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ARMENIA’S FUTURE,
RELATIONS WITH TURKEY,
AND THE KARABAGH CONFLICT
Levon Ter-Petrossian
Edited by Arman Grigoryan
Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey,
and the Karabagh Conflict
 Levon Ter-Petrossian

Armenia’s Future,
Relations with Turkey,
and the Karabagh
Conflict
Edited by Arman Grigoryan
Levon Ter-Petrossian Edited by
Armenian National Congress Arman Grigoryan
Armenia, Armenia Department of International Relations
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
USA

ISBN 978-3-319-58915-2 ISBN 978-3-319-58916-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58916-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017946712

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher,
whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation,
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any
other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation,
computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in
this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher
nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material
contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher
remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional
affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Tigran Hayrapetyan / Getty Images

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

A number of individuals have made important contributions to this project.

Several of the documents have been translated by Ara Arabyan, Alexander
Arzoumanyan, Melissa Brown, Gerard Libaridian, and Rouben
Shougaryan. Meline Toumani has done a superb job editing the entire
text. Ashot Sargsyan has provided invaluable help with many of the anno-
tations. Avetis Avagyan has compiled the index, helped with editing the
text, and acted as a go-to person for any problem that has arisen during the
process of preparing the manuscript for publication. I would also like to
thank the Palgrave Macmillan team, and Alina Yurova and Ben Bailey in
particular, for their patience and dedication to this project.

Arman Grigoryan

v
 CONTENTS

1 Foreword: The Struggle to Change the Logic of

Armenia’s History 1

2 The Early Challenges to the Traditional Narrative,

1989–1991 13

3 Armenian-Turkish Relations After Independence

and the Continued Struggle with the Traditional Narrative 23

4 The Karabagh Conflict and the Future of Armenian

Statehood 35

5 Views on the Karabagh Conflict and the Armenian Turkish

Relations Following the Return to Politics 61

6 The Politics and Geopolitics of the Process of Normalization

of Armenian-Turkish Relations 79

7 Peace with Neighbors Has No Good Alternatives 131

vii
viii CONTENTS

Appendix 153

Bibliography 169

Index 171
 CHAPTER 1

Foreword: The Struggle to Change the Logic

of Armenia’s History

Levon Ter-Petrossian, whose select articles, speeches, and interviews dealing

with Armenian-Turkish relations, the Karabagh conflict, and the future of the
Armenian statehood are presented in this volume, was the first president of
independent Armenia. He served in that capacity from 1991 to 1998 when
he resigned following a political crisis triggered by his endorsement of a plan
for settling the Karabagh conflict.1 Ter-Petrossian had briefly served as the
Chairman of Armenia’s Supreme Soviet prior to Armenia’s independence and
adoption of a presidential system. He had assumed that post in the summer of
1990 when the Armenian National Movement (ANM) unseated the Com-
munists in the elections to the Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1990,
becoming the first noncommunist government of a constituent republic of
the Soviet Union. Ter-Petrossian was one of the leaders of the ANM, which
had started as a movement demanding the transfer of the jurisdiction of
the Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Region from the Azerbaijani to the
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,2 but which then transformed into a
movement for democratic rule and independence from the Soviet Union.
As such, it became an integral part of the wider democratic movement in the
Soviet Union, while Ter-Petrossian became a highly respected figure in it,
providing important critiques of the Soviet system, and forming particularly
close ties with Boris Yelstin and the Russian liberals.
After his resignation in 1998, Ter-Petrossian returned to his vocation as a
historian of the medieval Middle East,3 and maintained total silence on
political matters for an entire decade. Concerned about the direction in

© The Author(s) 2018 1

L. Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey, and the
Karabagh Conflict, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58916-9_1
2 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .

which Armenia was headed and responding to public demand, he returned

to politics in 2007 and stood as a candidate for president in the elections of
2008. The ruling regime clung to power by falsifying the elections then
resorting to force after Ter-Petrossian’s supporters launched a campaign of
protests.4 Following the crackdown, Ter-Petrossian started an oppositional
mass movement, which he christened the Armenian National Congress
(ANC), and embarked on a protracted struggle for the two things that
have defined his political career—a democratic Armenia and Armenia that is
at peace with its neighbors.
The collection of articles, speeches, and interviews contained in this volume
provides a unique window into that struggle. But it is more than information
about a single politician’s views. It is an invaluable resource for tracing the most
important issues, problems, and disputes that have animated Armenian politics
for the last three decades. This is not a memoir designed to justify controversial
decisions or to respond to accusations. It is also not something that was written
to appeal to a foreign audience. Rather the material contained in this volume is
a debate with opponents in Armenia about why Armenia needs to normalize its
relations with Turkey and to settle the Karabagh conflict. As such it reveals a
fascinating political picture of a country that has been engaged in a protracted
conflict while transitioning from communism. The picture is made that much
more fascinating by the fact that it is radically different from the one painted
in most Western media and academic writings on Armenia.
The preponderant opinion on the conflict in Karabagh in the Western
media and academia, as on “ethnic conflicts” in general, draws inspiration
from two general arguments. They differ in their theoretical logics in signifi-
cant ways, but what they have in common is the insistence that these conflicts
are always irrational as far as the “real” interests of the ordinary members of
the groups in question are concerned and that the ideas driving them are
profoundly illiberal. According to the first of these arguments, “ethnic
conflicts” are the direct consequence of nationalist narratives, which simulta-
neously contain hostile myths about certain “others” as victimizers or inferiors
and myths of martyrdom and chosenness about the group itself. These
narratives become the fuel for nationalist mobilizations especially when mul-
tiethnic states and empires collapse, taking the deterrence against such politics
with them. The Karabagh conflict features prominently in the literature as an
example of such a conflict. In what is perhaps the most straightforward
articulation of this argument and its application to the Karabagh conflict,
Stuart Kaufman maintains that the conflict was the result of Armenians’
peculiar interpretation of their history as that of victims, and especially victims
 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . . 3

in the hands of Turks and their ethnic kin—the Azeris. Armenians, in fact, did
not even distinguish between Turks and Azeris, he further explains, and saw
the problem of Karabagh as part of a larger existential conflict with the
“Turks.” The genocide committed by Turks was seen by them as a warning
for what was in store for Karabagh Armenians. He also tells the readers about
the Armenian mythology of Christian martyrdom dating all the way back to a
sanctified fifth-century battle, which Armenians fought against Sassanid Iran as
they resisted the latter’s attempt to convert Armenians to Zoroastrianism. The
subsequent history of a subjugated Christian minority in various Islamic states
cemented the Armenian self-image of Christian martyrs. Kaufman insists that
the combination of hatreds, fears, and a sense of a righteous mission that this
narrative generated led to the bloodshed in Karabagh.5
Michael Croissant hits on all the same points and more—the importance
of the unique religious identity in the Armenian nationalist narrative, the
suffering as Christian subjects of Islamic empires, and especially at the hands
of Turks, the gaze toward Russia as a Christian savior, Armenian claims to
historic rights over Karabagh as the indigenous group in the region, the
Armenian contempt for Azeris, and, last, but not least, the overwhelming,
existential fear of Pan-Turkism combined with a desire to correct historic
wrongs ostensibly committed in the name of that doctrine.6 The conflict in
Karabagh was almost inevitable, given this narrative, or so argues Croissant.7
In an otherwise well-informed and intelligent book, which, in fact, is the
book of reference on the Karabagh conflict, Thomas de Waal writes along
similar lines:

A . . . more crucial factor in starting the [Karabagh] conflict was the ease with
which hatred of the other side could be disseminated among the population.
The Turkish historian Halil Berktay calls these mass expressions of fear and
prejudice “hate narratives.” They were the dark side of the “renaissance” of the
1960s. . . Armenian and Azerbaijani academics had been denigrating the claims
of rival scholars others’ republic for twenty years. In 1988, all that was needed
was injection of politics—of full-strength “alcohol”—into the mixture. In a war
of pamphlets, drawing on years of tendentious scholarship, sarcasm, and innu-
endo, and selective quotation incited ordinary people into hatred.8

This general outlook pervades the media coverage as well. For example,
it is difficult to find a reference to the Karabagh conflict in the New York
Times that fails to call it a conflict between “Christian Armenians and
4 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .

Muslim Azeris,” implying that the conflict was a clash of conflicting

identities rather than conflicting political preferences.
The second argument propping up the conventional wisdom agrees with
the first on the role of hatreds and exclusion in certain nationalist mobili-
zations, but provides a specific mechanism focusing on the manipulation of
masses by political elites. According to this argument, corrupt, venal elites
resort to exclusionary and aggressive nationalism to divert the attention of
the masses from their social and economic problems especially in times of
political and economic transitions. The masses succumb to such manipula-
tion not because they are irrational, but because elites control the market-
place of information and ideas. Jack Snyder’s remains the most influential
statement of this logic.9 Snyder applies it to the Armenian case, among
others, insisting that the Armenian mobilization was essentially a mask for
patronage politics with “nationalist discourse [serving] as cover for [the]
corruption of democratic politics.” Snyder also mentions Ter-Petrossian as a
major culprit in that process.10 A similar argument is made by Henry Hale in
his authoritative study of patronage politics in the post-Soviet space with
Ter-Petrossian again at the center of his discussion of the Armenian case.11
The same standard opinion considers the current state of Armenian-
Turkish relations, which is characterized by intense hostility, and absence of
diplomatic relations, normal and predictable. The components of that view-
point are well known: Armenians demand recognition of the genocide com-
mitted by the Ottoman Empire against their ancestors, they seek restitution
for that crime, and they are ready to line up with any country that has
problems with Turkey and is willing to confront it. At the same time,
Armenians fear destruction by the Turks and seek protection from Russia.
As I have already pointed out, some authors even think that the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is a manifestation of Armenians’ interpretation
of their history as victims of the Turks.12
In sum, with few exceptions,13 media and academic writings portray
modern Armenian nationalism as a monolithic, reactionary force—a force
that is responsible for the conflict in Karabagh and at least in part for
Armenia’s cold war with Turkey. In what is a particularly telling example,
Snyder credits the Armenian nationalist mobilization in the early 1990s to
the Dashnak Party,14 which indeed was (and remains) a party of revisionist,
ethnic nationalists, despite the fact that it was in bitter opposition to the
ANM and Ter-Petrossian and despite the fact that its candidate received
4 percent of the vote in the presidential elections of 1991 compared to
Ter-Petrossian’s 83 percent. Kaufman’s and Croissant’s discussions of the
 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . . 5

Armenian mobilization show complete unawareness of any philosophical or

ideological differences between different segments of the Armenian political
class. In fact, no one else in the Western media or academia has demon-
strated awareness of such differences beyond tepid acknowledgments that
Ter-Petrossian adopted a more moderate stance on Karabagh toward the
end of his presidency, which led to his resignation.
Were there such differences, what were they, and were these differences
sufficiently meaningful? The answer to all of these questions must be an
emphatic yes. The Armenian political thought, in fact, went through a
revolutionary transformation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
Ter-Petrossian was one of the most important agents of that transformation.
There was indeed a nationalist narrative in Armenia, which identified Azeris
with Turks; which insisted that both Turkey and Azerbaijan were in the grip
of the Pan-Turkist doctrine; which insisted that this doctrine saw Armenians
as an obstacle to be removed; which attributed the Armenian genocide to
that doctrine; which placed the struggle for Karabagh in the context of an
existential struggle with the “Turks”; and which simultaneously saw Russia
as the protector against the “Turks” and the agent of Armenian demands
against them, including the demand for Karabagh and territorial claims
against Turkey. The problem is that the ANM unequivocally and vehe-
mently rejected this narrative and subjected every single item comprising it
to a scathing criticism.
The very first document in the current collection (Chap. 2, document 1),
which is a document of immense importance, is a full-frontal attack on that
narrative. It is a response by the ANM to a speech by a prominent propo-
nent of that narrative, where the said proponent had laid out all the earlier-
listed points. The ANM document, which was authored by Ter-Petrossian,
argued that treating the problem of Karabagh as anything other than a
problem of the rights of its inhabitants, and especially treating it as a
problem of “historic justice” or an existential conflict between Armenians
and Azeris/Turks, was exactly the wrong thing to do. The document
launched an assault against the idea that Armenians could not survive
without Russian protection or that Armenians and Russians share a com-
mon interest in combating Pan-Turkism, warning that such claims turn the
just struggle for the self-determination of Karabagh Armenians into a
manifestation of revanchism. It argued finally, that such claims were aimed
at retarding Armenian people’s aspirations for freedom and independence.
The latter argument runs through the next several documents, where
Ter-Petrossian insistently and repeatedly argues that normal relations with
6 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .

the neighbors, as opposed to reliance on a great power to extract conces-

sions from them, are the most important “guarantee for any state’s exis-
tence.” In his speech during a conference on genocide that took place in
Yerevan in 1995 (Chap. 3, document 4), Ter-Petrossian attacked another
taboo: he argued that the Armenian genocide was a failure of politics, not a
clash of cultures or the culmination of the millennial Turkish hatred for
Armenians. The overarching theme in all of these arguments is that Arme-
nians have to begin to think and act like a people with a state, rather than a
stateless ethnic group, and that doing so requires pragmatism, rational
calculation, and rejection of historic grievances, including the ideology of
the Armenian Cause,15 as a basis of politics. The commitment to these ideas
was only strengthened following Ter-Petrossian’s return to politics in 2007.
In speech after speech, he defended the idea that Armenia’s future as a viable
state depends on normalized relations with Turkey and the peaceful resolu-
tion of the Karabagh conflict.
One can get the impression when reading some of his speeches in this
period that he succumbed to the political temptation of attacking the
Armenian government for its readiness to make certain concessions in
order to normalize the relations with Turkey during the so-called “soccer
diplomacy.”16 Ter-Petrossian was particularly critical of the Armenian side’s
willingness to agree to a historians’ commission that would be authorized to
investigate the claims that what happened to Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire during World War I was genocide (see Chap. 6, documents 4, 5, 6,
7, 9, 10). This, however, was a principled position based on two concerns—
(a) that the Armenian government was allowing the Armenian genocide to
become a bargaining chip; (b) and that by doing so the Armenian government
was hoping to delink the Armenian-Turkish relations and the Karabagh con-
flict, which he thought was an irrational hope. Events proved him right, as the
Turkish government eventually reaffirmed its traditional stance on Karabagh
and refused to move forward with full normalization. Ter-Petrossian also
criticized Western governments, arguing that they were willing to turn a
blind eye on the trampling of democracy in Armenia in exchange for the
Armenian government’s willingness to become more flexible in the
Armenian-Turkish negotiations, which he argued sullied that process and
raised doubts about its legitimacy. His fundamental position on the need for
normalization of relations with Turkey, however, did not change. He expressed
them clearly and forcefully in several articles and interviews (Chap. 6, docu-
ments 3, 8, 10). Ter-Petrossian also clearly expressed his overall approval for
the policy of normalization even if he was critical of its certain elements
 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . . 7

(Chap. 6, document 3), making a special point of distinguishing between the

right and wrong criticisms of that policy (Chap. 6, document 8).
The reality was equally different from the conventional wisdom about the
Karabagh conflict and what role Ter-Petrossian and the ANM played in
it. They were staunch defenders of Karabagh’s right to self-determination,
but they insisted on drawing a sharp distinction between that right and
claims about “historic justice” or a millennial conflict with the “Turks.”
They were uncompromising on Karabagh Armenians’ rights and their
security, but they also thought that the conflict must and could be settled
through compromises. Indeed, the ANM’s new doctrine, which combined
aspirations of independence, rejection of the revisionist ideology of the
Armenian Cause and the role of a Russian garrison in the Caucasus, directly
implied a preference for a compromise solution to that conflict. Such a
solution proved elusive, unfortunately, but the responsibility for that was
largely Azerbaijan’s as the latter badly miscalculated its chances on the
battlefield and hardened its bargaining position as Armenia’s was softening
following the ANM’s assent to power in 1990.17 Turkey, incidentally, played
a very unfortunate role in that process by strongly siding with Azerbaijan and
creating an impression that Azerbaijan could rely on more Turkish support
than Turkey was in a position to provide. Ter-Petrossian addressed this
problem in one of his press-conferences (Chap. 3, document 5).
Ter-Petrossian was not able to prevent the war, but even after the
Armenian side prevailed in that war—the war ended in 1994 with a cease-
fire that left Nagorno Karabagh and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions under
Armenian control, but no political solution—he remained dedicated to the
idea that a permanent solution based on compromises must be found to that
conflict. He made a bid for such a solution despite the fact that he faced fierce
resistance, including from certain influential members of his own administra-
tion who had hardened their positions and concluded that Armenia
and Karabagh could indefinitely maintain the post-1994 status quo.
Ter-Petrossian explained why that was, in fact, an untenable position first in
a lengthy article called “War or Peace? Time to Get Serious” (Chap. 4,
document 1) and then in a speech during a meeting of the National Security
Council (Chap. 4, document 2). Unfortunately, he was unable to break the
resistance of the hardliners and resigned the presidency in February 1998.
He has continued to advocate for a compromise solution to the
Karabagh conflict after his return to politics in 2007. Indeed, Karabagh
took up a good part of his first major speech following his return. He argued
that the decade following his resignation had vindicated his arguments and
8 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .

that Armenia and Karabagh needed to settle the conflict with Azerbaijan as
urgently as ever. Even though such advocacy was politically costly,18 he kept
it as one of the central items of his agenda both as a candidate for the
presidency in 2008 and as the leader of the opposition afterward. That
advocacy culminated in a particularly important and lengthy speech on
December 17, 2016, which was delivered at a meeting of the ANC in
preparation for the parliamentary elections set for April 2, 2017 (Chap. 7,
document 3). Ter-Petrossian argued that peace and reconciliation with
Azerbaijan should become the centerpiece of the ANC’s electoral platform
and that not only the conflict should be settled though compromise but also
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies should undergo a deeper process of
reconciliation. In an important gesture to further that cause, Ter-Petrossian
expressed “equal sorrow” for the suffering the conflict had inflicted on both
peoples.
Ter-Petrossian has insisted throughout his career that peaceful and good-
neighborly relations with the neighbors have no alternative, given the
realities of power and resource constraints. Seeing him only as a realist
driven by pragmatic calculations of power is too limiting, however. It
obscures too much of what Armenian politics has been about since the
country became independent. Specifically, Ter-Petrossian and his sup-
porters have regarded peaceful and good-neighborly relations with the
neighbors not only as fundamental for Armenia’s security and economic
development but also essential if Armenia was to develop as a “normal
state.” Such a state would be tasked to protect its citizens from external
and internal predation, provide basic services and infrastructure, provide
welfare to its vulnerable citizens, and do not much else. It would have no
totalizing ideology or a mission. Its policies would reflect the preferences of
its citizens, whatever they are. “Normal,” in other words, meant “liberal.”
All of this may sound trivial to a Western reader, because liberalism as a
philosophy of governance is not seriously contested in any Western society.
Adherence to such a philosophy was not a trivial matter in Armenia. It was
and remains bitterly contested. The traditional narrative, which I described
earlier in the text, implied a very different kind of state from the one the
ANM aspired to build. The proponents of that narrative were also joined by
those who expressed explicit contempt for the idea of building a “normal
state,” calling instead for a state bound by “national ideology”—a kind of
state that would have a special mission, a kind of state that would not allow
its mission to be determined by the mundane and vulgar preferences of the
public, and certainly a kind of state that would be inspired by the aspiration
of correcting historical wrongs. Its chief proponent—Vazgen Manoukyan,
 NOTES 9

who was Ter-Petrossian’s opponent in the 1996 presidential elections—

explicitly dismissed democracy as a desirable form of governance for
Armenia19 and argued that a state that simply wants to create security and
prosperity was not worth having.20
Ter-Petrossian was the most vocal critic of this philosophy. He triggered
the fury of nationalists by stating that “national ideology” was a false
political category and went on to explain why thought so on numerous
occasions. One such example is contained in this volume (Chap. 3, docu-
ment 5). But Ter-Petrossian has always been aware that the choice between
two trajectories of development—a “normal state” or a state bound by a
“national ideology”—is not a matter of mere intellectual disagreement.
Rather, Armenia’s chances of becoming a “normal state” are closely tied
to normalization of relations with its neighbors. The alternative is a state,
where every democratic challenge is menacingly described as a threat to
unity, where the public even refrains from issuing such challenges lest it wets
the enemy’s appetite, and where the defense minister is seriously pushing
the idea of turning the nation into an army (Chap. 7, document 3).
Arman Grigoryan

NOTES
1. The conflict was over the status of a region called Nagorno Karabagh, which
had an Armenian majority (79 percent), but was part of Azerbaijan as an
autonomous district (oblast) during the Soviet period. In 1988, exercising a
right granted by the Soviet constitution, Karabagh Armenians demanded a
transfer of their region from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction, which
produced mass movements both in Armenia and Azerbaijan and a conflict
between them. The conflict escalated to war in 1991 as the Soviet Union
started crumbling. In 1994, a ceasefire was signed with Armenians in full
military control of Karabagh and seven adjacent Azerbaijani districts. Parties
have been negotiating a permanent political settlement ever since without
success. They came closest in 1997–1998 when Ter-Petrossian endorsed a
plan brokered by Russia, the USA, and France, but powerful members of his
government opposed the plan. Unable to overcome their resistance, Ter-
Petrossian resigned in February 1998.
2. It was called the Karabagh movement after it erupted in February 1988 and
before it was officially renamed the Armenian National Movement in 1989.
3. Ter-Petrossian had a distinguished academic career prior to getting involved
in politics. He was a senior researcher in one of the most important academic
institutions in Armenia—the Museum of Ancient Manuscripts —when he
10 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .

joined the Karabagh movement in 1988. The research he conducted follow-

ing his resignation was on the interaction of Armenians and crusaders, which
resulted in the publications of a two-volume study on the subject—The
Crusaders and Armenians, Vol. I (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2005), The
Crusaders and Armenians, Vol. II (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2007).
4. For a comprehensive analysis of the elections see “Armenia’s 2008 Presiden-
tial Elections,” Policy Forum Armenia. Available at http://www.pf-armenia.
org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PFA_Election_Report–FINAL.pdf
5. Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ith-
aca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), ch. 3.
6. Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism is a doctrine calling for the political unifica-
tion of the Turkic-speaking peoples, which emerged in the late nineteenth
century. Many Armenians believe that the existence of Armenians in the
region is incompatible with that doctrine and that the Armenian genocide
was a consequence of the Young Turks’ embrace of it. They also believe that
Communists administratively subordinated Karabagh to Azerbaijan rather
than Armenia in 1921 under Turkish pressure, which they interpret as
another manifestation of the Pan-Turkist plan.
7. Michael P. Croissant, The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Causes and
Implications (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), ch. 1.
8. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace
and War (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2003), p. 142.
9. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist
Conflict (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2000).
10. See ibid., p. 230–232.
11. Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative
Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 104,
136–137.
12. See Kaufman, Modern Hatreds; Croissant, The Armenian-Azerbaijani Con-
flict; Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an
Oil-rich, War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic (London, UK: Routledge, 1999).
13. See Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern
History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,1993), ch. 14; Eric
Melander, “The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevita-
ble?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3. No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 48–75.
14. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, p. 223. Dashnak, or more accurately
Dashnaktsutyun, is the Armenian name for the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF), which was the most influential Armenian nationalist
party that emerged in the late nineteenth century. It governed Armenia
during the country’s brief period of independence following the Russian
Revolution in 1918–1920, and went into exile after Armenia was Sovietized.
 NOTES 11

After the doors were opened to political pluralism in the Soviet Union, the
ARF reestablished its presence in Armenia in 1990.
15. Armenian Cause was born as the Armenian Question after the Russian-
Turkish War of 1877–1878. Initially it described the politics of reforms in
the Armenian populated areas of the Ottoman Empire under the supervi-
sion, and sometimes the pressure, of European great powers. When the
problem vanished from the international agenda following the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923, the Armenian Question acquired a new meaning in the
Armenian diaspora and was rebranded as the Armenian Cause. Establishing
sovereignty over historic Armenia, which includes the territories where
Armenians were exterminated during WWI, forms the basis of that ideology.
16. The process was launched by the Armenian president Serge Sargsyan, who
published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (“We Are Ready to Talk to
Turkey,” July 9, 2008) and invited his Turkish counterpart to Armenia to
watch a match between the Armenian and Turkish national teams together.
The invitation was not only to watch a soccer match, of course, but to
attempt to restart a dialogue about normalizing the relations between the
two countries. The process culminated in the signing of protocols regarding
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2011, but the Turkish side
reverted to the position that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions could only happen after the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and
refused to ratify the protocols.
17. See de Waal, Black Garden, ch. 8; Melander, “The Nagorno Karabagh
Conflict Revisited,” pp. 69–70.
18. It was costly, because positions had continued to harden in both Armenia
and Karabagh, not the least because of the relentless nationalist propaganda
during the decade following Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, which had not
been challenged by anybody.
19. Gerard J. Libaridian, Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood
in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991), p. 46.
20. Vazgen Manoukyan, “We Are a Global Nation,” Hayastani Hanrapetutyun
[Republic of Armenia] [in Armenian], December 16, 1990.
 CHAPTER 2

The Early Challenges to the Traditional

Narrative, 1989–1991

1 THE DANGEROUS SCARECROW

Karabagh Committee’s Response to Zory Balayan’s Speech on Pan-Turanism1

The Armenia Committee of the Karabagh Movement [Karabagh Commit-

tee] is deeply concerned with the antidemocratic character of the current
session [of the Supreme Soviet] and with the fundamentally flawed and
shortsighted political program presented there.
Based on the sense of responsibility it has assumed on behalf of the
interests of the Armenian people, the Karabagh Committee feels obligated
to make the following statement from the podium of the highest authority
in Armenia:
Despite our bitter experience, and disregarding the many disappointments
our people have suffered, some of our intellectuals are still feverishly
preaching the politically bankrupt and dangerous idea according to which
Armenia, being surrounded by enemy peoples of another religion, can survive
only when it is under the protection of a powerful state. This mentality is
leading our people to moral bankruptcy and denying it the opportunity to
become a political partner, which is the only guarantee of success in political
life. The concept of Armenia as an obstruction to Pan-Turanic plans and,
therefore, as a political tool serving Russia’s interests, pushes the Armenian
question into the complex sphere of international relations, which has always
been pregnant with dangerous consequences for our people.

© The Author(s) 2018 13

L. Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey, and the
Karabagh Conflict, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58916-9_2
14 2 THE EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE. . .

As an ideology, Pan-Turkism was born during the First World War and at
the present has lost its value as a political factor, since Turkic-speaking
peoples have opted for the path of national development. Calls to crusade
against Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism are bound to again make Armenia
a political tool and turn it into a target for both.2
The Karabagh Committee, leading the popular movement for over a
year, has rejected from the start the dangerous mentality of seeing Pan-
Turkism as a permanent threat and placing our hopes on an external
savior. The Committee has consistently worked to act according to the
principle that the Armenian people can achieve their national goals by
relying on themselves, and only themselves. This political path has
already produced obvious positive results by moving the Artsakh3 issue
from the denial to the solution stage. Because of its just constitutional
struggle, the Armenian people have made a number of allies within the
international community: in Moscow, in Leningrad, in the Baltic repub-
lics, and among democratic movements elsewhere. That is the result of
the appreciation for the substantial contribution of the national move-
ment in Armenia to the process of democratization of the Soviet Union,
but it is also the best guarantee for the just solution of the problem of
Artsakh, which we should cherish above all else. Conscious of this reality,
certain forces are trying to drive the problem of Artsakh into a deadlock
and to that end they are plotting a conspiracy against our people, and
some Armenian intellectuals are participating in it wittingly or
unwittingly.
Focusing on Pan-Turkism and raising the issue of the Armenian terri-
tories occupied by Turkey at this juncture serves only one purpose: to
portray Armenians as revanchists, to discredit the just cause of Artsakh,
and to deny the Armenian people the support of its allies.
For that reason, the Karabagh Committee condemns, in the harshest
terms, the periodic attempts to turn the Armenian question into a cheap
card in the game of international relations. We are convinced that the
only available path to achieve our national goals is to guarantee the
permanence of the democratization of the country and the unity of the
Armenian people according the principles articulated by the Armenian
National Movement. We are convinced that had the ANM been formally
recognized in time and a mechanism created for the dialogue between
the leaders of the republic and the representatives of the people, we
would have avoided the political recklessness, which this statement
champions.
 2 HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBORS? 15

2 HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT OUR RELATIONS

WITH OUR NEIGHBORS?

Excerpt from an interview to the newspaper Republic of Armenia4

. . . The fourth key problem confronting Armenia is its isolation, which we

must overcome if we want to improve our value as a political partner. I am
talking about direct relations with foreign countries. We must embark on a
serious effort and adopt a flexible diplomatic posture so that we can establish
if not friendly, then at least normal relations with our immediate neighbors.
First of all, I have in mind Georgia with which we have an age-old tradition
of friendship, then Iran, with which we have not had a conflict since 1828,
therefore no psychological barriers either for the Armenian or the Iranian
side. The religious factor, in my view, should be irrelevant, because there are
influential actors both in Iran and Armenia who understand that state
interests are more important than religious sentiment, and that the relations
between the two states can be built on the basis of that understanding.
The establishment of relations between Armenia and Turkey are a little
more complicated from the perspective of social psychology and historical
justice. Nevertheless, old animosities should not prevent the establishment of
at least commercial, then broader economic relations, given our state interests,
and without without any compromise on the core issues. I think we should
take advantage of this opportunity for the sake of our own interests. This, in
my view, will fortify our aspirations for progress as an independent nation.
Normal relations with neighbors are one of the guarantees, and perhaps
the most important guarantee, for the secure existence of any state. We
should transcend our emotions without forgetting our valid grievances. We
must think as a state and have the people’s interests as our guide when
entering any relationship. Otherwise we are condemned to destruction. The
establishment of normal relations with our neighbors will only increase our
value as a political partner. It gives us more room to maneuver and increases
our value in the eyes of the Union, the Center.5 As long as the Center is
convinced that we are condemned to be attached to it and as long as we do
not have any access to the outside world, it can afford to ignore us. But we
have another route available to us. That is the route of reaching direct
agreements with the republics of the USSR, converting the vertical relation-
ships into horizontal ones. I particularly value direct relations with the
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, and some steps have already
16 2 THE EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE. . .

been taken in that direction. Indicative of those steps are Yeltsin’s letter to
me and my letter to Yeltsin. They establish a baseline for certain actions and
demonstrate understanding that the interests of our republics, of our peo-
ples should not be subordinated to those of the empire.

3 THE MOST IMPORTANT GUARANTEE OF ARMENIA’S

INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Armenian Supreme Soviet (22 October,
1990)6

. . . And finally, the fifth and the most important guarantee, which is essential
for the normal functioning of any state, is our relations with our immediate
neighbors—Iran and Turkey. These relations should be built on a pragmatic
understanding of what the Armenian people want and need. This issue has
become subject to political distortion, but rational actors understand the
imperative very well. And it is the authorities of Armenia that must design
and implement this policy. I am convinced that Armenian society, which has
reached a high level of political maturity, is capable of distinguishing mean-
ingful political goals from ideas that are the product of political distortion.
The people of Armenia should aim to make our republic into a self-
governing entity both politically and economically—one that can take
maximum advantage of the propitious circumstances and withstand the polit-
ical and economic challenges of our era. It is high time to draw serious lessons
from our bitter history, to abandon the identity of an emotional, romantic
nation, and to become a rational, realistic, and pragmatic one, which takes
every step on the basis of a well thought out and careful calculation.
Flexible diplomacy and the ability to maneuver should become the most
important political weapons we possess. We must monitor the relations of
our political partners and adversaries carefully and be able to take advantage
of the smallest disagreements among them. We must, therefore, altogether
reject pompous and unserious rhetoric, which unnecessarily antagonizes
our political partners and opponents, produces no political results, and
only causes disillusionment among our people.
Politics is a system, not a simple sum of random actions. Therefore, no
elected government that is implementing its own political program can
afford to appease peripheral pressures and veer off its main course.
A systematically developed political strategy can only be confronted with a
 4 REJECTING FANTASIES AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 17

different systematically developed political strategy, not demands for iso-

lated acts that are incompatible with it. Needless to say, this does not mean
that a political strategy should be a dogma and that it is not subject to
revision as needed.
To summarize this brief analysis, I would characterize the strategy
adopted by Armenia’s current democratically elected government as fol-
lows: to create the necessary guarantees for the continued existence and
prosperity of our republic by avoiding serious confrontations, flamboyant
and rash moves, by allowing us a space for flexible diplomacy and maneu-
vering, and at the same time by taking prompt and clear decisions. We will
have fulfilled our duty if we succeed in achieving that goal, leaving the
fulfillment of our other national aspirations to future generations.

4 REJECTING FANTASIES AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS

WITH TURKEY

Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at the Second Congress of the Armenian

National Movement7

. . .Another accusation, which has a history, is that the Armenian National

Movement has given up on the Armenian Cause and on the historic claims
of the Armenian people. We have explained our position, but our explana-
tions have no effect on our opponents. Unfortunately, the nature of this
debate is that explanations have no chance of swaying the other side. The
debate, instead, is for the purpose of convincing the public. No matter how
persuasive our arguments and clarifications are, they are going to keep
repeating the same accusations, because they have no other cards to play.
What can be said about this? Our attitude toward the Armenian Cause is
unequivocal. First, there is the erroneous perception that the Armenian
Cause is the diaspora’s cause and the cause of the Western Armenians.
Not at all, because at least half of the population of Armenia consists of
descendants of Western Armenians. And the sentiments that are so preva-
lent in the diaspora are not alien to the Armenians living in the homeland.
Therefore, claiming the Armenian Cause as the diaspora’s monopoly
is profoundly wrong. That is the first point. Second, we have stated on
numerous occasions that the Armenian National Movement does not
renounce the historical rights of the Armenian people and the demand for
international recognition of the Armenian genocide, but while considering
18 2 THE EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE. . .

it normal for political parties and organizations to include these issues in

their programs and agendas, they cannot become part of the state’s agenda.
This is our approach. There are 1500 national and political leaders in this
hall. You have to realize that these accusations are not going to stop, but we
cannot afford to waste our time on responding to such slander. We should
ignore them and that is the only way to make sure that they will fade away. I
am glad that our congress is being broadcast on television, which gives me
the opportunity to present our position clearly regarding this issue. The
Armenian Cause —the cause of restoring the rights of Western Armenians
in their historic homeland—will become a part of the state’s policy agenda
only when the Armenian state is in a position to solve that problem relying
on its capabilities.
There is another related question, which has become subject to political
speculation. Through no fault of our own, this question has attracted more
attention than it deserves. The question has to do with our relations with
Turkey. We do not distinguish this relationship from our relations with our
other neighbors. But for some reason people forget about the other neigh-
bors and insist only that we speak about Turkey. This is understandable, but
it has both objective and subjective causes. Objectively, it is difficult for our
people, who have internalized a certain attitude, to make a psychological
U-turn and see that it is in fact possible to have a dialogue with Turkey. The
subjective element is the exploitation of that fact by those who know very
well that relations with Turkey are of vital importance to us. The normal-
ization of these relations is not an end in itself, it is the rational thing to do,
and our society finally understands this. I think that the most important
revolution in our political thinking that has taken place in the last few years is
the rejection of the bankrupt idea of relying on third parties and pinning
hopes on protection by other countries. For 300 years our national con-
sciousness has been poisoned by the illusion that our national aspirations
will be fulfilled sometimes by Western Europeans, and more typically, by
Russia. Remaining committed to this idea has cost us dearly. It is only today
that the Armenians are giving up that fantasy, rejecting that naïve dream and
seeing that even the Soviet state, which provided certain guarantees for our
survival (and that is a reality, since in the Soviet period there were no bullets
fired across Armenia’s borders, and the Armenian people were able to live
and create in peace, despite the disintegration of the village and the horrible
losses sustained during Stalin’s terror), is no longer able to provide those
guarantees as it is on the verge of dissolution. Therefore it is we who must
seek and find more reliable guarantees for our people’s continued survival.
 5 THE MAIN GUARANTEE OF OUR SECURITY IS NORMALIZATION OF. . . 19

The normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is but one of the many

links in the chain of guarantees, but, as I already pointed out, thanks to
certain psychological factors it has attracted more of our society’s attention
than relations with other neighbors.
In order to rule out any misunderstandings, I want to emphasize once
again that normalization of relations with Turkey means first and foremost
the establishment of economic, commercial ties, and does not in any way
mean renunciation of our historic rights. At the same time, we are guided by
the principle that parties should be realistic and should avoid insisting on
preconditions for the establishment of relations given the delicate nature of
the issue (and it must be pointed out that these questions are no less delicate
and thorny in Turkey). Only such an approach would make it possible to
implement the normalization of relations with neighbors, including Turkey,
that are so important for Armenia.

5 THE MAIN GUARANTEE OF OUR SECURITY

IS NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

Excerpt from an Interview with the Russian Newspaper Nezavisimaya

Gazeta8

– Mutalibov9 has claimed that what is taking place is “Armenian expansion.”

Some of your statements in the media containing claims about “historic rights”
can also be interpreted as intent to restore Greater Armenia. That is cause for
some concern in Turkey. . .

We have already clarified our position on that question, including in the

pages of Nezavisimaya Gazeta. I have spoken not about “historic rights,”
but about the facts of history. We do have disagreements with Turkey as far
as interpreting the facts of history is concerned. We characterize the events
of 1915 and the subsequent years as genocide. Turks think differently. But
that should not affect our current relations. That is a separate issue.
Armenia has always considered Russia to be the guarantor of our
people’s survival. During the last three years, however, Armenians came
to the bitter realization that the guarantee is not there anymore. During
the pogroms in Sumgait and Baku, the Russian army did not protect the
innocent victims.
Besides, one cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviet army will leave
the Caucasus regardless of what we want. There are precedents of that in
20 2 THE EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE. . .

history. The Russian army evacuated Western Armenia during World War I
after a victorious campaign against Turkey. That happened in 1918.
We realize that we cannot, in such a short time, create a modern and
strong economy that would allow us to face all probably threats by our-
selves. For that reason alone, all the talk about “Armenian expansionism” is
pure idle speculation. The main guarantee of our security, as for any state, is
the normalization of relations with our neighbors. Consequently, we have
expressed our desire to establish mutually beneficial bilateral relations with
Turkey. The ambassador of that country visited Armenia. There are more
than a few complications we need to overcome, but what deserves emphasis
is the fact that the two peoples have begun the process of establishing
relations. We have already received verbal assurances that there will be
no political preconditions for establishing and developing economic and
cultural ties. Those ties, in fact, will create favorable conditions for the
resolution of political problems.

NOTES
1. This document was read in the Armenian Supreme Soviet on 24 June, 1989. An
earlier translation of it was published in Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the
Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA:
Blue Crane Books, 1991), pp. 155–156. It was issued in response to a speech in
the Armenian Supreme Soviet by Zory Balayan, who was a prominent intel-
lectual and activist, and who subscribed to the traditional Armenian nation-
alist narrative. In that speech, he reiterated some of the most important
postulates of that narrative: (1) Turkey and Azerbaijan are inspired by the
Pan-Turkist (or Pan-Turanist, which is a term used interchangeably with
Pan-Turkist) doctrine of political unification of Turkic-speaking peoples;
(2) the existence of Armenians in the Caucasus is an impediment on the
path of realization of that goal, hence that doctrine implies the extermination
of Armenians; (3) only Russian protection can stave off that threat; (4) Russia
and Armenia have a common interest in fighting Pan-Turkism, because the
idea of political unification of Turkic-speaking peoples threatens the stability
and integrity of the Soviet Union; (5) Moscow should support the Armenian
claims over Karabagh, because of that common interest; (6) Moscow should
similarly support Armenian claims over the territories of historic Armenia,
which are under Turkish control. See, Zory Balayan, “The Threat of Pan-
Turanism,” in Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroads, pp. 151–154.
2. Some proponents of the traditional nationalist narrative argued that Armenians
had been victimized not just by Turks, but by Muslims in general, as they had
 NOTES 21

endured conquest and subjugation by various Islamic states and empires

since the Arab conquest of Armenia in the seventh century. They claimed
simultaneously, and against all evidence, that there was pan-Islamic unity,
which regarded all Christians, including Armenians as enemies.
3. Artsakh is the historic Armenian name for Karabagh.
4. Republic of Armenia, 9 October, 1990; Levon Ter-Petrossian, Selected
Speeches, Articles, and Interviews (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2006),
pp. 135–136.
5. “Center” is a reference to the central government in Moscow.
6. Ter-Petrossian, Selected Speeches, Articles, and Interviews, pp. 149–150.
7. Republic of Armenia, 28 November, 1990; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Speeches,
Articles, and Interviews, pp. 161–163.
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 May, 1991. Interview of Alexander Banggersky
with Levon Ter-Petrossian; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles, Speeches, and
Interviews, pp. 213–214.
9. Ayaz Mutallibov was the president of Azerbaijan in 1991–1992.
 CHAPTER 3

Armenian-Turkish Relations After

Independence and the Continued Struggle
with the Traditional Narrative

1 THE OBSTACLES ON THE PATH OF NORMALIZATION

OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA AND TURKEY

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Fourth Congress of the Armenian

National Movement1

The strategy being worked out with regard to our relations with Iran and
Turkey is familiar to you in its basic contours. The current Armenian
administration has adopted the position that the guarantee of the survival
of any country rests in its ability to establish normal relations with its
neighbors. That is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We cannot create
a security system that is based on reliance on powerful but distant actors like
Russia, Europe or the United States. We must strive to solve our problems
locally, with our immediate neighbors.
The relations with Iran present no complications. On the contrary, the
parties have common interests, in addition to not having any historical
disagreements, which helps facilitate the development of Armenian-Iranian
relations. I should express my satisfaction with the pace of development of
relations with Iran, which has accelerated recently, and we will soon enjoy
the benefits of that process.
There is no question that the process of establishing relations with
Turkey is more complicated, although, as mentioned earlier, we have

© The Author(s) 2018 23

L. Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey, and the
Karabagh Conflict, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58916-9_3
24 3 ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THE. . .

succeeded in removing psychological barriers along that path. In particular,

we have succeeded in impressing upon our people that in our relations with
Turkey we must be guided exclusively by state interests and principles of
realism.
Although our position on this question is well established, I find it
necessary to reiterate it once again: as neighboring countries, Armenia and
Turkey have overlapping interests, which can be the basis for developing
close commercial, economic, scientific, and cultural ties. Because both
parties stand to gain from acting on these interests, they should ensure
that ties can be established without preconditions.
I should point out that Turkish officials basically agree with this point of
view. Some Turkish officials, however, have gone on the record
contradicting it. This was predictable and should not put us off. There are
two issues here, which we need to analyze with cool heads and without
being surprised by inconsistencies in the Turkish position.
The first is the question of Artsakh. Naturally, Turkey was not going
to be indifferent to the fate of its ethnic kin. We should not forget that
aside from official policy, there is also public opinion and a political
opposition in Turkey, which is exploiting the problem of Artsakh for
political gain. In other words, it seems like the problem of Artsakh is
gradually becoming an internal political problem in Turkey. All political
parties and politicians are jumping over each other to prove their dedi-
cation to the welfare of their Azeri kin. This, to be sure, is a dangerous
trend. For now the Turkish government is able to withstand that pres-
sure. We should appreciate this fact, because the administration is at least
guided by the genuine interests of the country, and would in all likeli-
hood not want the problem of Artsakh to become an obstacle on the path
of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. Be that as it may, the
Turkish government is subject to a certain degree of pressure and is
forced to make concessions in response to public opinion and to lend
Azerbaijan diplomatic and PR support on the world stage.
The second issue has to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union and
with the subsequent position of Russia, which I talked about earlier, and
which has created a vacuum in the Caucasus. As a powerful state with a rich
diplomatic tradition, Turkey had the instinct to take advantage of that
vacuum. That is why it has lately moved away from the principle of no
preconditions for establishing relations with Armenia and instead has put
forward such preconditions. This happened both in Prague during the
meetings of the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Telkens wordt hij wakker geschud door elleboogstooten van de juffrouw
naast hem, die zachtjes zegt:

„Toe nou Janes!” waarop hij dan knorrig: „la’-me met rust,” bromt.

In Ambro’s vindingrijk brein rijpt alweer een mooi plan. [238]

Hij klimt weer van de bank en constateert met genoegen, dat de poffertjes
inmiddels gekomen zijn.

Ofschoon ze erg heet zijn, vallen de jongens er direct op aan en smullen

naar hartelust.

Ambro, die eerst stevig doorgegeten heeft, houdt nu met eten op en laat
een stuk of vier poffertjes op zijn bord liggen.

„Lust je niet meer?” vraagt Chris verwonderd.

„Zal je gewaar worden, man! Nog wel vijf dozijn. Maar die blijven bewaard
voor m’n vrind hiernaast.”

„Je vrind?” en Chris stapt ook op de bank en kijkt over het schut.

„Hij heeft ’m om,” lacht hij tegen ’t gezelschap, wijzend naar het hoekje
waar de man nog steeds zit te dommelen.

„Toe, ga nou gauw deur, aap!” zegt verontwaardigt de juffrouw, die de

partij opneemt van haar echtgenoot.

De andere jongens zijn nu ook komen kijken en vier ondeugende

gezichten loeren over het schut naar het gezelschap naast ze.

„Toe, gane jullie sitte! D’r is hier niks besonders te sien, hoor!” wordt hun
toegeroepen.

„Vooruit, jongens, we gaan weg,” zei Ambro, zóó hard, dat de buren het
goed konden verstaan.

„Ja, gane jullie maar, leelijke deugnieten,” riep de beleedigde juffrouw.

De jongens doken naar omlaag.

„Maar we gaan niet heusch,” fluisterde Ambro. „Eerst nog een bak met
den dronken oome hebben. Nou net doen of we weggaan, knullen.” [239]

Ze schuifelden met hun voeten en liepen heen en weer, zoodat de buren

werkelijk dachten, dat ze weg waren.

Toen haalde Ambro een touw uit zijn zak, en maakte aan het einde
daarvan een groote lus.

De jongens volgden vol belangstelling zijn bewegingen.

„Zoo, dat is klaar,” zei Ambro. „Nou moet jij me helpen, Chris. Als ik onder
de bank kruip om oome Janes z’n voet in die las te krijgen, moet jij die
overgebleven poffertjes op je vork doen en als je dan de vork in de hoogte
houdt en er een mep tegen geeft met je andere hand, dan vliegen de
poffers die menschen hiernaast om hun ooren. En dan heb ik m’n handen
vrij en zal je oome Janes een buiging zien maken. Maar dan weghollen,
hoor! Want ze zullen ons even achterna rennen!”

Chris was onmiddellijk bereid en zachtjes ging hij op de bank staan om op

het eerste sein van Ambro den aanval te beginnen.

Intusschen was Ambro onder de bank gekropen.

Tusschen de twee kamertjes was aan den onderkant een groote spleet
open en daardoor waren de beenen van de buren zichtbaar.

Heel voorzichtig sloeg nu Ambro de lus om den schoen van „Oome

Janes”, die met de beenen over elkaar rustig zat te dommelen.

„Chris,” fluisterde hij. „Gooien!”

Hup! vier welgemikte, dikke poffers vlogen naar alle kanten in de

gezichten van de verbaasde buren. [240]
En temidden van dit tumult rolde eensklaps „Oome Janes” door een
vreeselijken ruk voorover, en sloeg met z’n armen op tafel, midden
tusschen de bordjes met poffertjes.

De woede en de verbazing van de omstanders is niet te beschrijven. En

tusschen al die woedende menschen zat Oome Janes met een onnoozel
gezicht te kijken, terwijl hij mompelde:

„Hè, hè … is da … slape!”

De jongens vlogen als een pijl uit den boog weg, achterna gezeten door
een der mannen van het gezelschap. Ze waren hem echter te vlug af en
de man gaf den wedloop dan ook spoedig op.

En zoo eindigde de eerste kermisavond der vier bengels.

Dat er de verdere dagen nog een aantal streken uitgehaald werden dient
geen betoog.

Toen ze op den laatsten dag echter hun kermispot nakeken, bleek het, dat
ze al hun geld nog niet verteerd hadden.

„We zijn zuinige pantalonika’s geweest,” zei Chris.

„Nou alle centen van avond stuk slaan?” vroeg Piet.

„Neen,” zei Ambro. „Ik weet wat leuks. Laten we de helft van de spiejen nu
bewaren om Karel, Paul en Wim te fuiven als ze terug zijn. We vieren dan
meteen ons afscheid van de lagere school. Want al blijft de bende
bestaan, we waaien toch verschillende kanten uit.”

Ze waren er alle drie voor te vinden en er [241]werd dien avond een gulden
negen en vijftig en een halve cent apart gelegd voor de afscheids-fuif.

En zoo vinden we de heele club dan terug op het stukske grond, dat al
zoo menig keer getuige was van hun jongensstreken, n.l. het weiland.

„We zullen eerst vreugdevuren ontsteken,” zegt Ambro.

Hij pakte al wat hij aan papieren en vodden vindt bijeen en gooit het op
een hoop.

Nu worden er houtjes gezocht en met behulp van de noodige lucifers, die

Ambro voor dit doel had meegebracht, wordt het vuurtje aangestookt.

Als het eindelijk lustig brandt, dansen de jongens er in woesten krijgsdans

om heen.

„Vooruit jongens, nu gaan we al het lekkers opeten,” zegt Chris plotseling.

„Lekkers?” vraagt Karel verwonderd.

„Wachten,” gebiedt Ambro. En dan gaat hij op hoogdravenden toon voort:

„Laat mij, roovers van het Hol van Kaan, wier hoofdman ik ben, nog
éénmaal als medescholier het woord tot jullie voeren.

„Wij zijn hier bijeen gekomen, om het afscheid te vieren van onze geliefde
en hooggewaardeerde lagere school. Over een week zitten we allen te
zweeten op een H … h … h … oogere School. Dàn zullen we aan den lijve
voelen wat werken heet. Totnogtoe hebben we pret gehad en óók wel es
gewerkt, maar dáár, geloof me, zullen ze ons mores leeren.

„Laten we, terwijl we al de lekkernijen opbikken, [242]die wij van onze

kermiscenten ter eere van jullie terugkomst gekocht hebben, de heerlijke
dagen herdenken die we doorgebracht hebben vanaf de Bewaarschool tot
nu.

„En roovers, laten we elkaar beloven steeds ons clubje in eere te houden
en geen vreemde snoeshanen naar binnen te smokkelen.

„De roovers van het Hol van Kaan, zij leven hoog!”

Een oorverdoovend applaus beloonde deze schitterende feestrede.

Toen vond Chris, dat hij nu niet minder kon, dan Ambro voor zijn speech
te bedanken.
Heel waardig stond hij op uit het gras, waarin hij languit lag en sprak
Ambro toe met de volgende woorden:

„Ambro, Hoofdman der roovers van het Hol van Kaan.

„Uit naam van de heele bende dank ik je voor je emmese toespraak.

„Je weet, ik kan niet zoo goed kletsen als jij, maar ik wil je alleen zeggen,
dat zoo’n kameraad als jij nog gevonden moet worden. Hè, jongens?”

„Nou en of! Zeg dat wel!” gilden de overige roover-leden dooreen.

„En,” ging Chris verder. „We hopen dan ook, dat je onze Hoofdman zult
blijven, we gaan door dik en dun met je mee. Hiep hôj voor Ambro!”

„Hiep hôj!” schreeuwden ze allen eenige malen.

„En nou de boel opschransen,” zei Chris, die vond, dat ie na zulk een
schoone rede recht op zijn aandeel had. [243]

Het was een waar feestmaal, de onvolprezen zuurballen, okkie’s, noga-

blokken, al wat het magazijn van Hazelip herbergde was aanwezig.

Toen alles op was, haalde Ambro een fijn bonbon-zakje te voorschijn,

waarin zeven rhumboonen zaten.

„Deze godendrank heb ik tot het laatste bewaard, we zullen den drank
opslurpen en met de chocolade-huls klinken op onze trouwe vriendschap.”

Plechtig reikte hij ieder een rhumboon over.

En even plechtig ging het zoete slokje naar binnen.

Toen gingen ze vlak bij elkaar staan en ze stootten aan met de eenigszins
weeke overblijfselen van de boonen.

„Lang leve de bende van Kaan, lang leve Ambro, hiep hôj!”

Toen was het feest geëindigd en gingen ze allen voldaan naar huis. [244]
[Inhoud]
 BESLUIT.

En nu ben ik aan het einde van mijn verhaal gekomen. De vacantie is

om en de jongens gaan naar de H.B.S. of Gymnasium.

Er komt nu een heel andere tijd voor ze, Ambro heeft dit zeer goed
gevoeld. Er moet stevig gewerkt worden en er kunnen geen heele
middagen meer besteed worden aan schelmenstreken.

Ik zou jullie nog heel veel van ze kunnen vertellen, misschien laat ik
ze nog wel eens als H.B.S.-sers voor jullie verschijnen.

Op dit tijdstip, dat is dus vijftien jaar na den tijd waarop ze hun
jongensstreken uithaalden, zijn ’t allen deftige mijnheertjes geworden.

Maar wacht, ik zal de film even laten draaien, net als bij het begin van
mijn boek, dan zien jullie mijn helden weer levensgroot op het doek
verschijnen.

Rrrrrrrr … zegt de motor, wacht even, hij weigert … rrrrr …

Kijk, zien jullie dien heer, deftig in het zwart met hoogen hoed op en
een portefeuille onder [245]den arm, die daar juist het Gerechtshof
verlaat.

Dat is Puckie!

Een coupeetje op luchtbanden rolt aan.

Er uit stapt een slanke jongeman.

Het is Paul, nu een zeer bekende kinder-arts met drukke praktijk.

Rrrrrrrr.…. de Rotterdamsche Beurs.

Tusschen een troepje druk pratende heeren, loopt Karel, hij is een
gezeten graanhandelaar geworden.

Nu gaan we ver weg.…. de film voert ons naar Indië.

Zie je dien heer, die daar in een langen rieten stoel in de voorgalerij
van zijn huis een fijne manilla rookt?

Dat is Wim, hij is ingenieur.

VIJFTIEN JAAR LATER

[246]

We gaan terug naar Holland. Een groot kantoor in Amsterdam.

Er zitten eenige heeren aan groote bureaux te schrijven.

Een van die heeren staat voor het raam, hij kauwt peinzend op zijn
penhouder en tuurt naar buiten.
Het is Chris, hij is candidaat-notaris.

Nu zijn we aan boord van een groot schip. Over de verschansing leunt
de eerste stuurman.

Hoe kranig staat hem zijn uniform, en hoe pienter kijken de levendige
oogen onder de stuurmans-pet uit.

Het is Piet.—Nu kan hij z’n lust tot avonturen bot vieren.

Florence.—Het is midden-zomer.

Voor een van de groote café’s op de Piazza del Duomo zit een jonge
man.

Hij heeft een schetsboek in de hand en maakt kleine krabbels van de

voorbijgangers.

Nu kijkt hij op.

Waar hebben we dit vroolijk, open gelaat meer gezien.

Halo! ’t Is Ambro. Hij is om studies te kunnen maken naar Italië

vertrokken.

Hij is onveranderd, de hoofdman van het Hol van Kaan.

Z’n oogen staan nog even overmoedig en brutaal als vroeger. Hij zal
zijn weg wel vinden door ’t leven.

Zoo—nu hebben jullie mijn helden een voor [247]een teruggezien, allen
als welgestelde burgers.

Er is niet één mislukt van het aardige jongenstroepje. En ik denk, dat

ze allen nog wel eens met weemoed terugdenken aan de heerlijke
onbezorgde dagen van
HET HOL VAN KAAN.
 Inhoudsopgave

INHOUD
I. DE BENDE UIT HET HOL VAN KAAN 1
II. „VAN M’N EIGEN VERDIENDE CENTEN.” 6
III. „TUSSCHEN HEMEL EN AARDE.” 11
IV. ’N KWARTJE ’N RAT! 18
V. EEN DROEVE DAG. 26
VI. HET „MONSTER”. 32
VII. DE GEHEIMZINNIGE MACHT. 38
VIII. NETTE MANIEREN... EN ONNETTE JONGENS. 46
IX. WIE EEN KUIL GRAAFT VOOR EEN ANDER... 58
X. EEN „DIKKE” VRIEND. 69
XI. DE KUNSTVEILING. 89
XII. DE MISLUKTE NACHT-WANDELING. 96
XIII. HET GEHEIMZINNIGE APPARAAT. 109
XIV. VAN EEN VLIEGER EN EEN MEISKE. 117
XV. KAREL’S EERSTE OPTREDEN. 127
XVI. RATTEN, KOGELFLESCHJES EN LADDERS! 141
XVII. AMBRO EN PAUL OP REIS. 160
XVIII. AMBRO REDT EEN SECTIE SOLDATEN. 170
XIX. VERRADERLIJKE ROOK! 182
XX. VAN EEN DIEFSTAL OP SCHOOL EN EEN
VUILNISBLIK ALS KOEKEPAN. 196
XXI. DE KERMIS. 213
XXII. DE KERMIS. 220
XXIII. BESLUIT. 244
 Colofon
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Metadata

Het hol van

Titel:
Kaan
Emilie
Info
Auteur: Belinfante
https://viaf.org/viaf/282449992/
(1875–1944)
Willem
Frederik Info
Illustrator:
Heskes (1891– https://viaf.org/viaf/286489399/
1973)
Aanmaakdatum 2023-11-12
bestand: 10:55:32 UTC
Nederlands
(Spelling De
Taal:
Vries-Te
Winkel)
Oorspronkelijke
1919
uitgiftedatum:

Codering
Dit boek is weergegeven in oorspronkelijke schrijfwijze. Afgebroken
woorden aan het einde van de regel zijn stilzwijgend hersteld.
Kennelijke zetfouten in het origineel zijn verbeterd. Deze
verbeteringen zijn aangegeven in de colofon aan het einde van dit
boek.

Documentgeschiedenis

2023-11-11 Begonnen.

Verbeteringen

De volgende verbeteringen zijn aangebracht in de tekst:

Bladzijde Bron Verbetering Bewerkingsafstand

1 heldinnen -heldinnen 1
5, 5, 149,
150, 150,
150, 152, societeit sociëteit 1/0
155, 159,
190
Zaterdag-
11 Zaterdagmiddag 1
middag
23, 172 „ [Verwijderd] 1
[Niet in
Passim. „ 1
bron]
42 ., „ 2
64, 68,
, . 1
203
mond-
72 mondharmonika’s 1
harmonika’s
72 direkt direct 1
76 bangert bangerd 1
77 goeïge goeiige 2/1
toeloo-
78 toeloopend 4
loopend
89 Boeker’s Boekers’ 2
 90 vernield vernielt 1
97 Bangert Bangerd 1
97 snert-krullen snert-knullen 1
kracht-
110 krachtpatser 1
patser
kwasie- kwasi-
127 1
onverschillig onverschillig
131 ” [Verwijderd] 1
138 eenigzins eenigszins 1
139 Diena Dina 1
goud-
165 goudreinetten 1
reinetten
202 onmiddelijk onmiddellijk 1
206 onmiddelijke onmiddellijke 1
222 Einkelijk Eindelijk 1
223 raakt raadt 1
239 volgde volgden 1

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Overzicht van gebruikte afkortingen.

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H.B.S. Hoogere Burger School
n.l. namelijk
O.-I. Oost-Indisch
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