were supported by the Secretariat, which prepared
for various meetings and implemented their decisions. The role of the
Secretariat was especially significant during the long period when neither
the Council nor the Assembly was in session. The first secretary-general,
Sir Eric Drummond, created the Secretariat. He was a Scottish aristocrat
educated at Eton, and entered the British Foreign Office in 1900. He
was also a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Confer-
ence.15 There would be some under secretaries-general, and a number of
sections such as the Political Section, each with a director as its head.16
Drummond was determined to recruit international civil servants to work
in the League, not those merely representing their own countries. A
balance of nationalities among those who occupied high positions had
to be considered.17
This book responds to the following questions. What were the
League’s social and other technical works in East Asia? What were their
achievements and limits? What were their long-term impacts? Were they
an isolated endeavour during the inter-war period? Or were they carried
on in the post-war world? This book covers the period until the end of
1946, and shows that the League’s works were succeeded by the United
Nations Organization. By answering the questions, this book argues that
the impact of the League of Nations in East Asia has hitherto been
underestimated.
The book is divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters 2–5) intro-
duces the League’s social, economic and humanitarian works in East Asia
and considers how they functioned. Chapter 2 first supplies context for
including social and humanitarian issues in the League’s Covenant, and
observes establishing technical organizations such as the OAC. Among
the various aspects of the League such as the Council and the Assembly,
8 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
Part I of this book mainly engages with several of those technical commit-
tees. As the committees were supported by relevant sections of the
Secretariat, this book also considers some officials of those sections.
Chapter 2 then looks at how Japan joined the League and came to partic-
ipate in those committees. It also introduces the characteristics of those
Japanese who were involved in the League.
Chapter 3 examines the League’s efforts to solve the problem of opium
trafficking and smoking. The League’s OAC functioned as a forum. It
asked the participating countries to provide information on opium not
only in their home countries but also in their colonies. It then discussed
the issue openly. The publicity or the threat of publicity forced the
member countries to introduce reforms in their opium regimes.
Chapter 4 examines Japan’s reactions to the technical co-operation
between the League of Nations and China. The members of the League’s
Secretariat played significant roles. Initially, there was no committee.
Concerning this issue, the League was more an actor, or a company of
actors, than a forum.
Chapter 5 is a short chapter which deals with the plight of Russian
women refugees in China. Article 23 (c) made the supervision over the
trafficking in women and children another task of the League. The Advi-
sory Committee on Traffic in Women and Children (hereafter, TWC) was
established. It also functioned as a forum. The Commission of Enquiry
sent to East Asia uncovered the unfortunate situation of Russian women
refugees. Individual actors such as Crowdy also overlapped with those
involved in the opium question. The aim of this Chapter is to observe the
part played by women relating to the League’s works in East Asia. The
Chapter also shows that Japan continued to participate in the League’s
social and humanitarian committees even after its withdrawal.
Part II (Chapters 6–10) traces the technical co-operation to its end,
and follows the control of opium until the end of 1946. At the same time,
it covers the rise and fall of the power and authority of the relevant coun-
tries in relation to the social and technical issues. Although those issues
were considered to be non-political, they turned out to be highly political,
and differences in opinions and collisions of interests were observed.
Chapter 6 examines how Japan withdrew from the League, and how
China, taking the opportunity, requested a seat in the Council. Article
1 of the League’s Covenant stipulated that any member may withdraw
after two years’ notification. The actual procedure of the withdrawal,
however, was not decided. Japan said that it would continue to co-operate
1 INTRODUCTION 9
in the League’s technical meetings such as the OAC and the TWC. China
initially argued that Japan could not withdraw without fulfilling what was
required by the League. On the other hand, China aspired to have a
higher status on the international stage. Japan’s withdrawal gave it a good
opportunity to require a permanent, or at least a semi-permanent seat in
the Council.
Chapter 7 examines technical co-operation between the League and
China after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. As a part of the co-
operation, the League sent experts to prevent epidemic diseases from
spreading. Although their contributions were significant, differences of
opinions between those who were supposed to be co-operating grew
wide. From the beginning of the co-operation, there were some Chinese
who worried that the co-operation might turn out to be another form of
foreign intervention, infringing upon China’s sovereignty. In the period
after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, differences of opinion were
observed between the League experts and the Chinese, and also within
the League itself.
Chapter 8 examines the final stage of the co-operation, which was
carried out in the south-western part of China due to the war. The
region bordered on British Burma. In the Yunnan-Burma borderland,
both Britain and China ruled the indigenes indirectly. China needed
international assistance to fight against Japan, but not all welcomed the
co-operation wholeheartedly. Some wondered whether co-operation with
the League so deeply into the country was worthwhile.
Chapter 9 observes the limits of the League’s opium control by way
of examining the final stage of the opium question in British Burma.
This book begins by looking at the League’s tackling of the opium ques-
tion. As will be seen in Chapter 3, its achievement was considerable. The
complete eradication of opium, however, was not achieved by the time
of the demise of the League of Nations. Indeed, the question of opium
eating was not touched at all. One region where the problem remained
is the borderland, which was dealt with in Chapter 8. To control the use
and trafficking of opium in the mountainous border region covered with
dense forests was considered almost impossible. Britain was, however,
placed under the pressure of the United States during the Second World
War.
Chapter 10 considers how the League and the United Nations Orga-
nization were related. The establishment of the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs (CND) in the United Nations Economic and Social Council
10 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
(ECOSOC) is closely studied. In the case of the CND, which was estab-
lished in 1946, the link with the League is clear and strong. This chapter
shows that the League did not just disappear, but many of its works
were succeeded by the United Nations. The authority and power of the
Republic of China were almost at its zenith in the period covered in
Chapter 10. The international co-operation was useful to the country. It
also understood the value of presenting itself as being interested in social
questions. It contributed greatly to the setting up of the CND.
Many studies relating to individual topics are cited throughout the
book. Here at the end of the introduction, let us just briefly observe the
change of the central authorities of China, because it happened several
times during the period examined in this book.
The Qing dynasty ruled China since the seventeenth century, but it
was in decline at the beginning of the twentieth century. The powers
competed for economic profits in the country. The United States was a
relative newcomer, and advanced an ‘open door’ policy as a way of safe-
guarding its interests. In order to change the situation from competition
into co-operation, the first China consortium agreement for financing
Chinese railways was signed in 1910 by the banks of Britain, France,
Germany and the United States. Russian and Japanese banks were later
allowed to co-operate with the consortium. Co-operation was, however,
just among the powers. The Chinese were dissatisfied with foreign railway
loans. The revolution in 1911 made the Qing dynasty fall in 1912. The
Republic of China was established.
The central government continued to exist in Beijing until the mid-
1920s. The Beijing government did not sign the Treaty of Versailles that
allowed Japan to succeed German interests on the Shandong Peninsula.
The Republic of China signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain, and joined
the League as an original member, more willingly than Japan, although
it was disappointed with American non-participation. The Chinese found
that international society was more useful in seeking assistance to change
the existing situation in China than bilateral negotiations with its mighty
counterparts, whether it be Japan or Britain.18 Their aspiration in the
1920s was to revise treaties and to improve its international status. The
Beijing government also aspired to have a non-permanent seat in the
Council. It had to be elected to the Council to secure one. It was
successful in 1920 and 1926, but the outcome of the election was not
always guaranteed. It also insisted at the time of creating the League of
Nations that its financial contribution to the League should be almost
1 INTRODUCTION 11
as much as those of Japan and Britain. It turned out, however, that

the Republic of China could not pay its shares of expenses, because its
financial basis was very weak.19 Meanwhile, the second China consortium
agreement was reached in May 1920 by the banking groups of Britain,
France, Japan and the United States. They had agreed to contract loans
to China together, to refrain from setting up new spheres of interests in
the country and from intervening in its internal politics.20
The power and authority of the Beijing government were not strong,
and chaos and internal fighting continued. The government of the
Nationalists, the Guomindang, in Guandong gradually gained strength.
The military forces of the Nationalists began the Northern Expedition
in July 1926. They defeated the Beijing government, achieving nominal
reunification of the country in 1928. The Nationalist government of the
Republic of China was recognized by Britain and the United States, and
started to send representatives to the League of Nations. There were
many talented diplomats and politicians in the Nationalist government
who had been educated in the West, especially in the United States.
They considered that to send their representatives to the League was
useful for them to prove that they were the legitimate central authori-
ties of the country. They had to prove themselves, because the unification
was not perfect and internal strife continued, especially between them
and the Communists. The latter would be the final victor and estab-
lish the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The defeated Nationalists
had to leave the continent. The government of China dealt with in this
book is mainly the Republic of China—not the People’s Republic of
China—unless clearly mentioned otherwise. In describing the situation
after 1928, the terms ‘Nationalist China’ or the ‘Nationalists’ are used
interchangeably with the ‘Republic of China’.
Notes
1. Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 8–9.
2. Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League
of Nations 1920–1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
3. Sunil S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast
Asia, 1930–65 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
4. Susan Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’, The American Historical
Review, 112/4, 2007, pp. 1091–1117; id., The Guardians.
12 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
5. William E. Rappard, International Relations as Viewed from Geneva (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1925). Quotes are from pages 16 and 62.
6. David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond, From Versailles
to Maastricht: International Organisation in the Twentieth Century
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996), pp. 22–23; Pedersen, The Guardians,
pp. 8–9.
7. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduc-
tion to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1961,
first published in 1939), p. 102.
8. Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the
League of Nations 1931–1933 (London: Kegan Paul, 1993); Thomas W.
Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008).
9. Satō Naotake, Kaiko 80 nen [Looking Back at My Eighty Years ] (Tokyo:
Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1963), pp. 199–202.
10. Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’, p. 1111.
11. Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan
and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45 (London:
Routledge, 2002). See also, D. Long and B. C. Schmidt (eds), Imperi-
alism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2005).
12. Sandrine Kott, ‘Cold War Internationalism’, in Glenda Sluga and Patricia
Clavin (eds), Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 344–345.
13. Zara Steiner, ‘Introductory Essay’, in United Nations Library and the
Graduate Institute Geneva, The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceed-
ings of a Symposium (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), p. 11.
14. Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht, p. 56.
15. Lorna Lloyd, ‘Drummond, (James) Eric, Seventh Earl of Perth (1876–
1951), Diplomatist,’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online
(hereafter, ODNB).
16. F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford
University Press, 1952, reprinted in 1960), p. 77.
17. Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht, p. 59;
Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Haakon A. Ikonomou, ‘The Construction
of the League of Nations Secretariat. Formative Practices of Autonomy
and Legitimacy in International Organizations’, The International History
Review, published online 21 December 2017, pp. 4–6.
18. Nishimura Shigeo, ‘20 seiki zenhan ki Chūgoku to “3 no gaikō kūkan”
[China in the Early Half of the 20th Century and Three Diplomatic
Spheres]’, in Nishimura Shigeo (ed.), Chūgoku gaikō to kokuren no seiritsu
[Chinese Diplomacy and the Establishment of the United Nations ] (Kyoto:
Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2004), pp. 5–11.
1 INTRODUCTION 13
19. Tang Chi-hua, Beijing zhengfu yu guoji lianmeng (1919–1928) [Beijing

Government and the League of Nations ] (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi,
1998), Chapter 4. Although China was also elected in 1922, due to its
internal situation and its failure to pay its annual subscription, it was
replaced by Czechoslovakia within a year. See Tang, Beijing zhengfu,
pp. 134–142; Shinohara Hatsue, Kokusai Renmei [The League of Nations ]
(Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2010), p. 277.
20. Mitani Taichirō, Wall Street to kyokutō: Seiji ni okeru kokusai kinyū shihon
[Wall Street and the Far East ] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
2009), pp. 78–79, 172–173.
PART I
The League of Nations as Forums and Actors

CHAPTER 2
Social and Humanitarian Issues

of the League of Nations
How did social and humanitarian issues come to be included in the scope
of the League of Nations? David Hunter Miller, the legal advisor of the
US State Department, mentioned several times in his The Drafting of the
Covenant that the British officials played a significant role in ‘extending
the humanitarian activities of the League’.1 Therefore, paying particular
attention to Britain, the first section of this chapter briefly observes the
emergence of social and other technical issues in the Covenant of the
League. The second section explores how Japan joined the League, and
the last section examines the League’s arrival in East Asia.
The Emergence of Social and Humanitarian

Issues in the Covenant of the League
International co-operation and establishing an international organization
to promote peace had been considered in Europe as early as the eigh-
teenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, arbitration came
to be considered significant in solving international disputes, and diplo-
matic conferences were held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. More
practical co-operation for common rules also developed in the latter half
of the nineteenth century. Technical organizations such as the Universal
Postal Union, which dates back to 1874, were established. International
co-operation in regulatory fields also started.
© The Author(s) 2020 17

H. Goto-Shibata, The League of Nations and the East Asian
Imperial Order, 1920–1946, New Directions in East Asian History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4968-7_2
18 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
The horrors and destruction of the First World War strengthened the
desire to prevent a repetition of conflicts. The war also convinced some
people of the acute necessity of international co-operation. In Britain
during the war, the Bryce Group was the first to discuss the idea of an
international organization to maintain peace. Its leader was James Bryce,
historian, Liberal politician and the former British ambassador to Wash-
ington. Among the members was John Atkinson Hobson, a well-known
journalist.2 Partly inspired by them, the League of Nations Society was
established in the summer of 1915. Lord Robert Cecil, the parliamentary
under-secretary of state for foreign affairs and the minister of blockade
from February 1916, also came to consider the establishment of the inter-
national organization as a most important task. As the son of the third
Marquess of Salisbury and the cousin of Arthur Balfour, Cecil was the
best-connected among the British advocates of international organization.
Both Salisbury and Balfour were former prime ministers.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the League to Enforce Peace was
formed. At its meeting held in May 1916, President Woodrow Wilson
publicly advocated the idea of an international organization. The idea
came to be included in the war aims as the United States joined the
Allies in April 1917. On 5 January 1918, the British prime minister,
David Lloyd George, gave a speech to the Trades Union Congress at
Caxton Hall. He declared the creation of some international organization
as being among Britain’s preconditions for peace. Cecil was among those
who drafted the speech.3 Three days later, President Wilson demanded a
general association of nations in his Fourteen Points speech. The French
including Leon Bourgeois were also working on their plan.
By the end of the war, it became obvious that establishing a new
international organization would be negotiated at the peace conference.
The British prepared well for the actual schemes for the League, and
their proposals greatly influenced its formation.4 On 3 January 1918, just
before the Caxton Hall speech, the Committee on the League of Nations
was appointed. Its chairman was Sir Walter Phillimore, a jurist and a
privy councillor. The plan of the Phillimore Committee was submitted
on 20 March 1918. It was still ‘limited in function to the considera-
tion of disputes on urgent occasions’. It did not provide for any regularly
recurrent meetings; its conference was the diplomatic group in a partic-
ular capital which came together when they were convened at a time of
stress.5
2 SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 19
After the Armistice on 11 November 1918, two further reports were

produced by the members of the Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence
Division. One was by Lord Eustace Percy. He had worked at the British
Embassy in Washington from 1910 to 1914, and Ambassador Bryce was
then his intellectual mentor.6 The other was by Alfred Zimmern, an
Oxford scholar, among those who were recruited to prepare the post-
war settlement.7 Cecil had been appointed to head the Foreign Office’s
League of Nations Section. He selected Zimmern’s memorandum as a
base, and the outcome was Cecil’s plan. It represented the mainstream
Foreign Office’s thinking on the League question.8
Jan Christiaan Smuts published a pamphlet The League of Nations: A
Practical Suggestion in December 1918. He was a politician of South
Africa, then a Dominion in the British Empire. When he participated in
the Imperial War Conference in 1917, Lloyd George noticed his capa-
bility and made him remain in the War Cabinet. Smuts had been given
responsibility for preparing the British brief for the peace conference.9 In
The League of Nations, he made the proposal of an international organiza-
tion more concrete and his proposal had ‘profound influence on President
Wilson’.10 He considered the actual structure of the League, suggesting
the two strata of the General Conference and the Council, including
permanent and additional members in the Council. Permanent members
were to be composed of representatives of the Great Powers, while addi-
tional members were to be drawn from the middle and small states.11
This was different from Cecil’s plan which limited the Council only to
the Great Powers.12
The idea of including international administration of wide-ranging
issues appeared quite early. It is widely known that Leonard Woolf consid-
ered the issue in his International Government.13 Hobson also wrote as
early as 1915 that some of those who considered an international orga-
nization also thought it necessary ‘to cure the deep, underlying causes of
the grievances, ambitions, and antagonisms of national or quasi-national
interests which have always been the great disturbers of the peace’. The
issues of ‘primarily utilitarian objects’ he raised include ‘the vast and
complex machinery of communications and transport’, ‘the monetary and
financial system’, ‘the prevention of disease’, and ‘the spread of reliable
information regarding … demands for labour’.14
Practical co-operation to control natural resources, shipping and trade
materialized among the Allies during the war. Some members of the
Allied Maritime Transport Council would come to play significant roles
20 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
in the League of Nations. Jean Monnet, well-known as the founding

father of the European Union, was one of them. He would be the deputy
secretary-general of the League, albeit only briefly (1919–1922). Another
was Arthur Salter, who would be the director of the League’s Economic
and Financial Section. In January 1918, Maurice Hankey, the secre-
tary of Britain’s War Cabinet, submitted a memorandum. He suggested
that political, economic and military organizations which already existed
during the war might be used as the basis of the League of Nations.
He also considered that various international activities ‘could gradually
be brought under league auspices’. This idea ‘received important public
support from several quarters’.15
Both Zimmern and Smuts developed the ideas concerning interna-
tional co-operation through the League. Zimmern wrote that there
were ‘a large number of existing bodies engaged in performing interna-
tional functions’, and suggested that ‘they should be required to report
regularly to the Inter-State Conference through the secretariat’. Further-
more, he proposed setting up various international bodies for study and
inquiry, because he was concerned that the chief dangers to the world’s
peace in the future might arise in connection with problems which were
not suitable for judicial determination. He raised various subjects as
examples of the problems: the slave trade, white slave traffic, health,
industrial conditions, finance and currency, transit and the conservation
of resources.16
Smuts also suggested that various existing international technical
bodies should be placed under the League of Nations. He began his
pamphlet, The League of Nations, by referring to the wartime ‘practice
of the Allies in controlling and rationing food, shipping, coal, muni-
tions, etc., for common purposes’, and suggested that ‘in future a League
of Nations might be similarly used for the common economic needs of
the nations belonging to the League’. It is also noticeable that, just like
Zimmern, he proposed that ‘[i]nternational administrative bodies, now
performing international functions in accordance with treaty arrange-
ment, should in future be placed under the management and control of
the Council’. The subjects he raised are also wide-ranging: post, telegraph
and cables; copyrights, patents and trademarks; sanitary regulations; the
slave trade and white slave traffic.17
Both Cecil and Smuts participated in the Paris Peace Conference, and
represented Britain at the League of Nations Commission. Soon after
arriving in Paris on 6 January 1919, Cecil began meeting the Americans
such as Colonel Edward House, the adviser to the president, and Robert
Lansing, the secretary of state. They agreed that experts from the two
countries should meet and draft a League of Nations treaty for consid-
eration as soon as possible. Cecil recorded on 12 January that a drafting
committee of the League of Nations was held in the evening and that it
made some progress.18 Miller recorded that a revision of Cecil’s earlier
paper was received on 18 January.19
Cecil and Smuts met President Wilson on the evening of 19 January.
Wilson showed his scheme for the League of Nations, and Cecil’s
impression of it was ‘almost entirely Smuts and Phillimore combined’.
Fortunately, Wilson was not difficult to deal with.20 Cecil showed the
president a copy of his draft convention and this became one basis for the
discussions between Cecil and Miller, who ‘received considerable powers
to discuss the differences between the American and the British League
of Nations scheme’.21 Miller noticed in discussions with Cecil ‘how much
the British were thinking of matters of international co-operation’.22
The Cecil-Miller Draft, which was prepared by 27 January, touched
upon appointing a ‘Commission to study and report on economic, sani-
tary and other similar problems of international concern’, although it
was considered supplementary.23 After Cecil exchanged opinions with
the president and Colonel House on 31 January,24 the legal adviser
of the British Foreign Office, Cecil Hurst, and Miller prepared the so-
called Hurst-Miller draft on 1 and 2 February. Thus, by the time the
League of Nations Commission began its work with President Wilson
as its chairman, substantial progress had already been made between the
American and British experts.
The first meeting of the League of Nations Commission was convened
on 3 February. Wilson, the chairman, laid the Hurst-Miller draft before
the Commission. Even Bourgeois saw it for the first time.25 He laid
the French proposal, while Italy laid an Italian draft scheme before the
Commission. But they did not oppose Wilson’s suggestion that the
Anglo-American draft should form the basis of the discussion. There
were initially fifteen members in the Commission, namely two members
representing each of the five principal allies, and five members elected
to represent all the other powers. Among the members were Nobuaki
Makino (1861–1949) and Sutemi Chinda (1857–1929) of Japan, and
young V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun, 1888–1985) of the Republic
of China. Koo’s impressive English name was taken from the Duke of
Wellington. He received a doctorate from Columbia University, and was
22 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
extremely fluent in English. Relations between the Chinese like him

and their foreign counterparts became smoother by the shared language
and experience. Diplomacy would be a strong point of the Republic of
China.26
The Commission members were supported by many colleagues.
Among the British team were, to name but a few, Percy, Frank P. Walters,
Philip Noel-Baker, Viscount Cranborne who was the nephew of Robert
Cecil, and E. H. Carr. Walters would work in the League of Nations,
rising to become its deputy secretary-general. He would also be the
author of A History of the League of Nations. Noel-Baker, a Quaker,
had worked on the continent as a member of the Friends’ Ambulance
Unit during the First World War. He would be a Labour MP and an
expert on disarmament and international law. As far as the League was
concerned, he was almost like a son to Cecil. They would form a very
close relationship.27
The British and the Americans planned to have an Executive Council of
the Great Powers as well as a General Assembly of all member states. Cecil
had met Paul Hymans, the Belgian foreign minister, for tea on 29 January,
and told the latter roughly what the League of Nations scheme was. Cecil,
however, did not tell Hymans that the smaller states were to have no
representatives on the Council.28 On the second and third meetings of
the League of Nations Commission, the smaller states demanded to be
represented on the Executive Council of the League. Hymans strongly
denounced the draft proposal. Belgium had been the first bulwark against
German invasion, and placed under four years of occupation during the
Great War. The decision to give the smaller states some representation
was made on 13 February.29
Meanwhile, Japan’s Great Power status and its seat at the Council were
not questioned.30 The British treated Japan as one of the Great Powers
at this stage. Both the plans of Zimmern and Smuts included Japan in
the Great Powers together with the British Empire, France, Italy and the
United States.31 The major reason for this was that Japan entered the First
World War as early as August 1914, and fought against Germany. It sent
warships to the Mediterranean and female nurses to Britain, France and
Russia.32 (I will touch upon one of the nurses later.) Japan was considered
to have contributed to the victory of the Allies.33 In addition, Japan had
been victorious in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 and the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904–1905. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in 1902
still continued. Military strength was a significant element to be consid-

ered as a Great Power in those days.34 Furthermore, to dominate the new
international organization by European countries and the United States
did not seem appropriate if one wanted to make it appear global and
universal rather than merely Western.35
The draft Covenant of 14 February was prepared and made public
to gauge the reaction of the other delegations, the neutral states, and
the world in general. While Wilson was back in the United States for a
month, the efforts to improve the text continued.36 Several draft articles
were combined, and more detailed provisions were prepared. The League
of Nations Commission reconvened on 22 March. The clauses regarding
the traffic in women and children and that in opium and other dangerous
drugs were then added by the 13th meeting of the Commission held on
26 March.37 As will be seen at the beginning of Chapters 3 and 5, relevant
works had already been started before the First World War. The represen-
tatives of voluntary organizations met and tried to influence the national
delegates.38 The proposals of extending social and humanitarian activi-
ties of the League of Nations were finally incorporated in the Covenant
as Article 23. Its section (c) reads that the members of the League ‘will
entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of
agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the
traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs’; and section (f) stipulates
that the members ‘will endeavour to take steps in matters of international
concern for the prevention and control of disease’.
Because of the more pressing problems of peace, the structure of the
technical organization was left undefined by the authors of the League’s
Covenant. The task of establishing it was entrusted to Drummond, the
first secretary-general. Various organizations and committees including
the International Labour Organization (ILO) would be established in the
early 1920s. The League’s first Assembly decided to establish the OAC.
The League of Nations Health Organization (hereafter the LNHO) was
established in 1923.
It should also be noted that Article 7 of the League’s Covenant stipu-
lated that all positions under or in connection with the League should
be open equally to men and women. Social and humanitarian issues
had attracted the interest of women. In addition, there had been many
philanthropic organizations.39 Women were sometimes appointed to the
League’s committees on social questions, and Rachel Crowdy was in
charge of social questions in the Secretariat. She had been renowned
24 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
for her work at the Voluntary Aid Detachment run by the British Red
Cross during the First World War, and had been made a DBE for her
work in 1919. She was recruited to work in the League in the same year,
and initially, her works included issues concerning traffic in opium and
other dangerous drugs, the traffic in women and children, and even health
questions. The independent Health Section was established in 1921, and
Crowdy became the chief of the Social Questions and Opium Traffic
Section in 1922.
Complete equality, however, was not achieved. While the LNHO
expanded, her section remained small. Her staff were not necessarily
competent. While other male section heads were all directors, she was
never given a rank of director or a salary equal to that of male section
heads.40 Furthermore, the contracts of male heads of other sections were
renewed for seven years in September 1928, but Crowdy’s contract lasted
for only one more year. She left the League in 1930.41
Japan’s Participation in the League of Nations

Japan entered the First World War early on the side of the Allies, and
became a permanent member of the League’s Council. Its experience
before and during the war was, however, very different from other Allies.
In his Governing the World, Mark Mazower traces the history of inter-
nationalism, and includes economic internationalism and Richard Cobden
in the genealogy. He has, however, also pointed out that free trade had a
different aspect when the idea was brought to the world outside Europe.
What had started out as a peace movement of its own was quickly
used to underwrite another kind of imperial policy, and the door into
other people’s economies was soon being forced open by British diplo-
mats, backed by gunboats, everywhere from West Africa to Istanbul and
Peking.42
Robinson and Gallagher’s term ‘imperialism of free trade’ is well-

known, and East Asia in the mid-nineteenth century was the region where
free trade was not easily introduced. Both the governments of China and
Japan controlled their foreign relations. China had been the centre of
the international order in East Asia, although Japan had maintained a
distance. There had been no traditional transborder organizations such as
the Christian church in the West. The idea of international co-operation

had not appeared.
From the mid-nineteenth century, Western powers challenged the
existing order in East Asia, often with violent measures. In China’s case,
the change was the result of the first Anglo-Chinese War, widely known
as the Opium War. Japan received the news of the war by Dutch and
Chinese reports, and was shocked to the core by the defeat of the Chinese.
It had several years for preparation before the arrival of Commodore
Matthew Perry of the United States. Free trade was by no means consid-
ered to be a vehicle of peace in East Asia. The West had various faces,
and that of imperialism was dominant in East Asia. Japan observed how
the Western countries behaved on the international stage, especially in
East Asia, feeling it necessary to emulate them in order to maintain its
independence.
Japan had mastered the rules of international society quite well by the
outbreak of the First World War, and had achieved a certain status there.
It had been victorious in the wars against China and Russia, becoming a
colonial power. On the other hand, it had never experienced any drastic
changes in the rules of international society. Nor had it participated in
major international conferences where the multiple countries negotiated
new post-war rules. As a result, Japan had not come to understand the
Western tradition that the rules could be revised through negotiations.
In addition, Japan was geographically very far away from the major
battlefields of the First World War, so that it did not suffer much from
the conflict. The economy in East Asia prospered during the war, because
European countries which had dominated the market could not export
commodities to the region. Therefore, the Japanese did not realize how
earnestly the Europeans had come to seek peace. Although the inter-war
period was when drastic changes occurred in the rules of international
relations, Japan did not expect them to happen. Japan’s understanding of
war and peace had not changed by much from the pre-war period. It had
not realized that war was excessively expensive and destructive. It would
be only a quarter of a century later and through the devastation as a result
of the Second World War that the Japanese began to seek peace earnestly.
For Japan, which entered the international society in the mid-
nineteenth century under the pressure from the Western powers, the
idea of international co-operation was difficult to grasp. Although Pres-
ident Wilson’s impact was tremendous worldwide in 1918–1919,43 the
Japanese senior politicians considered his idealism as mere lip service.
26 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
Their majority expected that it would be impossible to establish the

League of Nations. Although Japan attended the Paris Peace Confer-
ence as one of the five Great Powers, its preparation for the League
was extremely poor. The Japanese delegates to the Peace Conference
were instructed to postpone the establishment of the League of Nations.
Japan’s greatest worry was that such organizations might turn out to be
a white men’s club and that Japan might be placed in a disadvantageous
position because of race.44 It proposed racial equality to be included in
the League’s Covenant.45 The anxiety and intention of Japan were not
understood by the Western powers. Japan did not succeed, and its doubts
about equal and fair treatment were not mitigated.
Even Kijuro Shidehara (1872–1951), the vice-foreign minister, was
worried that the League’s multilateral diplomacy was disadvantageous
to Japan. Shidehara had been a diplomat, and would serve twice as the
foreign minister of Japan in 1924–1927 and 1929–1931. He was known
to have made great efforts towards good relations between the United
States and Japan, and would become the prime minister in 1946 after
Japan was defeated in the Second World War. At the time of the Paris
Peace Conference, however, Shidehara preferred bilateral negotiations
to conference diplomacy. He knew that the Japanese, perhaps including
himself, were not used to it.46
Another serious problem Shidehara must surely have been aware of was
that the Japanese were not good at communicating in foreign languages.
‘Talk’ was the gist of what the new system would bring about,47 and
that was exactly what the Japanese were not good at. Shidehara himself
was skilled in English,48 but the problem of communication was some-
times observed even among diplomats. It was partly because of cultural
differences, and partly because the older generation did not receive
good language training such as through studying abroad. Naotake Sato
(1882–1971), who was the ambassador to France from 1933 to 1936,
complained in his memoirs that there had been no established system
of language training when he had joined the diplomatic service.49 At
the Paris Peace Conference, Japan came to be nicknamed as a ‘silent
partner’,50 while participating Chinese diplomats could argue in fluent
English. Some Chinese diplomats in those days, such as Wellington Koo,
were educated in the United States.51 Some others were the sons of diplo-
mats and spent almost their entire lives in Europe or in the United States.
The example of the latter was Victor Chi-Tsai Hoo (Hu Shize, 1894–
1972), who would be the representative to the OAC in the 1930s. He
was born in Washington, DC, because his father was then working at
the Chinese Legation there. Those diplomats of the Republic of China
were competent, and internationalist by instinct and training. Further-
more, they were extremely fluent in English, and indeed some were more
natural in English than in Chinese. Hoo and T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen,
1894–1971) communicated in English.52
The language problem of the Japanese would become serious when the
League dealt with technical questions, because most Japanese experts of
such specialized issues had been born, bred and educated only in Japan.
Even if they could read, understand and acquire necessary information
written in English or French, they were not trained to communicate
in those languages. Japan had established its modern education system
based on its native language in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
This had been useful when Japan developed its industry and the mili-
tary forces, because neither workers nor soldiers had to learn foreign
languages at all. Once the Japanese had to communicate on the interna-
tional stage, however, the lack of proficiency in foreign languages turned
out to be a severe and serious handicap. Either experts with no language
ability attended meetings themselves, or they asked non-experts who
could communicate in English or French to do so—whichever the case,
a good performance could not be expected. Descriptions like ‘a smiling
Japanese who appeared to know no language besides Japanese’ could be
often found both in the primary and secondary literature.53
The Japanese themselves were aware of the problem of language
proficiency and did not consider the situation satisfactory. Kikujiro Ishii
(1866–1945), the representative of Japan to the League of Nations as well
as the ambassador to France from 1920 to 1927, wrote in his memoirs as
follows:
… anyone could see that the Japanese members who had to participate in
international conferences were in a difficult situation; although they had
favourably comparable knowledge on the topics discussed there, they did
not have the ability to express nor to explain it, so that they had to sit
silently in the corner of the room.54
Ishii lamented the disgrace and disadvantage the Japanese were suffering
as a result of their neglect of foreign language acquisition. It is highly
likely that the Japanese missed opportunities to socialize and join in
the community of the League officials or the representatives from other
28 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
countries. Not very many could become members of the transnational

community. It is also likely that they could not avoid misunderstandings
at critical moments.55
Although Japan was initially not keen on establishing the League, once
it was decided to be established, the Japanese considered it impossible for
them to remain isolated from it. It was obviously better to take part in
various rule-making processes. In addition, to be a permanent member
of the Council was honourable.56 Furthermore, Japan became one of the
mandatory powers. The former German islands in the Pacific north of
the equator were placed under Japan’s supervision as a Class C mandate.
Therefore, Japan not only participated in the League as a founding
member, but all through the 1920s it also did its best to co-operate fully
with the League. It prepared for the first Assembly thoroughly,57 so that
it appeared enthusiastic to Frank Walters.
Only Italy and Japan among the great powers looked upon the meeting as
an occasion of practical importance. … Japan appreciated the fact that at
Geneva she stood on an equal footing with the leading States of Europe
and could watch and, if she chose, share in, the management of interna-
tional affairs. The Japanese delegation was so numerous that a ship had to
be specially chartered to bring it to Europe.58
Walters also wrote that the ‘Japanese government was greatly attached to
the League’, and Shidehara and his colleagues of the Minseito party were
‘on the friendliest terms with the Secretariat’.59
The Japanese Bureau for the League of Nations Affairs was established
in Paris in 1921. Its aim was to support the Japanese ambassador to
France who was also the Japanese representative to the League.60 The
number of Bureau members was less than that of the Japanese Embassy
in London, but almost the same as that of the embassies in Belgium,
Italy and the Netherlands. The Japanese diplomats who worked in the
Bureau can be called the ‘League men’. Most of them had the experience
of service in France, while that in Britain, the United States, and Asian
countries was limited.61 Their first foreign language was French, which
means that they were not necessarily fluent in English. Not many Japanese
were good at both English and French, the two official languages of the
League. Elisabetta Tollardo considers that the lack of fluency in English
in the case of the Italians limited the possibility of interaction with other
League officials and especially with the Americans.62 It is likely that the
same was observed in the case of Japan’s ‘League men’.
Japan’s ‘League men’ were expected to become good at conference
diplomacy. The shared experience of France and the League itself made
them favourable to internationalism and to international co-operation
through the League. They devoted themselves to the organization. The
Japanese delegates to the League contributed to solving problems such as
the minorities questions between European countries.
… there may be some advantage, when a European problem is under

discussion, in including a suitable non-European member if one is avail-
able. First the Brazilian and then the Japanese delegate have, for example,
usefully acted as rapporteurs on minorities questions.63
The decisions of the Japanese diplomats were considered to be fair,

especially because they did not have any personal or national interests
involved in those European disputes. In addition, Japan regularly paid its
annual contributions to the League which were indispensable in the actual
running of the organization. Japan in the 1920s was later described even
as ‘a model member’.64
As Japan was a permanent member, some Japanese had significant
positions in the League and related organizations.65 Inazo Nitobe (1862–
1933) was the under secretary-general. He was originally an agricultural
economist, and studied both in the United States and Germany. He was
also known as the author of Bushido: The Soul of Japan (1900). The fact
that he was a Quaker married to an American might have made his life
easier at Geneva. Rachel Crowdy wrote on him as ‘the one who st[ood]
out most clearly in [her] mind’.66 Another Japanese who occupied a
high position was Mineitciro Adatci (Mineichiro Adachi, 1869–1934).
After taking part in the Council and Assembly as Japan’s ambassador to
Belgium (1917–27) and then to France (1927–1930), he was elected
to be a judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice (here-
after PCIJ). He served as its president from January 1931 to the end
of 1933. Although he had been educated only in Japan, it is known
that his French language ability was exceptionally high for a Japanese.
While in Belgium, he made tremendous efforts ‘at times in an exaggerated
manner’ to be accepted and liked by the people in the country.67 Both
Nitobe and Adachi can be considered as Japan’s internationalists. They
30 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
were influenced by the international environment in which they worked,

and believed in the value of international co-operation.
The efforts of them and the ‘League men’, however, did not increase
Japan’s interest in the League of Nations. Despite the above-mentioned
observation of Walters, it cannot be said that Japan maintained its interest
in the League. Japan, just like the European countries, began to consider
the League as a European concern.68 Different from China, which consid-
ered the League as a source of national and international legitimacy, Japan
did not feel the necessity to use the new international platform to pursue
any particular aim. The Japanese government came to leave the League
matters to the ‘League men’.69 When the ‘League men’ worked in Japan,
many were assigned to the Treaty Division in the Foreign Ministry.
The status of the Treaty Division in the Ministry was not low, but not
extremely high. Only one person reached the position of vice-foreign
minister after he served as the head of the Treaty Division.70 The ‘League
men’ were actually not very influential in Japan.
Naotake Sato can be considered to be one of the ‘League men’. He
had first been stationed at St Petersburg, where French was the language
of diplomacy and the upper class of society. He was the head of the
Japanese Bureau for the League of Nations Affairs in Paris from 1927
to 1930. While he was the ambassador to Belgium (1930–1933), the
Japanese Guandong Army began its aggression in Manchuria. As Kenkichi
Yoshizawa (1874–1965), the ambassador to France, was summoned back
home to be the foreign minister of the Cabinet of his father-in-law, Sato
represented Japan for some time. After he served as the ambassador to
France, he tendered his resignation in 1936. He was appointed foreign
minister in March 1937. This was not a promotion in the ministry, but an
appointment by the prime minister. Many British including Sir Alexander
Cadogan, then the deputy under-secretary of state who had been the
adviser on the League of Nations Affairs, knew Sato personally. When
Sato paid the British ambassador to France his farewell visit in 1937 before
leaving for Japan, the former said that ‘Japan was isolating herself from
every friend’. Cadogan had ‘every confidence in his good intentions and
in his ability, and his appointment [wa]s welcomed’ in Britain.71 In Japan,
however, the power of the military had already become overwhelming.
Sato’s speech in the Diet was detested by them, and he could serve as the
foreign minister only for three months.
The understanding of internationalism did not become deeper nor did
it spread widely in Japan. As was mentioned above, Shidehara tried to
have good relations with the United States. Different from the ‘League
men’, however, he spent most of his career at the Foreign Ministry in
Tokyo. He also served in the United States. It cannot be said that he made
efforts for international co-operation in general; rather, he was thinking
of co-operation with big powers, especially with the United States.
Yotaro Sugimura (1884–1939) is a complicated example. If we look
at his career first, he entered the Foreign Ministry four years after Sato
and was fortunate to be given the opportunity to study international
law at the University of Lyon. He received a doctorate there.72 After
serving at the Imperial Japanese Bureau for the League of Nations Affairs,
he succeeded Nitobe in January 1927, becoming one of the under
secretaries-general and the director of the Political Section of the League.
There was an unwritten rule that if an under secretary-general was of a
certain nationality, his successor would be from the same country.
Even after Sugimura became a League official, he continued to be
formally employed in the administration of Japan. Tollardo shows that
such ‘double-employment’ was frequent also in the cases of Germany and
Italy. These countries wanted their nationals to maintain links to their
home countries, especially when the information was needed. Having dual
loyalty was not a problem as far as the League and the home country
shared a common objective.73 It should be added that in Japan’s case,
it was not easy to find a person who would be able to work in the
Secretariat74 because of the language problem mentioned above.
Sugimura was one of the keenest on the League of Nations among
the Japanese in the 1920s, writing articles in Japanese explaining the
Covenant of the League of Nations. He was considered to be one of
Japan’s internationalists. At the Secretariat, Sugimura formed ‘a partic-
ularly trusting and affectionate relationship’ with Drummond.75 In
addition, in his memoirs published by the Japanese League of Nations
Association in 1930, he praised the British representatives at the League
as being flexible, practical and the best. He described Sir Austen Cham-
berlain, British foreign secretary 1924–1929, as an honest, fair and
respectable person in whom one could truly trust his strong sense of
responsibility.76
Sugimura, just like Shidehara, tended to understand internationalism
to be the co-operation with major powers. Furthermore, as will be seen in
Chapter 4, Sugimura was also a nationalist. Internationalism and nation-
alism coexisted in him. Japan’s national interests were always in his mind.
It seems that he was also a pragmatic person. Sugimura’s remarks after
32 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
Japan withdrew from the League became more nationalist than interna-
tionalist. Such remarks were probably necessary to communicate with the
military whose power was on the rise in the country.77 On the other hand,
the divergence between the League and Japan after the Manchurian Crisis
must have placed him under tremendous stress. Sugimura died of cancer
in 1939 at the age of 55.
Japan was a unique member of the League, and it is almost impos-
sible to categorize it into any one group. First, Japan was a permanent
member of the Council and a colonial power. It had a Class C mandate
under its supervision. Therefore, it shared characteristics with powers such
as Britain and France. Those countries were surely what Japan and the
Japanese diplomats such as Sugimura aimed to be like. On the other hand,
it was obvious that Japan was not a real equal with Britain and France.
Japan was an Asian member. There were only a few independent Asian
countries in the inter-war period. Initially, there were only four League
members in South to East Asia: China, India, Japan and Siam. Most other
territories were still colonies of Western powers. India was an anomalous
case. It could become a League member due to its contribution to the
war efforts of the mighty British Empire. It was, however, admitted only
after arguments. Wilson was actually against the membership of colonies,
arguing that if India could be a member, then the Philippines also could.
Under the circumstances, the Japanese always felt that they might be
isolated or discriminated because of race.
Japan, which had only poorly prepared for the establishment of the
League of Nations as a whole, did not expect at all that social and
humanitarian issues would be included in the Covenant. Japan’s atten-
tion was concentrated on disarmament, mandates, and the racial equality
proposal.78 Ishii considered technical conferences as less important than
other diplomatic meetings.79 Still, once the technical issues were included
in the Covenant, the Japanese government did not neglect them. As Iris
Borowy writes, the Japanese government considered LNHO work suffi-
ciently important to order its representative to remain permanently in
Europe to take part in its work, instead of returning to Japan as he had
previously planned to do.80
Another point which should be added concerning Japan is that the
League did not come into contact with ordinary Japanese subjects at
all; only the elite of Japan in some way or another knew the League.
Japan was still a class-based society in those days, and the gap between
the wealthy and the poor was huge. The language ability of those experts
who attended the League meetings might have been poor, but still, they
received higher education. On the other hand, there were many Japanese
who only had six years of compulsory elementary education. The rate of
literacy itself was high, but the knowledge of foreign languages was nil or
extremely limited at best. The League of Nations Association in Japan was
an organization which had a strong link with the Foreign Ministry. It was
by no means a voluntary organization supported by ordinary people. Its
characteristics were different from those of the British League of Nations
Union.
The League’s Arrival in East Asia

It was only after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 that
the League came to be involved in East Asia to maintain peace and solve
an international conflict. Until then, the League refrained from inter-
vening in political issues in East Asia. The reason was the chaotic situation
in China. After the Qing dynasty was overthrown in 1912, internal strife
continued. Therefore, until the Nationalist government came to power in
1928, it was not very clear to the European members of the League which
of the Beijing and the Nationalist governments was the central authority
to negotiate with.81
One field where the League of Nations’ contact with East Asia started
early was that of health. It was actually a Japanese who suggested the
necessity of collecting information on epidemics in East Asia.
At the second Health Committee held in October 1921, Dr Miki-
nosuke Miyajima (1872–1944), the representative of Japan and a malar-
iologist at the Kitasato Institute, drew attention to the spread of pneu-
monic plague in the north-eastern part of China and Siberia due to
population movement. His intention was to demonstrate the level of
modernity and civilization of Japan to the international community. The
Health Committee, on the other hand, needed to show that the League
was a global, not a European, organization. It also needed to control
infectious diseases. Miyajima’s suggestion led to the investigation into
the incidence of plague and cholera by Dr Norman White, formerly
of the Indian Medical Service and a British member of the League’s
Health Section. He visited various places in East Asia for eight months
in 1922–1923.
34 H. GOTO-SHIBATA
Based on his report, it was decided that the Eastern Bureau would be
established in Singapore in 1925 as the regional epidemiological intelli-
gence centre of the LNHO. Preventing epidemics, such as cholera and
plague, or at least collecting information on them was a significant work
of the LNHO. The Bureau came to be commonly referred to as the ‘Far
Eastern Bureau’. In those days, the term ‘Far East’ covered not only East
Asia but also today’s Southeast Asia. The Eastern Bureau would be the
symbol of the League’s global reach.82 Two Japanese would hold the
position of deputy director of the Eastern Bureau: Tadashi Sato for one
year from April 1926, and Dr Tsune Ouchi from September 1929 to
January 1939. Both were selected from Japan’s Home Ministry.83
White also proposed to have an interchange of public health personnel
in Japan. The purpose of this system was to stimulate the exchange
of information and experience and to promote liaison between the
various health administrations. The interchange was held in Japan in
October 1925. Seventeen public health officers from eleven administra-
tions studied in detail the public health services of Japan.84 Dr Thor-
vald Madsen, the president of the Health Committee, and Dr Ludwik
Rajchman, the director of the League’s Health Section and the secretary
of the Health Committee, also participated in the exchange. Drs Shiko
and Hiroshi Kusama, Japanese First Division members of the Health
Section at that time, were also there. They were brothers.85 Shiko Kusama
was a Christian who had studied sociology at the University of Chicago,
and went on to its graduate school. He came to know Miyajima, when
the latter visited the city, and started working at the Japanese Bureau for
the League of Nations Affairs in 1921. Later, he worked in the Secretariat
of the League of Nations for a few years. He would succeed Miyajima as a
member of the Permanent Central Opium Board (hereafter, PCOB), and
he would be involved in the League of Nations until Japan finally severed
its relations in November 1938. Hiroshi Kusama, the younger brother,
studied at Johns Hopkins University. He would come back to Japan after
four years at the Health Section.86
Now, back to Rajchman. While in Tokyo, he was impressed with the
‘magnificent system of public health administration which had been built
up in Japan’.87 There was not much room for the LNHO to work in
Japan. Rajchman then visited China, and had meetings with the Chinese
health authorities. Here he was ‘impressed with the sense of a new begin-
ning and powerful nationalist consciousness’. Also, he ‘saw an urgent
need not only for public health measures, notably effective quarantine
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No. 6. SIRLOIN OR RUMP OF BEEF.
As the very tender part of this favourite joint, which lies under the
bone, and is called the fillet, is preferred by many eaters, the beef
should be raised, and some slices be taken from it in the direction a
b, before the carver proceeds further. The slices should be cut quite
across the joint, from side to side, as indicated by the line from c to
d, in which direction the whole of the meat is occasionally carved,
though it is much more usual to slice the upper part from e to f.
When the brown outside has been taken off this, it should be evenly
carved in thin slices, and served with some of the gravy in the dish,
and accompanied with horseradish very lightly and finely scraped,
with tufts of which the beef is commonly garnished.
RIBS OF BEEF.
Are carved in the same manner as the sirloin; but there is no fillet
attached to them.
A ROUND OF BEEF.
To carve this well, a very sharp-edged and thin-bladed knife is

requisite. A thick slice should first be taken entirely off the top of the
joint, leaving it very smooth; it should then be cut as thin and as
evenly as possible, and delicate slices of the fat or udder should be
served with the lean.
A BRISKET OF BEEF
Is carved in slices quite across the bones.

No. 7. LEG OF MUTTON.
This, whether roast or boiled, is dished as it lies in the engraving,

unless when fanciful eaters prefer the underside of the joint laid
uppermost, and carved quite across the middle, for the sake of the
finely grained meat which lies beneath the part commonly called the
Pope’s eye. In a general way, the mutton should be sliced, rather
thick than thin as directed by the line between a b; the fat will be
found in the direction c d.
No. 8. QUARTER OF LAMB.
The shoulder must be divided, and raised entirely from the breast
in the direction of the letters a b c d. A slice of butter sprinkled with
cayenne and salt is then usually laid between them, and a little
lemon-juice is added, or a cold Mâitre d’Hôtel sauce is substituted for
these. The shoulder may then be removed into another dish or not,
as is most convenient. The brisket is next separated from the long
bones in the line e f, and carved in the direction g h; the rib-bones
are divided from i i to j j. The choice of the different parts is offered in
serving them.
No. 9. SHOULDER OF MUTTON OR LAMB.
Commence by cutting from the outer edge direct to the bone of the
shoulder in the line a b, and carve as many slices from that part of
the joint as it will afford: then, if more be required, draw the knife on
either side of the ridge of the blade-bone in the direction c c d d. The
fat must be carved in the line e f. Some eaters have a preference for
the juicy, but not very finely-grained flesh on the underside of the
shoulder, which must be turned, for it to be carved. For the mode of
boning a shoulder of mutton or veal, and giving it a more agreeable
appearance, see 219.
No. 10. A SUCKING PIG.
Every part of a sucking pig is good, but some persons consider the
flesh of the neck which lies between the shoulders, and the ribs as
the most delicate portion of it. The shoulders themselves are
preferred by others. They should be taken off, and the legs also, by
passing the knife under them at the letters a b c. The ribs may then
be easily divided from e to d. The flesh only of the larger joints
should be served to ladies; but gentlemen often prefer it sent to them
on the bones.
A FILLET OF VEAL.
There is no difference between the mode of carving this and a

round of beef; but the brown outside slice of the veal is much liked
by many eaters, and a portion of it should be served to them when it
is known to be so. The forcemeat must be reached by cutting deeply
into the flap, and a slice of it served always with the veal.
A LOIN OF VEAL.
This may be carved at choice quite across through the thick part of
the flesh, or in slices taken in the direction of the bones. A slice of
the kidney, and of the fat which surrounds it, should accompany the
veal.
No. 11. A BREAST OF VEAL.
The brisket or gristles[6] of this joint must first be entirely

separated from the rib-bones by pressing the knife quite through it in
the line between a and b; this part may then be divided as shown by
the letters c c c d d d, and the long bones or ribs may easily be
separated in the direction e f. The taste of those who are served
should be consulted as to the part of the joint which is preferred. The
sweetbread is commonly sent to table with a roast breast of veal,
and laid upon it: a portion of it should be served with every plate of
the breast.
6. The tendons are literally the small white gristles themselves, which are found
under the flesh in this part of the joint. When freed from the bone attached to
them, they may be dressed in a variety of ways, and are extremely good: but
they require from four to six hours’ stewing to render them perfectly tender,
even when each tendon is divided into three or four slices. The upper flesh
must be laid back from the tendons before they are taken from the breast,
not left adhering to them. They are very good simply stewed in white gravy,
and served with green peas, à la Française, in the centre. The breast entirely
boned, forced, and rolled, makes a handsome dish, either roasted or stewed.
No. 12. A TONGUE.
This is sliced, not very thin, through the thickest and best part,
shown by the letters a b. The fat of the root, when it is liked, must be
carved by turning the tongue, and cutting in the direction c d.
No. 13. A CALF’S HEAD.
An entire calf’s head, served in its

natural form, recalls too forcibly the
appearance of the living animal to
which it has belonged not to be very
uninviting. Even when the half of one
only is sent to table, something of the
same aspect remains, and as it is in every way improved, and
rendered most easy to carve when boned[7] and rolled, we would
recommend its being so prepared whenever it can be done without
difficulty. Our engraving does not give a very flattering representation
of it in that form, but having been dressed with the skin on, it was not
quite so easily brought into handsome shape as if it had been freed
from it; yet we would nevertheless advise its being generally
retained. When the head is served without being boned, it is carved
across the cheek, in the line from a to b; the part which in flavour and
appearance resembles a sweetbread, and which is regarded as a
delicacy, lies in the direction indicated by the letters c d. The flesh of
the eye is another favourite morsel, which must be detached from
the head by passing the point of the carving knife deeply round the
eye-hole, in the circle marked e e.
7. This will be more easily accomplished by an experienced cook after the head
has been boiled for half an hour and then allowed to cool; but it should not be
left until cold before it is altogether prepared for dressing. After the bones are
removed, it should be laid on a clean cloth, and the inside sprinkled over or
rubbed with a little salt, mace, and cayenne, well mixed together; the tongue
may be laid upon, and rolled up in it. It must be secured, first with a skewer,
and then bound tightly round with tape. It should be boiled or stewed
extremely tender; and is excellent when just covered with good stock, and
simmered for two hours, or when strong broth is substituted for this, and the
bones are added to it. The head may be glazed, and served with rich brown
gravy, or with the ordinary sauces if preferred; and it may be eaten cold, with
Oxford brawn sauce, which is compounded of brown sugar, vinegar,
mustard, and salt, mixed to the taste, with the addition of oil when it is liked.
No. 14. A HAM.
Strict economists sometimes commence the carving of a ham at

the knuckle, and so gradually reach the choicer portion of it; but this
method is not at all to be recommended. It should be cut at once
through the thick part of the flesh, quite down to the bone, in the line
a b, and sliced very thin and evenly, without separating the fat from
the lean. The decoration of the ham No. 14, is formed by leaving on
it a portion of the rind at the knuckle in a semi-circle, and then
trimming it into scollops or points at pleasure; and the ornamental
part of the top is formed from the fat which is pared away from the
thick end and the edges. A paper ruffle, as will be seen, is wrapped
round the bone of the knuckle.
No. 15. A PHEASANT.
This bird was formerly always sent to table with the head on, but it
was a barbarous custom, which has been partially abandoned of late
in the best houses, and which it is hoped may soon be altogether
superseded by one of better taste. The breast is by far the finest part
of a pheasant, and it is carved in slices from pinion to pinion, in the
lines a a b b; the legs may then be taken off, in the direction c d. The
bird, when it is preferred so, may be entirely dismembered by the
directions for a fowl, No. 16. Black and moor-game are trussed and
served like pheasants. The breasts of both are very fine eating, and
the thigh of the black-cock is highly esteemed.
No. 16. A BOILED FOWL.
The boiled fowl of plate 6 is represented as garnished with

branches of parsley, which is an error, as they would be appropriate
to it only if it were cold, and it is seldom served so, being considered
insipid. Small tufts of cauliflower would have been in better keeping
with it, as the bird is supposed to be dished for the dinner-table.
Unless it be for large family parties, fowls are seldom carved there
entirely into joints; but when it is wished to divide them so, the fork
should be fixed firmly in the centre of the breast, and the leg, being
first disengaged from the skin, may be taken off with the wing in the
line a b; or, the wing being previously removed, by carving it down
the line to b, and there separating it from the neck-bone, the leg may
be released from the skin, and easily taken off, by cutting round it
from a to c, and then turning it with the fork, back from the body,
when the joint will readily be perceived.
After the leg and wing on the other side have
been taken off in the same manner, the
merrythought must follow. To remove this, the
knife must be drawn through the flesh in the line
d e, and then turned towards the neck quite
under the merrythought, which it will so lift from
the breast, in this form:—The neck-bones—which
lie close under the upper part of the wings, and
are shaped thus—must next be disengaged from
the fowl, by putting the knife in at the top of the
joint, dividing the long part of the bone from the flesh, and breaking
the short one off by raising it up, and turning it from the body; the
breast, which is shown here, may then be divided from it by merely
cutting through the tender ribs on either side.
It is seldom that further disjointing than this is required at table; but
when it is necessary to cut up the entire fowl, the remainder of it
must be laid with the back uppermost, and to take off the side-bones,
which are of this shape—the point of the knife must be pressed
through the back-bone, near the top, about half an inch from the
centre, and brought down towards the end
of the back, quite through the bone, then
turned in the opposite direction, when the
joints will separate without difficulty. All
which then remains to be done is, to lay the
edge of the knife across the middle of the
only two undivided bones, and then with the
fork to raise the small end of the fowl, which
will part them immediately: to carve a boiled
fowl or chicken in a more modern manner, see the directions which
follow. The breast, wings, and merrythought, are the most delicate
parts of a fowl. On the upper part of the sidebone is the small round
portion of flesh called the oyster, by many persons considered as a
great delicacy.
No. 17. A ROAST FOWL.
It is not usual to carve fowls entirely at table in the manner

described above. The wings, and any other joints are taken off only
as they are required. The breast of a very large fowl may be carved
in slices like that of a turkey; or the whole of that of a small one may
be taken off with the wings, as shown by the line a b. As the liver is a
delicacy, the handsomer mode of serving these last is to remove the
gizzard, which is seldom eaten, then to divide the liver, and to send
an equal portion of it with each wing. The whole of a roast fowl may
be carved by the directions we have already given for No. 16.
No. 18. A PARTRIDGE.
When partridges are served to ladies only, or in

parties where they are present, it is now
customary to take off the heads, to truss the legs
short, and to make them appear (in poulterer’s
phrase) all breast. For gentlemen’s dinners, the
heads may be left on or not at choice. The most ready mode of
carving a partridge is to press back the legs, then to fix the fork firmly
in the inside of the back, and by passing the blade of the knife flat
under the lower part of the breast, to raise it, with the wings, entire
from the body, from which it easily separates. The breast may then
be divided in the middle, as shown by the line from a to b in the
engraving here. This is by far the best and handsomest manner of
carving a partridge, but when the supply of game at table is small,
and it is necessary to serve three persons from the choicer parts of
one bird, a not very large wing should be taken off with the leg on
either side, in the line from a to b in No. 13, and sufficient of the
breast will still remain to send to a third eater. The high game-flavour
of the back of a partridge, as well as that of various other birds,[8] is
greatly relished by many persons.
8. A great man o the north eloquently describes that of a grouse as “the most
pungent, palate-piercing, wild bitter-sweet.”
No. 19. A WOODCOCK.
The thigh and back are the most esteemed

parts of a woodcock which, being a small bird,
may be carved entirely through the centre of the
breast and back, or distributed in the same
manner as the partridge for three, which we have
described; or even carved down like a fowl, if needful. In whatever
way it is divided, however, a portion of the toast which has received
the trail, and on which it should always be sent to table, must
invariably be served to all who partake of it. The very old fashion of
trussing the bird with its own bill, by running it through the thighs and
body, is again adopted by very good cooks of the present day; but
the common method of preparing either woodcocks or snipes for
table is this: the trussing of the legs is, however, better shown at
Nos. 19 and 21 of Plate 6.

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The League of Nations and the East

Asian Imperial Order, 1920–1946 1st ed.

The League of Nations

More information about this series at

ISSN 2522-0195 ISSN 2522-0209 (electronic)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

Part I The League of Nations as Forums and Actors

2 Social and Humanitarian Issues of the League

3 Challenging the Imperial Order: Control of Opium 43

4 Expanding the Range: Japan’s Reaction

5 The TWC as Another Forum and Women 111

Part II Contested Power and Authority

6 Japan’s Withdrawal and China’s Request for a Seat

7 Who Controls the Co-operation?: Technical

8 The Question of Empires: Co-operation

9 The Limits of the League’s Control of Opium 205

10 East Asia in the Architecture of the Post-War World:

BDFA British Documents on Foreign Affairs

When Japanese language works are cited in the footnotes, surnames

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Remarkably, such works of the League were not limited to Europe.

When states co-operate with one another to maintain postal or transport

in criticizing imperial practices. Secondly, once established, the League

powers.13 As a result of reforms, revenues decreased, while expendi-

as much as those of Japan and Britain. It turned out, however, that

5. William E. Rappard, International Relations as Viewed from Geneva (New

19. Tang Chi-hua, Beijing zhengfu yu guoji lianmeng (1919–1928) [Beijing

The League of Nations as Forums and Actors

Social and Humanitarian Issues

The Emergence of Social and Humanitarian

© The Author(s) 2020 17

After the Armistice on 11 November 1918, two further reports were

in the League of Nations. Jean Monnet, well-known as the founding

extremely fluent in English. Relations between the Chinese like him

still continued. Military strength was a significant element to be consid-

Japan’s Participation in the League of Nations

Robinson and Gallagher’s term ‘imperialism of free trade’ is well-

the Christian church in the West. The idea of international co-operation

Their majority expected that it would be impossible to establish the

countries. Not very many could become members of the transnational

… there may be some advantage, when a European problem is under

The decisions of the Japanese diplomats were considered to be fair,

were influenced by the international environment in which they worked,

The League’s Arrival in East Asia

To carve this well, a very sharp-edged and thin-bladed knife is

Is carved in slices quite across the bones.

This, whether roast or boiled, is dished as it lies in the engraving,

There is no difference between the mode of carving this and a

The brisket or gristles[6] of this joint must first be entirely

An entire calf’s head, served in its

Strict economists sometimes commence the carving of a ham at

The boiled fowl of plate 6 is represented as garnished with

It is not usual to carve fowls entirely at table in the manner

When partridges are served to ladies only, or in

The thigh and back are the most esteemed

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