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I. 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

1. Florentina applied for registration as a psychologist without examination, pursuant to R.A. 10029 or the
Philippine Psychology Act of 2009. Section 16 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
said law as promulgated by the Professional Regulatory Board of Psychology (BOP) allows the
registration as a psychologist without passing the licensure examination, provided that certain
requirements are met. Did the BOP, in issuing the IRR, violate the principle of separation of powers?
No. The principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation”. The
rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and
executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and
regulations calculated to promote public interest. (Sobrejuanite-Flores vs. Pilando, Jr., GR No. 251816, November 23, 2021)

2. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) awarded lots to former military officers,
including Abaya, Maglonzo, Follosco and Sta. Clara in December 1996 and November 1998. However,
they were unable to introduce any improvements because the Philippine Navy and the Golf Club were
already occupying the lands. Abaya, Maglonzo, Follosco and Sta. Clara filed an accion reinvindicatoria
against the Philippine Navy and the Golf Club before the RTC. Is the invocation of the state immunity
from suit by the Philippine Navy considered valid?
No. The doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver
may be made expressly or by implication. Also, the doctrine may be shelved when its stubborn observance will
lead to the subversion of the ends of justice. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. Here, the Philippine Navy cannot
invoke the doctrine of state immunity considering that it has no valid reason to deprive Abaya, et al. the
enjoyment of the lands awarded to them. (Philippine Navy Golf Club vs. Abaya, GR No. 235619, July 13, 2020)

II. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

3. The NPC Board of Directors confirmed and ratified a Board Resolution No. 2009-72 granting Performance
Incentive Benefits (PIB) to certain officials and employees. COA issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND)
stating that the grant of PIB lacked presidential approval and was extravagant. Petitioners argued that
the grant of the PIB through Board Resolution No. 2009-72 was deemed authorized by the President
considering that the NPC Board is comprised of cabinet secretaries who are alter egos of the President.
Was the confirmation and ratification of the Board Resolution by the NPC Board of Directors deemed as
an approval by the President under the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency?
No. When the cabinet secretaries approved Board Resolution No. 2009-72, they did not act as alter egos of the
President, but as members of the NPC Board in their ex officio capacity under the EPIRA. Hence, their assent to
the grant of the PIB cannot be deemed as the required approval of the President. The doctrine of qualified
political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors despite some of its members being
themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Such Cabinet members sit on the Board of Directors
ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the
President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. (NAPOCOR Board of Directors vs.
COA, GR No. 218052, January 26, 2021)

III. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

4. What is grave abuse of discretion?

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
public officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. (Macasil vs. FAIO-COA, GR No. 226898, May 11, 2021)
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5. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9991, prescribing the guidelines for the submission of the SOCEs for
the May 9, 2016 national and local elections. The COMELEC reminded the candidates and the political
parties to submit their SOCEs not later than June 8, 2016. The deadline is "final and non-extendible" and
any submission filed beyond such date will not be accepted. However, on June 23, 2016, the COMELEC
En Banc, through Resolution No. 10147, extended the filing of SOCEs until June 30, 2016. PDP-Laban
and Peralta filed a petition for certiorari asserting that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 10147. Does PDP-Laban and Peralta have legal standing?
Yes. The legal issue involved is of transcendental importance. On procedural matters, it bears emphasis that
judicial review may be exercised only when the party challenging the act has the requisite legal standing which
refers to a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. Here, the PDP-Laban and Peralta, et al. are able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. The matters raised in the petition involved possible violation of the Constitution,
specifically, the COMELEC's exercise of legislative power without proper delegation. The resolution of the case
will also have far-reaching consequences affecting all political candidates and their liabilities for non-compliance
with the timely submission of their SOCEs. Moreover, the situation calls for review because it is capable of
repetition. (PDP-Laban vs. COMELEC En Banc, GR No. 225152, October 5, 2021)

6. Atty. Daisy Panga-Vega (Panga-Vega), then Secretary of HRET, requested authority to avail of the 15 days
of special leave benefit under RA No. 9710 or otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Women, but not to
exceed two months, to undergo hysterectomy, which was approved. A month after, she sought to
resume her duties and presented a medical certificate of her fitness to return to work. HRET directed her
to consume her 2-month special leave given her need for prolonged rest. After HRET denied her
reconsideration from the HRET Resolution, she filed an appeal with CSC assailing the HRET
Resolutions. Both the CSC and CA ruled against the HRET. Panga-Vega assails the capacity of the
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the HRET to file the instant case arguing that the instant petition should
have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Does the Deputy Secretary of the HRET have
the legal capacity to file the instant case?
No. The OSG, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when
there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases
involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position
different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent. A perusal of the records shows that there was no
express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized
legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no proof that the OSG took a position different from the HRET
in this case. Instead of providing a plausible justification why the OSG did not represent it, the HRET simply
reasoned that the instant petition should be given course in the interest of a speedy determination of issues.
These facts necessarily evince that HRET lacked the legal capacity to initiate this case, and the HRET gave no
compelling reason for the Court to disregard this finding. (HRET vs. Panga-Vega, GR No. 228236, January 27, 2021)

7. In the 2019 National Election, AES-WATCH et al., asked to declare as unconstitutional the prohibition on
poll watchers to take photographs of the proceeding during the election pursuant to Sec. 179 of the
Omnibus Election Code. AES-Watch filed a petition alleging that the prohibition against capturing
devices inside the polling place would make it difficult for poll watchers to record any irregularity and
discrepancies. Does AES-WATCH, et al., have legal standing to file the petition?
Yes. AES-WATCH, et al. has legal standing. Judicial review may be exercised only when the person challenging
the act has the requisite legal standing which refers to a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The party's interest must also be
material as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. It must be
personal, and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. For
petitions filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned citizens, they must still claim some kind of injury-in­fact and
allege that the continuing act has denied them some right or privilege to which they are entitled.Here,
AES-WATCH, et al. are filing the petition as citizens. It has a material interest in the case as a political party
which tends to suffer injury if its poll watchers cannot exercise their rights and duties under the Omnibus Election
Code. (AES Watch vs. COMELEC, GR No. 246332, December 9, 2020)

8. When is a ​case or issue considered Moot and Academic? What are its exceptions, if any?
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
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supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. However, the Court may pass upon issues albeit
supervening events had rendered the petition moot and academic under the following instances: (1)when there
is grave violation of the Constitution; (2)when the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public
interest is involved; (3)when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar and the public or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (MRM Asset Holdings
2, Inc. vs. Standard Chartered Bank, GR No. 202761, February 10, 2021)

9. What is the doctrine of operative fact?

The operative fact doctrine recognizes the effects of the law or executive issuance prior to its invalidation when
relied upon by the public in good faith. It is accepted that prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of an
executive or legislative act, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with as a matter of equity and fair play.
(PDP-Laban vs. COMELEC En Banc, GR No. 225152, October 5, 2021)

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

10. The Commission on Audit issued Notices of Disallowance (ND) to the City Government of Butuan for the
former’s separate item for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME) allegedly used as an
available source of funds for certain which are not covered by the regular budget allocation in the annual
budget for fiscal year 2009. The NDs were issued pursuant to SP Ordinance No. 2557-200. Said ordinance
provided for appropriation for the Office of the City Mayor’s discretionary funds. Petitioner City of
Butuan contends that the EME disbursements were improperly disallowed by the COA. Was the
disallowance by the COA proper?
Yes. The disallowances by the COA were proper. EME appropriations and discretionary funds have the same
purpose, i.e., to have an available source of funds for certain expenses in relation to the discharge of official
functions which are not covered by the regular budget allocation. Section 325(h) of the LGC proscribes any
appropriation with the same purpose as that of discretionary funds. Thus, separate amounts appropriated in the
local budget ordinance are patent circumventions of the limitation under the LGC. Local appropriations and
expenditures are still under the authority of the COA under its plenary auditing power, to ensure compliance with
laws and regulations. Concomitant to the COA's auditing power is the authority to disallow disbursements of
government funds, which contravenes established laws as in this case. (Abella vs. COA Proper, GR No. 238940, April 19,
2022)

11. Eulalia Maneja (Maneja), a Secondary School Teacher at the Macabalan National High School in Cagayan
De Oro, was authorized by Lyn Galarrita Cutamora (Cutamora), to handle the latter’s salary loan
application. Maneja processed it, but without Cutamora's consent, she deposited the proceeds of the
loan into her personal account and afterward, appropriated it. CSCRO No. X found Maneja guilty of
dishonesty and imposed a dismissal penalty. In response, Maneja filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied prompting her to file an appeal with the CSC. Pending appeal to CSC, the CSC adopted
Resolution No. 06-0538 which classified the offense of dishonesty into serious, less serious, and simple
dishonesty and provided corresponding penalties. On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
071120 modifying the CSCRO No. X's decision by finding Maneja liable for the lower offense of Simple
Dishonesty and imposing the penalty of three (3) months suspension. Is CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 a
valid exercise of the CSC’s rule-making power?
Yes. The CSC is a constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and
quasi-­legislative or rule-making powers. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is
subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must
not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement. Accordingly, the CSC, as the
central personnel agency of the government, in the exercise of its rule-making powers, is entitled to put into
effect the provisions of the Administrative Code on disciplinary actions by providing its proper penalty. Hence, it
issued a Resolution penalizing the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the service in the first offense.
Realizing that not all acts of dishonesty warrant the ultimate punishment of dismissal from the service, and in
light of the Court decisions reducing the penalty of dismissal from the service to suspension, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 06-0538, classifying the offense of Dishonesty with the corresponding penalties. Evidently CSC
Resolution No. 06-0538 is a valid exercise of the Commission’s rule-making power. It did not override but is in
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harmony with the Administrative Code- the law which the CSC seeks to enforce. (Republic vs. Maneja, GR. No. 209052,
June 23, 2021)

12. On October 2, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9991, prescribing the guidelines for the
submission of the SOCEs for the May 9, 2016 national and local elections. The COMELEC reminded the
candidates and the political parties to submit their SOCEs not later than June 8, 2016. The deadline is
"final and non-extendible" and any submission filed beyond such date will not be accepted. However, on
June 23, 2016, the COMELEC En Banc, through Resolution No. 10147, extended the filing of SOCEs until
June 30, 2016. The candidates and political parties who will submit their SOCEs on or before the new
deadline will not incur any administrative liability. The majority of the commissioners explained that the
law in providing that "no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required" implies that the SOCEs
may be submitted beyond the 30-day period. Moreover, the COMELEC previously allowed extension of
time in filing the SOCEs due to legal necessity and to prevent vacuum in the public service. May the
COMELEC extend the deadline for submission of the SOCEs and exempt candidates from political
parties from administrative liabilities?
No. The COMELEC cannot validly extend the deadline for submission of the SOCEs and exempt the candidates
and political parties from administrative liabilities. The language of the law is unambiguous and that the required
SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the elections. The Congress fixed the period to file SOCEs "within thirty
(30) days after the day of the election." The COMELEC cannot arbitrarily extend the deadline and substitute its
own wisdom in defiance with the clear legislative intent. The COMELEC likewise cannot conveniently invoke the
exigency of public service to justify its actions. The COMELEC's task is to administer and not to interpret the
election laws. At most, the COMELEC can only provide details to implement the statute but not to supplant the
expressed provisions of the law. (PDP-Laban vs. COMELEC En Banc, GR No. 225152, October 5, 2021)

V. BILL OF RIGHTS

13. De Alban, an aspiring Senator, was declared as a nuisance candidate. As such, the COMELEC denied
due course and cancelled his COC. De Alban alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC contending that his right to due process has been violated. According to De Alban, he was
not given the opportunity to adduce additional evidence that may be used for his defense since the
ground relied upon by the COMELEC in cancelling his CoC is material misrepresentation. Was De
Alban’s right to due process violated?
Yes. The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the
determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such
fact may result to a deprivation of one's right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one's right to hold public
office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that
he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. Iit is not sufficient that the candidate be notified
of the Commission's inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be
allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.
Procedural due process must be observed before the Comelec may refuse to give due course to the CoC of a
nuisance candidate. The Comelec's motu proprio authority must not result in the denial of the candidates'
opportunity to be heard, which must be construed as a chance to explain one's side or an occasion to seek a
reconsideration of the complained action or ruling. In election cases, the requirement of due process is satisfied
if the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to clarify their respective positions. (De Alban vs. COMELEC,
GR No. 243968, March 22, 2022)

14. What is the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings?

The quantum of proof in administrative proceedings necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The burden to
establish the charges rests upon the complainant. The case should be dismissed for lack of merit if the
complainant fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which his accusations are based. The
respondent is not even obliged to prove his exception or defense. (NBI vs. Najera, GR No. 237522, June 30, 2020)

15. The Philippine Psychology Act of 2009 provides for the registration of certain individuals as
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psychologists without passing the licensure examination. The law mandates that to qualify for such
privilege, one has to have at least an accumulated minimum 10 years of work experience in the practice
of psychology as a psychologist, and is required to complete at least 100 hours of updating workshops
and training programs, among others. Pursuant to this law, Florentina applied for registration as a
psychologist. The Board of Psychology (BOP) denied her application for insufficient work experience.
Both the PRC and the BOP found that she had only been employed as a Psychologist for 6 years. Her
previous work experience may have included psychology-related functions but she was not holding the
position title of psychologist as stipulated under the law. Florentina contends that Section 16 of the IRR
of RA 10029 violates the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution. Is she correct?
No. The equal protection clause recognizes reasonable classification which: (1) must rest on real and substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. These elements are present in the required
"completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs." The distinction between those
who have a Bachelor's Degree in Psychology and those who have graduated from advanced studies, Doctoral
Degree and Master's Degree in Psychology is also aligned to the policy of the law to regulate the practice of
psychology and to protect the public from incompetent individuals offering psychological services. The
classification is not limited to existing conditions only since its purpose is to nurture competent psychologists
whose practices and services can sustainably achieve excellence and competitiveness. Lastly, the requirement
applies indiscriminately to all holders of Bachelor's Degree prior to the enactment of the law who intend to avail
the exemption from licensure examinations. (Sobrejuanite-Flores vs. Pilando, Jr., GR No. 251816, November 23, 2021)

16. Following a tip-off, police officers conducted a checkpoint during the 2010 election period where Arturo
was arrested for possessing a loaded caliber .45 pistol and ammunition without COMELEC authorization.
Officer Tarazona observed a firearm protruding from his belt bag while on a Ceres bus. Subsequently,
Arturo was arrested without a warrant for illegal possession of firearms. Arturo challenges the
admissibility of the firearm as evidence, arguing that it was unlawfully obtained. Can the police officers
invoke the plain view doctrine in this case?
Yes. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have the view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. The doctrine requires that:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure. These requisites are present in this case. The police officers of the Malay Police
Station, after receiving a report that a person was in possession of a gun, conducted a checkpoint in coordination
with the municipal election officer. Upon contact with the subject Ceres bus, the police asked permission from the
driver to board the bus. On board the bus, PSI Tarazona came across the firearm, when in plain view, he saw the
firearm protruding from Arturo's half open belt bag. Thus, the police officers had the duty to arrest him and
confiscate the contraband in his possession. At the time of the arrest, Arturo was committing an offense by being
in possession of a firearm during an election gun ban. (Sullano vs. People, GR No. 232147, June 8, 2020)

VI. CITIZENSHIP

17. Mohamed, a Sudanese National, recognized as a convention refugee, filed a Petition for Naturalization
before the RTC of Pasay City. He alleged jurisdictional facts, attached supporting documents, and
presented two witnesses at trial. After taking his Oath of Allegiance, the OSG argued that the Declaration
of Intention must be submitted one year before the filing of a petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship yet Mohamed filed his petition for naturalization only a month after he submitted his
Supplemental Declaration of Intention. Is Mohamed's failure to comply with the required period in filing
his Declaration of Intention a jurisdictional defect that renders the entire naturalization proceedings
void?
Yes. Section 5 of C.A. No. 473 strictly enjoins the applicant to file with the OSG a declaration under oath that it is
his or her bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines one year prior to the filing of the petition for
admission to Philippine citizenship. The period is designed to give the government ample time to screen and
examine the qualifications of an applicant and to measure the latter's good intention and sincerity of purpose.
The filing of such declaration of intention, upon faithful compliance with the statutory requirements, is mandatory
and an absolute prerequisite to naturalization. (Mohamed Hussin vs. Republic, GR No. 220674, December 2, 2021)
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18. In a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC, a foreign national recognized as a refugee failed to submit
any document, such as a medical certificate, which would establish that he is not suffering from any
mental alienation or incurable disease. His witnesses did not testify on specific facts or events which
would establish that he is indeed not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable disease. Are the
bare testimonies and general statements of the witnesses inadequate to demonstrate his mental
aptitude?
Yes. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires the affidavits of two credible witnesses to support the petition for
naturalization. It must be proved that the witnesses are "credible persons" as defined under the law. It must be
established in the records that the witnesses have a high degree of reputation in the community for honesty and
integrity. It behooves the witnesses to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the
applicant, as personally known to them, possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law for purposes of naturalization. Here, the affidavits have no factual bases and are mere recitals of
the applicant's absence of disqualifications. (Mohamed Hussin vs. Republic, GR No. 220674, December 2, 2021)

19. Mohamed, a Sudanese National recognized as a convention refugee, filed a Petition for Naturalization
before the RTC of Pasay City. The records show that the OSG received on October 17, 2012 the RTC's
Order granting Mohamed's motion to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. Accordingly, the OSG has 30
days from notice, or until November 16, 2012, to file an appeal. However, Mohamed prematurely took the
oath on October 24, 2012. May the Court allow Mohammed to take the oath of allegiance without giving
the Government a chance to appeal from the said order?
No. The act of the court of first instance in allowing this applicant to take the oath of allegiance even before the
expiration of the Government's period to appeal from the order overruling its objections thereto is highly irregular.
The administration of the oath of allegiance to an applicant for citizenship by the presiding judge on the day that
said judge ordered the allowance of the applicant's oath-taking is an attempt to render nugatory the
government's right to appeal and, therefore, null and void. Republic Act No. 530 contemplates that the applicant
for naturalization becomes entitled to all the privileges of citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance, and the
precipitate administration of the oath in the present case appears to be an attempt to render nugatory the
Government's appeal. (Mohamed Hussin vs. Republic, GR No. 220674, December 2, 2021)

VII. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

20. Who are considered public officers?

A public officer is one who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government, or performs in
said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank
or class; and his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be
by direct provision of the law, by popular election, by appointment by competent authority. (Quiogue vs. Estacio, Jr.,
GR No. 218530, January 13, 2021)

21. Is the Supreme Court absolutely precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause?
No. The Court may review or interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause (a) to afford protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) when the acts
of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation; (f) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; and (i) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance. (Macasil vs. FAIO-COA, GR No. 226898, May 11, 2021)

22. The Commission on Audit has issued a disallowance notice against the disbursement of P3,354,123.50
worth of benefits, which include: rice allowance, medical allowance, Christmas groceries, year-end
financial assistance, mid-year bonus, and year-end bonus for officers and employees of Subic Water
District (SWD) in 2010. Ancheta, and Rapsing as general manager and corporate budget officer of SWD
respectively, explained that they were in good faith when they approved and certified the release of the
challenged benefits relying on the DBM Letters and Board Resolutions, which they ought to implement
as a matter of duty. . Should the SWD approving and certifying officers be held liable for the refund of the
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disallowed amount?
Yes. Civil liability of approving or certifying officers is provided under the Administrative Code of 1987. It is
grounded on the manifest bad faith, malice, or gross negligence of the public officers in the performance of their
official duties because of the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official dutv in their
favor. Ancheta and Rapsing cannot invoke the presumption of good faith and regularity. Good faith has been
defined in disallowance cases as that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. Ancheta and Rapsing's reliance upon the DBM
Letters, previous board resolutions, and dated authorizations fell short of the standard of good faith and diligence
required in the discharge of their duties to sustain exoneration from solidary liability. (Ancheta vs. COA, GR No. 236735,
February 2, 2021)

23. NPC Board of Directors confirmed and ratified a Board Resolution No. 2009-72 granting Performance
Incentive Benefits (PIB) to certain officials and employees. COA issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND)
stating that the grant of PIB lacked presidential approval and was extravagant. In case the disallowance
is upheld, should the NPC Board of Directors be held liable to refund the disallowed amounts?
Yes. The Administrative Code states that "every official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or
taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the
Government for the full amount so paid or received." The Administrative Code explains that such civil liability of
the officers is grounded upon the showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of their
official duties. The palpable disregard of laws, prevailing jurisprudence, and other applicable directives amounts
to gross negligence, which betrays the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions enjoyed by public officers. The NPC Board of Directors are liable despite not being recipients of the
disallowed amounts. (NAPOCOR Board of Directors vs. COA, GR No. 218052, January 26, 2021)

24. Benito Estacio was elected as member of the board of directors of Independent Realty Corporation
Group of Companies (IRC), a sequestered corporation. His election was by the virtue of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo’s letter to former PCGG Chairman expressing her desire that Estacio be elected.
Estacio later on received a total of P544,178.20 as separation pay, bonus, and 14th month pay in his
concurrent tenure as IRC Vice-President. IRC's General Manager filed a complaint before the
Ombudsman on the ground that Estacio's receipt of the emoluments caused undue injury to the
government, in violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. Estacio argues that he is not a public officer hence,
the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over him. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over
Estacio?
Yes. Section 15 (1) of RA No. 6770 provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to
investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
term public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Persons from the private sector who are invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by them for the benefit of the public, are public officers. Estacio was appointed by
the President of the Philippines as a public officer. While IRC was organized under the Corporation Code, it is a
sequestered corporation subject to the fiscal supervision of the PCGG and is a GOCC which is under the direct
supervision of the Office of the President. (Quiogue vs. Estacio, Jr., GR No. 218530, January 13, 2021)

VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

25. What are the requisites for the existence of a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC)?
Three requisites must be present for a corporation to be considered as a GOCC, namely: (1) any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; (2) vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature; and, (3) owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital
stock. Possession of all three attributes is necessary to consider an entity a GOCC. (Quiogue vs. Estacio, Jr., GR No.
218530, January 13, 2021)

26. A Compromise Agreement was entered into by Central Bay, a private corporation, and the Philippine
Reclamation Authority (PRA) which involved a claim amounting to P1,027,031,483.79. Said Compromise
 9

Agreement was declared void by the Commission on Audit (COA) for being violative of the constitutional
provision of private ownership of public domain. According to the COA, congressional approval is
required for compromise agreements such as this. Is the contention of COA correct?
Yes. The COA correctly rejected the Compromise Agreement absent congressional approval. The Administrative
Code of 1987 is explicit that the Congress has the exclusive authority to compromise a settled claim or liability
that exceeds P100,000.00 involving a government agency. The Compromise Agreement between PRA and
Central Bay must bear the approval of the Congress since the stipulated P1,027,031,483.79 money claim
exceeded the threshold amount. (Central Bay Reclamation vs. COA, GR No. 252940, April 5, 2022)

27. Is the COMELEC’s power to deny due course or cancel one’s certificate of candidacy an exercise of its
administrative power?
No. The denial of due course or cancellation of one's certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative
powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. On the other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a
judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. (De Alban vs. COMELEC, GR No. 243968, March 22, 2022)

28. Florentina applied for registration as a psychologist without examination, pursuant to R.A. 10029 or the
Philippine Psychology Act of 2009. Pursuant to this law, the Board of Psychology was expressly
authorized to issue its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Among others, the law provides that
applicants who have Bachelor's Degree in Psychology may be registered without examination if they
accumulated a "minimum of ten (10) years of work experience in the practice of psychology as a
psychologist" and "updated their professional education in various psychology-related functions."
Florentina assails that this provision renders the law as incomplete and gives the PRC and the BOP a
wide latitude of discretion and hence, an invalid delegation of legislative powers. Is Florentina’s
contention correct?
No. A valid delegation of legislative powers must comply with the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. The law is complete when it sets the policy to be executed leaving nothing to the delegate except to
implement it. On the other hand, the law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
RA No. 10029 satisfied the said tests. The clear legislative intent is to regulate the practice of psychology and to
protect the public from incompetent individuals offering psychological services. As such, Congress now requires
a licensure examination for psychologists. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of the
administrative bodies' rule making authority may be either expressed or implied. The standards do not have to be
spelled out specifically, and could be implied from the purpose of the act considered as a whole. It is recognized
that "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy, and
welfare" are sufficient standards. (Sobrejuanite-Flores vs. Pilando, Jr., GR No. 251816, November 23, 2021)

29. What are the requirements in order that a GOCC may hire a private lawyer?
The following indispensable conditions must be fulfilled before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) hiring is
only in exceptional cases; (2) the written conformity and acquiescence of the OGCC must first be secured; and
(3) the prior written concurrence of the COA must also be secured. (PNOC-Exploration Corporation vs. COA, GR No.
244461, September 28, 2021)

30. TransCo is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under RA 9136. It awarded a 25-year

concession contract to the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) consortium. This led to
the separation of TransCo employees, following the grant of an electricity transmission franchise. Said
employees were granted separation pay through a Board Resolution. To implement these board
resolutions, TransCo President and CEO Arthur N. Aguilar (Aguilar) issued a Circular, which basically
provided for the same separation pay computation as stated in the board resolutions but Notices of
Disallowance were issued pertaining to certain disbursements due to issues with contractual employees
not entitled to separation benefits and excessive pay due to rounding off of the length of service. COA
Proper sustained the disallowance of the adjudged overpayment in the separation pay which resulted
from the rounding-off of the length of service. May TransCo validly increase the benefits granted to
 10

separated employees?
No. GOCCs, like TransCo, are government entities created by special law. The terms and conditions of
employment of all government employees, including those of GOCCs, are governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations, as well as the specific charters for those GOCCs created by virtue of a special law.
TransCo is not given unbridled discretion to increase the benefits granted to separated employees. Similarly, the
additional separation pay in this case, which resulted from the rounding-off of the length of service, remains to be
illegal and unjustified because TransCo still failed to adduce proof of the required presidential approval. The
power of the TransCo Board to grant additional benefits is subject to the limitation under RA No. 9136 requiring
the President's imprimatur for increases in emoluments and benefits of TransCo personnel. (Transco vs. COA, GR No.
246173, June 22, 2021)

31. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

Primary jurisdiction, or the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by
statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. It does not
necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of the issues to the administrative body for its review. In some instances, an
administrative body is granted primary jurisdiction, concurrent with another government agency or the regular
court. (UR Employed International Corporation vs. Pinmiliw, GR No. 225263, March 16, 2022)

32. Mike, Murphy, Simon, and Ryan are construction workers hired by UREIC for deployment to Kota
Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia for the principal, The W Construction (TWC). They filed a complaint before the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against their employer, UREIC, for violation of
the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based
Overseas Workers. The complainants also filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
against UREIC before the Labor Arbiter alleging the same facts and submitting the same affidavits
submitted before POEA. Does the filing of the complaints before two different tribunals or agencies
violate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
No. Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested by the
Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence. In this case, while
the complainants alleged the same set of facts and the same affidavits were submitted before the LA and the
POEA, the complaints raised different causes of action. The LA complaint involved the issue of illegal dismissal
and various money claims, while the POEA complaint involved administrative disciplinary liability for violation of
the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-­Based Overseas
Workers. Thus, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply. (UR Employed International Corporation vs. Pinmiliw, GR
No. 225263, March 16, 2022)

IX. ELECTION LAW

33. De Alban filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Senator in the May 13, 2019 elections as an
independent candidate, indicating that he is a lawyer and a teacher. On October 22, 2018, the Comelec
Law Department motu proprio filed a petition to declare De Alban a nuisance candidate alleging that he
had no bona fide intent to run for public office and that his candidacy will prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate. De Alban claims that Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) which authorized the Comelec to motu proprio refuses to give due course to or cancel the
CoC of nuisance candidates does not apply to aspiring senators. This is because the OEC became
effective before the creation of the Senate under the 1987 Constitution. Under RA No. 6646, only
registered candidates running for the same position as the nuisance candidates can file a petition under
Section 69 of the OEC. Does that authority of the COMELEC to motu proprio give due course or cancel
COC apply to aspiring Senators?
 11

Yes. COMELEC’s authority applies to aspiring Senators. Section 2 of the OEC categorically states that it "shall
govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites." W]hile
legislations have been enacted every time an election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus Election
Code remains the fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of legislations are designed to improve the
law and to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections." Section 2 of RA No.
6646 is explicit that the OEC shall govern the elections under the 1987 Constitution. Hence, contrary to De
Alban's theory, the OEC applies to elections of all public officers including senatorial candidates. (De Alban vs.
COMELEC, GR No. 243968, March 22, 2022)

34. Is the COMELEC barred from refusing due course or cancelling motu proprio a COC of a nuisance
candidate because Republic Act (RA) No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 impliedly repealed
Section 69 of the OEC. Is De Alban’s contention tenable?
No. There is also no irreconcilable conflict between Section 69 of the OEC and RA 6646. Section 69 of the OEC
empowers the Comelec to "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy x x x." On the other hand, the words "motu proprio" in Section 69 of
the OEC do not appear in Section 5 of RA No. 6646. Nevertheless, this omission can hardly be construed that
the COMELEC is already prevented from refusing due course or cancelling motu proprio the CoC of a nuisance
candidate. Implied repeal is frowned upon in this jurisdiction absent any irreconcilable conflict between the two
laws. Moreover, the legislative deliberations reveal that RA No. 6646 was never intended to revoke the
Comelec's motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the OEC. (De Alban vs. COMELEC, GR No. 243968, March 22, 2022)

X. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

35. Notices of disallowance were issued by the Commission on Audit against the City of Butuan’s
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses. According to the COA, since appropriation for discretionary
funds already exists in their local budget, EME appropriations are no longer allowed since both have the
same purpose. The City of Butuan relies on the principle of local autonomy to validate the EME
disbursements which were based on a provision of their local ordinance. May the City of Butuan validly
claim that the EME disbursements are within the city government’s constitutionally guaranteed fiscal
autonomy?
No. The concept of local autonomy does not preclude intervention by the national government in the form of
supervision to ensure that the local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. Fiscal
decentralization — as an aspect of local autonomy — "does not signify the absolute freedom of the LGUs to
create their own sources of revenue and to spend their revenues unrestrictedly or upon their individual whims
and caprices."Indeed, local autonomy was never intended to sever the partnership and interdependence
between the central administration and LGUs. Thus, notwithstanding autonomy, local appropriations and
expenditures are still under the supervision of the President, through the DBM, as well as the authority of the
COA under its plenary auditing power, to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. (Abella vs. COA Proper, GR
No. 238940, April 19, 2022)

XI. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

36. May the provisions of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees which state that party
signatories to the treaty must make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings be invoked by a
convention refugee to excuse him from failure to strictly comply with the Philippines’ Naturalization
laws?
No. The Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments in international human rights law,
specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons. Yet, this statement cannot be construed
in derogation of the rule that all those seeking to acquire Philippine citizenship must prove compliance with all
the requirements of the law. Differently stated, the Philippines' international commitment does not amount to a
blanket waiver of all the legal requirements for naturalization. The 1951 Refugee Convention must be read in
consonance with the Philippine statutory requirements. (Mohamed Hussin vs. Republic, GR No. 220674, December 2, 2021)

37. Janet Napoles was convicted of Plunder on December 7, 2018. She filed a Motion alleging that she is at
 12

risk of contracting COVID-19 inside the prison due to her Diabetes, an underlying COVID-19 health
condition. She contends that the Nelson Mandela Rules and the international community’s call for the
temporary release of PDLs due to the threats of COVID-19 provide sufficient basis to grant her bail
post-conviction. Is Napoles’ contention tenable?
No. The Nelson Mandela Rules contain the universally acknowledged minimum standards for the management
of prison facilities and the treatment of prisoners.On the other hand, the release of PDLs in foreign jurisdictions
as a response to COVID-19 is restricted and unavailing to high-risk inmates or those who are considered a
danger to the society. While it is true that several countries have implemented release programs for prisoners to
prevent the spread of COVID-19 virus, these initiatives are subject to exceptions neither the Nelson Mandela
Rules, the Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013, nor the worldwide trend to decongest jail facilities due to
COVID-19, support the release of PDLs pending the appeal of their conviction of a capital offense. (People vs.
Revilla, GR No. 247611, January 13, 2021)