Attention Balance and Coordination

The A B C of Learning Success 2nd

Edition Sally Goddard Blythe
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/attention-balance-and-coordination-the-a-b-c-of-learni
ng-success-2nd-edition-sally-goddard-blythe/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Attention, balance and coordination : the A. B. C. of

learning success Second Edition Beuret

https://textbookfull.com/product/attention-balance-and-
coordination-the-a-b-c-of-learning-success-second-edition-beuret/

Protect The Everyday Heroes World 1st Edition Jane

Blythe & Kb Worlds [Blythe

https://textbookfull.com/product/protect-the-everyday-heroes-
world-1st-edition-jane-blythe-kb-worlds-blythe/

A Tour of C 3rd Edition Stroustrup B.

https://textbookfull.com/product/a-tour-of-c-3rd-edition-
stroustrup-b/

Billy Bramble and the Great Big Cook Off 2nd Edition
Sally Donovan

https://textbookfull.com/product/billy-bramble-and-the-great-big-
cook-off-2nd-edition-sally-donovan/
From Human Attention to Computational Attention A
Multidisciplinary Approach 1st Edition Matei Mancas

https://textbookfull.com/product/from-human-attention-to-
computational-attention-a-multidisciplinary-approach-1st-edition-
matei-mancas/

Form and Structure in Interior Architecture 2nd Edition

Sally Stone

https://textbookfull.com/product/form-and-structure-in-interior-
architecture-2nd-edition-sally-stone/

Sure Success Magic 11th Edition B Ramgopal

https://textbookfull.com/product/sure-success-magic-11th-edition-
b-ramgopal/

Italian Conversation A QuickStudy Laminated Language

Reference Guide 2nd Edition Sally Ann Del Vino

https://textbookfull.com/product/italian-conversation-a-
quickstudy-laminated-language-reference-guide-2nd-edition-sally-
ann-del-vino/

Learning C by Programming Games 2nd Edition Wouter Van

Toll

https://textbookfull.com/product/learning-c-by-programming-
games-2nd-edition-wouter-van-toll/
Attention, Balance and Coordination
Attention, Balance and Coordination

The A.B.C. of Learning Success

Second Edition

Sally Goddard Blythe

With contributions from

Lawrence J. Beuret, Peter Blythe, and
Valerie Scaramella-Nowinski
This edition first published 2017

© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, except for Appendix I, which is a revised and adapted
version of a study published by the College of Occupational Therapists; and Appendix II,
which is revised and adapted from www.listenhear.co.uk, published by Steven Brown,
for which permission has been kindly granted.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law.
Advice on how to obtain permision to reuse material from this title is available
at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

The right of Sally Goddard Blythe to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted in accordance with law.

Registered Offices
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex,
PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Office
The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, customer services, and more information about
Wiley products, visit us at www.wiley.com.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats and by print‐on‐demand.
Some content that appears in standard print versions of this book may not be available in
other formats.

Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty

While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book,
they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness
of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that
the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services, and neither the publisher
nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other
expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication data applied for

ISBN Paperback: 9781119164777

Cover image: © real444/iStockphoto

Cover design by Wiley

Set in 10/12pt Warnock by SPi Global, Pondicherry, India

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 v

Contents

About the Author vii

About the Contributors ix

1 Windows on the Brain 1

2 The Significance of Primitive and Postural Reflexes 29

3 Primitive Reflexes of Position 65

4 Primitive Tactile Reflexes 99

5 Postural Reflexes 127

6 Use of the INPP Screening Questionnaire 149

7 Postnatal Factors Using the INPP Questionnaire 191

8 The Development of the Vestibular–Cerebellar

Theory 227

9 The Effects of Neuromotor Immaturity in Adults

and in Adolescents 259

10 Development of the INPP Method—from Theory to Fact 295

11 Other Factors in Specific Learning Difficulties 307

12 Missed and Misdiagnosis 345

vi Contents

Appendix 1 365

Appendix 2 377

Glossary of Terms 379

Bibliography 385

Index 407
 vii

About the Author

Sally Goddard Blythe, MSc, is a director of the Institute for Neuro‐

Physiological Psychology (INPP) in Chester, United Kingdom.
Sally Goddard Blythe has worked in the area of neurodevelopment
since 1987, and is the author of several books and published papers on
child development and neuromotor immaturity in specific learning dif-
ficulties. Her first book, Reflexes, Learning and Behavior, provided the
basic information for many other professions throughout the world using
reflex assessment. Her subsequent books—The Well Balanced Child,
What Babies and Children Really Need, and The Genius of Natural
Childhood—examine the importance of physical development and
­interaction with the environment for later learning success, health, well‐
being, and social integration.
Sally Goddard Blythe is also the author of Assessing Neuromotor
Readiness for Learning—a screening test and daily physical movement
­program designed to be used in schools with a whole class of children over
one academic year. This program has been the subject of published
research1 involving 810 children across various schools in the United
Kingdom. The aim of the program is to enable teachers to identify children
in the classroom who are at risk of under‐achieving as a result of immature
neuromotor skills (physical readiness for learning), and to implement a
daily movement program to improve the physical foundations for learning.
Sally Goddard Blythe is passionate about the need for better under-
standing of the issues involved, and about communication between
­professionals involved in education, medicine, and psychiatry. She is also
the author of a screening test for clinicians and health practitioners.

Endnote
1 Goddard Blythe S. A., 2005. Releasing educational potential through
­movement. Child Care in Practice 11/4:415–432.
  ix

About the Contributors

Peter Blythe The late Peter Blythe, PhD, was formerly a senior lecturer in
applied psychology/education at the College of Education in Lancashire.
In 1969, he became aware that many children with average to above aver-
age intelligence who have specific learning difficulties in the classroom
still had a cluster of primitive reflexes that should not be present above
the first year of life and under‐developed postural reflexes, which are
necessary to support all aspects of education. These developmental
“signposts” of maturity in the functioning of the central nervous system
were connected to inability to demonstrate their intelligence in an
acceptable academic way. In 1975, he established the Institute for Neuro‐
Physiological Psychology (INPP), where he developed the protocols of
assessment and effective remedial intervention now known as “The INPP
Method.” He was the director of INPP until 2000. The INPP, located in
Chester, United Kingdom, is the international training center for profes-
sionals seeking access to the INPP Method.

Lawrence J. Beuret Lawrence J. Beuret graduated from the Loyala

Stritch School of Medicine in Chicago, Illinnois, United States. During
a fellowship at the Mayo Clinic, he observed a high incidence of learning
disabilities in the adolescent psychiatric population. Following two years
as an emergency‐room physician, he entered a private practice in the
treatment of psychosomatic and post‐traumatic stress disorders (PTSD).
In 1985, he trained in Chester, United Kingdom, with Peter Blythe in
the INPP treatment techniques for neurodevelopmental delay (NDD).
In the course of practice, he has extended the diagnostic and treatment
techniques of INPP to include pre‐school ages, as well as adolescents and
adults with reading and learning difficulties. He is currently active in
developing courses for therapists in the recognition and treatment of
subconscious aspects of PTSD. His medical practice is in the Chicago
suburb of Palatine.
x About the Contributors

Valerie Scaramella‐Nowinski Valerie Scaramella‐Nowinski is committed

to children, their health, learning, and development. She has worked as a
clinician and researcher regarding pediatric brain behavior development
for more than 35 years.
Her doctoral research was titled “Systems Analysis: A Neuropsychological
Investigation of the Psychological Structure and Cerebral Organization
of Human Mental Processes.” Nowinski’s clinical research involves:
electrophysiological dysrhythmias associated with neurodevelopmental
disorders; eye movement related to brain behavior development, especially
literacy development; and neurodevelopment of intelligence and learning.
Throughout her professional career, she has been deeply involved in
developing neurosystems biology understanding regarding human
development and learning, especially in the pediatric population.
Nowinski is the founder of the Pediatric Neuropsychology Diagnostic
Center, Orland Park, Illinois, United States. The center houses three
­specialty programs: Brain Injury Program, Autism Spectrum Program,
and Neurodevelopmental Disorders/Attention and Learning Disorders
Program. These diagnostic and training programs incorporate an inter-
disciplinary team of pediatric specialists, including neuroscientists,
­educators, and speech, language, movement, child development, and
learning specialists. Bridging neuroscience with education is a primary
focus at the center.
She and her team have developed brain training and education
­programs for thousands of children. The team consults for multiple
school districts, hospitals, health and allied health specialists, and child
development programs.
In 2003, Nowinski and her family founded the Neuropsychology
C.H.I.L.D. (Child Health Initiative for Learning and Development)
Foundation, non‐profit 501 (c)(3). The mission of the foundation is to
“promote public awareness of current neuroscience and education
research and clinical work related to child development and learning.”
 385

Bibliography

Alexopoulos E. I. et al. (2006). Association between primary nocturnal

enuresis and habitual snoring in children. Urology 68(2), 406–409.
Alhazen B. C. Cited in: Arnheim R. (1969). Visual Thinking. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press.
Allen A. C. (1991). Preterm development. In A. J. Capute & P. J. Accardo
(eds), Developmental Disabilities in Infancy and Childhood. Baltimore,
MD, Paul H. Brookes Publishing Co.
Allen M. C. (1987). The symmetric tonic neck reflex (STNR) as a normal
finding in premature infants prior to term. Pediatric Research 20, 208A.
Allman J. (2000). Evolving Brains. New York, Scientific American Library.
American Speech‐Language‐Hearing Association. (2006). http://www.asha.
org/members/deskref‐journals/deskref/default/. Ref. adapted from
Handbook of Auditory Processing Disorder. Comprehensive Intervention
Vol. 2, p. 3.
Anderson U. M. (1996). The Psalms of Children. Ellicottville, NY, She‐Bear
Publications.
Anderson U. M. (2004). www.andersonbeyondgenome.com
Annett M. (1972). The distribution of manual symmetry. British Journal of
Psychology 63, 343–358.
Annett M. (1985). Left, Right, Hand and Brain. The Right Shift Theory.
London, Lawrence Erlbaum.
Annett M. (1995). The right shift theory of a genetic balanced
polymorphism for cerebral dominance and cognitive processing. Cahiers
de Psychologie Cognitive 14(5), 427–623.
ARROW. http://www.self‐voice.co.uk/
Arvedson J. C. (2006). Swallowing and feeding in infants and young
children. GI Motility online. www.bioinfo.pl/[auth:Arvedson].

Attention, Balance and Coordination: The A.B.C. of Learning Success,

Second Edition. Sally Goddard Blythe.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
386 Bibliography

Aslin R. N. (1985). Oculo‐motor measures of visual development. In

G Gottlieb & N Krasnegor (eds), Measurement of Audition and Vision
During the First Year of Life: a Methodological Overview. Norwood, NJ,
Ablex, pp. 391–417.
Audesirk T. & Audesirk G. (1996). Biology. Life on Earth. Upper Saddle
River, NJ, Prentice‐Hall Inc.
Augur J. (1985). Guidelines for teachers, parents and learners. In M
Snowling (ed.), Children’s Written Language Difficulties. Windsor, NFER
Nelson.
Ayres A. J. (1972). Improving academic scores through sensory integration.
Journal of Learning Disabilities 5, 338–343.
Ayres A. J. (1973). Sensory Integration and Learning Disorders. Los Angeles,
CA, Western Psychological Services.
Ayres A. J. (1989). Sensory Integration and Praxis Tests. Los Angeles, CA,
Western Psychological Services.
Ayto J. (1990). Dictionary of Word Origins. St Ives, Cambridgeshire,
Columbia Marketing.
Babinski I. (1915). Revue Neurologique (Fr) 28(2), 145; (1922):1049.
Badian N. A. (1983). Developmental dyscalculia. In H. R. Mykelbost (ed.),
Progress in Learning Disabilities. New York, Grune and Stratton.
Barkley R. A. (1995). Taking Charge of ADHD: the Complete, Authoritative
Guide for Parents. New York, Guilford.
Barnes D. E. & Walker D. W. (1981). Prenatal ethanol exposure permanently
alters the rat hippocampus. Cited in: (1981) Mechanisms of alcohol
damage in utero. CIBA Foundation Symposium, Vol. 105. London,
Pitman.
Barsch R. H. (1968). Achieving motor perception efficiency. A self‐oriented
approach to learning. Vol. 1 of A Perceptual‐Motor Curriculum. Seattle,
WA, Special Child Publications.
Bateman B. D. (1973). Educational implications of minimal brain
dysfunction. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 205, 245–250.
Bauer J. (1916). Der Báránysuhe Zeigeveruch etc. Die traumatischen
Neurosen. Wiener Klinisch Wochenschrift 40.
Bauer J. & Schilder P. (1919). Uber einige psycholphysiologische
Mechanismen funtioneller Neurosen. Zeitschrift für Nervenheil‐kunde
164, 279.
Bax M. & MacKeith R. (eds) (1962). Minimal Cerebral Dysfunction.
London, The National Spastics Society. Education and Information Unit
in association with William Heinemann Medical Books, Ltd.
Becker R. D. (1974). Minimal brain dysfunction – clinical fact, neurological
fiction? The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines 12, 87.
Bein‐Wierzbinski W. (2001). Persistent primitive reflexes in elementary
school children. Effect on oculomotor and visual perception. Paper
 Bibliography 387

presented at the 13th European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental

Delay in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties, Chester, UK.
Bellis Waller M. (1993). Crack Affected Children. A Teacher’s Guide.
Newbury Park, CA, Corwin Press, Inc.
Bender L. (1938). A Visual Motor Gestalt Test and its Clinical Uses. New
York, American Orthopsychiatric Association.
Bender M. L. (1976). Bender‐Purdue Reflex Test and Training Manual. San
Rafael, CA, Academic Publications.
Bennett R. V. & Brown L. K. (1989). Myles Textbook for Midwives.
Edinburgh, Churchill Livingstone.
Benson A. J. (1998). Motion sickness. In J. M. Stellman et al. (eds),
Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4th ed. Vol. 50.
Geneva, International Labour Office, pp. 12–14.
Berard G. (1993). Hearing Equals Behaviour. New Canaan, CT, Keats
Publishing Inc.
Bernhardsson K. & Davidson K. (1983). A Different Way of Helping Children
with Learning Difficulties – A Final Report from the Dala Clinic.
Gothenburg, Sweden, Gothenburg Educational.
Berthoz A. (2000). The Brain’s Sense of Movement. Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press.
Berthoz A. (2003). Emotion and reason. The Cognitive Science of Decision
Making. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Berthoz A. (2007). Development and function of the balance system in the
early years. The 19th European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental
Delay in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties. Pisa,
September 2007.
Bertolotti M. (1904). Revue Neurologique 12, 1160. Cited in: Peiper A.
(1963). Cerebral function in infancy and childhood. The International
Behavioral Sciences Series. New York, Consultants Bureau.
Beuret L. J. (1992). The role of neuro‐developmental delays in advanced academic
failure. The 4th European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental Delay in
Children with Specific Learning Difficulties. Chester, UK, March 1992.
Beuret L. J. (1994). Seminar paper delivered to The Institute for Neuro‐
Physiological Psychology Supervision, Chester, 1994.
Beuret L. J. (2000). The role of postural reflexes in learning. Part 2. Paper
presented at the 12th European Conference of Neuro‐developmental Delay
in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties, Chester, UK, March 2000.
Biederman H. (1992). Kinematic imbalance due to suboccipital strain.
Journal of Manual Medicine 6, 151–156.
Biguer B. et al. (1982). The coordination of eye, head and arm movements
during reaching at a single target. Experimental Brain Research 46,
301–304.
Birth Choice UK website. http://www.BirthChoiceUK.com
388 Bibliography

Bloedal J. R. & Bracha V. (1997). Duality of the cerebellar motor and

cognitive function. International Review of Neurobiology 41(6), 613–634.
Blythe P. (1972). Stress Disease. London, Arthur Baker.
Blythe P. (1974a). A Somatogenic Basis for Neurosis and the Effect Upon
Health. Chester, The Institute for Psychosomatic Therapy.
Blythe P. (1974b). Somatogenic neuroses and the effect upon health.
Monograph. Chester, Institute of Psychosomatic Therapy, August 1974.
Blythe P. (1978). Minimal brain dysfunction and the treatment of
psychoneuroses. Journal of Psychomatic Research 22(4), 247–255.
Blythe P. (1987). Oculo‐motor dysfunctions and the effect on functioning.
Reflex Newsletter, Chester, INPP.
Blythe P. (1988a). An analysis of the developmental history of 103 patients
diagnosed with agoraphobia and/or panic disorder. The 2nd International
Conference of Neuro‐Developmental Delay. Stockholm, October 1988.
Blythe P. (1988b). A New Approach that Explains Specific Learning
Difficulties and Provides an Effective Treatment. Chester, INPP.
Blythe P. (1990a). Lecture for INPP Supervision, October 1990, Chester.
Blythe P. (1990b). The History of The Institute for Neuro‐Physiological
Psychology (INPP). Chester, INPP.
Blythe P. & McGlown D. J. (1978). Developmental Screening Questionnaire
for Organic Brain Dysfunction. Chester, INPP.
Blythe P. & McGlown D. J. (1979). An Organic Basis for Neuroses and
Educational Difficulties. Chester, Insight Publications.
Blythe P. & McGlown D. J. (1980). An Organic Basis for Neuroses and the
Existence, Detection and Treatment of Secondary Neuroses. Göteborg,
Svenska Institutet för Neurofysiologisk Psykologi.
Blythe P. & McGlown D. J. (1981). MBD and OBD. Swedish Medical Journal
78(1), 45–48.
Blythe P. & McGlown D. (1982). Agoraphobia – is it organic? World
Medicine, July 1982, pp. 57–59.
Bobath B. (1971). Abnormal Postural Reflex Activity Caused by Brain
Lesions. (2nd ed). London, William Heinemann Medical Books, Ltd.
Bobath B. (1978). Abnormal Postural Reflex Activity Caused by Brain
Lesions. (3rd ed). London, William Heinemann Medical Books Ltd.
Bobath K. (1991). A Neurophysiological Basis for the Treatment of Cerebral
Palsy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Bobath K. & Bobath B. (1965). Abnormal Postural Reflex Activity Caused by
Brain Lesions. London, William Heinemann.
Boden G. (2001). Free fatty acids‐the link between obesity and insulin
resistance. Endocrine Practice 7(1), 8–54.
Bower B. (1987). Images of obsession. Science News 131, 236–237.
Bowlby R. (2007). Babies and toddlers in non‐parental daycare can avoid
stress and anxiety if they develop a lasting secondary attachment bond
 Bibliography 389

with one carer who is consistently accessible to them. Attachment and

Human Development 4(4), 307–319.
Brambell F. W. R (1948). Prenatal mortality in mammals. Biological Review
23, 379–407.
Breuer J. (1874). Über die funktion der bogengängen des ohrlabyrinthes.
Wiener Medizinisch Jahrbuch 4, 72–124.
Breuer J. (1875). Beitrage zur lehre vom statischen sinne (gleichge‐
wichtsorgan, vestibularapparat des ohrlabyrinths). Zweite Mitteleilung.
Wiener Medizinisch Jahrbuch 5, 87–156.
Breuer J. (1889). Neue Versuche and den ohrbogengängen. Arch. ges.
Physiol. 44, 135–152.
Breuer J. (1891). Über die Funktion der Otolithenapparate. Pflügers Archiv
48, 195–306.
Briggs Myers I. et al. (1998). MBTI Manual (A Guide to the Development
and Use of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator). (3rd ed). Washington, DC,
Consulting Psychologists Press.
British Dyslexia Association (1998). The Dyslexia Handbook. Reading, The
British Dyslexia Association.
Brodal P. (1998). The Central Nervous System. Structure and Function.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Brooks V. B. (1986). The Neural Bases of Motor Control. New York, Oxford
University Press.
Buckley S. J. (2005). Gentle Birth, Gentle Mothering. Brisbane, One Moon
Press.
Bull J. (2005). The possible role of primitive reflexes in the birth process.
Midwifery Lecture delivered to students attending The Institute for
Neuro‐Physiological Psychology Training Course in Identification,
Assessment and Treatment of Neuro‐Developmental Delay, Chester,
November 2005.
Burne J. (2006). IVF: why we must be told the truth over birth defects.
Good Health Daily Mail, 12 December 2006.
Butcher J. N. & Williams C. L. (2000). Essentials of MMPI‐2 and MMPI‐A
Interpretation. (2nd ed). Minneapolis, MN, University of
Minnesota Press.
Butler Hall B. (1998). Discovering the hidden treasures in the ear. Paper
presented at the 10th European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental
Delay in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties, Chester,
March 1998.
Cantrell R. W. et al. (1979). Stapedius muscle function tests in the diagnosis
of neuromuscular disorders. Otolaryngology and Head and Neck Surgery
87, 261–265.
Capute A. J. & Accardo P. J. (1991). Developmental Disabilities in Infancy
and Childhood. Baltimore, MD, Paul H Brookes Publishing Co.
390 Bibliography

Capute A. J. et al. (1980). Primitive Reflex Profile. Baltimore,

M. D., University Park Press.
Capute A. J. et al. (1981). Primitive reflexes: a factor in non‐verbal language
in early infancy. In Stark (ed.), Language Behaviour in Infancy and Early
Childhood. New York, Elsevier.
Carbonell J. & Perez J. P. M. Cited in: O’Doherty N (1986). Neurological
Examination of the Newborn. Lancaster, MTP Press Limited.
Cawthorne T. (1944). The physiological basis for head exercises.
The Journal of the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy 30, 106.
Cawthorne T. (1946). Vestibular injuries. Proceedings of the Royal Society
of Medicine 39, 270–272.
Chalfant J. C. & Scheffelin M. (1969). Central Processing Dysfunctions in
Children. Bethesda, MD, National Institute of Neurological Disorders
and Stroke, National Institute of Health.
Chase C. & Jenner A. (1993). Magnocellular visual deficits affect temporal
processing of dyslexics. In P Tallal, A. M. Galaburda, R. Llinas & C. von
Euler (eds), Temporal Information Processing in the Nervous System, with
Special Reference to Dyslexia and Dysphasia. New York, New York
Academy of Sciences, pp. 326–329.
Chasnoff I. L. & Burns W. J. (1984). The Moro reaction: a scoring system for
neonatal narcotic withdrawal. Developmental Medicine and Child
Neurology 26, 484–489.
Chasnoff I. J. et al. (1985). Cocaine use in pregnancy. New England Journal
of Medicine 313, 666–669.
Chasnoff I. J. et al. (1986). Prenatal drug exposure: effects of neonatal and
infant growth development. Neurobehavioral Toxicology and Teratology
8, 357–362.
Christiansen C. & Baum C. (eds) (1991). Occupational Therapy.
Overcoming Human Performance Deficits. Thorofare, NJ, Slack
Incorporated.
Chyi L. J. et al. (2007). Cognitive school outcomes of infants born at 32 to
36 weeks gestation. Pediatric Academies Society’s Annual Meeting.
Toronto, Canada.
Clements S. (1966). Minimal Brain Dysfunction in Children: Terminology
and Identification. Task Force 1. Washington, DC, U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.
Cohen A. S. (1973). Minimal brain dysfunction and practical matters such
as teaching kids to read. Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences
205, 251–261.
Compston A. (2007). From the archives. Brain 2005 128(7), 1475–1477;
doi:10.1093/brain/awh566.
Conger K. (2007). Slightly early birth may still spell trouble later in school.
Stanford Report. Stanford News Service. 9 May 2007. http://www.
news‐service.stanford.edu/news/2007/may9/med‐premature
 Bibliography 391

Cooksey F. S. (1946). Rehabilitation in vestibular injuries. Proceedings of the

Royal Society of Medicine 39, 273–275.
Coryell J. & Henderson A. (1979). Role of the asymmetrical tonic neck
reflex in hand visualization in normal infants. American Journal of
Occupational Therapy 33(4), 255–260.
Cottrell S. (1988). Aetiology, diagnosis and treatment of asthma through
primitive reflex inhibition. Paper presented at the 2nd International
Conference of Neurological Dysfunction, Stockholm, October 1988.
Coulter H. L. (1990). Vaccination, Social Violence and Criminality. The
Medical Assault on the American Brain. Berkeley, CA, North
Atlantic Books.
Courchesne E. et al. (1994). Impairment in shifting attention in autistic and
cerebellar patients. Behavioral Neuroscience 108, 848–865.
Cox J. M. (1804). Practical Observations in Insanity. London, Baldwin and
Murray.
Crawford M. (1994). Cited in: Morgan E (1994). The Descent of the Child.
London, Souvenir Press.
Croucher T. & Hindmarch I. (1973). The spiral after effect (SAE) as a
measure of motion sickness susceptibility and the effect on the SAE of an
antimotion sickness drug and a central nervous system depressant.
Psychopharmacology 32, 2.
Cruickshank W. M. (1981). A new perspective in teacher education: The
neuroeducator. Journal of Learning Disabilities 14(6), 337–341, 367.
Crutchfield C. A. & Barnes M. R. (1993). Motor Control and Motor
Learning in Rehabilitation. Atlanta, GA, Stokesville Publishing
Company.
Dalby M. A. (1986). Aspects in reading processes. In K. Troudhjem (ed.),
12th Danavox Symposium. Denmark, Danavox.
Dean P. (1994). Cited in: A wobble now means less work later. The
Independent, 26 April 1994, London.
Delacato C. H. (1959). The Treatment and Prevention of Reading Problems.
Springfield, IL, Charles C. Thomas.
Delacato C. (1970). The Diagnosis and Treatment of Speech and Reading
Problems. Springfield, IL, Charles C. Thomas.
Delacato C. (1981). A New Start for the Child with Reading Problems. New
York, David McKay.
DeMause L. (1982). Foundations of Psychohistory. New York, Creative
Roots.
Denckla M. B. et al. (1985). Motor performance in dyslexic children with
and without attentional disorders. Archives of Neurology 42, 228–231.
De Quirós J. B. & Schrager O. L. (1978). Neurological Fundamentals in
Learning Disabilities. Novato, CA, Academic Therapy Publications Inc.
Deuschl G. et al. (2001). The pathophysiology of tremor. Muscles and
Nerves 24(6), 716–735.
392 Bibliography

Devries J. I. P. et al. (1985). The emergence of fetal behavior: II. Quantitative

aspects. Early Human Development 12, 99–120.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM IV) (1994).
Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association.
Draper I. T. (1993). Lecture Notes on Neurology. Oxford, Blackwell Scientific
Publications.
Drillien C. M. & Drummond M. B. (1977). Neurodevelopmental Problems in
Early Childhood. Oxford, Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Eggesbø M. et al. (2005). Cesarean delivery and cow milk allergy/
intolerance. Allergy 60(9), 1172.
El‐Chaar D. (2007). Fertility treatment raises birth defect risk. Presented at
Conference hosted by The Society for Maternal‐Fetal Medicine, San
Francisco, 9 February 2007.
Eustis R. S. (1947). The primary origin of the specific language disabilities.
Journal of Pediatrics XXXI, 455–488.
Eyeson‐Annan M. et al. (1996). Visual and vestibular components of
motion sickness. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 67(10),
955–962.
Fawcett A. J. (1994). Cited in: A wobble now means less work later. The
Independent, 26 April 1994, London.
Fawcett A. J. et al. (1996). Impaired performance of children with dyslexia
on a range of cerebellar tests. Annals of Dyslexia 46, 259–283.
Fay T. (1948). Neuromuscular reflex therapy for spastic disorders. The
Journal of the Florida Medical Association 44, 1234–1240.
Finnegan J. (1993). The vital role of essential fatty acids for pregnant and
nursing women. Celestial Arts. http://www.thorne.com/townsend/dec/
efas.html
Fiorentino M. R. (1981a). A Basis for Sensorimotor Development – Normal
and Abnormal. Springfield, IL, Charles C Thomas.
Fiorentino M. R. (1981b). Reflex Testing Methods for Evaluating CNS
Development. Springfield, IL, Charles C Thomas.
Fitzgibbon J. (2002). Feeling Tired All The Time. Dublin, Gill & Macmillan.
Flourens M. J. P. (1824). Recherches experimentales sur les propriétés et les
functions du système nerveux dans les animaux vertébrés. Paris, Crevot.
Flourens M. J. P. (1830). Experiences sur les canaux semi circulaires de
l’oreille. Memoire Académie Royale Sciences (Paris) 9, 455–477.
Foresight. http://www.foresight‐preconception.org.uk/
Forrest D. S. (2002). Prevalence of primitive reflexes in patients with anxiety
disorders. Thesis submitted to the University of Edinburgh in part
fulfilment of Doctorate in Clinical Psychology.
Frank J. & Levinson H. (1973). Dysmetric dyslexia and dyspraxia.
Hypothesis and study. The Journal of the American Academy of Child
Psychiatry 12(4), 690–701.
 Bibliography 393

Frank J. & Levinson H. N. (1976). Compensatory mechanisms in cerebellar‐

vestibular dysfunction, dysmetric dyslexia and dyspraxia. Academic
Therapy 12, 1–14.
French T. M. (1930). Beziehungen des Unbewussten zur Funktion der
Bogengänge. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 16, 73–86.
Freud S. Cited in: Brown J. A. C. (1991). Freud and the Post Freudians.
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
Gahlinger P. M. (1999). How to help your patients avoid travel travail.
Postgraduate Medicine online. 106(4), 1 October. http://www.
postgraduate.com/issues.
Galaburda A. L. (2001). Dyslexia and the brain. The 5th International BDA
Conference Proceedings. University of York, April 2001.
Galaburda A. M. & Kemper T. L. (1979). Cytoarchitectonic abnormalities in
developmental dyslexia: A case study. Annals of Neurology 6, 94–100.
Galaburda A. M. et al. (1985). Developmental dyslexia: four consecutive
patients with cortical anomalies. Annals of Neurology 18, 222, 223.
Galaburda A. M. et al. (1986). Histological asymmetry in the primary visual
cortex of the rat: Implications for mechanisms of cerebral asymmetry.
Cortex 22, 151–160.
Galant S. (1917). Der Rückgratreflex: ein neuer Reflex im Säugling‐salter
mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der anderen Reflex‐vorgänge bei den
Säuglingen. Doctoral Dissertation, Basel, Basler.
Gale C. R. & Martyn C. N. (2004). Birth weight and later risk of depression
in a national birth cohort. British Journal of Psychiatry 184, 28–33.
Gallahue D. L. & Ozmun J. C. (1998). Understanding Motor Development.
Singapore, McGraw‐Hill Book Company.
Gershon M. D. (1998). The Second Brain. The Scientific Basis of Gut
Instinct. New York, Harper Collins.
Geschwind N. & Galaburda A. M. (1985). Cerebral Lateralisation.
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Geschwind N. & Levitsky W. (1968). Left‐right asymmetries in the temporal
speech region. Science 161, 186–187.
Gesell A. (1954). The ontogenesis of infant behavior. In L. Carmichael (ed.),
Manual of Child Psychology. New York, NY, Wiley pp. 295–331.
Gibbs R. B. (1994). Estrogen and nerve growth factor‐related systems in the
brain. Effects on basal forebrain cholinergic neurons and implications for
learning and memory processes and aging. In V. N. Luine & C. F. Harding
(eds), Hormonal restructuring of the adult brain. Basic and clinical
perspectives. Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences Vol. 743, pp.
165–199.
Giordano G. G. (1953). Acta Neurologica III, Quaderno, 313. Cited in
Peiper A. (1963). Cerebral Function in Infancy and Childhood. New York,
Consultants Bureau.
394 Bibliography

Goddard S. A. (1989). The Fear Paralysis and its Interaction with the
Primitive Reflexes. INPP monograph Series 1, Chester.
Goddard S. A. (1990a). The Developmental Basis for Learning Difficulties
and Language Disorders. INPP Monograph Series 1.
Goddard S. A. (1990b). Developmental Milestones: a Blueprint for Survival.
INPP Monograph Series 2, Chester.
Goddard S. A. (1991). Elective mutism; the unchosen silence. Paper
presented at The 5th European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental
Delay in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties, March 1991. In:
Goddard S. A. (1996). A Teacher’s Window into the Child’s Mind. Eugene,
OR, Fern Ridge Press.
Goddard S. A. (1996). A Teacher’s Window into the Child’s Mind. Eugene,
OR, Fern Ridge Press.
Goddard S. A. (2002). Reflexes, Learning and Behavior. Eugene, OR, Fern
Ridge Press.
Goddard S. A. & Hyland D. (1998). Screening for neurological dysfunction
in the specific learning difficulty child. The British Journal of
Occupational Therapy 10, 459–464.
Goddard Blythe S. A. (1996). The Developmental Test Battery and Exercise
Programme for Use in Schools with Children with Special Needs. Chester,
The Institute for Neuro‐Physiological Psychology.
Goddard Blythe S. A. (2001). Neurological dysfunction as a significant
factor in children diagnosed with dyslexia. Proceedings of The 5th
International British Dyslexia Association Conference. University of York,
April 2001.
Goddard Blythe S. A. (2004). The Well Balanced Child. Stroud, Hawthorn
Press.
Goddard Blythe S. A. (2005). Releasing educational potential through
movement. A summary of individual studies carried out using the INPP
Test Battery and Developmental Exercise Programme for use in Schools
with Children with Special Needs. Child Care in Practice 11(4),
415–432.
Goddard Blythe S. A. (2008). What Babies and Children Really Need. How
Mothers and Fathers Can Nurture Children’s Growth for Health and Well
Being. Stroud, Hawthorn Press.
Goddard Blythe S. A. & Hyland D. (1998). Screening for neurological
dysfunction in the specific learning difficulty child. The British Journal of
Occupational Therapy 61(10).
Golan H. & Huleihel M. (2006). The effect of prenatal hypoxia on brain
development: short‐ and long‐term consequences demonstrated in
rodent models. Developmental Science 9(4), 338–349.
Gold S. J. (2006). Using the head righting reflex to check for warning
symptoms that something is wrong with the child’s “gaze control” and
 Bibliography 395

how to proceed from there. Svea Gold. Speech for AAHD conference
October 2006.
Golding J. (2007). Motion sickness: friend or foe? The Inaugural Lecture of
John Golding, March 2007, London.
Goldstein K. Cited in: Schilder P. (1933). The vestibular apparatus in neurosis
and psychosis. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 78(1), 1–23.
Goltz F. (1870). Über dei physiologische Bedeutung der Bogengänge des
Ohrlabyrinths. Pflügers Arch. ges. Physiol. 3, 172–192.
Goodenough F. (1926). Measurement of Intelligence by Drawings. New York,
World Book Co.
Gordon C. R. et al. (1994). Seasickness susceptibility, personality factors
and salivation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 65(7),
610–614.
Gustafsson D. (1971). A comparison of basis reflexes with the subtests of
the Purdue‐Perceptual‐Motor Survey. Unpublished Master’s Thesis,
University of Kansas.
Hadders Algra M. et al. (1986). Neurologically deviant newborn:
neurological and behavioural developments at the age of six years.
Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 28, 569–578.
Hadders Algra M. et al. (1988). Perinatal correlates of major and minor
neurological dysfunction at school‐age – a multivariate analysis.
Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 30, 482–491.
Hallaran W. S. (1810). An Enquiry into the Causes Producing the
Extraordinary Addition to the Number of Insane, Together with Extended
Observations on the Care of Insanity: with Hints as to the Better
Management of Public Asylums. Cork, Edwards & Savage.
Halleck R. P. (1898). Education of the Nervous System. New York, Macmillan
and Company Ltd.
Hallett M. & Grafman J. (1997). Executive function and motor skill
learning. International Review of Neurobiology 41, 297–323.
Halverson H. M. (1927). Studies of the grasp response in early infancy. The
Journal of Genetic Psychology 51, 371–449.
Harris D. B. (1963). Children’s Drawings as Measures of Intellectual
Maturity. New York, Harcourt Brace and World Inc.
Hava G. & Mahmoud H. (2006). The effect of prenatal hypoxia on brain
development: Short‐ and long‐term consequences demonstrated in
rodent models. Developmental Science 9(4), 338–349.
Hawkins J. E. & Schacht J. (2005). Sketches of Otohistory. Part 7: The
nineteenth‐century rise of laryngology. Audiology and Neurotology 10(3),
130–133.
Helmerhorst F. M. et al. (2004). Perinatal outcome of singletons and twins
after assisted conception: a systematic review of controlled studies. BMJ
328, 261.
396 Bibliography

Hertig A. T. et al. (1959). Thirty‐four fertilised human ova, good, bad and
indifferent, recovered from women of known fertility. A study of biologic
wastage in early human pregnancy. Pediatrics 23, 202–211.
Hippocrates. In Hippocrates VII. (1994). Epidemics 2/4–7. The Nature of
Man. Vol. 4. (1994). Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press.
Hobson A. J. (1988). The Dreaming Brain. New York, Basic Books.
Holle B. (1981). Motor Development in Children. Normal and Retarded.
Oxford, Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Holmes T. H. & Rahe R. H. (1967). Social readjustment rating scale. Journal
of Psychosomatic Research 11, 213–18.
Hooker D. (1938). Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
79, 597.
Hooker D. (1952). The Prenatal Origin of Behaviour. Lawrence, KS,
University of Kansas Press.
Hooker D. & Hare C. (1954). Early human fetal behaviour with a
preliminary note on double simultaneous fetal stimulation. In D. Hooker
& C. Hare (eds), Genetics and Inheritance of Neuropsychiatric Patterns,
Vol. 33. Research Publications – Association for Research in Nervous and
Mental Disease, pp. 98–113.
Horrobin D. (2001). The Madness of Adam and Eve. How Schizophrenia
Shaped Humanity. London, Corgi Books.
Horvath K. et al. (1999). Gastrointestinal abnormalities in children with
autistic disorder. Journal of Pediatrics 135(5), 559–563.
http://www.balametrics.com
http://www.merck.com/
http://www.patient.co.uk/
http://www.vestibular.org/vestibular
Hughlings Jackson J. (1946). Cited in: Walshe F. M. R. (1923).
On certain tonic or postural reflexes in hemiplegia with special
reference to the so‐called associated movements. Brain Part 1.46/2,
14, 16–23.
Humphrey T. (1964). Some correlations between the appearance of human
fetal reflexes and the development of the nervous system. Progress in
Brain Research 4, 93–135.
Humphreys P. et al. (1990). Developmental dyslexia in women:
Neuropathological findings in three cases. Annals of Neurology
28, 727–738.
Hyppönen E. & Power C. (2007). Hypovitaminosis D in British adults at age
45y: Nationwide cohort study on dietary and lifestyle predictors.
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition. 85, 860–868.
Ingram T. T. S. (1973). Soft signs. Developmental Medicine and Child
Neurology 15, 527.
 Bibliography 397

Isbert H. & Peiper A. (1963). Cited in: Peiper A. & Isbert H. (1963). Cerebral
Function in Infancy and Childhood. The International Behavioral
Sciences Series. New York, Consultants Bureau.
James W. (1882). The sense of dizziness in deaf mutes. The American
Journal of Otology 4, 239–254.
Jenike M. A. et al. (1989). Obsessive compulsive disorder: A double blind,
placebo controlled trial of clomiprimine in 27 patients. American Journal
of Psychiatry 146, 1328–1330.
Jensen T. K. et al. (2007). Fertility treatment and reproductive health of
male offspring: a study of 1925 young men from the general population.
American Journal of Epidemiology 165(5), 583–590.
Johansen K. V. (1988). Sensory deprivation – a possible cause of dyslexia.
In Nordisk Tidsskrift for Spesialpedagogikk. Oslo, Scandinavian
University Press.
Johansen K. V. (2002). Dyslexia, auditory laterality and hemispheric‐specific
auditory stimulation. Nordisk Tidsskrift for Spesialpedagogikk 80,
258–271. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget.
Johnson D. L. et al. (1999). Cerebral blood flow and personality: A positron
emission tomography study. American Journal of Psychiatry 156,
252–257.
Kaada B. (1986). Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. The Possible Role of the
Fear Paralysis Reflex. Oslo, Scandinavian University Press.
Kaye K. (1977). Toward the origin of dialogue. In H. R. Schaffer (ed.),
Studies in Mother‐Infant Interaction. London, Academic Press.
Kelly Y. J. et al. (2001). Birth weight and behavioural problems in children: a
modifiable effect? International Journal of Epidemiology 30, 88–94.
Kennard M. A. (1996). Value of equivocal signs in neurologic diagnosis.
Neurology 10, 753–764.
Kohen‐Raz R. (1986). Learning Disabilities and Postural Control. London,
Freund Publishing House.
Kohen‐Raz R. (2004). Postural correlates of learning and disabilities and
communication disorders. The European Conference of Neuro‐
developmental delay in children with specific learning difficulties,
Chester, March 2004.
Lack of vitamin D made worse in winter. 28 October 2003. http://www.
CNN.com./HEALTH
Lagercrantz H. (1989). Neurochemical modulation of fetal behaviour and
excitation at birth. In E. Euler, H. Forssberg & H. Lagercrantz (eds),
Neurobiology of Early Infant Behaviour. Wenner‐Gren International
Symposium Series. Vol. 55. New York, Stockton Press.
Lawton Brown R. (1990). Dyslexia and maths. Paper presented at the 2nd
European Conference of Neuro‐developmental Delay in Children with
Specific Learning Difficulties, Chester, UK, March 1990.
398 Bibliography

Leidler R. & Loewy K. (1923). Der Schwindel bei Neurosen. Monatschrift

für Ohrenheilkunde und Laryngo‐ Rhinologie 57(1).
Leiner H. C. et al. (1986). Does the cerebellum contribute to mental skills?
Behavioral Neuroscience 100, 443–454.
Leiner H. C. et al. (1991). The human cerebro‐cerebellar system: its computing,
cognitive and language skills. Behavioral Brain Research 44, 113–128.
Leiner H. C. et al. (1993). Cognitive and language functions of the human
cerebellum. Trends in Neuroscience 16, 444–447.
Levine R. J. et al. (2006). Soluble endoglin and other circulatory
antiangiogenic factors in preeclampsia. New England Journal of Medicine
355, 992–1005.
Levinson H. N. (1974). Dyslexia: does this unusual childhood syndrome
begin as an ear infection? Infectious Diseases 15(15).
Levinson H. N. (1980). A Solution to the Riddle – Dyslexia. New York
Springer‐Verlag.
Levinson H. N. (1984). Smart but Feeling Dumb. New York, Warner
Books Inc.
Levinson H. N. (1986). Phobia Free. New York, M. Evans and Company Inc.
Levinson H. N. (1990). Total Concentration. New York, M. Evans and
Company.
Levinson H. N. (1992). Turning Around the Upside Down Kids. New York,
M. Evans and Company.
Levinson H. N. (1994). A Scientific Watergate. Lake Success, NY
Stonebridge Publishing Ltd.
Levinson H. N. (2000). Feeling Smarter and Smarter. Lake Success, NY,
Stonebridge Publishing Ltd.
Levinson H. N. & Sanders A. (1991). The Upside Down Kids. New York,
M. Evans and Company.
Levitt S (1984). Treatment of Cerebral Palsy and Motor Delay. Oxford,
Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Lipsitt L. P. (1980). Conditioning the rage to live. Psychology Today,
February.
Ljunggren M. (1982). Agoraphobia – an organic basis? An explanatory
neuropsychological approach. Unpublished Master’s Thesis. Universitet
Göteborg, Psychologiska Institutionen.
Luckett P. W. (1974). Reproductive development and evolution of the
placenta in primates. Contributions of Primatology 3, 142–234.
Mach E. (1873). Physikalische Versuche uber den Gleichgewichts‐sinn des
Menschen. Sitzungsberichte der kaiserl. Akademie der Wissenschaften.
68, 124–140.
Macnair T. (2006). Febrile convulsions. http://www.bbc.co.uk/health
Madaule P. (1994). When Listening Comes Alive. Norval, Ontario, Moulin
Publishing.
 Bibliography 399

Madaule P. (2001). Seminar on The Ear‐Voice Connection, November 2001,

Chester.
Mahoney D. (2003). Cited in: Pediatric News, 31 July 2003.
Manor O. & Amir N. (1995). Developmental right hemisphere syndrome:
clinical spectrum of the non‐verbal learning disability. Journal of
Learning Disabilities 28, 80–86.
Manor O. et al. (1993). The acquisition of arithmetic in normal children:
Assessment by a cognitive model of dyscalculia. Developmental Medicine
and Child Neurology 35, 593–601.
Maurer D. (1983). The scanning of compound figures by young infants.
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 35, 437–448.
Maurer D. & Maurer C. (1988). The World of the Newborn. London,
Viking.
McGraw M. (1945). The Neuromuscular Maturation of the Human Infant.
New York, Hafner Press.
McKeever T. M. et al. (2002). A birth cohort study using the West Midlands
General Practice Database. American Journal of Respiratory and Critical
Care Medicine 166, 827–832.
McPhillips M. (2006). The role of movement in early development and
long‐term implications for educational progress. Paper presented at The
Vision, Basic Skills Development and Bridging the Skills Gap Conference,
BABO, University of London, November 2006.
McPhillips M. & Sheehy N. (2004). Prevalence of persistent primary reflexes
and motor problems in children with reading difficulties. Dyslexia 10(4),
316–338.
McPhillips M. et al. (2000). Effects of replicating primary reflex movements
on specific reading difficulties in children: A randomised, double‐blind,
controlled trial. Lancet 355(2), 537–541.
Medical references: Drinking alchohol during pregnancy. http://www.
marchofdimes.com/
Melillo R. & Leisman G. (2004). Neurobehavioral disorders of childhood. An
evolutionary perspective. New York, Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Publishers.
Melzack R. & Wall P. (1965). Pain mechanisms: A new theory. Science 150,
171–179.
Members of the Department of Neurology and the Department of
Physiology and Biophysics, Mayo Clinic and Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research, Graduate School, University of
Minnesota, Rochester, M. N. (1976). Clinical examinations in neurology.
Philadelphia, PA, WB Saunders Company.
Ménière P. (1861). Mémoire sur des lesions de l’oreille interne donnant lieu
à des symptômes de congestion cérébrale apoplectiforme. Gazette
Médicale de Paris 55, 17–32.
400 Bibliography

Mereu G. et al. (2003). Prenatal exposure to a cannabinoid agonist produces

memory deficits linked to dysfunction in hippocampal long‐term
potentiation and glutamate release. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 100(8), 4915–4920.
Micklethwaite J. (2004). A report of a study into the efficacy of the INPP
School Programme at Swanwick Primary School, Derbyshire.
A controlled study of 93 children. Department for Education and
Employment Best Practice Scholarship. http://www.teachernet.gov.uk,
December 2004.
Milani‐Comparetti A. (1981). The neurophysiological and clinical
implications of studies on fetal motor behaviour. Seminars in
Perinatology 5, 183–189.
Miller J. L. et al. (2003). Emergence of oropharyngeal, laryngeal and
swallowing activity in the developing fetal upper aerodigestive tract: An
ultrasound evaluation. Early Human Development 71(1), 61–87.
Minowski A. (Ed.) (1967). Regional Development of the Brain in Early Life.
Davis FA, Philadelphia, PA, pp. 3–70.
Mitchell R. G. (1960). The Moro reflex. Cerebral Palsy Bulletin 2, 135–141.
Moir A. & Jessel D. (1991). Brain Sex. The Real Difference Between Men and
Women. London, Mandarin.
Montagu A. (1971). Touching. The Human Significance of Skin. New York,
Columbia University Press.
Morris S. E. (1978). Oral motor development: Normal and abnormal.
In J. M. Wilson (ed.), Oral Motor Function and Dysfunction in Children.
Proceedings of a conference on oral‐motor dysfunction in children,
Chapel Hill, NC. Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina,
Department of Medical Allied Health Professionals, Division of Physical
Therapy, pp. 114–206.
Moscowitz‐Cook A. (1979). The development of photopic spectral
sensitivity in human infants. Vision Research 19, 1133–1142.
Mutti M. et al. (1978). QNST Quick neurological screening test. Novato, CA,
Academic Therapy Publications Inc.
National Library for Health. (1982), http://www.cks.library.nhs.uk.
Nicolson R. I. & Fawcett A. J. (1990). A new framework for dyslexia
research? Cognition 35, 159–182.
Nicolson R. I. & Fawcett A. J. (1994). Reaction times and dyslexia. Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology 47A, 29–48.
Nicolson R. I. et al. (1995). Time estimation deficits in developmental
dyslexia: evidence for cerebellar involvement. Proceedings of the Royal
Society 259, 43–47.
Noica D. (1912). Revue Neurologique. 20(1), 134.
Nopola‐Hemme J. et al. (2001). A dominant gene for developmental
dyslexia on chromosome 3. Journal of Medical Genetics 38, 658–664.
 Bibliography 401

Nordtveit T. I. et al. (2008). Maternal and paternal contribution to

intergenerational recurrence of breech delivery: population based cohort
study. BMJ doi: 10.1136/bmj.39505.436539.BE
North Eastern Education and Library Board (NEELB) (2004). An evaluation
of the pilot INPP movement programme in primary schools in the North
Eastern Education and Library Board, Northern Ireland. Final Report.
Prepared by Brainbox Research Ltd for the NEELB. www.neeelb.org.uk
O’Connor T. G. et al. (2002). Maternal antenatal anxiety and children’s
behavioural/emotional problems at 4 years: report from the Avon
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children. British Journal of Psychiatry
180, 502–508.
O’Dell N. E. & Cook P. A. (2004). Stopping ADHD. A Unique and Proven
Drug‐free Program for Treating ADHD in Children and Adults. New
York, Avery.
Odent M. (1991). The early expression of the rooting reflex. Paper
presented at The European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental Delay
in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties, Chester, UK.
O’Hare A. (1999). Dysgraphia and dyscalculia. In K. Whitmore, H. Hart &
G. Willems (eds), A Neurodevelopmental Approach to Specific Learning
Disorders. London, MacKeith Press.
O’Keane V. & Scott J. (2005). From obstetric complications to a maternal‐
foetal origin hypothesis of mood disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry
18, 367, 368.
Ott P. (1997). How to Detect and Manage Dyslexia. A Resource Manual.
Oxford, Heinemann.
Parmelee A. H. (1964). A critical evaluation of the Moro reflex. Pediatrics
33, 773–788.
Parmenter C. (1975). The asymmetric tonic neck reflex in normal first and
third grade children. The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 29,
463–468.
Passingham R. E. (1975). Changes in the size and organisation of the brain
in man and his ancestors. Brain, Behavior and Evolution 11, 73–90.
Pavlidis G. & Miles T. (1981). Dyslexia Research and its Application to
Education. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
Pavlidis G. & Miles T. (1987). Dyslexia Research and its Applications to
Education. Chichester, Wiley.
Paynter A. (2006). Learn to move, move to learn. St Aidan’s School Sports
Partnership. Inspiring Partnerships. DVD produced by Youth Sport
Trust. Learning Through Sharing Publication Series. http://www.
youthsporttrust.org/
Peiper A. (1963). Cerebral Function in Infancy and Childhood. The
International Behavioral Sciences Series. New York, Consultants
Bureau.
402 Bibliography

Pellionisz A. (1985). Tensorial aspects of the multidimensional approach to

the vestibule‐oculo‐motor reflex and gaze. In A. Berthoz & M. Jones
(eds), Adaptive Mechanisms in Gaze Control. Facts and Theories.
Amsterdam, Elsevier Science Publishers BV.
Peto A. (1970). To cast away. Pyschoanalytic Study of the Child 25, 401.
Philip Rice F. (1992). Human Development. A Life Span Approach. London,
Prentice‐Hall International.
Portions of brain are smaller in children born prematurely. Genetics,
hormones may shield girls’ brains from adverse effects of early birth.
Stanford Report, 18 August 2004.
Posner M. I. & Raichle M. E. (1994). Images of Mind. New York, Freeman.
Prechtl H. F. R. (1953). Über die Koppelung von Saugen und Greifreflex
beim Säugling. Naturwissenschaften 12, 347.
Profet M. (1992). Cited in: The Adapted Mind. J. H. Barkow et al. (ed.). New
York, Oxford University Press.
Profet M. (1995). Protecting Your Baby‐to‐be: Preventing Birth Defects in the
First Trimester. Reading, Addison‐Wesley.
Pucher G. et al. (1987). Quantitative assessment of the Moro reflex: An
attempt to identify infants at risk for SIDS? Biomedizinische Technik.
Biomedical Engineering 32(5), 112–117.
Pulgar Marx I. (1955). Revista Espanola de Pediatria 11, 317; also see
(1957) Zentralblatt für Kinderheilkunde 58, 220.
Purkinje J. (1820). Beyträge zur näheren Kenntnis des Schwindels aus
heautognostischen Daten. Medicinische Jahrbücher des kaiserlich‐
königlichen österreichischen Staates 6, 79–125.
Reason J. T. & Brand J. J. (1975). Motion Sickness. London, Academic
Press.
Reiss A. et al. (2004). Sex differences in cerebral volumes of 8‐year‐olds
born preterm. The Journal of Pediatrics 145(2), 242–249.
Richardson A. J. & Montgomery P. (2005). The Oxford‐Durham study: A
randomized, controlled trial of dietary supplementation with fatty acids
in children with developmental coordination disorder. Pediatrics 115,
1360–1366.
Richter C. P. (1931). Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 26, 748.
Rider B. (1976). Relationship of postural reflexes to learning disabilities.
American Journal of Occupational Therapy 26(5), 239–243.
Righard L. & Alade M. O. (1990). Effect of delivery room routine on success
of first breast‐feed. Lancet 3/336(8723), 1105–1107.
Risey J. & Briner W. (1990). Dyscalculia in patients with vertigo. Journal of
Vestibular Research 1, 31–37.
Roberts B. L. et al. (1989). Motor problems among children of very low
birth weight. The British Journal of Occupational Therapy 52(3), 97–99.
 Bibliography 403

Robinson R. (1891). The nineteenth century. 30, 831. Cited in: Peiper A.
(1963). Cerebral Function in Infancy, and Early Childhood. New York,
Consultants Bureau.
Roeckelein J. E. (1998). Dictionary of Theories, Laws, and Concepts in
Psychology. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press.
Rosen G. D. et al. (1993). Dyslexia and brain pathology: Experimental
animal models. In A. M. Galaburda (ed.), Dyslexia and Development.
Neurobiological Aspects of Extraordinary Brains. Cambridge MA,
Harvard University Press.
Rosenberg K. & Trevathen W. R. (2001). The evolution of human birth.
Scientific American, November, pp. 77–81.
Sarkar P. et al. (2007). Ontogeny of foetal exposure to maternal cortisol
using midtrimester amniotic fluid as a biomarker. Clinical Endocrinology
66(5), 636.
Schaughnecy E. A. & Hynd G. W. (1989). Attention and impulse control in
attention deficit disorders (ADD). Learning and Individual Differences 1,
423–449.
Schilder P. (1920). Uber Halluzinationen. Zeitschrift für Neurologie. 53,
169–173.
Schilder P. (1933). The vestibular apparatus in neurosis and psychosis.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 78, 1–23, 137–164.
Schmidt R. A. & Lee T. D. (1999). Motor Control and Learning. A
Behavioural Emphasis. Champagne, IL, Human Kinetics.
Schrager O. L. (2000). Balance, control, age and language development.
Paper presented at the 12th European Conference on Neuro‐
Developmental Delay in Children with Specific Learning Difficulties,
Chester, March 2000.
Selye H. (1956). The Stress of Life. New York, McGraw‐Hill Book Co.
Shalev R. S. et al. (1988). Developmental dyscalculia. Cortex 24, 555–561.
Shaskan D. A. & Roller W. L. (1985). Paul Schilder. Mind Explorer. New
York, Human Sciences Press.
Shaywitz S. E. (1996). Dyslexia. Scientific American, November, pp. 77–104.
Shepherd R. (1980). Physiotherapy in Paediatrics. Oxford, Butterworth‐
Heinemann Limited.
Sherrington C. (1906). The Integrative Function of the Nervous System.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Singhal A. et al. (2007). Infant nutrition and stereoacuity at age 4–6 years.
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 85(1), 152–159.
Sinn N. & Bryan J. (2007). Effect of supplementation with polyunsaturated
fatty acids and micronutrients on learning and behavior problems
associated with child ADHD. Journal of Developmental & Behavioral
Pediatrics 28, 82–91.
404 Bibliography

Smith G. (2006). Learn to move, move to learn. St Aidan’s School Sports

Partnership. Inspiring Partnerships. DVD produced by Youth Sport Trust.
Learning Through Sharing Publication Series. http://www.
youthsporttrust.org/
Sontag L. W. (1944). War and the foetal maternal relationship. Marriage
and Family Living 6, 1–5.
Steinbach I. (1994). How does sound therapy work? Paper presented at the
6th European Conference of Neuro‐Developmental Delay in Children
with Specific Learning Difficulties, Chester, UK.
Stephan H. & Andy O. J. (1969). Quantitative comparative neuroanatomy of
primates: an attempt at a phylogenetic interpretation. In J. M. Petras &
C. R. Noback (eds), Comparative and Evolutionary Aspects of the
Vertebrate Nervous System. Annals 167. New York, New York Academy
of Sciences, pp. 370–387.
Stoodley C. J. et al. (2005). Impaired balancing ability in dyslexic children.
Experimental Brain Research 167(3), 370–380.
Strauss H. (1929). Journal of Psychology 38, 111.
Swamy G. (2008). Cited in: Preterm birth linked to lifelong health issues.
Science Daily. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/03.
Swamy G. K. et al. (2008). Association of preterm birth with long‐term survival,
reproduction, and next‐generation preterm birth. JAMA 299, 1429–1436.
Tallal P. (1996). Language learning impairment: Integrating research and
remediation. In Orton Dyslexia Society 47th Annual Conference
Commemorative Booklet. Boston, MA, Orton Dyslexia Society.
Tallal P. & Piercy M. (1974). Developmental aphasia: rate of auditory
processing and selective impairment of consonant perception.
Neuropsychologia 12, 83–98.
Tallal P. et al. (1996). Language comprehension in language‐learning
impaired children improved with acoustically modified speech. Science
271, 81–84.
Tansley A. E. (1967). Reading and Remedial Reading. London, Routledge
and Kegan Paul Ltd.
Taylor M. et al. (2004). Primitive reflexes and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity
disorder: developmental origins of classroom dysfunction. International
Journal of Special Education 19(1), 23–37.
Tebruegge M. et al. (2004). Does routine child health surveillance
contribute to the early detection of children with pervasive
developmental disorders? An epidemiological study in Kent, U.K. BMC
Pediatrics 3(4), 4. [abstract]
Telleus C. (1980). En komparariv studie av neurologisk skillnader hos barn
med och utan läsoch skrivsvarigheter. Unpublished Master’s Thesis,
Göteborg Universitet PsychologiskInstitu.
Thelan E. (1979). Rhythmical stereotypes in normal human infants. Animal
Behaviour 27, 699–715.
 Bibliography 405

The Listening Fitness Trainer (LiFT). www.listeningfitness.com

The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy (1999). Whitehouse Station, NJ,
Merck Research Laboratories.
The New England Journal of Medicine 355, 992–1005. Cited in: New Scientist.
com.news service, 22 September 2006.
Thomas A. et al. (1954). La Presse Médicale 146, 885.
Thompson C. et al. (2001). Birth weight and the risk of depressive disorder
in late life. British Journal of Psychiatry 179, 450–455.
Tomatis A. (1991). The Conscious Ear. New York, The Talman Company.
Tomlinson D. R. (1988). Gaze shifts and vestibular‐ocular reflex. In
O. H. Barber & J. A. Sharpe (eds), Vestibular Disorders. Chicago, IL,
Year Book Medical Publishers, Inc.
Tong S. et al. (2004). Serum concentrations of macrophage inhibitory
cytokine 1 (MIC 1) as a predictor of miscarriage. Lancet 363, 129–130.
Towen B. (1976). Neurological Development in Infancy. London, William
Heinemann Medical Books Ltd.
Trevathan W. R. (1987). Human Birth. An Evolutionary Perspective.
New York, Aldine de Gruyter.
Tuormaa T. E. (1994). The adverse effects of alcohol on reproduction.
International Journal of Biosocial and Medical Research 14(2). Reproduced
for Foresight, The Association for the Promotion of Pre‐conceptual Care.
Underwood R (1976). Learning disability as a predisposing cause of
criminality. Canada’s Mental Health 24(4), 11–16.
Van Allen M. W. & Rodnitzky R. L. (1981). Pictorial Manual of Neurological
Tests. Chicago, IL, Year Book Medical Publishers Inc.
Van Dongen G. R. & Goudie E. G. (1980). Fetal movements in the first trimester
of pregnancy. British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 87, 191–193.
Van Woerkom W (1912). Revue Neurologique 20(II), 285.
Veraguth (1918). Neurologisches Zentralblatt 7. Cited in: Peiper A. (1963).
Cerebral function in infancy and childhood. The International Behavioral
Sciences Series. New York, Consultants Bureau.
Verny T. (1982). The Secret Life of the Unborn Child. London, Sphere Books Ltd.
von Weizsäcker V. Cited in: Schilder P. (1933). The vestibular apparatus in
neurosis and psychosis. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
78(1), 1–23.
Vose R. H. (1981). Agoraphobia. London, Faber & Faber.
Wakefield A. J. et al. (1998). Ileal‐lymphoid hyperplasia non‐specific colitis,
and pervasive developmental disorder in children. Lancet 351(9103),
637–641.
Wakefield A. J. et al. (2006). Gastrointestinal comorbidity, autistic
regression and measles‐containing vaccines: positive re‐challenge and
biological gradient. Medical Veritas 3, 796–802.
Walk R. D. & Gibson E. J. (1961). A comparative and analytical study of
visual depth perception. Psychological Monographs 75.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
so as to embrace the whole scheme of the universe, I should no
longer perceive the contents of that universe as dispersed through
space, because I should no longer have as my special standpoint a
here to which other existence would be there.
My special standpoint in space may thus be said to be
phenomenal of my special and peculiar interests in life, the special
logical standpoint from which my experience reflects the ultimate
structure of the Absolute. And so, generally, though the conclusion
can for various reasons not be pressed in respect of every detail of
spatial appearance, the spatial grouping of intelligent purposive
beings is phenomenal of their inner logical affinity of interest and
purpose. Groups of such beings, closely associated together in
space, are commonly also associated in their peculiar interests, their
special purposes, their characteristic attitude towards the universe.
The local contiguity of the members of the group is but an “outward
and visible sign” of an “inward and spiritual” community of social
aspiration. This is, of course, only approximately the case; the less
the extent to which any section of mankind have succeeded in
actively controlling the physical order for the realisation of their own
purposes, the more nearly is it the truth that spatial remoteness and
inner dissimilarity of social purposes coincide. In proportion as man’s
conquest over his non-human environment becomes complete, he
devises for himself means to retain the inner unity of social aims and
interests in spite of spatial separation. But this only shows once
more how completely the spatial order is a mere imperfect
appearance which only confusedly adumbrates the nature of the
higher Reality behind it. Thus we may say that the “abolition of
distance” effected by science and civilisation is, as it were, a
practical vindication of our metaphysical doctrine of the comparative
unreality of space.
Similarly with time, though the temporal series may, in a sense, be
said to be less of an unreality than the spatial. For it does not seem
possible to show that spatial appearance is an inevitable form of
finite experience. We can at least conceive of a finite experience
composed entirely of successive arrangements of secondary
qualities, such as sounds or smells, and the accompanying feeling-
tones, though we have no positive ground for affirming the existence
of such a type of experience. But the temporal form seems
inseparable from finite intelligence. For the limitation of my existence
to a certain portion of time is clearly simply the abstract and external
aspect of the fact that my interests and purposes, so far as I can
apprehend the meaning of my own life, occupy just this special place
in the logical development of the larger whole of social life and
purpose of which my own life is a member. So the position of a
particular purposive act in the temporal series of acts which I call the
history of my own life, is the outward indication of the logical place
filled by this particular act in the connected scheme of interests
which form my life on its inner side. But it is an inevitable
consequence of the want of complete internal harmony we call
finitude, that the aims and interests of the finite subject cannot be in
the same degree present to its apprehension all at once and
together. In being aware of its own internal purpose or meaning, it
must, because it is finite and therefore not ultimately a completely
harmonious systematic whole, be aware of that purpose as only
partially fulfilled. And in this sense of one’s own purposes as only
partially fulfilled, we have the foundation of the time-experience, with
its contrast between the “now” of fulfilment and the “no longer” and
“not yet” of dissatisfied aspiration.
For this reason, dissatisfaction, unfulfilled craving, and the time-
experience seem to be bound up together, and time to be merely the
abstract expression of the yearning of the finite individual for a
systematic realisation of its own purpose which lies for ever beyond
its reach as finite. If this is so, only the absolute and infinite individual
whose experience is throughout that of perfectly harmonious
systematic realisation of meaning, can be outside the time-process;
to it, “vanished and present are the same,” because its whole nature
is once for all perfectly expressed in the detail of existence. But the
finite, just because its very nature as finite is to aspire to a perfection
which is out of reach, must have its experience marked with the
distinction of now from by and by, of desire from performance. In this
temporal character of all finite experience we may perhaps
afterwards discern the ultimate ground of morality, as we can already
discern in the unresting struggle of the finite to overcome its finitude,
practical evidence that time is not a form which adequately
expresses the nature of Reality, and must therefore be imperfect
appearance.[154]
Thus we seem finally to have reached the conclusion that time and
space are the imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical
relations between the purposes of finite individuals standing in social
relations to each other; the inner purposive life of each of these
individuals being itself in its turn, as we have previously seen, the
imperfect expression, from a special logical “point of view,” of the
structure and life of the ultimate infinite individual. For the infinite
individual itself the whole of the purposes and interests of the finite
individuals must form a single harmonious system. This system
cannot itself be in the spatial and temporal form; space and time
must thus in some way cease to exist, as space and time, for the
absolute experience. They must, in that experience, be taken up,
rearranged, and transcended, so as to lose their character of an
endless chain of relations between other relations.
Precisely how this is effected, we, from our finite standpoint,
cannot presume to say. It is natural to draw illustrations from the
“specious present” of perception, in which we appear to have a
succession that is also simultaneous; or again, from the timeless and
purely logical character science seeks to ascribe to its “laws of
nature.” But in the “specious present” we seem obliged to attend to
one aspect, succession or simultaneity, to the exclusion of the other;
probably we never succeed in equally fixing both aspects at once. It
thus presents us rather with the problem than with its solution. And
again, after our discussion of the meaning of law, we cannot affirm
that Nature is, for the absolute experience, a system of general laws.
Hence it seems well not to take these illustrations for more than they
are actually worth as indications of the merely phenomenal character
of time. Metaphysics, like the old scholastic theology, needs
sometimes to be reminded that God’s thoughts are not as ours, and
His ways, in a very real sense when Philosophy has done its best,
still past finding out.[155]

Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chaps. 4

(Space and Time), 18 (Temporal and Spatial Appearance); L.
Couturat, L’Infini Mathématique, pt. 2, bk. iv. chap. 4 (against the
Kantian antinomies); H. Poincaré, La Science et L’Hypothèse, pp.
68-109; H. Lotze, Metaphysic, bk. ii. chaps. 1-3; W. Ostwald,
Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, lects. 5, 8; J. Royce, The World
and the Individual, Second Series, lect. 3; B. Russell, Foundations of
Geometry: Is Position in Space and Time Absolute or Relative (Mind,
July 1901), Principles of Mathematics, pt. 6, vol. i.; H. Spencer, First
Principles, pt. 2, chap. 3.
 141. The student who desires to think out the problems for himself
would probably do well to take the discussions of Locke (Essay, bk.
ii. chaps. 13-15) and Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i. pt. 2)
rather than that of Kant as his starting-point, as they are less vitiated
by psychological superstitions. In recent metaphysical work the
chapters on the subject in Mr. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality will
probably be found most useful. Much may be learned from Mr.
Russell’s work, Foundations of Geometry, with which should,
however, be compared the largely discrepant results of his later
article, “Is Position in Space and Time Relative or Absolute?” (Mind,
July 1901).
142. We are not called upon to enter into such specially
psychological questions as, e.g., whether both directions, past and
future, can be detected within the “specious present” of direct
perception, or whether the specious present only contains the
elements “now” and “no longer,” the “not yet” being a subsequent
intellectual construction, as is held, e.g., by Mr. Bradley and Mr.
Shadworth Hodgson.
143. We may indeed go still further, and say that every unique
moment or experience has its own unique spatial and temporal
system. The method by which I weave the perceived space-time
systems of different experiences within my own mental life into a
single conceptual system, is in principle the same by which the
spaces and times of myself and other men are made into one
system for the purpose of practical intercourse.
144. For an account of the psychological processes involved in all
this, see, e.g., Stout, Manual of Psychology,3 bk. iii. pt. 2, chaps. 3-5;
bk. iv. chap. 6.
145. Thus Dedekind (Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? p. xii.)
maintains that none of the constructions of Euclid involve the
continuity of space.
146. Of course, a physical vacuum is not the same thing as empty
space. For the purposes of any special science a vacuum means a
space not occupied by contents of the special kind in which that
special science is interested. Thus, in the ordinary parlance of
Physics, a vacuum means simply a space in which there is no mass.
Whether it is desirable, for the purposes of physical science, to
assume the existence of vacuum, is altogether a question for
Physics itself, and to decide it in the affirmative is not to maintain the
existence of that unmeaning abstraction, absolutely empty space. In
any case, it may be observed that the widespread notion that motion
is only possible in a physical vacuum is a mistake, motion being
perfectly possible in a fluid plenum.
147. It must be carefully noted that distance as thus defined is not
properly a quantitative relation, and involves no notion of magnitude,
but only of relative place in a series. It should also be observed that
in assuming the existence of such a unique relation between every
pair of points, it is tacitly taken for granted that the number of
dimensions of the spatial order is finite. In a space of an infinite
number of dimensions, such unique relation would be impossible.
(See Russell, Foundations of Geometry, p. 161 ff.) Our justification
for making this assumption, as also for taking time to be of one
dimension only, seems to be that it is indispensable for all those
practical purposes which depend on our ability to create a science of
Geometry, and that we have no positive ground for assuming the
opposite. Thus ultimately the assumption appears to be of the nature
of a postulate.
148. The ablest detailed account of the relativity of spatial position
readily accessible to the English reader, will be found in Mr. Russell’s
Foundations of Geometry, chaps. iiiA, iv. Mr. Russell has since, in
Mind for July 1901, attempted to prove the opposite view, that
positions in space and time are inherently distinct, but without
discussing his own previous arguments for relativity. Into the purely
mathematical part of Mr. Russell’s later contentions I am not
competent to enter. I may, however, suggest that the question of
Metaphysics cannot be decided merely by urging, as Mr. Russell
does, that fewer assumptions are required to construct a geometry
on the hypothesis of absolute than on that of relative position. The
superior convenience of an assumption for certain special purposes
is no proof of its ultimate intelligibility. And when Mr. Russell goes on
to admit that points in space are indistinguishable for us, he seems
to me to give up his case. For is not this to admit that, after all, the
space with which we deal in our geometrical science is relative from
beginning to end? How differences of quality of which we, by
hypothesis, can know nothing, can help or hinder our scientific
constructions, it is indeed hard to see.
149. This may be brought home even to those who, like myself,
are not mathematicians, by the perusal of such a work as
Lobatchevsky’s Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Parallel-Linien,
where a consistent geometry of triangles is constructed in entire
independence of the postulate of parallelism. Of course, in the end it
must be a mere question of nomenclature whether a form of serial
order independent of these quasi-empirical restrictions is to be called
“space” or not.
150. It must be carefully remembered that the essential defect of
the indefinite regress is not its interminableness, but its monotony.
We ourselves held that Reality is an individual composed of lesser
individuals which repeat the structure of the whole, and that the
number of these individuals need not be finite. But, in our view, the
higher the order of individuality the more self-explanatory was its
structure, whereas in the indefinite regress an incomprehensible
construction is endlessly repeated in the same form.
151. Normally, that is; for brevity’s sake I omit to note the possible
case of a coherent dream-life continued from night to night. In
principle there would be a difference between the case of the space
and time of such a dream-life and those of our waking hours.
152. So the events of my dreams, though not occupying any place
in the temporal series of the events of waking life, are so far logically
connected with that series as both sets of events stand in relation to
certain identical elements of psychical temperament and disposition.
Another interesting case is that of so-called “dual personality.” The
experience of both the two alternating personalities can be arranged
in a single temporal series only because of the way in which both
sets are inwoven with the systematic interests of other men, whose
personality does not alternate, or alternates with a different rhythm. If
all mankind were subject to simultaneous alternations of personality,
the construction of a single time-series for all our experiences would
be impossible. In this discussion I have throughout followed the full
and thorough treatment of the problem by Mr. Bradley, Appearance
and Reality, chap. 18.
 153. Otherwise, conceptual space and time are, as we have seen,
derivatives of the number-series, and we have already learned that
the number-series leads to the problem of summing an endless
series, and is therefore not an adequate way of representing ultimate
Reality. (Bk. II. chap. 4, § 10). Another form of the same difficulty
would be that conceptual space and time are applications of the
numerical series,—but application to what? To a material which is
already spatial and temporal. All these puzzles are only different
ways of expressing the essential relativity of space and time. But see
the anti-Kantian view in, e.g., Couturat, L’Infini Mathématique, pt. 2.
154. Compare Prof. Royce’s remarks, The World and the
Individual, Second Series, lect. 3, “The Temporal and the Eternal,” p.
134. I should certainly have had to acknowledge considerable
obligation to Prof. Royce’s discussion had not the present chapter
been written before I had an opportunity of studying it.
155. Against the plausible attempt to solve the problem by simply
thinking of the whole physical order as forming a “specious present”
to the Absolute Experience, we may urge that the “specious present”
itself regularly consists for us of a multiplicity of detail, which we
apprehend as simultaneous without insight into its inner unity as the
embodiment of coherent system. Hence the direct insight of the
Absolute Experience into its own internal meaning or structure
cannot be adequately thought of as mere simultaneous awareness
of the detail of existence. So long as a succession is merely
apprehended as simultaneous, its meaning is not yet grasped.
 CHAPTER V

SOME CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION

§ 1. The concept of evolution an attempt to interpret natural processes in terms of
individual growth. § 2. Evolution means change culminating in an end which is
the result of the process and is qualitatively new. The concept is thus
teleological. § 3. Evolution, being teleological, is essentially either progress or
degeneration. If it is more than illusion, there must be real ends in the physical
order. And ends can only be real as subjective interests of sentient beings
which are actualised by the process of change. § 4. Thus all evolution must
take place within an individual subject. § 5. Further, the subject of evolution
must be a finite individual. All attempts to make “evolution” a property of the
whole of Reality lead to the infinite regress. § 6. The distinction between
progressive evolution and degeneration has an “objective” basis in the
metaphysical distinction between higher and lower degrees of individuality. §
7. In the evolutionary process, old individuals disappear and fresh ones
originate. Hence evolution is incompatible with the view that Reality consists
of a plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals.

§ 1. We saw, in the first chapter of the present Book, that evolution

or orderly development is a fundamental characteristic of the
processes which compose the physical order as apprehended by the
various empirical sciences. For the purposes of Mechanics and
Mechanical Physics, indeed, we have no need to look upon Nature
as the scene of development; for these sciences it is enough to
conceive of it as a vast complex of changes of configuration and
transformations of energy, connected by regular uniformities of
sequence. As soon, however, as we come to regard Nature from the
standpoint of those sciences which explicitly recognise differences of
quality, as well as differences in position and quantity, among the
objects with which they deal, this narrowly mechanistic conception of
natural processes becomes inadequate. With the notion of physical
processes as productive of changes of quality we are inevitably led
to think of the physical order as a world in which the qualitatively new
is derived from, or developed out of, the previously familiar by fixed
lines of deviation and under determinate conditions.
 Naturally enough, it is from the biological sciences, in which the
study of organic growth plays so prominent a part, that the impulse
to conceive of physical change as development originally comes. As
long ago as the fourth century B.C., Aristotle had taken the concept of
growth or development as the foundation of the most influential
scheme of metaphysical construction yet produced in the whole
history of speculation. In Aristotle’s view, however, the process of
development was regarded as strictly confined within the limits of the
individual life. The individual organism, beginning its existence as an
undeveloped germ or potentiality, gradually unfolds itself in a series
of successive stages of growth, which culminates at the period of
complete maturity. But the individual germ itself is a product or
secretion derived from a pre-existing mature individual of the same
type as that into which this germ will ultimately grow. The number of
distinct typical processes of growth is thus strictly determined, and
each such process implies the previous existence of its completed
result. In other words, the boundaries between species are fixed and
ultimate; there can be no beginning in time of the existence of a new
species, and therefore no origination of new species by development
from other types. As Aristotle epigrammatically puts it, “It takes a
man to beget a man.”
A further point of weakness in the Aristotelian theory is the
absence of any definite account of the machinery by which the
process of growth is effected. We learn, indeed, that the latent
capacity of the organic germ to develop according to a certain
specific type is stimulated into activity by influences contained in the
environment, but the precise nature of this process of stimulation
was necessarily left in obscurity, in consequence of the imperfect
knowledge possessed by Aristotle of the minute character of natural
processes in general.
In the evolutionary theories of modern biology, it is precisely the
problems of the origination of new species, and of the special
character of the relations between the species and its environment
by which this process is conditioned, that have attracted almost
exclusive attention. And, with the steadily increasing success of
evolutionary hypotheses in dealing with biological problems, there
has naturally arisen a tendency to extend the application of the
general concept of evolution far beyond the sphere in which it first
originated. We have now not only more or less well-accredited
hypotheses of the production by evolution of our chemical elements,
but even ambitious philosophical constructions which treat the
concept of evolution as the one and only key to all the problems of
existence. In the presence of these far-reaching applications of
evolutionary ideas, it becomes all the more necessary to bear in
mind, in our estimate of the worth of the evolution concept, that its
logical character remains unaltered by the extension of its sphere of
applicability; it is still, in spite of all minor modifications, essentially
an attempt to interpret natural processes in general in terms of
individual growth.
We are not, of course, in the present chapter in any way
concerned with the details of any one particular theory as to the
special conditions which determine the course of organic or other
evolution. What those conditions in any special case are, is a
question, in the first instance, for that particular branch of empirical
science which deals with the description of the particular aspect of
the processes of the physical order under investigation. And though
it would be a proper question for a complete Philosophy of Nature
how the details of a well-established scientific theory must be
interpreted so as to harmonise with the general metaphysical
implications of the physical order, it is for many reasons premature to
raise such a question in the present state of our actual knowledge of
the details of evolutionary processes. All that can be done here is to
ask what in general are the logical implications involved in thinking of
a process as an evolution at all, and how those implications are
related to our general interpretation of the physical order.
§ 2. Evolution obviously involves the two concepts, already
criticised at length, of change and the dependence of the order and
direction of change upon determinate conditions. But an evolutionary
process is never a mere orderly sequence of changes. For instance,
the changes of configuration and exchanges of energy which take
place when work is done in a material system, conceived as
composed of moving masses without any element of secondary
quality, are not properly to be called a process of evolution. They are
not an evolution or development, because, so long as we keep to the
strictly kinetic view of natural processes as consisting solely in the
varying configuration of systems of mass-particles, the end of the
process is qualitatively undistinguishable from its beginning; nothing
qualitatively new has emerged as its result. Or rather, to speak with
more accuracy, the process has really no end and no unity of its
own. It is only by an entirely arbitrary limitation of view, due to purely
subjective interests of our own, that we isolate just this collection of
mass-particles from the larger aggregate of such particles which
form the physical order as regarded from the strictly kinetic
standpoint, and call it one system; and again, it is with equal
arbitrariness that we determine the point of time beyond which we
shall cease to follow the system’s changes of configuration. In the
indefinitely prolonged series of successive configurations there is no
stage which can properly be called final. Hence from the rigidly
mechanistic point of view of Kinetics and Kinematics there are no
evolutions or developments in the universe, there is only continuous
change.
Development or evolution, then, definitely implies the culmination
of a process of change in the establishment of a state of things
which is relatively new, and implies, further, that the relatively new
state of things may truly be regarded as the end or completion of this
special process of change. Thus the fundamental peculiarity of all
evolutionary ideas is that they are essentially teleological; the
changes which are evolutions are all changes thought of as
throughout relative to an end or result. Except in so far as a process
of change is thus essentially relative to the result in which it
culminates, there is no sense in calling it a development. We may
see this even by considering the way in which the concepts of
evolution and development are used in the various departments of
Physics. We sometimes speak of a chemical process as marked by
the “evolution” of heat, or again we say that, if the second law of
Thermo-dynamics is rigidly and universally true, the physical
universe must be in a process of evolution towards a stage in which
none of its energy will be available for work. But we can only attach a
meaning to such language so long as we allow ourselves to retain
the common-sense point of view according to which there are real
qualitative differences between what abstract Mechanics treats as
equivalent forms of “energy.”
We can speak of the evolution of heat, just because we,
consciously or unconsciously, think of heat as being really, what it is
for our senses, something qualitatively new and distinct from the
other kinds of energy which are converted into it by the chemical
process. So we can intelligibly talk of the gradual conversion of one
form of energy into another as an evolution only so long as we
regard the various forms of energy as qualitatively different, and are
therefore entitled to look upon the complete conversion of the one
into another as the qualitatively new result of a process which is
therefore terminated by its complete establishment. From the
standpoint of the physical theories which regard the distinction
between the forms of energy as only “subjective,” there would be no
sense in regarding that particular stage in the course of events at
which one form of energy disappeared as the end or result of a
process which terminates in it, and thus such terms as evolution and
development would lose their meaning. Only the establishment of
the qualitatively new can form a real end or result, and so afford a
logical basis for the recognition of the changes in the physical order
as distinct processes of development.
§ 3. This essentially teleological character of development is
emphasised in the language of the biological sciences by the
constant use of the concepts of progress and degeneration. For
biology an evolution is essentially a process either in the progressive
or in the regressive direction. Every evolution is an advance to a
“higher” or a decline to a “lower” state of development. Now progress
and regress are only possible where the process of change is
regarded as throughout relative to the end to be attained by the
process. Exactly how we conceive this end, which serves us as a
standard for distinguishing progress from degeneration, is a
secondary question; the point of fundamental importance is that,
except in reference to such an end, there can be no distinction at all
between progressive and retrogressive change. Thus, unless there
are really ends in the physical order which determine the processes
of change that culminate in their actual establishment, evolution
cannot be real. If the ends, by the establishment of which we
estimate progress in development, are merely arbitrary standards of
our own to which nothing in external reality corresponds, then the
physical order must really be a mere succession of changes which
are in no true sense developments, and the whole concept of nature
as marked by development will be a mere human delusion. And, on
the contrary, if there is any truth in the great scientific conceptions of
evolution, there must be real ends in the physical order.
Now, there is only one intelligible way in which we can think of a
process of change as really relative to an end. The resultant state
which we call the end of the process, as being the final stage which
completes this special process, and enables us to mark off all that
succeeds it as belonging to a fresh process of development, must
also be its end in the sense of being the conscious attainment of an
interest or purpose underlying the whole process. It is only in so far
as any state of things is, for some sentient being, the realisation of a
subjective interest previously manifested in an earlier stage of
experience, that that state of things forms the real culmination of a
process which is distinguished from all other processes, and
stamped with an individuality of its own, by the fact that it does
culminate in precisely this result. The conceptions of end or result
and of subjective interest are logically inseparable. Hence we seem
forced to infer that, since evolution is an unmeaning word, unless
there are genuine, and not merely arbitrarily assigned, ends
underlying the processes of physical nature, the concept of evolution
as characteristic of the physical order involves the metaphysical
interpretation of that order as consisting of the teleological acts of
sentient beings, which we had previously accepted on more general
grounds. It would be useless to attempt an escape from this
conclusion by drawing a distinction between two meanings of
“end”—“a last state” and “the achievement of a purpose.” For the
whole point of the preceding argument was that nothing can be an
“end” in the former sense without also being an end in the latter.
Unless processes have ends which are their subjective fulfilment, it
is only by an arbitrary convention of our own that we assign to them
ends which are their last states. And if it is only an arbitrary
convention that physical processes have ends in this sense,
evolution itself is just such a convention and nothing more.[156]
 § 4. What is in principle the same argument may be put in another
form, and the equivalence of the two forms is itself very suggestive
from the metaphysical point of view. Evolution or development, like
all change, implies the presence throughout successive stages in a
process of something which is permanent and unchanging. But it
implies something more definite still. Whatever develops must
therefore have a permanent individual character of its own of which
the successive stages in the development process are the gradual
unfolding. Unless the earlier and the later stages in a connected
series of changes belong alike to the gradual unfolding, under the
influence of surroundings, of a single individual nature, there is no
meaning in speaking of them as belonging to a process of
development. Only the individual can develop, if we are to attribute
precise meaning to our words. We speak of the evolution of a society
or a species, but if our words are not to be empty we must mean by
such phrases one of two things. Either we must mean that the
species and the society which develop are themselves individuals of
a higher order, no less real than the members which compose them,
or our language must be merely a way of saying that the life of each
member of the social or biological group exhibits development.
When we reflect on what is really involved in our ordinary loose
expressions about the “inheritance” of this or the other physical or
social trait, we shall see that the former alternative is far less
removed from ordinary ways of thought than might at first seem to be
the case. If any kind of reality corresponds to our current metaphor
of the “inheritance” of qualities, the groups within which such
“inheritance” takes place must be something much more than mere
aggregates of mutually exclusive individuals. A group within which
qualities can be thus inherited must, as a whole, possess a marked
individual nature of its own. Now we have already seen that all
individuality is in the end teleological. A group of processes forms an
individual life in the degree to which it is the expression of a unique
and coherent interest or aim, and no further. Hence, once more, only
what is truly individual can develop or evolve. And we readily see
that it is precisely in so far as a set of processes form the expression
of individual interest, that the demarcation of the group as a
connected whole from all previous and subsequent processes
possesses more than a conventional significance. Hence only
processes which are the expression of individual interest possess
“ends” or “last states,” and thus the two forms of our argument are in
principle identical. Once more, then, the significance of evolutionary
ideas, if they are to be more than a purely conventional scheme
devised for the furtherance of our own practical purposes, and as an
artificial aid to classification, is bound up with the doctrine that the
events of the physical order are really the expression of the
subjective interests of sentient subjects of experience.[157]
§ 5. To proceed to a further point of the utmost importance. Not
only does evolution imply the presence of individuality in the subject
of the evolutionary process; it implies its possession of finite
individuality. An infinite individual cannot have development or
evolution ascribed to it without contradiction. Hence the Absolute,
the Universe, or whatever other name we prefer to give to the infinite
individual whole of existence, cannot develop, cannot progress,
cannot degenerate. This conclusion might be derived at once from
reflecting upon the single consideration that temporal succession is
involved in all evolution, whether progressive or retrogressive. For
temporal succession is, as we have seen, an inseparable
consequence of finite individuality. But it will be as well to reach our
result in a different way, by considering certain further implications of
the concept of evolution which are manifestly only present in the
case of finite individuality.
In every process of development or evolution there are involved a
pair of interrelated factors, the individual nature which develops, and
the environment which contains the conditions under which and the
stimuli in response to which it develops. The undeveloped germ is as
yet a mere possibility, something which will yet exhibit qualities not
as yet possessed by it. In its undeveloped state, what it possesses is
not the qualities characteristic of its later stages, but only
“tendencies” or “dispositions” to manifest those qualities, provided
that the environment provides the suitable stimulus. Hence, if either
of the two interrelated factors of development, the individual or the
environment, is missing, there can be no evolution. Now, the infinite
individual whole of existence has no environment outside itself to
supply conditions of development and incentives to change. Or, what
is the same thing, since the “possible” means simply that which will
follow if certain conditions are realised, there is no region of
unrealised possibility outside the realised existence of the infinite
whole. Hence in the infinite whole there can be no development: it
cannot progressively adapt itself to new conditions of existence; it
must once and for all be in its reality all that it is in “idea.” The infinite
whole therefore evolves neither forward nor backward.
This impossibility of ascribing development to the whole of Reality
is strikingly illustrated by a consideration of the impasse into which
we are led when we try in practice to think of the whole universe as
in process of evolution. So long as you are still in the presence of the
fundamental distinction between the developing subject and its
environment, you are logically driven, if everything is to be taken as
a product of evolution, to supplement every evolutionary theory by a
fresh evolutionary problem. To account for this special evolution
(e.g., the evolution of the vertebrata) you have to assume an
environment with determinate qualities of its own, influencing the
evolution in question in a determinate way in consequence of these
qualities. But if everything has been evolved, you have again to ask
by what process of evolution this special environment came to be
what it is. To solve this problem you have once more to postulate a
second “environment” determining, by interaction, the course of the
evolution of the former. And thus you are thrown back upon the
indefinite regress.
Unless, indeed, you are prepared boldly to assert that, as all
determinate character is the product of evolution, the universe as a
whole must have evolved out of nothing. (You would not escape this
dilemma by an appeal to the very ancient notion of a “cycle” or
“periodic rhythm” of evolution, in virtue of which the product of a
process of evolution serves in its turn as the environment for the
reiterated evolution of its own antecedent conditions, A thus passing
by evolution into B and B back again into A. For you would at least
have to accept this tendency to periodic rhythm itself as an ultimate
property of all existence, not itself resulting by evolution from
something else.) The dilemma thus created by the attempt to apply
the concept of evolution to the whole of Reality, is sufficient to show
that evolution itself is only thinkable as a characteristic of processes
which fall within the nature of a system which, as a whole, does not
evolve.
We may restate the same contention in the following form:—All
development means advance towards an end. But only that which is
as yet in imperfect possession of its end can advance towards it. For
that which already is all that it has it in its nature to be there can be
no advance, and hence no progressive development. Neither can
such a complete individual degenerate. For even in degenerating,
that which degenerates is gradually realising some feature of its own
nature which was previously only an unrealised potentiality. Thus
even degeneration implies the realisation of an end or interest, and
is itself a kind of advance[.] As the biologists tell us, the atrophy of an
organ, which we call degeneration, is itself a step in the progressive
adaptation of the organisation to new conditions of life, and, as the
moralists remind us, in the ethical sphere a “fall” is, in its way, an
upward step. Hence what cannot rise higher in the scale of existence
also cannot sink lower.
§ 6. Evolution is thus an inseparable characteristic of the life of
finite individuals, and of finite individuals only. And this consideration
gives us the clue to the metaphysical interpretation of the distinction,
so significant for all evolutionary theory, between the progressive
and retrogressive directions of the evolution process. To a large
extent it is, of course, a matter of convention what we shall regard as
progress and what as degeneration. So long as we are specially
interested in the attainment of any end or culminating result, we call
the line of development which leads up to that result progressive,
and the line which leads to its subsequent destruction degeneration.
And thus the same development may be viewed as progress or as
degeneration, according to the special character of the interests with
which we study it. Thus, for instance, the successive modifications of
the vertebrate structure which have resulted in the production of the
human skeleton are naturally thought of as progressive, because our
special interest in human intelligent life and character leads us to
regard the human type as superior to its predecessors in the line of
development. At the same time, many of these modifications consist
in the gradual loss of characteristics previously evolved, and are
therefore degenerative from the point of view of the anatomical
student, who is specially interested in the production of organs of
increasing complexity of structure, and therefore takes the
complexity of those structures as his standard in distinguishing
progress from retrogression.
But the distinction is not a purely conventional one. As we have
seen, degrees of individuality are also degrees of reality; what is
more completely individual is also a completer representative of the
ultimate structure of the infinite individual whole, and therefore more
completely real. Hence we may say that advance in individuality is
really, and not in a merely conventional sense, progress in
development; loss of individuality is real degeneration. Thus we get
at least the possibility of a true “objective” basis for distinction
between the directions of evolutionary progress. But we must
remember that it is only where we are able to know something of the
actual interests of finite experiencing beings that we have safe
grounds for judging whether those interests receive more adequate
embodiment in consequence of the changes of structure and habit
produced by evolution or not. Hence, while our insight into the inner
lives of ourselves and our animal congeners theoretically warrants
us in pronouncing the various developments in human social life to
be genuinely progressive or retrogressive, and again in regarding the
series of organic types which leads directly up to man as a true
“ascent,” our ignorance of the special character of the individual
experiences of which the inorganic physical order at large is the
phenomenal manifestation, makes it impossible for us to determine
whether an “evolution” outside these limits is really progressive or
not. We have to treat “cosmic evolution” in general, outside the
special line of animal development which leads up to man, as
indifferently a “progress” or a “degeneration” according to our own
arbitrary point of view, not because it is not “objectively” definitely the
one or the other, but because our insight is not sufficient to discern
which it is.
§ 7. One more point may be noted, which is of some importance in
view of certain metaphysical problems connected with the nature of
finite individuality. If evolution is more than an illusion, it seems
necessary to hold that it is a process in the course of which finite
individuals may disappear and new finite individuals originate. This
point is metaphysically significant, because it means that the fact of
evolution is irreconcilable with any of the philosophical theories of
ancient and modern times, which regard Reality as composed of a
plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals or
“personalities.”[158] If these philosophical theories are sound, the
course of the world’s history must be made up of the successive
transformations of finite individuals, who somehow remain
unaffected and unaltered in their character by the various external
disguises they assume. The individuals of such a philosophy would,
in fact, be as little modified by these changes as the actors on a
stage by their changes of costume, or the souls of the
“transmigration” hypothesis by the bodies into which they
successively enter. And thus development would not be even a
relatively genuine feature of the life of finite individuals; it would be a
mere illusion, inevitable indeed in the present condition of our
acquaintance with the detailed contents of existence, but
corresponding to no actual fact of inner experience.
On the other hand, if evolution is not a pure illusion, these
metaphysical constructions cannot be valid. For the whole essence
of the modern doctrine of evolution is contained in the principle that
radical differences in kind result from the accumulation of successive
modifications of individual structure, and once established continue
to be perpetuated as differences in kind. Now, such differences in
kind can only be interpreted metaphysically as radical differences in
the determining aims and interests of the experiencing subjects
constituting the physical order, and we have already seen that it is
precisely the character of these dominant unique interests which
forms the individuality of the individual. Thus the metaphysical
interpretation of the evolution process seems inevitably to resolve it
into a process of the development of fresh and disappearance of old
individual interests, and thus into a process of the origination and
disappearance of finite individuals within the one infinite individual
whole.
A conclusion of the same sort would be suggested by
consideration of those facts of our own individual development from
which the wider evolutionary theories have, in the last resort,
borrowed their ideas and their terminology. The mental growth of the