Inclusion in Post-Conflict Legislatures:

The Kosovo and Northern Ireland

Assemblies 1st ed. 2020 Edition
Michael Potter
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Inclusion in Post-Conflict
Legislatures
The Kosovo and
Northern Ireland Assemblies

Michael Potter
Inclusion in Post-Conflict Legislatures
 Michael Potter

Inclusion
in Post-Conflict
Legislatures
The Kosovo and Northern Ireland Assemblies
Michael Potter
Centre for the Study of Ethnic
Conflict
Queen’s University Belfast
Belfast, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-25535-0 ISBN 978-3-030-25536-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25536-7

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 Preface

This book is about investigating how ordinary people are marginalised or

excluded by prevailing political and social forces created by the particu-
lar circumstances of where they live. In this instance, it is the effects of
the design of political institutions to manage conflict between particular
identities on other identities that are not directly associated with the con-
flict, women and minority ethnic identities being used here as examples.
I am not taking the view that women and minority ethnic groups do not
participate in violent conflict. Of course they do. But a broad range of
literature recognises conflict as a masculinist project, and I do not oppose
this view. Also, it is clear that for the most part conflict based on ethnic
identity does not have much meaning for the majority of people who are
not of the identities in conflict. Women and minority ethnic groups are
also relatively easy to identify, so they make useful analytical categories.
I have chosen Northern Ireland and Kosovo as the regions for study.
I am in no way implying that they are comparable as contexts, but there
are interesting themes that are manifested in both places. Ironically, dur-
ing the fieldwork both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Kosovo
Assembly managed to find themselves unable to choose a Speaker of the
legislature or form a government at about the same time. Similar forces
were at work in different places. I do not take a position in this book
on the constitutional situation of either Kosovo or Northern Ireland. My
sole interest is to look at the operation of their political systems.
Terminology is important in contested societies. I take no political
side when using terminology and any implied is unintentional. I have

v
vi PREFACE

used terms expressed by my interviewees when discussing what they have

said. I use the terms ‘Northern Ireland’ and ‘Republic of Ireland’ so that
they can be differentiated as jurisdictions. I use ‘Kosovo’ as the inter-
nationally recognised form of that place and ‘Pristina’ rather than the
Serbian Priština or Albanian Prishtina, except in the bibliography where
publications use one or the other. People in Kosovo often refer to ‘MPs’
and ‘Parliament’. I have used the official name of the Kosovo Assembly
and have translated ‘deputetët’ as ‘deputies’. Again, no political assump-
tions should be made by my use of this terminology.
I have used ‘post-conflict’ to describe political institutions, but I am
very much aware that for many, the conflicts are not over. There were
shootings and bombings in Northern Ireland during the fieldwork
in 2015, including one conflict-related death in January of that year
(a second death was a result of an attack in 2006). During the fieldwork
in Kosovo, there were attacks on Serb families in Albanian-majority areas.
These physical manifestations of conflict were in contexts of other con-
flict-related incidents, such as demonstrations. While terminology is con-
tested, it is understood that both societies are in transition.

Belfast, UK Michael Potter

 Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Professor Adrian Guelke for his encouragement

and advice in starting this research and to Professor Yvonne Galligan
for initial and ongoing help and support during the project. Specific
thanks also go to Yvonne and to Sara Clavero for allowing me to use
and adapt their excellent analytical framework. I would like to thank my
Ph.D. supervisors, Professor Beverley Milton-Edwards and Dr. Stefan
Andreasson. I am most grateful to a range of people for their valuable
input and advice during the development of the research and to all those
who gave me contacts, help, advice, practical support or submitted to
interview. In particular, I am thankful for the help of Ganimete Asllani-
Price, Timofey Agarin, Allison McCulloch, Tim Moore, John Power
and Arben Loshi. I would especially like to thank the William and Betty
McQuitty Travel Scholarship and the School of Politics, International
Studies and Philosophy at Queen’s University Belfast for essential finan-
cial support without which the research on which this book is based
would not have been possible.

vii
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Northern Ireland and Kosovo in Comparative Perspective 15

3 Post-Conflict Institutional Design in Kosovo

and Northern Ireland 47

4 The Nature of Representation 77

5 Gender and Politics in Northern Ireland and Kosovo 99

6 Gender and Inclusion in Northern Ireland and Kosovo 127

7 Ethnicity in Northern Ireland and Kosovo 177

8 Ethnicity and Inclusion in Northern Ireland and Kosovo 203

9 Conclusion 259

Bibliography 269

Index 303

ix
 Abbreviations

AAK Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of

Kosovo)
AERC Assembly and Executive Review Committee
ASK Agencija Statistikave të Kosovës (Kosovo Statistics Agency)
BME Black and Minority Ethnic
CSI Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (Strategy)
ECNI Equality Commission for Northern Ireland
ERRC European Roma Rights Centre
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
IRA Irish Republican Army
KCGS Kosovar Centre for Gender Studies
KQZ Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve (Central Election Commission)
KWN Kosova Women’s Network
LDK Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Kosovo Democratic League)
MAC Migration Advisory Committee
MLA Member of the Legislative Assembly
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIA Northern Ireland Assembly
NICEM Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities
NIHRC Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
NILT Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey
OFMdFM Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDK Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Kosovo Democratic Party)
RAE Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian

xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS

STEP South Tyrone Empowerment Programme

UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
WRDA Women’s Resource and Development Agency
 List of Tables

Table 3.1 Comparison of the Northern Ireland and Kosovo political

structures 64
Table 3.2 Constitutional provisions for women and minority ethnic
groups 68
Table 4.1 Deliberative venues relating to decision-making
in the Northern Ireland Assembly 92
Table 4.2 Deliberative venues relating to decision-making
in the Kosovo Assembly 93
Table 5.1 Motions on ‘women’s issues’ in the 2007–2011 mandate
in the Northern Ireland Assembly 115
Table 5.2 Gender and Northern Ireland government ministries,
January 2015 118
Table 5.3 Gender and Kosovo government ministries, January 2015 119
Table 6.1 Gender of committee chairs and members in the Kosovo
Assembly 133
Table 6.2 Gender of committee chairs and members in the Northern
Ireland Assembly 140
Table 6.3 Gender-related motions in the Northern Ireland Assembly
2011–2016 141
Table 6.4 Gender equality in Northern Ireland party manifestos 2016 155
Table 6.5 Summary of stereotypical ‘male’ and ‘female’ issues 170
Table 6.6 Comparative scores for the Galligan/Clavero framework
for gender 172
Table 7.1 2011 census data in Northern Ireland—national identity 183
Table 7.2 2011 census data in Northern Ireland—ethnic group 183
Table 7.3 2011 census data in Northern Ireland—country of birth 185

xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES

Table 7.4 2011 census data in Kosovo—ethnicity 188

Table 8.1 Minority ethnic parties contesting the 2014 Kosovo
Assembly election 213
Table 8.2 Motions in the Northern Ireland Assembly on
minority ethnic issues in the 2011–2016 mandate 217
Table 8.3 Ethnic composition of the Committee on Rights, Interests
of Communities and Returns 4 May 2016 223
Table 8.4 References to minority ethnic issues in Northern Ireland
party manifestos 2016 234
Table 8.5 Comparative scores for the Galligan/Clavero framework
for minority ethnicity 254
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Sitting in his office in Belfast, the director of an NGO working on

the issues of sectarianism and racism summarised his view of how the
Northern Ireland Assembly engages with minority ethnic issues:

I would say there has been a general reduction in expectation of what

the Assembly’s going to listen to. That you can go through the processes, you
can gain access to people, you can make representation, you can get positive
responses, but that doesn’t necessarily translate into any sustained actions.
[…] The issues may be around photo ops and being seen to support certain
things, but it’s not a key political issue here. It least, everything is still orange
and green. (Northern Ireland NGO representative)

By ‘orange and green’, he means issues specifically related to the two

main communities in Northern Ireland, which can be described as
‘Protestant/Unionist’ and ‘Catholic/Nationalist’. More specifically, the
terminology refers to the relationship between these two communities in
whose name violent conflict had been pursued in Northern Ireland, for
the purposes of this book, since the most recent outbreak of armed con-
flict of an ethno-national nature (arguably) from 1968.
The assertion is that conflict-related issues take priority and domi-
nate the political sphere to the detriment of the interests of, in this case,
minority ethnic groups. This is the key concern of this book. Does the
Northern Ireland political system marginalise the interests of identities

© The Author(s) 2020 1

M. Potter, Inclusion in Post-Conflict Legislatures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25536-7_1
2 M. POTTER

other than those associated with the conflict? If so, is it because of the
design of the political system itself? The Northern Ireland Assembly is
configured to accommodate identities self-identifying as ‘Unionist’ and
‘Nationalist’, with specific features intended to ensure that important
decisions have the consensus of these two defined identities. This raises
the question of whether this arrangement is to the detriment of other
identities. The evidence presented in this volume is that such arrange-
ments do indeed marginalise identities not directly associated with the
conflict. A more pertinent question may therefore be whether such sys-
tems necessarily always exclude other identities.
The conflict management features of the structure of the legisla-
ture in Northern Ireland reflect a wider trend of dealing with identi-
ty-based violent conflict through power-sharing arrangements between
the elites associated with the identities in conflict, such as in Rwanda,
Burundi, transition South Africa, Kenya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, Macedonia, etc. The logic is that bringing adversaries
together to share political power provides an opportunity to undermine
the rationale for violence by providing a stake in the governance of a
given political entity. But if such an arrangement is deemed to exclude
‘other’ (i.e. non-conflict related) identities in Northern Ireland, the same
may be true for other power-sharing systems designed to accommodate
identities in conflict.
The research carried out for this book seeks not only to ascertain
whether Northern Ireland’s political system prioritises conflict-related
identities to the disadvantage of other identities, but also to do so com-
paratively with another post-conflict legislature with power-sharing fea-
tures, the Kosovo Assembly. For ‘Protestant and Catholic’, substitute
‘Albanian and Serb’. While in many ways very different in history, cul-
ture, course of conflict and mechanism of transition, the political system
in Kosovo was also designed to accommodate conflict-related identities.
Yet, in addition to conflict management features, the Kosovo Assembly
incorporates mechanisms to include minority ethnic groups and women.
The comparative aspect of this research allows some analysis to be made
as to whether such provisions make a difference, or whether the lure of
the conflict paradigm is too strong for such mitigating measures to resist.
That ethnic identities other than those associated with a particu-
lar conflict are excluded in power-sharing arrangements is unsurprising.
But the extent and nature of exclusion can be examined by looking at
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

another aspect of exclusion—that of gender. This gives a broader under-

standing that the exclusion within such political contexts is multi-dimen-
sional and this may provide indications of other forms of exclusion.
Taking inclusion or exclusion in post-conflict legislatures as the
major theme of the analysis, the discussion also has to tackle what it
means to be included or excluded in politics before making any judge-
ment on the assumptions at the heart of this book. Beyond interrogat-
ing the academic literature and consulting statistical data, the primary
mode of inquiry here has been to ask the views of a broad range of peo-
ple well placed to have a perspective on the issue in Northern Ireland
and Kosovo. While subjective and contextual in nature, this evidence has
then been structured around a set of questions in a framework devised by
Yvonne Galligan and Sara Clavero (2008) to measure inclusion in polit-
ical arenas. This way a more objective analysis has been made possible in
comparative perspective between the two cases.
This book is significant on a number of levels. Firstly, while there are
theoretical claims in the academic literature that certain groups are priv-
ileged and others excluded by power-sharing systems, this has not been
substantially measured in depth in specific cases. This is done in this vol-
ume. Secondly, the book sheds light individually on how women and
minority ethnic groups fare in political spaces in both Northern Ireland
and Kosovo and compares and contrasts their experiences. This adds to
and enriches the studies of both contexts. Thirdly, the comparative anal-
ysis of two different power-sharing systems allows for a greater under-
standing of the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of certain identity
groups, which can inform the design and development of conflict man-
agement systems in the future. Finally, and perhaps more significantly,
the qualitative approach of the research raises the voices of women and
of minority ethnic groups to tell their own stories of exclusion or inclu-
sion in post-conflict polities.

Theoretical Framework
The book takes as its theoretical background the notion that the man-
agement of identity-based conflicts is best undertaken through the estab-
lishment of power-sharing arrangements involving the parties in conflict
in a given region (Lijphart 1975, 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 1993,
2009). Yet, while they have a role in reducing or pausing violent conflict,
4 M. POTTER

such approaches have been conceptually challenged on the grounds that

they reinforce, not mitigate, ethnic identities in contention with each
other and that they exclude identities not associated with the conflict in
question, squeezing the ‘middle ground’ (Phillips 1993; Horowitz 2000;
Taylor 2001; Murtagh 2008).
The impact of identity-based conflict tends to define people in terms
of the markers associated with the conflict, be they ethnic, religious or
other community marker (Horowitz 2000; Northrup 1989; Voutat
2000; Beasley and Bacchi 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997; Smith 1999; Liechty
and Clegg 2001). Communities in conflict seek security in their own
kind and come to view other identities as a potential threat. This has
the effect of distilling and confining views of identity in terms of ethnic
conflict paradigms, which views other identities, such as gender, sexual
orientation, disability and other ethnic identities, through the prism of
the conflict (Phillips 1993; Woroniuk and Schalwyk 1998; Karam 2001;
Pateman 1989).
The formation of ethnic and community identity is complex and the
impact of the forces of conflict and other influencers are a matter for
debate (Schlee 2008; Romanucci-Ross and de Vos 1995; Enloe 1986;
Wolff 2006). In this context, acknowledging the nature of identity con-
struction in conflict and the mechanisms of group identity formation
(Brubaker 2004), the place of ‘other’ identities in post-conflict polities is
a matter of theoretical importance.
In theoretical terms, the political engagement of the representatives
of certain specific ethno-national identities in institutional arrangements
for the transition from conflict might be expected to exclude other eth-
no-national identities not associated with the conflict, and this phenom-
enon has been identified for Northern Ireland (Wilson 2010; STEP
2010). Women have traditionally for the most part felt excluded from
discourses prevalent during conflict and in the process of post-con-
flict nation-building (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2006; Racioppi and
O’Sullivan See 2006; Brock-Utne 1989; Drakulić 1993; Karam 2001;
Potter 2008; Ainhorn and Sever 2003). Conflict is (arguably) framed
conceptually as a masculine undertaking (Enloe 2000). There is already a
substantial literature on the marginalisation of women in ethno-national
identity formation (Abdo 1994; Yuval-Davis 1997; Kaplan 1997) and
this has been transferred to the masculinist nature of peace negotiations
and the exclusion of women from post-conflict polities (Enloe 1986;
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

Karam 2001; Potter and Abernethy 2012; Deiana 2013a, b). As such,
therefore, there are two cross-cutting theoretical dimensions for analysis
that can serve to determine the extent of inclusion or exclusion: minority
ethnicity and gender.
The analysis in the research for this book draws on theories of politi-
cal inclusion, discerning between descriptive and substantive representa-
tion, discussing the nature of political engagement and the participation
of excluded or marginalised groups and examining the quality of political
participation (Pitkin 1967; Okin 1989; Phillips 1993; Young 2000). In
particular, while not unchallenged conceptually, deliberative democratic
theory provides a basis for examining the extent and quality of discourse
in political arenas (Habermas 1999; Dryzek 2000, 2005) and theories
of group dynamics and organisational cultures provide measurable indi-
cators of representation, applied extensively to gender representation as
critical mass theory, but equally valid for other identities (Kanter 1977;
Dahlerup 2001; Lovenduski 2005).
Analyses of the inclusion of women in political contexts have drawn
on theories of participation in deliberative venues (Chaney 2006) and
the gendering of political spaces (Krook and O’Brien 2012). While
these approaches have provided insightful indicators of political inclu-
sion from a gender perspective, they do not provide a broader frame-
work for analysis for wider political representation or for identities
other than gender. Drawing on the theories of Habermas (1999) and
Young (2000), Galligan and Clavero (2008) derive a broader frame-
work for analysis using deliberative democratic principles to meas-
ure gender democracy. The framework comprises indicators under
the broad headings of inclusion, political equality, publicity and
reasonableness.
While the framework is designed for the analysis of gender democracy,
it draws sufficiently on more general concepts of inclusion to enable the
analysis to be extended to the participation of minority ethnic groups.
In addition, the original framework was intended to be applied to EU
polities that have not necessarily been affected by ethno-national con-
flict. However, the two cases selected, Northern Ireland and Kosovo, are
located in Europe and can be said to have or to be building a European
political culture, and the framework is sufficiently flexible to field gen-
eral principles of political inclusion applicable to conflict and non-conflict
contexts alike.
6 M. POTTER

Analysis of Two Cases

The framework is applied to two cases, Northern Ireland and Kosovo,
which have both undergone identity-based conflicts and have experi-
enced a transition process in the late 1990s. However, the political insti-
tutions derived from the conflict management process are configured
differently.
The ending of the conflict in Northern Ireland has led to the estab-
lishment of post-conflict power-sharing political institutions in the form
of the Northern Ireland Assembly, which has been described as conso-
ciational in nature (O’Leary 1999). In this sense, certain key decisions
in the Assembly have to be agreed by a majority of each of the two
communities, designated Nationalist or Unionist, to be passed. Such
power-sharing arrangements have been successful, for the most part,
in bringing overt inter-community conflict to an end (Lijphart 1975,
1977). Yet, criticisms of this mechanism include the relative insignifi-
cance of identities which do not identify as either of the two designa-
tions, the prejudicing of identities and issues associated with the conflict
rather than cross-cutting issues and the reinforcement of conflict identi-
ties that perpetuate division, not cohesion (Manning 2002; Taylor 2001;
Wilson 2010).
The Kosovo Assembly, a product of the transition from the conflict
primarily between Serbian and Albanian communities, works through a
quota system that guarantees minority groups, including Serbs, seats in
the legislature. Again, while playing a role in the reduction of violence
in Kosovo, the system could equally be challenged on inclusion grounds
(Yannis 2009), with the exception that other minorities not usually asso-
ciated with the conflict are included in this arrangement, and there is a
quota for women.
In terms of institutional structure and processes, these two post-con-
flict institutions, while the result of two different contexts and paths to
settlement, are worthy of detailed comparison in structural and theoret-
ical terms. However, there are deeper issues that can be explored within
both of these political institutions.
These patterns can be examined in more detail through a compara-
tive study of the contexts of Kosovo and Northern Ireland. For exam-
ple, the treatment of Roma communities during and after the conflict in
Kosovo can be compared with the treatment of Irish Travellers during
the Irish Civil War and post-independence nation-building (McLaughlin
1995; Hart 1999). Both examples demonstrate the limits of minority
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

inclusion in the face of ethno-national political consolidation. Minority

ethnic groups have struggled to find a place in post-conflict Northern
Ireland (STEP 2010; Knox 2011a) and in Kosovo (OSCE 2010), despite
provisions to protect minorities in the latter. While the academic liter-
ature identifies these difficulties, this research brings together evidence
to more closely examine the experience of exclusion and inclusion in the
two cases. As such, the main mode of inquiry has been qualitative, to
reflect the subjective nature of what it is to be included or excluded.

Analytical Framework
This book is not just about the ‘what’ of examining inclusion, but the
‘how’. One major impediment in conducting research on inclusion is
that there has been no reliable measure of ‘inclusion’ available. In quan-
titative terms, numbers of women and minority ethnic representatives in
a legislature could be counted. But that is only descriptive representa-
tion, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. This book is
just as concerned with substantive representation, which looks more at
the quality of participation in political life.
Initially, the descriptive representation of women and minority ethnic
groups has been investigated through quantitative means: the numbers
of members who are female and who are from minority ethnic back-
grounds are enumerated in each legislature. This says something about
how many of those identities are present in political life, but it says little
about how they got there, how they are regarded and how much impact
they can have, i.e. the level of substantive representation. Some degree of
quantitative assessment of substantive representation is presented, such
as representation at committees and in leading debates on issues relating
to women and minority ethnic groups, drawing on models by Chaney
(2006) and Krook and O’Brien (2012), but this does not encompass the
experience of representation and how meaningful it is in each context.
The qualitative dimension of the research uses a methodological
framework developed by Galligan and Clavero (2008), which draws
on the philosophical work of Iris Marion Young (2000) on deliberative
democratic principles for gender democracy. While not unchallenged (see
Chapter 4), deliberative democracy provides a basis by which substantive
representation can be subjected to assessment and measure. In the case
of Galligan and Clavero’s model, it is developed as a set of indicators
for gender democracy. In the research for this book, the model has been
adapted for minority ethnic representation also (Potter 2018).
8 M. POTTER

Reflecting Young’s work, the model comprises a set of 17 indica-

tors under the broad headings of inclusion, political equality, publicity
and reasonableness (Galligan and Clavero 2008: 10–15). These indica-
tors are then used to form interview questions to investigate the quali-
tative aspects of inclusion. The information thus gained could then be
migrated on to the original framework to allow for a comparative analysis
of how women and minority ethnic communities fare in the polities of
Northern Ireland and Kosovo.

Outline of the Book

The broad approach of this book is to examine qualitative evidence from
interviews with individuals in Northern Ireland and Kosovo who are
well placed to inform the themes of inclusion and exclusion. These main
themes are explored in the preliminary chapters, led by the interview
data. Then the qualitative evidence is placed in the analytical framework
to assess inclusion, in this case, in terms of gender and minority ethnic
representation.
Chapter 2 examines aspects of the two cases in comparative perspec-
tive, exploring how they have been compared with other contexts in the
literature and some themes relevant to the research. The contexts them-
selves are not being compared: there are many aspects of them that are
incomparable, but there are key themes related to conflict, conflict tran-
sition and the natures of their political institutions that are explored in
tandem.
The institutions of the two cases are then conceptually examined in
more detail. The approach to many negotiated (or otherwise) political
settlements since the 1990s has been to design institutions that accom-
modate conflict adversaries. Chapter 3 explores the options for the man-
agement of political conflict and describes and evaluates the systems put
in place in Northern Ireland and Kosovo.
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of ‘representation’, as this is key
to determining how inclusive the legislatures in Northern Ireland and
Kosovo are. Being represented in a political context is not just about
having people like oneself sitting in the legislature (descriptive rep-
resentation). It is all very well women seeing other women and minority
ethnic communities seeing members of their own background in polit-
ical office, but it is also about what they do when they are there, and
more particularly for the purposes of this book, what they are able to do.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

Representation is therefore also about the extent to which the concerns

and needs of a given section of the population are taken seriously and
addressed (i.e. substantive representation).
The impact of political systems for conflict management on iden-
tities not directly associated with the conflicts under discussion is then
examined. The first of these is gender, which is discussed in Chapter
5. The literature on women and conflict is evolving, on the one hand,
highlighting how women have been marginalised by conflict, but on the
other, how women have also participated and indeed seen certain con-
flicts as emancipatory. What the literature tends to agree on, however, is
that conflict elites tend to be men and it is men who tend to determine
post-conflict political arrangements. The chapter traces how women have
fared in the conflicts in Kosovo and Northern Ireland, and how gender
is featured in the respective post-conflict polities. Chapter 6 provides the
evidence from the framework that the needs of women in both Northern
Ireland and Kosovo are undermined by the prevalence of a masculinist
political conflict paradigm that trumps any notion of gender equality or
the inclusion of women in decision-making.
The other identity under examination in relation to post-conflict
political institutions is that of ethnic identities not considered to have
been engaged in the conflict. Chapter 7 discusses the concept of minor-
ity ethnicity and how it has featured in the conflicts and post-conflict
polities of Northern Ireland and Kosovo. The rationale for this is that,
if ethnic conflict identities are privileged by power-sharing post-conflict
political institutions, then other ethnicities may be excluded. The chapter
investigates whether this is indeed the case. Chapter 8 demonstrates that
ethnicities that are not associated with the conflict are not ‘seen’ by the
political system in either Northern Ireland or Kosovo, even though there
is a requirement in Kosovo to do so.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn as to how well the two political
contexts fare in the inclusion of women and minority ethnic identities.
These are based on the analysis of the evidence generated by the frame-
work in the context of political power-sharing theory.

Conclusion
The book therefore aims to address the key questions posed in the
research—whether post-conflict political institutions include or exclude
identities not related to the conflict—through a comparative exploration
10 M. POTTER

of the representation of women and minority ethnic groups in the

Northern Ireland and Kosovo Assemblies. This is derived from the theo-
retical discussion above: political systems that are designed with conflict
management in mind reflect the needs of the ethno-national identities in
conflict and the masculinist nature of violent conflict and political nego-
tiations, leading to the exclusion or marginalisation of identities such as
women and non-conflict-related ethnic identities. The book addresses
these questions through the operationalisation of a unique framework of
analysis. The next chapter reviews the body of literature of the two cases
under examination in relation to the themes of the book.

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 CHAPTER 2

Northern Ireland and Kosovo

in Comparative Perspective

Introduction
The position on Kosovo’s uniqueness is summed up by an ethnologist in
Pristina:

Kosovo is sui generis. That means there are no comparisons. (Kosovo

Albanian ethnologist)

Comparisons can be problematic. On the one hand, every context is

different. On the other, there are some remarkably similar themes and
experiences across cases that warrant comparative study. That said,
there are political implications for comparing or not comparing. For a
Kosovo Albanian ethnologist and historian speaking in Pristina, it pays
to make a case for Kosovo’s independence as a one-off single event with
a clear rationale: a distinct ethno-national group throws off the shack-
les of foreign domination to separate from Serbia and become an inde-
pendent state. But to generalise a broad right to self-determination that
entitles a group to change borders has impacts on Kosovo itself, where a
well-defined geographical area inhabited by Kosovo Serbs might likewise
threaten the territorial integrity of the new state. These are some of the
considerations to bear in mind in the discussions on comparative analysis
set out in this chapter.
This book analyses the extent of inclusion in post-conflict political
institutions in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. In order to understand the

© The Author(s) 2020 15

M. Potter, Inclusion in Post-Conflict Legislatures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25536-7_2
16 M. POTTER

nature of these institutions, it is necessary to track the contexts in which

they came to be. The design of political structures in the transition from
conflict in certain ways reflects the conflicts that they are intended to
manage. In this case, the chapter explores how the conflicts in Northern
Ireland and Kosovo have been described, how they have been explained
and the nature of their transitions.
This chapter looks at how Northern Ireland and Kosovo have
been subjected to comparative analysis in the academic literature.
Acknowledging that as whole contexts the two cases are not being
compared in their entirety, this gives some indication of how themes in
both cases have been considered comparable. As Northern Ireland and
Kosovo have not previously been subject to comparative analysis, the
chapter then looks at themes relevant to the research carried out for this
book comparatively, specifically how the conflicts have been defined and
how the respective transitions from conflict have been conceptualised.

Comparisons
The analysis in this book compares the relative political representation
of women and minority ethnic groups across two cases. Such cross-na-
tional research projects ‘set out to study particular issues or phenomena
in two or more countries with the express intention of comparing their
manifestations in different cultural settings’ (Hantrais and Mangen 1996:
1). In this case, it is not the countries themselves being compared, but
the political systems. Essentially what the comparative method analyses is
what is different (or similar), asks why and attempts to assess the conse-
quences of that difference (or similarity) (Rose 1991: 447).
An alternative approach to assessing inclusion in post-conflict systems
would be to use the statistical method, that is, to increase the number
of cases and apply quantitative approaches to examining the differences
between them. Where the comparative method is ‘essentially a case-
oriented strategy of research’, statistical methods ‘disaggregate cases
into variables and examine the relationships between variables’ (Ragin
1987: 9). The statistical method has a number of difficulties in this case.
Firstly, political systems, even post-conflict power-sharing ones, can vary
considerably in detail, so as to defy neat classifications (see Chapter 3).
Secondly, there is a range of other context-specific variables that may
influence outcomes in terms of representation. Consequently, the
approach for this investigation conforms with Lijphart’s conclusion that
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17

‘intensive comparative analysis of a few cases can be more promising than

a more superficial analysis of many cases’ (1971: 685).
An ideal medium might be to increase the number of cases but to
examine each in depth in a broader cross-national project involving
qualitative and quantitative data analysis. For example, Kolstø’s (2014)
edited collection comprises a comparison of seven cases in South Eastern
Europe, including Kosovo, examining the meanings and relative success
or failure associated with nation-building in the region in some depth.
However, apart from the requirement for significant resources, the exam-
ination of two cases allows for greater depth of study of each context to
seek to explain variation, at the expense of possibilities for greater gen-
eralisation. As Rose explains: ‘A narrow-gauge comparison of two coun-
tries makes it possible to test broad hypotheses against rich empirical
materials’ (1991: 455), in this case, testing a broad hypothesis regarding
the effects of political systems in two contexts that can be examined in
some detail.
However, there are significant problems associated with the compara-
tive method, summarised in broad terms as those associated with dealing
with many variables and issues of generalisability due to the small number
of cases (Lijphart 1971: 685). These two issues are linked. The research
for this book says something about common themes between the two
contexts that can have important resonance elsewhere, and where out-
comes can be attributed to certain variables in each context, the research
can draw some conclusions about how the two political systems operate
in each case, while avoiding grand claims about generalisation.
Defenders of the comparative method have suggested that the model
rejects both universalism and particularism and instead takes a ‘middle of
the road’ approach (van Deth 2013: xv). This process is referred to by Rose
as ‘bounded variability’, described in the following terms (1991: 447):

Anyone who engages in comparative research immediately notices differ-

ences between countries. Yet anyone who persists in wide-ranging compar-
ative analysis also recognises boundaries to the differences.

As Ragin notes, the problems with the comparative method lie in issues of
dissimilarity and that the cases are not anonymous or disembodied units
of study, but they have known histories (1987: 9). The social world is per-
ceived from a point of view dependent on socialisation, experience and
belief, which is contextual (Webb 1995: 32). The key question is whether a
18 M. POTTER

theme that arises in Kosovo is comparable with one that arises in Northern
Ireland. Central to this, as Sartori (1970) notes, is the problem of ‘con-
cept-stretching’, so that concepts from one or more contexts are ‘stretched’
to apply across all cases. His solution, similar to the ‘middle of the road’
approach between particularism and universalism, is to use a ‘ladder of
abstraction’, which recognises that the more general the theory, the less
grounded the evidence from a context; the more detail, the less general-
isable the concept. A ‘medium level of abstraction’ is Sartori’s recommen-
dation. In the research for this book, concepts are applied across the two
cases where they appear in the same or equivalent form in both contexts.
Strategies to deal with issues of comparability include establishing
equivalence, minimising bias in the research process and applying con-
cepts across cases. In terms of equivalence, if a direct comparator is not
obvious, there can be functional equivalence, where an object of study
is not the same, but has the same function, semantic equivalence, where
there are different terms for the same (or similar) thing, or linguistic
equivalence, where the same meanings can be found in different lan-
guages (Hantrais 2009: 77). In the research for this book, for example,
interviewee identification did not always directly match between Kosovo
and Northern Ireland, so a strategy was devised to establish levels of
equivalence: equivalence of role, equivalence of knowledge and equiva-
lence of personal identity. As Rose (1991) notes, there can be valid com-
parable or functionally equivalent units of analysis that are not the same
and no direct equivalence does not necessarily prevent comparison.
The evidence in this book does not claim to be directly comparable
across the two (or any other) cases. But universal concepts such as the
marginalisation of women and the exclusion of minority ethnic identities
are identified and recognised within a common frame of understanding.
Again, Northern Ireland and Kosovo are not being directly compared as
if they were the same. They are not. But there are important themes that
have resonance in both contexts.

Comparing Northern Ireland and Kosovo

As a contested space in a relatively economically advanced European state
with significant international interest, particularly from the USA and the
European Union, there has been an immense amount of investment in
examining the genesis and course of conflict in Northern Ireland. Part of
this intense scrutiny has involved comparative studies of other regions in
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19

conflict around the world. In this respect, there is a field of literature that
uses Northern Ireland as a point of comparison with other conflicts. This
literature can be characterised as follows:

• Wider conceptual analyses of the nature of comparisons, with

Northern Ireland as the start point
• The nature of the conflict, using Northern Ireland as the primary
comparator
• Mechanisms for managing or resolving conflict, such as partition
or power-sharing, with Northern Ireland examined in historical or
contemporary context
• Geo-political dimensions, such as island status.

Some illustrative examples of this typology are discussed below.

Guelke (2004: 168–175) differentiates between comparative political
analysis, which academics engage in, and political comparison, which is
used as a tool for justification, condemnation and imitation by political
forces. Such political comparisons are problematic: besides their overt
political purposes, they can support different conclusions for differ-
ent actors in the conflict and can come and go according to the politi-
cal climate. Guelke uses the examples of Irish Nationalist support in the
early twentieth century for Afrikaner and Zionist nationalisms, which
were reversed in the 1970s to support revolutionary movements such
as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO). McGarry’s (2001: 14–20) analysis of comparative
studies on Northern Ireland likewise moves beyond the political compar-
isons used to support Unionist or Nationalist ambitions to classify more
considered comparisons. Firstly, the Classical Pluralist approach sees
social divisions as reinforcing the conflict, requiring cross-cutting inter-
ests to overcome communal schisms; secondly, Consociational Theory
rests on the assumption that elites are prepared to co-operate across
community divisions; thirdly, Integrationist studies, rather than the
emphasis on cross-cutting interests of Classical Pluralists, favour integra-
tion; fourthly, Linkage Theory examines exogenous rather than endog-
enous factors, such as the connection between the conflict and political
influences from the UK and Irish Governments; and finally, settler-colo-
nial studies, rather than simply taking an Irish Nationalist line in seeing
the conflict in terms of British imperialism, look at the factors surround-
ing settler-native community relationships.
20 M. POTTER

Settler/Native Explanations
Frank Wright’s (1988) comparisons of Northern Ireland with West
Prussia, Bohemia, the USA (in its treatment of African Americans) and
Algeria are viewed from the perspective of settler-native contexts, or ‘eth-
nic frontiers’, where populations are fairly evenly balanced and a dom-
inant community is unable to assimilate a subordinate one. The first
two examples are examined in terms of similarity, where a native pop-
ulation, experiencing a ‘crisis of assimilation’, engages in the ‘organic
work’ of developing its own middle-class infrastructure and education
system. In contrast, US blacks were subject to more drastic inequali-
ties than could be claimed of Northern Irish Catholics, and the French
minority in Algeria was much smaller relative to the native population.
Wright is using a broad conceptual link that works in general terms with
the other European examples, but those outside Europe are more prob-
lematic, although Lustick (1993: 47) finds similarity in the Algerian and
Northern Ireland cases in the ‘similar effects of similarly structured polit-
ical legacies’. These include the incomplete integration of territories into
core states where the disputation of territories have been treated as inte-
gral parts of the central state, where both cases failed to absorb prob-
lematic regions and disengaged, in part or entirely. A similar conceptual
observation might be made for Kosovo under Yugoslav and Serbian con-
trol, where it could also be compared more closely in terms of a minority
dominating a majority population, although that is where the similarity
ends, as the Kosovo Serb population, if it can be described as ‘settler’ at
all, has been present for many centuries.
Comparative political analysis, rather than political comparison, is
associated with theory-building, although Guelke (2010: 1) elsewhere
indicates that these can be difficult to separate. Similarly, McGarry’s clas-
sification described above does not assume conceptually discreet expla-
nations or solutions to conflict, but a range of approaches may apply to
any analysis, for example, there may be a combination of exogenous and
endogenous explanations for the conflict in Northern Ireland, although
authors may place greater emphasis on one or the other, and while insti-
tutional reform may be pursued through consociationalism, cross-cut-
ting and integrationist processes may be taking place at community
level (see Bloomfield 1997). Wright’s examination of the nature of the
relationships between communities is important to assist concept-form-
ing in comparative analyses, but again cannot assume specific criteria
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21

of comparison, and certainly not in the case of Kosovo and Northern

Ireland, where there is a significant imbalance in the Serbian and
Albanian communities, but a closer margin of majority/minority ratio in
Northern Ireland.
Certainly, settler/native comparisons with Northern Ireland have
taken various forms. These include themes such as the colonial legacy of
settler/native relationships with an ethnic dimension, where Northern
Ireland has been compared with Israel/Palestine and South Africa
(Mitchell 2000), analysis of a ‘Hebrew Covenant’ factor in those same
examples (Akenson 1992) or Weiss (2000) ‘politics of privilege’ in rela-
tion to Northern Ireland and South Africa. Similarly, Lustick (1993)
has examined Northern Ireland, Algeria and Israel/Palestine as con-
texts where there has been incomplete integration, and Letamendia and
McLoughlin (2000: 234) have concluded the same for Northern Ireland
and Corsica. Rather than similarities, contrasts are also important. As
Connor (1990: 23) points out, Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine
are contexts of dominant majorities, whereas the example of South Africa
represented a situation where a minority was dominant.

Ethnic Conflict Management

A taxomony of strategies for managing ethnic conflict is provided by
McGarry and O’Leary (1993: 4), grouped into four strategies for elim-
inating differences (genocide, forced population transfer, partition/se-
cession, integration/assimilation) and four for managing differences
(hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation/federalisation, conso-
ciation/power-sharing). Strategies attempted for Northern Ireland are
referred to in relation to Irish Nationalist demands for secession (p. 11),
calls for integration in education or concerns of assimilation (pp. 17–18),
attempts at hegemonic control by the Protestant majority (p. 25), arbi-
tration by the British and Irish Governments in 1985 (p. 28) and the
‘failed consociational experiment’ of the 1970s (p. 36). This list could
be updated to US arbitration towards the Belfast Agreement and the
current consociational arrangement in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Kosovo is mentioned only in relation to hegemonic control by the
minority Serbian population (p. 24).
Fraser (1984) compares Ireland with India and Palestine in the context
of the (unsuccessful) use of partition as a mechanism. He acknowledges
that they are all very different culturally, ethnically and geographically,
22 M. POTTER

but all were in the ‘British system’, albeit differently—as an integral part
of the UK, empire in its own right and League of Nations mandate—‘but
the crucial point of similarity is that in each case partition became the
“problem-solving” device adopted in an attempt to meet the claims of
conflicting political aspirations’ (p. 2). The conceptual link is, therefore,
the attempted resolution mechanism, but the author does not effectively
differentiate the extensive political and contextual circumstances of transi-
tion in each case. But as Ben-Porat (2006: 260) points out in his similar
study of the use of partition in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, the
contexts are different, but they share characteristics for comparison.
Another resolution mechanism that has been compared, explored in
depth later in the book, is that of consociationalism, for example, by
Russell (2008), examining parallels between the Lebanese Ta’if Accord
and Belfast Agreement as examples of power-sharing. The study exam-
ines the nature of power-sharing in each context and the role of civic
leadership in the relative success or failure of a consociational enterprise.
However, the comparison does not get to grips with the detail of how
‘civic leadership’ is understood in two very different cultural and political
settings and does not effectively move beyond the universal assumptions
of the operation of political co-operation. In contrast, Kerr’s examination
of consociational agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon comes to
more complex conceptual conclusions around the interplay of exogenous
and endogenous factors at work and, more specifically, the importance of
how internal-external relationships are managed (2005: 198–199). Barry
(1991) carried out a more in-depth review of the applicability of conso-
ciationalism in a range of cases, including a detailed comparison between
Northern Ireland and Canada.

Peace Processes
The peace process in Northern Ireland has also been extensively com-
pared. Guelke (2008: 80) draws comparisons between the peace pro-
cesses in Northern Ireland and South Africa, but also notes that the
Northern Ireland process has provided inspiration for other peace pro-
cesses, such as in the Basque Country, Corsica, Kashmir and Sri Lanka
(Guelke 2006: 375). Snyder (2013) explains that what the peace pro-
cesses in Northern Ireland and the Middle East have in common is that
both emerged from a decline in revolutionary nationalism, whereas
Tonge (2014: 1) contrasts a range of peace processes, declaring those
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23

of Bosnia and Northern Ireland successful, Sri Lanka unsuccessful and

that in Israel/Palestine ‘bereft of any chance’. This shows that Northern
Ireland is not unique in its experiences of moving beyond armed conflict,
being situated in a context where there is a range of options and a range
of outcomes to such efforts, in turn informing processes in other theatres
of conflict.

Geography
The geographical dimension of the Northern Ireland conflict—that it is
a divided island—is examined by Guelke (2001). Rather than a detailed
comparison of cases, the analysis draws on the responses of the inter-
national community to disputed islands, his thesis being that there is
reluctance internationally to allow them to be partitioned and that the
North–South dimension of the Belfast Agreement was important to its
acceptance. In this example, it is the application of a universal concept
that is applied to all cases of disputed islands.
In terms of the subject of this book—inclusion in post-conflict legisla-
tures—there has been less analysis. While there has been no direct com-
parative analysis in relation to minority ethnic inclusion in politics, there
have been some studies looking at the status of women in post-conflict
Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Hercegovina (Deina and Goldie 2012;
Potter and Abernethy 2012). However, these comparisons look at the
experiences of women during and after conflict, rather than political
representation.
While by no means exhaustive, this brief review of comparisons with
Northern Ireland demonstrates a variety of approaches to comparing,
many taking aspects of the conflict, such as origins, relations between
communities, transition mechanisms and geography. For the purposes of
this book, there is a focus on aspects of how power-sharing institutions
function, but there is also learning from these comparisons in terms of
how comparable other contexts are, how they vary and how variations
affect the relative success or failure of conflict management processes.

Kosovo
In contrast to Northern Ireland, Kosovo has been less extensively com-
pared. Indeed, some authors have emphasised the difference between
the Balkans in general and the rest of Europe, citing its ‘isolating upland
24 M. POTTER

geography’ and ‘prolonged experience of fragmented imperial domi-

nation’ leading to significant historical internal divisions (Lampe 2006:
11; Pavlowitch 1999: 1). Comparisons have been made within the
Balkans, particularly with Bosnia, which had its own transition in the
1990s, Čirjaković (2001: 71) contrasting the ethnic similarity between
Slavic Croats, Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia with the more divided Serbs
and Albanians in Kosovo and Willigen (2013) comparing the relative
experiences of international administration in both contexts. Indeed,
it is international constraint that prevents the Republika Srpska from
engaging internationally in same way as Kosovo, according to Fawn and
Richmond’s (2010) comparative analysis of both breakaway regions.
As for specific comparisons regarding gender issues in Kosovo and
Bosnia and Hercegovina, Rodgers (2001) deals with parallels in the
experience of violence against women in both contexts.
Perhaps qualifying as political comparison rather than comparative
political analysis have been studies raising concerns of other potential
Balkan secessionist movements, such as Albanians in Macedonia (Drezov
2001) and the Hungarian region of Romania (Kulish 2008). What these
assertions lack is a sound analysis of why secessions might happen in
these particular regions but not in others in a similar position, such as
Vojvodina. Specific political comparison has also been made to justify
actions in the former USSR. This has been the case as part of Vladimir
Putin’s explanation for intervention in Russian majority areas of Ukraine
(Aresenović 2014), but there has also been extensive comparative analy-
sis between Kosovo and the South Caucasus generally (Khutsishvili and
Schnabel 2000) and Chechnya (Moore 2010) and breakaway regions of
Georgia specifically (Sandole 2010). These comparisons are important,
as, on the one hand, Kosovo appears to offer a clear cut precedent for
external intervention, but on the other, has been argued to be a sui gen-
eris case that offers no comparison at all (Ker-Lindsay 2012: 43; 2013).
Judah (2000a: 309) examines comparisons of Serbian responses to
the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës—UÇK)
with that of tackling separatism in the rest of Europe, rejecting parallels
because ‘for all their faults and mistakes, the British, Spanish and French
governments…have not tried to crush the IRA, ETA or Corsican bomb-
ers by village burning and ethnic cleansing’. Closer conceptual compar-
isons are made by Weller (2009: 146), who notes that the Rambouillet
process for Kosovo does not copy, but builds on innovative settlements,
using aspects of territorial unity and self-governance from Bosnia’s
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 25

Dayton Accords, establishing authority at different levels of governance

as in the Belfast Agreement and in Palestine and constituting an interim
arrangement pending the will of the people, as in Eritrea and Chechnya.
Similarly, Koinova’s (2011) analysis of diasporas and their impact on
conflicts as an exogenous factor draws comparisons between Kosovo,
Armenia and Chechnya.
Comparisons between Kosovo and Northern Ireland have been fleet-
ing: Wilson and McGonigle (2006) look at the possibilities for mutual
learning for local government structures in both divided societies and
Winnifrith (2002: 20) refers to ‘borderland status’: ‘Places where a
political frontier does not coincide with a religious or ethnic frontier are
often unhappy places. Kosovo is one example, South Armagh another’.
However, this analogy perhaps stretches beyond Wright’s ‘ethnic fron-
tier’ concept, as the Serb and Albanian populations are less evenly
matched, being more representative of Huntington’s (1996) thesis of
‘fault lines’ between ‘civilisations’. Boyle’s (2014: 197) more succinct
comparison looks specifically at patterns in post-conflict violence in both
contexts.
This book compares Northern Ireland and Kosovo in terms of institu-
tional arrangements to manage identity-based conflict and will necessar-
ily draw in comparative theories of the nature of conflict in each case to
examine how this has influenced institutional design. Northern Ireland
and Kosovo, despite conceptual similarities, have not previously been
compared in this respect. In addition, the comparisons discussed above
focus on the contention between identities associated with the conflict,
which generally ignore other identities in the population, such as other
ethnic identities and women, except where women are associated with
the conflict and therefore contribute to the assumed conflict paradigm.
In terms of the typology of comparisons with Northern Ireland set out
above, this analysis falls into the category of mechanisms for managing
conflict.

The Nature of Conflict in Northern Ireland and Kosovo

Processes of transition are linked to the nature of conflict and how con-
flicts are perceived, as management mechanisms are designed to solve a
problem in a political entity. Therefore, an understanding of how con-
flicts are perceived assists in the process of understanding post-conflict
institutions and also assists in the process of comparison, for example,
26 M. POTTER

raising questions such as whether applying a particular model to

more than one conflict assumes comparability between the contexts
themselves.
The origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland have been seen from
broadly different perspectives. In terms of ethno-national explanations,
the ‘clash of nationalisms’ thesis sees the conflict from the perspective of
two competing ethno-national groups (Porter 1998: 37). Also ethno-na-
tional in character, there is the perception of the ‘predictable’ conflict
emerging from ‘political dysfunction’ and the ‘grievances and frustration
of Nationalists’ (Cochrane 2013: 31). But the discrimination against a
Catholic minority thesis is not unchallenged. While not denying there
was discrimination, Bew et al. (1995: 140) argue that Catholic disadvan-
tage was also a product of other circumstances, such as economic forces.
John Whyte’s (1991) examination of the nature of the conflict in
Northern Ireland looks at four major interpretations. The ‘traditional
Nationalist’ interpretation views the island of Ireland as one nation
divided by Britain, which is seen as being at fault for the conflict. The
‘traditional Unionist’ interpretation is summarised as the belief that
there are two communities on the island, Unionist and Nationalist (or
Protestant and Catholic) and Irish Nationalists fail to understand this
and intend to deny Unionists the right of self-determination, the British
being seen as unreliable allies. The Marxist interpretation sees British
colonial imposition of capitalism as the divisive factor, which Protestant
and Catholic workers need to see through and unite against. These first
three views see the conflict in terms of exogenous factors, whereas the
fourth, the internal conflict explanation, interprets the conflict endog-
enously as one between two communities. Whyte concludes that there
is significant convergence in research in defining the conflict as one
between the two communities in Northern Ireland, with significant but
secondary exogenous factors.
While McGarry and O’Leary (1996) take a more synthesised view
of endogenous and exogenous factors in the conflict, Ruane and Todd
(2000) warn specifically against classifying the conflict in terms of eth-
no-nationalist or settler-colonial explanations, leaning more on the influ-
ences of British–Irish strategic rivalry and the international context of the
conflict. Certainly, perceptions of the conflict can be viewed as multi-fac-
eted according to most interpretations and for some, the core meanings
cannot be resolved (Mitchell 2015: 37). Indeed, the Belfast Agreement
recognises the multiplicity of dimensions to the conflict, having strands
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27

dealing with issues within Northern Ireland, north–south relationships

and connections between the two islands, reflecting the complexity of
interpretations and political ambitions.
Explanations of conflict are not fixed, objective understandings of cir-
cumstances, but are interpreted and reinterpreted differently. As Wilson
(2010: 14) explains, ethnic protagonists claim to represent communi-
ties and they succeed in doing so if they can suppress individuality. The
individual is therefore subordinated to the narratives and understandings
of the community in conflict. In the Northern Ireland context, this is
referred to as ‘orange and green’ politics, or the ‘sectarian divide’. In the
research for this book, a representative of an NGO working in the field
of sectarianism and racism in Northern Ireland described this as follows:

When it comes down to particular issues it comes down to ‘orange and

green’. It’s a bit like being Nationalist or Unionist. They’re ‘hard’ issues.
Your concerns are not going to be listened to. (NGO representative in
Northern Ireland)

Echoing some interpretations of Northern Ireland, the conflict in

Kosovo has been presented by the protagonists as a clash of national ide-
ologies in the mould of a settler–native model, as, writes Pavković (2001:
3–8), each side relies on national ‘myths’ to justify their cause, where
‘a mythical past is transplanted into the present and cultivated for every-
day political use’ (Martens 2007). As Dannreuther (2001: 12) describes
it, a ‘clash of incommensurate nationalisms’. Each side has a twin claim
to the territory, firstly on the grounds of historical precedence, Albanians
claiming descent from the Illyrians, thought to have occupied the area
in ancient times, Serbs indicating the existence of the medieval Serbian
empire with its roots and origins centred on Kosovo, and secondly legal
claims, on the one hand, the Albanian claim to self-determination as the
majority population in Kosovo and on the other, the Serbian recourse to
the inviolability of national sovereignty (Daskalovski 2003: 23).
While Hehir (2010: 1) complains a model of mutual ethnic antognism
is prevalent in the analysis, much academic literature largely focusses on
challenging the notion of the conflict as a product of ‘ancient hatreds’ in
Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkan region, instead being the result of
political manipulation by elites, who stand to gain from evoking histori-
cal and mythical notions of ethnic rivalry and victimhood (Mertus 1999:
4; Calic 2000: 24; Duijzings 2000: 8, 204; Ramet 2001: 30; Gagnon
28 M. POTTER

2004: 7; Weller 2009: 40). This view is not unchallenged, however.

Schwartz contends that the ethnic groups in Kosovo did not live in har-
mony before nationalist conflict engulfed the region. This may have been
true of Bosnia, he explains, where the apparently different ethnic groups
are all Slavic in origin, but in Kosovo ‘these hatreds really were and are
quite ancient and quite virulent’ (2000: 15).
But if hatreds there have been, they cannot be said to have been
universal. Certainly, there are some accounts of inter-ethnic tolerance
or even harmony. As a local NGO representative in Kosovo, who had
grown up in Pristina during the Yugoslav period lamented:

We lived together in our neighbourhood: Serbs, Albanians, Bošnjaks. We all

played together, we spoke Serbo-Croatian to each other, but Albanian and
Serbian at home […] But no-one remembers anything before 1999. Nothing.
Nothing. And the kids know nothing about it. They only know what is now.
But no-one remembers how good it was in Yugoslavia. (NGO representative
in Kosovo)

The notion of ethnic hatred has been seen as a process of Serbian

domination of other ethnic groups in the region, and the subjugation
of Kosovo Albanians is part of this wider ‘Serbian project’ to broaden
Serbia’s borders in the region (Gow 2003: 199), sometimes extended
to accusations of genocide (e.g. Kokott 2002: 27). Partly, this has been
explained by the concept of ‘shifting Serbias’ (Čirjaković 2001: xxi–xxiv),
where the cultural and political heart of medieval Serbia lay in Kosovo,
but the modern population resides to the north and east, leaving a sense
of a lost Serbian land in the hands of Albanians. Serbian perceptions,
writes Ramet, are ‘filtered through a thick layer of mythology’ (2001:
30). However, rather than a one-sided narrative of Serbian culpability,
Nikolić (2003: 57) describes a historical ‘pendulum of domination’ in
Kosovo, where there were periods of Albanian ascendancy, followed by
periods of Serbian control.
Certainly, it can be said that the Yugoslav government had played
down the importance of inter-ethnic rivalry after the Second World
War (Judah 2000b: 130–133), but the literature of ethnic conflict,
in general, argues convincingly that ethnicity has been used as a tool
by elites to garner political support and foment conflict, rather than
being a primary cause of conflict. Contrary to primordialist interpreta-
tions of conflict, change and crisis produce collective fears for the future
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 29

(Smith 1999: 276; Shöpflin 2000: 63; Lake and Rothchild 2001: 126),
which are harnessed by elites to make ethnicity the rallying point for a
political cause (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 82; Rothschild 1981: 2;
Crick 1990: 268; Sisk 1997: viii), which in turn, by the processes of con-
flict, influence the strengthening of ethnic identity as a unifying feature
of a community under threat from the outside and seeing the ‘other’ in
terms of stereotypes and prejudices (Agnew 1989: 42; Fitzduff 1999:
41–42; Nikolić 2003: 69). Snyder (2000) argues that transitions to more
democratic systems make this process more acute, as ethnicity represents
an easily defined and identified political identity, rather than more com-
plex cross-cutting political ideologies and concepts, creating contexts
where ethnic identity and ethnic rivalry develop into the primary locus of
political debate.
Endogenous explanations of the Kosovo conflict need to be seen in
the context of wider change occurring in the Balkan peninsula, particu-
larly in terms of the ‘messy’ disintegration of Yugoslavia and the rapid
emergence of new nation states in its place (Gow 2010: 163). Kosovo
was unusual in that, unlike Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and
Montenegro, it was a region of Serbia and therefore did not have the
constitutional right to secede from Yugoslavia, as Northern Ireland
is a de facto region of the UK. Yet, while there was an active claim on
Northern Ireland in the Irish constitution, now amended to an aspira-
tion, authors have noted a marked disinterest in Kosovo from neighbour-
ing Albania (Vickers 2001: 30). This has been explained as a historical
wish for a small and weak Albania not to challenge a larger and more
powerful Yugoslavia, but more significantly, this reluctance has been
attributed to intra-ethnic rivalry between Kosovar and North Albanian
Ghegs and South Albanian Tosks, the latter having ruled Albania for
most of its existence (Vickers 1999: 5), and ‘to absorb Yugoslav Ghegs
might doom the Tosk regime’ (Horowitz 2000: 285).
Ljubišić (2004: 1, 24) maintains that primordialist (ancient hatreds)
and constructivist (artificial and imagined) explanations are wide of the
mark, as they both ignore the international dimension. Wider exogenous
factors influencing events in Kosovo are, to a certain extent, Russian
political support for the Serbian position (e.g. Yeltsin 2000: 255–266),
described as ‘unthinking reflex loyalty for ‘Serb brothers’’ (Buckley
2001: 156), but more significantly, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in
Europe and the USA. As Vickers and Pettifer (1997: 151) have noted,
‘The émigré factor is of the greatest importance in Kosovar politics.
30 M. POTTER

The notion of a ‘Unified Albania’ has much more active support in New
York than it does in Albania’. Koinova (2011) notes that while diaspo-
ras do not cause secession, they significantly react to it in four processes.
Firstly, they become part of the conflict spiral, which in the case of the
atomised Albanian diaspora, created unity of purpose. Secondly, trans-
national coalitions are formed, as a shadow Kosovo government was
formed abroad under Ibrahim Rugova in the 1990s. Thirdly, human
rights violations at home radicalise diasporas, for example, Serbian acts
against Kosovar Albanians prompted worldwide demonstrations and the
despatch of volunteers to fight in the region. Finally, diasporas radical-
ise domestic affairs, such as when the pacifist Rugova fell out of favour
in 1998 and diaspora support switched to the UÇK. Similarly, Cochrane
et al. (2009) trace the effects of the Irish diaspora, particularly in the
USA, on the conflict in Northern Ireland, but also significantly on the
peace process.
The discussions around the nature of conflict in both Northern
Ireland and Kosovo illustrate the processes around which identities are
formed in opposition, shaped by elite mobilisation along ethno-national
lines. These forces do not take account of identities outside those domi-
nant in the conflict, such as other ethnicities, and notions that there may
be gender differences in the process of conflict-related identity formation
are absent. If alternative identities are not considered during conflict,
there is little likelihood of this being the case in the transition from con-
flict. It is these transitions which are considered next.

Transitions from Conflict in Northern Ireland

and Kosovo

The transitions from conflict in Kosovo and Northern Ireland took rad-
ically different forms, but exogenous factors were crucial in both cases.
In Northern Ireland, it was a US-brokered process that was at the pin-
nacle of years of groundwork to find a peaceful solution, involving local,
British and Irish dimensions (Mitchell 1999). In Kosovo, it was a rel-
atively short, sharp process, where armed resistance by the UÇK from
1996 was accelerated by Serbian responses and the availability of arms
from the political turmoil in Albania in 1997, leading to a more con-
certed military response from Serbia and NATO intervention in 1999.
In this case, there was a sense of ‘unfinished business’ when post-
conflict arrangements were made for Bosnia in 1995 (Judah 2001: 21),
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 31

and while there was a peace agreement on the table from the
Rambouillet negotiations in 1999, it was unusual in being, for the first
time, concluded and later enforced through the threat of military action
(Dauphinee 2003: 104; Perrit 2010: 1; Thornberry 2001: 45; Weller
2009: 146).
While the Northern Ireland transition was a product of mediated bro-
kerage between parties to the conflict, the Kosovo transition has been
theorised variously as a return to classical nineteenth-century diplomacy
of intervention, emerging interest in establishing an international con-
stitutional order and a fragmentation of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity (Weller 2009: 1–2). Some have argued that the transition was at
least partly due to endogenous factors, such as the policies of Slobodan
Milošević having the effect of transforming the UÇK from a small group
of fighters into a formidable fighting force (Judah 2000a: 309; 2001:
20) or Serbian ascendancy leading to a strong and significant alternative
and separate Albanian society (similar to Wright’s ‘organic work’). But
critics of NATO action have referred to the transition as an ‘American
war’ (Singh 2001: 61), where NATO essentially became the UÇK’s air
force (Chomsky 1999: 26), intervention giving a clear signal to Kosovo
Albanians that NATO was acting on their behalf on the path to inde-
pendence (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 154). This view has some merit, as there is
clear evidence of significant and increased US pressure for military inter-
vention (Albright 2003: 378–406).
Some authors have taken a more critical view of the US and allied role
in bringing about the transition in Kosovo, but with a specific goal in
mind for the violent expulsion of Serbia from Kosovo. By this view, the
US pursued war with Serbia (Kouchner 2004), side-lined the non-vio-
lent Kosovo Albanian movement in favour of support to the UÇK (Péan
2013) and the international hosts at the Rambouillet negotiations cre-
ated a predetermined outcome in which local actors had only a subordi-
nate role (Dauphinée 2003: 116). By this thesis, the nature of transition
was not a product of meaningful negotiation involving a broad range of
protagonists and other influential outside actors, as (arguably) occurred
in Northern Ireland, but a pre-ordained process engineered by a US-led
international bloc.
Dannreuther (2001: 20) explains diplomatic pressure for military
action against Serbia/Yugoslavia as a response to the Bosnia experience
haunting western decision-makers. Authors such as Bahadur (2007) and
Laureij (2010) describe convincingly how the media played a major role
32 M. POTTER

in instigating a drive for a military solution to the Kosovo crisis. Here,

descriptions of Serb atrocities dominated news headlines and alternative
narratives, positions or solutions were largely ignored. Added to this is
the role of Kosovo Albanian diaspora communities that were more suc-
cessful in articulating a rationale for military intervention (Sullivan
2004).
The NATO intervention in Kosovo was followed by Albanian repris-
als against Serbs, which has been described thus: “while Albanians take
their revenge today, the time may yet come when Serbs can take theirs”
(Judah 2000a: 312). While the nature, extent and justification of revenge
attacks are still a matter of debate in Kosovo, the ‘re-Albanianisation’ of
the country is evident. An EU official who had observed developments
in Kosovo over a number of years described the situation in the follow-
ing terms:

I don’t think the Kosovo Government understands that it needs to act as a

custodian for future generations. They view it more as a prize that is won
and they need to get as much out of it as they can before their time is up.
(EU official in Kosovo)

King and Mason (2006: 261) lament this ‘pendulum effect’, but are also
critical of attempts to build a state based on ‘western’ values. The chal-
lenge, writes Pula (2003: 11), is to develop structures that ‘foster civic
participation and political accountability’. This is a central challenge for
Kosovo’s transition: there is an Albanian population that feels it has won
independence from Serbia and international actors who assisted in this
process and now face the task of slowing the swing of the pendulum too
far in the direction of exclusive nationalism in order to establish a func-
tioning inclusive state. This stands in contrast to the dominant histori-
cal political narrative in Kosovo: The path to statehood for Kosovo has
been depicted as a natural, inevitable process associated with a right to
self-determination for the ethnic Albanian people in the area (Krasniqi
2005), seen in a broader historical perspective of nation states and a log-
ical dissolution of a federal structure such as Yugoslavia (Hasani 2003)
and brought about by a national liberation struggle on the part of the
UÇK on behalf of the Kosovo Albanian population (Krasniqi 2006).
This is reinforced by a notion of historical continuity of Albanian resist-
ance to invaders from bygone eras, for example, Jakup Krasniqi’s com-
parison between the medieval Albanian hero Skënderbeu and the UҪK
leader Adem Jashari (Krasniqi 2012: 129–132).
 2 NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 33

Power-Sharing Literatures
Post-conflict legislatures were established in both Northern Ireland and
Kosovo with power-sharing features. In Northern Ireland, 108 mem-
bers (now 90) were originally elected and ministries and committee
membership decided by the d’Hondt formula, which allocates positions
to parties according to the number of seats in the Assembly. Where a
petition of concern is raised against an issue under debate, decisions
must be through a majority of both communities, i.e. those declared to
be Unionist or Nationalist. In the Kosovo Assembly, 120 members are
elected, with seats reserved for 10 Serbs and 10 ‘other’ identities (Roma,
Ashkali, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and Gorani). Serbs and an ‘other’
identity are guaranteed one seat each on the seven-member presidency
and the nine ministries. Unlike Northern Ireland, decisions are made
on a simple majority, apart from specific laws of ‘vital interest’, although
members can bring a motion to the presidency if there is an allegation of
a violation of community rights.
O’Leary (1999) concludes that the Northern Ireland Assembly is con-
sociational which, according to Lijphart (1977), has features of a grand
coalition of elites, a minority veto, proportionality and segmental auton-
omy. Kosovo fails on the grounds of having no effective minority veto
(except for some specific prescribed circumstances) and the principle of
proportionality is offset by quotas for communities regardless of their share
of the vote, but it is nonetheless a power-sharing arrangement based on
ethnic identity. There have been significant debates around consociation-
alism with regard to its applicability to managing ethnic cleavages within
a polity. Lijphart (1969: 216) originally set the requirements that elites
must have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands
of subcultures, must be able to transcend cleavages to enter into commit-
ments with elites of rival subcultures, be committed to the maintenance
of the system and understand the perils of fragmentation. Essentially, elites
must want to make peace and share power within a given region and bring
an ethnic group with them. It could be argued that parties which have
policy positions that favour union with another country, such as those of
Serbs in Kosovo or Irish Nationalists in Northern Ireland, may not have
as strong a commitment to power-sharing institutions in a disputed terri-
tory, leading to a potential source of instability. Daalder (1974: 620) states
that consociationalism was developed as an alternative to ‘Anglo-American’
majoritarianism, but the theory leaves out other systems that are not
strictly majoritarian as alternatives. Kosovo has one such system.
34 M. POTTER

Power-sharing systems between ethnic groups have been criticised

by Taylor on the grounds that they oversimplify ethnicity (1994: 169)
and that they engineer ‘ethno-national group identity as a social base for
political development’ (2001: 46). According to Ottaway (1995: 248),
power-sharing systems are less democratic because they create a ‘perma-
nent coalition’ and Glenny (1999: 651–652) writes of the consociational
system in Bosnia that the parties have no incentive to move beyond
conflict because they are too comfortable in power. Indeed, Horowitz
(2000: 346) asserts that ethnic party systems foster, not moderate con-
flict, based on three observations: a single principle issue becomes the
axis of political engagement, parties are subject to ‘ethnic outbidding’
where political actors attempt to present themselves as being more repre-
sentative of the ethnic group, and party and ethnicity converge through
ascriptive affiliation. Mitchell et al. (2009) demonstrate this process of
increased ethnicisation of politics in Northern Ireland in their examina-
tion of voting patterns. In Kosovo, there is a similar alignment of eth-
nicity and political parties, with the added complication that groups that
may not necessarily have been organised politically, such as Roma and
Ashkali, have developed political parties to suit the quota system in the
Assembly, that is, the start point appears to be an institutionally engi-
neered ethnic party system. Power-sharing systems will be discussed in
greater detail in the next chapter.
Authors describe Kosovo as a divided society, with parallel systems of
social interaction, political parties, economic activity, publishing, health
care and education (Mertus 1999: 270; Kostovićova 2001: 11–14;
2005), where Albanians and Serbs rarely accept each other as neigh-
bours, friends or marriage partners (Calic 2000: 25) and ethnic prejudice
and antagonism is fostered through lack of contact and a political focus
on one side of the argument (Nikolić 2003: 53). This does not mean
that there are no Serb-Albanian friendships, as cross-community relation-
ships are possible, and despite literature to the contrary, may be com-
mon, but there are dangers associated with them, with reports of some
Albanians having been attacked by their own community for alleged frat-
ernisation (Seierstad 2005: 177–199). In such a context, there has been
an absence of reconciliation processes in Kosovo (Willigen 2013: 190).
For Northern Ireland, Liechty and Clegg’s (2001) examination of
sectarian divisions tells a similar story of communities living separate
lives: people tend to live, be educated, attend worship, socialise, organise
politically, play sport and (although less so more recently) work within
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
lausein tämän sankarittaren luonteen: »Epätoivo varhaisella iällä,
varhain koettu petos ja lankeemus, hänet hylänneen sulhasen
uskottomuus, sen jälkeen köyhyys, rehellisen perheen kirous ja
viimein erään rikkaan ukon suojelus, ukon, jota hän muuten vielä
nytkin pitää hyväntekijänään. Nuoreen sydämeen, jossa kenties piili
paljon hyvää, pesiytyi viha jo liian varhain. Luonne muodostui
laskelmia tekeväksi, rahaa kokoavaksi. Kehittyi ivallisuutta ja halua
kostaa yhteiskunnalle.» Tämän karakteristiikan jälkeen
ymmärrämme, että hän saattoi pitää pilanaan kumpaakin,
ainoastaan leikkiäkseen ilkeätä leikkiä. Ja tuon kuukauden aikana,
johon sisältyy toivotonta rakkautta, siveellisiä lankeemuksia, oman
morsiamen pettämistä, vieraitten, hänen kunniallisuutensa varaan
uskottujen rahojen anastamista, — syytetty kaiken lisäksi joutuu
miltei raivon ja vimmastuksen valtaan ainaisesta
mustasukkaisuudesta, ja ketä kohtaan, — omaa isäänsä kohtaan! Ja
pääasia on, että mieletön ukko koettaa houkutella ja viekoitella
hänen intohimonsa esinettä niillä samoilla kolmellatuhannella, joita
poika pitää äidinperintönään ja joiden anastamisesta hän soimaa
isää. Niin, minä myönnän, että tämä oli raskasta kantaa! Tässä
saattoi todella sairastua maniaan. Ei ollut kysymys rahoista, vaan
siitä, että juuri noilla rahoilla niin inhoittavan kyynillisesti tahdottiin
särkeä hänen onnensa —

Sitten Ippolit Kirillovitš siirtyi kuvaamaan, kuinka syytetyssä

vähitellen syntyi ajatus tappaa isänsä, ja seurasi tämän ajatuksen
kehittymistä perustaen esityksensä tosiasioihin.

— Aluksi me vain huutelemme ravintoloissa, — huutelemme koko

tämän kuukauden. Oi, me rakastamme elää ihmisten parissa ja heti
paikalla kertoa noille ihmisille kaikki pirullisimmatkin ja
vaarallisimmatkin ideamme, me rakastamme ilmaista ajatuksemme
ihmisille ja, en tiedä miksi, me vaadimme heti, aivan samassa, että
osaksemme tulisi näitten ihmisten puolelta täydellinen sympatia, että
he perehtyisivät kaikkiin meidän huoliimme ja murheisiimme,
myöntelisivät, kun puhumme, eivätkä olisi esteenä tavoillemme.
Muuten me suutumme ja hajoitamme koko ravintolan. (Seurasi
kertomus alikapteeni Snegirevistä.) Ne, jotka näkivät ja kuulivat
syytetyn tämän kuukauden aikana, alkoivat lopulta tuntea, että tässä
voi jo olla muutakin kuin aivan huutoja ja uhkauksia isää kohtaan ja
että raivostuksen ollessa niin suuri sanoista kenties siirrytään
tekoonkin. (Tässä prokuraattori kuvasi perhekokouksen luostarissa,
keskustelut Aljošan kanssa ja säädyttömän väkivaltaisen kohtauksen
isän kodissa, jolloin syytetty syöksyi taloon päivällisen jälkeen.) Minä
en aio tiukasti vakuuttaa, — jatkoi Ippolit Kirillovitš, — että ennen
tätä kohtausta syytetty oli jo harkiten ja määrätietoisesti päättänyt
tehdä lopun isästään murhaamalla hänet. Siitä huolimatta oli tämä
ajatus jo joitakin kertoja ollut hänen mielessään, ja hän oli harkiten
sitä tarkastanut — sen osoittavat meille tosiasiat, todistajien
lausunnot ja hänen oma tunnustuksensa. Minä tunnustan, herrat
valamiehet, — lisäsi Ippolit Kirillovitš, — että minä tähän päivään
saakka olen empinyt väittää syytetyllä olleen täyden ja tietoisen
aikomuksen tehdä rikos, joka väikkyi hänen mielessään. Minä olin
vahvasti vakuutettu sitä, että hänen sielunsa oli jo monta kertaa
nähnyt tuon kohtalokkaan hetken edessään, mutta ainoastaan
nähnyt, kuvitellut sen ainoastaan mahdollisuutena, mutta ei vielä
määrännyt toimeenpanon aikaa eikä muita siihen kuuluvia seikkoja.
Mutta minun empimiseni loppui tänään, kun neiti Verhovtsev tänään
esitti oikeudelle tämän onnettoman asiakirjan. Te itse kuulitte, hyvät
herrat, hänen huudahduksensa: »Tämä on suunnitelma, tämä on
murhan ohjelma!» näin hän määritteli onnettoman syytetyn
onnettoman »humalaisen» kirjeen. Ja todellakin tällä kirjeellä on
täysin ohjelman ja suunnitelman merkitys. Se on kirjoitettu kaksi
vuorokautta ennen rikosta, — ja näin ollen tiedämme nyt varmasti,
että kaksi vuorokautta ennen kamalan aikeensa toteuttamista
syytetty vannoi ja ilmoitti, että jollei hän seuraavana päivänä saa
rahoja, niin hän tappaa isänsä ottaakseen tämän rahat tyynyn alta
»punaisella nauhalla sidotusta kääröstä, kunhan vain Ivan lähtisi
pois». Kuulitteko: »Kunhan vain Ivan lähtisi pois», — tässä on siis
kaikki jo harkittua, asianhaaroja punnittu, — ja mistäs: kaikki
täytettiinkin sitten aivan niinkuin tämän kirjoituksen mukaan!
Aikomus ja harkinta ovat epäilemättömät, rikos oli tehtävä
ryöstämistarkoituksessa, se on suoraan ilmoitettu, se on kirjoitettu ja
allekirjoitettu. Syytetty ei kiellä allekirjoitustaan. Sanotaan: hän
kirjoitti tämän juovuksissa. Mutta se ei vähennä mitään ja on sitäkin
tärkeämpää: kirjoitti juovuksissa sitä, minkä oli miettinyt selvänä. Jos
ei asiaa olisi suunniteltu selvänä, ei sitä olisi kirjoitettu juovuksissa.
Sanotaan kenties: miksi hän sitten huuteli aikeestaan ravintoloissa?
Se, joka edeltäpäin harkiten päättää ryhtyä tämmöiseen tekoon, on
vaiti ja pitää kaikki salassa. Se on totta, mutta hän huuteli silloin, kun
ei vielä ollut suunnitelmia eikä aikomusta, vaan oli olemassa
ainoastaan toivomus, oli kypsymässä ainoastaan pyrkimys.
Myöhemmin hän jo huutelee vähemmän tästä. Sinä iltana, jolloin
tämä kirje on kirjoitettu, hän juotuaan itsenä juovuksiin
»Pääkaupunki»-ravintolassa oli vastoin tavallisuutta vaitelias, ei
pelannut biljardia, istui syrjässä, ei puhunut kenenkään kanssa ja
vain ajoi sieltä pois erään täkäläisen kauppa-apulaisen, mutta sen
hän teki miltei tiedottomasti, tottunut kun oli riitelemään eikä
ravintolaan tultuaan mitenkään voinut olla riitaa rakentamatta. Totta
on, että kun syytetty oli tehnyt lopullisen päätöksensä, hänen
mieleensä samalla täytyi nousta se pelko, että hän oli liian paljon
huudellut kaupungilla etukäteen ja että se voi suuresti todistaa häntä
vastaan ja hänen syyllisyyttään, kun hän toteuttaa aikeensa. Mutta
minkäpä sille voi, tosiasiana pysyi, että hän oli aikeitaan kuulutellut,
tehtyä ei saanut tekemättömäksi, ja totta kai loppujen lopuksi piru
auttaa niinkuin on tehnyt tähänkin asti. Me luotimme onneemme,
hyvät herrat! Minun täytyy lisäksi vielä tunnustaa, että hän teki paljon
välttääkseen onnettoman hetken, että hän ponnisteli sangen paljon
välttääkseen verenvuodatusta. »Pyydän huomenna kolmeatuhatta
kaikilta ihmisiltä», kuten hän kirjoittaa omalaatuisella
kielenkäytöllään, »ja jos ihmiset eivät anna, niin vuotaa verta».
Taaskin juovuksissa kirjoitettu ja taaskin selvänä toimeenpantu ihan
kuin kirjoituksen mukaan! —

Sitten Ippolit Kirillovitš ryhtyi seikkaperäisesti kuvailemaan kaikkia

Mitjan puuhia rahojen saamiseksi, ettei tarvitsisi tehdä rikosta. Hän
kuvasi hänen käyntinsä Samsonovin luona, matkan Ljagavyin luokse
— kaikki asiakirjain perusteella. — Kiusaantuneena, pilkattuna,
nälkäisenä, myytyään kellonsa tämän matkan takia (vaikka hänellä
olikin päällään puolitoista tuhatta ruplaa — muka, oi, muka),
mustasukkaisuuden kiduttaessa häntä kaupunkiin jääneen lempensä
esineen tähden, epäillen tämän hänen poissa ollessaan menevän
Fjodor Pavlovitšin luo, hän palaa viimein takaisin kaupunkiin.
Jumalan kiitos! Lemmitty ei ole ollut Fjodor Pavlovitšin luona. Hän
itse saattaa hänet tämän suojelijan Samsonovin luo. (Omituista,
Samsonovia kohtaan me emme ole mustasukkainen, ja tämä on
hyvin kuvaava psykologinen erikoisuus tässä jutussa!) Sitten hän
rientää tähystysasemalle »takalistoon» ja siellä — siellä hän saa
tietää, että Smerdjakov on saanut kaatuvataudin kohtauksen, että
toinen palvelija on sairas, — tie on vapaa, »merkit» hän tuntee, mikä
kiusaus! Siitä huolimatta hän kuitenkin koettaa vastustaa; hän
menee meidän kaikkien suuresti kunnioittaman, täällä väliaikaisesti
asuvan rouva Hohlakovin luo. Tämä rouva, joka jo kauan on tuntenut
osanottoa hänen kohtaloonsa, antaa hänelle mitä järkevimmän
neuvon: että hän heittäisi pois tuon juopottelun, tuon säädyttömän
rakkauden, nuo joutilaana ravintolassa vetelehtimiset, nuorten
voimain hyödyttömän tuhlailun, ja menisi Siperiaan kultakaivokseen:
»Siellä tulevat kuohuvat voimanne käytetyiksi, se sopii teidän
romanttiselle luonteellenne, joka kiihkeästi haluaa seikkailuja.» —
Kuvattuaan keskustelun tuloksen ja sen hetken, jolloin syytetty
yhtäkkiä sai tietää, että Grušenjka ei ollutkaan Samsonovin luona,
kuvattuaan, miten onneton, mustasukkainen mies, jonka hermot
olivat äärimmilleen kiusatut, joutui silmänräpäyksessä raivon valtaan
ajatellessaan, että lemmittynsä oli pettänyt hänet ja on nyt Fjodor
Pavlovitšin luona, Ippolit Kirillovitš lopetti kiinnittäen huomiota
sattuman kohtalokkaaseen vaikutukseen: — Jos palvelijatar olisi
ennättänyt sanoa hänelle, että hänen lemmittynsä on Mokrojessa,
»entisen» ja »kiistämättömän» kanssa, — niin ei mitään olisi
tapahtunut. Mutta palvelijatar oli hölmistynyt kauhusta, vannoi ja
vakuutti, ja jos syytetty ei tappanut häntä siihen paikkaan, niin se
johtui vain siitä, että hän syöksyi päistikkaa petollisen lemmittynsä
jälkeen. Mutta huomatkaa: niin suunniltaan kuin hän olikin, niin hän
kuitenkin sieppasi mukaansa vaskisen survimen. Miksi juuri
survimen, miksi ei jotakin muuta asetta? Mutta jos me jo kokonaisen
kuukauden ajan olemme nähneet edessämme tuon kuvan ja
valmistautuneet siihen, niin me sieppaamme aseeksi sen, mikä
sattuu vilahtamaan silmiimme ja näyttää sopivan aseeksi. Ja että
jokin tämäntapainen esine voi olla aseena, — sitä olemme
mielessämme ajatelleet jo kokonaisen kuukauden. Siksipä me niin
silmänräpäyksessä ja empimättä katsoimmekin sen sopivan aseeksi!
Ja siksipä hän ei oikeastaan tiedottomasti eikä vastoin tahtoaan
siepannut tuota onnetonta survinta. Nyt hän on isän puutarhassa —
tie on avoinna, todistajia ei ole, on yösydän, pimeyttä ja
mustasukkaisuutta. Epäluulo, että lemmitty on täällä, tuon hänen
kilpailijansa kanssa, hänen sylissään, ja kenties pilkkaa häntä tällä
hetkellä, — saa vallan hänen sielussaan. Eikä pelkkä epäluulo, —
millepä epäluuloille enää olisi sijaa, petos on ilmeinen,
silminnähtävä: hän on täällä, tässä huoneessa, josta näkyy valoa,
hän on siellä hänen luonaan, verhon takana, — ja onneton mies
hiipii ikkunan luo, katsoo siihen kunnioittavasti, tyyntyy säyseästi ja
poistuu järkevästi rientäen nopeasti pakoon onnettomuutta,
estääkseen vaarallisen ja epäsiveellisen teon, — ja meidät
tahdotaan saada vakuutetuiksi tästä, meidät, jotka tunnemme
syytetyn luonteen, ymmärrämme, millaisessa mielentilassa hän oli,
ymmärrämme sen meille tunnettujen tosiasiain perusteella, ja, ennen
kaikkea, tiedämme hänen tuntevan merkit, joitten avulla hän heti voi
saada ovet aukeamaan ja päästä sisälle! — Tässä, »merkeistä»
mainitessaan, Ippolit Kirillovitš joksikin aikaa jätti syytöksensä ja
katsoi välttämättömäksi puhua laajasti Smerdjakovista, jotta tuo
väliin tullut episodi Smerdjakoviin kohdistuvista epäluuloista tulisi
perin pohjin pengotuksi ja se ajatus, että tämä oli tehnyt murhan,
saataisiin kerta kaikkiaan poistetuksi. Hän teki tämän sangen
seikkaperäisesti, ja kaikki ymmärsivät, että vaikka hän olikin
suhtautunut hyvin halveksivasti moiseen epäluuloon, niin hän
kuitenkin piti sitä varsin tärkeänä asiana.

8.

Tutkielma Smerdjakovista
 — Mistä ensiksikin on johtunut se, että tuollainen epäluulo
ollenkaan on voinut syntyä? — tällä kysymyksellä Ippolit Kirillovitš
aloitti. — Ensimmäinen, joka huudahti, että Smerdjakov oli murhaaja,
oli syytetty itse vangitsemisensa hetkellä, mutta hän ei ole
kuitenkaan tuosta ensimmäisestä huudostaan lähtien aina tähän
hetkeen asti esittänyt syytöksensä tueksi ainoatakaan tosiasiaa, —
eipä edes jossakin määrin inhimillisen järjen mukaista viittaustakaan
johonkin tosiasiaan. Sitten on tämän syytöksen esittänyt ainoastaan
kolme henkilöä: syytetyn molemmat veljet ja rouva Svetlov. Mutta
syytetyn vanhempi veli esitti epäluulonsa vasta tänään, sairaana,
kiistämättömän mielenhäiriön ja kuumeen vallassa, kun taas tätä
ennen koko kahden kuukauden ajan, kuten varmasti tiedämme, hän
on täydelleen ollut vakuutettu veljensä syyllisyydestä eikä ole
koettanutkaan väittää mitään tätä ajatusta vastaan. Mutta tästä
puhumme erikseen myöhemmin. Sitten ilmoitti syytetyn nuorempi
veli meille äsken itse, ettei hänellä ole mitään tosiasioita esitettävänä
sen ajatuksensa tueksi, että Smerdjakov on syyllinen, ei
pienimpiäkään, ja että hän on saanut tämän käsityksensä
ainoastaan syytetyn sanoista ja »hänen kasvojensa ilmeestä», —
niin, tämän suurenmoisen todistuksen lausui hänen veljensä äsken
kahdesti. Rouva Svetlov taas lausui kenties vieläkin
suurenmoisemmin: »Mitä syytetty teille sanoo, sitä uskokaa, hän ei
ole niitä miehiä, että valehtelisi.» Tässä ovat noiden kolmen
henkilön, joita syytetyn kohtalo perin läheisesti koskee, kaikki
tosiasialliset todistukset Smerdjakovia vastaan. Ja kuitenkin syytös
Smerdjakovia vastaan on pysynyt vireillä ja levinnyt ja elää yhä, —
voiko sitä uskoa, onko se ajateltavissa? —

Tässä Ippolit Kirillovitš katsoi tarpeelliseksi hiukan kuvailla

»sairaalloisen mielenhäiriön ja hulluuden kohtauksessa itseltään
hengen riistäneen» Smerdjakov-vainajan luonnetta. Hän esitti hänet
heikkojärkiseksi mieheksi, joka oli saanut jonkinmoisen sekavan
opillisen sivistyksen alkeita ja jonka pään olivat panneet pyörälle yli
hänen ymmärryksensä menevät filosofiset aatteet; hän pelästyi
erinäisiä nykyaikaisia oppeja velvollisuudesta ja ihmisen tehtävästä,
joita oppeja hänelle jakelivat — käytännöllisesti hänen herra- ja
mahdollisesti isävainajansa Fjodor Pavlovitš hillittömällä elämällään,
ja teoreettisesti herran toinen poika Ivan Fjodorovitš monenlaisilla
omituisilla filosofisilla keskusteluilla, joihin hän mielellään huvikseen
ryhtyi, luultavasti ikävissään tai tuntien ivailun tarvetta, jolle ei
sattunut löytymään parempaa purkautumismahdollisuutta. — Hän on
itse kertonut minulle henkisestä tilastaan viimeisinä olinpäivinään
herransa talossa, — selitti Ippolit Kirillovitš, — mutta siitä todistavat
toisetkin: syytetty itse, hänen veljensä, vieläpä palvelija Grigori, toisin
sanoen kaikki ne, joitten täytyi tuntea hänet sangen hyvin. Sitäpaitsi
kaatuvataudin runtelema Smerdjakov oli »arka kuin kana». »Hän
lankesi jalkoihini ja suuteli jalkojani», kertoi meille syytetty itse sillä
hetkellä, jolloin hän ei vielä tajunnut sellaisen kertomuksen olevan
itselleen jossakin määrin epäedullisen, — »se on kaatuvatautinen
kana», lausui hän hänestä luonteenomaisella puhetavallaan.
Tämänpä miehen syytetty (niinkuin hän itsekin todistaa) valitsee
uskotukseen ja peloittelee häntä niin paljon, että tämä lopulta
suostuu rupeamaan hänen vakoojakseen ja tietojen tuojaksi.
Tämmöisenä urkkijana talossa hän pettää herraansa, kertoo
syytetylle sekä rahakäärön olemassaolosta että merkeistä, joitten
avulla voi päästä herran luo, — ja kuinka hän olisikaan voinut olla
kertomatta! »He tappavat, näin sen selvästi, että he tappavat minut»,
sanoi hän kuulustelussa vavisten ja tutisten meidänkin edessämme
siitä huolimatta, että kiduttaja, joka oli häntä peloitellut, oli silloin jo
itse vankilassa eikä voinut tulla häntä rankaisemaan. »He epäilivät
minua joka hetki, minä olin pelossa ja vavistuksessa, vain
välttääkseni heidän vihaansa kiiruhdin ilmoittamaan heille jokaisen
salaisuuden, jotta he juuri siten näkisivät minun syyttömyyteni heidän
edessään ja päästäisivät minut hengissä käsistään.» Nämä ovat
hänen omat sanansa, minä kirjoitin ne muistiin ja muistan: »Kun he
alkavat huutaa minulle, niin minä lysähdän polvilleni heidän
eteensä.» Ollen luonnostaan perin rehellinen nuori mies, jonka
ominaisuuden avulla hän oli saavuttanut herransa luottamuksen, sillä
tämä oli huomannut hänen rehellisyytensä, kun hän oli antanut
isännälleen takaisin tämän pudottamat rahat, onneton Smerdjakov,
täytyy otaksua, kärsi hirveitä katumuksen tuskia sen johdosta, että
oli ollut uskoton herralleen, jota hän rakasti hyväntekijänään.
Henkilöt, jotka potevat ankaraa kaatuvatautia, ovat etevimpien
psykiatrien todistuksen mukaan aina taipuvaisia lakkaamatta ja
tietenkin sairaalloisesti syyttämään itseään. Heitä kiusaa heidän
»syyllisyytensä» jossakin asiassa jonkun edessä, heitä kiduttavat
omantunnon tuskat, joihin usein ei ole mitään syytä, he liioittelevat ja
keksivät itsekin syykseen kaikenlaisia vikoja ja rikoksia. Ja tällainen
subjekti tulee todellakin syylliseksi ja rikolliseksi pelosta ja
peloittelusta. Sitäpaitsi hän aavisti selvästi, että hänen silmiensä
edessä kehittyvistä asianhaaroista saattoi tulla seuraukseksi jotakin
pahaa. Kun Fjodor Pavlovitšin keskimmäinen poika, Ivan Fjodorovitš,
aivan katastrofin edellä oli lähdössä Moskovaan, niin Smerdjakov
pyyteli häntä jäämään, uskaltamatta kuitenkaan, pelkuri kun oli,
lausua hänelle kaikkea pelkoaan selvässä ja kategorisessa
muodossa. Hän tyytyi pelkkiin vihjauksiin, mutta niitä ei ymmärretty.
On huomattava, että Ivan Fjodorovitšissa hän ikäänkuin näki
turvansa, ikäänkuin vakuuden siitä, että niin kauan kuin tämä on
kotona, ei onnettomuutta tapahdu. Muistakaa Dmitri Karamazovin
»humalaisessa» kirjeessä oleva lause: »Tapan ukon, jos vain Ivan
matkustaa pois», siis Ivan Fjodorovitšin läsnäoloa pitivät kaikki
ikäänkuin vakuutena rauhan ja järjestyksen säilymisestä talossa.
Mutta hän matkustaa pois, ja Smerdjakov saa heti, melkein tunnin
kuluttua nuoren herran lähdöstä, kaatuvataudin kohtauksen. Sehän
on täysin ymmärrettävää. Tässä on mainittava, että kauhun ja
eräänlaisen epätoivon näännyttämä Smerdjakov oli varsinkin viime
päivinä tuntenut kaatuvataudin kohtausten saattavan tulla,
jommoista hänelle oli sattunut ennenkin siveellisen jännityksen ja
järkytyksen hetkinä. Näiden kohtausten päivää ja hetkeä ei
tietenkään voi ennakolta arvata, mutta taipumusta kohtaukseen voi
jokainen kaatuvatautinen tuntea itsessään jo edeltäkäsin. Niin sanoo
lääketiede. Ja niinpä heti Ivan Fjodorovitšin lähdettyä talosta
Smerdjakov tuntien niin sanoakseni orpoutensa ja turvattomuutensa
on kotoisissa askareissaan menossa kellariin, kulkee alas portaita ja
ajattelee: »Tuleeko vai eikö tule kohtaus, ja entäpä jos se tuleekin
juuri nyt?» — Ja juuri tämän mielentilan johdosta, tämän kuvittelun ja
näiden kysymysten johdosta, hän saa vetokohtauksia kurkkuunsa,
jotka oireet aina käyvät kaatuvataudin kohtauksen edellä, ja hän
lentää päistikkaa tajuttomana kellarin pohjalle. Ja tässä mitä
luonnollisimmassa sattumassa osataan viekkaasti nähdä jotakin
epäilyttävää, jokin osoitus, jokin viittaus siihen, että hän tahallaan
tekeytyi sairaaksi! Mutta jos hän sen teki tahallaan, niin herää heti
kysymys: mitä varten? Millainen oli laskelma, mikä oli tarkoitus?
Minä en nyt puhukaan lääketieteestä; tiede muka valehtelee, tiede
erehtyy, lääkärit eivät ole osanneet erottaa toisistaan totuutta ja
teeskentelyä, — olkoon niin, olkoon, mutta vastatkaa kuitenkin
kysymykseeni: mitä varten hänen tarvitsi teeskennellä? Eiköhän sitä
varten, että hän, päätettyään tehdä murhan, tuolla kaatuvataudin
kohtauksella jo sitä ennen ja mahdollisimman pian kiinnittäisi talossa
toisten huomion itseensä? Nähkääs, herrat valamiehet, Fjodor
Pavlovitšin talossa oli ja oleskeli rikosyönä viisi ihmistä: ensiksikin
itse Fjodor Pavlovitš, — mutta eihän hän tappanut itseään, se on
selvää, toiseksi hänen palvelijansa Grigori, mutta tämähän oli
vähällä itse tulla tapetuksi, — kolmanneksi Grigorin vaimo,
palvelijatar Marfa Ignatjevna, mutta suorastaan hävettää otaksua,
että hän olisi murhannut herransa. Jää siis kaksi miestä: syytetty ja
Smerdjakov. Mutta koska syytetty vakuuttaa, ettei hän ole murhaaja,
niin murhan on siis tehnyt Smerdjakov, muuta mahdollisuutta ei ole,
mitään muuta murhaajaa ei voi löytää. Siitäpä, siitäpä siis on
syntynyt tuo »ovela» ja suurenmoinen syytös onnetonta, eilen
päivänsä päättänyttä idioottia vastaan! Vain siksi, ettei ketään muuta
voi löytää! Jos olisi edes epäluulon varjoakaan jotakuta muuta
kohtaan, jotakuta kuudetta henkilöä kohtaan, niin, minä olen
vakuutettu siitä, syytetty itsekin häpeäisi silloin viitata Smerdjakoviin,
hän syyttäisi tuota kuudetta henkilöä, sillä on suorastaan mieletöntä
syyttää tästä murhasta Smerdjakovia.

Hyvät herrat, jättäkäämme psykologia, jättäkäämme lääketiede,

jättäkäämme logiikkakin, pitäkäämme kiinni vain tosiasioista ja
katsokaamme, mitä tosiasiat meille puhuvat. Smerdjakov tappoi,
mutta millä tavoin? Yksinkö vaiko yhdessä syytetyn kanssa?
Tarkastakaamme ensin ensimmäistä tapausta, nimittäin että
Smerdjakov tekee murhan yksin. Jos hän tappoi, niin tietysti hän teki
sen jostakin syystä, jotakin etua saavuttaakseen. Mutta kun hänellä
ei ollut edes nimeksikään sellaisia vaikuttimia murhan tekoon kuin oli
syytetyllä, nimittäin vihaa, mustasukkaisuutta ynnä muuta, niin
Smerdjakov epäilemättä saattoi tehdä murhan ainoastaan rahojen
tähden, anastaakseen itselleen nimenomaan nuo kolmetuhatta, jotka
hän itse oli nähnyt herran laittavan kääröön. Ja niinpä hän
päätettyään tehdä murhan ennakolta ilmoittaa toiselle henkilölle, —
nimittäin syytetylle, — kaikki rahoja ja merkkejä koskevat seikat:
missä käärö on, mitä kääröön on kirjoitettu, minkä sisään se on
kääritty, ja, mikä on tärkeintä, kaikkein tärkeintä, kertoo hänelle
noista »merkeistä», joitten avulla pääsee sisälle herran luo. Mitä,
tekeekö hän sen suorastaan joutuakseen kiinni? Vai saadakseenko
itselleen kilpailijan, joka kenties tahtoo itsekin mennä sisälle ja saada
käärön? Niin, sanotaan minulle, mutta hänhän kertoi sen pelosta.
Mutta miten lienee? Mies, joka silmää räpäyttämättä on suunnitellut
niin rohkeutta vaativan ja petomaisen asian ja sitten paneekin sen
toimeen, — ilmaisee sellaisia tietoja, jotka hän yksin koko
maailmassa tuntee ja joita ei kukaan koko maailmassa osaa
aavistaakaan, jos hän vain ei puhu niistä. Ei, olipa mies millainen
pelkuri tahansa, niin jos hän on suunnitellut semmoisen teon, niin
hän ei sano kenellekään mitään ainakaan kääröstä ja merkeistä, sillä
niistä kertominenhan on samaa kuin ennakolta laittaa niin, että
joutuu kiinni. Hän olisi keksaissut jotakin vartavasten, olisi
valehdellut jotakin muuta, jos häneltä aivan välttämättömästi
vaadittiin tietoja, mutta näistä asioista hän ei olisi hiiskunut mitään!
Päinvastoin, toistan sen, jos hän olisi ollut puhumatta vaikkapa vain
rahoista ja sitten tehnyt murhan ja anastanut nuo rahat itselleen, niin
ei kukaan koskaan koko maailmassa olisi voinut syyttää häntä
ainakaan ryöstömurhasta, sillä eihän kukaan muu kuin hän ollut
nähnyt noita rahoja, ei kukaan tietänyt, että ne olivat talossa. Jos
häntä olisi syytettykin, niin ehdottomasti olisi katsottu hänen tehneen
murhan jostakin muusta vaikuttimesta. Mutta kun kukaan ei
aikaisemmin ollut huomannut hänellä olevan noita vaikuttimia, vaan
kaikki päinvastoin näkivät, että hänen herransa rakastaa häntä ja
kunnioittaa häntä luottamuksellaan, niin tietysti häntä olisi viimeiseksi
epäilty, ja olisi ennen kaikkea epäilty sellaista, jolla oli näitä
vaikuttimia, joka itse huusi, että hänellä oli nämä vaikuttimet, joka ei
niitä salannut, vaan ilmaisi ne kaikille, sanalla sanoen, olisi epäilty
murhatun poikaa Dmitri Fjodorovitšia. Smerdjakov olisi murhannut ja
ryöstänyt, mutta poikaa olisi syytetty, — tämähän olisi ollut edullista
Smerdjakoville, murhaajalle? No, mutta tuollepa pojalle juuri
Smerdjakov päätettyään tehdä murhan kertoo edeltäpäin rahoista,
kääröstä ja merkeistä, — kuinka loogillista, kuinka selvää tämä
onkaan!

Tulee Smerdjakovin suunnitteleman murhateon päivä, ja silloin

hän kaatuu nurin teeskennellen kaatuvataudin kohtausta, miksi?
Tietysti siksi, että ensiksikin palvelija Grigori, joka on aikonut ryhtyä
parantelemaan sairauttaan, nähdessään ettei ole kerrassaan ketään,
joka vahtisi taloa, kenties lykkäisi sairautensa hoitelemisen toiseen
kertaan ja ryhtyisi vahtimaan. Toiseksi tietysti sen tähden, että itse
herra, joka näkisi, ettei häntä kukaan vartioi, ja joka hirveästi pelkäsi
poikansa tuloa, mitä hän ei toisilta salannut, olisi kahta vertaa
epäluuloisempi ja varovaisempi. Ja lopuksi, mikä on pääasia, tietysti
sen tähden, että hänet, taudinkohtauksen heikontama Smerdjakov,
heti vietäisiin keittiöstä, jossa hän aina makasi yönsä erillään muista
ja jossa hän sai vapaasti tulla ja mennä, sivurakennuksen toiseen
päähän Grigorin huoneeseen, heidän molempien luo väliseinän
taakse, kolmen askelen päähän heidän omasta vuoteestaan,
niinkuin oli ollut aina tapana jo ammoisista ajoista, heti kun häntä
runteli kaatuvatauti, mikä asiain järjestely johtui hänen herransa ja
helläsydämisen Marfa Ignatjevnan tahdosta. Maatessaan siellä
väliseinän takana hän luultavimmin, jotta häntä sitäkin varmemmin
pidettäisiin sairaana, alkaa tietysti vaikeroida, toisin sanoen herätellä
heitä unesta kaiken yötä — (niinkuin asia olikin Grigorin ja tämän
vaimon todistuksen mukaan), — ja kaikki tämä, kaikki tämä vain
siksi, että hän sitä mukavammin voisi yht'äkkiä nousta vuoteeltaan ja
sitten tappaa herransa!
 Mutta, sanotaan minulle, kenties hän siksi juuri teeskentelikin, ettei
häntä sairaana epäiltäisi, ja syytetylle hän ilmaisi rahoja ja merkkejä
koskevat seikat juuri siksi, että tämä rupeaisi tuntemaan houkutusta
ja tulisi itse ja tekisi murhan, ja kun sitten, näettekö, toinen olisi
murhan tehtyään mennyt pois ja vienyt rahat ja tällöin kenties
synnyttänyt melua ja touhua, herättänyt todistajat unesta, silloin,
näettekö, nousee myös Smerdjakov ja menee, — niin, minkäpä sille
tekee, hän menee. Hän menee nimenomaan tappamaan toisen
kerran herran ja viemään toisen kerran tämän rahat. Hyvät herrat,
nauratteko te? Minua hävettää itseänikin esittäessäni tämmöisiä
otaksumia, mutta kuitenkin, ajatelkaahan, syytetty vakuuttaa juuri
tämmöistä: minun jälkeeni, muka, kun minä olin jo lähtenyt ulos
talosta, lyönyt maahan Grigorin ja synnyttänyt hälyn, hän nousi
vuoteesta, meni, tappoi ja ryösti rahat. Minä en edes puhukaan siitä,
miten Smerdjakov saattoi laskea kaikki edeltäpäin ja tietää kaikki
edeltäkäsin kuin viisi sormeaan, nimittäin että kiihtynyt ja hurjistunut
poika tulee vain sitä varten, että katsahtaisi kunnioittavasti ikkunasta
sisään ja vetäytyisi taas pois, vaikka tiesi merkit, sekä jättäisi
hänelle, Smerdjakoville, koko saaliin! Hyvät herrat, minä kysyn
vakavasti: mikä on se hetki, jolloin Smerdjakov teki rikoksensa?
Osoittakaa se hetki, sillä ilman sitä ei voi syyttää!

Mutta ehkäpä kaatuvatauti oli oikeata. Sairas toipui yhtäkkiä, kuuli

huutoa, meni ulos, — no, ja mitä sitten? Katsoi ja sanoi itsekseen:
annahan kun menen ja tapan herran? Mutta mistä hän tiesi, mitä
täällä oli ollut, mitä täällä oli tapahtunut, hänhän oli siihen saakka
maannut tiedottomana? Onpa muuten, hyvät herrat, rajansa myöskin
mielikuvituksen lennolla.

Niin, sanovat tarkkanäköiset ihmiset, entäpä jos molemmat

yhdessä tappoivat ja jakoivat rahat, kuinka silloin?
 Niin, se on todellakin tärkeä epäluulo, ja ensiksikin on
suurenmoisia todistuskappaleita sitä tukemassa: toinen tappaa ja
ottaa osalleen kaiken vaivan, ja toinen, hänen toverinsa, makailee
kyljellään teeskennellen kaatuvatautia, — nimenomaan
herättääkseen kaikissa edeltäpäin epäluuloja, levottomuutta
herrassa, levottomuutta Grigorissa. Olisi mielenkiintoista tietää,
mitkä vaikuttimet saivat nuo toverukset keksimään juuri tuon
mielettömän suunnitelman! Mutta ehkäpä se ei ollutkaan mitään
aktiivista kumppanuutta Smerdjakovin puolelta, vaan niin sanoakseni
passiivista ja kärsivää: kenties pahanpäiväiseksi peloiteltu
Smerdjakov oli suostunut vain olemaan vastustamatta murhan
tekemistä ja aavistaen, että häntä ruvetaan syyttämään siitä, että
hän oli antanut tappaa herransa huutamatta ja vastarintaa
tekemättä, — oli etukäteen tingannut itselleen Dmitri Karamazovilta
luvan olla olevinaan teon aikana kaatuvataudissa, »tapa sinä omia
aikojasi, minä en pistä lusikkaani siihen liemeen». Mutta näinkin
ollen on muistettava, että koska tuon kaatuvataudinkohtauksen
kuitenkin täytyi synnyttää hämminkiä talossa, niin Dmitri Karamazov,
ymmärtäen tämän edeltäpäin, ei mitenkään olisi voinut suostua
tuollaiseen välipuheeseen. Mutta minä en tahdo väittää vastaan,
olkoon niin, että hän suostui; silloinhan olisi kuitenkin tullut
tulokseksi, että Dmitri Karamazov on murhaaja, suoranainen
murhaaja ja aloitteen tekijä, kun taas Smerdjakov on vain passiivinen
osanottaja, eikä edes osanottajakaan, vaan hän on ainoastaan
antanut asian tapahtua peläten ja vasten tahtoaan, senhän olisi
oikeus ehdottomasti voinut käsittää, mutta mitä me näemmekään?
Tuskin on syytetty vangittu, kun hän jo heti panee kaikki
Smerdjakovin syyksi ja syyttää yksistään häntä. Hän ei syytä häntä
rikostoveruudesta, vaan syyttää häntä yksistään: yksin hän, muka,
teki sen, hän murhasi ja ryösti, se on hänen kättensä työtä! Mitä
tovereita ne ovat, jotka heti alkavat työntää syytä toinen toisensa
päälle, — eihän sellaista koskaan tapahdu. Ja huomatkaa, miten
vaarallista se on Karamazoville: hän on päämurhaaja ja toinen vain
sivuhenkilö, toinen on vain antanut asian tapahtua ja maannut
väliseinän takana, mutta hän syyttää makaajaa. Mutta tuo
makaajahan voisi suuttua ja yksistään suojellakseen itseään heti
ilmoittaa asian todellisen laidan: molemmat olemme osallisia, mutta
minä en tappanut, minä vain pelosta sallin sen tapahtua enkä
estänyt. Olisihan hän, Smerdjakov, ymmärtänyt, että oikeus heti olisi
pitänyt häntä paljon vähemmässä määrässä syyllisenä, ja hän
saattoi siis toivoa, että jos häntä rangaistaankin, niin paljon
lievemmin kuin tuota toista, varsinaista murhaajaa, joka tahtoi panna
kaikki hänen syykseen. Mutta silloin hän pakostakin olisi
tunnustanut. Sitä emme kuitenkaan ole nähneet. Smerdjakov ei
hiiskahtanut sanaakaan yhteistoiminnasta, vaikka murhaaja
ankarasti syytti häntä ja kaiken aikaa viittasi häneen, joka muka
yksin oli murhan tehnyt. Ja vielä enemmänkin: Smerdjakov juuri
ilmaisikin tutkijoille, että rahakääröstä ja merkeistä oli syytetylle
kertonut hän itse, ja ilman häntä ei tämä olisi saanut tietää mitään.
Jos hän todellakin olisi ollut rikostoveri ja syyllinen, niin olisiko hän
noin helposti ilmaissut sen tutkijoille, nimittäin sen, että hän itse oli
antanut kaikesta tiedon syytetylle? Päinvastoin hän olisi kieltänyt ja
ehdottomasti esittänyt tosiasiat väärässä valossa ja vähentänyt
niiden merkitystä. Mutta hän ei vääristellyt tosiasioita eikä niitä
pienennellyt. Niin voi tehdä ainoastaan viaton, sellainen, joka ei
pelkää, että häntä syytetään osallisuudesta. Nyt hän sairaalloisen
melankolian puuskan vallassa, joka johtui hänen kaatuvataudistaan
ja koko tapahtuneesta katastrofista, hirttäytyi eilen. Hirttäytyessään
hän jätti jälkeensä lapun, johon oli kirjoittanut hänelle ominaisella
sanontatavalla: »Teen lopun itsestäni omasta tahdostani ja halustani,
ettei ketään syytettäisi.» No, mikäpä häntä olisi estänyt lisäämästä
lappuun: murhan olen tehnyt minä eikä Karamazov. Mutta hän ei ole
lisännyt tätä: pakottiko omatunto toiseen, mutta ei toiseen?

Ja mitäs: äsken tänne, oikeuteen, tuotiin rahoja, kolmetuhatta

ruplaa, —- ne ovat, muka samat rahat, jotka olivat siinä käärössä,
joka on pöydällä muitten esineellisten todistuskappaleitten joukossa,
tuoja sai ne, muka, eilen Smerdjakovilta. Mutta te, herrat valamiehet,
muistatte itse äskeisen surullisen kohtauksen. Minä en rupea
uudelleen kertomaan yksityiskohtia, mutta katson voivani kuitenkin
lausua pari kolme mietelmää ottaen kaikkein vähäpätöisimpiä
seikkoja, — sen tähden juuri, että ne ovat vähäpätöisiä eivätkä siis
nouse mieleen jokaiselle, vaan unohtuvat. Ensiksi ja taaskin: oman
tunnonvaivojen johdosta Smerdjakov eilen antoi pois rahat ja
hirttäytyi itse. (Sillä jos hänellä ei olisi ollut tunnonvaivoja, niin hän ei
olisi antanut rahoja.) Ja tietysti hän vasta eilen illalla ensikerran
tunnusti rikoksensa Ivan Karamazoville, kuten Ivan Karamazov
itsekin on ilmoittanut, sillä miksi hän muuten olisi ollut vaiti tähän
saakka? Hän siis tunnusti, mutta miksi, kysyn sitä taaskin, hän ei ole
kuolemansa edellä kirjoittamassaan lapussa ilmoittanut meille koko
totuutta, vaikka hän tiesi, että huomenna on viattomalla syytetyllä
kauhea tuomion päivä? Eiväthän rahat yksinään todista mitään. Minä
esimerkiksi ja vielä kaksi muuta henkilöä tässä salissa olemme aivan
sattumalta saaneet tietää jo viikko sitten erään tosiasian, nimittäin
että Ivan Fjodorovitš Karamazov on lähettänyt läänin pääkaupunkiin
vaihdettavaksi kaksi viidentuhannen ruplan arvopaperia, jotka
tuottavat korkoa viisi prosenttia, siis kaikkiaan kymmenentuhannen
arvosta. Tarkoitan vain sitä, että rahoja saattaa tätä nykyä olla
kenellä hyvänsä ja ettei tuomalla kolmetuhatta voi todistaa sitovasti,
että ne ovat juuri niitä samoja rahoja, juuri siitä samasta laatikosta tai
kääröstä. Lopuksi vielä Ivan Karamazov saatuaan eilen niin tärkeän
tiedon todelliselta murhaajalta pysyy aivan rauhassa. Miksi hän ei
voinut ilmoittaa siitä heti paikalla? Miksi hän lykkäsi kaikki
seuraavaan aamuun? Luulenpa, että minulla on oikeus arvata miksi:
jo viikon on hänen terveytensä ollut piloilla, itse hän on tunnustanut
tohtorille ja läheisilleen näkevänsä näkyjä, kohtaavansa jo kuolleita
ihmisiä, hän on juoppohulluuden partaalla, joka tauti tänään juuri
hänessä puhkesi näkyviin, ja niinpä hän kuultuaan odottamatta
Smerdjakovin kuolemasta yhtäkkiä ajattelee: »Mies on kuollut, häntä
voi syyttää, ja veljeni minä saan pelastetuksi. Onhan minulla rahaa:
otan rahatukun ja sanon Smerdjakovin antaneen sen minulle ennen
kuolemaansa.» Te sanotte: tuo ei ole kunniallista, on epärehellistä
valehdella, vaikkapa toinen olisikin kuollut ja vaikkapa tahtoisikin
pelastaa veljensä! No niin, mutta entäpä jos hän valehteli
tietämättään, jospa hän itse kuvitteli asian olleen sillä tavoin, sillä tuo
tieto lakeijan äkillisestä kuolemasta sai lopullisesti hänen järkensä
menemään sekaisin? Tehän näitte äskeisen kohtauksen, näitte
missä tilassa mies oli. Hän seisoi jaloillaan ja puhui, mutta missä oli
hänen järkensä? Kuumeessa olevan miehen äskeisen todistuksen
jälkeen seurasi asiakirja, syytetyn kirje neiti Verhovtseville, jonka
kirjeen syytetty oli kirjoittanut kaksi päivää ennen rikoksen tekemistä
ja jossa on ennakolta seikkaperäinen rikoksen ohjelma. No, miksi me
siis etsimme ohjelmaa ja sen laatijoita? Täsmälleen tämän ohjelman
mukaan toimittiinkin, eikä toimija ollut kukaan muu kuin ohjelman
laatija. Niin, herrat valamiehet, »tehtiin aivan kirjoituksen
mukaisesti»! Emmekä me ollenkaan, emme ollenkaan juosseet
kunnioittavasti ja peläten pois isän ikkunan alta, vieläpä varmasti
vakuutettuina siitä, että lemmittymme nyt on tämän luona. Ei, se on
järjetöntä ja epätodenmukaista. Hän meni sisälle ja — pani asian
toimeen. Luultavasti hän tappoi suutuksissaan, vihan kuohahtaessa,
kun hän vain oli katsahtanut vihamieheensä ja kilpailijaansa, mutta
tehtyään murhan, jonka hän luultavasti teki yhdellä iskulla,
heilauttamalla vain kättään, jossa oli aseena vaskinen survin, ja
tultuaan sitten perinpohjaisen etsinnän jälkeen vakuutetuksi, ettei
hänen lemmittynsä ollut siellä, hän vielä muisti pistää kätensä tyynyn
alle ja ottaa rahakäärön, jonka rikki reväisty päällys on nyt täällä
tuossa pöydällä, jolla ovat esineelliset todistuskappaleet. Puhun sen
tähden, että te huomaisitten erään seikan, joka on mielestäni perin
kuvaava. Jos murhan olisi tehnyt kokenut murhaaja ja nimenomaan
sellainen, jonka ainoana päämääränä olisi ollut ryöstö, — niin olisiko
hän jättänyt käärön päällyksen lattialle sillä tavoin kuin se löydettiin
ruumiin vierestä? No, jos se oli esimerkiksi Smerdjakov, joka tappoi
ryöstääkseen, — niin hän olisi yksinkertaisesti vienyt koko käärön
mukanaan vaivautumatta ollenkaan avaamaan sitä uhrinsa ruumiin
ääressä; sillä tiesihän hän varmasti, että rahat olivat käärössä, —
hänen nähtensähän ne oli siihen pantu ja suljettu, — ja jos hän veisi
käärön kokonaan, niin eihän tiedettäisi, oliko mitään ryöstöä
tapahtunutkaan. Minä kysyn teiltä, herrat valamiehet, olisiko
Smerdjakov menetellyt näin, olisiko hän jättänyt kirjekuoren lattialle?
Ei, juuri näin täytyi tehdä raivostuneen murhamiehen, joka ei enää
jaksanut kyllin hyvästi harkita, murhamiehen, joka ei ollut varas eikä
ollut tähän saakka varastanut mitään ja joka nytkään ei ollut
siepannut rahoja vuoteesta niinkuin varas, vaan joka oli vienyt
varkaalta oman, häneltä itseltään varastetun omaisuutensa, — sillä
semmoinen oli nimenomaan Dmitri Karamazovin käsitys noista
kolmestatuhannesta, ja tämä ajatus oli kehittynyt hänessä maniaksi.
Siepattuaan käärön, jota hän ei koskaan ennen ollut nähnyt, hän
repäisee päällyksen päästäkseen varmuuteen, onko siinä rahaa,
sitten hän pakenee rahat taskussa muistamatta ajatellakaan, että
jättää jälkeensä lattialle reväistyn kirjekuoren, joka on mitä painavin
syytös häntä vastaan. Kaikki vain siksi, että se on Karamazov eikä
Smerdjakov, ei ajatellut, ei ymmärtänyt, ja kuinkapa hän olisi sitä
voinutkaan! Hän pakenee, hän kuulee hänet saavuttavan palvelijan
kirkaisun, palvelija tarttuu häneen kiinni, pysähdyttää hänet ja kaatuu
vaskisen survimen iskusta. Syytetty hyppää alas hänen luokseen
säälistä. Ajatelkaahan, hän vakuuttaa meille yhtäkkiä, että hän
hyppäsi silloin alas hänen luokseen säälistä, myötätunnosta,
katsoakseen, voisiko jollakin tavoin tätä auttaa. No, oliko hetki
sellainen, että saattoi osoittaa semmoista sääliä? Ei, hän hyppäsi
alas nimenomaan päästäkseen selville, oliko hänen tihutyönsä ainoa
todistaja hengissä. Jokainen muu tunne, jokainen muu vaikutin olisi
ollut luonnoton! Huomatkaa, että hän puuhailee Grigoria tarkastellen,
pyyhkii nenäliinallaan tämän päätä, ja tultuaan vakuutetuksi, että
tämä on kuollut, hän juoksee kuin mieletön, aivan veren vallassa,
taas sinne, lemmittynsä taloon, — kuinka hän ei tullut ajatelleeksi
sitä, että hän on yltyleensä veressä ja että se heti todistaa hänen
syyllisyytensä? Mutta syytetty itse vakuuttaa meille, ettei hän
ollenkaan kiinnittänyt huomiota siihen, että oli veren tahrima; sen voi
uskoa, voi hyvinkin, semmoista tapahtuu aina sellaisina hetkinä
rikoksentekijöille. Toisaalta helvetillinen suunnittelukyky, toisaalta
taas harkintakyvyn puutetta. Mutta hän ajatteli sillä hetkellä vain,
missä hän mahtoi olla. Hänen täytyi mahdollisimman pian saada
tietää hänen olinpaikkansa, ja niinpä hän juoksee hänen asuntoonsa
ja saa kuulla odottamattoman ja hänelle mitä tärkeimmän uutisen:
hän on mennyt Mokrojeen, on »entisensä», »kiistämättömän»
kanssa!

9.