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Global Logistics Network
Modelling and Policy
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Global Logistics Network
Modelling and Policy
Quantification and Analysis for
International Freight
Edited by
Ryuichi Shibasaki
Hironori Kato
Cesar Ducruet
Elsevier
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Contents
Contributors ix
Preface: Globalisation and global logistics xi
Part One General introduction 1

1 Introduction to global container shipping market 3
César Ducruet and Hidekazu Itoh
Introduction: Containerisation and global logistics 3
Economic growth and container cargo movements 7
Port development and terminal operations 11
Global maritime container shipping 17
Conclusion 22
Appendix 23
References 29
2 A global analysis of hinterlands from a European perspective 31

David Guerrero
Introduction 31
Historical origin of European hinterlands 31
Analysing global hinterlands in a contemporary context 32
Determinants of hinterland expansion and shrinkage 34
Variations in port choice behaviour 34
Conclusion 42
References 44
3 Cross-border logistics practices, policies, and its impact 47

Masahiko Furuichi
Introduction 47
Logistics performance and liner shipping connectivity 47
Trade facilitation, transport facilitation, and cross-border management 52
Logistics infrastructure investment needs to 2030/2040 60
Conclusions 62
Appendix 63
References 69
4 Basics of container demand forecast 71

Ryuichi Shibasaki
Introduction 71
Preparation 72
viContents
Step 1: Cargo attraction and generation 77

Step 2: Cargo distribution 79
Step 3: Modal split 86
Step 4: Route choice 89
Conclusion 94
References 95
Part Two Model & data 97

5 Basic concept 99
Ryuichi Shibasaki
Model concept 99
Entire structure of model 101
Other model features and future works 103
Structure of Part 2 103
References 104
6 Global maritime container shipping model 105

Ryuichi Shibasaki
Model framework 105
Shipping time function 106
Shipping cost function 109
Estimation of ocean freight charge 114
Model performance 115
Conclusion 118
References 119
7 Intermodal transport super-network model 121

Ryuichi Shibasaki
Model framework 121
Regional land transport submodel 124
Model calculation and convergence 129
Conclusion 134
References 134
8 Data [1] maritime container shipping and land transport network 135
Ryuichi Shibasaki
Ports: Intersection between MCS and LT networks 135
Global MCS network 138
Regional LT network 145
Conclusion 149
Appendices 149
References 164
Contentsvii
9 Data [2] container shipping demand for the present and future 165
Ryuichi Shibasaki
Present demand 165
Future demand 169
Conclusion 170
Appendix 171
References 176
Part Three Application to the developing world 177

10 Central America: Small countries with active border-crossing
transport on land 179
Ryuichi Shibasaki, Takashi Kadono, and Taiji Kawakami
Introduction 179
Ports and maritime container cargo movements in Central America 180
Data 184
Calculation results 190
Policy simulations 193
Conclusion 199
References 200
11 Greater Mekong Subregion: Is the Mekong River shipping

competitive with other modes? 201
Ryuichi Shibasaki, Takashi Shimada, and Masaru Suzuki
Introduction 201
International container transport in Cambodia 202
Data 211
Conclusion 220
References 221
12 South Asia: Impact simulations of logistics projects in India,

Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka 223
Ryuichi Shibasaki and Tomoya Kawasaki
Introduction 223
Ports and container cargo flow in South Asia 224
Data 229
Conclusion 250
References 251
viiiContents
13 Central Asia: Typical landlocked region across Eurasian continent 253

Ryuichi Shibasaki, Satoshi Tanabe, and Hironori Kato
Introduction 253
Gateway seaports and access routes of Central Asia 256
Data 260
Conclusion 274
References 275
14 Pacific Islands: Small and dispersed ‘sea-locked’ islands 277

Takashi Riku, Ryuichi Shibasaki, and Hironori Kato
Introduction 277
Ports and maritime container cargo movement in the Pacific region 279
Data 281
Conclusion 296
Acknowledgments 299
References 299
15 Southern Africa: Overcoming corridor and border challenges

for landlocked countries 301
Tomoya Kawasaki, Masaya Kobayashi, and Ryuichi Shibasaki
Introduction 301
Regional seaports and land transport 301
Data 307
Conclusion 318
References 320
16 Belt and Road Initiative: How does China’s BRI encourage the
use of international rail transport across the Eurasian continent? 321
Ryuichi Shibasaki, Kentaro Nishimura, Satoshi Tanabe,
and Hironori Kato
Introduction 321
International container railway services to/from China 322
Data 325
Conclusion 334
References 334
Conclusion 337
Author Index 341
Subject Index 345
Contributors
César Ducruet Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Masahiko Furuichi International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH), The

University of Tokyo
David Guerrero AME-SPLOTT, Univ Gustave Eiffel, IFSTTAR
Hidekazu Itoh Kwansei Gakuin University
Takashi Kadono NEWJEC Inc.
Hironori Kato The University of Tokyo
Taiji Kawakami Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan
Tomoya Kawasaki Tokyo Institute of Technology
Masaya Kobayashi Nippon Express Co., Ltd.
Kentaro Nishimura The University of Tokyo
Takashi Riku The University of Tokyo
Ryuichi Shibasaki The University of Tokyo
Takashi Shimada The Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan (OCDI)
Masaru Suzuki Nikken Kogaku Co., Ltd.
Satoshi Tanabe The University of Tokyo

Preface: Globalisation and global
logistics
In our daily lives, we are surrounded by many goods from all over the world. My shirt,
for example, is from Vietnam, my trousers are made in China, and my jacket comes
from Italy. My watch is Swiss made, and my glasses are imported from the United
States. The coffee cup on my desk is produced in France, and the coffee in it is made
from blended beans from Brazil and Guatemala. Perhaps my laptop is assembled in
my own country, but its parts are imported. In the same way, many goods are produced
in various regions, transported across locations, and finally consumed at other places.
This complicated production–consumption system has been facilitated by the global-
ised logistics system wherein products are transported internationally, in addition to
the international movements of people, currency, and information.
The establishment of the global logistics system is the result of three major fac-
tors: technological innovation, infrastructure investment, and evolution of the insti-
tutional system. Containerisation was an epoch-making event that transformed the
logistics industry from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive industry (Levinson,
2006). Containerisation has facilitated complex cargo-handling tasks such as load-
ing/discharging and trans-shipment of cargo to and from vessels at ports, upgraded
safety standards, reduced damage to cargos, and also enabled an intermodal transport
network connecting ships, railways, and trucks. Vessel design technology has also
evolved, resulting in larger vessels over time (Rodrigue, 2017). The upward trend in
the sizes of containerships is mainly motivated by economies of scale, which has led
to a significant reduction in average cargo transport costs. International cargo traffic
flows are also supported by sophisticated transactions of commercial information and
currency. Notably, recent revolutions in information and communication technology
(ICT) have enhanced the efficiency and safety of global logistics operations. These
developments include sophisticatedly digitalised operating systems such as electronic
data interchange (EDI) processing, radio-frequency identification (RFID) processing,
and optimisation of cargo handling at automated container terminals (Saragiotis, 2019;
Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015; Steenken et al., 2004). Regarding the institutional framework,
trade obstacles due to traditional manual transactions at cross-border points have been
gradually removed under the guidance of regional strategies. The liberalisation of inter-
national trade can be realised by trade facilitation and implementation of cross-border
paperless trade, which includes simplifying required paperwork, modernising proce-
dures, harmonising customs requirements, and introducing a single-window system
(Tijan et al., 2019). Reductions in time and costs of cross-border point transactions
xii Preface: Globalisation and global logistics
enable nations to seamlessly connect with others, which can facilitate the process of
evolution into an integrated global production chain.
Rapid globalisation with reduced transport costs has motivated global firms to op-
timise their manufacturing clusters located in regions with the cheapest labour and
material costs. This significantly diminishes production and operating costs. This
trend is further accelerated by a business model of horizontal specialisation at a global
scale (Bloch, 1995). Firms that specialise horizontally identify a specific market to
which it can offer a complete business solution, which may involve offering a wide
range of components, products, and services to a narrow range of customer types
(Williams and Aaron, 2018). Additionally, this business model has promoted the rapid
development of manufacturing industries located in the markets of emerging econo-
mies. To keep updated, major logistics industry players have adapted to rapid global-
isation. Shipping liner companies have established a global hub-and-spoke shipping
network (Farahani et al., 2013). Tough competition amongst shipping companies has
also encouraged mergers and acquisitions under horizontal integration since the 1990s
(Notteboom et al., 2017). This has led to the establishment of giant shipping liners and
promoted global strategic alliances amongst shipping companies (Crotti et al., 2019).
Furthermore, the increased sizes of vessels require massive investment in port and/or
canal facilities. Many governments have participated in the global competition (Parola
et al., 2017) to construct large-scale hub ports to lead the global supply chain and earn
benefits from saved transport costs by facilitating the movement of direct shipping
services to and from hub ports. An interregional intermodal transport network has
been formulated (Reis et al., 2013) under the international development strategies of
regional bodies. Such efforts to improve efficiency in the global logistics system have
accelerated international business activities.
In summary, the globalisation of the supply chain, in line with innovation in logis-
tics and institutional systems and massive investment in freight transport infrastruc-
ture, has enabled many firms to diversify their procurement sources, which has led to
lower supply costs. End users now have more options in consumption goods, whilst
prices have also significantly reduced. This has improved the quality of life for people
whilst increasing tax revenues for governments through the revitalisation of economic
activities. The above-mentioned causality is supported by much empirical evidence,
particularly on the significant associations between international trade and global GDP
growth (Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004; Frankel and Romer, 1999) and positive impacts of
the liberalisation of international trade on economic efficiency (Pavcnik, 2002; Bloom
et al., 2016). Many studies have indicated that even in the least-developed countries,
export growth could stimulate economic growth (e.g. Ghirmay et al., 2001) following
two paths: increasing investments (capital accumulation) and enhancing efficiency.
This has contributed to addressing poverty and other global issues, which are targeted
by the sustainable development goals. The rapid development of the global logistics
network has upgraded accessibility to and from landlocked regions where no sea-
port is available as well as remote areas located far from major markets (Faye et al.,
2004). These improvements in accessibility have encouraged global firms to invest
in such landlocked and remote areas whilst also promoting exports from those areas
that could create more jobs, generate better salaries, and improve the quality of life of
Preface: Globalisation and global logisticsxiii
the people in these places. Similarly, enhancement of regional connectivity amongst

nations enables the development of an integrated economic market, fosters regional
competitions, stimulates international trade and leads to better economic growth even
in less-developed regions.
Nonetheless, the negative aspects of globalisation also exist. A commonly dis-
cussed issue is its damaging effect on local economies and domestic jobs. Developed
countries that outsource manufacturing to other regions to exploit cheaper labour costs
could suffer from employment insecurity; developing countries could also be affected
in their domestic employment although the impacts are still inconclusive (Lee and
Vivarelli, 2006). This may lead to political movements favouring protectionism and
isolationism (Stiglitz, 2017). Another issue relating to globalisation is the income
inequality compromised for the sake of countries’ economic growth. This typically
indicates a ‘core-periphery’ structure, wherein the core contains the major wealthy
and powerful countries, with countries that cannot reap the benefits of global wealth
located at the periphery (Hartmann et al., 2019). Core countries settle on a diverse set
of knowledge-intensive and value-added products, and peripheral developing coun-
tries specialise in exports of simple resources and labour-intensive products to higher
blocks of the hierarchy (Kostoska et al., 2020). This could be regarded as neocolo-
nialism—the dark side of globalisation (Rao, 2000). Additionally, the world system
may be more vulnerable under globalisation, as supply chain disruptions could trans-
fer to and significantly affect international trade. Such system disturbances may be
caused by natural disasters, trade embargoes, or disruptive demand change (Sprecher
et al., 2015). Many researchers in recent years have highlighted the resilience and
vulnerability of the supply chain (Elleuch et al., 2016). The tremendous impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 are still ongoing.
This book attempts to provide a reference for discussions on the above-mentioned
issues from a global logistics system perspective by presenting a technical tool to
investigate the international freight transport network and its related policies. Part 1
contains four chapters which cover introductory topics regarding the container ship-
ping market, hinterlands, cross-border logistics, and container demand forecast. Part 2
presents the model and data, which are complemented with quantitative simulations
and later applied to case studies in many regions. A macroscopic network modelling
technique is employed to analyse cargo flows in international freight networks. The
practical modelling approach enables us to examine the expected impacts of the logis-
tics system changes in a realistic manner. As explained earlier, these logistics changes
include technological innovation, infrastructure investment, and evolution of the insti-
tutional system. The proposed simulation model can assist in evaluating the policies
intended to change the logistics system in terms with their impacts on accessibility,
traffic volume, trade patterns, or share of transport modes. Their expected influences
on regional/local economic performance could also be discussed if the logistics net-
work model is integrated with another international economic simulation model. The
logistics transport network assumed in this book’s model covers multiple transport
modes, including maritime shipping, railway, trucks, and inland waterway transport,
although maritime shipping should be highlighted since its role is dominant in inter-
national trade. Part 3 demonstrates a series of cases wherein the proposed model is
xiv Preface: Globalisation and global logistics
customised and applied to seven regions across the world. They highlight the logistics
network in developing countries since the major problems in logistics systems are
observed in less-developed regions. These case studies are expected to contribute to
the policy debates in each region.
The unique contribution of this book is in providing a useful tool and verifying
its application in various regions for the decision-making of stakeholders in logistics
industries, related government authorities, and international donors concerned with
global issues. We hope that our modelling approach can assist various individuals,
such as supply chain and logistics professionals, university students interested in lo-
gistics and freight transport, and experts in logistics and transport planning/policy in
exploring novel directions in logistics research.
References
Alcalá, F., Ciccone, A., 2004. Trade and productivity. Q. J. Econ. 119 (2), 613–646.
Al-Fuqaha, A., Guizani, M., Mohammadi, M., Aledhari, M., Ayyash, M., 2015. Internet of
things: a survey on enabling technologies, protocols, and applications. IEEE Commun.
Surv. Tutor. 17 (4), 2347–2376.
Bloch, B., 1995. Specialization and its critical role in business. Manag. Decis. 33 (6), 51–58.
Bloom, N., Draca, M., Van Reenen, J., 2016. Trade induced technical change? The impact of
Chinese imports on innovation, IT and productivity. Rev. Econ. Stud. 83 (1), 87–117.
Crotti, D., Ferrari, C., Tei, A., 2019. Merger waves and alliance stability in container shipping.
Marit. Econ. Log. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41278-019-00118-6.
Elleuch, H., Dafaoui, E., Elmhamedi, A., Chabchoub, H., 2016. Resilience and vulnerability in
supply chain: literature review. IFAC-PapersOnLine 49-12, 1448–1453.
Farahani, R.Z., Hekmatfar, M., Arabano, A.B., Nikbakhsh, E., 2013. Hub location problems: a
review of models, classification, solution techniques, and applications. Comput. Ind. Eng.
64 (4), 1096–1109.
Faye, M.L., McArthur, J.W., Sachs, J.D., Snow, T., 2004. The challenges facing landlocked
developing countries. J. Hum. Dev. 5 (1), 31–68.
Frankel, J.A., Romer, D.H., 1999. Does trade cause growth? Am. Econ. Rev. 89 (3), 379–399.
Ghirmay, T., Grabowski, R., Sharma, S.C., 2001. Exports, investment, efficiency and economic
growth in LDC: an empirical investigation. Appl. Econ. 33 (6), 689–700.
Hartmann, D., Bezerra, M., Lodolo, B., Pinheiro, F.L., 2019. International trade, develop-
ment traps, and the core-periphery structure of income inequality. Economia. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001.
Kostoska, O., Mitikj, S., Jovanovski, P., Kocarev, L., 2020. Core-periphery structure in sec-
toral international trade networks: a new approach to an old theory. PLoS ONE 15 (4),
e0229547.
Lee, E., Vivarelli, M., 2006. The social impact of globalization in the developing countries. Int.
Labour Rev. 145 (3), 167–184.
Levinson, M., 2006. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the
World Economy Bigger. Princeton University Press.
Notteboom, T.E., Parola, F., Satta, G., Pallis, A.A., 2017. The relationship between port choice
and terminal involvement of alliance members in container shipping. J. Transp. Geogr. 64,
158–173.
Preface: Globalisation and global logisticsxv
Parola, F., Risitano, M., Ferretti, M., Panetti, E., 2017. The drivers of port competitiveness: a
critical review. Transp. Rev. 37 (1), 116–138.
Pavcnik, N., 2002. Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: evidence from
Chilean plants. Rev. Econ. Stud. 69 (1), 245–276.
Rao, N., 2000. “Neocolonialism” or “globalization”?: postcolonial theory and the demands of
political economy. Interdiscip. Lit. Stud. 1 (2), 165–184.
Reis, V., Meier, J.F., Pace, G., Palacin, R., 2013. Rail and multi-modal transport. Res. Transp.
Econ. 41, 17–30.
Rodrigue, J.P., 2017. The Geography of Transport Systems, fourth ed. Routledge, New York.
Saragiotis, P., 2019. Business process management in the port sector: a literature review. Marit.
Bus. Rev. 4 (1), 49–70.
Sprecher, B., Daigo, I., Murakami, S., Kleijn, R., Vos, M., Kramer, G.J., 2015. Framework
for resilience in material supply chains, with a case study from the 2010 rare earth crisis.
Environ. Sci. Technol. 49 (11), 6740–6750.
Steenken, D., Voß, S., Stahlbock, R., 2004. Container terminal operation and operations re-
search: a classification and literature review. OR Spectr. 26, 3–49.
Stiglitz, J.E., 2017. The overselling of globalization. Bus. Econ. 52, 129–137.
Tijan, E., Agatic, A., Jovic, M., Aksentijevic, S., 2019. Maritime national single window: a pre-
requisite for sustainable seaport business. Sustainability 11, 4570. https://doi.org/10.3390/
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Inst. J. 14 (2), 1–15.
Part One
General introduction
Introduction to global container
shipping market 1
César Ducrueta and Hidekazu Itohb
a
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, bKwansei Gakuin University
Introduction: Containerisation and global logistics

In 26 April 1956, an American land transporter named Malcom McLean started
competing with freight railway companies on interstate long distance transport in
the United States. He first navigated a hopped-up container ship from Newark,
New Jersey, to Houston, Texas, along the US East Coast by his shipping company
(later named Sea-Land). Maritime containers were acquired for two main purposes:
(1) to reduce port handling costs by the unitisation (container ‘box’) of cargo and
(2) to reduce truck transport cost on long-distance delivery. Indeed, the container
ships are permitted to deliver cargo through intermodal transport on land and sea
(Levinson, 2006).
The strongest advantage of containerisation is that cargo handling on the docks
could be managed in a more efficient way. At this time, a container was mounted on
a wagon for land transport, or current roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) shipping. However,
because the system was initially inefficient due to the weight and space of wagons,
container ships used cranes to handle the box between the ship and the yard. Finally,
the Sea-Land company launched a modern full-container ship without crane onboard
in 1966 to cross the Atlantic, as European ports such as Antwerp became able to
handle containers in the late 1960s (Morel and Ducruet, 2015). After certain techno-
logical progress, gantry cranes were placed on berths to carry containers between the
ship and the terminal, whilst chassis and trailer moved containers inside the container
terminal.
Containerisation helped reducing handling time on both sea and land sides. At the
time of early containerisation, the total duration of a round trip in the Pacific Ocean
between East Asia (e.g. Kobe, Japan) and North America (NA) (e.g. San Francisco,
US East Coast) by conventional ship (general cargo) was about 80 days (35 days on
sea and 45 days on land) in 1956. However, in 1968, after full-container ships were
launched, and the total duration of a round trip decreased to 30 days (23 days on sea
and 7 days on land) between Tokyo and Los Angeles (Hoshino, 1995). Containerisation
had contributed to minimising the temporal gaps between origin and destination along
supply chains, whilst accelerating global trade and horizontal division of production.
In 2017, because of slow steaming and multistops at hub-ports, most of round-trip
durations were 35 days (5 weeks) or 42 days (6 weeks) on the route (International
Transport Handbook, 2017), as explained in the following.
Global Logistics Network Modelling and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814060-4.00001-0

Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
4 Global Logistics Network Modelling and Policy
Finally, maritime transport business had changed from labour-intensive to

c apital-intensive industry. For example, global major ports have invested heavily in new
gantry cranes for faster handling operations. In addition to container terminal develop-
ment, container ships grown in size to achieve economies of scale. Indeed, after the in-
troduction of over-Panamaxa vessels in 1988, shipping lines built ever-larger container
ships (Table 1.3). Such vessels again needed investments on the terminal side to ac-
commodate ship calls all over the world. Deeper container berths, mega-gantry cranes,
and larger container yards became the norm for terminal operations. For instance, such
cranes must be cover 24 lines for the beam of 18,000 TEUs class container ships today.
Such operational and technological changes are both causes and consequences of
wider global economic (e.g. manufacturing shifts) dynamics affecting the global port
hierarchy, as presented in Table 1.1 for the period 1975–2016. In 1975, most of the top
ranked container ports were North American, European, and Japanese ports due to the
provision, in the ‘Triade’ (Ohmae, 1985), of container berths with gantry and terminal
cranes that were still lacking at developing countries. However, in 2016, 7 of the top
10 ports were Chinese (including Hong Kong), following high economic growth and
rapid port development since the 2000s. The other three major ports are also in Asia,
like Singapore, Busan, and Dubai.
Despite their initial domination within Asia, Japanese ports, especially the port of
Kobe, had been taken over by other East Asian ports, especially by the port of Busan
due to network effects and the 1995 Hanshin Earthquake (Xu and Itoh, 2018). In a
similar vein, and after playing a crucial role as a gateway and hub for mainland China
due to its pre-1997 status as an independent city-state with Western trade practices,
Hong Kong lost cargo in the last decade to Shenzhen. By contrast, Singapore main-
tained its port growth as the transit point between Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean
connecting Asia with Europe, and by providing highly frequent feeder services to
neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. Yet, competitors started to emerge such as
Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia (2000), Cai-Mep Thi-Vai in Vietnam (1996), and Jakarta/
New Priok in Indonesia (under construction) to provide alternative transit points and
enhance their respective local economies.
In this chapter, we discuss the changes in maritime and port logistics caused by
containerisation in the last 50 years. In “Economic growth and container cargo move-
ments” section, we show the impact of containerisation on the world economy and
global maritime networks including supply chain. “Port development and terminal
operations” section discusses the function of container terminal enhancing maritime
transport and connecting the land and sea transports, especially the constraints and
challenges of port development for larger ships, and the port management and termi-
nal operation. In “Global maritime container shipping” section, we present operational
logics of shipping lines and alliances whilst providing concrete empirical evidences
on changing patterns of global container flows. As reference, Chapter 2 discusses port
hinterland which is the connection to port on the land side with shippers.
a
Based on the ship size which can navigate on Panama Canal; the ship which cannot navigate on the canal
is defined as post-Panamax (or over-Panamax) vessel.
Table 1.1 The container handling ranking changes at ports (unit: thousand TEUs).
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
1 NY/NJ 1730 NY/NJ 1947 Rotterdam 2655 Singapore 5220 Hong Kong 12,550
2 Rotterdam 1079 Rotterdam 1901 NY/NJ 2367 Hong Kong 5100 Singapore 11,846
3 Kobe 905 Hong Kong 1465 Hong Kong 2289 Rotterdam 3670 Kaohsiung 5232
4 San Juan 877 Kobe 1456 Kaohsiung 1901 Kaohsiung 3490 Rotterdam 4787
5 Hong Kong 802 Kaohsiung 979 Kobe 1857 Kobe 2600 Busan 4503
6 Oakland 522 Singapore 917 Singapore 1699 Busan 2350 Hamburg 2890
7 Seattle 481 San Juan 852 Yokohama 1327 Los Angeles 2120 Yokohama 2757
8 Baltimore 421 Long Beach 825 Antwerp 1243 Hamburg 1970 Los Angeles 2555
9 Bremen 410 Hamburg 783 Long Beach 1172 NY/NJ 1900 Long Beach 2390
10 Long Beach 391 Oakland 782 Hamburg 1159 Keelung 1810 Antwerp 2329
11 Tokyo 369 Seattle 782 Keelung 1158 Yokohama 1650 NY/NJ 2276
12 Melbourne 365 Antwerp 724 Busan 1115 Long Beach 1600 Tokyo 2177
13 Keelung 246 Yokohama 722 Los Angeles 1104 Tokyo 1560 Keelung 2170
14 Hamburg 326 Bremen 703 Tokyo 1004 Antwerp 1550 Dubai/Jebel 2073
Ali
15 Antwerp 297 Keelung 660 Bremen 986 Felixstowe 1420 Felixstowe 1898
16 Virginia 292 Busan 634 San Juan 882 San Juan 1380 Manila 1668
17 Sydney 262 Los Angeles 633 Oakland 856 Seattle 1170 San Juan 1593
18 London 260 Tokyo 632 Seattle 845 Bremen 1160 Oakland 1550
19 Yokohama 329 Jeddah 563 Felixstowe 726 Oakland 1120 Shanghai 1527
20 Le Havre 232 Baltimore 523 Baltimore 706 Manila 1039 Bremen 1526
Continued
Table 1.1 Continued
2000 2005 2010 2015 2016

1 Hong Kong 18,100 Singapore 23,192 Shanghai 29,069 Shanghai 36,537 Shanghai 37,130
2 Singapore 17,040 Hong Kong 22,427 Singapore 28,431 Singapore 30,922 Singapore 30,900
3 Busan 7540 Shanghai 18,084 Hong Kong 23,699 Shenzhen 24,204 Shenzhen 23,979
4 Kaohsiung 7426 Shenzhen 16,197 Shenzhen 22,510 Ningbo 20,620 Ningbo 21,560
5 Rotterdam 6280 Busan 11,843 Busan 14,194 Hong Kong 20,114 Busan 19,850
6 Shanghai 5613 Kaohsiung 9471 Ningbo 13,144 Busan 19,469 Hong Kong 19,580
7 Los Angeles 4879 Rotterdam 9300 Guangzhou 12,550 Guangzhou 17,625 Guangzhou 18,885
8 Long Beach 4601 Hamburg 8088 Qingdao/ 12,012 Qingdao/Tsingta 17,510 Qingdao/ 18,000
Tsingta Tsingta
9 Hamburg 4248 Dubai/Jebel Ali 7619 Dubai/Jebel 11,600 Dubai/Jebel Ali 15,592 Dubai/Jebel 14,772
Ali Ali
10 Antwerp 4082 Los Angeles 7485 Rotterdam 11,146 Tianjin 14,100 Tianjin 14,500
11 Shenzhen 3994 Long Beach 6710 Tianjin 10,080 Rotterdam 12,235 Port Kelang 13,183
12 Port Kelang 3207 Antwerp 6482 Kaohsiung 9181 Port Kelang 11,890 Rotterdam 12,385
13 Dubai/Jebel 3059 Qingdao/ 6307 Port Kelang 8870 Kaohsiung 10,264 Kaohsiung 10,465
Ali Tsingta
14 NY/NJ 3050 Port Kelang 5716 Antwerp 8468 Antwerp 9654 Antwerp 10,037
15 Tokyo 2899 Ningbo 5208 Hamburg 7900 Dalian 9450 Dalian 9614
16 Felixstowe 2853 Tianjin 4801 Tanjung 6530 Xiamen 9183 Xiamen 9414
Perapus
17 Bremen 2712 NY/NJ 4793 Long Beach 6263 Tanjung Perapus 9120 Hamburg 8910
18 Gioia Tauro 2653 Guangzhou 4685 Xiamen 5820 Hamburg 8821 Los Angeles 8857
19 Tanjung 2476 Tanjung 4177 NY/NJ 5292 Los Angeles 8160 Tanjung 8029
Priok/Ja Pelepas Perapus
20 Yokohama 2317 Laem Chabang 3766 Dalian 5242 Long Beach 7192 Laem 7227
Chabang
From Containerization International, 2009. Containerization International Yearbook. Informa UK Ltd, and United Nations, 2016. Review of maritime transport. In: United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, Geneva.
Introduction to global container shipping market7
Economic growth and container cargo movements

The innovation of containerisation in maritime trade cause a rapid expansion of global
trade (see also Bernhofen et al., 2013). Fig. 1.1 compares the evolution of different
maritime trades in the last four decades (the handling level of 1990 is the baseline).
Most of the goods shipped in containers being general cargo, or intermediate and
finished goods, container traffic had expanded much quickly than general cargo, es-
pecially after 1998 (see also Fig. 1.4). Indeed, a growing share of general cargo had
become containerised in the last two decades. In addition, the impacts of global reces-
sion for maritime trade were much bigger on container than on general cargoes.
The relationship between maritime trade, especially containerisation, and economic
activities, Fig. 1.2, shows the increasing rate changes of container handling volumes
(TEUs) and dry cargo (ton base) compared to Global Domestic Product (GDP) in the
last four decades or so. Except for 1998 and 2009, the growth rate of container han-
dling volumes has been higher than that of dry cargo and GDP. The average growth
rate of container handling volume is about 9.6% as compared to 4.1% for dry cargo
and 3.0% for GDP. On the other hand, the standard deviation of container handling
growth rate is 5.8, as compared with 5.0 and 1.3 for dry cargo and GDP, respectively.
Several factors explain such a result. First, handling items in containers are mainly
high value-added goods (i.e. consumption and intermediate goods), so the demand
for container transport is less stable than that for general cargo and natural resources
(i.e. bulks). Second, container handling is highly connected with economic circula-
tion. For example, the correlation coefficients of the growth rate with GDP are 0.66
Container Dry cargo loaded Total goods loaded
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
70 972 974 976 978 980 982 984 986 988 990 992 994 996 998 000 002 004 006 008 010 012 014 016
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Fig. 1.1 The relative expanding speeds of maritime trade. World Bank Open Data, and
UNCTAD Stat.
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
–0.05
–0.1
–0.15
Container Dry cargo GDP
Fig. 1.2 The increasing rate changes of container, dry cargo, and GDP. World Bank Open
Data, and UNCTAD Stat.
with container and 0.47 with dry cargo. Third, slowing of trade, or increase in global
GDP, is higher than that for global trade, as the Lehman shock ended in 2017 (CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economics Policy Analysis, 24 November 2017).
When observing the growth rate of container handling volumes and GDP by coun-
tries (see Appendix, Table 1.A1), again, the growth rate of container handling was
found to be higher than that of GDP. However, the current Chinese growth rate of con-
tainer handling remains rather moderate, whilst that in Hong Kong has been negative
in the last 5 years. The centre of gravity of economic expansion had, indeed, shifted
toward South Asia, like Indonesia and Vietnam (Itoh, 2012).
Fig. 1.3A and B show the relative scales of container handling volumes and
value-added goods (GDP) by regions/countries (see Appendix, Table 1.A2). Until the
mid-1990s, most of the container traffic was handled in advanced economies and re-
gions as mentioned earlier, until Chinese ports increased their share after 1995, and es-
pecially in 2001 [entry of China in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)]. Currently,
the total Chinese share including Hong Kong is more than 30%, whilst European ports
witnessed a decrease from 30% in 1975 to 12% in 2015. Although Hong Kong had in-
creased its global share until the middle of 1990s, its share was taken by the mainland
Chinese ports by the container terminal developments, turning it into a global financial
and value-added centre instead of a cargo handling hub (see Wang and Chen, 2010).
On the other hand, the relative shares of GDP have been changing more smoothly
than that for container handling. For example, although the Chinese economy in-
cluding Hong Kong occupied about 12% in 2015, the advanced economies, like NA,
Europe (Germany, United Kingdom, and France), and Japan still take their position
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
North America Europe East Asia Southeat Asia India Brazil Australia Midle East Others
(A)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
North America Europe East Asia Southeat Asia India Brazil Australia Midle East Others
(B)
Fig. 1.3 The shares for global total by countries/regions. (A) Container handling volumes.
Based on the data from Table 1.A2A; (B) Gross domestics products (GDP). Based on the data
from Table 1.A2B.
to some extent. This result is partly due to the fact that container handling volumes
are sometimes inflated by official statistics because of large transshipment volumes,
leading to double counts of each container move.
Until the end of 1990s, the relative changes in economic activities (GDP) and cargo
movements (containers) had maintained relatively tight linkages. In Fig. 1.4, the cor-
relation coefficients between the relative shares of GDP and container handling on
countries (see Appendix, Table 1.A2) had been increasing until 1999. The decrease
after 2000, including China’s entry in the WTO and the global financial crisis effects,
can be explained by the rapid progress of supply chain development in emerging econ-
omies (i.e. BRICS countries), especially in Asia, and a growing imbalanced interna-
tional horizontal division of production (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2A and B present the inter- and intraregional container movements in 1998
and 2016. As discussed earlier, the distribution of container and economic activities
had been closely connected until 1999. However, they are less connected in the 2000s.
The centre of gravity of container movements have been shifting to intraregional activ-
ities in Asia in a context of increased regional integration, thereby concentrating more
than 25% of global container movements. Currently, the impact of economic growth
on container movements is amplified and imbalanced on routes, or highly weighted
inside Asia. Containerisation has increased the speed of economic growth at emerging
economies and expanded the imbalance of cargo movements on routes and regions
throughout the world.
1.000
0.950
0.900
0.850
0.800
0.750
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Fig. 1.4 The correlation coefficient between GDP and container shares. This figure is based
on the data sets on Table 1.A1A and B.
Table 1.2 World container movements (unit: thousand TEUs).
(A) 1998
East/Southeast
Origin/destination North America Europe Asia
North America – 2036 (5.7%) 3338 (9.4%)
Europe 1509 (4.2%) – 2296 (6.5%)
East/Southeast Asia 5938 (16.7%) 4246 (12.0%) 5873 (16.5%)
(B) 2016
East/Southeast
Origin/destination North America Europe Asia
North America 482 (0.3%) 2048 (1.3%) 7252 (4.7%)
Europe 3913 (2.6%) 6928 (4.5%) 7022 (4.6%)
East/Southeast Asia 16,708 (10.9%) 15,049 (9.8%) 39,214 (25.6%)
(A) The estimated total container handling volumes are 35,528,000 TEUs.
(B) The estimated total container handling volumes are 153,270,049 TEUs.
(A) From MOL Research Institute, 1999. Current Status of Liner Shipping Service 1998–1999 (in Japanese); (B) From
Japan Maritime Public Relations Center, 2017. Shipping Now 2017–2018 (in Japanese). see https://www.kaijipr.or.jp/
shipping_now/.
Port development and terminal operations

Terminal development and new port opening
The first ship in 1956 by McLean delivered 58 boxes. Containerships expanded through
economies of scale (see Table 1.3) as underlined by Cullinane and Khanna (2000).
For instance, although the ship capacity was less than 1000 in the 1960s, currently
the world’s largest containership ‘MOL Triumph’ of the shipping line MOL built in
2017 reached more than 20,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (20,170 TEU), 400 m in
length, and 59 m in width. As a consequence, such ‘mega-ships’ require high-standard
container terminals in terms of both berth length and depth (see Ducruet and Berli,
2018 for an empirical analysis of the global distribution of mega-ship traffic). These
facilities affected port operational efficiencies (Tongzon, 2001; Itoh, 2002) and led to
a debate on whether ports and nation-states should follow such a trend. As discussed
previously, the so-called ‘Post-Panamax II’ ships carrying about 8000 TEU needed
container berth with 16–18 m water depth and 18,000 TEU capacity on the terminal
(ULCS).
Large-size container ship causes the expansion of container terminals. Except the
ports of Marseilles and Barcelona in Europe, Los Angeles, and Long Beach in NA,
numerous ports are located upstream rivers and estuaries as a reflection of their his-
torical background of port development, so their expansion faces important limita-
tions, with Antwerp and Hamburg being exceptional cases (Notteboom, 2016). This
explains why larger ships increasingly call at deepwater ports, the exemplary case be-
ing London, mainly served by Felixstowe (operated by Hong Kong-based Hutchinson
Whampoa), 250 km away, although recently the global operator Dubai Ports World
Table 1.3 The changes of container ship sizes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Category Early Fully Panamax Panamax Post Post New- VLCS ULCS (ultra
cellular Max Panamax Panamax II Panamax (very large) large)
Year 1956– 1970s 1980 1985– 1988– 2000– 2014– 2006– 2013–
Capacity 500– 1000–2500 3000–3400 3400–4500 4000–6000 6000–8500 12,500 11,000– 18,000–
800 15,000 21,000
Length (m) 200 215 250 290 300 340 366 397 400
Beam (m) 20 20 32 32 40 43 49 56 59
Draught (m) 9 10 12.5 12.5 13 14.5 15.2 15.5 16
Across 6 10 13 13 15 17 19–20 22 23
Higha 4 (4) 5 (4) 6 (5) 8 (6) 9 (5) 9 (6) 10 (6) 10 (8) 10 (8)
a
High is the number of container high on deck, the number in parentheses is below deck.
Based on Rodrigue, J.P., 2017. The Geography of Transport Systems, fourth ed. Routledge, New York.
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for the information of our representatives aforesaid.
"In the first place there arose in the provinces of Chih Li

and Shantung a kind of rebellious subjects who had been in the
habit of practicing boxing and fencing in their respective
villages, and at the same time clothing their doings with
spiritualistic and strange rites. The local authorities failed
to take due notice of them at the time. Accordingly the
infection spread with astonishing rapidity. Within the space
of a month it seemed to make its appearance everywhere, and
finally even reached the capital itself. Everyone looked upon
the movement as supernatural and strange, and many joined it.
Then there were lawless and treacherous persons who sounded
the cry of 'Down with Christianity!' About the middle of the
fifth moon these persons began to create disturbances without
warning. Churches were burned and converts were killed. The
whole city was in a ferment. A situation was created which
could not be brought under control. At first the foreign
Powers requested that foreign troops be allowed to enter the
capital for the protection of the legations. The imperial
government, having in view the comparative urgency of the
occasion, granted the request as an extraordinary mark of
courtesy beyond the requirements of international intercourse.
Over five hundred foreign troops were sent to Pekin. This
shows clearly how much care China exercised in the maintenance
of friendly relations with other countries.
"The legations at the capital never had much to do with the

people. But from the time foreign troops entered the city the
guards did not devote themselves exclusively to the protection
of their respective legations. They sometimes fired their guns
on top of the city walls and sometimes patrolled the streets
everywhere. There were repeated reports of persons being hit
by stray bullets. Moreover they strolled about the city
without restraint, and even attempted to enter the Tung Hua
gate (the eastern gate of the palace grounds). They only
desisted when admittance was positively forbidden. On this
account, both the soldiers and the people were provoked to
resentment, and voiced their indignation with one accord.
Lawless persons then took advantage of the situation to do
mischief, and became bolder than ever in burning and killing
Christian converts. The Powers thereupon attempted to
reinforce the foreign troops in Pekin, but the reinforcements
encountered resistance and defeat at the hands of the
insurgents on the way and have not yet been able to proceed.
The insurgents of the two provinces of Chih Li and Shantung
had by this time effected a complete union and could not be
separated. The imperial government was by no means reluctant
to issue orders for the entire suppression of this insurgent
element. But as the trouble was so near at hand there was a
great fear that due protection might not be assured to the
legations if the anarchists should be driven to extremities,
thus bringing on a national calamity. There also was a fear
that uprisings might occur in the provinces of Chih Li and
Shantung at the same time, with the result that both foreign
missionaries and Chinese converts in the two provinces might
fall victims to popular fury. It was therefore absolutely
necessary to consider the matter from every point of view.
"As a measure of precaution it was finally decided to request

the foreign ministers to retire temporarily to Tien-Tsin for
safety. It was while the discussion of this proposition was in
progress that the German minister, Baron Von Ketteler, was
assassinated by a riotous mob one morning while on his way to
the Tsung-Li-Yamen. On the previous day the German minister
had written a letter appointing a time for calling at the
Tsung-Li-Yamen. But the Yamen, fearing he might be molested on
the way, did not consent to the appointment as suggested by
the minister. Since this occurrence the anarchists assumed a
more bold and threatening attitude, and consequently 'it was
not deemed wise to carry out the project of sending the
diplomatic corps to Tien-Tsin under an escort. However, orders
were issued to the troops detailed for the protection of the
legations to keep stricter watch and take greater precaution
against any emergency.
"To our surprise, on the 20th of the fifth moon (June 16th),
foreign (naval?) officers at Taku called upon Lo Jung Kwang,
the general commanding, and demanded his surrender of the
forts, notifying him that failing to receive compliance they
would at two o'clock the next day take steps to seize the
forts by force. Lo Jung Kwang, being bound by the duties of
his office to hold the forts, how could he yield to the
demand? On the day named they actually first fired upon the
forts, which responded, and kept up fighting all day and then
surrendered. Thus the conflict of forces began, but certainly
the initiative did not come from our side. Even supposing that
China were not conscious of her true condition, how could she
take such a step as to engage in war with all the Powers
simultaneously? and how could she, relying upon the support of
anarchistic populace, go into war with the Powers?
{115}
"Our position in this matter ought to be clearly understood by

all the Powers. The above is a statement of the wrongs we have
suffered, and how China was driven to the unfortunate position
from which she could not escape. Our several ministers will make
known accurately and in detail the contents of this decree and
the policy of China to the ministers of foreign affairs in
their respective countries, and assure them that military
authorities are still strictly enjoined to afford protection
to the legations as hitherto to the utmost of their power. As
for the anarchists they will be as severely dealt with as
circumstances permit. The several ministers will continue in
the discharge of the duties of their office as hitherto
without hesitation or doubt. This telegraphic decree to be
transmitted for their information. Respect this."
CHINA: A. D. 1900 (June-July).

Failure of attempt to entrust Japan with the rescuing of
the Legations at Peking.
A British Blue Book, issued on the 18th of February, 1901,

contains correspondence that took place between the Powers
late in June and early in July, looking to an arrangement for
the immediate sending of a large force from Japan to the
rescue of the beleaguered Legations in Peking. As summarized
in the "London Times," this correspondence showed that "the
necessity of asking the help of the only Power that was near
enough to intervene promptly was strongly pressed by Lord
Salisbury on the other Powers in the beginning of July. M.
Delcassé fell in entirely with the scheme and insisted on the
need of putting aside all jealousies or afterthoughts which
might hinder unity of action on the spot. The Russian
Government, however, seems to have misunderstood Lord
Salisbury's meaning and to have conceived him to wish Japan to
settle the Chinese crisis by herself and with a view to her
own interests, a misunderstanding which it required a whole
series of despatches to clear up completely. The Japanese
Government itself showed the most commendable readiness to
act, and on July 11 Mr. Whitehead telegraphed from Tokio, in
reply to an appeal from Lord Salisbury to the Japanese
Government, that 'in consequence of the friendly assurances'
given by Lord Salisbury the Japanese Government had decided to
send one or two more divisions to China. To this Lord
Salisbury replied on July 13 that her Majesty's Government
were willing to assist the Japanese Government up to
£1,000,000 if they at once mobilized and despatched an
additional 20,000 men to Peking. But the latter, in the
absence of any definite scheme of operations on the part of
the Powers, showed an unwillingness to accede to this
proposal, which thus fell through."
CHINA: A. D. 1900 (June-August).

The siege of the Foreign Legations at Peking.
The story of two dreadful months as told by one of the besieged.
The most detailed and altogether best account of the dreadful
experience which the foreigners besieged in the quarter of the
Legations at Peking underwent, from the first week in June
until the 14th day of August, when a rescuing army forced its
way into the city, is that furnished to the "London Times" by
its Peking correspondent, who was one of the besieged. His
narrative, forwarded immediately upon the opening of
communication with the outer world, was published in "The
Times" of October 13 and 15. With some abridgment it is given
here under permission from the Manager of "The Times."
"Missionaries in Peking began collecting together into the

larger mission compounds for common protection. Many ladies
went for safety into the British Legation. Railway
communication was now severed and the telegraph communication
threatened. Our isolation was being completed. In the country
disaffection spread to the districts to the east of Peking,
and the position of the American missionaries at Tung-chau
became one of great danger. It was decided to abandon their
great missionary establishments, and with the native
Christians that could follow them to come into Peking. They
asked for an escort, but Mr. Conger felt himself compelled to
decline one, on the ground that he did not venture to send the
small body of men that he could spare from the Legation
through so dangerous a district. Protection must be looked for
from the Chinese Government. What soldiers could not be sent
to do one fearless American missionary succeeded in doing.
Late in the evening of June 7 the Rev. W. S. Ament, of the
Board Mission, left Peking in a cart, and with 20 other carts
journeyed 14 miles to Tung-chau through a country palpitating
with excitement. It was an act of courage and devotion that
seemed to us who knew the country a deed of heroism. His
arrival was most opportune. He brought safely back with him to
Peking the whole missionary body then in Tung-chau—five men,
including the author of 'Chinese Characteristics,' 11 ladies,
and seven children, together with their Christian servants. …
"More troops were sent for to reinforce the Legation guards in
Peking, but they were sent for too late. Already many miles of
the railway had been torn up, and it was hopeless to expect an
early restoration of communication. … The Empress-Dowager and
the Emperor, who had been for some time past at the Summer
Palace, returned to Peking, entering the city at the same hour
by different gates. Large escorts of cavalry and infantry
accompanied them; Manchu bannermen in large numbers were
posted on the walls. It was noticeable that the body-guard of
the Empress was provided by the renegade Mahomedan rabble of
Tung-fuh-siang, who had long been a menace to foreigners in
the province. The return of the Court was expected to have a
tranquillizing effect upon the populace. But this was not the
case. Students were attacked when riding in the country; our
race-course, grand stand, and stables were burnt by 'Boxers'
armed with knives; Europeans could not venture along the
streets outside the foreign quarter without being insulted.
People were saying everywhere, 'The foreigners are to be
ended.' Streets were being patrolled by cavalry, but there was
every fear that the patrols were in league with the 'Boxers,'
who were marching through the streets bearing banners
inscribed 'Fu Ching Mieh Yang.' 'Protect Pure (the Dynasty),
exterminate the foreigner.'
"The London Mission and the Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel handed over their buildings to the Chinese authorities,
holding them responsible for their safe keeping, and all
missionaries and their families went to the British Legation.
The American Board Mission likewise delivered over their
valuable property to the Government and fell back upon the
great Methodist Episcopalian Mission near the Hata Mên Gate,
beyond the foreign quarter. Tung-chau missionaries and their
families and several hundred Christian converts were already
gathered there. Steps were at once taken to fortify the
compound. Under the direction of Mr. F. D. Gamewell deep
trenches were cut, earthworks thrown up, and barbed-wire
entanglements laid down.
{116}
Watch was kept and sentries posted, provisions laid in, and
all preparations made to withstand a siege. Twenty marines and
a captain from the American Legation were sent as a guard, and
some spare rifles were obtained from the British Legation.
Converts were armed with pikes and knives, and a determined
effort was to be made in case of attack. The mission was,
however, absolutely at the mercy of any force holding the high
city wall and Hata Mên Gate. Without the power of reply the
small garrison could have been shot down from the wall, which
is little more than a stone's throw from the nearest point of
the compound. Shell-fire such as was subsequently used against
the Legations would have smashed the buildings into fragments.
All the Maritime Customs staff and their families living in
the East City, a mile or more beyond the foreign quarter, the
professors and teachers of the Tung-wen-Kuan, Dr. Dudgeon, Mr.
Pethick, the secretary of Li Hung Chang, and others, were
forced to abandon their homes and come in for protection.
Preparations for defence went on at all the Legations, for it
was now inevitable that we should have to fight. A 'conseil de
guerre' was held, attended by all the military officers, and a
plan of defence determined. The palace and grounds of Prince
Su, opposite the British Legation, were to be held for the
Christian refugees, and an area was to be defended some half a
mile long by half a mile broad, bounded by the Austrian and
Italian Legations to the east, the street running over the
north bridge of the canal to the north, the British, Russian,
and American Legations to the west, while the southern
boundary was to be the street running at the foot of the great
City Wall from the American Legation on the west, past the
German Legation on the east, to the lane running from the Wall
north past the French Legation, the buildings of the
Inspectorate General of Customs, and the Austrian Legation.
All women and children and non-combatants were to come into
the British Legation. Each position was to be held as long as
possible, and the final stand was to be made at the British
Legation. No question of surrender could ever be entertained,
for surrender meant massacre.
"On the 10th it was announced that reinforcements were on the

way and that they were coming with the approval of the Viceroy
and of the Chinese Government, an approval more readily
accorded since it was known to the Viceroy that the troops
could not come by train. More than one of the Ministers was so
confident that they were coming that carts were sent to await
their arrival at Machia-pu, the terminal railway station at
Peking. … Then Government gave its first public official
recognition of the 'Boxers' by announcing that the notorious
chief of the 'Boxers,' Prince Tuan, had been appointed
President of the Tsung-li-Yamên. Prince Ching was superseded
but was not removed from the Yamên. One harmless old Chinese,
Liao Shou-hêng was sent into retirement while four rabidly
anti-foreign Manchus entirely ignorant of all foreign affairs
were appointed members. The last hope of any wisdom springing
from the Yamên disappeared with the supersession of Prince
Ching by the anti-foreign barbarian who, more than any other
man in China, was responsible for the outbreak. The following
morning most of the Europeans rode to Machia-pu to await the
arrival of the foreign troops. They waited, but no troops
came, and then rode back past the jeering faces of hordes of
Chinese soldiers. Our security was not increased by this
fiasco.
"Soldiers sent to guard the summer residences of the British

Legation in the Western Hills left their posts during the
night. The buildings had been officially placed under the
protection of the Imperial Government. In the pre-arranged
absence of the soldiers the buildings were attacked by
'Boxers' and entirely burnt to the ground; the soldiers
witnessed if they did not assist in the burning. But worse
events were to happen that day. In the afternoon news passed
through Peking that Mr. Sugiyama, the Chancellor of the
Japanese Legation, had been murdered by soldiers. He had been
sent by his Minister a second time to Machia-pu to await the
arrival of the troops. Passing unarmed and alone in his cart
beyond the Yung-ting Mên, the outer gate on the way to the
station, he was seized by the soldiers of Tung-fuh-siang,
dragged from his cart, and done to death in the presence of a
crowd of Chinese who witnessed his struggles with unpitying
interest and unconcealed satisfaction. …
"On the 12th a deputation, consisting of Chi Hsiu, a member of

the Grand Council and newly appointed to the Yamên, Hsu
Ching-chêng, the ex-Minister, the 'Boxer' leader Chao
Shu-chiao, and another Manchu, called upon the British
Minister. Chi Hsiu made a long address, his theme being the
enduring nature of the friendship between China and England
and the duty which China has always recognized as a sacred
obligation to protect the members of the Legations who were
her guests and the strangers within her walls. Chi Hsiu
assured the Minister that the movement was at an end, that all
was now tranquil, and that there was no more reason to fear.
Yet the very next day Baron von Ketteler himself captured a
'Boxer' from amid the crowd in Legation-street. He carried the
consecrated headpiece, and was armed with a sword. Round his
waist he had a belt containing a talisman of yellow paper
smeared with mystic red symbols by which he was rendered
'impermeable to foreign bullets.' And in the afternoon the
'Boxers' came down in force from the north of the city and the
burning of foreign buildings began. The cry arose that the
'Boxers' were coming. Every man ran to his post, a cordon was
established round the foreign quarter and no one was allowed
to pass. Guards were on watch at all the Legations, but their
numbers, spread over so many posts, were very inadequate, and
they were still further reduced by the guards detached for
duty at the Pei-tang Cathedral, where, three miles distant
within the Imperial City, were gathered in the one great
compound Mgr. Favier, the Bishop, his coadjutor, Mgr. Jarlin,
the missionaries and lay brothers, the sisters of charity, and
a vast concourse of Christian refugees, estimated at 2,000,
who had fled from the massacre in the country. A guard of five
Austrians was sent to the Belgian Legation. The Austrians with
their machine gun commanded the Customs-street leading to the
north: the Italians with a one pounder commanded the
Legation-street to the east. The British with their
Nordenfeldt swept the Canal-street to the north and the
North-bridge, the Russians were on the South-bridge, while the
Americans with their Colt machine gun had command of
Legation-street to the west as far as the court facing the
Imperial Palace. The Russians, having no gun, dropped their
heavy ammunition down the well.
{117}
"As darkness came on the most awful cries were heard in the
city, most demoniacal and unforgettable, the cries of the
'Boxers,' 'Sha kweitze'—'Kill the devils'—mingled with the
shrieks of the victims and the groans of the dying. For
'Boxers' were sweeping through the city massacring the native
Christians and burning them alive in their homes. The first
building to be burned was the chapel of the Methodist Mission
in the Hata Mên-street. Then flames sprang up in many quarters
of the city. Amid the most deafening uproar the Tung-tang, or
East Cathedral, shot flames into the sky. The old Greek Church
in the north-east of the city, the London Mission buildings,
the handsome pile of the American Board Mission, and the
entire foreign buildings belonging to the Imperial Maritime
Customs in the East City burned throughout the night. It was
an appalling sight. Late in the night a large party of
'Boxers' bearing torches were seen moving down Customs-street
towards the Austrian Legation. The machine gun mounted was in
waiting for them. They were allowed to come within 150 yards
in the open street near the great cross road, and then the
order was given and the gun rained forth death. It was a
grateful sound. The torches disappeared. They had come within
a restricted space, and none, we thought, could have escaped.
Eagerly we went forth to count the dead, expecting to find
them in heaps. But there was not one dead. The gun had been
aimed very wide of the mark. Two hundred yards north of the
'Boxers' there is a place where 30 ft. above the level road
the telegraph wires crossed to the station. Next morning they
were found to have been cut by the Austrian fire. The only
persons who suffered injury were possible wayfarers two miles
up the street. There can be little doubt that this fiasco
helped to confirm the Boxers in a belief in their
invulnerability.
"The Tung-tang, or East Cathedral, having been burned, it, was

clear that the Nan-tang, the South Cathedral, was in danger.
Père Garrigues, the aged priest of the Tung-tang, had refused
to leave his post and had perished in the flames. But the
fathers and sisters at the Nan-tang might yet be saved. Their
lives were in great peril; it was necessary to act quickly. A
party of French gentlemen, led by M. Fliche of the French
Legation and accompanied by M. and Mme. Chamot, rode out at
night, and early the following morning safely escorted to the
hotel every member of the mission—Père d' Addosio and his two
colleagues, a French brother, five sisters of charity, and
some twenty native nuns of the Order of Josephine. They were
rescued just in time. Scarcely had they reached a place of
safety when the splendid edifice they had forsaken was in
flames. … It continued burning all day, the region round it,
the chief Catholic centre of Peking, being also burnt. Acres
of houses were destroyed and the Christians in thousands put
to the sword. …
"On the 15th rescue parties were sent out by the American and
Russian Legations in the morning, and by the British and
German Legations in the afternoon, to save if possible native
Christians from the burning ruins around the Nan-tang. Awful
sights were witnessed. Women and children hacked to pieces,
men trussed like fowls, with noses and ears cut off and eyes
gouged out. Chinese Christians accompanied the reliefs and ran
about in the labyrinth of network of streets that formed the
quarter, calling upon the Christians to come out from their
hiding-places. All through the night the massacre had
continued, and 'Boxers' were even now shot redhanded at their
bloody work. But their work was still incomplete, and many
hundreds of women and children had escaped. They came out of
their hiding-places crossing themselves and pleading for
mercy. It was a most pitiful sight. Thousands of soldiers on
the wall witnessed the rescue; they had with callous hearts
witnessed the massacre without ever raising a hand to save.
During the awful nights of the 13th and 14th Duke Lan, the
brother of Prince Tuan, and Chao Shu-Chiao, of the
Tsung-li-Yamên, had followed round in their carts to gloat
over the spectacle. Yet the Chinese Government were afterwards
to describe this massacre done under official supervision
under the very walls of the Imperial Palace as the handiwork
of local banditti. More than 1,200 of the poor refugees were
escorted by the 'foreign devils' to a place of safety. Many
were wounded, many were burnt beyond recognition. All had
suffered the loss of every thing they possessed in the world.
They were given quarters in the palace grounds of Prince Su,
opposite the British Legation. Among them was the aged mother
and the nephew of Ching Chang, recently Minister to France,
and now Chinese Commissioner to the Paris Exhibition. The
nephew was cruelly burnt; nearly every other member of the
family was murdered. A Catholic family of much distinction—a
family Catholic for seven generations—was thus almost
exterminated and its property laid in ashes. It was announced
this day that only 'Boxers' might enter the Imperial City. The
Government was rushing headlong to its ruin.
"On June 16 a party of twenty British, ten Americans, and five

Japanese, with some Volunteers, and accompanied by
Lieutenant-Colonel Shiba, the Japanese military attache,
patrolled the East City, visiting the ruins in the hopes that
some Christians might yet be in hiding. But to our calls
everywhere no reply was given. Refugees, however, from the
East City had managed to escape miraculously and find their
way, many of them wounded, to the foreign Legations, seeking
that protection and humanity that was denied them by their own
people. As the patrol was passing a Taoist temple on the way,
a noted 'Boxer' meeting place, cries were heard within. The
temple was forcibly entered. Native Christians were found
there, their hands tied behind their backs, awaiting execution
and torture. Some had already been put to death, and their
bodies were still warm and bleeding. All were shockingly
mutilated. Their fiendish murderers were at their incantations
burning incense before their gods, offering Christians in
sacrifice to their angered deities. They shut themselves
within the temple, but their defence availed them nothing.
Everyone of them, 46 in all, was in 'Boxer' uniform armed with
sword and lance. Retribution was swift; every man was shot to
death without mercy. In the afternoon a fire broke out in the
foreign drug store in the native city outside the great gate
of the Chien Mên.
{118}
It was the work of 'Boxers,' done while the soldiers were
looking on. In order to burn the foreign drug store and do the
foreigners a few pounds worth of damage, they did not hesitate
to jeopardize by fire property worth millions of pounds, and that
is what happened. Adjoining buildings took fire, the flames
spread to the booksellers' street, and the most interesting
street in China, filled with priceless scrolls, manuscripts,
and printed books, was gutted from end to end. Fire licked up
house after house, and soon the conflagration was the most
disastrous ever known in China, reducing to ashes the richest
part of Peking, the pearl and jewel shops, the silk and fur,
the satin and embroidery stores, the great curio shops, the
gold and silver shops, the melting houses, and nearly all that
was of the highest value in the metropolis. Irreparable was
the damage done. …
"During the night the Americans, fearing an attack from the

street at the back of their Legation, kept the street clear
till daybreak. During one of the volleys four of the
Tsung-li-Yamên Ministers called upon the American Minister.
They were blandly assuring him that all was now quiet, that
there was no need for further alarm, that great was the
tenderness of the Throne for men from afar, when a rattle of
musketry was heard which rendered them speechless with fear.
They hurriedly went away. Assurances of the Throne's
tenderness did not deceive us. Our barricades were everywhere
strengthened and defences systematically planned, for rumour
was quick to reach us that the relief forces had been driven
back to Tien-tsin, and this did not add to the security of our
position. Inside the Imperial City wall, within one hundred
yards of the British picket on the north bridge a large
Chinese camp was formed. Peking was in a state of panic, all
the streets near the foreign quarters were empty, and people
were fleeing from the city. There was a run on the banks, and
the Ssu-ta-hêng, the four great banks, the leading banks of
Peking, closed their doors, and paper money was not in
circulation. The Palace of Prince Su was occupied by the
refugees, and its defence, the most important of all and a
vital one to the British Legation, was entrusted to Colonel
Shiba and Japanese marines and volunteers.
"The crisis was approaching. On the morning of June 19 Mr.

Cordes, the Chinese Secretary of the German Legation, was at
the Yamên, when the secretaries told him that the allied
fleets had taken the Ta-ku forts on June 17. This was
remembered when at 4.30 in the afternoon an ultimatum was sent
to the foreign Ministers. It was a bolt from the blue. They
were to leave Peking within 24 hours. 'A despatch,' they
wrote, 'has arrived from the Viceroy Yu Lu, forwarding a note
which he has received from the doyen of the Consular body in
Tien-tsin, the French Comte du Chaylard, to say that, unless
foreign troops are at once permitted to land at Tien-tsin, the
allied fleets will bombard the Ta-ku forts. As this is
equivalent to a declaration of war, the Tsung-li-Yamên
herewith notify the foreign Ministers that they must leave
Peking within 24 hours, otherwise protection cannot be
guaranteed to them. They will be given safe conduct and
transport.' It was quite in accordance with Chinese custom
that a despatch saying that the seizure of the Ta-ku forts had
been threatened should be sent after the seizure had been
effected. What is distasteful to them to say they avoid
saying. A meeting of the diplomatic body was at once held. It
was decided to accept the ultimatum. They had been given their
passports by the Chinese Government; what other course was
open to them? … Word was passed round that preparation had to
be made to leave Peking the following day. Mr. Conger, the
American Minister, asked for 100 carts; and his Legation spent
most of the night making preparations. No packing was done at
the British Legation, for it was there considered
inconceivable that China should insist upon sending the
Ministers their passports. Only two days before, in the
'Peking Gazette' of June 17, it had been officially announced
that the road to Tien-tsin was unsafe. … When the decision of
the Diplomatic Body became known in Peking the most profound
indignation was everywhere expressed at so unworthy a decision
and the most profound astonishment that such a course of
action should have received the support of M. Pichon, the
French Minister 'Protecteur des Missions Catholiques en
Chine,' and of so humane a man as Mr. Conger, the American
Minister; for to leave Peking meant the immediate abandonment
to massacre of the thousands of native Christians who had
trusted the foreigner and believed in his good faith.
"Early on the morning of the 20th a meeting of the Diplomatic

Body was held at the French Legation. No reply had been
received from the Tsung-li-Yamên to the request for an
audience, and the proposition that all the Ministers should go
to the Yamên found no seconder. Had it been carried out, there
would have occurred one of the most appalling massacres on
record. Two chairs later left for the Yamên. In the first was
the German Minister, Baron van Ketteler, who had this
advantage over the other Ministers, that he spoke Chinese
fluently. In the second was the Chinese Secretary of the
German Legation, Mr. Cordes. News travels quickly in Peking.
Not many minutes later my boy burst into my office—'Any man
speakee have makee kill German Minister!' It was true. The
German Minister had been assassinated by an Imperial officer.
The Secretary had been grievously wounded, but, running for
his life, shot at by a hundred rifles, had escaped as if by a
miracle. A patrol of 15 men under Count Soden, the commander,
went out to recover the body. Fired on by Chinese soldiers
from every side, they were forced to retire. … There was no
more question about leaving for Tien-tsin. Later in the day
the Yamên, evidently indifferent to the gravity of the
position created by the Government, sent an impudent despatch
to the German Legation to the effect that two Germans had been
proceeding in chairs along the Hata Mên-street, and at the
mouth of the street leading to the Tsung-li-Yamên one of them
had fired upon the crowd. The Chinese had retaliated and he
had been killed. They wished to know his name. No reply was
sent, for it was felt to be a mockery. Only too well the Yamên
knew whom they had murdered. Weeks passed before the body was
recovered, and it was not until July 18 that any official
reference was made to the murder. In the course of the morning
a despatch was sent to the Diplomatic Body in reply to the
answer they had sent to the ultimatum of yesterday.
{119}
The country, it said, between Peking and Tien-tsin was overrun
with brigands, and it would not be safe for the Ministers to go
there. They should therefore remain in Peking. It is difficult
to write with calmness of the treachery with which the Chinese
were now acting. Four p. m. was the hour given in the ultimatum
for the Ministers to vacate their Legations, but the ultimatum
had been rescinded, and the Ministers invited to remain in
Peking. Thus it was hoped that they would be lulled into a
false security. Chinese soldiers were secretly stationed under
cover at every vantage point commanding the outposts. At 4 p.
m. precisely to the minute, by preconcerted signal, they
opened fire upon the Austrian and French outposts. A French
marine fell shot dead through the forehead. An Austrian was
wounded. The siege had begun.
"At this time (June 20), at the opening of the siege, the
total strength of the combined Legation guards consisted of 18
officers and 389 men, distributed as follows:
"American.
Three officers, Captain Myers in command, Captain Hall,
Surgeon Lippett, and 53 marines from the Newark.
"Austrian.
Five officers, Captain Thomann, the Commander of the Zenta,
Flag-Lieutenant von Winterhalder, Lieutenant Kollar,
two mid-shipmen, and 30 marines from the Zenta.
"British.
Three officers, Captain B. M. Strouts in command,
Captain Halliday, Captain Wray, and 79 men R. M. L. I.
-30 from H. M. S. Orlando and 49 from Wei-hai-wei.
"French.
Two officers, Captain Darcy and Midshipman Herbert, and
45 marines from the D'Entrecasteaux and Descartes.
"German.
Lieutenant Graf Soden and 51 marines of the
3rd Battalion Kiao-chau.
"Italian.
Lieutenant Paolini and 28 blue-jackets from the Elba.
"Japanese.
Lieutenant Hara and 24 marines from the Atago.
"Russian.
Two officers, Lieutenant Baron von Rahden and Lieutenant
von Dehn, and 79 men—72 marines from the Sissoi Veliki and
Navarin and seven Legation Cossacks.
"Total,
18 officers and 389 men.
"In addition the French sent Lieutenant Henry and 30 men to

guard the Pei-tang Cathedral, and the Italians detached one
officer, Lieutenant Cavalieri, and 11 men for the same humane
mission. To this insignificant force of 18 officers and 389
men of eight nationalities the entire foreign quarter had to
trust for its defence. Fortunately several visitors or
residents had received military training, and they at once
went on the active list and rendered invaluable service. … A
volunteer force numbering altogether 75 men, of whom 31 were
Japanese, was enrolled and armed with all available rifles.
They added greatly to the strength of the garrison, taking
watch and watch like the Regulars, fighting behind the
barricades, and never shrinking from any duty imposed upon
them. There was also an irregular force of 50 gentlemen of
many nationalities, who did garrison guard duty in the British
Legation and were most useful. They were known, from the
gentleman who enrolled them, as 'Thornhill's Roughs,' and they
bore themselves as the legitimate successors on foot of
Roosevelt's Roughriders. Armed with a variety of weapons, from
an elephant rifle to the 'fusil de chasse' with a picture of
the Grand Prix, to all of which carving knives had been lashed
as bayonets, they were known as the 'Carving Knife Brigade.' …
Such were the effective forces. They were provided with four
guns, an Italian one-pounder with 120 rounds, an American Colt
with 25,000 rounds, an Austrian machine gun, and a British
five-barrel Nordenfelt, pattern 1887. Rifle ammunition was
very scanty. The Japanese had only 100 rounds apiece, the
Russians 145, and the Italians 120, while the best provided of
the other guards had only 300 rounds per man, none too many
for a siege the duration of which could not be foreseen.
"Punctually, then, at 4 o'clock Chinese soldiers began firing

upon us whom they had requested to remain in peace at Peking.
And immediately after the Austrian Legation was abandoned. No
sufficient reason has been given for its abandonment, which
was done so precipitately that not an article was saved. It
was left to the mercy of the Chinese, and the guard retired to
the corner of Customs-lane, leading west to the Prince's
Palace. This involved the sacrifice of Sir Robert Hart's and
all the Customs buildings, and hastened the advance of the
Chinese westward. As previously arranged, the American mission
buildings had been abandoned in the morning, for they were
quite untenable. All the missionaries, their wives, and
families crossed over to the British Legation. Converts to the
number of several hundreds joined the other refugees. The
captain and 20 American marines returned to the American
Legation. By an error of judgment on the part of the captain
the mission was finally left in a panic. Almost nothing was
saved, and nearly all the stores accumulated for a siege were
lost. The British Legation was now thronged. Rarely has a more
cosmopolitan gathering been gathered together within the limits
of one compound. All the women and children were there, all
the missionaries, American, British, French, and Russian, all
the Customs staff, the French, Belgian, Russian, American,
Spanish, Japanese, and Italian Ministers, and their families,
the entire unofficial foreign community of Peking, with the
exception of M. Chamot, who remained in his hotel throughout,
though it was in the hottest corner of the besieged area. …
French volunteers bravely stood by their own Legation, and the
Austrian Charge d'Affaires and Mme. von Rosthorn remained there
as long as there was a room habitable. Mr. Squiers, the first
Secretary of the American Legation, with Mr. Cheshire, the
Chinese Secretary, and Mr. Pethiek, the well-known private
secretary of Li Hung Chang, stayed by the United States
Legation, and the staff of the German Legation also kept
stanchly to their posts. … At the British Legation
fortification began in real earnest, the refugees working like
coolies. Sand-bags were made by the thousand, and posts
mounted round the Legation. A way was knocked through the
houses to the Russian Legation, so that the Americans, if they
had to fall back, could pass through to the British Legation.
During the day every Legation was exposed to a continuous fire
from surrounding house-tops, and in the case of the British
Legation from the cover in the Imperial Carriage Park. Chinese
put flames to the abandoned buildings, and the Belgian
Legation, the Austrian Legation, the Methodist Mission, and
some private houses were burned.
{120}
"June 22 opened disastrously. The evening before, Captain

Thomann, the Austrian commander, announced that as the senior
officer he had taken command in Peking. This morning, hearing
from an irresponsible American that the American Legation was
abandoned, he, without taking steps to verify the information,
ordered the abandonment of all the Legations cast of
Canal-street, the detachments to fall back upon the British
Legation. There had been no casualties to speak of, none of
the Legations had been attacked, and every commander who
received the order to retreat regarded the action as madness.
Peremptory orders were sent to the Japanese to abandon the
Prince's Palace or Fu (as I shall henceforth call it), and
they retired to their Legation. In the British Legation
nothing was known of the order when, to the amazement of all,
the Italians, Austrians, and French came running down
Legation-street, followed a little later by the Japanese, and
subsequently by the Germans, who recalled their post on the
wall and marched without a shot being fired at them down under
the wall to Canal-street. Americans and Russians, learning
that all east of Canal-street had been abandoned, saw
themselves cut off, though their communications had not even
been menaced, and retreated precipitately into the British
Legation. It was a veritable stampede—a panic that might have
been fraught with the gravest disaster. Prompt action was
taken. Captain Thomann was relieved of his command, and Sir
Claude MacDonald, at the urgent instance of the French and
Russian Ministers, subsequently confirmed by all their

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Global Logistics Network Modelling and

Policy: Quantification and Analysis for

For information on all Elsevier publications

Publisher: Joe Hayton

Part One General introduction 1

2 A global analysis of hinterlands from a European perspective 31

3 Cross-border logistics practices, policies, and its impact 47

4 Basics of container demand forecast 71

Step 1: Cargo attraction and generation 77

Part Two Model & data 97

6 Global maritime container shipping model 105

7 Intermodal transport super-network model 121

Part Three Application to the developing world 177

11 Greater Mekong Subregion: Is the Mekong River shipping

12 South Asia: Impact simulations of logistics projects in India,

13 Central Asia: Typical landlocked region across Eurasian continent 253

14 Pacific Islands: Small and dispersed ‘sea-locked’ islands 277

15 Southern Africa: Overcoming corridor and border challenges

César Ducruet Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Masahiko Furuichi International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH), The

David Guerrero AME-SPLOTT, Univ Gustave Eiffel, IFSTTAR

Hidekazu Itoh Kwansei Gakuin University

Takashi Kadono NEWJEC Inc.

Hironori Kato The University of Tokyo

Taiji Kawakami Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan

Tomoya Kawasaki Tokyo Institute of Technology

Masaya Kobayashi Nippon Express Co., Ltd.

Kentaro Nishimura The University of Tokyo

Takashi Riku The University of Tokyo

Ryuichi Shibasaki The University of Tokyo

Masaru Suzuki Nikken Kogaku Co., Ltd.

Satoshi Tanabe The University of Tokyo

the people in these places. Similarly, enhancement of regional connectivity amongst

Introduction: Containerisation and global logistics

Global Logistics Network Modelling and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814060-4.00001-0

Finally, maritime transport business had changed from labour-intensive to

2000 2005 2010 2015 2016

Economic growth and container cargo movements

Container Dry cargo loaded Total goods loaded

Table 1.2 World container movements (unit: thousand TEUs).

Port development and terminal operations

"In the first place there arose in the provinces of Chih Li

"The legations at the capital never had much to do with the

"As a measure of precaution it was finally decided to request

"Our position in this matter ought to be clearly understood by

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (June-July).

A British Blue Book, issued on the 18th of February, 1901,

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (June-August).

"Missionaries in Peking began collecting together into the

"On the 10th it was announced that reinforcements were on the

"Soldiers sent to guard the summer residences of the British

"On the 12th a deputation, consisting of Chi Hsiu, a member of

"The Tung-tang, or East Cathedral, having been burned, it, was

"On June 16 a party of twenty British, ten Americans, and five

"During the night the Americans, fearing an attack from the

"The crisis was approaching. On the morning of June 19 Mr.

"Early on the morning of the 20th a meeting of the Diplomatic

"In addition the French sent Lieutenant Henry and 30 men to

"Punctually, then, at 4 o'clock Chinese soldiers began firing

"June 22 opened disastrously. The evening before, Captain

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