Hazop Ip

M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.
RISK ASSESSMENT
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical and bulk drug industries are generally associated with use of raw
materials and chemicals which are hazardous in nature. The process activities of these
industries are also associated with certain risks. Therefore Hazop analysis and risk
assessment are addressed in detail as additional studies.
Apart from the above studies air pollution dispersion modeling using US EPA approved
AERMOD software has been used to predict the profile of dispersion and associated
impacts within the project study area.
7.2 HAZOP ANALYSIS

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a highly structured and detailed technique,
developed primarily for application to chemical process systems. A HAZOP can generate
a comprehensive understanding of the possible ‘deviations from design intent’ that may
occur. However, HAZOP is less suitable for identification of hazards not related to process
operations, such as mechanical integrity failures, procedural errors, or external events.
HAZOP also tends to identify hazards specific to the section being assessed, while hazards
related to the interactions between different sections may not be identified.
However, this technique helps to identify hazards in a process plant and the operability
problems. It is performed once the engineering line diagrams of the plant are made
available. It is carried out during or immediately after the design stage. The purpose of
the study is to identify all possible deviations from the way the design/operation is
expected to work and all the hazards associated with these deviations. A multidisciplinary
team was constituted with chemical, mechanical and instrumentationengineers, R&D
chemist and production manager. It is important to keep the team smallenough to be
efficient, while retaining a sufficient spread of skills and disciplines for all aspects of the
study to be covered comprehensively. The group discussion is facilitated by a Chairman
and the results of the discussion are recorded by a Secretary. Every investigation must be
led by Chairman who is familiar with the HAZOP study technique, which is primarily
concerned with applying, controlling the discussions and stimulating team thinking. The
preparative work for HAZOP studies consisted of four stages i.e., obtaining the data,
converting into usable form, planning the sequence of the study and arranging the
necessary meetings. The documents referred to for the study include process description,
process flow diagrams, P&I diagrams plant layout, operating manuals including startup &
shutdown, safety instructions etc., The parameters such as temperature, pressure, flow,
level were investigated for deviation and hazard situations are identified.
Risk Assessment Report- 1-

M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,
Some basic definitions of terms frequently used in HAZOP studies are deviation, causes,
consequences and guide words etc., Deviations are departures from the design intent
which are discovered by systematically applying the guide words. Causes are the reasons
why deviations might occur. Consequences are the reasons why deviations should they
occur. Guide words are simple words used to understand a particular plant section in
operating condition in order to guide and simulate the creative thinking process and so
discover deviations. NO, less, more, as well as, part of, reverse, other than are guide
words used.
Potential problems as represented by the consequences of the deviation should be

evaluated as they arise and a decision reached on whether they merit further
consideration or action. Except for major risk areas where a fully quantitative assessment
is required this decision is made semi-quantitatively on the consequence (usually scaled
as trivial, important or very probable).
Detailed step-wise hazop analysis studies describing process, operation, possible hazard
failure and remedial actions for each of the product manufactured is given in the table
7.1 as under.
Table 7.1 HAZOP ANALYSIS

Sl.No PRODUCTS
1 Bromazepam
2 Cinnarizine
3 Clonazepam
4 Dothiepine Hydrochloride
5 Doxepin Hydrochloride
6 Flunarizine
7 Nitrazepam

7.2.1 Bromazepam
Hazop Analysis - Process – for Bromazepam product
1st Possible Hazards /

Process Operation Remedial Action
Stages failures
Dissolution of Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch
Ammonia in solvent Preparation of Bottom valve sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed
Step -1
Methanol in SS ammonia solution opened prior to charging Methanol.
reactor
Methanol addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor
so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided,
a) Charging of Fire hazard due to
vacuum sucking with negative pressure is done to avoid
Methanol static electricity
spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof.
Ammonia is slowly passed with cooling and checking the
b) Purging of
Ammonia escape scrubber vent periodically for ammonia escape.
Ammonia
Ph paper test. Ensured No Ammonia should escape.
Reaction of bromo
Step-2 chloro compound in Reaction
SS Reactor
a) charging of SS scoop is used to prevent static electricity while charging the
Irritant to eyes &
bromo chloro solid.
skin
benzophenone Hand gloves & goggles should be used.
The temperature is raised by slow heating till
Required temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent
solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser.
b) Heating the Escape of solvent
In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc
reaction mass Ammonia escape
provided to the reactor will open up and the mass will come
out of the reactor and will be separately collected in the PP
vessel of 5000L which is kept outside the plant.

The centrifuge is earthed by

conducting wires.
The filtration is carried out through a
centrifuge, Centrifuges are high
speed machines and sources of
hazard in a chemical plant. Ample
precautions are taken to carry out the
centrifuging as hazard free as
possible. We are using a 36 inch dia
SS316 centrifuge, bottom driven and
top discharge. this is a four point
suspension machines which are put on
special vibra mount for smooth
Fire hazard due to static vibration free noiseless operation.
electricity, operator The speed is controlled by a variable
Centrifuging to remove the
c) To remove the by- hazard if any loading / frequency drive and the feeding of
Byproduct.
product amm. chloride unloading activity carried the centrifuge is done by
Separation of solid and liquid.
out in a running pneumatically controlled valves at
centrifuge lower RPM under nitrogen purging.
Even the bearing housing of the
centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen
purging facility. An interlocking
system is provided for ensuring that
the lids cannot be opened while the
centrifuge is running and thereby
preventing any human hazard. All the
limits switches and the safety
interlocking switches are flame proof
including the VFD controls. Collect
the mother liquor for isolating the
product. This is sucked back to the SS
reactor for recovery & isolation.
d) Distillation of Slow heating by passing steam in the
Methanol from the jacket &
Isolation of Bromazepam No specific hazard
filtrate of the Chilled water is circulated in the
reaction mass condenser.

Recover ~200L methanol ,cool to

<15*C.
The centrifuge is earthed by

conducting wires. The filtration is
carried out through a centrifuge;
Centrifuges are high speed machines
and sources of hazard in a chemical
plant. Ample precautions are taken
to carry out the centrifuging as
hazard free as possible. We are using
a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge,
bottom driven and top discharge. This
is a four point suspension machines
which are put on special vibra mount
Fire hazard due to static for smooth vibration free noiseless
electricity, operator operation. The speed is controlled by
Centrifuging to isolate the
To isolate the product hazard if any loading / a variable frequency drive and the
product.
Bromazepam unloading activity carried feeding of the centrifuge is done by
out in a running pneumatically controlled valves at
centrifuge lower RPM under nitrogen purging.
Even the bearing housing of the
centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen
purging facility. An interlocking
system is provided for ensuring that
the lids cannot be opened while the
centrifuge is running and thereby
preventing any human hazard. All the
limits switches and the safety
interlocking switches are flame proof
including the VFD controls
The MLR is taken for solvent
recovery.
All charging is done by vacuum
Solvent recovery (MLR)in SS Charging of MLR Haz.
Recovery No specific hazard sucking to avoid spillages and
reactor waste after distillation
through the SS pipe lines.

Distilled to recover Methanol. Un

distilled which is remaining at the
bottom of the reactor is Haz Waste.
FBD is fitted with flame proof
motors.SS scoops are employed
Separation of solvents from Drying of the product No specific hazard
Drying operation while charging and unloading.
the product in FBD Irritant to eyes & skin
Hand gloves & goggles should be
used.

SAFETY DATA
Name of the product 1) Bromo chloro 2) Methanol (RM)
acetylaminoBenzophenone.
Chemical name 5-bromo 2-chloroacetylamino phenyl Methyl alcohol
pyridine ketone
CAS NO: 67-56-1
MW: 353.0 32.0
Physical appearance Yellowish coloured solid Colorless liquid
Odour Pungent, hygroscopic acidic like Characteristic
Melting point 135-140* C --
Boiling point --- 65*C
Health hazards  Irreversible effects if swallowed.  Irreversible effects if swallowed.
 Danger of very serious effect on eye&  Danger of very serious effect on
harmful if absorbed through the skin. eye& harmful if absorbed through
Slow absorption. the skin. Slow absorption.
 Very serious effect on inhalation.  Very serious effect on inhalation.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water.
medical help immediately. Do not allow Get medical help immediately. Do
the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes not allow the victim to rub the
closed. eyes. Keep eyes closed.
 Induce vomiting & make him drink  Induce vomiting & make him drink
ethanol. ethanol .
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get  Skin: Flush skin with plenty of
medical aid. water. Get medical aid.
 Ingestion: Get medical aid.  Ingestion: Get medical aid.
 Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and  Inhalation: Remove from
move to fresh air immediately mouth to exposure and move to fresh
mouth respiration if required. air immediately mouth to mouth
respiration if required.
Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing As in any fire, use a self-contained
apparatus. breathing apparatus.
Do not use water spray directly on the fire. Do not use water spray directly on the
Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or fire. Use dry chemical, Carbon
Chemical foam. dioxide or Chemical foam.
Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid Store in large tanks as per flammable
store, as per Rules ,away from naked fame liquid store, as per Rules ,away from
& hot elements and ignition sources. naked fame & hot elements and
ignition sources.
Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint Highly flammable, flashpoint
11*C.Electrostatic charge possible. 11*Celectrostatic charge possible.
Incompatibility Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali Avoid contact with water, ammonia,
metals, strong oxidizing agents et. alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents
etc.
Hazardous decomposition Hazardous decomposition products in the Hazardous decomposition products in
product event of fire. the event of fire.
Carcinogenetic Not reported in OSHA Disposal Not reported in OSHA Disposal
Disposal Dispose in a manner according to State and Dispose in a manner according to
Federal laws State and Federal laws

Name of the product 3) Ammmonia 4) Bromazepam( FG)

Chemical name Gas liquefied under pressure. 1,3-Dihydro-7-bromo-5-(pyridine2-yl)
2h-1,4-Benzodiazepin-2-One
CAS NO: 7664-41-7 1812-30-2
MW: 17.0 316.
Physical appearance Liquid, colorless Yellow, crystalline powder
Odour Pungent Odourless
Melting point -77.7*C : about – 2370 C.
Boiling point -33.5* C ---
Health hazards  Will cause eye burns. Risk of blindness.  Harmful if swallowed.
 Harmful if swallowed. May be harmful if  May cause eye irritation.
absorbed through the skin; cause skin  May be harmful if absorbed through
irritations. the skin
 May cedemass in the respiratory tract.  May cause respiratory tract
irritation. Effects central nervous
system.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse with plenty of water for at  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of
least 10 min& get medical help water. Get medical help
immediately. Do not allow the victim to  Skin: Flush skin with plenty of
rub the eyes. Keep eyes closed. water. Get medical aid.
 If swallowed drink lot of water & induce  Ingestion: Get medical aid.
vomiting. Call doctor.  Inhalation: remove from
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Dab exposure &move to fresh air
with PEG 400 remove contaminated immediately
clothing.
 Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and
move to fresh air immediately.
Calldoctor
apparatus. Not combustible. breathing apparatus.
Do not use water. Use dry chemical, Carbon Use water spray, dry chemical,
dioxide or Chemical foam. Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.
Storage Store in a dry cool place, protected from Store in a dry cool place, protected
light in tightly closed containers. from light in tightly closed containers.
Hazards Not reported. Stable
Incompatibility Incompatible with various metals. Avoid strong oxidizing agents etc.
Hazardous decomposition Nitrogen oxides generate. In event of fire . Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
product Nitrogen oxide
Carcinogenetic Not reported . Not reported

7.2.2 Cinnarizine
Hazop Analysis - Process – for CINNARIZINE product

Possible Hazards /
1st Stages Process Operation Remedial Action
failures
Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in
Reaction of Benzhydryl Charging of
the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom
piperizine& Cinnamyl alcohol Benzhydrylpiperizine
Step -1 Bottom valve opened valve has been closed prior to charging Toluene.
acid in solvent Toluene in SS Cinnamyl alcohol&
reactor Toluene
Toluene addition pipe is bent towards the wall of
the reactor so that the possibility of potential
a) Charging of Fire hazard due to static difference is avoided .vacuum sucking is done to
Toluene electricity avoid spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame
proof .
b) Charging of SS scoops are used to avoid static electricity.
Irritation to skin.
Benzhydrylpiperizine Using hand gloves & goggles.
Charging of Vacuum sucking into the DOSING TANK The tank is
Cinnamyl alcohol Irritation to skin. earthed by conducting wires
Using hand gloves & goggles
Reflux; good condenser to prevent solvent loss by
circulating chilled water in condenser.
The water is co distills along with Toluene which is
separated during the reaction. After complete
d) Refluxing the
Escape of solvent removal of water, the reaction is complete.
reaction mass
In case of overheating and pressure development
rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up and
the mass will come out of the reactor and will be
separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L which
is kept outside the plant.

e) cooling the reaction Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

No specific hazard
mass
The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires.
centrifuge, Centrifuges are high speed
machines and sources of hazard in a chemical
plant. Ample precautions are taken to carry out
the centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We
are using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom
driven and top discharge. this is a four point
suspension machines which are put on special
Fire hazard due to static vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless
To isolate the product electricity, operator operation. The speed is controlled by a variable
2) Isolation of Cinnarizine hazard if any loading / frequency drive and the feeding of the
product.
product. unloading activity centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled
carried out in a running valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging.
centrifuge Even the bearing housing of the centrifuge is
provided with a nitrogen purging facility. An
interlocking system is provided for ensuring
that the lids cannot be opened while the
centrifuge is running and thereby preventing
any human hazard. All the limits switches and
the safety interlocking switches are flame proof
The MLR is taken for solvent recovery.
The wet product is sent for drying.
All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid
Charging of MLR Haz.
spillages and through the SS pipe lines.
Solvent recovery (MLR)in SS waste after
Recovery No specific hazard Distilled to recover Toluene. Un distilled which
reactor distillation
is remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz
Waste.
FBD is fitted with flame proof motors. SS scoops
Drying Separation of solvents from Drying of the product
No specific hazard are employed while charging and unloading.
operation the product in FBD
Hand gloves & goggles should be used.

SAFETY DATA
Name of the product 1) Benzhydryl piperizine 2) Toluene
Chemical name 1 diphenyl-piperizine Toluene
CAS NO: 108-88-3
MW: 252 92.0
Physical appearance Pale yellow coloured solid Colorless liquid
Odour Amine like Aromatic pungent smell.
Melting point 72-76*C*C -
Boiling point -- 111*C
Health hazards  Harmful if swallowed. Effects central  Harmful if swallowed.
nervous system  Vapors cause eye irritation.
 May cause eye irritation. May cause  May be harmful if absorbed through
corneal damage. the skin
 May be harmful if absorbed through the  May cause respiratory irritation&
skin arrest on inhalation.
 May cause respiratory tract irritation. On
inhalation.
First aid measure  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of water.  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of
Get medical help water. Get medical help
medical aid. water. Remove contaminated
 Ingestion: Get medical aid. cloth. Get medical aid.
 Inhalation: remove from exposure &move  Ingestion: Get medical aid.
to fresh air immediately.  Inhalation: remove from exposure
&move to fresh air immediately.
Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing As in any fir, use a self-contained
Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or
dioxide or Chemical foam. Chemical foam. DONOT USE WATER.
Storage Store in a dry cool place, protected from Store in large tanks as per flammable
light in tightly closed containers. liquid store. as per Rules, away from
naked fame & hot elements and
ignition sources.
Hazards Stable. Flammable , flash point 4* C
Incompatibility Avoid strong oxidizing agents. Avoid strong oxidizing agents.
Hazardous decomposition Hazardous decomposition products. Carbon Hazardous combustion gases &vapors
product monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxides of in the event of fire.
nitrogen.
Carcinogeneticity Not classified as a human carcinogen.. Not reported in OSHA
Disposal Dispose in a manner according to state & Dispose in a manner according to
federal laws. state & federal laws.

Name of the product 3) Cinnamylalcohol 4) Cinnarizine

Chemical name 3-phenyl 2-propene-1-ol 1-diphenyl 4-cinamyl pyperizine
CAS NO: 104-54-1 298-57-7
MW: 134.0 368.0
Physical appearance Colorless liquid. White powder
Odour Mint fragrant. Odorless
Melting point 30-33*C 1180 C To 1200 C
Boiling point 250*C --
Health hazards  Harmful if swallowed.  Harmful if swallowed.
 Vapors irritate eyes  Serious to eye.
 Dryness of skin  May be harmful if absorbed through
 Causes irritation to respiratory tract, the skin
causes headache & dizziness  May cause respiratory irritation on
inhalation
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse with plenty of water. Get  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of
medical help immediately. Do not allow water. Get medical help
the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes  Skin: Flush skin with plenty of
closed. water. Remove contaminated
 Drink lot of water.No milk risk of cloth. Get medical aid.
aspiration on swallowing.Get medical  Ingestion: wash out mouth with lot
aid. of water. .Get medical aid.
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water.  Inhalation: remove from exposure
Remove contaminated cloth &move to fresh air immediately.
 Inhalation: Remove from exposure and Give artificial respiration
move to fresh air immediately. Give
mouth to mouth respiration if required.
Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or
apparatus. Chemical foam.
Do not use water spray directly on the fire. As in any fire, use a self-contained
Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or breathing apparatus
Chemical foam.
Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid, Store in a dry cool place, protected
store as per Rules,away from naked flame & from light in tightly closed containers
hot elements and ignition sources.
Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint low, Not reported
electrostatic charge possible.
metals, strong oxidizing agents etc. alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents
etc.
Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA disposal Not reported in OSHA disposal

7.2.3 Clonazepam
Hazop Analysis - Process – for Clonazepam product

1st Stages Process Operation Possible Hazards / failures Remedial Action
Operational control - checkpoint shall be included
Dissolution of Ammonia in Preparation of ammonia
Step -1 Bottom valve opened in the batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom
solvent Methanol in SS reactor solution
valve has been closed prior to charging Methanol
Methanol addition pipe is bent towards the wall of
the reactor so that the possibility of potential
Methanol electricity avoid spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are
flame proof.
Ammonia is slowly passed with cooling and
b) Purging of Ammonia checking the scrubber vent periodically for
Ammonia escape
ammonia escape.
Ph paper test. No Ammonia should escape.
Reaction of nitro dichloro
Step-2 Reaction
compound in SS Reactor
SS scoop is used to prevent static electricity while
a) charging of nitro dichloro
Irritant to eyes & skin charging the solid.
benzophenone
Required temperature is achieved; good
condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating
chilled water in condenser.
Escape of solvent
b) Heating the reaction mass In case of overheating and pressure development
Ammonia escape
rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up
and the mass will come out of the reactor and will
be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L
which is kept outside the plant.


The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge,
Centrifuges are high speed machines and sources
of hazard in a chemical plant. Ample precautions
are taken to carry out the centrifuging as hazard
free as possible. We are using a 36 inch dia SS316
centrifuge, bottom driven and top discharge. this
is a four point suspension machines which are put
on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free
Fire hazard due to static
noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a
electricity, operator
Centrifuging to remove the variable frequency drive and the feeding of the
c) To remove the by hazard if any loading /
Byproduct. centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled
product amm. chloride unloading activity carried
Separation of solid and liquid. valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even
out in a running
the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided
centrifuge
with a nitrogen purging facility. An interlocking
system is provided for ensuring that the lids
cannot be opened while the centrifuge is running
and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the
limits switches and the safety interlocking
switches are flame proof including the VFD
controls. Collect the mother liquor for isolating
the product. This is sucked back to the SS reactor
for recovery & isolation.
d) Distillation of Slow heating by passing steam in the jacket &
Methanol from the Chilled water is circulated in the condenser.
Isolation of clonazepam No specific hazard
filtrate of the Recover ~200L methanol ,cool to <15*C.
reaction mass


The filtration is carried out through a centrifuge;
Fire hazard due to static on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free
To isolate the product electricity, operator noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a
Clonazepam. hazard if any loading / variable frequency drive and the feeding of the
product.
unloading activity carried centrifuge is done by pneumatically controlled
out in a running valves at lower RPM under nitrogen purging. Even
centrifuge the bearing housing of the centrifuge is provided
and thereby preventing any human hazard. All the
controls
Recovery No specific hazard Distilled to recover Methanol. Un distilled which is
remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz.
Waste.
FBD is fitted with flame proof motors. SS scoops
Drying operation are employed while charging and unloading.
Hand gloves & goggles should be used

SAFTY DATA
Name of the product 1) 2’Chloro,5-Nitro 2-chloro 2) Methanol (RM)

acetylaminoBenzophenone.(nitro dicloro
benzophenone)
Chemical name 2’chloro, 5-nitro 2chloroacetylamino Methyl alcohol
benzophenone.
CAS NO: 67-56-1
MW: 353.0 32.0
Physical appearance Yellow coloured solid Colorless liquid
Odour Pungent hygroscopic acidic Characteristic
Melting point 176-186*C --
Boiling point --- 65*C
 Danger of very serious effect on eye &  Danger of very serious effect on
harmful if absorbed through the skin. eye.& harmful if absorbed through
Slow absorption. the skin. slow absorption.
 Very serious effect on inhalation.  very serious effect on inhalation.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get  Eyes: rinse out with plenty of
the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes immediately. Do not allow the
closed. victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes
 Induce vomiting & make him drink closed.
ethanol.  Induce vomiting & make him drink
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get ethanol.
medical aid.  Skin: Flush skin with plenty of
 Ingestion: Get medical aid. water. Get medical aid.
 Inhalation: Remove from exposure and  Ingestion: Get medical aid.
move to fresh air immediately, give  Inhalation: Remove fromexposure
mouth to mouth respiration if required. and move to fresh air immediately;
give mouth to mouth respiration if
required.
store as per Rules,away from naked fame & liquid store as per Rules,away from
hot elements and ignition sources. naked fame & hot elements and
ignition sources.
11*C.Electrostatic charge possible. 11*C.Electrostatic charge possible.
etc.
Carcinogenetic Not reported in OSHAdisposal Not reported in OSHA disposal

Name of the product 3) Ammmonia 4) Clonazepam(FG)

Chemical name Gas liquefied under pressure. 1,3-Dihydro-7-nitro-5-(o-
chlorophenyl)-2h-1,4-Benzodiazepin-
2-One
CAS NO: 7664-41-7 1622-61-3
MW: 17.0 : 315.72.
Physical appearance Liquid, colorless Yellow, crystalline powder. Odorless
Odour Pungent Odourless

Melting point -77.7*C : about – 2400 C.
Boiling point -33.5* C ---
absorbed through the skin, cause skin  May be harmful if absorbed through
irritations. the skin
irritation. Effects central nervous
system.
least 10 min& get medical help water. Get medical help
vomiting. Call doctor.  Inhalation: remove from exposure
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Dab &move to fresh air immediately
with PEG 400 remove contaminated
clothing.
 Inhalation: Remove fromexposure and
move to fresh air immediately. Call
doctor
light in tightly closed containers. from light in tightly closed containers
Incompatibility Incompatible with various metals. Avoid strong oxidizing agents etc.
Hazardous decomposition Nitrogen oxides generate. In event of fire. Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
Carcinogenetic Not reported. Not reported

7.2.4 Dothiepine hydrochloride
Hazop Analysis - Process – for Dothiepine hydrochloride product

st
1 Possible Hazards /
Process Operation Remedial Action
Stages failures
Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the
Dissolution of HCL as in
Step -1 Charging of Acetone Bottom valve opened batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been
solvent acetone in GL reactor
closed prior to charging Acetone.
Acetone addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor
a) Charging of Fire hazard due to static so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided
Acetone electricity .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof .
The gas is passed through the gas trap containing sulphuric
acid and empty trap to prevent back suck.
The dry gas coming out from the trap is connected to the dip
pipe of the GL Reactor which is dipped in the solvent.
b) Purging of HCL gas.
Irritant to eyes & skin The gas is passed till required sp. gravity and assay is
achieved.
The outlet of the reactor is connected to the scrubber where
alkali is circulated.
Using hand gloves & goggles.
Reaction of dothepine base
a) Charging of batch sheet to indicate whether the required pH has been
Step-2 with acetone- HCL in GL Irritant to eyes & skin
dissolved base achieved.
Reactor
Required temperature is achieved; good condenser to
prevent solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser.
c) Heating the The acidic fumes are scrubbed in alkali scrubber.
Escape of solvent & Hcl
reaction mass In case of overheating and pressure development rupture disc

d) cooling the Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

No specific hazard
reaction mass
To isolate the product on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free
Centrifuging to isolate the Dothepine noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a
hazard if any loading /
product. hydrochloride. variable frequency drive and the feeding of the
unloading activity carried
Separation of solid and liquid. centrifuge is done by valves at lower RPM under
out in a running
nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the
centrifuge
centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging
facility. An interlocking system is provided for
ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the
centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any
human hazard. All the limits switches and the
safety interlocking switches are flame proof
Charging of MLR Haz. spillages and through the SS pipe lines.
Solvent recovery (MLR)in SS
Recovery waste after distillation No specific hazard Distilled to recover Acetone. Un distilled which is
reactor
remaining at the bottom of the reactor is Haz
Waste.
Separation of solvents from Drying of the product No specific hazard, FBD is fitted with flame proof motors.
Drying operation Hand gloves & goggles should be used
the product in FBD irritant to eyes & skin

SAFETY DATA
Name of the product 1) Dothiepine base 2) Acetone
Chemical name 3-Dibenzo [b,e]thiepin-11(6H)-ylidene-N,N- Dimethyl ketone
dimethyl-1-propanamine
CAS NO: 67-64-1
MW: 295.0 58.0
Physical appearance Pale yellow colored viscous liquid Colorless liquid.
Odour Amine like Mint fragrant.
Melting point -- --
Boiling point ~200*C at 0.5mm 57*C
 May cause eye irritation. May cause  Vapors irritate eyes
corneal damage.  Dryness of skin
 May be harmful if absorbed through the  Causes irritation to respiratory
skin. tract, causes headache & dizziness
 May cause respiratory tract irritation.
First aid measure  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of water.  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water.
Get medical help Get medical help immediately. Do
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get not allow the victim to rub the
medical aid. eyes. Keep eyes closed.
 Ingestion: Get medical aid.  Drink lot of water .No milk risk of
 Inhalation: remove from exposure &move aspiration on swallowing.Get
to fresh air immediately. medical aid.
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of
water. Remove contaminated
cloth
 Inhalation: Remove from exposure
and move to fresh air
immediately, give mouth to mouth
Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-containedbreathing As in any fire, use a self-contained
Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon Do not use water spray directly on the
dioxide or Chemical foam. fire. Use dry chemical, Carbon
dioxide or Chemical foam.
light in tightly closed containers. liquid store as per Rules,away from
naked flame & hot elements and
ignition sources.
Hazards Stable flash point notavailable. Highly flammable, flashpoint
low.Electrostatic charge possible.
Incompatibility Avoid acids bases & strong oxidizing agents. Avoid contact with water, ammonia,
alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents
etc.
Hazardous decomposition Hazardous decomposition products. Carbon Hazardous decomposition products in
product monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxides of the event of fire.
nitrogen.
Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen. Not reported in OSHA disposal
federal laws. State and Federal laws

Name of the product 3)HCl GAS 4)Dothiepine HCL(FG)

Chemical name Hydrogen chloride 3-Dibenzo [b,e]thiepin-11(6H)-
ylidene-N,N-dimethyl-1-propanamine
hydrocloride
CAS NO: 7647-01-0 897-15-4
MW: 36.5 331.91
Physical appearance Colorless liquid,fuming with acid White crystalline solid.
Odour Characteristic Pungent , acidic
Melting point -- : 218-221°
Boiling point ----
Health hazards  Irreversible effects if swallowed.  Harmful if swallowed.
 Danger of very serious effect on eye&  May cause eye irritation.
harmful if absorbed through the skin.  May be harmful if absorbed
Slow absorption. through the skin
 Very serious effect on inhalation.  May cause respiratory tract
irritation
 Effects CNS.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of
closed. water. Get medical aid.
 Induce vomiting & make him drink  Ingestion: Get medical aid.
ethanol.  Inhalation: remove from exposure
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get &move to fresh air immediately
medical aid.
 Ingestion: Get medical aid.
 Inhalation: Remove from exposure and
move to fresh air immediately mouth to
mouth respiration if required.
Do not use water spray directly on the fire. Use water spray, dry chemical,
Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.
Chemical foam.
Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid Store in a dry cool place, protected
store as per Rules,away from naked fame & from light in tightly closed containers.
Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint Stable.
11*C.Electrostatic charge possible.
Incompatibility Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali Avoid strong bases & oxidizing agents
metals, strong oxidizing agents etc. etc.
Hazardous decomposition Hazardous decomposition products in the Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
product event of fire. oxides of nitrogen.
Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA. Disposal Not reported

7.2.5 Doxepin hydrochloride
Hazop Analysis - Process – for Doxepin hydrochloride product

Possible Hazards /
failures
Step -1 Charging of Acetone Bottom valve opened batch sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been
solvent acetone in GL reactor
closed prior to charging Acetone
Acetone addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor
a) Charging of Fire hazard due to static so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided
Acetone electricity .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof .
achieved.
Reaction of Doxepin base with a) Charging of batch sheet to indicate whether the required pH has been
Step-2 Irritant to eyes & skin
acetone- HCL in GL Reactor dissolved base achieved.
Required temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent
solvent loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. The
c) Heating the acidic fumes are scrubbed in alkali scrubber.
Escape of solvent & HCl

d) cooling the reaction Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

No specific hazard
mass
To isolate the on special vibra mount for smooth vibration free
Centrifuging to isolate the product Doxepin noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a
product. hydrochloride. variable frequency drive and the feeding of the
out in a running
nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of the
centrifuge
centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen purging
facility. An interlocking system is provided for
ensuring that the lids cannot be opened while the
centrifuge is running and thereby preventing any
human hazard. All the limits switches and the
safety interlocking switches are flame proof
Charging of MLR All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid

Solvent recovery (MLR)in SS Haz waste after spillages and through the SS pipe lines.
Recovery No specific hazard Distilled to recover Acetone. Un distilled which
Waste.

Drying operation FBD is fitted with flame proof motors.

SAFETY DATA
Name of the product 1) Doxepin base 2) Acetone

Chemical name 1-propylamine-3-dibenz(be)oxepine- Dimethyl ketone
11(6H)ylidine-NN-dimethyl base
CAS NO: 67-64-1
MW: 279.0 58.0
Melting point -- --
Boiling point 180-190*C at 0.5mm 57*C
 May cause eye irritation. May cause  Vapours irritate eyes
 Ingestion: Get medical aid.  Drink lot of water .No milk risk of
 Inhalation: remove from exposure &move aspiration on swallowing.get
cloth
 Inhalation: Remove from
 exposure and and move to
 fresh air immediately mouth to
mouth respiration if required.
light in tightly closed containers. liquid store. as per Rules ,away from
ignition sources.
low.electrostatic charge possible.
etc.
nitrogen.

Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen.. Not reported in OSHA. Disposal

Name of the product 3) HCL ( gas) Doxepin hydrochloride (FG)

Chemical name Hydrogen chloride 1-propylamine-3-dibenz(be)oxepine-11(6H)ylidine-NN-
dimethyl hydrocloride
CAS NO: 7647-01-0 [1229-29-4]
MW: 36.5 315.8
Physical appearance Colorless liquid,fuming with acid White crystalline Solid.
Odour Characteristic Pungent acidic
Melting point -- Above 185-191 0 C
Boiling point 65*C -----
harmful if absorbed through the skin.  May be harmful if absorbed through the skin
Slow absorption.  May cause respiratory tract irritation.
 Very serious effect on inhalation.  Effects CNS.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of water. Get medical
medical help immediately. Do not help
allow the victim to rub the eyes. Keep  Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get medical
eyes closed. aid.
ethanol .  Inhalation: remove from exposure &move to fresh
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. air immediately
Get medical aid.
 Inhalation: Remove from
exposure and move to fresh air
immediately; give mouth to mouth
Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing
breathing apparatus. apparatus.
Do not use water spray directly on the Use water spray, dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or
fire. Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.
Chemical foam.
Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable Store in a dry cool place, protected from light in tightly
liquid store as per Rules, away from naked closed containers with good
fame & hot elements and ignition sources.
Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint Stable
Incompatibility Avoid contact with water, ammonia, Avoid base,strong oxidizing agents etc.
alkali metals, strong oxidizing agents etc.
Hazardous decomposition Hazardous decomposition products in the Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxides of nitrogen.
product event of fire.
Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA Disposal Not reported
Disposal Dispose in a manner according to State and Dispose in a manner according to State and Federal laws
Federal laws

7.2.6 Flunarizine
Hazop Analysis - Process – for Flunarizine hydrochloride product

Possible Hazards /
failures
Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch
Step -1 Charging of Acetone Bottom valve opened sheet to indicate whether the bottom valve has been closed
solvent acetone in GLreactor
prior to charging Acetone.
Toluene addition pipe is bent towards the wall of the reactor
Fire hazard due to static so that the possibility of potential difference is avoided
a) Charging of Acetone
electricity .vacuum sucking is done to avoid spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are flame proof.
achieved.
Reaction of flunarizine base Operational control - checkpoint shall be included in the batch
a) Charging of
Step-2 with acetone- HCL in Irritant to eyes & skin sheet to indicate whether the required pH has been achieved.
dissolved base
GLReactor Using hand gloves & goggles
The temperature is raised by slow heating till required
temperature is achieved; good condenser to prevent solvent
loss by circulating chilled water in condenser. The acidic
c) Heating the fumes are scrubbed in alkali scrubber.
Escape of solvent & HCl

d) cooling the Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

No specific hazard
reaction mass
centrifuge, Centrifuges are high speed machines
and sources of hazard in a chemical plant.
Ample precautions are taken to carry out the
centrifuging as hazard free as possible. We are
using a 48 inch dia SS316 centrifuge, bottom
driven and top discharge. this is a four point
suspension machines which are put on special
To isolate the vibra mount for smooth vibration free noiseless
Centrifuging to isolate the product Flunarizine operation. The speed is controlled by a variable
product. Dihydrochloride. frequency drive and the feeding of the
out in a running
nitrogen purging. Even the bearing housing of
centrifuge
the centrifuge is provided with a nitrogen
purging facility. An interlocking system is
provided for ensuring that the lids cannot be
opened while the centrifuge is running and
thereby preventing any human hazard. All the
controls
Charging of MLR
Solvent recovery (MLR)in SS Haz waste after
Recovery No specific hazard Distilled to recover Acetone. Un distilled which
Waste.
Separation of solvents from Drying of the product No specific hazard FBD is fitted with flame proof motors.
Drying operation
the product in FBD Irritant to eyes & skin Hand gloves & goggles should be used

SAFETY DATA
Name of the product 1) Flunarizine base 2) Acetone
Chemical name 1-bis fluorophenyl methyl 4-cinamyl Dimethyl ketone
piperizine
CAS NO: 67-64-1
MW: 404 58.0
Melting point -- --
Boiling point ~200*C at 0.5mm 57*C
 May cause eye irritation. May cause  Vapours irritate eyes
 Ingestion: Get medical aid.  Drink lot of water.No milk risk of
 Inhalation: remove from exposure &move aspiration on swallowing.Get
cloth
and move to fresh air
immediately; give mouth to mouth
light in tightly closed containers. liquid store. as per Rules ,away from
ignition sources.
low.Electrostatic charge possible.
etc.
nitrogen.
Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen. Not reported in OSHA disposal

Name of the product 3) HCL ( gas) 4)Flunarizine HCL(FG)

Chemical name Hydrogen chloride 1-bis fluorophenyl methyl 4-cinamyl
piperizine di hydochloride
CAS NO: 7647-01-0 30484-77-6
MW: 36.5 477.0
Physical appearance Colorless liquid,fuming with acid White colored solid
Odour Characteristic Pungent acidic, hygroscopic
Melting point -- ~208*C with decomposition
Boiling point 65*C -----
harmful if absorbed through the skin.  May be harmful if absorbed
Slow absorption. through the skin
 Very serious effect on inhalation.  May cause respiratory tract
irritation
 Effects CNS.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get  Eyes: Flush eyes with plenty of
closed. water. Get medical aid.
ethanol.  Inhalation: remove from exposure
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Get &move to fresh air immediately
medical aid.
 Inhalation: Remove from exposure and
move to fresh air immediately; give
mouth to mouth respiration if required.
Do not use water spray directly on the fire. Use water spray, dry chemical,
Use dry chemical, Carbon dioxide or Carbon dioxide or Chemical foam.
Chemical foam.
Storage Store in large tanks as per flammable liquid Store in a dry cool place, protected
store as per Rules,away from naked flame & from light in tightly closed containers
Hazards Highly flammable, flashpoint Stable.
Incompatibility Avoid contact with water, ammonia, alkali Avoid strong bases & oxidizing agents
metals, strong oxidizing agents etc. etc.
Hazardous decomposition Hazardous decomposition products in the Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
product event of fire. oxides of nitrogen.
Carcinogeneticity Not reported in OSHA Disposal Not reported

7.2.7 Nitrazepam
Hazop Analysis - Process – for Nitrazepam product

Possible Hazards /
failures
Operational control - checkpoint shall be
Dissolution of Ammonia in Preparation of included in the batch sheet to indicate whether
Step -1 Bottom valve opened
solvent Methanol in SS reactor ammonia solution the bottom valve has been closed prior to
charging Methanol.
Methanol addition pipe is bent towards the wall
of the reactor so that the possibility of potential
Methanol electricity avoid spillages.
Pipe lines are all SS and equipment motors are
flame proof.
Ammonia is slowly passed with cooling and
b) Purging of
checking the scrubber vent periodically for
Ammonia Ammonia escape
ammonia escape.
Ph paper test. No Ammonia should escape.
Reaction of nitro chloro
Step-2 Reaction
compound in SS Reactor
SS scoop is used to prevent static electricity while
a) charging of nitro
Irritant to eyes & skin charging the solid.
chloro benzophenone
Required temperature is achieved; good
condenser to prevent solvent loss by circulating
chilled water in condenser.
b) Heating the Escape of solvent
In case of overheating and pressure development
reaction mass Ammonia escape
rupture disc provided to the reactor will open up
and the mass will come out of the reactor and will
be separately collected in the PP vessel of 5000L
which is kept outside the plant.


electricity, operator noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a
Centrifuging to remove the c) To remove the
hazard if any loading / variable frequency drive and the feeding of the
Byproduct. by product
Separation of solid and liquid. amm.chloride
and thereby preventing any human hazard. All
the limits switches and the safety interlocking
controls. Collect the mother liquor for isolating
the product. This is sucked back to the SS reactor
for recovery & isolation.
Slow heating by passing steam in the jacket &
d) Distillation of Chilled water is circulated in the condenser.
Methanol from the Recover ~250L methanol (50%),cool to <15*C.
Isolation of nitrazepam No specific hazard
filtrate of the
reaction mass


To isolate the electricity, operator noiseless operation. The speed is controlled by a
product Nitrazepam. hazard if any loading / variable frequency drive and the feeding of the
product.
and thereby preventing any human hazard. All
the limits switches and the safety interlocking
controls
Recovery No specific hazard Distilled to recover Methanol. Un distilled which
Waste.
FBD is fitted with flame proof motors.SS scoops
Drying operation are employed while charging and unloading.

SAFETY DATA
Name of the product 1) Nitro chloro acetylamino 2) Methanol (RM)
Benzophenone.
Chemical name 5-Nitro-2-chloroacetylamino benzophenone Methyl alcohol
CAS NO: 67-56-1
MW: 318.0 32.0
Physical appearance Yellow colored amorphous powder Colorless liquid
Odour Pungent hygroscopic, strong acidic. Characteristic
Melting point 170-172*C --
Boiling point ---- 65*C
 Danger of very serious effect on eye &  Danger of very serious effect on
harmful if absorbed through the skin. eye & harmful if absorbed through
Slow absorption. the skin. Slow absorption.
 Very serious effect on inhalation.  Very serious effect on inhalation.
First aid measure  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water. Get  Eyes: rinse out plenty of water.
medical help immediately. Do not allow Get medical help immediately. Do
the victim to rub the eyes. Keep eyes not allow the victim to rub the
closed. eyes. Keep eyes closed.
 Induce vomiting & make him drink  Induce vomiting & make him drink
ethanol. ethanol.
medical aid. water. Get medical aid.
 Ingestion: Get medical aid.  Ingestion: Get medical aid.
 Inhalation: Remove from exposure and  Inhalation: Remove from exposure
move to fresh air immediately; give and move to Fresh air
mouth to mouth respiration if required. immediately; give mouth to mouth
store as per Rules,away from naked flame & liquid store as per Rules ,away from
hot elements and ignition sources. naked fame & hot elements and
ignition sources.
11*C.Electrostatic charge possible. 11*C.Electrostatic charge possible.
etc.
Carcinogenetic Not reported in OSHA. Disposal Not reported in OSHA. Disposal

Name of the product 3) AMMMONIA 4) Nitrazepam(FG)

Chemical name Gas liquefied under pressure. * 1,3-Dihydro-7-Nitro-5-Phenyl-2h-
1,4-Benzodiazepin-2-One
CAS NO: 7664-41-7 146-22-5
MW: 17.0 281.3
Physical appearance Liquid, colorless Yellow crystalline powder, odourless
Odour Pungent odourless
Melting point -77.7*C 2240 C – 2260 C.
Boiling point -33.5* C
absorbed through the skin cause skin  May be harmful if absorbed
irritations. through the skin
irritation. And effect Central
nervous system
least 10 mts & Get medical help water. Get medical help
vomiting. Call doctor.  Inhalation: remove from exposure
 Skin: Flush skin with plenty of water. Dab &move to fresh air immediately
with PEG 400 remove contaminated
clothing.
and move to fresh air immediately.
Calldoctor
Fire fighting As in any fire, use a self-contained breathing As in any fir, use a self-contained
light in tightly closed containers. from light in tightly closed containers
with good
Incompatibility Incompatible with various metals. Avoid strong oxidizing agents et.
Hazardous decomposition Nitrogen oxides generate. In event of fire. Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
Carcinogenetic Not reported. Not reported

7.3 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF HYDROGEN GAS AND CARBON
The following are the safety precautions adopted while handling hydrogen gas &carbon
1. It is ensured that all the equipments have earthing and bondings.
2. It is ensured that the mechanical seal pressure is +2.0 kg/cm2 with operating pressure.
3. Care is taken to see that there are no leackages in the mechanical seal.
4. Cleanliness of autoclave reactor and it is surroundings is maintained.
5. Before charging pressure test of autoclave is taken; only if it is ok proceed further otherwise leak
should be rectified.
6. Hydrogen lines and availability of required cylinders near header is ensured.
7. All the cylinders are tied with chain and it is ensured that there are no leackages in the manifold.
8. All the gauges are calibrated.
9. Presence of water in autoclave vent receiver is ensured.
10. Availability of suitable rupture disc & its connection to the dump vessel is ensured.
11. Use the necessary PPE’s before batch charging i.e., 3M cartridge mask, safety goggles, safety helmets,
safety shoes & safety gloves.
12. Availability of fire fighting equipments nearby is ensured.
13. ERT (Emergency Response Team) is available in case of emergency.
14. Hydrogen Gas detector is on.
15. 50% Pd/C making slurry with suitable solvent under nitrogen blanketing with proper earthing by
holding the vacuum into the receiver.
16. Vacuum is released with nitrogen pressure only through vent line.
17. Hydrogen gas 0.2 kg/cm2 is slowly applied and flushed out. The process is repeated once again.
18. Hydrogen gas 4.0-4.5 kg/cm2 is slowly applied and pressure is maintained as per BPR.
19. All necessary PPE’s i.e., 3M cartridge mask, safety goggles, safety helmets, safety shoes & safety gloves
are used during filtration.
20. Nitrogen blanketing in the nutch filter is added and slowly filtration into the nutch filter is started.
21. Main filtration is completed and the spent Carbon cake is washed with suitable solvent under nitrogen
blanketing until absence of the product.
22. Water and HCl are charged into the reactor for decomposing of left over traces of spent Carbon; the
mass is unloaded and transferred to EHS department for further disposal.
23. Wet spent Carbon is unloaded from Nutsche filter and packed under nitrogen blanketing & transferred
to WH for recovery.

7.4 RISK ASSESSMENT

7.4.1 BACKGROUND
The manufacture of fine chemicals by M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd., involves use and storage of certain
solvents which may cause hazards/risks in case of accidental spill/leakage. Also the operation of DGs,
boilers& thermic fluid heater requires the use and storage of diesel and fuel oil which can be a source of
hazard in case of accidental spill/leakage.Therefore a methodology has to be developed for identifying
and evaluating the potential risks and preparation of intervention plans to reduce and prevent the
associated risks.
Identification analysis and assessment of hazards and risks provide vital information to the risk
management, that what should be the type & capacity of any on-site and off-site emergency plan & what
type of safety measures and maintenance is required. Risk and consequence analysis is carried out
considering storage and handling of various hazardousraw materials, intermediates and product as well
as manufacturing process.
The above factors have necessitated preparation of risk assessment report for M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,
7.4.2 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the risk assessment study results for the plant operations, transportand storage of
raw materials, and identifies maximum credible accident scenarios to drawthe emergency management
plan addressing various credible scenarios identified.
Environmental risk analysis deals with the identification and quantification of risks the equipment and
personnel are exposed to, from the hazards present in the area.
Risk analysis follows hazard analysis (Risk = Hazard x Probability of occurrence). It involves identification
and assessment of risks to the plant personnel and neighboring populations. This requires a thorough
knowledge of failure probability, credible accident scenario, vulnerability of population etc. Much of this
information is difficult to procure. Consequently, the risk analysis is confined to maximum credible
accident studies. The subsequent sections shall address the identification of various hazards and risks in
the operations, which will give a broad identification of risks involved.
7.4.3 OBJECTIVE & SCOPE

The objective of the study is to carry out risk analysis and prepare disaster management plan/emergency
preparedness plans
The risk analysis/assessment study covers the following:
(a) Identification of potential hazards associated with the solvent storage and their usage.
(b) Identification of potential hazard due fuel storage.
(c) Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and impact zones from the
accident scenarios.
(d) Suggestions and recommendations on the minimization of the accident possibilities.

7.4.4 METHODOLOGY
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a means of making a systematic analysis of the risks from
hazardous activities, and forming a rational evaluation of their significance, in order to provide input to
a decision-making process. The term ‘quantitative risk analysis’ is widely used, but strictly this refers to
the purely numerical analysis of risks without any evaluation of their significance. The study has been
conducted based on the premises of a traditional Quantitative Risk Assessment. The key components of
a QRA are explained and illustrated in Figure 7.1 below.
Fig 7.1 METHODOLOGY

The purpose of Risk Assessment is to develop mitigation measures for unacceptable generators of risk,
as well as to reduce the overall level of risk to As Low as Reasonably Practical. The alarp principle is given
in the fig 7.2 below.
FIG 7.2 ALARP PRINCIPLE
In order to help assess the viability of Risk Reduction Measures (RRM), the economic costs of the
measures can be compared with their risk benefits using Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).
7.4.5 STORAGE AND HANDLING OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
The details of storage of Hazardous chemicals along with measures taken during storage are given in
Table 7.2 and properties of chemicals is detailed in the table 7.3.

Table 7.2 STORAGE DETAILS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Name of the Maximum Mode of Actual State & Possible type
Sr. Operating
No Hazardous Substance Storage Storage Storage pressure & of Hazards
. temperature
20000 Drums 20000 RT Flammable liquid
THF ATMP
1 Industrial solvent
15KL TANK/DR 15KL RT Flammable liquid
ACETONE UMS ATMP
3 TOLUENE TANK RT Flammable liquid
15KL 15KL ATMP Industrial solvent
TANK RT Flammable liquid
METHANOL 15KL 25KL ATMP
HYDROGEN 10 Cylinders 5 RT Fire/Explosion
5 150kg
Drums RT Flammable liquid
IPA 20KL 20KL ATMP
7 Hydrochloric Acid 1000kg TANK 1000Kg RT Corrosive
Poly bags 1000 Kg RT Corrosive, Water
Sodium Methoxide 1000 Kg
8 reactive
DRUMS 3000Kg RT Flammable liquid
DMF 3000Kg
Carboys 316 RT Corrosive, Water
Chloro acetyl chloride 316
10 reactive
Bags 312 RT Corrosive, Water
Sodamide 312
11 reactive
Drums 34000 RT Flammable liquid
N-Butanol 34000
Drums 1800Kg. RT Flammable liquid
Cyclohexanone 1800Kg
13 Corrosive
Drums 560 RT Flammable liquid
Chlorobenzene 560

TABLE 7.3 PROPERTIES OF CHEMICALS
FP SP.G SOLUBILITY VP LD50

NAME OF THE R. LD50
SR. VD TLV
RAW UEL ORAL LC 50
HAZARD BP °C mm LEL% DERM
20° WITH WATER % mg/L
°C VS Hg pp AL
NO. MATERIALS C mg/kg
air at 20°C 20C m mg/kg
1. Isopropyl alcohol Flammable 11.6 82.5 0.78 2.07 Miscible 4.4kpa 400 2.5 12 5045 12800 ---
2. Ethyl acetate Flammable 24F 77 0.89 3.04 Miscible 100 400 2.2 11 5620 16000
3. Hydrochloric acid Corrosive NA 108 1.6 1.267 Soluble 3.8kpa 5 NA NA 900 NA 4701
- 19.3kp
4. THF Flammable 65 0.88 2.5 Partly 590 2 11 1650 NA 24000
14.5 a
5. Toluene Flammable 4.44 110 0.86 3.1 Immiscible 3.8kpa 1.1 7.1 636 14100 440
6. Butanol Flammable 28.9 117.2 0.81 2.55 Immiscible 0.6kpa 50 1.4 11.2 790 3400 8000
12.3kp
7. Methanol Flammable 12 64.5 0.79 1.11 Miscible 6 36 5628 15800 64000
a
Corr./
8. Sodium Methoxide NA NA NA NA Decompose NA 3 7.3 36 2037 NA NA
Wat.R
9. Hydrogen Explosive Gas Gas 0.07 0.07 Immiscible Gas NA 4 75 NA NA NA
Soli
10 Sodamide Flammable NA NA NA Reacts Solid DNA NA NA DNA DNA DNA
d

7.4.6 FACILITIES / SYSTEM FOR PROCESS SAFETY, STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, FIRE FIGHTING
SYSTEM AND EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES TO BE ADOPTED
1. Process Safety:
Flameproof equipment’s and fittings will be provided for handling of hazardous chemicals.
Tanks and all pump motors will be earthed.
Road tanker earthing lines will be provided near the unloading pumps.
Independent dykes will be provided for hazardous chemicals storage to contain leakages. Floors of the
dyke area have impervious finish.
Housekeeping of the plant will be carried out regularly. Floors, platforms, staircases, passages will be kept
free of any obstruction.
All hazardous operations will be explained to the workers. They are periodically trained on the hazardous
processes.
Dedicated supply of firewater will available in the plant. Only authorized

persons will be allowed inside the plant.
All instrument and safety devices will be checked and calibrated during installation. They will be also
calibrated, checked at a frequent interval. Calibration records will be maintained.
All electrical equipment’s will be installed as per prescribed standards.
All the equipment’s of the plant are periodically tested as per standard and results will be documented.
All equipment’s undergo preventive maintenance schedule.
Hydrant system will be pressured with a Jockey Pump. Flame arrestor will
be provided on each tank.
Pressure gauge will be provided on each tank.
In addition to fire hydrant system, nos. of fire extinguishers will be installed at different locations within
premises as per requirement.
Retention basin will be provided to collect the contaminated water used during fire fighting.
Adequate ventilation arrangement will be provided for safe and better working in the plant as per the
standard.
Process, equipment’s, plant involving serious fire hazards will be designed as per prescribed guideline.

2.For underground and above ground storage tank farm:

Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank
as per petroleum rules.
Tank farm will be constructed as per explosive department requirement and separation distance will be
maintained.
Static earthing provision will be made for road tanker as well as storage tank. Flame arrestor with
breather valve will be provided on vent line.
Road tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented.
Fire load calculation will be done and as per fire load Hydrant System will be provided as per NFPA std.
and Fire extinguishers will be provided as per fire load calculation.
Spark arrestor will be provided to all vehicles in side premises. Flame proof type
equipment’s and lighting will be provided. Lightening arrestor will be provided for
all buildings and structures as per IS-3029.
Trained and experience operator will be employed for tank farm area.
NFPA label (hazard identification) capacity and content will be displayed on storage tank.
Solvents will be transferred by pump only in plant area and day tank will be provided. Overflow line will
be return to the storage tank or Pump On-Off switch will be provided near day tank in plant.
Jumpers will be provided on solvent handling pipe line flanges.
Flexible SS hose will be used for road tanker unloading purpose and other temperature connection.
For Drum Storage area:

Some chemicals will be received at plant in drums by road truck and stored in a separate drum storage
area.
FLP type light fittings will be provided where flammable materials are stored.
Proper ventilation will be provided in ware house.
Proper label and identification board /stickers will be provided in the storage area. Conductive drum
pallets will be provided.
Drum handling trolley / stackers/fork lift will be used for drum handling.
Separate dispensing room with local exhaust and static earthing provision will be made.
Materials will be stored as per its compatibility study and separate area will be made for flammable,

corrosive and toxic chemical drums storage.

Smoking and other spark, flame generating item will be banned from the Gate.
3.Transportation
Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank
as per petroleum Act & Rules.
Road tanker unloading procedure will be in place and will be implemented for safe unloading of road
tanker.
Static earthing provision will be made for tanker unloading.
Earthed Flexible Steel hose will be used for solvent unloading from the road tanker. Fixed pipelines with
pumps will be provided for solvent transfer up to Day
4.Tanks/reactors:
Double mechanical seal type pumps will be installed. NRV provision will be made on all pump discharge
line.
Transportation, Unloading and handling procedure for chemicals and solvents given in the table 7.4
below.

Table 7.4 Transportation, Unloading and handling procedure for Chemicals and solvents
No Activity Scenario Mitigation measures

1. Unloading and storing of Leaks, splash Unloading ramp
drums or fire Drum cushioning
Trained operators
Sorbent pads
Respirator with face shield and
chemical clothing.
Fire extinguisher and hydrant
Checking compatibility before
storing.
Availability of eye wash/shower
facility nearby.
Charging to reactors and Leaks, splash SOP for activity
service tanks or fire Precautions against ESD
Leak containment facility
Trained operators
Sorbent pads
chemical clothing.
facility nearby.
Unloading to tankers Leaks, splash SOP for activity
and vessels. or fire Tanker loading and unloading
permit.
Precautions against ESD
Trained operators
Sorbent pads
chemical clothing.
facility nearby.
2. Unloading and storing of Leaks, splash Trained operators
chemicals or fire Sorbent pads
chemical clothing.
Checking compatibility before
storing


facility near by
Charging to reactors and Leaks, splash SOP/BMR for activity
service tanks or fire Precautions against ESD
Trained operators
Sorbent pads
chemical clothing.
facility nearby.
7.4.7 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM:

Occupational Health is a branch which examines the relationship between work and health and effects
of work on the health of the worker. Occupational health service is operated to achieve the statutory
declared aim of occupational health by medical and technical measures. Its role is mainly preventive
and to give first aid and emergency treatment. It is certainly useful in early detection of any
occupational or non-occupational disease or any man-adjustment of the man-job relationship.
1.OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM:

1. Medical examinations: Pre-employment, periodic and others.
2. Supervision of the working environment industrial hygiene, safety, job analysis and adaptation of
the job to the worker in good working conditions.
3. Advice to management and worker.
4. Health education and training.
5. Health statistics.
6. Medical treatment-first aid, emergency and ambulatory treatment.
7. Health counselling-individual.
8. Nutrition.
9. Co-operation with other services in the undertaking.
10. Collaboration with external services.

Other purposes of industrial medical services are:

I) Identifying the Hazards
II) Preventing or minimizing the Hazards
III) Curative treatment in case of exposure
IV) Determining the Compensation for damages
Expected Occupational Health & Safety Hazards

• Physical Hazards: Noise, Heat, Dust,
• Chemical Hazards: Corrosive, Toxic Substances, Irritants, Carcinogens, Chemical emissions

• Psychological hazards resulting from stress and strain
• Hazards associated with the non-application of ergonomic principles, for example badly designed
machinery, mechanical devices and tools used by workers, improper seating and workstation
design, or poorly designed work practices.
Expected chemical hazards in work environment is given in the table 7.5 below.
Table 7.5 Expected chemical hazards in work environment
Name of Chemical Health Hazard due to exposure to these chemicals
Hydrogen Asphyxiating agent
Sodium methoxide Highly corrosive and water reactive. Severe burns on skin and
eyes.
Acids (HCl) Corrosive, Irritant. Causes severe eye burns.
Dimethyl amine Toxic by inhalation, skin absorption.
Hazardous in case of skin contact (irritant, permeator), of eye
Solvents contact (Irritant), of ingestion, of inhalation
Corrosive, water reactive, causes severe burns on skin
Sodamide contact.
Solvent, hazard of forming explosive peroxides on exposure to
THF air.
Mitigation Measures for OSH: It is proposed to formulate and implement a structure for
Occupational Safety and Health with following aims…
• To keep air-borne concentration of toxic and hazardous chemicals below PEL and TLV.
• Protect general health of workers likely to be exposed to such chemicals
• Providing training, guidelines, resources and facilities to concerned department for

occupational health hazards.

• It is proposed that this EMP be formulated on the guidelines issued by Bureau of Indian
Standards on OH&S Management Systems: IS 18001:2000 Occupational Health and Safety
Management Systems
• Proposed EMP will be incorporated in Standard Operating Procedure also.
The proposed EMP will also include measure to keep air-born concentration of toxic and hazardous
chemicals below its PEL and TLV, like…
– Leak Surveys
– Separate storage for toxic chemicals
– Exhaust Ventilation
– Proper illumination
– On-line detectors toxic chemicals
– Close processes to avoid spills and exposures
– Atomization of process operations to hazards of manual handling of chemicals
– Supply of proper PPEs like Air mask, breathing canisters, SCBA sets and On-line breathing
apparatus at the places where there is possibility of presence of toxic chemicals
– Decontamination procedure for empty drums and carboys.
– Regular maintenance program for pumps, equipment, instruments handling toxic and corrosive
chemicals
– Display of warning boards
– Training to persons handling toxic and corrosive chemicals
7.4.8 DETERMINING SIGNIFICANCE
Determining Significance is evaluation of the significance of the risk estimation and each of the
components of the risk assessment process, including elements of risk perception and cost/benefit
consideration.

7.5 RISK MANAGEMENT
M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. will manage the economical and social aspects of risk. Improvement in
scientific and factual basis for risk assessment is necessary for better risk management decisions and
public creditability of those decisions.
M/s RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. Will be considering the Risk management strategies including all the specific
activities. First step involves taking a decision about the whether any actions are necessary and if so,
what nature of the action should it be.
The fatality probability is function of:

• Probability of occurrence of hazardous events
• Probability of weather condition, wind direction
• Probability of number of persons exposed which depends on the severity of the consequences
• Lethality factor
• Probability of ignition source
Probability exposed weather conditions; wind directions, ignition sources and lethality factors cannot be
changed or controlled. The only factor possible to reduce is the probability of occurrence of hazardous
event. M/s RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. could be achieved by reducing the failure probabilities of system
components through proper maintenance or in some cases providing redundancies and also providing
adequate safety measures in the form of protective system such as alarms, trips, sprinkles etc.
7.6 RISK ACCEPTANCE
The acceptance of risk by individuals and collectively by society in M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. is affected
by many parameters. Some people may accept the risk voluntarily while some may do so involuntarily.
The general public acceptance also depends on their understanding and knowledge of risks. Finally each
individual has a different perception for risk acceptance. The lowest level for involuntary uses is set by
the risk of death from natural events such as lightening, flood, earthquakes, etc. M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt.
Ltd. is carried out survey of risks in this range which is shown in Table 7.3 below.

Fig 7.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment

7.6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS AREAS
The procedure for QRA starts with identification of major risk areas in the installation. Operation carried
out in pesticide Industries usually come under certain board, general categories. In M/s. RL fine chem.
Pvt. Ltd. Major risk areas will storage tank area, plant area and utility area.
• Bulk storage of liquids (e.g. HCl, Solvents etc.) area in M/s. RL fine chem. Pvt. Ltd. at ambient
temperature and atmospheric pressure.
• Process Plant involving pumping, transportation, reactors, distillation, heating, cooling, centrifuge
operations etc.
• Bulk loading from storage tanks into road tankers.
• Drum Storage Area.
7.6.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE CASES FOR HAZARDOUS AREAS
 Release due to catastrophic failure of storage tanks or process vessels.

 Rupture of connected pipe with storage tank or process vessels.
 Continuous release at significant rates for long durations transfer pipelines caused by sudden,
major break of the pipeline.
 Continuous release at low rate through small holes or cracks in piping and vessels, flange leaks,
and leakage from pump glands and similar seals.
 Fire and explosion scenarios due to deviation from set parameters during chemical processing.

7.7 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
In a plant handling hazardous chemicals, the main hazard arises due to storage, handling
& use of these chemicals. If these chemicals are released into the atmosphere, they may
cause damage due to resulting fires or vapour clouds. Blast Overpressures depend upon
the reactivity class of material and the amount of gas between two explosive limits.
7.7.1.Operating Parameters
Potential gas/vapour release for the same material depends significantly on the
operating conditions. Especially for any flammable gas, the operating conditions are
very critical to assess the damage potential.
7.7.2 Inventory
Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short
listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential
hazard. Larger the inventory of a vessel or a system, larger the quantity of potential
release. The potential vapour release (source strength) depends upon the quantity of
liquid release, the properties of the materials and the operating conditions (pressure,
temperature). If all these influencing parameters are combined into a matrix and vapour
source strength estimated for each release case, a ranking should become a credible
exercise.
7.7.3 Loss of Containment

Plant inventory can get discharged to Environment due to Loss of Containment. Certain
features of materials to be handled at the plant need to the clearly understood to firstly
list out all significant release cases and then to short list release scenarios for a detailed
examination. Liquid release can be either instantaneous or continuous. Failure of a
vessel leading to an instantaneous outflow assumes the sudden appearance of such a
major crack that practically all of the contents above the crack shall be released in a very
short time. The more likely event is the case of liquid release from a hole in a pipe
connected to the vessel. The flow rate will depend on the size of the hole as well as on
the pressure, which was present, in front of the hole, prior to the accident. Such
pressure is basically dependent on the pressure in the vessel. The vaporisation of
released liquid depends on the vapour pressure and weather conditions. Such
consideration and others have been kept in mind both during the initial listing as well as
during the short-listing procedure. In the study, Maximum Credible Loss accident
methodology is to be used, therefore, the largest potential hazard inventories have been
considered for consequence estimation.
7.7.4 DAMAGE CRITERIA
Environmental Impact Assessment Report- 51-

In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the

physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the damage
(lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects. The calculations can roughly be
divided in three major groups:
a) Determination of the source strength parameters;
b) Determination of the consequential effects;
c) Determination of the damage or damage distances. The basic

physical effect models consist of the following.
Source strength parameters
Calculation of the outflow of liquid, vapour or gas out of a vessel or a pipe, in case of
rupture. Also two-phase outflow can be calculated.
Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the
dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.
Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool

dimensions and wind velocity.
Source strength equals pump capacities, etc. in some cases.
Consequential effects
Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength,

relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical situation of the
surrounding area.
Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire or a BLEVE, as a function of the
distance to the source.
Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of
evaporated chemical.
The latter can be either explosive or toxic.
It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study
strongly depend upon the type of material involved:
- Gas, vapour, liquid, solid

- Inflammable, explosive, toxic, toxic combustion products
- Stored at high/low temperatures or pressure
Selection of Damage Criteria

The damage criteria give the relation between extent of the physical effects (exposure)
and the percentage of the people that will be killed or injured due to those effects. The
knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure. For
instance, much more is known about the damage caused by heat radiation, than about
the damage due to toxic exposure, and for these toxic effects, the knowledge differs
strongly between different materials.
In Consequence Analysis studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous
effects are distinguished:
- Heat radiation, from a jet, pool fire, a flash fire or a BLEVE.
- Explosion
- Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.
In the next three paragraphs, the chosen damage criteria are given and explained.
7.7.5 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LOSS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterised as the worst credible

accident. In other words: an accident in an activity, resulting in the maximum
consequence distance that is still believed to be possible. A MCA-analysis does not
include a quantification of the probability of occurrence of the accident. Another aspect,
in which the pessimistic approach of MCA studies appears, is the atmospheric condition
that is used for dispersion calculations. As per the reference of the study, weather
conditions having an average wind speed of 7.0 m/s have been chosen.
The Maximum Credible Loss (MCL) scenarios have been developed for the Facility. The
MCL cases considered, attempt to include the worst “Credible” incidents- what
constitutes a credible incident is always subjective. Nevertheless, guidelines have
evolved over the years and based on basic engineering judgement, the cases have been
found to be credible and modelling for assessing vulnerability zones is prepared
accordingly. Only catastrophic cases have been considered and not partial or small
failures (as is the case in Quantitative Risk Assessment where contributions from low
frequency - high outcome effect as well as high frequency - low outcome events are
distinguished). The objective of the study is emergency planning; hence only holistic &

conservative assumptions are used for obvious reasons. Hence though the outcomes
may look pessimistic, the planning for emergency concept should be borne in mind
whilst interpreting the results.
7.7.6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
The Consequence Analysis has been done for selected scenarios. This has been done for
weather conditions having wind speed 7.0 m/s. In Consequence Analysis, geographical
location of the source of potential release plays an important role. Consideration of a
large number of scenarios in the same geographical location serves little purpose if the
dominant scenario has been identified and duly considered.
7.7.7 SOFTWARE USED FOR CALCULATIONS

Aloha contains all the discharge, dispersion, effects and risk models you will need to
accurately assess all your major hazards and associated risks. Aloha Consequence
provides you with comprehensive hazard analysis facilities to examine the progress of a
potential incident from the initial release to its far-field effects.
7.7.8 TOXIC AND FLAMMABLE IMPACT
It calculates the initial discharge, as the material expands from its storage conditions to
atmospheric, through dispersion, as the material mixes with air and dilutes, and the
subsequent toxic or flammable effects. Aloha includes a wide range of models for
discharge and dispersion as well as flammable, explosive and toxic effects.
Discharge
• Aloha requires basic information about storage or process conditions and material
properties in order to perform discharge calculations
• The software comes with an integrated material property database containing

more than 1,600 pre-defined pure component chemicals
• Various discharge scenario options have been implemented to represent common

process failures, and model their behaviour. These include:
Leaks and line ruptures from long & short pipelines

Catastrophic rupture Dispersion

The dispersion models within Aloha are able to model the following phenomena
• Dispersion of gas, liquid and two-phase releases
• Liquid droplet thermo dynamics calculations and liquid droplet rainout
• Pool spreading and vaporization
• Building wake dispersion effects for vapour releases
7.7.9 FLAMMABLE EFFECTS

For releases of flammable material Aloha calculates
• Radiation profiles and contours from a range of fire scenarios including pool fires,
flash fires, jet fires and fire balls, including cross-wind effects on a jet fire
• Vapour Cloud Explosion modelling using industry standards.
7.8 TOXIC EFFECTS

• Graphs of toxic concentration profile
• Indoor and outdoor toxic dose prediction
7.8.1 ALOHA RISK
Aloha Risk allows you to combine the flammable and toxic consequences from each
scenario in your QRA model with their likelihood to quantify the risk of fatalities. Phase
Risk allows you to take account of local population distribution, sources of ignition, land
usage and local prevailing weather conditions. It is designed to perform all the analysis,
data handling and results presentation elements of a QRA within a structured
framework.
Aloha Risk allows you to quickly identify major risk contributors so that time and efforts
can be directed to mitigating these highest risk activities. Based on effects calculations
and population vulnerabilities, Aloha Risk can integrate over all scenarios and weather
conditions to estimate the total risk. The established individual and societal risk
indicators are predicted by Aloha Risk across your facility and surrounding area using
the classical QRA methodology. Risk ranking reports can be produced at points of
strategic importance to show the relative influence of the various failure scenarios and
their contribution to both the individual and societal risk metrics.
A key benefit of Aloha Risk is the ability to identify major risk contributors and
differentiate these from incidents with worst case consequences which might otherwise

dominate the safety reviews. Whilst medium scale incidents have lesser consequences,
they may have a higher frequency, which, when combined with their hazardous effects,
generate a higher level of risk. Time and effort directed to mitigating high consequence
but often low frequency events may not be well spent. Aloha Risk helps you direct this
effort more effectively.
Aloha Risk also provides facilities to help you manage large quantities of input data,
including scenarios, parameters, wind roses, ignition and population, and combine these
in many ways. This is critical when looking at sensitivity analyses and assessing the
merits of a range of risk reduction measures.
Benefits
• Facilitates cost reduction in terms of losses and insurance
• Allows optimization of plant and process design
• Assist in compliance with safety regulators
• Enables quicker response to hazardous incidents
• Improve engineer’s understanding of potential hazards
• Regular software upgrades incorporate industry experience and expertise, and

advances in consequence modelling technology
7.8.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

1.INTRODUCTION
In this, the source terms for each defined failure cases are presented, including
calculated release rate, release duration and total released mass of fluid. Subsequently
consequence results from selected failure cases are also presented in order to give
overview on the extent of impact from potential major accident scenarios. Five types of
consequences are presented, i.e. jet fire, pool fire, flash fire, explosion and toxic impact.
Consequence Distances Pool Fire, Fire ball, Flash Fire
The extent of the consequence of a Pool fire is represented by the thermal radiation
envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:
2 kW/m2; pain within 60 sec. 0: lethality.
10 kW/m2; potentially lethal within 60 sec.
37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality as outlined above.

2. DETAILED SUMMARY OF RESULTS:
Detailed Results of the consequence analysis of above-mentioned scenarios have

been given below:
Toluene release from road tanker in solvent yard.
1.8.3 Scenario # 1A: Toluene release from tanker and catching fire.
Results indicate:
Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical tank
Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank
Tank Diameter: 2.236 meters Tank Length: 4.980 meters
Tank Volume: 19.6 cubic meters
Tank contains liquid Internal Temperature: 30° C
Chemical Mass in Tank: 11.1 tons Tank is 60% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 2.5 inches
Opening is 0 meters from tank bottom
Max Flame Length: 11 meters
Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Burn Rate: 153 kilograms/min
Total Amount Burned: 9,068 kilograms
Note: The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed a burning puddle.
The puddle spread to a diameter of 6.3 meters.
THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modelled: Thermal radiation from pool fire
Red : 12 meters --- (37.5 kW/ (sq m))
Orange: 19 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq m) potentially lethal within 60 sec)
Yellow: 32 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq m) pain within 60 sec)
THREAT AT POINT:
Thermal Radiation Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 75.8 meters Off Centreline: 28.2 meters
Max Thermal Radiation: 0.191 kW/ (sq m)
Results of Toulene release from tanker and catching fire is given in the table 7.6 below
and severity mapping of toluene is given in the fig 7.4 below.
Table 7.6 Results of Toulene release from tanker and catching fire
Distance in
Radiation level Injury type Remarks
meters
Safe zone beyond
2 kW 32 Pain within 60 sec.
32M
Avoid human
potentially lethal
10 kW 19 presence within
within 60 sec
19M
37.5 kW 12 100% fatal Avoid human and

property presence
within 12M
Fig 7.4 SEVERITY MAPPING OF TOULENE
7.8.4 Scenario # 1B: IPA release from tanker and catching fire.
Results indicate:

Max Thermal Radiation: 0.191 kW/ (sq m) Chemical Mass in Tank: 13.4 tons Tank
is 80% full
Max Puddle Diameter: Unknown
THREAT ZONE:
Red : 11 meters --- (37.5 kW/ (sq m))
Orange: 16 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
Yellow: 26 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
Results of IPA release from tanker and catching fire is given in the table 7.7 below and
severity mapping of IPA is given in the fig 7.5 below.
Table 7.7 Results of IPA release from tanker and catching fire
Distance in
meters
Safe zone beyond
26M
Avoid human
potentially lethal
within 60 sec
16M
Avoid human and
37.5 kW 11 100% fatal property presence
within 11M
Fig 7.5 SEVERITY MAPPING OF IPA

7.8.5 Scenario # 1C: Acetone release from tanker and catching fire.

Results indicate:
Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical tank
Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank
Tank Diameter: 2.236 meters Tank Length: 4.980 meters
Tank Volume: 19.6 cubic meters
Tank contains liquid Internal Temperature: 30° C
Chemical Mass in Tank: 10.1 tons Tank is 60% full
THREAT ZONE:
Red : 10 meters --- (37.5 kW/ (sq m))
Orange: 17 meters --- (10.0 kW/ (sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
Yellow: 26 meters --- (2.0 kW/ (sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
Results of Acetone release from tanker and catching fire is given in the table 7.6 and
severity mapping is shown in the fig 7.6 below.
Table 7.8 Results of Acetone release from tanker and catching fire
Distance in
meters
Safe zone beyond
26M
Avoid human
potentially lethal
within 60 sec
17M
Avoid human and
37.5 kW 10 100% fatal property presence
within 10M
Fig 7.6 SEVERITY MAPPING OF ACETONE

7.8.6 Scenario # 2: Process reactors/equipment

FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX

REFERENCE:
DOW’S FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION GUDE
Seventh Edition
-AIChE MANUAL PUBLISHED BY
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
The index has been widely used in Dow and outside of Dow. It is the leading hazard index
recognized by the chemical industry. The F&EI provides key information to help evaluate
overall risk from fire and explosion. The F&EI is one of the tools used for evaluation of
realistic fire, explosion and reactivity potential of process equipment and its contents.
For the assessment purpose we have chose hydrogenation, Grignard reactions and
centrifuge operations which involved use of highly flammable and explosive gas like
Hydrogen, considerable quantities of Flammable solvent Toluene and high rotation
equipment like centrifuge.
Results of fire and explosion index with risk and its control measures is given in the table
7.9 below.
Table 7.9 FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX
Sn Process Material MF F&EI Area of Risk Controls
exposure
In Sq.M
Improved
solvent
1 DULOX.Hydrogenation Hydrogen 21 127.12 33.3 Intermediate handling and
spill
containment
Improved
solvent
Toluene
2 AMTRIP.HCL 16 119.9 31.41 Intermediate handling and
Grignard.Re.
spill
containment
Improved
solvent
3. ALIMEMAZINE.TAR. THF 16 114.2 29.92 Intermediate handling and
spill
containment
Improved
solvent
4. CENTRIFUGATION TOLUENE 16 72.28 18.9 Moderate handling and
spill
containment
7.8.7 Scenario-3Rupture and leak of Ammonia cylinder.
SOURCE STRENGTH:

Direct Source: 3.89 kilograms/min Source Height: 1.2 meters

Release Duration: 15 minutes
Release Rate: 3.89 kilograms/min
Total Amount Released: 58.4 kilograms
Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow.
Use both dispersion modules to investigate its potential behaviour.
THREAT ZONE:
Model Run: Gaussian
Red : 51 meters --- (300 ppm = IDLH)
Orange: 161 meters --- (35 ppm)
Yellow: 193 meters --- (25 ppm)
Results of ammonia is depicted in the table 7.10 as under.
Table: 7.10 Results of Ammonia

Contamination Distance in
Injury type
level meters
No adverse effect
25 ppm 193
for 8hrs.
No adverse effect
35 ppm 161
for 15 minutes.
Immediately
300 ppm 51 dangerous to life
or health.
Measures to be taken to prevent such accident:

• Priority will be given to Tanker to immediately enter the storage premises at site and
will not be kept waiting near the gate or the main road.
• Security person will check License, TREM CARD, Fire extinguisher condition, Antidote Kit,
required PPEs as per SOP laid down.
Following precautions will be adopted during unloading
• Wheel stopper will be provided to TL at unloading platform.

• Static earthing will be provided to road tanker.
• Tanker unloading procedure will be followed according to check list and implemented.
• Flexible SS hose connection will be done at TL outlet line.
• The quantity remaining in the hose pipeline will be drained to a small underground
storage tank, which will be subsequently transferred by nitrogen pressure to the
main storage tank thus ensuring complete closed conditions for transfer from road

tanker.
• All TL valves will be closed in TL.
• Finally earthing connection and wheel stopper will be removed.
• Only day time unloading will be permitted.
Following precautions will be adopted Storage of such chemicals

• Storage tank will be stored away from the process plant.
• Tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented.
• Caution note and emergency handling procedure will be displayed at unloading area and
trained all operators.
• NFPA label will be provided.
• Required PPEs like full body protection PVC apron, Hand gloves, gumboot, Respiratory
mask etc. will be provided to operator.
• Neutralizing agent will be kept ready for tackle any emergency spillage.
• Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit will be provided in acid storage area.
• Material will be handled in close condition in pipe line.
• Dyke wall will be provided to all storage tanks, collection pit with valve provision.
• Double drain valve will provided.
• Level gauge will be provided on all storage tanks.
• Safety permit for loading unloading of hazardous material will be prepared and
implemented.
• TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for transportation
Emergency of Hazardous chemicals.
• Fire hydrant system with jockey pump as per TAC norms will be installed.
For Storage tank farm area:

• Under N2 pressure storage.
• Safety valve provided and storage facility to ensure safe release of HC in case of over
pressure.
• Dyke with separate fencing area is provided.
• SOP prepared
• Road tanker unloading procedure prepared

• Work permit followed

• PPEs used
• Safety shower, eye wash provided.
• NFPA labelling system adopted for storage tanks.
• Level indicator at local.
• Alarm for high level & high pressure.
• Automatic fire fighting indication provided for around the storage area
• Sprinkler system will be provided
7.8.8 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION SAFETY GUIDELINES

1.INTRODUCTION
Transportation typically involves carrying of small amounts of materials over short

distances transportation does, however, pose significant risks from the frequency of the
activity and the lack of observance of prescribed regulations. The hazardous materials
should be packaged, based on the composition in a manner suitable for handling,
storage and transport. Labelling and packaging is required to be easily visible and be
able to withstand physical conditions and climatic factors. These guidelines are issued
to facilitate safe transportation of the hazardous material in compliance of the
regulations. In view of the stringent product quality requirement, various complex
processes are introduced involving the handling of hazardous chemicals. These
chemicals pose various types of hazards like flammability, toxicity, explosives, corrosives
etc. Inadequate awareness about the hazardous properties of these chemicals may lead
to serious accidents which will affect the men at work and the environment.
Scope
This document applies to the vehicular transportation, within geographically

contiguous, of hazardous materials, substances, and wastes. Hazardous materials
include chemical materials, substances or wastes. Transportation shall be performed in
a manner which minimizes risk to the health and safety of employees, the public and
the environment.
Guidelines for
Transportation General

It will be ensured that during the transportation contents are not spilled, packaging is
not damaged and personnel are properly trained to generate, transport and receive
such materials. The maximum speed limit is 16 KMPH. TREM (Transport Emergency)
cards are to be provided to the drivers.
Packing
The containers must be able to withstand normal handling and retain integrity for a
minimum period of six months. In general, packaging for hazardous substances must
meet the following requirements:
- All packaging materials including containers shall be of such strength, construction
and type as not to break open or become defective during transportation.
- All packaging materials including containers shall be so packaged and sealed those
spillages of hazardous materials / substances are prevented during transportation
due to jerks and vibrations caused by uneven road surface.
- Re-packaging materials including that used for fastening must not be affected by the
contents or form a dangerous combination with them.
- Packaging material should be such that there will be no significant chemical or

galvanic action among any of the material in the package.
- Ensure that any cushioning or absorbent material used for packaging is also
compatible with the hazardous material.
The containers when used for packaging of the hazardous Material shall meet
the following requirements:
- Modes of packaging, like collection in 200-litre plastic drums, cardboard cartons, PP and
HDPE/LDPE containers etc., also work for variety of materials. However, all such container
should be amenable to mechanical handling.
- It should be leak proof.
- Use drums that are in good condition and free of rust and major dents.
- Ensure that drums are not leaking or overfilled before transporting them.
- Ensure that drum bungs are tight.
- Carefully inspect pallets before they are loaded.
- Do not use pallets with cracked or broken slats.
- Use a drum dolly to place drums on pallets.
- Secure all drums to the pallet with appropriate strapping material.

In general, the containers for liquid HM should be completely closed, in fact sealed. There
should be no gas generation due to any chemical reaction within the container, and,
hence, there should not be any need for air vents; expansion due to increase /decrease
in temperature normally does not need air vents.
- Container should be covered with a solid lid or a canvas to avoid emissions of any sort
including spillage, dust etc. and to minimize odour generation both at the point
of loading as well as during transportation.
- Container used for transportation of Material should be able to withstand the shock
loads due to vibration effect/undulations of pavements etc.
- Container should be easy to handle during transportation and emptying.
- As far as possible, manual handling of containers should be minimized. Appropriate

material handling equipment is to be used to load, transport and unload
containers. This equipment includes drum, dollies, and forklifts, drum handling
equipment, lift gates and pallets. Drums should not be rolled on or off vehicles.
- Where two-tier or three-tier storage is envisaged, the frame should have adequate
strength to hold the containers.
- One-way containers are also allowed. The multi-use containers should be re-usable
provided it should be cleaned and free from deterioration or defects.
- Loads are to be properly placed on vehicles. HM containers are not to overhang,

perch, lean or be placed in other unstable base. Load should be secured with straps,
clamps, braces or other measures to prevent movement and loss. Design of the
container should be such that it can be safely accommodated on the transport
vehicle.
- Dissimilar materials shall not be transported in the same container.
Labelling
There are two types of labelling requirements:
i. Labelling of individual transport containers [ranging from a pint-size to a tank], and
ii. Labelling of transport vehicles.
- All hazardous Material containers must be clearly marked with current contents. The
markings must be waterproof and firmly attached so that they cannot be removed.

Previous content labels shall be obliterated when the contents are different. Proper
marking of containers is essential.
- Colour code is to be provided to the tanker to indicate the type of material present in
that.
- Containers that contain HM shall be labelled with the words "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL"
in Kannada, Hindi / English. The information on the label must include the code number
of the Material, the Material type, the origin (name, address, telephone number of the
supplier and receiver), hazardous property (e.g. flammable, corrosive), and the symbol
for the hazardous property.
- The label must withstand the effects of rain and sun. Labelling of containers is important.
The following are the requirements for labelling:
Emergency contact phone numbers shall be prominently displayed viz. the phone
number of concerned Regional Officer of the SPCB, Fire Station, Police Station and other
agencies concerned.
Unloading of Tank
- Before the tanker enters the industry premises, the tanker is to be inspected for
authorized entry and safe & sound condition of the tanker, its contents and that of the
prime mover.
- Tankers entering plant are to be fitted with flare arresters on their exhaust.
- The quality of the chemical in the tanker should be ascertained before unloading to
avoid contamination of chemical already at storage.
- In case of flammable chemicals, the prime mover (engine) should be kept of. The tanker
should be properly blocked from movement before connections are made for unloading
hazardous chemicals.
- In case of flammable chemicals, the unloading point should be located at a safe distance
outside the storage dyke.
- Pressurizing with air / inert gas for unloading should be avoided. It is recommended to
use pumps / vacuum systems for unloading. Pumps should preferably be of seal less
type and valves should be of glandless types. Solid chemicals in bulk should be handled
with lifting machines and conveyors.
- Coupling used for connecting hose to tanker must be leak proof. Flange connections are

preferred. Where threaded connections are used, the threaded portion should be
properly preserved against corrosion / wearing of threads and thoroughly inspected
before connections are made.
- The unloading hose should be devoid of cracks & blisters and should be capable of
withstanding whatever pressure developed during unloading operation. The hose
should be hydro-tested at a frequency guided by experience. Proper records of hydro-
test should be maintained.
- Same hose should not be used for unloading different chemicals. Hoses for different
chemicals should be marked with different colour stripes for easy identification.
- For flammable chemicals, the tanker and the hose are to be properly earthed before
starting unloading operation.
- Unloading should preferably be done in day time.
- Unloading should be done under personal supervision of responsible staff authorized by

the management.
- The operating staff must use suitable personal protective clothing /equipment. Suitable
breathing canisters and first aid box must be available at site for use in case of
emergency.
- Provision of sample quantity of water / neutralizing medium to take care of leakage /

spillage must be made. Also steam and inert gas hose stations must be available at
unloading point.
- There must be adequate illumination at site. Flame proof fittings should be used
wherever necessary.
- The unloading systems should have facility to vent / drain the remaining chemical in the
hose to a suitable safe point. The hose should be kept blinded when not in use. Thermal
safety valve discharging to safe disposal or handling facility should be provided.
- Before starting unloading, the silage of the receiving tank should be checked. Care
should be taken to avoid overflow of tanks. Gas / chemical leak detection system to
sound an alarm at the control room/site may be provided wherever possible, so that
quick remedial measures can be taken. Wherever necessary, quick/remote isolation
valves should be provided.

Fire fighting facility commensurate with the chemical – as mentioned in the data sheet
should be provided at the unloading point.
Effective communication system like telephone must be available for communicating

with the control room / fire station / health unit.
Unloading of Drums / Containers
Manual handling of drums / containers should be minimized. It is preferable fork-lifters

and suitable cradles are used to handle drums.
Carboys containing hazardous chemicals should not be subjected to impact.
Suitable protective clothing should be used while handling drums / containers and the
operators should position him such that he is in the upwind direction so that even in
case of accidental release of chemical, he is safe.
2.RECOMMENDATIONS
The following actions are particularly recommended to be implemented in order to
ensure
ALARP (As Low As reasonably practical) performance in the operation: Maintain and
ensure effectiveness of all the safety measures, among others through the following
actions:
Raw Material Storage Area (Ware House I&II)
The raw material storage area, i.e. ware house, should be declared as a prohibited area
and should be provided having at least two exits, “No Smoking” and “Prohibited Area”
display boards, as applicable should be provided at site.
- Regular inspection of drums containing raw material to be done to take care.
- Periodic site inspection should be carried out to ensure that there is no leakage from
any of the drums in the ware house.
- Fire hydrant system needs to be provided in ware house area as per standards.
- Smoke detector and fire alarm systems need to be provided.
- Provision of fire doors in ware house area.
3.FIRE ACCESS FOR TANK FARM AREA AND WARE HOUSES
- Fire access roads should be provided to storage area. The storage tanks / area

should have suitable fire protection and fire fighting facility.

The following features are also important for the project by taking the layout into
consideration:-
• Hinged doors swing outward in an explosion.
• Window panes (if installed) are shatterproof or plastic in frame.
• Floors, walls and ceilings are designed and installed to limit the generation and
accumulation of static electricity.
• All doors must be fire resistant. Floors, walls and ceilings are designed for at least 2
h of fire resistance.
• Walls or partitions are continuous from floor to ceiling, and securely anchored.
• Integrity of the wall should be ensured i.e. blast wall not to be broken or drilled as
that can leads to weak spots.
• The building is constructed of non-combustible materials, on a substantial frame.
• Restrained deflagration vent panels are present.
• There is adequate ventilation, and any heating in rooms is limited to steam, hot
water, or other indirect means.
Electrical Safety for Whole Facility
• Electrical Safety: All cables and electric fittings shall be constructed, installed,
protected, operated and maintained in such a manner so as to prevent risk of open
sparking.
7.8.9 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

1.DEFINING THE NATURE OF EMERGENCY
1. Hazop study will be conducted before setting up of the plant.
2. Onsite Emergency Plan is to be up graded and mock drills will be conducted.
3. Emergency Response Team (ERT) activities will be continued.
4. Training to be imparted to all employees on safety and health aspects of chemicals

handling.
2.LEVEL OF EMERGENCY CAN BE CLASSIFIED IN THREE CATEGORIES.

LEVEL - 1:
The leakage or emergency, which is confinable within the plant, premises. It
may be
Due to -
a) Small fire in the plant
b) Low toxic gas release for short duration.
c) Collapsing of equipment that do not affect outside premises.
LEVEL - 2:
The emergency, which is confinable to factory premises. It may arise due to -

a) Major fire inside the factory premises.
b) Medium scale explosion confined to the factory premises.
c) Heavy toxic / flammable gas leakage for short duration.
LEVEL - 3:
The emergency, which is not confinable to factory premises and general

public in the vicinity likely to be affected. It may arise due to -
a) Explosion of high magnitude affecting the adjacent area
b) Heavy / Profuse leakage of toxic / flammable gases for a long duration.
3.OBSERVER
DUTIES OF OBSERVER
Any person noticing a fire, leakage of chemicals or an unusual occurrence will contact
the security personnel a main gate and Plant Supervisor by:
1. Giving a telephone message
2. Sending message through a messenger
3. Rush personally
While giving the message, he will:
1. Identify himself
2. State briefly type of emergency
3. Location of Incident / accident
4. Severity of emergency

After giving message, he will return to the scene / area of emergency by taking all
personnel protection measures, if possible and awaits instructions from Plant
Supervisor (Incident Controller).
4.CHIEF EMERGENCY CONTROLLER

Responsibility of Site Main Controller
Immediately when he is aware of the emergency, the Site Main Controller will proceed
to the Emergency Control Room, where he will meet Communications Officer, Liaison
Officer and Safety Officer.
1. The Site Main Controller will assess the magnitude of the situation, in consultation
with the Incident Controller and decide if staff needs to be evacuated from their
roll call points. He will announce the emergency through Messenger or via
Intercom line and will give an order for evacuation.
2. Ensure that outside emergency services are called. (Fire Brigade, Police, Doctors,
etc.)
3. Ensure that KEY PERSONNEL are called.
4. Exercise direct operational control of those parts of the works, outside the affected
area.
5. Maintain a speculative continuous review of possible developments and assess

these to determine the most probable course of events.
6. Ensure that the emergency is intimated to District Emergency Authorities
7. Issue authorized statements to the news media. Where appropriate, inform the
seniors.
8. Ensure that proper consideration is given to the preservation of evidence.
9. Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of emergency.
10. Determine what investigations and reporting should be carried out, and by whom,
to determine cause and (if appropriate) prevention of recurrence.
1.9 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The major hazards are described below.

Toxic hazard due to leakage of hazardous chemicals like Ammonia.
Fire and Explosive hazard due to leakage of chemicals like THF, IPA, Methanol and

Toluene etc. from storage tank, drums and reactors.
Fire hazards due to contact of water with water reactive materials like Sodium
methoxide, Potassium methoxide and Sodamide.
Fire hazards due to leak and ignition of flammable gas like hydrogen during
hydrogenation and handling hydrogen gas.
Corrosive hazard due to leakage of chemicals like HCl, chloro acetyl chloride etc. from
containers.
Electrical hazards due to the electrical major equipment/ machinery, operations,
welding, motors, and heavy lift devices, cabling, human intervention (short circuit
possibility), maintenance work (due to machinery breakdown etc.), plant lighting related
electrical hazards.
Possibility of human injury due to working with rotating machines, manual handling etc.
Possibility of injury during chemicals handled, during operations and due to intoxication.
Major dropped objects hazard due to large number of physical handling steps /
operations involved with crane/ overhead lifting/ hoisting equipment.
Fires in any part of the plant working areas – there is a possibility of rapid escalation if it
is not brought under control quickly.
Possibilities of fire hazards at transformers, switch gear and other electrical equipment
etc.
The Hazard identification process must identify hazards that could cause a potential major
accident for the full range of operational modes, including normal operations, start-
up,shutdown, and also potential upset, emergency or abnormal conditions.
Employersshould also reassess their Hazard identification process whenever a significant
change inoperations has occurred or a new substance has been introduced.
They should also consider incidents, which have occurred elsewhere at similar facilities
including within the same industry and in other industries.The technique used for the
hazard identification is Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis, which allows
identification of an accident with probable maximum damage distance.
Hazard identification and risk assessment involves a critical sequence of

informationgathering and the application of a decision-making process. These assist in
discovering what could possibly cause a major accident (hazard identification), how likely
it is that a major accident would occur and the potential consequences (risk assessment)

and what options there are for preventing and mitigating a major accident (control
measures). These activities should also assist in improving operations and productivity
and reduce the occurrence of incidents and near misses.
The chemical and process industries have been using a variety of hazard identification
techniques for many years, ranging from simple screening checklists to highly structured
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis. Each technique has its own strengths and
weaknesses for identifying hazards. It is impossible to compare hazard identification
techniques and come to any conclusion as to which is the best. Each technique has been
developed for a specific range of circumstances taking many factors into account
including the resources required to undertake the analysis, expertise available and stage
of the process. While HAZOP is primarily a tool for hazard identification, the HAZOP
process can also include assessment of the causes of accidents, their likelihood and the
consequences that may arise, so as to decide if the risk is acceptable, unacceptable or
requires further study.. Moreover, a formal guidance for applying this technique
isavailable. Collaboration between management and staff is fundamental to achieving
effective and efficient hazard identification and risk assessment processes.
After identifying hazards through a qualitative process, quantification of potential

consequences of identified hazards using simulation modeling is undertaken. Estimation
of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the basis of
quantification of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or personnel.
Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of release of a toxic or flammable
substance have to be identified in order to estimate its damaging effects, the area
involved, and the possible precautionary measures required to be taken.
Considering operating modes of the facility, and based on available resources the
following hazard identification process chosen are:
a) Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI) Approach;
b) HAZOP studies;
c) Maximum Credible Accident and Consequence Analysis (MCACA);
d) Classification of Major Hazard Substances;
e) Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 (GOI Rules,
1989);
f) Identification of Major Hazardous Units.
The physical properties of solvents used in the process which forms the basis for
identification of hazards during storage and interpretation of the Manufacture, Storage
and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989 (GOI Rules, 1989).
The interpretation of “The Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous chemicals”

issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, GOI, which guides the preparation of
various reports necessary for safe handling and storage of chemicals shows that the

present project requires preparation of safety reports before commencing operation and
risk assessment is not mandatory
Apart from the solvents, diesel fuel and fuel oil will also be stored in plant premises. The
solvent storage tanks are designed as per the safety norms of Hazardous Storage
Guidelines of Institute of Fire and Safety Engineering, Nagpur. Apart from the tanks small
quantities of solvents are stored in flame proof barrels in the designated storage area.
Storage tank sizes and quantity of solvent is planned as per the storage capacity of
respective solvents. The probable hazards in the plant is shown in the table 7.11 below.
Table 7.11: Probable hazards in the plant
Hazard type Description
Solvent use  Spillage of chemicals while handling.
 Spillage of chemicals or baths into trench.
Fuel storage  Diesel and furnace oil spill and fire.
 Tank failure and fire.
The drawing indicating the areas earmarked for storage of solvents and fuel is shown in
the appended plant layout of the industry.
Hazardous raw materials with their schedule numbers according to the 19th January 2000,
Schedule I, Part II is shown in table 7.12 as under.
Table 7.12: Hazardous raw materials
Hazardous raw Sl. No. as per Manufacture, Storage and
material Import of Hazardous Chemical
(Amendment) Rules, 19th January 2000,
Schedule I, Part II
Hydrochloric acid 313
N- Butanol 412
Sodium Hydroxide 571
Magnesium 350
Potassium 522
hydroxide
Methanol 377
Ammonia 31
Toulene 628
Iso Propyl Alcohol 334
Formaldehyde 295
Dimethyl Amine 215
Acetone 4
Chloroacetyl 124
Chloride
Acetic anhydride 45
Cyclohexanone 161
Hydrogen peroxide 318

7.9.1 EXPOSURE TO SOLVENTS
As per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazard Chemicals Rules, 1989, and further
amendments in 2000, these solvents possess risk to the health and safety and the user
must be aware of the safe handling procedures, health risk involved and safety
arrangements.
Severity mapping with their mitigation measures for the various solvents used is detailed
in the table 7.13 below.

M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.
Table 7.13: Severity mapping

Sl. Solvent Severity Precautionary measures proposed Mitigation measures
No. Less severe Moderate Severe proposed
FIRE
1 Acetone - Flammable - Storage: Non-corrosive in the Fire fighting measures:
presence of glass. As in any fire, use of a
self-contained breathing
Stored in segregated and approved
apparatus is
area. Kept in cool, well-ventilated
recommended.
areas in tightly closed and sealed
Use of dry chemical,
containers.
carbon dioxide, water or
Stability and reactivity: Slightly chemical foam.
explosive in the presence of open
flames, sparks, oxidizing materials
and acids.
Forms explosive mixtures with

hydrogen peroxide, acetic acid, nitric
acid, chromic anhydride etc.
Reactive with oxidizing agents,

reducing agents, acids and alkalis.
2 Isopropyl alcohol - - Highly Storage:Stored in drums as per Fire fighting measures:
flammable flammable liquid store, as per Rules,Water spray, dry
away from source of naked flame & chemical, alcohol foam,
hot elements and ignition sources. or carbon dioxide.
Incompatibility:Heat, flame, strong Water spray may be
oxidizers, acetaldehyde, acids, used to keep fire
exposed containers
- 79 -
chlorine, ethylene oxide, hydrogen- cool, dilute spills to

palladium combination, hydrogen nonflammable mixtures.
peroxide-sulfuric acid combination,
potassium tert-butoxide,
hypochlorous acid, isocyanates,
nitroform, phosgene, aluminum,
oleum and perchloric acid.
Carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide

may form when heated to
decomposition.
3 Toluene - Flammable - Storage: Stored in a segregated and Fire fighting measures:
approved area in a cool well- Dry chemical
ventilated area in tightly closed and powder,water spray or
sealed containers away from all fog can be used as fire
possible sources of ignition. extinguishing media.
Stability and reactivity: Stable under
normal conditions. Can become
instable when exposed to conditions
of heat and ignition sources.
Incompatible with strong oxidizers,
silver perchlorate, sodium difluoride,
tetranitromethane, uranium
hexafluoride.
Frozen bromine trifluoride reacts
violently with toluene at – 800C
Reactive with oxidizing agents.

Reacts chemically with nitrogen

oxides or halogens to form
nitrotoulene, nitrobenzene and
nitrophenol and halogenated
products respectively.
Toluene forms explosive reaction
with 1,3-dichloro-5,5-dimethyl-2,4-
imidazolididione, dinitrogen
tetrachloride.
Non-corrosive in the presence of
glass.
4 Diesel - - Highly Storage: Should be kept away from Fire fighting measures:
flammable flame, sparks, excessive Water spray, fog or fire
temperatures and open flame. fighting foam. Water
Incompatibility: High temperatures, may be ineffective for
open flames, sparks, welding, fighting the fire, but may
smoking and other ignition sources. be used to cool fire-
Should be kept away from strong exposed containers.
oxidizers.
Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide
and non-combusted hydrocarbons
(smoke) are the hazardous
decomposition products that may be
formed.
5 Fuel oil - - Highly Storage:Should bekept away from Fire fighting measures:
flammable flame, sparks, excessive Dry chemical, foam,
temperatures and open flame. carbon dioxide and

(stable Incompatibility:May react with strong water spray or fog.

under acids or oxidizing agents. Heated Water may be
normal vapor or mist and may form explosive ineffective for fighting
conditions) mixture with air. the fire, but may be
Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide used to cool fire-
and low molecular weight exposed containers.
hydrocarbons, acidic gases, nitrogen
oxides, sulfur oxides and other toxic
contaminants are the hazardous
decomposition products that may be
formed.
Sl. Raw material Severity Precautionary measures Mitigation measures proposed

No. Less Moderate Severe proposed
severe
SPILLAGES
1 Acetone Less - - EXPOSURE CONTROLS AND FIRST AID MEASURES:
toxic PERSONNEL PROTECTION: After inhalation: Removed to fresh air. If not
Engineering controls: breathing, artificial respiration to be given. If
Exhaust ventilation to be breathing is difficult, oxygen to be given.
provided to prevent Physician should be called immediately.
accumulation above the
exposure limit. After skin contact: Remove contaminated
Personal protection: clothing and flush affected areas with water.
Splash goggles, lab coat, Cover contaminated skin with an emollient. Seek
vapor respirator, gloves, medical attention.

safety goggles or glasses, After eye contact: Flush eyes immediately with
boots etc to be provided. water for at least 15 minutes. Cold water may be
used. A physician should see the patient
promptly.
After ingestion: DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING

unless directed to do so by medical personnel.
Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious
person. Loosen tight clothing such as collar, tie,
belt or waist-band. Get medical attention if
symptoms appear.
2 Isopropyl - Moderately - To be handled carefully FIRST AID MEASURES:
alcohol toxic with the usual Eyes & Skin: In case of contact, eyes are
precautionary measures. immediately flushed with plenty of water for at
The product should not be least 15 minutes. Medical aid is obtained
allowed to reach the immediately.
groundwater, water bodies Inhalation: Removed to fresh air. If not breathing,
or sewerage system in artificial respiration to be given. If breathing is
large quantities. difficult, oxygen to be given. Physician should be
called immediately.
Ingestion: Large amounts of water to be given to
drink. An unconscious person should not be given
anything by mouth. Medical attention should be
sought immediately.
2 Toluene - Moderately - EXPOSURE CONTROLS AND FIRST AID MEASURES:
toxic PERSONNEL PROTECTION: After inhalation: Remove to fresh air. If breathing
stops provide artificial respiration. If breathing is

Engineering difficult oxygen should be administered. Get

controls:Exhaust medical attention.
ventilation should be
provided. After skin contact: Wash with a disinfectant soap
Personnel protection: and cover contaminated skin with an anti-
Splash goggles, lab coat, bacterial cream. Seek immediate medical
attention
vapor respirator, gloves.
Personnel protection in After eye contact: Remove contact lenses.
case of large spill: Splash Immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at
goggles, full suit, vapor least 15 minutes. Obtain medical attention.
respirator, boots, gloves,
self-contained breathing After ingestion: DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING
apparatus. unless directed to do so by medical personnel.
Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious
person. Loosen tight clothing such as collar, tie,
belt or waist-band.
3 Diesel - Moderately - To be handled carefully FIRST AID MEASURES:
toxic with the usual Eye & Skin:In case of contact, eyes are
precautionary measures. immediately flushed with clean, low-pressure
The product should not be water for at least 15 min. Eyelids are held open to
allowed to reach the ensure adequate flushing. Medical attention is
groundwater, water bodies obtained if irritation or redness develops in skin.
or sewerage system in Ingestion: VOMITING SHOULD NOT BE INDUCED.
large quantities.
Liquids should not be given.
Runoff to sewer may cause Inhalation: The person should be removed to
fire or explosion hazard. fresh air. If person is not breathing artificial
respiration to be provided. If necessary,

additional oxygen to be provided once breathing

is restored if trained to do so. Medical attention
to be sought immediately.
4 Fuel oil - - Highly To be handled carefully FIRST AID MEASURES:
toxic with the usual Eye & Skin:In case of contact, eyes are
precautionary measures. immediately flushed with clean, low-pressure
The product should not be water for at least 15 min. Eyelids are held open to
allowed to reach the ensure adequate flushing. Medical attention is
groundwater, water bodies obtained if irritation or redness develops in skin.
or sewerage system in Ingestion: VOMITING SHOULD NOT BE INDUCED.
large quantities. Liquids should not be given.
Inhalation: The person should be removed to
fresh air. If person is not breathing artificial
respiration to be provided. If necessary,
additional oxygen to be provided once breathing
is restored if trained to do so. Medical attention
to be sought immediately.

7.9.2 FIRE HAZARDS
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX (F & EI)
The Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis System is a step-by-step objective evaluation of the
realistic fire, explosion and reactivity potential of process equipment and its contents. The
quantitative measurements used in the analysis are based on historic loss data, the energy
potential of the material under study, and the extent to which loss prevention practices are
currently applied.
The purpose of the F&EI system is to:

1. QUANTIFY the expected damage of potential fire, explosion and reactivity
incidents in realistic terms.
2. IDENTIFY equipment that would be likely to contribute to the creation or escalation
of an incident.
3. COMMUNICATE the F&EI risk potential to management.
The most important goal of the F&EI System is to make the engineer aware of the loss
potential of each process area and to help the engineer identify ways to lessen the severity
and resultant rupee loss of potential incidents in an efficient and cost effective manner.
The F&EI is used in the Dow Risk Review Process. Determination of the F&EI is done in
conducting a Process Hazard Analysis or Level I Risk Review.
The Dow F&EI system attempts to determine the realistic maximum loss that can occur to a
process plant (or process unit) or related facility - a loss that could actually be experienced
under the most adverse operating conditions. The calculation is based on quantifiable data.
Finite spill rates, process temperature in relation to material flash points and boiling points
and reactivity are just a few of the many contributors to a probable incident.
The system can be applied if handling a minimum of approximately 454 kg of a flammable or

reactive material.
2.PROCEDURE FOR RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS

Procedure for risk analysis calculations is shown in the fid 7.7 below as under.
Fig 7.7: Procedure for risk analysis calculations

Selection of pertinent
process unit
Determination of Material
Factor
Calculation of General Calculation of Special

Process Hazards Process Hazards
Factor (F1) Factor (F2)
Determination of Process
Unit Hazards Factor
F3 = F1 x F2
Determination of F&EI
F&EI = F3 x Material Factor
3. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Fire and Explosion Index system assumes that a process unit handles a minimum of
2268 kg, or about 2.27 m3 of a flammable, combustible or reactive material. If less material
is involved, generally the risk will be overstated. However, F&EI calculations can provide
meaningful results for pilot plants if they handle at least 454 kg or about 0.454
3
m of combustible or reactive material.
B. Careful consideration is needed when equipment is arranged in series and the items are
not effectively isolated from each other.
4.CALCULATION OF F & EI FOR THE STORAGE AREA OF M/S. RL FINECHEM PVT. LTD.,.
The warehouse/storage area is considered for the calculation of the fire & explosion index.
The solvents & fuels are stored in large quantities in the factory premises. The calculation of
F & EI is shown in the following stages.

Step 1: Determination of material factors (MF)

Step 2: Determination of general process hazards factor (F1)
Step 3: Determination of special process hazards factor (F2)
Step 4: Determination of process unit hazard factor (F3)
F3 = F1 x F2
Step 5: Determination of Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI)
F & EI = F3 x material factor (MF)
Step 6: Determination of degree of hazard potential
The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the
criteria given in the following table 7.14 as under.
Table 7.14: Degree of hazard

F&EI range Degree of hazard
1 - 60 Light
61 - 96 Moderate
97 - 127 Intermediate
128 - 158 Heavy
159 - up Severe
Following table 7.5 provides the details of the identified potential hazards and the systems
suggested to minimize the hazards in the industry.
Table 7.15: Preventive systems provided in the plant

Unit Hazard identified Provision
Solvent use and Spill of solvents  Eye wash / Shower rooms.

mixing Fire  Adequate firefighting equipment is
Health hazard provided at all storage areas and in
various parts of the plant.
 MSDS sheets are available.
 Use of PPE while handing the
solvents.

Diesel and furnace Fire  CO2, extinguishing powder or water

oil jet, alcohol - resistant foam.
 Factory fire bridge.
Unloading trucks Fire/Explosion Factory fire bridge and fire fighting
systems.
7.9.3 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA) ANALYSIS
The MCA scenarios were short-listed based on the storage quantities and properties of the
chemicals, (hazard identification). MCA analysis studies were conducted for following scenario
"Pool fire due to rupture/leakage and accumulation of solvents and fuel".
7.9.4 FIRE DAMAGE
A flammable liquid in a pool will burn with a large turbulent diffusion flame. This release of
heat is based on the heat of combustion and the burning rate of the liquid. A part of the heat
is radiated while the rest is convected away by the rising hot air and combustion products.
The radiation may heat the contents of a nearby storage or process unit to above its ignition
temperature and thus result in the spread of fire. The radiation may also cause severe burns
or fatalities of workers or fire fighters located within a certain distance. Hence, it will be
important to know beforehand the damage potential of a flammable liquid pool likely to be
created due to leakage or catastrophic failure of a storage or process vessel. This will help to
decide the type of protective clothing for the workers/fire fighters, the time they can be in
vicinity of the fire (without any significant danger to life and health), the fire extinguishing
systems needed and the protection needs for the nearby storage/process vessels. The
following table 7.16 & 7.17 presents the damage effect on equipment at different thermal
radiation levels &Radiation exposure and lethality.
Table 7.16 :- Damage due to incident radiation intensities
Sl. Incident radiation Type of damage intensity
no. (kW/m ) 2
Damage to equipment Damage to people
1 37.5 Damage to process 100% lethality in 1 min.
equipment 1% lethality in 10 s.
2 25.0 Minimum energy required to 50% lethality in 1 min.
ignite wood at indefinitely Significant injury in 10 s.
long exposure without a
flame.
3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation -
intensity allowed on
thermally unprotected
adjoining equipment.

4 12.5 Minimum energy to ignite 1 % lethality in 1 min.

with a flame; melts plastic
tubing
5 4.5 - Causes pain if duration is
longer than 20 s; however
blistering is un-likely (first
degree burns)
6 1.6 - Causes no discomfort on long
exposures.
Table 7.17 :- Radiation exposure and lethality
Radiation intensity Exposure time Lethality Degree of burns
(kW/m ) 2 (s) (%)
1.6 - 0 No discomfort even
after long exposure.
4.5 20 0 1st
4.5 50 0 1st
8.0 20 0 1st
8.0 50 <1 3rd
8.0 60 <1 3rd
12.0 20 <1 2nd
12.0 50 8 3rd
12.5 60 1 3rd
25.0 60 50 3rd
37.5 60 100 3rd
For tank storage, it is assumed that the fuel leaks due to tank failure or rupture develops into a
pool and gets ignited (pool fire). Pool fire can also take place in case of pipeline rupture and
accumulation of solvents or fuels.
Following are the assumptions of the MCA analysis

 no fire detection and mitigation measures are initiated;
 secondary containment (dykes) that will confine flow of liquid and liquid absorption into
the ground is not considered;
 secondary fire at public road and building is not likely to happen, since they are far away
from the storage area;
 the effect of smoke on reduction of source radiation intensity has not been considered;
therefore hazard distances calculated tend to be conservative;
 shielding effect of intervening trees or other structures has not been considered.
Adequate fire detection and protection systems needs to be installed to handle such
emergencies as suggested in the following table 7.18 as under.

Table 7.18: - Fire protection system proposed for M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,
Suggested system
1. For unloading area (solvents and fuel), automatic detection system and manually
operated medium velocity water spray system along with foam system should be
provided.
2. An adequate number of portable chemical fire extinguishers will be installed at suitable
locations throughout the plant area. The extinguisher will be used during the early
stages of fire to prevent spreading while handling flammable solvents.
3. Hydrant system covering the entire plant including all important auxiliaries and
buildings will be installed. The system will be complete with piping, valves,
instrumentation, hoses, nozzles, hydrants valves etc.
4. All electrical fittings in hazardous area should be of flame-proof type.
7.9.5 SALIENT FEATURES OF RISK AUDITING AND ASSESSMENT
The risks associated with the Aromatic Chemicals manufacturing industry are commensurate
with their rapid growth and development. Apart from their utility, chemicals and the raw
materials used in their production have their own inherent properties and hazards. Some of
them can be flammable, explosive, toxic or corrosive etc. The whole lifecycle of a chemical
should be considered when assessing its dangers and benefits. Though many of chemical
accidents have a limited effect, occasionally there are disasters like the one in Bhopal, India,
in 1984, where lakhs of people were affected and LPG explosion in Vizag refinery where huge
property damage in addition to 60 deaths was experienced. Therefore chemicals have the
potential to affect the nearby environment also.
 Design and pre-modification review: Improper layout like location of plant in downwind
side of tank farm, fire station near process area, process area very close to public road
and wrong material of selection had caused severe damages to the work and outside
environment.
 Chemical risk assessment: Not assessed for new chemicals from the point of view of
compatibility, storage, fire protection, toxicity, hazard index rating, fire and explosion
hazards.
 Process safety management: HAZOP, FTA, F&E Index calculation, reliability assessment
of process equipment, incorporating safety trips and interlocks, scrubbing system, etc.
not done before effecting major process changes, lack of Management of Change
procedure (MoC), etc.
 Electrical safety: Hazardous area classification, protection against static electricity,
improper maintenance of specialized equipment like flameproof etc. were ignored.

 Safety audits: Periodical assessment of safety procedures and practices, performance of

safety systems and gadgets along with follow up measures were not carried out.
 Emergency planning: Lack of comprehensive risk analysis indicating the impact of
consequences and specific written down and practiced emergency procedures along
with suitable facilities had increased the severity of the emergency situations.
 Training: Safety induction and periodical refresher training for the regular employees
and contract workmen were not carried out.
 Risk management & insurance planning: Thorough identification and analysis of all risks
and insurance planning were not done so that interruption risks and public liability risks
could also be managed effectively.
7.9.6 FIRE PROTECTION
1.Indian Standards
 IS 2189 - Standard for automatic fire detection and alarm system.
 IS 2190 - Code of practice for selection, installation and maintenance of first aid fire
extinguishers.
 IS 3844 - Code of practice for installation and maintenance of internal fire hydrants and
hose reels.
 IS 6382 - Carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system - fixed design and installation.
2.Oil Industry Safety Directorate

 OISD 117 - Fire Protection Facilities for Petroleum Depots and Terminals.
 OISD 142 - Inspection of firefighting equipment and systems.
 OISD 158 - Recommended Practices on Storage and Handling of Bulk Liquefied
Petroleum Gas.
3.NFPA Standards
 NFPA 12 - Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishing Systems.

 NFPA 654 - Prevention of Fire & Dust in Pharmaceutical Industries.
 NFPA 1600 - Disaster Management.
 NFPA 921 - Fire & Explosion Investigation.
 NFPA 45 - Fire protection for Laboratories using Chemicals.
4. OHS (OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY)

 IS 14489 - Code of Practice for Occupational Safety & Health Audit.

 NFPA 101 - Life Safety Code.
5.ER (ELECTRICAL RISK)
 Hazardous Area Classification (base standard: IS 5572)

 Selection of Electrical Equipment for Hazardous Areas (base standard: IS 5571)
 Lightning Protection (base document: IS: 2309 /NFPA 780 /BS 6651)
 NFPA 70 B - Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance
 NFPA 70 E - Standard for Electrical Safety in Employee Work places
7.9.7 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

 Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) studies
 Failure Tree Analysis (FTA)
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
 Primary Hazard Analysis (PHA) using Dow Index
 Risk Assessment (with risk ranking technique)
7.9.8 ELECTRICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
 Review of Hazardous Area Classification
 Lightning Protection Risk Assessment
 Identification & Control of Electro-Static Hazards
 Review of electrical Preventive Maintenance System
 Electrical Risk Assessment (fire, shock explosion) using Semi-Quantitative Risk Ranking
(SQRR) technique.
7.9.9 FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT

 Identification & assessment of fire risks during operations in receipt, storage, transfer
and handling of chemicals (raw materials and finished products).
 Identification & control of ignition sources in areas where flammable chemicals are
stored / handled / transferred.
o Review of chemical compatibility in storage areas and to suggest appropriate fire
loss control measures.
o Review of fire detection measures adopted in the plant & to suggest suitable
improvement measures.
o Review of the various active (fire hydrant, sprinkler, portable fire extinguishers)
and passive fire protection requirements for chemical storage and handling areas
and to suggest improvements as necessary.
o Review of contractor safety awareness (chemical spill, fire fighting, emergency
communication, knowledge of plant hazards & safety regulations) and to
recommend suitable improvement measures to enhance contractor safety.
o Review of safety awareness and safety training requirements (training
identification and efficacy) of plant employees with respect to hazards present in
the plant.
Fire risk assessment will be carried out based on techniques like Matrix method, Hani Raafat
Risk Calculator. The consequence, likelihood and exposure of each hazard are arrived using a

systematic approach and will help to determine the relative importance of hazard and focus
on significant risks.
7.10 RISK ANALYSIS & EMERGENCY PLAN

 Identification of scenarios of potential disasters / emergencies leading to loss of life,
property damage etc. and qualitative assessment of their likelihood.
 Quantitative risk assessment for selected scenarios of major credible events.
 Recommendations for risk control measures wherever applicable.
 Preparation of onsite emergency preparedness plan.
7.10.1 RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE PLANNING

 Identification of all major internal and external risks including the natural risks and
analysis of the impact of above risks.
 Review of existing risk control measures and offering comments.
 Scrutiny of all existing major insurance policies in respect of:
o Rationalization of basic rate of premium and widening of covers.
o Applicability / eligibility of discounts in premium.
o Application of suitable clauses, warranties and conditions.
 Identification of possible areas for refund of premium and suggestions regarding
procedure for the same.
 Selection of insurance coverage on the basis of risk analysis.
 Providing guidelines for fixation of sum insured and illustrating the same on selected
equipment.
 Evaluation of business interruption exposure due to identified risks.
 Providing guidelines on documentation requirements, procedures for claims under
various policies, evaluation of insurers.
7.10.2 RISK MANAGEMENT TRAINING
Specialized and focussed training, if imparted effectively, can contribute significantly to Risk
Management. Expert faculty, carefully selected training module, interactive and participate
approach, useful training material, case studies and syndicate exercises could help in having
effective risk management system in place.
The training topics for bulk drug industry could be:
 Chemical safety
 Safety with compressed gases
 Solvent safety
 Hazard identification techniques
 Industrial risk management
 Fire prevention and protection
 Electrical risk management

 Emergency preparedness
 Safety management system
 Accident prevention
 Personal Protective Equipment
7.10.3 GENERAL GUIDELINES TO BE ADOPTED BY THE UNIT FOR MINIMIZING ASSOCIATED

RISKS AT M/S. RL FINECHEM PVT. LTD.,
The plant should draft an environmental health and safety policy and work adhering to it.
1. The study is based on assumptions that the storage are designed, constructed and
operated in accordance with the safe engineering practices and standards. It is
recommended that strict adherence to the standards, accepted practices and operating
maintenance & safety procedures are followed not only during the installation of the
plant but also throughout the life of the plant.
2. Wind direction plays a major role in case of chemical releases. Hence adequate wind
socks are to be provided at strategic locations for people to notice and take appropriate
actions in case of an emergency.
3. Non essential personnel should be located away from the main plant area. These include
office staff, administration, accounts etc. and they should be restricted to the
administrative building.
4. The main plant area within the plant premises should be marked as high safety zone and
only operation and maintenance personnel and authorized staff/visitor should be
allowed to enter in this area. Any person entering this area, be it visitor or plant
personnel must be equipped with safety gadgets and must be made aware of the
assembly points.
5. The safety instructions and safe operating conditions (for the plant and machinery)
recommended by the manufacturers / vendors should be strictly followed.
6. Maintenance plays a vital role in proper upkeep of the plant. An equally important
function is monitoring of health of equipment, pipelines and machinery. The following
systems will be adopted
 thickness survey (including supports),
 maintenance history cards,
 preventive maintenance practices
These will not only improve plant performance but also safety. It should be pointed out that
the failure rates of equipment and pipes are influenced by the maintenance practice followed.
When the plant starts aging, it is suggested that due attention be given to this aspect when
formulating a maintenance strategy.
7.10.4 ACCIDENT REPORTING

1. INTRODUCTION

An accident is an unplanned event that results in injury, damage to property or some other
loss. The law requires that certain work-related accidents are reported to the local authority
or the Health and Safety Executive.
All accidents to employees, however minor, should be recorded. This is a requirement under
social security legislation. As a result of a workplace injury an employee may need to claim
for benefits in the future, and the relevant checks will be made to confirm that the accident
occurred at work.
Reporting and recording procedures vary. Employers need to be sure that they satisfy all legal
reporting requirements for employees and non-employees, and take measures to monitor
accidents. As part of the reactive monitoring process, accident records are needed to assess
whether the existing controls are adequate or to identify if trends are developing and to
implement new procedures.
2. ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
The following actions are to be taken in the event of an accident/incident

 Area to be made safe if necessary or possible.
 First-aider to be contacted if there is an injured person. Alternatively, Security can be
contacted for first-aid assistance.
 Report accident/incident to the relevant manager and/or safety officer. The safety
officer must investigate the accident recording corrective actions,sign the form and
forward a copy to the safety office within 4 days.
3. REPORTS TO BE GENERATED IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENTS
The following reports have to be generated
 Accidents involving employees, including minor injuries.

 Accidents involving non-employees e.g visitors.
 Incidents where no one is injured but there is a potential for injury.
 Physical assaults or verbal abuse of employees.
 Dangerous occurrences such as fires, gas leaks or explosions, chemical spillages,
damage to materials, failure or collapse of equipment etc.
 Work-related ill-health from use of chemicals, occupational asthma, musculo-skeletal
pain etc.
4. THE REPORTING OF INJURIES, DISEASES AND DANGEROUS OCCURRENCES REGULATIONS
The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 1995
requires the Industry to notify certain work related injuries, illness and “dangerous
occurrences” (summarized below) to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) at the earliest
practicable time after the event. This reporting responsibility will be with the safety office staff
or the duty manager in the absence of safety personnel.
Any incident that results in a serious injury to an employee including

 A break or fracture of any bone except those of the fingers or toes;

 Any amputation;
 Dislocation of the shoulder, hip, knee or spine;
 Loss of sight (whether temporary or permanent);
 Chemical or hot burn to the eye or any penetrating injury to the eye;
 An injury resulting from electric shock or electrical burns;
 An injury that leads to a loss of consciousness or requires resuscitation;
 An injury resulting in an employee being unable to perform regular duties or being
away from work for 3 days or more;
 An injury that requires the injured employee to be hospitalised for more than 24 hours.
 Any accident or incident, connected with or arising out of the industrial work activity,
that results in a 'non-employee', i.e someone who is not a industry employee, being
taken from the scene of the accident to hospital for treatment. This is regardless
whether or not they are admitted into hospital.
 Any dangerous occurrence such as fires.
 Specified diseases associated with certain work activities, or exposure to certain
substances.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Employees
It is the responsibility of individual employees to report accidents/incidents to their heads of

process as soon as possible. In most cases, individual employees will complete their own
accident report form but it is important that this form is forwarded to the safety officer.
2. Safety officer
Safety officer must ensure that all accidents are investigated to identify underlying causes,
the accident/investigation report form is completed and the original is forwarded to the
safety office within 4 days of the accident. The safety officer should recommend appropriate
corrective actions and ensure that risk assessments are revised if necessary.
3. Managers
Managers must ensure that corrective actions are implemented and communicated to all
relevant persons.
If an employee is absent as a result of an accident then the manager or safety officer must
complete the form on his/her behalf.
4. Safety office
Maintaining records:record of incidents and investigations reports will be maintained by the

Safety Office according to statutory requirements.

Investigating: The safety office will investigate all serious incidents/dangerous

occurrences/near misses/diseases.
Monitoring: The safety office will monitor the details and information provided on the
accident investigation report form, follow-up on corrective actions and report trends to the
safety officer.
The incident and accident investigation and reporting procedure will be audited as part of
each area’s Health and Safety Management audit.
6. Incident/accident reporting and investigation flow chart for work-related

accidents/incident and near misses
*Work-related Accidents/incidents
accidents/incidents involving non-
involving employees employees i.e visitors
Over 3 days Major

incapacity
Environmental Impact Assessment Report- 98- injury **
or absence orfatalit
from work y
All other Fatality or

accidents taken from
including acts of the scene No
violence against of accident
staff and near to hospital
misses for
treatment
Yes
Contact process head or

manager on duty immediately
Investigate and send

completed accident form to
safety office within 4 days
*Work-related accidents, near misses and illnesses are those that are attributed
to work activity, equipment and substances, condition of the premises or the
level of supervision.
**Major injuries include fractures (except fingers and toes), amputations, loss of
sight, 24 hrs hospitalization etc.
7.10.5 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDIES CARRIED OUT FOR
M/S. RL FINECHEM PVT. LTD.,
The risk assessment studies carried out for the industry, M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd.,has
covered various aspects encompassing hazard identification, severity mapping for fire and
spillages, MCA analysis studies etc.
Based on the above it can be concluded that there are ample risks associated with the
handling of various solvents and fuel as elucidated in the severity matrix studies.
Suitable fire protection system and general guidelines to be adopted by theindustry and
preventive systems provided to prevent or reduce the hazards have been proposed.
The management of M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd., is committed to the implementation of the
recommendations of the risk assessment report in true spirits.

7.10.6 AIR POLLUTION DISPERSION MODELING STUDIES

1. INTRODUCTION
Atmospheric dispersion modeling is the mathematical simulation of how air pollutants
disperse in the ambient atmosphere. It is performed with computer programs that solve the
mathematical equations and algorithms which simulate the pollutant dispersion. The
dispersion models are used to estimate or to predict the downwind concentration of air
pollutants emitted from sources such as industrial plants and vehicular traffic. Such models
are important to governmental agencies tasked with protecting and managing the ambient
air quality. The models are typically employed to determine whether existing or proposed
new industrial facilities are or will be in compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) in the United States and other nations. The models also serve to assist in
the design of effective control strategies to reduce emissions of harmful air pollutants.
In the present study prediction of impacts on the air environment has been carried out
employing U.S. EPA AERMOD dispersion model, 1996 – 2009 Lakes Environmental Software,
Version 7.1.0 and designed for multiple sources for predicting the maximum ground level
concentration (GLC).
2. MODEL INPUT DATA

The major air emissions at the site of M/s. RL FineChem Pvt. Ltd. are SPM, SO2 and NOx from
boilers and DGs. The Proponents have proposed to install column scrubbers & dust collectors
to the process section stacks. Also the manufacturing process involves reactions in completely
closed reactors and therefore no emissions are anticipated. The site specific details
considered as input data for the software (AERMOD view by Lakes Environmental) to predict
the impacts on the air environment are given in the following tables.
Data considered for calculation of GLC is given in the table 7.19 as under.
Table 7.19: Data considered for calculation of GLC

Particulars Sources
DG SET Boiler Boiler
(500 KVA) (3 TPH) (3 TPH)
Stack height, m 7 ARL 30 AGL 30 AGL
Stack diameter, m 0.22 0.49 0.49
Flue gas temperature, 0C 194 105 105
Gas exit velocity, m/s 8.58 7.97 7.97
Emission rate, g/s
PM10 0.00149 6.72 0.0106
SO2 0.02734 0.49 0.0490
NOx 0.0447 0.36 0.0360

CO 0.3874 0.32 0.0320

Acid mist/VOCs - - -
7.10.7 METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Data recorded at the site for one year period (2015) for wind speed, direction and
temperature has been used for computations. In order to conduct a refined air dispersion
modeling short term air quality dispersion models, the site specific hourly meteorological data
measured at the site is pre-processed using U.S. EPA AERMET program.
1. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
The simulations were made to evaluate incremental short-term concentrations due to
proposed project.
In the short-term simulations, the incremental concentrations were estimated to obtain an

optimum description of variations in concentrations within study area of 10 km radius. The
predicted results are tabulated in the following table.
Table 7.20 shows the Predicted incremental short-term concentrations due to the proposed
project.
Fig 7.8 shows Suspended Particulate Matter (PM10) isotherms for the proposed project for i)
24 hours – 1st highest value, ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile, iii) Annual
Fig 7.9shows the Sulfur di-oxide (SO2) isotherms for proposed project for i) 24 hours – 1st
highest value, ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile, iii) Annual
Fig 7.10shows the Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) isotherms for proposed project for i) 24 hours –
1st highest value, ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile and iii) Annual.
Fig 7.11shows the Carbon monoxide (CO) isotherms for proposed project for i) 1 hour – 1st
highest value, ii) 1 hour – 98 percentile, iii) 8 hours – 1st highest value, iv) 8 hours – 98
percentile.
The predicted incremental short term concentrations due to the proposed project with the
the Resultant maximum 24 hourly concentrations is shown in the table 7.20 as under.
Table 7.20: Predicted incremental short-term concentrations due to the proposed project
Time Maximum predicted concentrations, Direction and distance of occurrence
µg/m3
24 hour Annual 24 hour Annual
st
1 highest 98 1st 98
values percentile highest percentile
values
PROPOSED

Suspended 0.47569 0.35737 0.06317 Site Site Site

Particulate Boundary Boundary Boundar
Matter y
(PM10)
Sulfur di- 9.06439 6.74192 1.3740 0.156 km Site 0.33 km –
oxide (SO2) – North Boundary North West
West
Oxides of 14.81998 11.02281 2.0104 Site Site Site
nitrogen Boundary Boundary Boundary
(NOx)
Carbon 1 hr – 1 hr – 0.1362 Site Site Site
monoxide 1.2544 0.84605 Boundary Boundary Boundary
(CO) 8 hr – 8 hr –
1.6896 1.16715
Fig 7.8: Suspended Particulate Matter (PM) isotherms for the proposed project
i) 24 hours – 1st highest value

ii) 24 hours – 98 percentile

iii) Annual

Fig 7.9: Sulfur di-oxide (SO2) isotherms for proposed project



iii) Annual

Fig 7.10: Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) isotherms for proposed project



iii) Annual

Fig 7.11: Carbon monoxide (CO) isotherms for proposed project
i) 1 hour – 1st highest value

ii) 1 hour – 98 percentile

iii) 8 hours – 98 percentile

iv) Annual

2. COMMENTS
The maximum short-term incremental ground-level concentrations are superimposed on the
baseline data to get the likely resultant levels after the establishment of the proposed project
and resultant maximum 24 hourly concentrations is given in the table 7.21 as under.
Table 7.21: Resultant maximum 24 hourly concentrations

Pollutant Incremental Max. baseline Resultant Limits as per MoEF,
concentrations, concentrations, concentrations, µg/m3 for industrial
µg/m 3 µg/m 3 µg/m 3 areas (24 hrs)

PROJECT SITE (A1)

PM10 0.35737 24 24.35737 100
SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80
NOx 11.02281 8.53 19.55281 80
CO 1 hr –0.84605 Nil 1 hr –0.84605 4,000 – 1 hr
8 hr – 1.16715 8 hr – 1.16715 2,000 – 8 hrs
A2-thumakunta
PM10 0.35737 32 32.35737 100
SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80
NOx 11.02281 9.7 20.72281 80
CO 1 hr –0.84605 Nil 1 hr –0.84605 4,000 – 1 hr
8 hr – 1.16715 8 hr – 1.16715 2,000 – 8 hrs

µg/m3 µg/m3 µg/m3 areas (24 hrs)
(A3) ramachandra puram
PM10 0.35737 28.66 29.01737 100
SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80
NOx 11.02281 7.76 18.78281 80
CO 1 hr –0.84605 Nil 1 hr –0.84605 4,000 – 1 hr
8 hr – 1.16715 8 hr – 1.16715 2,000 – 8 hrs
(A4) huchodanahalli
PM10 0.35737 32.33 32.68737 100
SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80
NOx 11.02281 9.73 20.75281 80
CO 1 hr –0.84605 Nil 1 hr –0.84605 4,000 – 1 hr
8 hr – 1.16715 8 hr – 1.16715 2,000 – 8 hrs

µg/m3 µg/m3 µg/m3 areas (24 hrs)
(A5) gollapuram
PM10 0.35737 30.33 30.68737 100
SO2 6.74192 4 10.74192 80
NOx 11.02281 9.23 20.25281 80
CO 1 hr –0.84605 Nil 1 hr –0.84605 4,000 – 1 hr
8 hr – 1.16715 8 hr – 1.16715 2,000 – 8 hrs
A1: Project site; A2: Thumakunta; A3: Ramachandrapura; 4: Huchodanahalali; 5: Gollapuram;

According to MoEF air quality standards (as per the notification dated 16 th November 2009
for industrial, residential & rural areas) 24 hourly or 8 hourly or 1 hourly monitored values,
as applicable, shall be complied with 98% of the time in a year; 2% of the time, they may
exceed the limits but not on two consecutive days of monitoring.
Therefore the 98% values are considered for estimation of the incremental concentration.
The above table indicates that the cumulative resultant ambient air quality after proposed
project operation will be within the ambient air quality limits specified by MoEF as per the
notification dated 16th November 2009 for industrial, residential & rural areas.
7.10.8 PUBLIC CONSULTATION
The proposed project comes under notified industrial area. The public hearing was already
conducted for this notified industrial area (for the Development of Industrial area Ohase I &
II at Gowribidanur in district Chikkaballapur (Karnataka) by Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Board) and its reference number: Terms of Reference (TOR) Letter F.No. 21-
65/2012-IA.III and F.No. 21-66/2012-IA.III vide letter dated 10/10/2013. Therefore public
hearinh is exempted for the proposed project.
7.10.9 SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, R&R ACTION PLANS

The proposed project is establishment of API’s manufacturing industry with R & D activity.
The land is sufficient for the proposed proposal & therefore no re-settlement &re-habilitation
is envisaged.

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7.2 HAZOP ANALYSIS

Risk Assessment Report- 1-

Potential problems as represented by the consequences of the deviation should be

Table 7.1 HAZOP ANALYSIS

Risk Assessment Report- 2-

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Bromazepam product

1st Possible Hazards /

Risk Assessment Report- 3-

The centrifuge is earthed by

Risk Assessment Report- 4-

Recover ~200L methanol ,cool to

The centrifuge is earthed by

Risk Assessment Report- 5-

Distilled to recover Methanol. Un

Risk Assessment Report- 6-

Risk Assessment Report- 7-

Name of the product 3) Ammmonia 4) Bromazepam( FG)

Risk Assessment Report- 8-

Hazop Analysis - Process – for CINNARIZINE product

Risk Assessment Report- 9-

e) cooling the reaction Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

Risk Assessment Report- 10-

Risk Assessment Report- 11-

Name of the product 3) Cinnamylalcohol 4) Cinnarizine

Risk Assessment Report- 12-

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Clonazepam product

Risk Assessment Report- 13-

The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires.

Risk Assessment Report- 14-

The centrifuge is earthed by conducting wires.

Risk Assessment Report- 15-

Name of the product 1) 2’Chloro,5-Nitro 2-chloro 2) Methanol (RM)

Risk Assessment Report- 16-

Name of the product 3) Ammmonia 4) Clonazepam(FG)

Odour Pungent Odourless

Risk Assessment Report- 17-

7.2.4 Dothiepine hydrochloride

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Dothiepine hydrochloride product

Risk Assessment Report- 18-

d) cooling the Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

Risk Assessment Report- 19-

Risk Assessment Report- 20-

Name of the product 3)HCl GAS 4)Dothiepine HCL(FG)

Risk Assessment Report- 21-

7.2.5 Doxepin hydrochloride

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Doxepin hydrochloride product

Risk Assessment Report- 22-

d) cooling the reaction Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

Charging of MLR All charging is done by vacuum sucking to avoid

Separation of solvents from Drying of the product No specific hazard

Risk Assessment Report- 23-

Name of the product 1) Doxepin base 2) Acetone

Risk Assessment Report- 24-

Carcinogenetic Not classified as a human carcinogen.. Not reported in OSHA. Disposal

Name of the product 3) HCL ( gas) Doxepin hydrochloride (FG)

Risk Assessment Report- 25-

Hazop Analysis - Process – for Flunarizine hydrochloride product

Risk Assessment Report- 26-

d) cooling the Chilled water is circulated in the Jacket.

Risk Assessment Report- 27-

Risk Assessment Report- 28-

Name of the product 3) HCL ( gas) 4)Flunarizine HCL(FG)