Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Edited by
TOM CLIFF
TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI
SHUGE WEI
The Living Politics of Self-Help Movements
in East Asia
Tom Cliff • Tessa Morris-Suzuki
Shuge Wei
Editors
Shuge Wei
Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
v
vi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
study of this phenomenon in East Asia and beyond. The cases we have
studied pose important questions about our understanding of the very
meaning of “politics” itself. Our aim, in responding to those questions, is
to open up space for a wider reimagining of the meaning of political life in
the twenty-first-century world.
The editors and authors express their deep gratitude to the Australian
Research Council, which has supported this research through its Laureate
Fellowship program (project FL120100155—Informal Life Politics in the
Remaking of Northeast Asia: From Cold War to post-Cold War). We also
warmly thank our fellow project members Eun Jeong Soh and Robert
Winstanley-Chesters, who have contributed greatly to the development of
our ideas about informal life politics in the region, and express particular
thanks to the project’s research assistant and administrator, Hanbyol Lee.
This research, of course, would not have been possible without the kind-
ness and cooperation of many people in Beijing, South Korea, Inner
Mongolia, Okinawa and other parts of Japan, and Taiwan, who generously
shared their time, experiences, and ideas with us. We express our gratitude
to all of them, and to our partners and families who have shared this jour-
ney of discovery with us.
Contents
Part I Citizenships 15
vii
viii CONTENTS
Part II Networks 97
Bibliography 219
Index 235
List of Figures
ix
x LIST OF FIGURES
ous and ethically virtuous life. The many and diverse strands of Confucian,
Neo-Confucian, and Daoist thought that emerged in China—and were
then taken up and reworked in Japan, Korea, and elsewhere—shared a
concern with the creation of a harmonious and virtuous society. Though
Confucian ideas are often seen as emphasising hierarchical order and obe-
dience to the ruler, many currents of East Asian thought in fact gave ordi-
nary people a vital part in the creation of the good society.4 There is,
indeed, a recurrent motif in East Asian political thought which sees politi-
cal virtue, harmony, and happiness as being created in the everyday lives of
the population:
Someone said to Confucius, Why are you not in government? The Master
said, The Shu says, “Be filial toward your parents, be friendly toward your
brothers, and you will contribute to the government.” This too, then, is
being in government. Why should you speak of being “in government?”5
Ideas in Motion
These debates about politics and subpolitics, ideology and post-ideology
are profoundly relevant to our discussion of informal life politics. But their
broad-brush abstractions fail to come to grips with some of the most
intriguing and puzzling features of our age. One problem is that the
debates outlined so far set up a dichotomy between (on the one hand)
ideology and antagonistic/agonistic politics and (on the other) post-
ideology and consensus; but events of recent years complicate this dichot-
omy. The global rise of populism challenges the established schema of
“right versus left,” and even raises questions about the very meaning of
“ideology” itself. The populist “reality TV politics” of figures like Duterte
or Trump are certainly antagonistic, but do they involve “ideology” in the
sense that this word was used by political thinkers like Carl Schmitt or
(from a very different perspective) Antonio Gramschi? The difficulties
inherent in a sharp dichotomy between ideology and post-ideology also
become very clear when we consider cases of grassroots actions like the
ones presented in this book.
The groups that we are studying here are not necessarily “ideological”
in the sense of embracing any of the major political traditions outlined by
Bronner. But that does not mean that they are devoid of political ideas.
Many are eclectic, borrowing ideas from a diverse range of sources, and
embracing participants with varying views of the world. In this sense,
obviously, they need to create some degree of internal consensus (however
incomplete) in order to do anything at all. But to be politically eclectic is
a very different matter from embracing a post-political consensus. In their
relationship to the wider world, most groups which seek to bring about
INTRODUCTION: LIVING POLITICS—SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES… 7
and educational resources available for city residents, the workers’ NGO
chooses to “ignore” the state, and to “enact” citizenship by fostering a cul-
tural and political aesthetic parallel to the mainstream ideal. In Chapter 4,
Yonjae Paik emphasises the importance of communal self-help in creating an
autonomous space against the state’s threat to personal and community life.
Paik points out that the rise of chemical farming in South Korea since the
1960s is not purely an economic matter, to increase food production, but
a political process to strengthen the state’s control of farming and rural
society: part of a long East Asian tradition of building a “rich country and
strong military.” In tracing the international origins of the organic farming
movement in the 1920s, including the Danish rural movement, he explores
the way in which local communities have developed and adapted ideas from
a wide range of sources, and shows how these grassroots efforts served to
protect local citizenship from erosion by state ideologies.
Part II, “Networks,” moves the focus to informal networks. Uchralt
Otede highlights the crucial role that networking between external groups
and the local community plays in the dynamics of living politics. The
exchange of information and resources through informal networks is illus-
trated by his study of the efforts of the herders from Eastern Ujimchin
Banner in Inner Mongolia to protect their land and water from pollution
by a paper mill. He identifies three networks as vitally important to these
efforts. The first links Inner Mongolian herders with former “Educated
Youth,” young people who were sent to Eastern Ujimchin grassland from
urban areas for re-education during the 1960s and 1970s; the second con-
nects former “Educated Youth” themselves; and the third is a loosely
structured group linked by a shared concern for the grassland environ-
ment. In Chapter 7, Shinnosuke Takahashi challenges the view that activ-
ists are motivated and united by homogenous identity and ideology. By
analysing daily practices and social networks in Takae, a rural Okinawan
community whose life is disrupted by the construction of a US military
base, Takahashi shows how multiple forms of place-based consciousness
come together to provide the basis for collected action. Both Inner
Mongolia and Okinawa are “ethnic minority” areas from the perspective of
the nation state, but both Uchralt Otede’s and Takahashi’s analyses, while
acknowledging distinctive regional histories and cultures, go beyond exist-
ing analyses that frame the regions’ living politics in strictly “ethnic” terms.
Part III, “Alternatives,” centres on experiments in alternative value cre-
ation. Shuge Wei suggests that non-market exchange pursued by local com-
munities in rural areas is not merely a complement to the market system,
12 T. MORRIS-SUZUKI AND S. WEI
but an act of resistance against it. Behind the different exchange systems are
different value systems: while the market focuses on maximising profits,
local non-market exchanges value mutuality and balance. She examines the
social experiment of non-market exchange by investigating a local com-
munity’s efforts to revive rice terrace farming in the Gongliao district of
Taiwan. This story shows how intellectuals and farmers cooperate to redis-
cover and re-invent the local farming tradition as a challenge to the domi-
nant market system. In Chapter 10, Tessa Morris-Suzuki shows how living
politics may start from action rather than ideology. Drawing on the history
of the Mayu alternative currency scheme in the Japanese regional city of
Ueda, she suggests that the very act of being apparently “apolitical” can be
seen as a way of reshaping the meaning of politics.
The Epilogue brings together the key themes of the book and suggests
avenues for future research and action. The formal political landscape of
East Asia is very diverse, but the examples of informal life politics explored
in the book’s chapters show that, within this diversity, local communities
face common challenges as they struggle to pursue their own visions of the
“good life” in the twenty-first-century world. At the same time, the exam-
ples of living politics highlighted in the following chapters suggest ideas,
hopes, and practices which may provide inspiration to others engaged in
similar quests, not only around the East Asian region but also worldwide.
Notes
1. See, for example, John M. Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,”
in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, eds. Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety
(Lanham, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 65–90.
2. Kostas Vlassopoulos, Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History
Beyond Eurocentrism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
3. See, for example, Omedi Ochieng, Groundwork for the Practice of the Good
Life: Politics and Ethics at the Intersection of North Atlantic and African
Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).
4. See, for example, Dorothy Ko, “Bodies in Utopia and Utopian Bodies in
Imperial China,” in Thinking Utopia: Steps into Other Worlds, eds. Jörn Rüsen,
Michael Fehr, and Thomas W. Rieger (Oxford and New York: Berghahn
Books), 98–103; Jacqueline Dutton, “‘Non-Western’ Utopian Traditions,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, ed. Gregory Claeys
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 223–258.
5. 或谓孔子曰:“子奚不为政?“子曰:“《书》云:‘孝乎惟孝、友于兄弟,施于有
政。‘是亦为政,奚其为为政?” See Analects 2:21.
INTRODUCTION: LIVING POLITICS—SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES… 13
6. In Japan, 73% of eligible voters voted in the 1990 general election, com-
pared with 53% in the 2014 election; in South Korea, voter participation
in the 1992 presidential election was more than 70%, compared with
53% in the 2012 presidential election; in Taiwan, more than 80% of the
electorate voted in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, compared
with 62% in the 2016 election. See the online data published by the
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, accessed December
15, 2016, www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=114, www.idea.int/
vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=KR, www.idea.int/vt/countryview.
cfm?CountryCode=TW
7. Globescan, “New Poll Shows UK Voters Disillusioned With Political
System,” 26 March 2015, accessed January 15, 2017, http://www.glob-
escan.com/101-press-releases-2015/347-uk-voters-disillusioned-
with-political-system.html
8. Gary W. Reichard, Deadlock and Disillusionment: American Politics since
1968 (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016).
9. For example, Davina Cooper, Everyday Utopias: The Conceptual Life of
Promising Spaces. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Ruth
Levitas, Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
10. For example, John Holloway, Crack Capitalism (London: Pluto Press,
2010); James Scott, Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces in Autonomy,
Dignity and Meaningful Work and Play. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2012); Chris Dixon, Another Politics: Talking Across Today’s
Transformative Movements (Oakland, CA: University of California Press,
2014).
11. For example, Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the
Middle East (2nd edition, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
12. Stephen Eric Bronner, Ideas in Action: Political Tradition in the Twentieth
Century (Lanham, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 9.
13. Bronner, Ideas in Action, 317.
14. Bronner, Ideas in Action, 323.
15. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 10.
16. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right.
17. Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 44.
18. Giddens, The Third Way, 45.
19. Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 95–96.
20. Beck, World at Risk, 95.
21. Beck, World at Risk, 97.
22. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), 10.
14 T. MORRIS-SUZUKI AND S. WEI
Citizenships
CHAPTER 2
Tom Cliff
The implicit demand voiced by the state is to pay attention to it. The other
side of the state’s demand for attention is, of course, the urge to ignore the
state. But what does it mean for the state to demand attention, or for any-
one to ignore the state? In this essay, I parse some examples that support
my opening statement, and explore some of the possible empirical and
theoretical consequences. My aim is to pose some guiding questions for a
research agenda into civil movements—and “non-movements”1—that
takes the state’s demand for attention as an object of analysis in and of
itself.
Ignoring the state, in one area of life or another, is a condition of infor-
mal life politics. Informal life politics actions are informal precisely because
they do not “seek redress” for wrongs or relief from threats to their
existence through appeal to the state, or “higher” political power.2 Even if
the state chooses to ignore them, or crush their protest, vertically-oriented
appeals reaffirm the hierarchical relationship between ruler and ruled. Self-
help actions are horizontal. They effectively ignore the state by disengag-
ing from what Thomas Hobbes termed the “covenant” that requires the
state to protect—and in some polities, provide.3
T. Cliff (*)
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
Legacies
The strenuous arguments put forward by some prominent “libertarian”
political philosophers of the mid-nineteenth century themselves constitute
evidence of the state’s demand for attention. A germane starting point is
the English social theorist Herbert Spencer, who pushed the principles of
individualism to their fullest extent with an 1851 essay titled “The Right
to Ignore the State.”4 If Spencer had not felt that the citizen’s (his) ability
to ignore the state was somehow constrained, he would surely not have
seen the need to spend his energy asserting this as an inalienable right.
The foundation of Spencer’s political philosophy was “that every man
has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal
freedom of any other man.” He called this “the law of equal freedom.”5
Using the emergence and legitimation of Protestantism in England as an
example of how the right to ignore the official state religion—which meant
the right to refuse allegiance to Catholicism and not pay taxes to the
Catholic Church—became widely accepted by both state and social actors,
Spencer proceeded to extend this liberty to every aspect of life. “Civil and
religious liberty … are parts of the same whole and cannot philosophically
be separated.” “Liberty of action” was to him as much “a point of con-
science” as was liberty of belief.6
Spencer does not broach the important question of whether England’s
sixteenth-century break with Catholicism would ever have been permit-
ted without the support of the reigning monarch. This omission is cer-
tainly critical: the English Reformation was driven by the monarch Henry
VIII and the merchant classes for political and personal reasons, not
“matters of [religious] conscience.” Henry wanted to be rid of papal
authority, and to assert his own authority over both the clergy and the
populace within his realm.7 That is to say, whatever freedom of religious
choice existed in nineteenth-century England did not come about
CONCEPT ESSAY ONE: IGNORING THE ATTENTION-SEEKING STATE 19
through any individual’s insistence on moral law, but rather through the
sovereign’s insistence on absolute authority, over and above even that of
the supra-state authority of the Roman Catholic Church. This was essen-
tially a competition between two statist organisations for the right to
demand popular attention.
Henry David Thoreau was an American contemporary of Spencer’s,
and their views overlapped considerably, but while the radically individu-
alistic Spencer framed his approach as passive, Thoreau advocated an active
stance that was explicitly concerned with the citizenship rights of a broader
public.8 Arguing that civil disobedience was an obligation when one’s own
government is doing wrong, he criticised those who “hesitate, and …
regret, and sometimes … petition; but … do nothing in earnest.” He said
that “They will wait, well disposed, for others to remedy the evil, that they
may no longer have it to regret.”9 The evil that Thoreau was talking about
was the American government’s Mexican War of 1846–47, and the com-
plicity of that same government in the slavery that was ongoing in the
southern states. He argued that Americans who did not actively oppose
the government were supporting it both financially and morally, even if
they professed to be against the Mexican War and against slavery.
Anthropomorphising the state in the form of the tax collector—“the only
mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it”—Thoreau
describes how the state says, “Recognize me.” The only time in the whole
essay that he articulates the direct voice of the state, it is as a demand for
attention. Concurring with Spencer’s assertion that “to refuse to be taxed,
is to cut all connection with the state,” Thoreau says that “the simplest,
the most effectual, and … the indispensablest [sic] mode of treating with
it on this head … is to deny it then.”10 Like Spencer, he takes offence at
the state’s demand for attention, and asserts the right to ignore it. Unlike
Spencer, he affirms “ignoring” as something that transcends the individual
and which is, in fact, a most vigorous resistance: “Let your life be a
counter-friction to stop the machine.”11
The evidence is that … The majority of modern states are demanding more
and more while offering less and less. … Possibly by way of compensating
for their growing impotence, many states have also developed a disturbing
habit of meddling in the most minute detail of people’s lives. 19
Turkmens … see [the state as] a paternalistic organ, which displays father-
like care for them, … makes them happy and provides them with a free life.
This is the reason, why the Turkmen people adore with devotion the state
and its President, believe in it, support it and are willing to defend it even
laying down their lives.22
Exchange is what the structure of world history has always been all
about, according to Karatani, and it is difficult to disagree with him. If
ruled populations got absolutely nothing, including safety, out of submit-
ting material and/or symbolic tribute to a given entity that claimed ruling
status, then there would be little cause for them to do so. The political
community would not come to be. Turning this around, all political com-
munities depend on some form of exchange between ruler and ruled.
More generally, Karatani’s broad definition of exchange makes a polity in
which no form of exchange can be discerned all-but impossible. What
interests me here is the specific nature of that exchange in the context of
different sorts of political community. To put this in question form: What
is the relationship between the nature of the political community and the
nature of the symbolic capital, safety guarantees, and material goods
exchanged between ruler and ruled? Is the tribute being submitted to the
rulers by the ruled population primarily symbolic or primarily economic?
More specifically, under what circumstances is symbolic tribute the primary
concern of the state?
A Mirror
Within any given polity, many different spaces of freedom and unfreedom
exist; these spaces are rarely if ever total in either respect, and are them-
selves in a continual state of flux. One recent illustration of this hails from
CONCEPT ESSAY ONE: IGNORING THE ATTENTION-SEEKING STATE 23
Active Citizenship
Citizenship lies in a complex, even uneasy, relationship with the claim to a
right to ignore the state. The complexity arises because, being constituted
of rights and responsibilities in relation to a particular polity or political
24 T. CLIFF
* * *
establish their own school, and begin to propagate their “own culture,”
local and municipal authorities become increasingly attentive and unfriendly.
The second case study complements the first by examining the practices
and religiously-inspired origins of the South Korean organic farming
movement. Like the migrant workers, the pioneer organic farmers were
initially viewed with suspicion by the communities around them, and seen
as threatening by the authoritarian regime in power at the time. Both
workers and farmers were driven by the pragmatic needs of their own situ-
ation, by a sense of what is “right,” and by intellectual influences both
local and international. Paik’s chapter details how Christian nationalism
combined with the traditions of the Danish rural movement of the 1920s
to provide the organic farming movement with alternative economic and
moral bases to the government’s Green Revolution. Alternate Christian
ideals arising out of the Korean and Japanese non-church movements also
directly influenced the development of organic farming in Northeast Asia.
Although both the migrant workers’ and the farmers’ movements were
(are) inherently political, neither began with rebellious or revolutionary
aims. Their political action was and is not directed at regime change but
rather at improving their own lives and those of people around them. The
following case studies explicate these active expressions of citizenship.
Notes
1. Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
2. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Invisible Politics,” Humanities Australia (2013), 8.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-
Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (McMaster University Archive of the
History of Economic Thought, 1998 [1651]), 82.
4. Herbert Spencer, “The Right to Ignore the State,” The Best of the Online
Library of Liberty No. 22, (1851 [2013]), accessed April 28, 2016, http://
oll.libertyfund.org/pages/spencer-the-right-to-ignore-the-state-1851.
5. Spencer, “The Right to Ignore the State,” 3.
6. Spencer, “The Right to Ignore the State,” 6–7.
7. Terence Allen Morris, Europe and England in the Sixteenth Century
(London: Routledge, 1998), 172; Christopher Haigh, English
Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society Under the Tudors (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 89–106. Haigh describes how Henry put
together a “divorce think-tank” to gather documents supporting the
annulment of his marriage to Katherine of Aragon, in order that he could
26 T. CLIFF
19. Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, 410.
20. Chris Monday, “Family Rule as the Highest Stage of Communism,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5 (2011).
21. Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic
Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 155.
22. Quoted in Slavomir Horak, “The ideology of the Turkmenbashy regime,”
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), 1.
23. Wendy McElroy, Henry Thoreau and ‘Civil Disobedience’, September 8,
2009, Iowa State University, accessed April 28, 2016, http://thoreau.
eserver.org/wendy.html
24. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience.
25. Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of
Speech, Vol. 90, No. 2 (2004); James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship:
Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008); Rivke Jaffe, “The Hybrid State: Crime and
Citizenship in Urban Jamaica,” American Ethnologist, Vol. 40, No. 4
(2013).
Chinese rural peoples’ migration to the city is motivated first and foremost
by the urge to survive. The first verse of “All Workers Are One Family”
(Tianxia dagong shi yi jia 天下打工是一家) by New Workers Art Troupe
links survival with collective action.1
and recreational facilities. These services were rudimentary at best, but the
Zhejiang migrants succeeded in forming an urban community with politi-
cal significance:
small and informal as a city district ruled over by a gang lord (Jaffe), or as
large and formally-constituted as a nation. Attempts to create citizens
through education are thus attempts to create a particular sense of com-
munity—a consciousness of shared interests or commonality. In East Asia,
one particularly prevalent example of this is state-driven nationalism, but,
as can be seen in this book, smaller-scale and informal examples abound.
“Political groups,” a term borrowed from the late Qing-era scholar Yan
Fu, are a form of community with a high level of political potency. “Those
who form groups will survive while those who do not form groups will
perish,” wrote Yan.10 He defined “political groups” as those that were
held together with what he called “citizenship consciousness,” rather than
the obligations of localism or familialism. Yan saw the traditional loyalties
of native place and kin as burdens on Chinese society, arguing that they
discouraged horizontal ties between autonomous individuals from differ-
ent social groups, and thus the formation of a politically-engaged and
influential citizenry. His concept of a truly civil society was in this way
close to the Habermasian ideal.
The historic, collective effort to survive by the Zhejiang migrants
played an important role in opening socio-political space for rural migrant
workers in urban China. Their construction of alternative social services
and infrastructure (both very much the realm of the state in China at the
time) laid the groundwork for a later generation of migrants to assert the
validity of a culture that was distinct from that of mainstream, urban, stat-
ist China. This chapter focuses on the activities of a group of that later
generation. In both cases, the migrants were in some respects ignored by
the state, and in some respects attacked by state actors. In response, both
groups of outsiders took collected self-help actions (mutual assistance
within the group) with the aim of perpetuating their own survival. They
were, in other words, practising informal life politics.
“Informal” actions—those that do not directly appeal to or engage
with state actors—are only a part of what groups practising informal life
politics do. Formal engagement with state actors, be that explicitly politi-
cal or otherwise, still makes up the greater part of these groups’ actions.
Informal life politics actions rarely stand alone in China, tending instead
to be nested within a suite of governmentally-oriented responses to exog-
enous threats. The societal actors may, in the terms of my foregoing con-
cept essay, ignore the state in some respects whilst simultaneously paying
attention to the state and its declarations in various other ways. The aim of
the social researcher, then, is not to identify conceptually-pure examples of
SURVIVAL AS CITIZENSHIP, OR CITIZENSHIP AS SURVIVAL? IMAGINED… 33
informal life politics, but to see what role informal life politics actions play
in political life and interactions more broadly.
This chapter explores a multifaceted attempt to generate citizenship
consciousness in others, showing how survival efforts can lead to inadver-
tent or transient expressions of citizenship that have important political
effects. I call this phenomenon “oblique activism,” and would like to sug-
gest that it has an important role to play in social change, especially in
more heavily-repressive situations where the potential cost of activism is
high. Both the Zhejiang Village case and the two-part case study below
highlight the resounding political effect of direct actions that are not
directly contentious. The following section illustrates these processes with
a focus on the crucial role of education. I then reflect on the relationship
between citizenship and survival, and end the chapter by briefly illustrat-
ing the slide between indirect action and direct political contention.
Survival Politics
In a light industrial village on the outskirts of Beijing there is a non-state
primary school for children of migrant workers (Fig. 3.1). It is known as
the Tongxin (“Of One Heart”) school, after the fact that it is run by
Fig. 3.1 Industrial alleyway in Picun Village. Photograph © Tom Cliff 2013
34 T. CLIFF AND K. WANG
migrant workers for migrant workers and their children. The conditions
and facilities fall short of even the most basic state-funded schools in the
area. Although Chinese law provides for universal and compulsory basic
education for nine years, in practice it is only available in the location of
the parents’ hukou.11 The exclusion of rural children from urban schools
has prompted the establishment of many private schools for out-of-area
children, in places with sizeable migrant populations. Since it is almost
impossible for the schools to abide by every single regulation, they are
officially illegal, and subject to the constant threat of arbitrary demolition.
The Tongxin migrant primary school is one such school, but Tongxin
distinguishes itself in two very important ways. First, the Tongxin school
is not an enterprise with a profit motive, as most migrant schools are, and
as the services that made Zhejiang Village all were. The school fees are
roughly 30% lower than similar schools in surrounding villages, and yet
the school manages to sustain its operations solely through fees received.
At end 2013, they had about 750 students, but estimated that only 250
students are required to break even. External donations (which it does get,
from private corporations and philanthropic individuals) are a bonus.
Second, the Tongxin school is the most important political asset of a
labour NGO called “Spiritual Home for Migrant Workers” (Gongyou zhi
jia). The three main leaders of Spiritual Home are musicians, and their
first foray into labour politics was travelling from place to place playing
their own rousing music for migrant workers. In 2002 they set up Spiritual
Home, but were shut down and moved on twice in three years due to local
government pressure on the (profit-oriented) migrant schools that they
had set up alongside. When, in 2005, they got a recording contract based
on the popularity of their song “All Workers Are One Family,”12 they
invested the entire 75,000 Chinese Yuan in establishing the Tongxin
school. Having control of “their own” school meant that they would have
direct access to workers (the childrens’ parents), and, since they them-
selves were the school leaders, they would not be thrown out if the politi-
cal heat was turned up. At worst, the school and the NGO would go down
together. Moreover, even if all external funding ceased, the small surplus
made by the school would be enough to sustain their NGO, and allow
them to continue to tour factories and places with heavy concentrations of
migrant workers to spread their messages—Unite! Raise your head! Claim
your dignity!
Spiritual Home relies also upon a combination of formal and informal
ties to a wide variety of societal and governmental actors for political sur-
SURVIVAL AS CITIZENSHIP, OR CITIZENSHIP AS SURVIVAL? IMAGINED… 35
vival. Apart from those migrant workers who are involved with the organ-
isation, Spiritual Home has a substantial body of university student
volunteers and strong links with certain influential academics, media per-
sonalities, and government officials. Mainly through the medium of social
media, staff of Spiritual Home spend a great deal of energy reaching out
to the urban middle class and the mainstream media. The main front-man
and political leader of Spiritual Home, Sun Heng, said, “if you are
involved in labour organisation, you must construct extensive social net-
works [for protection]. Otherwise, you are so vulnerable.” The opera-
tional elements of this survival strategy will be outlined in the latter part
of this chapter.
Spiritual Home is now one of the largest and most influential labour
NGOs in China. It has branches in a number of other large and mid-sized
cities in China, including Suzhou, Xi’an, and Shenzhen, and it is c onnected
in a looser way to more than 30 labour NGOs nationwide. Sun Heng
regularly visits these “partner organisations” to oversee and assist in their
development. All of them are considerably smaller than Spiritual Home
itself: they range in size from 3 to 10 staff, while Spiritual Home has more
than 80 paid employees, including 40 teachers at the school. “Taking out”
Spiritual Home would render the many other smaller labour NGOs in its
nationwide network both demoralised and politically vulnerable. The
migrant childrens’ primary school can thus be said to play a key role in
protecting—enabling the survival of—a significant chunk of labour-
oriented civil society in China.
the city at a time when the cost of living is rising more quickly than their
wages, and also operate as informal meeting points for the local migrant
population.
Another example of how Spiritual Home merges social and environ-
mental benefit with economic benefit is what they call the “women work-
ers’ cooperative.” It is basically a sewing room in the primary school
compound, where migrant mothers can do some productive work making
small items out of donated materials that cannot be sold as is in the op
shop. At the same time, they can look after their children, including
younger ones who do not yet attend school. The piece work is low value,
and even those who do it full time earn only about 1500 renminbi per
month, but if their family commitments preclude them from taking on
full-time work elsewhere, it is at least something. Most importantly, some
of the participants told me, the interaction with other mothers helps to
reduce the feelings of isolation that they may otherwise have and provides
a much-needed psychological support network.
The community centre is where the organisation is based, a couple of
hundred metres away from the Tongxin school on the outskirts of Beijing.
It hosts a museum, a cinema, a library, a theatre (Fig. 3.2), and an open
area for recreation. All of the functions of the centre, including the salaries
of the leaders and paid employees, are funded primarily by Oxfam Hong
Kong. Across the road from the community centre is another compound
where the key staff of the organisation live. After work and on weekends,
and especially when a film or theatre production is being staged, the centre
serves as a gathering place for locally-resident migrant workers. The aim is
to provide a space for the migrant workers to relax in and feel ownership
of (since they feel highly unwelcome in many other public spaces of the
city) and to promote a common identity among them. The community
life that the centre fosters feeds into the most immediate organisational
objective—education. Education, in the broadest sense, has long been
seen as elemental to creating citizens out of a passive and/or an ignorant
populace.
Fig. 3.2 The New Workers’ Theatre in Picun Village. Photograph © Tom Cliff
2013
My child
I am sorry
Looking at your inquisitive eyes
I am disheartened and ashamed …
How do I dare tell you
Tell you that this city won’t let you to go to school
What kind of scene is this?
What should I do?
I have been choking on my words for days
How do I explain to you,
Explain that this country is not ours
Or rather, that we are not of this country …
Excerpt from the poem “My Child, I am Sorry” (emphasis added)13
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Rasutovi oli tyytyväinen, niin tyytyväinen kuin ikävää pelkäävä
ihminen voi olla päästyänsä viihtymyksen riemuun.
*****
*****
*****
———
Ristianilla oli ikävä. Lumi oli eristänyt hänet kylästä, ja aina yhtä
hiljaisina alkaneet päivät olivat uuvuttaneet hänet makailuun ja
laiskaan kääntelehtimiseen. Nekin reenjäljet olivat jo hävinneet
lumikatteisiin, jotka vielä viikko sitten kertoivat kartanolta lähteneistä
täyteläisistä kuormista ja eräästä arvoituksesta, jota Ristian oli
miettinyt monta päivää: muutamat Järvituitun syksyllä hevosensa
menettäneet miehet olivat pyssyt olalla tulleet nummistoon ja
sanoneet heillä olevan luvan viedä mitä tahtoivat; ja veivätkin,
Rasutovin hevosella ja reellä omiensa lisäksi vielä, usuttivatpa
Ristianiakin mukaansa muka uuteen elämään kerrassaan. Mutta
isännyyden ja lohien makuun päässyt Ristian jäi entisekseen
nummien saarrokseen muistelemaan Rasutovia ja kaikkea, mitä
hänelle oli tapahtunut haaraparran tultua Järvituittuun.
— Sinulle annan, ota, ota koko kala, muista minun antaneen, vai
otanko tupaan ja paistan sinulle? Ylen on rasvainen kala, on kuin
juhannuslahna, rasvainen ja selästä pehmeä.
— Mutta jos nyt jäivät herrat tulematta, niin kyllä kuollaan kuin
torakat kuivaan uuninraviin. Mistä otat silloin ruplan ja ruuan?
— Voi näyttää siltä, mutta voi toisellakin. Ampui tuo sama hätä
minunkin lävitseni silloin, kun liitti sänkyyn läsimään. Minä katselin
silloin asiat niin, että tällä ruoskalla ärsytetyllä vauhdilla ajetaan pian
notkoon, ellei muutosta tule. Ja ainahan ihmiset pelkäävät mustia
pilvenkiukamia, niin kauan kuin ne roikkuvat niskan päällä, mutta
sitten sateen mentyä katsovat ympärillensä kuin uutta maailmaa.
Minusta ei ole enää siivo eläjäksi, sillä en näillä ramaantuneilla
käsillä mahda maalle mitään, mutta jos nyt alkaisi ajella pellonselkiä
yhtä ahkerasti ja rapsakasti kuin maantien raiteita, niin itsestään
joutuisi uuteen elämään.