Incarnating Feelings, Constructing

Communities: Experiencing Emotions

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Policy in the Americas 1st ed. Edition
Ana María Forero Angel
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 Incarnating Feelings,
Constructing Communities

Experiencing Emotions via

Education, Violence, and
Public Policy in the Americas

Edited by
Ana María Forero Angel
Catalina González Quintero
Allison B. Wolf
 Incarnating Feelings, Constructing Communities

“Emotions engender emotions. And, working with emotions in the academic con-
text is a very serious and complex endeavor because they put the researcher (he or
she) in the challenging situation of recognizing themselves as embodied subjects
who also feel. This is probably one of the reasons why they too often receive insuf-
ficient attention—both as objects of study and philosophical inquiry. But emotions
are important inquiries of study and they are significant as a way of knowing, creat-
ing and being in the world. The collection that Allison B. Wolf, Catalina González
Quintero and Ana María Forero Angel have put together is a brave and wonderful
example of how remarkable, stimulating and productive the challenge of taking
emotions seriously in philosophy, anthropology and in daily life can be.”
—Gabriela Arguedas Ramírez, Associate Professor of Philosophy and
Faculty Member of the Center for Research in Women’s Studies,
University of Costa Rica

“We know injustice when we feel it. Our emotional responses to structural vio-
lence, cruelty, tyranny, and intolerance have epistemic content. They not only tell
us about the kinds of people we are, they also call attention to the texture of our
engagements with the emotional climate of world-wide uncertainty. We frequently
restrain our emotional responses to violence and harm. We are socialized to ignore
what our embodied reactions are trying to tell us during intellectual conversations
on injustice. These expressions of willful ignorance take the knowledge present in
our angry, fearful, or guilty responses out of circulation. When we restrain our
emotions we flatten our collective engagement with the issues we care about most.
Incarnating Feelings, Constructing Communities, highlights the importance of
attending to this affective content that moves silently, often without notice,
through our public policy discussions, lived experiences with state violence, and in
classrooms where students push back against ideas that make them feel uncomfort-
able. This remarkable collection of essays highlights the important role that our
emotional responses to injustice play in the production of meaning in conversa-
tions related to violence, education, and public policy in South America and the
United States. The essays in this collection work together to illustrate how collec-
tive attention to the affective dimensions of these issues pushes these conversations
onto new epistemic terrains that reveal more nuanced and promising directions for
future inquiry.”
—Alison Bailey, Professor of Philosophy, Illinois State University, USA
 Ana María Forero Angel
Catalina González Quintero
Allison B. Wolf
Editors

Incarnating Feelings,
Constructing
Communities
Experiencing Emotions via Education, Violence,
and Public Policy in the Americas
Editors
Ana María Forero Angel Catalina González Quintero
Department of Anthropology, Department of Philosophy,
Universidad de los Andes Universidad de los Andes
Bogotá, Colombia Bogotá, Colombia

Allison B. Wolf
Department of Philosophy and
Center of Migration Studies
Universidad de los Andes
Bogotá, Colombia

ISBN 978-3-030-57110-8    ISBN 978-3-030-57111-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57111-5

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 Acknowledgments

As with any major project, this book would not have been possible with-
out the hard work and support of so many. We would all like to thank the
entire editorial staff at Palgrave Macmillan, especially Mary Al-Sayeed for
believing in our vision from the very beginning, and both Madison Allums
and Arun Prasath for all of their help as we have brought the project to
fruition. We also would like to thank the School of Social Sciences and our
colleagues in Anthropology and Philosophy at Universidad de los Andes.
In particular, we want to recognize the School of Social Sciences for pro-
viding financial support to Ana María Forero’s and Catalina González’s
original research project, “Narratives and Rhetoric of Emotions in
Colombian Career Soldiers,” which served as the foundation for this col-
lection. We also thank Felipe Zárate Guerrero for all of his astute attention
to detail and patience as we finalized the manuscript. Last, but not least,
we would like to thank our families for their support through this, and so
many other, endeavors.

v
 Contents

1 Introduction: The Force of Emotions  1

Ana María Forero Angel, Catalina González Quintero, and
Allison B. Wolf

Part I Emotional Communities in Contexts of Violence  13

2 The Emotional Turn in Colombian Experiences of Violence 15

Myriam Jimeno

3 Understanding Emotions in Members of Societally

Powerful Institutions: Emotional Events and Communities
in the Narratives of Colombian Soldiers 41
Ana María Forero Angel and Catalina González Quintero

Part II Teaching Emotions: White Fragility and the

Emotional Weight of Epistemic Resistance  67

4 Moral Development and Racial Education: How We

Socialize White Children and Construct White Fragility 69
Sonya Charles

vii
viii CONTENTS

5 Epistemic Pushback and Harm to Educators 93

Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr.

Part III Constructing Emotions in Public Policy and

Discourse 115

6 “Quit Trying to Make Us Feel Teary-Eyed for the

Children!” Constructions of Emotion, Anger, and
Immigration Injustice117
Allison B. Wolf

7 Staging Guilt and Forgiveness in Colombian Mass Media:

Transactional Forgiveness and the Effacement of Victims151
Julieta Escobar and Santiago Roa

8 Awkward Ruins: Topophilia and the Narratives of

Stripping in Santiago and Bogotá183
Andrés Góngora and Francisca Márquez
 Notes on Contributors

Ana María Forero Angel is Associate Professor of Anthropology at

Universidad de los Andes. She completed her doctoral studies at the
Universitá degli Studi La Sapienza, Roma, Italia, and holds degrees in
philosophy and anthropology from Universidad de los Andes. Her research
interests include the anthropology of emotions, political anthropology,
and anthropology of the state and elites. She is author of the book The
Colonel Has No One to Listen to Him: An Anthropological Approach to
Military Narratives (2017) as well as many articles, including, “El Ejército
Nacional de Colombia y sus heridas: una aproximación a las narrativas
militares de dolor y desilusión,” published in Antípoda (2017), and “La
invención del orden en las narrativas del Ejército Nacional” published in
Contemporary Ethnographies III, Myriam Jimeno, Daniel Varela and
Angela Castillo (eds.) (2016). For the past two years, she coordinated the
project Narratives and Rhetoric of Emotions: The War in the Testimonies of
Professional Soldiers with Professor Catalina González Quintero. As part of
that project, she has published the articles: “‘The War That Lingers’:
Construction and Transformations of the Body in the Narratives and
Rhetoric of Colombia’s Professional Soldiers” (with Catalina González
and Simón Ramírez) in Revista Latina de Comunicación Social 74 (2019),
and “‘Entering the Army Is Not Choosing to Kill’: Towards the
Understanding of Two Emotional Events Among Professional Soldiers of
Colombia” (with Catalina González, Simón Ramírez and Felipe Zárate) in
Revista Latina de Comunicación Social 73 (2018).

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sonya Charles is Professor of Philosophy at Cleveland State University,

where she teaches various courses in bioethics, feminist theory, critical race
theory, and philosophy and science fiction. Her main research areas are
bioethics, feminist philosophy, and virtue ethics. Her recently pub-
lished book Parents and Virtues: An Analysis of Moral Development and
Parental Virtue came out in 2019. In addition, her work has been
published in The International Journal of Feminist Bioethics (IJFAB), The
Hastings Center Report, American Journal of Bioethics (AJOB), Journal of
Medical Humanities, Janushead, Journal of Medical Ethics, Social Theory
and Practice, and Philosophy in the Contemporary World.
Julieta Escobar completed her master’s degree in Philosophy at
Universidad Nacional de Colombia in 2019. In her thesis entitled, El
perdón, una fabulación, she argues that forgiveness should not be reduced
to a normative model since it is a lived experience expressed in distinct and
imaginative ways. Currently, she works as editorial assistant at the journal,
Ciencia Política (Editorial Universidad Nacional). Her research interests
focus on contemporary ethics and ancient philosophy. Her article, “Del
resentimiento a la reconciliación. Consideraciones sobre un proceso de
paz inclusivo,” appeared in ¿Venganza o perdón? Un camino hacia la rec-
onciliación, Maria Victoria Llorente and Leonel Narvaez (eds.) (2017).
Andrés Góngora is chief curator of the Department of Ethnography at
the National Museum of Colombia. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in
Social Anthropology from Universidad Federal de Rio de Janeiro and is a
member of the research groups “Conflicto Social y Violencia” (Universidad
Nacional de Colombia), “Núcleo de Pesquisas sobre Economía y Cultura”
(Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro), and “Núcleo de Estudios
Interdisciplinarios sobre Psicoactivos de la Universidad de São Paulo.” He
has also taught Anthropology at Universidad Nacional de Colombia and
has worked on issues such as cultural diversity, gender, sexuality, social
movements, drug policies, urban anthropology, medical anthropology
and popular economy. His more recent work explores the bonds between
materiality, memory, and conflict in Colombia. His recent publications
include: “Cannabis medicinal y arreglos farmacológicos en Colombia” in
Cahiers des Amérques Latines 92, (2019), “200 años de vida callejera en
Bogotá” in Cuadernos de Curaduría (2019), and “La maqueta de la “L”
in Espacios heterotópicos y experimentación etnográfica (with A. Rodríguez,
M. Cano, A. Jiménez, N. & J.D. Jiménez) in 2019.
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

Myriam Jimeno is professor emerita at Universidad Nacional de Colombia

and before that was Professor of Anthropology and Researcher at the
Center for Social Studies of the same university. She served as Director of
the Colombian Institute of Anthropology and History (ICANH) twice
(1988–1990 and 1992–1993). Dr. Jimeno received her doctorate in
Anthropology from University of Brasilia and received the Medals for
University Merit and Meritorious Comprehensive Academy from the
National University of Colombia (1997 and 2006). In 1995 she received
the Alejandro Angel Escobar National Prize for Research in Social and
Human Sciences for her work on domestic violence and in 2010 she was a
research fellow at the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. Since 1993
she has coordinated the research group Social Conflict and Violence at
Centro de Estudios Sociales (CES) at Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
She has authored the books Después de la Masacre. Emociones y política en
el Cauca Indio (co-authored with Ángela Castillo and Daniel Varela) pub-
lished in 2016; Crimen Pasional. Contribución a una Antropología de las
Emociones published in 2004, which received an honorable mention from
the Ibero-American Prize of the Latin American Studies Association
(LASA) in 2006; Juan Gregorio Palechor: Historia de mi vida in 2006 in
Spanish and 2010 in English, and Las Sombras Arbitrarias. Violencia y
autoridad en Colombia in 1996 (co-authored with Ismael Roldan).
Francisca Márquez is Professor of Anthropology at Alberto Hurtado
University, in Santiago de Chile. She holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from
Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium) and an M.A. in Development
from the same university. Her most recent publications include: “Chile: de
los subterráneos al protagonismo, ¿ocaso del modelo neoliberal?” in
Revista Realidad Económica (2019), Ciências Sociais E Ética: Sobre O
Respeito Aos Outros Saberes, Revista Pós-Ciências Sociais da UFMA (2019),
and the entry “Urban Ethnography” (co-authored with Walter Imilan), in
The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Urban and Regional Studies (2019).
She conducts research on urban ruins in Bogotá, Quito, and Santiago
de Chile.
Gaile Pohlhaus Jr is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Miami
University of Ohio where she teaches both graduate and advanced under-
graduate student courses in Feminist Philosophy, Critical Epistemology,
Social Epistemology, and Wittgenstein. Her research interests focus on the
intersection of Epistemology and Social and Political Philosophy. In par-
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ticular, she is interested in questions of knowledge and identity in light of

differences in social position. Her work draws on feminist and critical race
theorists, both analytic and continental. In addition, she works on and in
the spirit of the later Wittgenstein insofar as he sought to avoid both foun-
dationalist and relativist tendencies in philosophizing. Her publications
include The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, co-edited with
I.J. Kidd and J. Medina (2017) and “Knowing Without Borders and the
Work of Epistemic Gathering,” in Decolonizing Feminism: Transnational
Feminism and Globalization ed. McLaren (2017). Her work has been
published in Hypatia, Social Epistemology, Feminist Philosophical Quarterly,
and Teoria.
Catalina González Quintero is Associate Professor of Philosophy at
Universidad de los Andes. She has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Emory
University (USA), an M.A. in Philosophy from Universidad Nacional de
Colombia, and a B.A. in Social Communication from Pontificia
Universidad Javeriana (Colombia). Her research interests include modern
philosophy, skepticism, rhetoric, hermeneutics, and the study of emotions.
She has just completed a book, Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant,
which is due to be published in early 2021 by Springer. In addition, she
has published various articles, including: “The Prussian Academy’s
Struggle between Dogmatism and Skepticism: An Antecedent to the
Kantian Critique” in Critique in German Philosophy edited by María del
Rosario Acosta and Collin McQuillan (2020), “Modern Skeptical
Disturbances and their Remedies” in Skeptical Doubt and Disbelief in
Modern European Thought, edited by Plínio Smith and Vicente Raga
(2020), and “Secularization and Infinity in Pascal and Kant” in CTK-
Contextos kantianos (2017). For the past two years, she has coordinated
the project Narratives and Rhetoric of Emotions: The War in the Testimonies
of Professional Soldiers with Professor Ana María Forero Angel. As part of
this project, she has also published: “‘The War That Lingers’: Construction
and Transformations of the Body in the Narratives and Rhetoric of
Colombia’s Professional Soldiers” (with Ana María Forero and Simón
Ramírez) in Revista Latina de Comunicación Social 74 (2019) and
“‘Entering the Army is Not Choosing to Kill’: Towards the Understanding
of Two Emotional Events among Professional soldiers of Colombia” (with
Ana María Forero, Simón Ramírez, and Felipe Zárate) in Revista Latina
de Comunicación Social 73 (2018).
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

Santiago Roa is a psychologist from Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá,

Colombia), and holds an M.A. degree in Philosophy from the same uni-
versity. His Master’s thesis Habitar el laberinto: Un ensayo sobre la culpa y
la amistad, aims at defining guilt from an existential perspective and show-
ing how friendship can alleviate the suffering of this emotional experience
and he is currently the academic coordinator at the Spanish Center in
Universidad de los Andes. He has been awarded several scholarships,
among them the scholarship of the CienciAmerica Summer Research
Program of Cornell University (2015). His research interests are related
to the philosophy and psychology of emotions, social reconciliation pro-
cesses and hermeneutics. He co-authored, with Santiago Amaya and Maria
Camila Castro, the chapter on Moral Psychology of the book, Introducción
a la Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas (Skidelsky & Barberis, 2020).
Allison B. Wolf is Associate Professor of Philosophy and an affiliated
faculty member of the Center of Migration Studies at Universidad de los
Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, where she teaches political philosophy, phi-
losophy of immigration, and feminist philosophy. She is the author of the
book Just Immigration in the Americas: A Feminist Account (Rowman &
Littlefield International, 2020) as well as various essays on immigration
justice, feminist philosophy, feminist ethics and bioethics including:
“Dying in Detention as an Example of Oppression,” in Hispanic/Latino
Issues in Philosophy Newsletter of the American Philosophical Association
(2019), “Breastfeeding In-Between: A Comparative Analysis of Watsuji
and Maria Lugones” in Comparative Studies in Asian and Latin American
Philosophies edited by Leah Kalmanson and Stephanie Rivera-Berruz
(2018), “Tell Me How That Makes You Feel”: Philosophy’s Reason/
Emotion Divide and Epistemic Pushback in the Philosophy Classroom,”
Hypatia, (2018), and “Embracing Our Values: Ending the ‘Birth Wars’
and Improving Women’s Satisfaction with Childbirth,” in International
Journal of Feminist Bioethics (IJFAB) (2017). Her work has been pub-
lished in various journals and collections, including: Hypatia, Comparative
Studies in Asian and Latin American Philosophies, Hispanic/Latino Issues
in Philosophy Newsletter of the American Philosophical Association,
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, Diversidad
Sexual: Democracía y cuidanía, International Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Journal of Medical Humanities (with Sonya Charles), Philosophical Inquiry
into Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Mothering: Maternal Subjects (with
Jennifer Benson), Queer Philosophy: Presentations of the Society of Lesbian
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

and Gay Philosophy, 1998–2008, and the Journal of Global Ethics. She is
currently working on projects about philosophical issues arising in the
content of Venezuelan migration to Colombia, issues in feminist episte-
mology (especially related to epistemic oppression and feminism and skep-
ticism), and obstetric violence in the context of immigration in the
Americas.
 List of Figures

Fig. 8.1 Márquez, F. (2018a, April) Villa San Luis in ruins and the
corporate towers of LATAM in the background [Photograph] 188
Fig. 8.2 Contreras, T. (2017) Backhoe and collapse [Photograph] 189
Fig. 8.3 Lawner, M. (ca. 1972) Resident families settled in transit
camps adjacent to the Villa San Luis project [Photograph] 191
Fig. 8.4 Márquez, F. (2018b) Ruins of Villa San Luis in the mirrored
city [Photograph] 192
Fig. 8.5 Márquez, F. (2018c, April) Ruins of Villa San Luis, concrete
and iron [Photograph] 194
Fig. 8.6 Contreras, T. (2019a) Taken from the photobook. The Collapse of
a Dream [Photograph] 195
Fig. 8.7 Contreras, T. (2019c) View of the garden from an abandoned
apartment [Photograph] 197
Fig. 8.8 Ramírez, M. (2019) The Stripping Performance; Group of
former residents of Villa San Luis [Photograph] 199
Fig. 8.9 Ramírez, M. (2019) The Stripping Performance; Group of
former women and men residents of Villa San Luis [Photograph] 201
Fig. 8.10 Márquez, F. (2018, August) Ruins of Villa San Luis and
corporate buildings, August [Photograph] 204
Fig. 8.11 IDIPRON-Press: office (2018a) Ruins of the Bronx
[Photograph]206
Fig. 8.12 Ortiz, F. (2019a) Demolition of the last house in the Bronx
[Photograph]209
Fig. 8.13 IDIPRON-Press: office (2018b) Ruins of the Bronx
[Photograph]212

xv
xvi List of Figures

Fig. 8.14 IDIPRON-Press: office (2018c) Ruins of the Bronx in Black

and White [Photograph] 214
Fig. 8.15 Góngora, A. (2019) Scale model of “the L” in the National
Museum of Colombia [Photograph] 216
Fig. 8.16 Ortiz, J. (2019b) La Esquina Redonda team [Photograph] 217
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Force of Emotions

Ana María Forero Angel, Catalina González Quintero,

and Allison B. Wolf

We write this introduction after almost three months of preventive isolation

in Bogota, Colombia, with no end in sight. On March 23, 2020, the
nation’s president, Iván Duque, announced that, like so many of the nations
of the world, quarantine and lockdown measures requiring all citizens to
remain at home and avoid physical contact were to be implemented by both
the national and local governments to avoid the spread of Coronavirus.
While he, understandably, used his speech to detail how our physical exis-
tences would have to change and adjust during these unprecedented times,
Duque also emphasized that we had to learn to express our emotions in a
different way than we usually did. And, with this, he officially enlisted the

A. M. Forero Angel
Department of Anthropology, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
e-mail: am.forero260@uniandes.edu.co
C. González Quintero
Department of Philosophy, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
e-mail: cgonzale@uniandes.edu.co
A. B. Wolf (*)
Department of Philosophy and Center of Migration Studies, Universidad de los
Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
e-mail: a.wolf@uniandes.edu.co

© The Author(s) 2021 1

A. M. Forero Angel et al. (eds.), Incarnating Feelings, Constructing
Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57111-5_1
2 A. M. FORERO ANGEL ET AL.

Colombia’s population in a global emotional regime (Reddy, 2001) marked

by social distancing as well as feelings of anxiety, distrust of others (because
we do not know who is infected or not, who is following the rules or not,
etc.), solidarity with health care practitioners and a sense of connection
with the poorest sectors of the population. Mere days earlier, on March 19,
2020, the President of Chile, Sebastián Piñera, officially declared a
Catastrophic State of Emergency (Estado Excepcional de Catástrofe), with
which the country became officially part of this emotional climate of world-
wide uncertainty and a member of the global emotional regime.
While various measures were implemented to varying degrees in differ-
ent states at the same time as they were imposed in Colombia,1 the United
States of America, and specifically President Donald Trump, continues to
underestimate (or outright deny) the gravity of the situation. Despite very
emotionally forceful (Rosaldo, 1984) arguments from epidemiologists,
public health officials, health care workers, and members of the opposition
party, he refuses to enact national measures against the pandemic, instead
leaving each individual state to envisage and put in place the policies and
strategies they consider adequate. These uneven measures combine with
the hyper-partisan political climate and overall fatigue with the virus to
generate other emotions, such as anger, indignation, fear, and sadness,
and both sustain and expand the global emotional regime just outlined.
It is within this global context, that we, the authors and editors of this
volume—all of whom are citizens of the three aforementioned countries—
finished writing our contributions for this book. Put differently, we con-
cluded our writings in the context of a shared global emotional regime
that highlights the main theoretical assumption of this book, namely that
emotions are unavoidable, socially constructed, and politically meaningful
and, as such, they constitute a highly influential part of our social exis-
tence. Allow us to elaborate.
In order to make a lasting impression and affect their citizenry, the
presidential declarations in these different countries must resonate with
both the collective’s and everyday individuals’ emotional lives. This is
because political appeals and socially binding laws are only successful when
they are made in communities that share the same emotional repertoires
(Reddy, 2001; Rosenwein, 2002); emotional repertoires that traverse
common values, beliefs, and goals. For this reason, we (and all the authors

1
Because of its system of government, in the United States it is likely illegal and impractical
to impose a national lockdown as they are doing in Latin American nations.
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE FORCE OF EMOTIONS 3

of the chapters that comprise this volume) insist that emotions do not live
“inside” the subject—they are not private states of mind that only live or
occur in the brain. To the contrary, they are enacted and acted-upon forces
that convey and constitute social meanings; they are intersubjective in
nature and should be understood as public phenomena rather than inter-
nal states of mind.
In addition to rejecting the common belief that emotions are private,
internal, states of mind, we reject the idea that emotions are “irrational
moments” that happen to people when they “lose their minds”—as if they
constituted exceptions to a state of permanent and “normal” rationality.
To the contrary, we note that, in addition to their social elements, emo-
tions have cognitive aspects that inform and are informed by values
embedded in social practices. In this way, the book builds on the theoreti-
cal legacy of approaches to emotion in both the social sciences and human-
ities, a legacy that recognizes their unavoidable social and historical
character.
In light of the above, the chapters in this collection utilize a methodol-
ogy that investigates emotions as they develop, embed, and express them-
selves in specific, concrete practices, valuations, and patterns of action in
multiple contexts in the Americas, including Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and
the United States. In particular, Incarnating Feelings, Constructing
Communities: Experiencing Emotions in the Americas Through Education,
Violence, and Public Policy in the Americas attempts to show the social life,
development, expression, and consequences of emotions in different cul-
tural practices throughout the continent. Its chapters explore how distinct
subjects (children, migrants, indigenous peoples, soldiers, and victims of
violence and displacement) feel, act, establish and alter communities, and
take political stances within their specific social contexts. All of the chap-
ters discuss research conducted in different countries of the Americas in
ways that illuminate how emotions both necessarily motivate and chal-
lenge social inequality, violence, and political change throughout
the region.

1   Organization of the Book

The philosophers and anthropologists who have contributed to this col-
lection focus on achieving the above by understanding both how emo-
tions are lived and how they produce meaning in contexts of violence,
education, and enforcement of public policy. To that end, the volume is
divided into three parts focusing on precisely these themes—emotions
4 A. M. FORERO ANGEL ET AL.

related to violence, education, and public policy throughout South

America and the United States. The first part, “Emotional Communities
in Contexts of Violence,” consists of two chapters—one by anthropologist
Myriam Jimeno and the second by anthropologist Ana María Forero
Angel and philosopher Catalina González Quintero—examining emo-
tions that arise out of different social practices in contexts of violence in
Colombia. In the first chapter of this part (Chap. 2), “The Emotional
Turn in Colombian Experiences of Violence,” Jimeno offers a state-of-
the-art summary of different perspectives that promoted and centered the
study of the emotions in the social and natural sciences. Specifically, after
describing the main characteristics and consequences of the so-called emo-
tional turn, she argues that recent work in both neuro-­ science and
the social sciences questions the classical dichotomies between body and
soul, reason and emotion, cognition and feeling, materiality and immate-
riality, and biological and social determinations, which has been enriched
and supported by experimental research, observation, and analysis of col-
lective practices, cultural meanings, historical processes, and social struc-
tures. After offering a general overview of the emotional turn, Jimeno
turns to analyze three case studies from her own research to demonstrate
that emotions are fundamentally social and relational. In the first case, she
shows the political projection of emotions rooted in childhood experi-
ences of domestic abuse and highlights how these emotions negatively
shape the social performance of adults vis-à-vis public authority. In par-
ticular, she reveals how traumatic experiences of arbitrary and violent exer-
cises of parental authority engender a deep mistrust of both political
authority and peers and, consequently, hinders the adequate functioning
of society. In the second case, Jimeno surveys the results of her compara-
tive study of crimes of passion between romantic partners in Brazil and
Colombia. Crucially, the author claims that crimes of passion are not path-
ological acts—they are not the product of “excessive love, as they tend to
be depicted in Latin American societies—but rather, actions whose moti-
vations involve a complex set of convictions and feelings about romantic
couples, love, femininity, masculinity, honor, and loyalty. In other words,
these crimes are only possible within a particular emotional configuration—
the social tapestry of all these elements. In the last section of her chapter,
Jimeno analyzes the emotional processes involved in the subjective and
social reconstruction of a community in southwest Colombia (Cauca). In
2001, a paramilitary group perpetrated a horrific massacre against this
community, forcing many to flee. The surviving, displaced, population
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE FORCE OF EMOTIONS 5

then engaged in a process of social reconstruction, building an emotional

community through creatively expressing their experiences of pain and
loss and re-signifying those experiences as social injustices requiring recti-
fication. In particular, they achieved this by producing a series of dramatic
performances of their experiences of violence, directed to different audi-
ences—both governmental and international agencies—as means to
reclaim the status of victim and the restoration of their rights and territory.
In the second chapter of this part (Chap. 3), “Understanding Emotions
in Members of Societally Powerful Institutions: Emotional Events and
Communities in the Narratives of Colombian Soldiers,” Ana María Forero
Angel and Catalina González Quintero argue that analyzing emotions is
essential to understanding powerful institutions, like the Colombian mili-
tary. More specifically, they explore the emotional narratives of Colombian
career soldiers in order to advance a topography of power (Lutz, 2006), or
an anthropological study of the institutions that determine the fate of
nations, while leaving behind the tradition of studying marginalized social
groups. To develop this topography, the authors focus on two emotional
events—experiences that transformed their identities—namely, “joining
the institution” and “learning to kill.” The first event describes how
Colombian soldiers make the decision to join the Army as opposed to
other illegal, armed groups, such as guerrillas and paramilitary groups as
well as the soldiers’ experiences during their first days in the Army, espe-
cially the bodily and character changes they undergo during this period to
incorporate a military identity. The second event concerns a “change of
mentality” the soldiers claim to have in the combat area, when they actu-
ally “learn to kill” the enemy. They argue that it is impossible to “learn to
kill” during their training because for this to happen they need to undergo
a psychological transformation that shifts their understanding of war to
one that is a personal issue that affects them and their lives, rather than an
abstract idea. But that only happens when the soldier feels that his life is
actually threatened or when his best friend, his “lanza,” has been killed by
the enemy. Based on their research, the authors uncover various findings.
First, they note that the soldiers appeal to their emotions in their narra-
tives to arouse empathy in their listeners and convince them of the signifi-
cance and truthfulness of their stories. Second, they conclude that narrating
and listening to these events, among others, the soldiers form an emo-
tional community. This is a community of reciprocal listening, in which
only soldiers, who have lived the transforming experiences of war, know
6 A. M. FORERO ANGEL ET AL.

how to speak, listen, and sympathetically react to the emotional force of

their peer’s narratives.
In the second part of the book, “Teaching Emotions: White Fragility
and the Emotional Weight of Epistemic Resistance,” philosophers Sonya
Charles and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. explore the different ways that emotions
are taught, learned, and carried in the United States. In the first chapter of
this part (Chap. 4), “Moral Development and Racial Education: How We
Socialize White Children and Construct White Fragility,” Charles offers a
sharp criticism of “color-blind” education among progressive parents and
teachers in the Unites States. She explains that, despite the fact that many
maintain (or have maintained) that color-blindness is a strategy to combat
ethnic and racial discrimination by focusing on people’s shared humanity
by overlooking racial differences, in reality the approach fails. In particu-
lar, it neither promotes empathy toward nor solidarity with minorities
because it makes it impossible for children to voice their questions about
race and ethnicity. This approach yields two seriously problematic
responses: (1) it leads parents to become unreliable mentors by encourag-
ing children to develop moral vices rather than virtues; and (2) it cultivates
what Di Angelo calls, “white fragility,” as the default emotional response
of white people to revelations of their participation and support (inadver-
tent or intentional) in institutionalized racism in the United States. For
this reason, Charles emphasizes the importance of explicitly engaging
issues of race to promote children’s awareness of social injustices. After
showing the limitations of color-blind education, Charles employs Jennifer
Harvey’s approach to anti-racist education to show how white parents can
help their children to overcome their own feelings of guilt over the history
of racism in the United States and develop virtuous character traits based
on Aristotle’s virtue ethics, arguing that, “a key component of early moral
development is to cultivate proper habits. This means a person should
practice doing the right thing—so much so that it becomes a habit.” In
this way, questions about race and ethnicity should be encouraged in chil-
dren to create healthy emotional and moral habits and behaviors that resist
racial discrimination.
In the next chapter of this part (Chap. 5), “Epistemic Pushback and
Harm to Educators,” Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. explores the negative emotional
and physical effects that the students’ epistemic resistance produces in uni-
versity professors who teach courses related to feminism, racism, colonial-
ism, and other marginalized philosophies and ontologies. In particular,
Pohlhaus explores and analyzes an all-­ too-­
common occurrence in
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE FORCE OF EMOTIONS 7

university classrooms across the United States, namely students’ aggres-

sive, critical, responses to both their professors and their peers who iden-
tify as members of marginalized groups when they feel that social position,
ethical values, or worldviews around issues like race and gender are threat-
ened. In addition to criticizing their professors’ intellectual abilities and
epistemic authority, Pohlhaus argues that these answers usually involve
sexist, racist, and even expressly violent comments intended to discredit
and silence the professor and ensure that the challenging material is dele-
gitimated. Having to endure this constantly takes a serious toll that we
must recognize. Professors who teach this material and are, often, the
targets of these practices suffer both emotional and physical effects—they
may become ill, psychologically burned out, and prone to somatic reac-
tions. For this reason, she argues that it is urgent for these faculty mem-
bers (and the universities to which they belong) to introduce and encourage
self-care practices. Now, Pohlhaus expressly recognizes that the emotional
and somatic consequences of this epistemic resistance depend on the social
status and position the particular professor occupies—white men teaching
feminism or white women teaching about issues of race do not experience
these issues to the same extent or in the same ways as professors of color
do. And, this matters. But, this should encourage us to take the emotional
and bodily effects of teaching this material even more seriously and address
it through a variety of strategies. In this way, Pohlhaus, compels universi-
ties to pay attention to affective conditions in the classroom, to admit that
interaction with students can sometimes be psychologically and physically
harmful, and, with this, she reminds us that emotions are actually embod-
ied, that they live and shape our bodily functions and reactions.
In the third part of the book, “Constructing Emotions in Public Policy
and Discourse,” essays by Allison B. Wolf, Santiago Roa and Julieta
Escobar, and Andrés Góngora and Francisca Márquez explore how emo-
tions are essential to understanding public debates about immigration
policies in the United States, processes of transitional justice with paramili-
tary groups in Colombia, and forceful displacement of urban populations
in Santiago de Chile and Bogotá, Colombia. The section begins with
Wolf’s piece, “‘Quit Trying to Make Us Feel Teary-Eyed for the Children!’
Constructions of Emotion, Anger, and Immigration Injustice” (Chap. 6),
which critically assesses current immigration policies of the US govern-
ment around forcefully separating and detaining Central American immi-
grant families who entered the country without documents. Wolf offers a
profound criticism of these policies and an innovative analysis of the
8 A. M. FORERO ANGEL ET AL.

emotions involved in the public debate about them, especially anger. After
reviewing the policies in question, she explains how the policy’s defenders
often accuse their opponents of being too emotional and susceptible to
testimonies they claim are directed at making the public “cry for the chil-
dren” separated from their parents. In other words, they criticize their
opponents—mostly democrats and supporters of progressive policies—for
making irrational, emotionally charged judgments. These discourses make
use of the artificial division between emotion and reason, which in this
case becomes a distinction between a rational policy and an emotional
reaction that will threaten the sanctity and sovereignty of the United
States. In labeling the positions of their political opponents “emotional,”
the policy’s supporters deploy a strategy to undermine the efficacy of their
critics by trying to represent them as weak and incapable of appropriately
responding to the serious immigration crisis confronting the United
States. But, Wolf warns, we should not be moved by these critiques as
emotions are ubiquitous in public debates on this topic—on all sides—and
so, while some political actors may proclaim themselves as rational, their
discourses are, in fact, just as emotionally charged as those of their oppo-
nents. This is not, in itself, a problem, however. The question is not that
the debate on the policies is emotionally charged, but rather the ways in
which emotional responses on both sides of this debate—especially
anger—are constructed, expressed, and regulated to validate and protect
privilege of some, while discrediting and silencing the views of others. To
show this, Wolf offers an analysis of anger based on the theoretical accounts
of three feminist philosophers, Martha Nussbaum, Audre Lorde, and
Marilyn Frye, that both establishes a suggestive contrast among their char-
acterizations of this emotion and reveals the types of anger operating in
the public debate about family separation policy in the United States.
Based on this, she concludes that anger per se is not the issue but “rather
how that anger has been constructed, manipulated, and regulated to pro-
tect privilege and further injustice both in and out of the United States.”
Wolf closes the chapter by inviting political philosophers who engage with
the problem of immigration to pay closer attention to the role of anger
and other emotions in public debates. Emotions, she argues, must be
incorporated in social and political analysis in order to avoid reinforcing
the distinction between reason and emotion, which divests the debate of a
richer and more nuanced analysis.
In the second chapter of the part (Chap. 7), “Staging Guilt and
Forgiveness in Colombian Mass Media: Transactional Forgiveness and the
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE FORCE OF EMOTIONS 9

Effacement of Victims,” philosophers Julieta Escobar and Santiago Roa

claim that the Colombian news media use a transactional paradigm of
forgiveness in their representation of the transitional justice process with
paramilitary groups. Starting with an exhaustive examination of the online
and print coverage of the judicial process of paramilitary ex-commander,
Jorge Iván Laverde—alias “El Iguano”—from 2004 and 2019, Escobar
and Roa argue that these media stage forgiveness as a sort of hypocritical
theater, to use Derrida’s expression, in which forgiveness is understood as
an emotional exchange between aggressors and victims. Such media treat-
ment marginalizes the testimonies of victims and trivializes their processes
of forgiveness in ways that favor the image of the aggressors by centering
their expressions of guilt and repentance over the experiences of the vic-
tims. As the authors illuminate, Colombian mass media has followed and
reproduced this paradigm in melodramatic ways that require actors to fol-
low performative rituals, such as weeping, lamenting, and hugging the
victims. To accomplish the above, the authors begin by showing how the
transactional conception of forgiveness by Charles Griswold (2007) is per-
vasive in the media coverage of Jorge Iván Laverde’s public demands of
forgiveness. Then, they turn to the media coverage of some of these sto-
ries from the perspective of the victims, showing how their emotional
approaches to forgiveness are much more diverse and cannot be limited to
this transactional conception. They stress the need to further explore the
effects of these media representations on the audience, since they have
important consequences for peace and reconciliation processes like the
one that is taking place in Colombia. Finally, they conclude by suggesting
that alternative ways of conceptualizing and representing experiences of
guilt and forgiveness may actually enrich and show the complexity of these
emotionally charged situations, thus being more fruitful for the recon-
struction of social ties in societies that have undergone armed conflicts.
In the final chapter of the part and the volume (Chap. 8), “Awkward
Ruins: Topophilia and the Narratives of Stripping in Santiago and Bogotá,”
anthropologists Andrés Góngora and Francisca Márquez, describe the
demolition and eviction processes of two Latin American cities’ neighbor-
hoods—“Villa San Luis” in Santiago de Chile and “Calle del Bronx” in
Bogotá, Colombia. They argue that, while government officials and urban
developers consider the ruins of the demolished buildings still standing in
these locations to be hindrances to progress and hideous signs of blight of
the urban landscape, the former inhabitants of the streets and homes of
“Villa San Luis” and “el Bronx” see these vestiges as invested with
10 A. M. FORERO ANGEL ET AL.

memories and emotions that should be preserved. The authors use the
concept of topophilia—an organizing principle of the ways in which indi-
viduals and communities feel about their places and spaces—to offer an
account of the emotional relationship between urban ruins and citizens.
Through topophilia, they argue, these places have great existential and
symbolic value. Thus, the authors claim that the evicted inhabitants of
“Villa San Luis” and “el Bronx” perceive their neighborhood’s ruins as
more than mere debris, trash, and empty material—they are bearers of
memories that invite us to reimagine meanings and uses as well as to con-
test and resist an aesthetics of capitalistic progress imposed on the con-
trasting landscape of Latin American cities. And this is seen even more
clearly through artistic projects in the neighborhoods with former resi-
dents. In particular, Góngora and Márquez describe how the inhabitants
of these neighborhoods artistically re-appropriated these ruins in photog-
raphy and museum pieces, to conclude that in topophilia resides a great
creative and political potential. The long journey of eviction and demoli-
tion of these urban sectors, then, teaches us that ruins have a material
agency (Gell, 1998) in which displacement, destabilization, and friction
work to produce creative processes and political demands associated
with memory.
…………
Before concluding this introduction, we want to note that Incarnating
Feelings, Constructing Communities: Experiencing Emotions in the
Americas Through Education, Violence, and Public Policy in the Americas is
meant to begin and engage in an extended interdisciplinary and interna-
tional dialogue among researchers in the Americas for the purpose of bet-
ter understanding how emotions circulate as historical and cultural
constructions in the region. And we are confident that the chapters of this
compilation—chapters that focus on violence, educational settings, public
policy, urban contexts, and media discourses—provide a strong founda-
tion for beginning such a conversation and investigation. All of the works
in this collection invite the reader to recognize the unavoidability of emo-
tions and the consequent need to include them in the research agendas
throughout the social sciences and humanities. They also all clearly dem-
onstrate that it is not possible to study emotions in isolation from particu-
lar social practices and contexts. The philosophers and anthropologists
whose work comprise this book confirm that emotions are inserted in
social tapestries, give meaning to both individuals and groups, are part of
educational processes and political causes, and are best expressed in public
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE FORCE OF EMOTIONS 11

discourses that recognize their complexity and resist the tendency to

reductionist models. Emotions, in other words, are embedded in commu-
nities of support and reconstruction after experiences of violence, in edu-
cational processes, public policies, media discourses, and material vestiges,
all of which make possible new ways of envisaging social action. We invite
the reader into the conversation to delineate the ways this is the case.

References
Gell, A. (1998). Art and Agency. An Anthropological Theory. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Griswold, C. L. (2007). Forgiveness a Philosophical Exploration. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press..
Lutz, C. (2006). Empire is In the Details. American Ethnologist, 33(4), 593–611.
Reddy, W. M. (2001). The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of
Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..
Rosaldo, M. Z. (1984). Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling. In
R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and
Emotion (pp. 137–157). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..
Rosenwein, B. (2002, June 1). Worrying about Emotions in History. The American
Historical Review, 107(3), 821–845.
 PART I

Emotional Communities in Contexts

of Violence
 CHAPTER 2

The Emotional Turn in Colombian

Experiences of Violence

Myriam Jimeno

1   Introduction
The emotional turn in the social sciences refers to the change of focus over
the past decades that this field has placed on gaining a broader understand-
ing of affective expressions and emotional states in socio-cultural contexts.
Just as we speak of the “linguistic turn,” when we speak of an “emotional
turn,” we are making reference to a bourgeoning field of research guided
by an increasing interest in a certain aspect of social life that has been tra-
ditionally overlooked or obliterated. Since many scholars have already
evaluated this emotional turn and the reasons it has not received the atten-
tion it deserves, I will not rehearse these issues here. Rather, I will high-
light the general lines of research that constitute it and discuss some of its
analytical and methodological axes and presuppositions. From here, I will
turn to a discussion about how I encountered this area of research, as I was

Translated by Catalina González Quintero.

M. Jimeno (*)
Department of Anthropology, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá,
Colombia
e-mail: msjimenos@unal.edu.co

© The Author(s) 2021 15

A. M. Forero Angel et al. (eds.), Incarnating Feelings, Constructing
Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57111-5_2
16 M. JIMENO

not originally interested in emotions, but, as it were, encountered them in

three different research scenarios throughout many years of anthropologi-
cal fieldwork in Colombia and Brazil. My first encounter with them
occurred in the 1990s, when I was studying the experiences of violence in
low-income urban sectors in Bogotá and Tolima, Colombia. The second
took place when I researched crimes of romantic partners both in Colombia
and in Brazil from 1999 to 2000. My third encounter with emotions
occurred in 2008, as I investigated the process of social restructuring of an
interethnic population who suffered a massacre (the massacre of “el
Naya”), perpetrated by paramilitary groups in 2001 in a rural area of
Cauca, Colombia. Through these research experiences I advanced the
concepts of emotional configurations and emotional communities, to
which I will refer with more depth. But before getting into these matters,
I will begin with a brief overview on the history of research on emotions.

2   An Overview of the History of Research

on Emotions

Among the works that historically trace the intellectual development of

the discussion on emotions, the philosophers Cheshire Calhoun and
Robert C. Solomon’s compilation What is an emotion? Classic and
Contemporary Readings (2003) stands out. This early book discusses and
contrasts two main tendencies in the definition of emotions: first, those
that stress their sensorial and physiological character, and, second, those
that emphasize their cognitive, intelligent aspect and the ways in which
emotions help us understand a particular situation. Calhoun and Solomon
note that this debate goes back thousands of years in Western thought,
arguing that, “Twenty-five hundred years ago, Plato and Aristotle debated
the nature of emotions, and Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, developed a strik-
ingly modern theory of emotion that stands up to the most contemporary
criticism” (2003, p. 1). Despite this long history—which includes not
only the Ancient Greeks, but also the Roman Stoics—emotions, Calhoun
and Solomon say, have not been considered an important topic in itself, in
philosophy or in other disciplines, and has only been tangentially touched
upon in relation to other issues such as mental and cognitive phenomena.
Keith Oatley’s work reminds us that although the emotions were dis-
cussed in the first known written texts, such as the Sumerians, they have
been largely overlooked as object of study (Oatley, 2004). In particular, he
emphasizes a curious status of emotions in that, on the one hand, they
appear constantly in world-wide narratives from the very beginning of
humanity, but, on the other hand, they are continually overlooked,
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 17

undervalued, and even despised. Great epic narratives such as the Indian
Gilgamesh, or other Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, American, and
African traditional tales offer accounts of pain, anger, joy, compassion,
love, and so on. Confucius wrote in the fifth century BC, about the emo-
tions, just as the Mayans did in their codices. So, humanity has produced
a vast emotional repertoire with deep social implications. Is it, then, Oatley
asks, that humans really have a vision of things that is blurred by emotions?
It seems so, given that, just as in the great Greek tragedies, we cannot see
the most important results of our actions.
Calhoun and Solomon continue to trace this intellectual engagement
with emotions, arguing that the previously mentioned two lines of research
on emotions—those stressing their sensorial and physiological character
and those emphasizing their cognitive aspect—are problematic. They offer
a broad historical outline of research on the issue, compiling texts that
include: Aristotle, René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, William
James, Sigmund Freud, Walter Cannon, John Dewey, Stanley Schachter,
Jerome Singer, Franz Brentano, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Jean
Paul Sartre. Calhoun and Solomon contend that the theory that sees emo-
tions as physiological reactions, inspired in Charles Darwin and formu-
lated by William James in 1884 and C. G. Lange in 1885, is still prevailing
(Calhoun & Solomon, 2003). Despite a long history that reaches back to
Aristotle, the second line of research, which sees emotions as cognitive and
evaluative phenomena, has been less predominant. The more recent
“emotional turn,” takes place precisely at the divergence between the two
camps and proposes a change of perspective that seeks to overcome the
psycho-biological reductionism of the first trend, by opening a wide array
of perspectives for the study of the emotions.
As a consequence of the “emotional turn,” research on the emotions in
recent decades has been primarily transdisciplinary. Diverse perspectives
work jointly to offer an understanding of the emotions as providing evalu-
ative guidelines in particular contexts, that is, as giving us essential insight
and guidance about what we consider important, valuable, and just for our
lives. Emotions are understood, then, as both evaluative judgments and as
forms of engagement with social action. Several scholars have pointed to
the fact that they constitute motivations which orient people’s action
(Castillo del Pino, 2000; Jimeno, 2004; Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1996;
Oatley, 2004), and, in the words of Martha Nussbaum “Emotions […]
involve judgments about important things, judgments in which appraising
an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our
own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do
not fully control” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 19). In this way, the emotional
18 M. JIMENO

turn involves understanding emotions as relational social acts, modeled by

historical and cultural contexts, and constitutive of social hierarchies and
relations.
Just like philosophy, anthropology and sociology have a long history of
reflection on the emotions and have engaged in particular studies on spe-
cific emotional states. One example is sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s 1982
book, Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy (Liebe als Passion: Zur
Codierung von Intimität), in which he saw love as a means of symbolic
communication, a code that makes possible the interaction between the
self and others. In this book, he explores the historical formation of new
codes of intimacy in Europe, as well as the different transformations of the
code of love, from polite love to amour passion (passionate love), which
emerged in France in the seventeenth century and involves freedom to
choose a romantic partner (Luhmann, 1998, pp. 9–11).
Another, more recent, example is Marina Ariza’s sociological approach
to emotions in her 2016 work, Emociones, afectos y sociología. Diálogos
desde la investigación social y la interdisciplina. There, she argues that,
despite the important views on the issue of classical sociology authors such
as Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber, it was Parsons’s interpretation, accord-
ing to which the function of emotions is limited to the maintenance of
primary relations, which became mainstream in the discipline. In this way,
Durkheim’s view of emotions as forces of social cohesion, constitutive of
a moral and symbolic order, was relegated and the idea that emotions are
opposed to reason, and that reason alone is a civilizing power, gained
ascendancy. Even if, Weber, for example, also gave great importance to the
emotions in his analysis of charismatic power and in the formation of prot-
estant ethics, emotions were generally neglected as object of sociologi-
cal study.
Despite efforts like these, however, emotions have been usually studied
either in a marginal way, in relation to other issues of more central impor-
tance, or, when they are touched upon, they are referred to as negative,
irrational, and abrupt subjective forces. Fortunately, Sociologists and
anthropologists from Durkheim, to the Culture and Personality
Movement, to G. Bateson, V. Turner, and C. Geertz, studied affective
states and emotional expressions in socio-cultural contexts and in relation
to particular social processes, including activities furthering social cohe-
sion and solidarity, rituals, communication, interactions involved in the
social construction of meaning, and in the notion of personhood (Ariza,
2016; Barcellos & Coelho, 2010; Dias, 1986; Lienhardt, 1979; Lutz &
Abu-Lughod, 1990).
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 19

Nonetheless, the study of emotions only gained prominence with

authors like David Le Breton, Michele Rosaldo, Catherine Lutz, Lila Abu-­
Lughold, Fred Myers, and Geoffrey White, who began to speak about an
anthropology of emotions (Jimeno, 2004; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990;
Reddy, 1997). Today we have a wide array of studies on the history of
emotions (Reddy, 2008; Rosenwein & Cristiani, 2018; Vegetti, 2004), on
the different approaches to their analysis (Ariza, 2016; Bolaños, 20161),
and on the emotional life of different groups, for example, in Latin
America (Calderón & Zirión, 2018). A work usually brought to the fore
in this context is the pioneering research of Jean Briggs (1971), Never in
Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family, who observed “the emotional behav-
ioral patterns of the Utku in their daily life.” She examined the absence of
anger among the Eskimos, who do not even have a word to designate this
emotion. As a consequence, she provided ethnographic evidence against
the idea that emotions and the vocabulary of emotions can be universal,
and supports the view that socio-cultural life defines the meaning and
force of emotional expressions.
More recently, Catherine Lutz challenged the assumptions of Western
science on the nature of the emotions with her fieldwork, first, on the
Ifaluk people, in the Western Pacific, and, then, in the United States. Lutz
said that in the field, “I became aware of how emotional exchanges […]
are at the core of the community’s political and moral life, instead of being
mere expressions or gestures of internal states in the psychological devel-
opment” (Lutz, 2018, p. 44).2 With her intention to understand the
power dynamics that arose from emotional exchanges, her work became
part of the anthropological turn that criticized traditional dichotomies—
such as mind/body and reason/emotion—and universalistic assumptions
drawn from psychological and neuroscience’s studies on the emotions.
She also deplored the exaggerated importance given to reason and ratio-
nality in the analysis of human life, and, in contrast, advocated for an
understanding of affects as the basis of creativity, in spite of the fact that it
is object of ill-intended manipulation (Lutz, 2018, p. 45).
In a similar vein as Lutz, Sergio Moravia has argued that the delay in a
historical and semantic understanding of the “passions” is due to their
being influenced by primary and archetypical structures of the Western

1
Bolaños presents a very complete state of the art of the debates on emotions in both
disciplines during the twentieth century.
2
My translation. The text was published originally in Spanish.
20 M. JIMENO

tradition, such as the division between mind and body. These archetypical
structures gave rise to the idea that emotions are independent from social
bonds, and, consequently, it became difficult to see them as the product of
both a conceptual and affective sedimentation. Moravia continued argu-
ing that we can only now appreciate that the study of the emotions cor-
responds to the field of hermeneutics, insofar as they are in essence a
signifying apparatus. Only when we consider emotions in this light, does
their semantic and historical significance becomes visible (Moravia, 1998).
As we can see from this historical overview on the field of emotions, the
affective turn sprung from inconformity with a reductionist and non-­
historical approach to emotions, which involved that they were disre-
garded as a social force. Historical, hermeneutical, and ethnographic
studies, to the contrary, revealed how emotions are culturally shaped, have
a relational, intersubjective character, and are public phenomena, not
merely internal psychological or mental states. This perspective took hold
once emotions began to be studied in the context of social practices, val-
ues, patterns of actions—in other words, from the point of view of the
cultural history of particular social groups. Let us now examine with more
detail the main aspects of the emotional turn.

3   The Emotional Turn: Emotions as Relational

Acts in the Operation of Social Structures
One of the most important theoretical bases for this new approach to
emotions came from a criticism of the naturalistic and ahistorical character
of important modern assumptions, such as the notion of individual at the
core of the concept of person. In 1939, Marcel Mauss presented the his-
torical process that led, after many centuries of conceptual sedimentation,
to the modern notion of person as a psychological being with an individ-
ual rational consciousness (Mauss, 1939). In particular, he showed that it
was the Protestant thinkers of diverse denominations—Puritans, Wesleyans,
Pietists, and Moravians—and not the Cartesians, who began to ask impor-
tant questions about individual consciousness and freedom as well as an
individual’s right to have a personal relation to God. Through these inter-
rogations, the notion of the person as an individual entity with an identity
emerged. Beyond this, Mauss showed how Hume and Berkeley contrib-
uted to the understanding of the soul as a mere state of consciousness,
Kant provided the view of individual consciousness as the sacred nucleus
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 21

of the person and seat of practical reason, and Fichte afforded the concep-
tion of the self as necessary condition for consciousness and science
(Jimeno, 2019b, p. 149). In this sense, I agree with Brazilian anthropolo-
gist, Luis Fernado Dias Duarte’s analysis—based on Mauss—of the repre-
sentation of the person as a psychological entity. He claimed—supported
by his fieldwork to study the character of the “nervous person” in low-­
income social classes in Brazil—that there was a repeated pattern of use of
the notion of “psychological being” to explain this character, namely a
being that contains an unknown and powerful interior space, where char-
acter disturbances arise due to the accumulation and conflict of thoughts
and passions (Dias, 1986, p. 25; Jimeno, 2019b, pp. 150–151).
This notion of person, which was formed over many centuries, coin-
cides with what Norbert Elias called a homo clausus (Elias, 1983)—a con-
ception of person in which the mind/body divide is central and the
emotions are reduced to obscure forces in opposition to reason. Nobert
Elias was a pioneer in turning the attention to the sociogenesis and psy-
chogenesis of this notion of person as an individual with a psychological
inner self. Elias’s novelty lay in putting European political structures in
relation with the emergence of such psychological subject. In other words,
he saw the homo clausus as a European historical product, tied to the
political ascent of the bourgeoisie and to the creation of nation-states. For
him, the homo clausus and its associated personality structure reflect the
socio-political modern arrangement, so that human emotions and their
self-control mechanisms have a historical relation with economic and
political structures in modern society (Elias, 1983, p. 9). He also pointed
to how sociology committed to the idea of a homo clausus, according to
which a person is understood as an isolated individual. All other individu-
als are also homo clausus, enclosed in their psychological inner life, and
isolated from the rest of human beings (Elias, 1983). For Elias, the soci-
ologist Talcott Parsons accurately illustrated this view with the metaphor
of a black box, in whose interior occur all sorts of individual psychological
processes (Jimeno, 2004). Elias studied the historicity of this model of an
isolated, self-controlled individual, which must master some emotional
expressions and incorporate others, and showed how this conception cor-
responds with the emergence of modern states and their monopoly of
violence. In this way, he questioned the narrow and asocial conception of
emotions and was able to relativize the notion of a self-controlled indi-
vidual. At the same time, he highlighted the historicity of emotions—he
showed the values attached to emotions in particular periods of time and
22 M. JIMENO

how they play a role in social hierarchy and power dynamics. Thus, Elias
offered important conceptual basis for restructuring the research field on
emotions.
An innovative approach is also offered by Michel Foucault in working
out a genetic history of discourses concerning madness and the abnormal,
institutions such as prison, and the very notion of the subject in relation to
the exercise of power (see particularly, Foucault, 1991). His work under-
mined the naturalization of historical dispositives aimed at social control
and allowed an examination of their internal mechanisms. Exploring the
social history of the emotions, he also helped in opening a research field
that examined established notions about social hierarchies and power
interactions.

4   Body and Soul in Transdisciplinary Research

As we just saw, there is a deep transdisciplinarity of the emotional turn. As
a result, sciences such as neurobiology, neuropsychology, and ethology
began to collaborate with philosophy and the social sciences in unexpected
ways. Since the decade of the 1970s, for example, research in neurosci-
ences laboratories has questioned some of the main assumptions of the
traditional view on emotions, particularly three of its central dichotomies:
material versus immaterial (or, body vs. soul), reason versus emotion (or
cognition vs. feeling), and genetic versus acquired (or inherited vs. socially
constructed features). A similar deconstruction has been made by anthro-
pologists, sociologists, and historians, who contribute to experimental
research with the examination of social practices, cultural meanings, and
historical and social structures. Beyond these general overlaps, we see spe-
cific examples of convergence and divergence throughout the natural and
social sciences, of which I will outline some of the most notable.
Biochemist Eric Kandel, cellular physiologist James Schwartz, and psy-
chiatrist Thomas Jessel experimentally investigated the cognitive means
(beliefs, value judgments, and perceptions) by which individuals perceive
emotional states and, how desires and emotions also influence behavior.
They concluded that thought and feeling are parts of the same mental
processes, which are very complex insofar as they relate different functions
and parts of the brain (Kandel et al., 1996).3

3
Kandel received the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 2000.
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 23

Another contribution to this debate came from neurologist Antonio

Damasio, in 1990, with the book Descartes’s Error, which aimed at under-
mining one of the most deeply rooted cultural ideas of Western thought
about the mind: dualism. Researching patients with neuronal damage in
the prefrontal lobe, Damasio noted that they experience serious emotional
distress as well as great difficulty in planning everyday ordinary tasks, espe-
cially when these tasks involve other people (Oatley, 2004). Given this, the
brain injury seemed to also cause emotional damage in these patients. For
instance, Elliott, the main subject of Damasio’s studies, lost the capacity to
emotionally engage with everyday events of his life, seeing them instead
with indifference and detachment. Things that moved him before, no lon-
ger did. And, with the loss of his emotions, he also lost social relationships,
commitments, and the ability to make plans and attain his goals. Descartes’s
error, Damasio argued, was to separate body and soul. While Descartes
thought that the mind (soul) was immaterial and substantially different
from the brain or material body, Damasio claimed, to the contrary, that
since when the material brain is injured, not only is the mind harmed, but
also the person’s identity and relationships with others, then material and
immaterial aspects of the human being are tightly related (Oatley, 2004).
Neurologist Roberto Mercadillo Caballero is among many researchers
working in this area in América Latina. In particular, Mercadillo Caballero
questioned another Western presupposition—the deterministic interpreta-
tion that originated in William James, who reduced the emotions to physi-
ological responses to external stimuli. He maintains that it is precisely the
study of the biological processes of emotions that breaks with this idea. As
such, biology is not deterministic (Mercadillo, 2016) and a new science—
social neuroscience—should attempt to relate social dynamics with the
cognitive modeling. Of course, this idea is not a novelty for social sciences,
such as anthropology and sociology, since they have always related cogni-
tive and social functions. What is novel, however, is the assertion that
social dynamics influence the anatomical and physiological substratum of
cognition, namely, the nervous system. The challenge for this new science
lies in determining the cellular, functional, and behavioral mechanisms
that allow for symbolic relations.
Mercadillo Caballero’s study on the neurocognitive basis of compas-
sion as a moral emotion, based on MRI results of the participants, led him
to affirm, along with other studies, that the relationship between activity
in certain areas of the cortex and the system of “mirror neurons” allow for
us to experience empathy with the emotional states of others. However,
24 M. JIMENO

we must note that the empathic connection with the pain of others varies
according to cultural factors and the corporal experience of every indi-
vidual, even if it has at its basis the same cellular mechanism.
In a similar vein, Debra Niehoff (1998) found in her study on the biol-
ogy of violence that the neuronal basis of behavior encompasses much
more than a mere genetic programming or assassin instinct. While noting
the historical reasons for the social scientist’s distrust in biology—namely,
the opposition of society and nature, and the dichotomy of social and
biological approaches—Niehoff argues that today’s advances in the under-
standing of the brain’s functioning allow us to affirm that social and physi-
cal environments model the nervous system even before birth. Inversely,
the innate characteristics of the brain orient the ways in which everyone
perceives and reacts to the environment. The astonishing plasticity of
genes allows us to say that behavior is the result of a permanently moving
process (Niehoff, pp. x). Violent behavior, just as other types of behavior,
is neither a preestablished program nor a simple reaction, but rather a
complex process in which the brain maintains a “politics of open doors
that invite external influence” (p. 32). Even the coldest-blooded and most
sadistic assassin was a child, so internal (genetic) factors along with exter-
nal influences (education, moral values, mass media, stress, etc.) interacted
in complex ways to bring about his violent tendencies. It was precisely
from the study of violent action that I approached the field of emotions.
Let us take a moment to summarize the main points of the discussion
up to this point: the emotional turn arose from a deep discomfort with the
reductive, ahistorical, approach to emotions and its disregard of their
social function. In response, sociology, anthropology, history, psychology,
and philosophy began exploring the historical, relational, and intersubjec-
tive character of emotions and the great variety of cultural nuances in their
expression. In this way, emotions were taken out of the narrow limits of
individual psyches and moved to the public sphere, where they began to
be understood as social phenomena.
In the development of this new approach to understanding the nature
of emotions, important and deeply rooted dichotomies were criticized:
public versus private, individual versus group, reason versus emotion,
mind versus body, inheritance versus environment, subject versus struc-
ture. The emotional turn aimed at overcoming them by converging social
sciences and neurosciences. Beyond this, the emotional turn conceptual-
ized emotions as encompassing a broad range of phenomena—like reac-
tive emotions (anger, fear, etc.), moods, affective attachments, and
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 25

feelings—that were products of socio-cultural processes of modeling and,

even if not explicit, are essential for the operation of social structures
(Oatley, 2004). In light of this, emotions can be understood both as a
constitutive aspect of social action and as part of the experience of each
individual subject. Scholars such as Oatley (2004) argue that emotions are
the springs of social action, since at least three processes converge in
them—our evolutive history as a species, our cultural differences and pro-
cesses of learning, and our understanding and assessment of the environ-
ment. And thus, as both personal and collective motivating factors,
emotions structure our social relations.
In conclusion, we can say that emotions are irreducible to cognitions,
even if they involve mental processes and operate as evaluations of our
environment. They both shape and are shaped by the moral valuations of
each culture, and constitute essential parts of our engagements with our-
selves and others. Now I will turn to my experience with this field of
research, by describing how I began to be interested in this aspect of social
life and how I approached it.

5   First Encounter with Emotions: Parental

Punishment as a Way to Correct Behavior
and Teach Respect

Between 1992 and 1993, I worked with an interdisciplinary group inves-

tigating the experiences of violence among people of low-income groups,
in Bogotá and the region of Tolima (Colombia). The group was made up
of three anthropologists, three psychiatrists, and a statistician. We asked
the study’s participants how they defined violence and which violent expe-
rience they identified as the most important in the lives, placing special
emphasis on understanding their most significant personal narratives of
violent experiences. In order to contrast it with how the subjects of the
study defined violence, we created a methodological definition, which
described “violence” as: “a type of social action whose most important
characteristic is the intention of harming others or oneself.” With this in
mind, in the first phase of the work, we conducted over 300 structured
interviews and, from those, we then selected life-stories about specific
cases. Collecting statistical data during this first phase, then, was guided by
the general principle of gaining an understanding of how people describe
violent actions they have suffered, which we examined more deeply in the
26 M. JIMENO

qualitative analysis of the life stories. The methodological design sought to

obtain information about the people’s immediate interaction networks,
thinking structures, motivations and assessments, and how these were all
connected to the wider social structure. What do people understand as a
violent experience? How do they narrate it? What relations can be estab-
lished between these experiences and the general characteristic of the
social structure in which they take place? These were some of the ques-
tions we attempted to answer.
Our first significant finding was that people privileged domestic experi-
ences of violence above all others. Most of the interviewees were, at that
point in time, over 20 years old and their appalling life-stories mostly
described violent events from their childhoods involving their parents,
which revealed a perdurable mental mark of the violent actions that they
understood as severe abuse. In fact, most participants told detailed stories
of parents responding to their acts of disobedience or to their impertinent
answers by beating, insulting, and humiliating them as well as forcing
them into confinement. Also, 70% of the women in the study told similar
stories of abuse from their romantic partners in their adult lives.
In listening to these stories, we noticed two important things. First,
people were visibly altered while conveying their experiences: they shiv-
ered, cried, nervously paced, and their voices changed. In other words,
they experienced an affective shock while recalling the episodes of vio-
lence. Second, their emotional expressions also affected us, the members
of the research team. We empathically connected with the interviewees,
feeling pain and impotence as we recognized that we could not alleviate
their suffering. This was an important finding, because it illustrated what
psychological and sociological literature confirms—that violent experi-
ences are profoundly emotional and durable. But still more important
than this was that these emotional expressions led us to want to explore
more carefully the emotional aspect of violence.
In addition to corporal manifestations of their emotions, people
recounted detailed and vivid stories of the events involved and how they
felt at the time of the event as well as in the present. To the question about
how they explained why their parents treated them in a certain way, they
gave elaborate responses that had a common, complex, rationalization:
their parents loved them and they thought that this was the best way to
correct their behavior and teach them not to disrespect their authority.
This reasoning, however, was accompanied by expressions of anger, pain,
and fear. Most of the interviewees affirmed that they were constantly
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 27

“nervous” and “sad,” as a consequence of what had happened to them.

They also said that they avoided the contact with neighbors and other
people from their community because they were distrustful of their
reactions.
Finally, to our questions about institutions such as police, laws, and
tribunals of justice, their answers expressed distrust. We understood, then,
that their experiences of domestic violence made them construct a repre-
sentation of authority, both domestic and civil, as arbitrary and frighten-
ing. Authority was not recognized for its persuasive force or protective
capability, but only for its tendency to overreact and use violence at the
smallest manifestation of disobedience. This, in turn, produced an attitude
of general distrust of the social environment. The notions of correction
and respect organized the cognitive frame of reference with which the
interviewees sought to explain their suffering, but they were also indistin-
guishably infused with contradictory emotional evaluations, particularly,
with pain, fear, and anger. Parents, the symbol of authority, were, thus,
simultaneously the object of love, fear, and anger.
In this way, we could understand how these violent interactions were
part of a complex socio-cultural model about the exercise of authority.
This model is characterized by ambivalence, since in the name of paternal
love, parents correct their children through the infliction of pain and
secure their children’s respect by imposing force, which produced physical
and emotional harm. These emotional valuations are contradictory and
long-lasting; they leave painful scars on the psyches and bodies of those
who experience them. Moreover, the household’s and society’s hierarchi-
cal structures are woven with the same affective and evaluative threads.
Very often experts and activists disregard subjective experiences of pain,
fear, and love, or reduce them to structural features, particularly the pre-
carious living conditions of those who are in low-income stratas. In the
process, emotional experiences get flattened by unidimensional explica-
tions of social phenomena, which tend to appeal only to general concep-
tions of oppression and poverty. In these approaches, emotions are mere
circumstantial byproducts, relegated to the corner of personal data, rather
than constitutive elements of violent structures and actions. Given this
conceptualization, the subjective impact of violent actions along with its
psychological and affective effects on the development of social life are
judged irrelevant. All these complex phenomena are disregarded in favor
of a macro-structural analysis of patriarchal or social-class conditions.
28 M. JIMENO

Let me be clear, patriarchal and social-class conditions do comprise the

wider structural framework of domestic and other forms of violence. But
dissociating structure from social life operations and society from individ-
uals prevents us from understanding emotions as powerful and active
social structuring forces. As Bourdieu demonstrated with his notion of
habitus—a notion that Norbert Elias had already coined in 1939—what
we call “social structure” is not an empty and rigid entity, but rather, is a
complex of forces, institutions, subjective acts, emotional attachments that
all converge in social action.
To conclude this description of my first encounter with the field of
emotions, I want to stress that these investigations conducted in Bogotá
and Tolima showed the political projection of emotions that appeared in
experiences of domestic violence, perpetrated by parents to children.
These emotions negatively influence people’s performance in common life
and social relations, because the arbitrary and violent exercise of authority
is emotionally projected in a twofold mistrust: mistrust of all forms of
authority, which questions their social legitimacy—namely, the symbolic
bond on which these authorities exert their power—and mistrust of oth-
ers, which accounts for a breach in all social relations and makes an ade-
quate collective functioning difficult. More specific research is needed
about the way in which culture and politics influence each other to pro-
duce this mistrust, a political emotion, as Martha Nussbaum would call it.
In fact, “All societies […] need to think about compassion for loss, anger
at injustice, the limiting of envy and disgust in favor of inclusive sympa-
thy” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 2).

6   Second Encounter with Emotions: Emotive

Configuration in Crimes of Passion
In the introduction to the book Cultura y violencia: hacia una ética social
del reconocimiento (2019),4 I discussed the results of the research con-
ducted between 1999 and 2001 on crimes between romantic partners in
Brazil and Colombia. Unlike in the previous study, in this research emo-
tions were an intrinsic part of the study’s objective from the outset, as it
can be appreciated from its very name in ordinary language—“crimes of
passion.” It was, then, necessary to engage with the ways in which

4
Culture and Violence: Toward a Social Ethics of Recognition in English.
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 29

emotions shape this type of violent action and how they are viewed and
dealt with socially.
The study’s central finding was that violence in this particular context
was framed as what I called an emotive configuration. With this, I meant
that crimes between romantic partners are not, as they are usually con-
ceived, isolated and pathological acts—like an expression of excessive
romantic love. Rather, they are actions that result from a complex tapestry
of convictions and feelings, emotions and ideas about relationships, love,
femininity, masculinity, and honor (Jimeno, 2004). I called this tapestry
an emotive configuration because it has a particular, tangible, and opera-
tional role in the formation of sociocultural structures.
I approached the study through various cases in Brazil and Colombia.
In particular, I examined three kinds of narratives— those of the individu-
als involved in the homicide (and sometimes also those of their relatives),5
those in the corresponding judicial files, and those on the broader juridical
dispositions of each country. Based on these narratives, I reconstructed
the context and dynamics of each relationship, the internal logic of the
judicial processes, and their normative orientation. How did the three lev-
els of the case—the subjective, the relational or intersubjective, and the
institutional or normative—connect? What role did the emotions play in
each of these levels? What oriented the narratives involved in each of them?
My study aimed at overcoming the traditional dichotomy between
what is given, structural and objective, and the individuals’ agency, their
subjectivity, and interests.6 Thus, I adopted the point of view according to
which the meaning of a fact or action makes part of the very constitution
of social processes and structures. In the words of Marshall Sahlins (1985),
an occurrence becomes an event when society gives it a particular meaning
and there is a new relationship between the social structure and the par-
ticular occurrence. The ethnographic approach allows us to gain access to
this meaning and understand the discursive practices and activities of social
subjects involved (Jimeno, 2019a, p. 196). In other words, structure and
every-day practice are connected in social life such that the relation

5
I talked to 14 murderers in prisons both in Brasilia and in Bogotá, to whom I asked the
way in which the event occurred, the reasons they had for committing it, and their relation-
ship with the victim.
6
I follow in this regard the indications of Hans Medick (1987) in a provoking dialogue
between anthropology and history. I have referred to this in more detail in the chapter, “El
juego de las emociones: de la pasión al feminicidio” of my book Crimen pasional: con el
corazón en tinieblas (Jimeno, 2019b).
30 M. JIMENO

between affective subjective meaning, social meaning, and normative,

institutionalized expressions is precisely what anthropological interpreta-
tion seeks to unveil.
To this particular relation between the different socio-cultural levels
that can be found in the murder of a romantic partner, I called emotive
configuration. An emotive configuration is a configuration because the
different social levels that give rise to this type of violent action overlap
and intertwine in complex ways. This particular configuration is articu-
lated by three symbolic axes: first, beliefs about love as a romantic bond
and the practices related to them; second, beliefs about violence as an act
of “madness”; and, third, the deeply rooted divide between reason and
emotion. Each one of these axes has, as we saw at the beginning of this
article, a traceable social history. They pertain to a modern European con-
struction of the subject, of love relationships, of the social role of women,
and of the constitution of nation-states. In this configuration of thoughts,
convictions, feelings, and institutions, violence has the central function of
ensuring the continuity of the patriarchal model of romantic relationships.
In fact, gender hierarchies are sustained by forms of violence that range
from explicit and brutal physical abuse, to disguised and veiled linguistic
or symbolic denigration (Jimeno, 2004). Latin American cultural forma-
tions are hereditary of these symbolic axes and their normative
constructions.7
The first axis relates to the romanticizing of love, which refers to the
historical process of cultural sedimentation that produced the particular
way of considering romantic relationships between adult men and women
in contemporary Western societies. I will not detail here the process that
Foucault revealed in The Will to Knowledge (1998), where he related insti-
tutions and discursive formations (family, sexuality, school, prison, psychi-
atric hospitals, etc.) with specific social and normative structures of control,
in order to resituate interpersonal relationships. Neither can I delve here
into the many socio-historical studies on the issue. But I should highlight
Niklas Luhmann’s view that the high value given to individuality and self-­
control in the eighteenth century in Europe produced a new form of

7
Elias and Foucault are, to my eyes, the most important thinkers of this social tapestry,
with their conceptions about, on the one hand, power, discourse, and the subject, and, on
the other hand, the correlation between the historical and political structure and the personal
psyche, in what Elias called the civilization process.
 2 THE EMOTIONAL TURN IN COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE 31

intimate communication which constituted a new semantics of love and

friendship (Luhmann, 1998).
Unlike the medieval courtly love, the modern code of conduct describes
love through symbols, and the most important of these, which organizes
their semantic structure, designate love as a passion. In this way, the idea
appeared that a person who loves suffers some radical experience that she
can neither modify nor explain. Although, as Luhmann affirms, there are
very old references to passionate love and to love as a sickness or madness
in literature and history, the shift that operated in modernity culminated
in the generalization of this symbolic means of communication, which
unfolds and manifests in both corporeal and intellectual processes, reorga-
nizing sexuality and marriage. In this way, passionate love became the goal
of personal self-fulfillment in the unity of sexuality, love, and marriage.
These are the historical bases of the aspect of this emotive configuration
that I have called the romanticizing of love.
To clarify, I am not referring here to romanticism as the cultural move-
ment, which, of course, made important contributions to our inherited
concept of love. Instead, I am referring to the particular meaning that
became attached to the concept—its understanding as an indivisible and
perdurable relationship, involving the full surrender of one to the other
and the concealment of all sorts of differences and conflicts. The visible
meaning of this concept is the idyllic representation of the bond, while its
implicit meaning is the appropriation of one individual by the other (“she
is mine, he is mine”), which is especially strong in male-female romantic
relationships. In this context, infidelity, separation, or abandonment seem
to be unthinkable, because they imply tearing up the ideal; and all sorts of
cultural circuits, such as parental advice, literature, film, music, mass
media, and social jokes, feed and adorn with many variations this idealized
love, as a source of self-fulfillment or personal failure, as either happiness
or tragedy. Despite the pervasiveness of this ideal, however, it is gendered
in that it is permissive for men and punitive for women. And, it is at this
point that the romanticizing of amorous relationships and violence meet,
given the culturally established role according to which men ought to
punish both real and imaginary breakups, and legitimately reaffirm their
wounded pride through the use of violence, as most perpetrators and
defense lawyers tirelessly repeat.
The second crucial element in the emotive configuration of the crime
of passion, which is also pervasive in the use of violence in general, is the
social assimilation of violence with a pathology or an act of “madness.”
32 M. JIMENO

This conception began to develop at the beginning of the twentieth cen-

tury, with the European criminology studies that established a correlation
between biological characteristics (physiognomy, inheritance, etc.) and
criminal behavior (Jimeno, 2004, p. 197). “Madness,” as well as the pres-
ence of perturbing emotions, became a source of juridical non-­
responsibility. This pathologizing of violence, then, developed as yet
another cultural mechanism to attenuate guilt for the transgression of the
principle of not to kill, particularly when committed by men. It is easy to
observe how in Brazil and Colombia, even today, many years after this
research, between seven and eight out of ten crimes against a romantic
partner are perpetrated by men. This shows the close connection between
masculine identity and the use of violence, which continues in these soci-
eties today. The cultural and judicial protection of masculine pride contin-
ues to play a role, although more timidly expressed.
By understanding homicide of a romantic partner as a form of transi-
tory madness—as it is usually discussed in tribunals of justice—significant
aspects of the crime, like its high propensity to be committed by men, the
particular history of the relationship, the detailed preparation of the crime,
and the deliberate intention to murder are usually disregarded. In other
words, considering this violent action as a pathology results in overlooking
its motives, the specific emotional configuration in which it occurs, and
the chain of interactions, social values, and types of environment that
incite it.
The last component of the emotive configuration of this violent act is
the dichotomy emotion versus reason. In the text above mentioned
(Jimeno, 2019a), I argued that, throughout the twentieth century, Latin
American societies witnessed a progressive positive valuation of the role of
reason in human action, accompanied by the view that emotions are irra-
tional, pre-social, and dangerous forces that should be dealt with differ-
ently according to the gender of the agent. This higher valuation of reason
over emotion rests on the broader modern representation of the subject,
understood as only responsible for his or her acts insofar as they are done
while in possession of their mental faculties. According to this conception,
reason and emotions are separate compartments and, while reason repre-
sents civilization, emotions reflect what is primitive in human beings. This
conception led to changes in the judicial codification of guilt in Latin
America around mid-twentieth century that was essential to leaving pride
or honor behind as the nucleus of violence against romantic partners and,
instead, situating it in the irrationality of emotional life (Jimeno, 2004).
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 Minä menin sanomaan hänelle jäähyväisiä.

"Miksi jo nyt menette? Odottakaa vähän, mamma tulee kohta."

"Ei, minä en voi", vastasin minä, "parasta on minun tulla toiste."

Minun kauhukseni, tosiaan suureksi kauhukseni astui Sofia juuri

silloin vakavin askelin saliin. Hänen kasvonsa olivat kalpeammat
kuin tavallisesti ja silmäluomet punaiset itkusta. Minua hän ei ollut
huomaavinaankaan.

"Tules tänne, niin saat nähdä, Sonja!" sanoi Varvara. "Tuo pikku
notaari kävelee lakkaamatta tästä ohitse."

"Se on kaiketi vakooja", huomautti Solia hyvin halveksivalla

äänellä.

Se oli minulle jo liiaksi! Minä riensin ulos enkä tosiaankaan tiedä,

mitenkä minä pääsin kotiin.

Minun mieleni oli niin raskas ja katkera, että sitä en voi

kavalakaan. Neljänkolmatta tunnin kuluessa kaksi sellaista julmaa
iskua! Minä olin saanut tietää, että Sofia rakasti toista ja että minä
olin ainiaaksi kadottanut hänen kunnioituksensa. Minä tunsin olevani
niin nöyryytetty ja kukistettu, että en edes voinut olla suutuksissani
itseenikään. Maaten sohvalla, kasvot seinään päin, antauduin
nauttimaan harmini ja toivottomuuteni ensimmäisen purkauksen
katkeruutta.

Yht'äkkiä kuulin astuntaa huoneeni lattialla. Minä nousin ylös.

Tulija oli eräs lähimpiä ystäviäni, Jakov Pasinkov.
 Minä kyllä olisin suuttunut kehen hyvänsä muuhun ihmiseen, joka
olisi sinä päivänä tullut kutsumatta minun huoneeseni, mutta
kerrassaan mahdoton oli minun suuttua Pasinkoviin. Päin vastoin
surunkin vaiheella, joka niin katkerasti minua ahdisti, minä tosiaan
ilostuin hänen tulostansa ja tervehdin häntä ystävällisesti. Vanhan
tapansa mukaan astui hän pari kertaa edes takaisin huoneessa,
puhkuen ja vetäen pitkiä jalkojaan jäljestänsä, seisoi sitte
silmänräpäyksen ajan ääneti minun edessäni ja kävi viimein yhtä
ääneti nurkkaan istumaan.
IV.

Minä olin hyvin kauan, melkein ihan lapsuudesta asti ollut hyvä tuttu
Jakov Pasinkovin kanssa. Hän oli ollut kasvatettavana samassa
yksityisessä oppilaitoksessa Moskovassa, saksalaisen Winterkellerin
luona, jossa minäkin olin viettänyt kolme vuotta.

Jakovin isä, joka oli köyhä, virasta eronnut majori ja muuten hyvin
rehellinen, mutta hiukan heikkomielinen mies, oli tullut herra
Winterkellerin luo pienen, silloin seitsenvuotisen poikansa kanssa,
maksanut hänestä vuoden maksun, mutta sitte matkustanut pois
Moskovasta ja kadonnut, antamatta enää mitään tietoa itsestään.
Tuon tuostakin kuului hämäriä kummallisia huhuja hänen
vaiheistansa. Vasta kahdeksan vuoden kuluttua saatiin varmasti
tietää hänen hukkuneen Irtish-joen tulvaan. Ei kukaan tiennyt, mikä
hänet oli vienyt Siperiaan.

Jakovilla ei ollut ketään läheisiä sukulaisia. Hänen äitinsä oli

kuollut jo hyvin kauan sitte. Sillä tavalla joutui hän jäämään
Winterkellerin taloon. Oli hänellä tosiaan yksi etäinen sukulainen,
jota hän sanoi "tädiksi", mutta hän oli niin köyhä, että alussa ei
uskaltanut tulla tervehtimään nuorta sukulaistansa, kun pelkäsi, että
poika tungettaisiin hänelle vastuksiksi.
 Vaimovanhuksen pelko oli kuitenkin turha. Hyväsydämminen
saksalainen piti Jakovin luonansa, antoi hänen opiskella ja syödä
yhdessä toisten oppilasten kanssa (mutta arkipäivinä jätettiin aina
jälkiruoka hänelle antamatta) ja teki hänelle vaatteita vanhoista
nuuskanruskeista kapoista, joita hänen äitinsä, hyvin vanha, mutta
vielä reipas ja toimelias liiviläisvaimo, oli käyttänyt.

Kaikkein näiden asianhaarain tähden ja varsinkin siitä syystä, että

Jakovin asema koulussa oli muka alhaisempi, kohtelivat kumppanit
tavallisesti häntä huolimattomasti ja halveksivasti. He katselivat
häntä yli olkansa kuin köyhää poikaa, josta ei kukaan huolinut, ja
sanoivat häntä milloin "akankapaksi", milloin "myssysankariksi",
hänen tätinsä kun aina käytti kummallista pitsimyssyä, jonka
päälaella törrötti keltainen nauhaviuhka kuin hernetukku, ja milloin
"Jermakin pojaksi", koska hänen isänsä oli kulkenut Irtishiin kuten
kuuluisa Jermak. Mutta huolimatta noista haukkumanimistä, hänen
naurettavista vaatteistaan ja köyhyydestään kaikki kuitenkin pitivät
hänestä paljon. Mahdoton tosiaan olikin olla häntä suosimatta.
Parempi sydämmistä, nöyrempää ja uhraavaisempaa ihmistä tuskin
vain on koskaan ollut maailmassa.

Kuin minä näin hänet ensi kerran, oli hän kuudentoista vuoden
ijässä ja minä olin äsken täyttänyt kolmetoista. Minä olin silloin hyvin
itserakas ja lellitelty poika, rikkaassa kodissa kasvanut. Niinpä minä
heti kouluun tultuani kiiruhdin tekemään lähempää tuttavuutta erään
ruhtinaan pojan kanssa, josta herra Winterkeller piti aivan erityistä
huolta, ja parin muun ylhäissukuisen pojan kanssa. Kaikki muut
pidätin minä kaukana itsestäni enkä Pasinkovia ottanut edes
huomioonikaan. Sitä pitkää ja hoikkaa poikaa rumassa nutussaan ja
lyhyissä housuissa, joiden alta näkyi karkeat, kuluneet puolisukat,
katselin minä köyhän työmiehen pojan tai sellaisen palveluspojan
vertaiseksi, jonka isäni oli minulle valinnut kotitilustemme maaorjain
joukosta.

Pasinkov oli hyvin kohtelias kaikille, mutta ei koskaan koettanut

tunkeutua kenenkään suosioon millään erityisillä keinoilla. Jos hänet
karkoitettiin pois, hän ei nöyrtynyt eikä myöskään pahastunut, vaan
pysyi etäämpänä ikään kuin odotellen, että toinen katuisi tylyyttänsä.
Sellainen hän oli minuakin kohtaan, mutta kaksi kokonaista
kuukautta kului, ennenkuin minun ylpeyteni lannistui ja minä käsitin,
miten paljon parempi hän oli meitä muita.

Oli kirkas, kaunis kesäpäivä. Innokkaan ja väsyttävän pallipelin

jälkeen menin minä pihasta pieneen puutarhaan, joka oli koulun
oma, ja näin Pasinkovin istuvan penkillä korkean sireenipensaan
alla.

Hän luki kirjaa. Astuessani hänen ohitsensa katsahdin kirjan

kansiin ja luin saranoista nimen "Schillers Werke". Minä pysähdyin.

"Osaatteko te saksaa, te?" kysyin minä.

Minua hävettää vielä tänäkin päivänä, kun muistan, miten kopeaa

ylpeyttä ja halveksimista oli ääneni kaiussa.

Pasinkov katsoi minuun pienillä, mutta paljon sanovilla silmillään ja

vastasi:

"Kyllä, kyllä minä osaan. Entä te?"

"Enkö minä sitä osaisi!" vastasin minä.

Minä olin melkein pahastunut tuosta hänen kysymyksestään ja

aioin astua edelleen, mutta olipa siinä kuitenkin jotain,
käsittämätöntä itsellenikin, mitä se oli, joka minua pidätti lähtemästä.

"No, mitä Schillerin teosta te luette sitte?" kysyin minä samalla

ylpeällä äänellä.

"Nyt minä luen Mielenmalttia. Se on erinomaisen kaunis kappale.

Jos tahdotte, niin luen sen teille. Käykää istumaan tähän viereeni
penkille."

Minä vitkastelin vähän, mutta kävin sentään istumaan. Pasinkov

alkoi lukea.

Hän ilmeisesti osasi saksaa paljon paremmin kuin minä ja

monessa paikassa täytyi hänen selittää, ajatusta minulle. Mutta minä
en enää hävennyt omaa taitamattomuuttani enkä hänen
taitavammuuttansa.

Siitä päivästä, siitä yhteisestä lukemisesta sireenein varjossa

rakastin minä Pasinkovia koko nuoren sydämmeni innolla, liityin
häneen ja katselin ylös häneen kaikessa, joka oli hyvää ja oikeata.

Muistanpa vielä tänäkin päivänä hyvin elävästi, minkä näköinen

hän siiloin oli. Vähänpä hänen muotonsa muuttuikin vuosien
kuluessa. Hän oli pitkä ja laiha ja jotenkin kömpelö, kapeat olkapäät
ja syvälle painunut rinta tekivät hänet sairaan näköiseksi, vaikka
hänellä ei ollut mitään syytä valitella pahoinvointia. Suuri, yläpuolelta
aivan pyöreä pää oli aina vähän kallellaan toiselle puolelle ja
pehmoinen vaalea tukka riippui ohuina kiehkuroina hänen hoikalla
kaulallansa. Kasvot eivät olleet kauniit, vaan melkein naurettavat
pitkän, paksun ja punaisen nenän tähden, joka riippui leveäin
suorien huulien päällä. Mutta erinomaisen kaunis oli hänen avoin,
kirkas otsansa, ja kun hän hymyili, loistivat hänen pienet, harmaat
silmänsä niin lempeän sydämmellisesti ja ystävällisesti, että kun vain
niihin katsoi, sydän oikein lämpeni ja ilostui.

Minä muistan myöskin varsin hyvin hänen hiljaisen ja tasaisen

äänensä, joka oli hiukan käheä, mutta ei vastenmielisesti. Hän puhui
yleensä vähän ja nähtävästi vaivalloisesti, mutta milloin hän hiukan
lämpeni ja vilkastui, sujui puhe helposti ja vapaasti, ja — varsin
kummallista katsella — hänen äänensä silloin hiljeni hiljenemistään,
katse muuttui yhä enemmin sisälliseksi ja ikään kuin sammuvaksi ja
koko muoto hiukan punastui. Sanoilla sellaisilla kuin "totuus",
"hyvyys", "elämä", "tiede", "rakkaus" ei koskaan ollut mitään väärää
kaikua Pasinkovin huulilla, lausuipa hän ne kuinka suurella
innostuksella hyvänsä. Pakotta, ponnistuksetta nousi hänen
henkensä ylös ihanteiden maailmaan. Hänen puhdas sielunsa oli
joka hetki valmis astumaan "kauneuden pyhyyteen". Se odotti vain
tulotervehdystä, sisällistä yhteyttä toisen sielun kanssa.

Pasinkov oli romantikko, viimeisiä romantikkoja kuin minä olen

kohdannut matkallani. Nykyaikaan ovat kuten tietty romantikot
melkein kokonaan kadonneet. Ainakaan niitä ei ole yhtään nykyajan
nuorisossa. Sitä pahempi tälle nykyajan nuorisolle!

Sillä tavalla vietin minä kolme vuolta paraimmassa ystävyydessä

Pasinkovin kanssa. Joka ajatuksen, jokaisen tunteen ilmoitimme me
toinen toisellemme, me olimme, kuten sanotaan, yksi sydän ja yksi
sielu. Niinpä minä sainkin eräänä päivänä tiedon hänen
ensimmäisestä rakkaudestaan, ja minä muistan vielä, miten
kiitollisen ja ihastuneen myötätuntoisesti minä kuuntelin hänen
tunnustustansa.

Hänen kainon rakkautensa esine oli herra Winterkellerin

sisarentytär, sievä, valkoverinen saksalaistyttö, jolla oli pienet
pyöreät lapsenkasvot ja lempeät uskolliset sinisilmät. Hän oli hyvin
hyvä ja tunteellinen tyttö, ihasteli Mattissonia, Ulandia ja Schilleriä ja
saneli heidän runojaan varsin viehättävästi hennolla vaan kirkkaalla
äänellä.

Pasinkovin rakkaus oli niin platoninen kuin mahdollista. Hän tapasi

lemmittyänsä ainoastaan pyhäpäivinä, jolloin hän aina tuli
panttileikkisille Winterkellerin lasten kanssa, ja silloinkin hän puhui
hyvin vähän tytön kanssa. Ja kun tyttö kerran sanoi hänelle: "rakas
herra Jakov", hän ei saanut unta koko seuraavana yönä pelkän
onnentunteen tähden. Hän ei tullut hetkeäkään ajatelleeksi, että tyttö
puhutteli kaikkia muitakin hänen kumppanejansa samalla tavalla:
"rakas herra Se tai Se."

Muistan minä myöskin hänen surunsa ja murheensa, kun eräänä

päivänä se uutinen kerrottiin koulussa, että neiti Fredrika — se oli
tytön nimi — oli mennyt suuren teurastuslaitoksen ja lihakaupan
omistajalle, herra Kniftukselle, joka oli sangen kaunis ja sivistynyt
nuori mies, ja että hän ei ollut sitä tehnyt yksistään
tottelevaisuudesta vanhempiansa kohtaan, vaan totisesta
rakkaudesta.

Se oli kova isku minun ystäväparalleni, ja varsinkin oli hänelle

katkera se päivä, jolloin nuorikot ensi kerran kävivät tervehtimässä
eno Winterkelleriä. Entinen neiti, nykyinen rouva Fredrika esitteli
miehellensä Pasinkovin, sanoen häntä nytkin "rakkaaksi herra
Jakoviksi". Herra Kniftuksessa loisti ja paistoi kaikki tyyni, silmät,
otsa ja hampaat, komeasti kammattu musta tukka, frakin
metallinapit, kultavitjat, jotka riippuivat kauniissa kaaressa liivillä,
yksinpä saappaatkin hänen suurehkoissa ja hyvin ulos päin
pyrkivissä jaloissaan.
 Pasinkov puristi hänen kättänsä ja toivotti täydestä sydämmestä
— siitä olen ihan varma — hänelle pitkää häiriytymätöntä onnea.

Se tapahtui minun läsnä ollessani. Muistanpa, miten osaaottavasti

ihmetellen minä katselin ystävääni. Hän näytti minusta oikealta
sankarilta! Ja kun sitte jäimme kahden kesken, miten surumieliset
olivatkaan kaikki meidän sanamme ja ajatuksemme!

"Etsi lohdutusta taiteesta!" sanoin minä hänelle.

"Niin", vastasi hän, "taiteesta ja runoudesta."

"Ja ystävyydestä!" virkoin minä hellästi.

"Niin, ystävyydestä!" toisti hän liikutettuna.

Mitkä viattoman, lapsellisen onnen päivät!

Ero Pasinkovista oli ensimmäinen katkera suru minun elämässäni.

Muutamia viikkoja ennen minun lähtöäni oli hän, kärsittyään paljon
huolia ja vastuksia, pitkän, monesti aivan naurettavankin
kirjeenvaihdon jälkeen monen asianomaisen viraston kanssa,
viimeinkin saanut paperinsa selville, niin että pääsi yliopistoon.
Hyväsydäminen saksalainen kustansi häntä ylioppilaanakin yhä
edelleen, mutta vanhojen sadekappanuttujen ja housujen sijaan sai
hän nyt kunnolliset vaatteet korvaukseksi monenlaisten ainetten
opetuksesta kasvatusisänsä koulun nuorille oppilaille.

Minun seurusteluni hänen kanssansa jatkui aivan samalla tavalla

kuin ennenkin aina viimeiseen hetkeen asti, kuin minä oleskelin
herra Winterkellerin luona, vaikka meidän ikämme ero nyt tuli
enemmin näkyviin kuin ennen ja vaikka minä aloin vähän kadehtia
muutamia hänen uusia ylioppilaskumppanejansa. Hänen
vaikutuksensa minuun oli aina ollut parasta lajia, mutta kovaksi
onneksi sitä ei kestänyt kauan. Minä kerron vain yhden esimerkin
siitä, minkä muutoksen parempaan päin hänen esimerkkinsä voi
saada aikaan minussa. Lapsena olin minä tottunut valehtelemaan.
Mutta Jakovin läsnä ollessa, jopa häntä vain muistellessanikin oli
minun mahdoton saada kieltäni kääntymään valheesen.

Erityinen nautinto oli minusta kävellä hänen kanssansa pitkät

matkat taikka vain astua hänen vieressään edes takaisin huoneessa
ja kuunnella, mitenkä hän minuun katsomatta saneli runoja
hiljaisella, sointuvalla äänellään. Minusta tuntui silloin, kuin me
molemmat olisimme hitaasti ja vähitellen päässeet vapaaksi kaikista
maallisista siteistä ja liidelleet kauas pois johonkin ihmeelliseen,
salaperäisestä kauneudesta säteilevään seutuun.

Erittäin muistan minä erään yön.

Me istuimme yhdessä penkillä sireenipensaan alla; se oli aina

tuosta ensikohtauksesta asti ollut meidän lempipaikkamme. Kaikki
muut makasivat ja nukkuivat. Ääneti ja hiljaa olimme me nousseet
ylös, pukeutuneet puolipimeässä ja hiipineet hiljaa ulos
haaveksimaan. Ulkona taivasalla oli sangen lämmin, mutta tuon
tuostakin tuli raitis tuulenpuuska ja me lähennyimme silloin vielä
lähemmäksi toisiamme. Me puhuimme molemmat paljon ja
innokkaasti, niin että me usein keskeytimme toisemme puhetta,
mutta emme kiistelleet koskaan. Meidän yllämme loisti lukematon
tähtijoukko. Jakov nosti silmänsä tummaa yötaivasta kohti, puristi
minun kättäni ja saneli hiljaa vapisevalla äänellä:

Ylhäällä avaruuden teillä

Täht'joukot ijät' kiertelevät —
Ja kaikki hoitaa Luojan valpas silmä.
 Harras vavistus väräytti koko minun nuorta olentoani. Vavisten
kuin vilusta kiersin minä käteni ystäväni kaulaan ja itkin. Sydämmeni
oli täynnä yli taitojensa.

Mihinkä on paennut se nuori, haaveksiva innostus? Sinne pois,

jonne nuoruuden aikakin on mennyt ja josta ei mikään enää palaa
takaisin!

*****

Kahdeksan vuoden kuluttua tapasin minä Pasinkovin Pietarissa.

Minä olin silloin vähän ennen päättänyt antautua virkamiesuralle, ja
eräs sukulainen, jolla oli jonkin verta vaikutusvaltaa, oli hankkinut
minulle pienen paikan eräästä hallintovirastosta.

Meidän jälleen yhtymisemme tuli oikeaksi ilojuhlaksi. Minä en voi

koskaan unhottaa sitä hetkeä. Eräänä päivänä keskitalvella istuen
yksin huoneessani kuulin hänen äänensä tampuurista. Miten minä
vavahdin sen rakkaan äänen kaiusta, miten sydämmeni sykki, kuin
juoksin hänelle kaulaan, antamatta hänelle aikaa riisua turkkiansa tai
edes päästää vyötäkään vyöltänsä! Miten innokkaasti minä häntä
katselin kyynelien lävitse, jotka liikutuksesta vasten tahtoani nousivat
pimittämään silmiäni!

Hän oli vähän vanhennut seitsemän viime vuoden kuluessa.

Otsassa oli koko joukko hienoja ryppyjä, posket syvälle painuneet ja
tukka harvennut, multa partaa ei ollut kasvanut ja hymy oli vielä
ennallaan. Ja hänen naurunsa, tuo omituinen minulle niin rakas
sisällinen, melkein nyyhkyttävä nauru oli myöskin sama kuin ennen.

Olipa meillä sinä päivänä puhumista, kyselemistä ja kertomista

keskenämme! Miten paljon vanhoja lempirunoelmia me luimme
toinen toisellemme!

Minä pyysin häntä muuttamaan minun luokseni asumaan, mutta

siihen hän ei suostunut. Sen sijaan lupasi hän käydä tervehtimässä
minua joka päivä ja sen lupauksensa hän myöskin piti.

Ei Pasinkov ollut sisällisestikään muuttunut. Hän oli yhä vielä

sama romantikko kuin ennenkin. Vaikka elämän halla, kokemuksen
kylmä viima oli viileksinyt hänen olemustansa sisäisimpiin
komeroihin asti, niin se kaunis kukka, joka oli jo aikaisin alkanut
juurtua hänen sydämmeensä, kuitenkin oli säilyttänyt hennon, raittiin
kauneutensa kokonaisena, ihan eheänä. Minä en voinut hänessä
huomata surua enkä huolia. Hän oli kuten ennenkin hiljainen ja
äänetön, mutta aina hyväsydämminen ja ystävällinen kaikkia kohti.

Pietarissa eli hän kuin erämaassa, ei huolehtinut vähääkään

vastaisesta elämästänsä eikä seurustellut juuri kenenkään kanssa.

Minä vein hänet Slotnitskin perheesen ja sitte kävi hän siellä

sangen usein. Hän ei ollut itserakas, ei arka eikä kaino, mutta
sielläkin, kuten kaikkialla muualla, oli hän yleensä hyvin äänetön ja
hiljainen. Kuitenkin häntä mielellään nähtiin siellä vieraana. Ei
ainoastaan Tatjana Vasiljevna, joka samoin oli hyvin hiljainen, vaan
myöskin hänen vanha miehensä, jonka kanssa ei juuri ollut helppo
seurustella, otti aina hänet ystävällisesti vastaan, ja molemmat
harvapuheiset tytöt myöskin tottuivat kohta hänen hiljaiseen,
ystävälliseen käytökseensä.

Usein oli hänellä tullessaan muutamia äsken ilmestyneitä

runoelmia pitkän aina nuuskanruskean takkinsa takataskussa.
Pitkään aikaan hän ei saa ottaneeksi esille kirjaansa, vaan istuu ja
ojentelee päätänsä joka taholle kuin lintu, katsellakseen, oliko
missään sopivaa nurkkaa, johon hän voisi vetäytyä syrjään. Hän
yleensä mielellään istuu aina nurkassa. Löydettyään viimein pikku
paikan jostakin sopukasta ottaa hän esiin kirjan ja alkaa lukea ensin
hiljaa, melkein kuiskaavalla äänellä, sille vähitellen yhä kovemmin,
keskeyttäen siiloin tällöin itseään jollakin lyhyellä huomautuksella tai
huudahduksella.

Minä panin huomiooni, että sellaisissa tapauksissa Varvara

mieluisemmin kuin hänen sisarensa lähestyi häntä ja kuunteli hänen
lukemistansa, vaikka hän tosin ei ymmärtänytkään kaikkea. Yleensä
Varvara hyvin vähän harrasti kirjallisuutta. Hän tavallisesti kävi
istumaan juuri Pasinkovin eteen, laski leukansa käsien nojaan ja
katseli häntä keskelle kasvoja eikä silmiin. Koko lukemisen aikana
hän ei lausunut sanaakaan, mutta välistä veti syvän huokauksen.

Iltasilla, varsinkin pyhä- ja juhlapäivinä me olimme panttisilla.

Silloin tuli tavallisesti lisäksi myöskin kaksi nuorta tyttöä, Slotnitskien
sisaria ja etäisempiä sukulaisia sekä pari kadettia tai muita nuoria
poikia. Tytöt olivat sievänlaiset, lyhyehköt, hyvin iloiset ja herkät
nauramaan. Pojat varsin siivot ja käytökseltään siistit, ja silloin oli
varsin iloista ja hupaista muuten niin äänettömässä ja hiljaisessa
huoneessa.

Näiden leikkien aikana istui Pasinkov aina Tatjana Vasiljevnan

vieressä. Heidän molempain tuli ajatella, "mitä sen piti tehdä, joka
tunsi pantin omakseen", eikä se ollut mikään helppo tehtävä.

Sofia ei pitänyt suuteloista eikä muista hellyyden osoituksista, joilla

pantti tavallisesti lunastetaan, ja Varvara suuttui milloin hänen piti
etsiä tai arvata jotakin.
 Molemmat nuoret sukulaiset nauroivat lakkaamatta, huolimatta
mistään. Mitä ihmettä heillä saattoi ollakaan nauraa niin
herkeämättä! Välistä minä oikein pahastuin heitä katsellessani,
mutta Pasinkov vain hymyili ystävällisesti ja nyykytti päätänsä.

Ukko Slotnitski ei ottanut osaa meidän leikkeihimme, vaan istui

huoneessaan ja katseli äreästi ja tyytymättömästi meitä avonaisesta
ovesta. Mutta kerran sattui, että hän ihan yht'äkkiä kenenkään
aavistamatta tuli ulos ja ehdotti, että se, joka tunsi pantin omakseen,
tanssisi hänen kanssansa valssin. Tietysti ehdotus hyväksyttiin.
Tatjana Vasiljevnan pantti tuli näkyviin. Hän joutui hyvin hämilleen ja
punastui kuin viisitoista vuotinen tyttö; mutta hänen miehensä käski
Sofiaa soittamaan, kumarsi rouvalleen ja tanssi hänen kanssansa
vanhaan tapaan kolmen neljäsosan tahdissa kaksi kertaa salin
ympäri.

Muistan varsin hyvin, miten hänen mustaveriset, kellertävät

kasvonsa terävine pikku silmineen, joissa ei muuten koskaan
näkynyt hymyä, milloin oli näkyvissä, milloin piilossa, hänen hitaasti
pyöriessään, unhottamatta koskaan tavallista ankaruuttansa, joka
hänen muodossansa asui. Tanssissa hän harppasi pitkiä askelia ja
vähän hypähti joka uuden tahdin alussa, mutta hänen rouvansa
liikutteli jalkojaan sukkelaan ja sievästi sekä ikään kuin pelosta
painoi kasvojaan hänen rintaansa vasten.

Valssin loputtua vei hän hänet takaisin istuinpaikalleen, kumarsi,

meni huoneesensa jälleen ja veti oven jälkeensä kiinni.

Sofia aikoi nyt nousta pois pianon edestä. Mutta Varvara pyysi
häntä soittamaan edelleen, meni Pasinkovin luo ja ojentaen hänelle
kätensä, sanoi hämillään hymyillen:
 "Tahdotteko?"

Pasinkov näytti hyvin kummastuneelta, mutta nousi heti, hän kun

aina oli erinomaisen kohtelias, ja laski kätensä Varvaran vyötäisille.
Vaan ensi askeleella hän jo lipesi ja kaatui, ja koettaessaan äkisti
irrottautua naisestaan sysäsi hän kyynyspäällään sitä, pikku pöytää,
jolla papukaijan häkki oli.

Häkki putosi lattialle, papukaija peljästyi ja alkoi huutaa: "kivääri

käteen!" Siitä syntyi yleinen nauru. Ukko Slotnitski näyttäytyi
huoneensa kynnyksellä, katsahti tyytymättömästi tuota
epäjärjestystä ja paiskasi kiivaasti oven jäljestään kiinni. Aina siitä
asti ei tarvittu muuta kuin mainita sitä tapausta Varvaran
läsnäollessa, niin hän heti alkoi nauraa ja katsoa Pasinkoviin, ikään
kuin hän olisi tahtonut sanoa, että kerrassaan mahdoton oli keksiä
mitään hauskempaa, kuin Pasinkov silloin teki.

Pasinkov rakasti suuresti musiikkia. Usein pyysi hän Sofia

Nikolajevnaa soittamaan jotakin ja istui silloin nurkassa kuunnellen ja
hiljaa hyräillen mukaan tuntehikkaimmissa paikoissa. Varsinkin
ihasteli hän Schubertin "Tähtitaivasta". Hän vakuutti, että hänestä
sitä kappaletta kuunnellessa aina tuntui, kuin yht'aikaa sävelien
kanssa pitkät siniset valosäteet ampuisivat korkeudesta suorastaan
häntä rintaan. Ja nyt minä katsellessani pilvetöntä tähtikirkasta
yötaivasta en voi olla muistelematta Pasinkovia ja Schubertin
säveliä.

Viimeksi johtuu minulle mieleen huvimatka, jonka teimme

Slotnitskin perheen kanssa Pargalaan [suuren, kaunisseutuisen
järven rannalle, joka on 1 1/2 peninkulman päässä Pietarista
Viipuriin piin].
 Me ajoimme koko seura kaksissa neljän istuttavissa ajurin
vaunuissa, joissa oli c:n muotoiset vieterit, korkeat kuskinistuimet ja
heinillä täytetyt istuintyynyt. Ruunit, kivulloiset hevoset, jotka ontuivat
jokainen eri jalkaa, veivät meidät hitaassa juoksussa perille.

Me kävelimme kauan kauneissa hongikoissa, joimme maitoa

suurista savipulloista ja söimme mansikoita sokurin kanssa. Ilma oli
ihana. Varvara yleensä ei mielellään kävellyt paljoa, hän kun pian
väsyi, mutta tällä kertaa hän ei jäänyt jäljelle meistä muista. Hän oli
ottanut hatun päästään, tukka riippui vapaana, hitaisuus oli
muuttunut elävyydeksi ja kasvoja kaunisti raitis puna. Tavattuaan
metsässä kaksi pientä talonpoikaistyttöä istahti hän heti alas
maahan, huusi tytöt luoksensa ja asetti heidät istumaan viereensä,
mutta muuten ei osoittanut heille mitään ystävyyttä.

Sofia, jolla seurakumppanina oli herra Asanov, katsahti heihin

kylmäkiskoisesti hymyillen, mutta ei huolinut heistä sen enempää.
Ukko Slotnitski huomautti, että Varvara oli oikea "pesäkana", ja
silloin Varvara heti nousi ylös ja astui edelleen. Pari kertaa tällä
kävelyretkellä metsässä meni hän Pasinkovin luo ja sanoi:

"Jakov Ivanits, minulla on jotakin sanomista teille." Mutta mitä

hänellä oli sanottavaa, Pasinkov ei saanut koskaan tietää.

Vaan jopa on aika palata keskeytyneesen kertomukseeni takaisin.

V.

Minä ilostuin hyvin Pasinkovin tulosta, mutta kun ajattelin, mitä olin
tehnyt edellisenä päivänä, jouduin niin häpeihini, että käännyin
jälleen seinään päin, sanomatta hänelle sanaakaan.

Odoteltuaan hetkisen vaiti, kysyi Pasinkov, enkö minä voinut

hyvin.

"Kyllä, kiitos kysymyksestäsi", mutisin minä hammasten välistä,

"minun vain vähän kivistää päätäni."

Jakov ei enää kysellyt mitään, vaan otti kirjan, istahti nurkkaan ja

rupesi lukemaan.

Siten kului toista tuntia. Minä jo olin ihan ryhtymässä kertomaan

hänelle kaikki tyyni, kuin äkisti tampuurin kello soi, ilmoittaen jonkun
tulevan.

Tampuurin ovi aukesi. Minä kuuntelin, Asanovin ääni kysyi minun

palvelijaltani, olinko minä kotona.

Pasinkov nousi. Hän ei pitänyt Asanovista, jonka tähden hän

minulle kuiskasi menevänsä sisähuoneesen ja käyvänsä minun
sänkyyni odottamaan, ja hän meni.

Juuri samassa astui sisään Asanov.

Jo hänen kiihkosta punaisten kasvojensa muodosta sekä lyhyestä

ja äreästä tervehdyksestään minä aavistin, että hän ei suinkaan ollut
tullut vain huviksensa. "Mitähän tästäkin nyt tulee?" ajattelin minä
itsekseni vähän levottomana.

"Hyvä herra", alkoi Asanov, käyden nojatuoliin istumaan, "minä

tulin teidän luoksenne, että te saisitte tilaisuuden haihduttaa minulta
eräitä epäilyksiä."

"Vai niin, todellako?"

"Niin, juuri niin. Minä tahdon tietää, oletteko te kunniallinen mies."

"Mitä te niillä sanoilla tarkoitatte?" kysyin minä kiivastuen.

"Niin, minä tarkoitan yhtä tosi asiaa", vastasi hän pannen eri
painoa joka sanalle. "Eilen minä näytin teille lompakkoani, jossa oli
erään henkilön kirjeitä minulle. Tänään te olette nenäkkäästi ja
sopimattomasti nuhdellen — huomatkaa tarkkaan: nenäkkäästi ja
sopimattomasti nuhdellen — maininneet samalle henkilölle
muutamia sanoja niistä kirjeistä, vaikka teillä ei ole ollut mitään
oikeuden tapaistakaan sellaiseen, lievimmiten sanoen, kömpelöön
käytökseen. Minä haluan sen tähden kuulla, miten te aiotte selittää
tuon kaikin puolin moitittavan käytöksenne."

"Ja minä haluan tietää, mikä oikeus teillä on tällä tavoin tutkistella
minua", vastasin minä, vavisten sekä häpeästä että kiukusta. "Jos te
huviksenne sopimattomasti kerskailette ylhäisistä tuttavuuksistanne
ja huvittavasta kirjeenvaihdostanne, mitä se minuun koskee? Vai
eivätkö ehkä kaikki kirjeenne teillä enää ole tallella?"

"Kirjeet minulla kyllä on tallella, mutta minä olin eilisiltana

sellaisessa tilassa, että te varsin helposti saatoitte…"

"Lyhyesti puhuen, hyvä herra", keskeytin minä ja puhuin tahallani

niin kovasti kuin mahdollista, "minä pyydän teitä jättämään minua
rauhaan, kuuletteko? Minä en tahdo mitään tietää enkä aio antaa
teille mitään selityksiä käytöksestäni. Saatattehan mennä
tiedustelemaan siltä eräältä henkilöltä, ehkä hän osaa selitellä teille
asiat."

Minä tunsin, miten suuttumus kiehui minussa, ja päätäni pyörrytti.

Asanov katsoi minuun, nähtävästi koettaen tehdä katsettaan

pilkalliseksi ja läpitunkevan teräväksi, siveli viiksiänsä ja nousi
hitaasti seisomaan.

"Minä tiedän nyt, mitä minun tulee ajatella", sanoi hän. "Teidän
muotonne todistaa kyllin selvästi teitä vastaan. Mutta minä sanon
teille, että oikea aatelismies ei tee sillä tavalla. Varkain lukea toisten
kirjeitä ja sitte mennä nuoren, ylhäis-sukuisen naisen luo
häiritsemään hänen rauhaansa…"

"Menkää hiiteen! sanon minä teille", tiuskasin ihan raivoisesti ja

jalkaa polkien. "Lähettäkää tänne sekundanttinne, minä en aio teidän
kanssanne vaihtaa enää sanaakaan."

"Te voitte säästää opetuksenne sellaiselle, joka niitä paremmin

tarvitsee", vastasi Asanov kylmästi. "Minä aioin itsestänikin lähettää
tänne sekundantit."
 Hän läksi

Uuvuksissa vaivuin minä sohvalle ja peitin kasvoni käsilläni. Joku

koski minua olkapäähän. Minä katsahdin ylös. Se oli Pasinkov.

"Mitä tämä merkitsee?" kysyi hän. "Onko se tosiaankin totta?

Oletko sinä lukenut toisten kirjeitä?"

Minulla ei ollut voimaa vastata, minä vain nyykäytin päätäni

myöntävästi.

Pasinkov meni ikkunan luo. Seisoen seljin minuun sanoi hän

hitaasti:

"Sinä olet lukenut nuoren tytön kirjeen Asanoville. Kuka se nuori

tyttö on?"

"Sofia Nikolajevna", vastasin minä sellaisella äänellä, kuin syytetty

vastaa tuomarillensa.

Pasinkov seisoi pitkän hetken vaiti ja ajatuksiin vaipuneena.

"Ainoastaan tunteiden kiihko voi olla jonkin verran

puolustuksenasi", sanoi hän viimein. "Rakastatko sinä häntä, sitä
nuorta tyttöä?"

"Rakastan."

Pasinkov oli taas vaiti pitkän ajan.

"Sitä luulinkin. Ja sinä olet tänään käynyt häntä torumassa…"

"Olen, olen, olen", keskeytin minä toivottomasti. "Sinulla on kyllin

syytä halveksia minua."