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Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral
Jacques Calmet
Francisco J. Martín-Mateos (Eds.)
LNAI 8884
Artificial Intelligence
and Symbolic Computation
12th International Conference, AISC 2014
Seville, Spain, December 11–13, 2014
Proceedings
123
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 8884
Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
LNAI Series Editors

Randy Goebel
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Yuzuru Tanaka
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
Wolfgang Wahlster
DFKI and Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
LNAI Founding Series Editor

Joerg Siekmann
DFKI and Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral Jacques Calmet
Francisco J. Martín-Mateos (Eds.)
Artificial Intelligence
and Symbolic Computation
12th International Conference, AISC 2014
Seville, Spain, December 11-13, 2014
Proceedings
13
Volume Editors
Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral
University of Huelva
Department of Information Technologies
Crta. Huelva - Palos de la Frontera, s/n
21810 Palos de la Frontera, Spain
E-mail: aranda@us.es
Jacques Calmet
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Institute for Theoretical Informatics
Am Fasanengarten 5
76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
E-mail: calmet@ira.uka.de
Francisco J. Martín-Mateos
University of Seville
Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
Av. Reina Mercedes, s/n
41012 Seville, Spain
E-mail: fjesus@us.es
ISSN 0302-9743 e-ISSN 1611-3349

ISBN 978-3-319-13769-8 e-ISBN 978-3-319-13770-4
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-13770-4
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014955464
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 7 – Artificial Intelligence

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
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Preface
This volume is devoted to the proceedings of the 12th International Confer-

ence on Artificial Intelligence and Symbolic Computation (AISC 2014). This
conference was organized by the University of Seville in Spain and held during
December 11–13, 2014, in the Department of Computer Sciences and Artificial
Intelligence at the University of Seville.
AISC 2014 was the latest in the series of specialized biennial conferences
founded in 1992 by Jacques Calmet and John Campbell. Its goal was to inves-
tigate original research contributions in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI)
and symbolic computation: Originally, the conferences were called AISMC where
the letter M stood for mathematical. From 1998 on the scope became broader
than only mathematics and the M was dropped. This trend led to the confer-
ence being associated with potentially similar ones, including Calculemus and
Mathematical Knowledge Management (MKM), under the integrated federation
of the Conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics (CICM).
From the beginning, the proceedings have appeared as volumes in the LNCS
and then the LNAI series.
AISC 2014 was again independent from the CICM federation in order to
extend the scope to new domains covered by AI and symbolic computation
beyond mathematics. The goals were to bind mathematical domains such as
algebraic topology or algebraic geometry to AI, but also to link AI to domains
outside pure algorithmic computing.
The new scope thus covers domains that can be described generically as be-
longing to the mechanization and computability of AI. This covers the basic
concepts of computability and new Turing machines, logics including non-classic
ones, reasoning, learning, decision support systems but also machine intelligence
and epistemology and philosophy of symbolic mathematical computing. Theo-
retical as well as application papers were solicited.
Among the 22 submitted papers, 16 were selected. Each paper was reviewed
by three referees, either members of the Program Committee or sub-reviewers.
Acceptance was based solely on the evaluation of the referees and scores achieved.
For two accepted papers a revised version was required and refereed again by
the same reviewers who evaluated the original submission. In a third case the
revised version was rejected.
The scope of the accepted contributions does not fully cover the expected
new scope outlined for this series of conferences but illustrates nicely the trend
set for these conferences.
October 2014 Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral

Jacques Calmet
Francisco J. Martı́n-Mateos
Organization
AISC 2014, the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Sym-
bolic Computation, was held at the University of Seville, Seville, December 11-13,
2014. The Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, Univer-
sity of Seville, was responsible for the organization and local arrangements of
the conference.
Conference Direction
Conference chairs
Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral University of Huelva
Francisco J. Martı́n-Mateos University of Seville
Program Committee
Rajendra Akerkar Western Norway Research Institute, Norway
Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral University of Huelva, Spain
Serge Autexier DFKI Bremen, Germany
José Antonio Alonso-Jiménez University of Seville, Spain
Bernhard Beckert Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
Belaid Benhamou University of Aix-Marseille, France
Rudolf Berghammer Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel,
Germany
Joaquı́n Borrego-Dı́az University of Seville, Spain
Francisco Botana University of Vigo, Spain
Jacques Calmet Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
Jacques Carette McMaster University, Canada
John A. Campbell University College London, UK
Ivo Düntsch Brock University, Ontario, Canada
Marc Giusti Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France
Martin Charles Golumbic University of Haifa, Israel
Reiner Hähnle University of Darmstadt, Germany
Tetsuo Ida University of Tsukuba, Japan
David J. Jeffrey The University of Western Ontario, Canada
Deepak Kapur University of New Mexico, USA
Ilias S. Kotsireas Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Luis M. Laita Royal Academy of Sciences, Madrid, Spain
Francisco J. Martı́n-Mateos University of Seville, Spain
Javier Montero Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
VIII Organization
Manuel Ojeda-Aciego University of Malaga, Spain

Mario Jesus Pérez-Jiménez University of Seville, Spain
Tomas Recio University of Cantabria, Spain
Renaud Rioboo ENSIIE, Evry, France
Eugenio Roanes-Lozano Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Julio Rubio University of la Rioja, Spain
José-Luis Ruiz-Reina University of Seville, Spain
Fariba Sadri Imperial College, London, UK
Cristina Sernadas Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal
Tony Shaska Oakland University, USA
Volker Sorge University of Birmingham, UK
Stanley Steinberg University of New Mexico, USA
Carolyn Talcott SRI International, USA
Dongming Wang University Pierre & Marie Curie, Paris, France
Stephen M. Watt University of Western Ontario, Canada
Michael Wester University of New Mexico, USA
Wolfgang Windsteiger RISC, Johannes Kepler University Linz,
Austria
Local Arrangements
Pedro Almagro-Blanco Marı́a José Hidalgo-Doblado
José Antonio Alonso-Jiménez Jaime de Miguel
Joaquı́n Borrego-Dı́az Antonio Paredes-Moreno
Antonia Chávez-González M. Carmen Pérez-Cardona
Juan Galán-Páez José-Luis Ruiz-Reina
Additional Reviewers
Ramón Béjar Bruce Reznick
James Davenport Marie Francoise Roy
Antonio E. Flores Montoya José Javier Segura
Vladimir Klebanov Mattias Ulbrich
Pavel Pech Jing Yang
Daniel Plaumann
Table of Contents
Invited Presentations
Proving and Computing: Applying Automated Reasoning to the
Verification of Symbolic Computation Systems (Invited Talk) . . . . . . . . . . 1
José-Luis Ruiz-Reina
Combining Systems for Mathematical Creativity

(Invited Talk) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Volker Sorge
Contributed Papers
Models for Logics and Conditional Constraints in Automated Proofs of
Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Salvador Lucas and José Meseguer
Using Representation Theorems for Proving Polynomials

Non-negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Salvador Lucas
A Rule–Based Expert System for Vaginal Cytology Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . 34

Carlos Gamallo-Chicano, Eugenio Roanes-Lozano,
and Carlos Gamallo-Amat
Obtaining an ACL2 Specification from an Isabelle/HOL Theory . . . . . . . 49

Jesús Aransay-Azofra, Jose Divasón, Jónathan Heras,
Laureano Lambán, Marı́a Vico Pascual, Ángel Luis Rubio,
and Julio Rubio
A Direct Propagation Method in Singly Connected Causal Belief

Networks with Conditional Distributions for all Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Oumaima Boussarsar, Imen Boukhris, and Zied Elouedi
From Declarative Set Constraint Models to “Good” SAT Instances . . . . . 76

Frédéric Lardeux and Eric Monfroy
A Mathematical Hierarchy of Sudoku Puzzles and Its Computation by

Boolean Gröbner Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Shutaro Inoue and Yosuke Sato
A Simple GUI for Developing Applications That Use Mathematical

Software Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Eugenio Roanes-Lozano and Antonio Hernando
X Table of Contents
Conformant Planning as a Case Study of Incremental QBF Solving . . . . . 120

Uwe Egly, Martin Kronegger, Florian Lonsing, and Andreas Pfandler
Dynamic Symmetry Breaking in Itemset Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Belaı̈d Benhamou
A Distance-Based Decision in the Credal Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Amira Essaid, Arnaud Martin, Grégory Smits,
and Boutheina Ben Yaghlane
Multivalued Elementary Functions in Computer-Algebra Systems . . . . . . 157

David J. Jeffrey
Rational Conchoid and Offset Constructions: Algorithms and

Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Juana Sendra, David Gómez, and Valerio Morán
Algorithmic Aspects of Theory Blending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Maricarmen Martinez, Ulf Krumnack, Alan Smaill,
Tarek Richard Besold, Ahmed M.H. Abdel-Fattah,
Martin Schmidt, Helmar Gust, Kai-Uwe Kühnberger, Markus Guhe,
and Alison Pease
Decomposition of Some Jacobian Varieties of Dimension 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Lubjana Beshaj and Tony Shaska
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Proving and Computing: Applying
Automated Reasoning to the Verification
of Symbolic Computation Systems (Invited Talk)
José-Luis Ruiz-Reina
Computational Logic Group

Dept. of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, University of Seville
E.T.S.I. Informática, Avda. Reina Mercedes, s/n. 41012 Sevilla, Spain
jruiz@us.es
Abstract. The application of automated reasoning to the formal veri-

fication of symbolic computation systems is motivated by the need of
ensuring the correctness of the results computed by the system, beyond
the classical approach of testing. Formal verification of properties of the
implemented algorithms require not only to formalize the properties of
the algorithm, but also of the underlying (usually rich) mathematical
theory.
We show how we can use ACL2, a first-order interactive theorem
prover, to reason about properties of algorithms that are typically im-
plemented as part of symbolic computation systems. We emphasize two
aspects. First, how we can override the apparent lack of expressiveness we
have using a first-order approach (at least compared to higher-order lo-
gics). Second, how we can execute the algorithms (efficiently, if possible)
in the same setting where we formally reason about their correctness.
Three examples of formal verification of symbolic computation algo-
rithms are presented to illustrate the main issues one has to face in this
task: a Gröbner basis algorithm, a first-order unification algorithm based
on directed acyclic graphs, and the Eilenberg-Zilber algorithm, one of
the central components of a symbolic computation system in algebraic
topology.
1 Introduction
Formal verification of the correctness properties of computing systems is one of
the main applications of mechanized reasoning. This is applied in any situation
where correctness is so important that one has to verify the system beyond the
classical approach of testing. For example, safety critical systems or those where
failures may produce high economic losses (these include hardware, micropro-
cessors, microcode and software systems or, more precisely, models of them).
In these cases, to increase confidence in the system, a theorem stating its main
properties is mechanically proved using a theorem prover.
Symbolic computation systems are software systems, so this idea can be ap-
plied to formally verify the correctness of the algorithms implemented in them.
G.A. Aranda-Corral et al. (Eds.): AISC 2014, LNAI 8884, pp. 1–6, 2014.

c Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
2 J.-L. Ruiz-Reina
Since in this case they are usually based on a rich mathematical theory, formal
verification require not only to formalize the properties of the algorithms, but
also of the underlying theory. Another important aspect to take into account is
that the models implemented have to be executable and, if possible, efficient.
ACL2 [7,8] is a theorem prover that uses a first-order logic to reason about
properties of programs written in an applicative programming language. It has
been successfully applied in a number of industrial–strength verification projects
[7]. In this talk, we argue that it can be also applied to the verification of symbolic
computation systems. We emphasize two aspects. First, how we deal with the
apparent lack of expressiveness of a first–order logic (at least compared to higher-
order logics). Second, how we can execute the algorithms modeled (efficiently, if
possible) in a setting where we also formally reason about them.
We illustrate the main issues one has to deal with when facing this task, by
means of three examples. First, Buchberger algorithm for computing a Gröbner
basis of a given polynomial ideal. Second, an algorithm, based on directed acyclic
graphs, for computing most general unifiers of two given first-order terms. Finally
the Eilenberg-Zilber theorem, a central theorem in algebraic topology.
2 The ACL2 System
ACL2 is both a programming language, a logic for reasoning about programs

in the language and a theorem prover to assist in the development of proofs of
theorems in the logic.
As a programming language, ACL2 is an extension of an applicative subset of
Common Lisp. This means that it contains none of Common Lisp that involve
side effects like global variables or destructive updates. In this way, functions in
the programming language behave as functions in mathematics, and thus one
can reason about them using a first-order logic.
The ACL2 logic is a quantifier-free, first-order logic with equality. The logic
includes axioms for propositional logic and for a number of Lisp functions and
data types, describing the programming language. Rules of inference of the logic
include those for propositional calculus, equality and instantiation. But maybe
the main rule of inference is the principle of induction, that permits proofs
by well-founded induction on the ordinal ε0 . This include induction on natural
numbers and structural induction.
From the logical point of view, ACL2 functions are total, in the sense that they
are defined on every input, even if it is not an intended input. By the principle
of definition, new function definitions are admitted as definitional axioms only if
there exists a measure in which the arguments of each recursive call decrease with
respect to a well-founded relation, ensuring in this way that no inconsistencies
are introduced by new definitions.
The ACL2 theorem prover mechanizes that logic, being particularly well suited
for obtaining mechanized proofs based on simplification and induction. ACL2 is
automatic in the sense that once a conjecture is submitted to the prover, the
attempt is carried out without interaction with the user. But for non-elementary
Proving and Computing 3
results, is often the case that the prover fails to find a proof in its first attempt.
Thus, we can say that ACL2 is interactive in the sense that the role of the user is
essential for a successful use of the prover: usually, she has to provide a number
of definition and lemmas (what is called the logical world) that the system will
use as simplification (rewrite) rules. The proper definitions and lemmas needed
for the proof are obtained first from a preconceived hand proof, but also from
inspection of failed proof attempts.
3 Gröbner Basis Computation

In [13], a formal verification of a Common Lisp implementation of Buchberger’s
algorithm [4] for computing Gröbner bases of polynomial ideals is presented.
This needed to formalize a number of previous mathematical theories, including
results about coefficient fields, polynomial rings and ideals, abstract reductions,
polynomial reductions, ordinal measures and of course Gröbner bases. All these
notions fit quite well in the first–order ACL2 logic.
It is worth mentioning that this formal project benefited from previous works
done in the system. In particular, an ACL2 theory about term rewriting sys-
tems had been previously developed [14]. It turns out that the notions of critical
pair and of complete rewrite system [2] are closely related to the notions of s-
polynomial and Gröbner basis, respectively. In fact, some of the results needed
in both formalizations are concrete instances of general results about abstract
reductions. Thus, once proved the abstract results, they can applied in any con-
crete context. Encapsulation and functional instantiation [9] in ACL2 are a good
abstraction mechanism that provides some kind of second–order reasoning in
this first–order logic, allowing to reuse previous general results in a convenient
way.
Another key concept in this formalization is the notion of polynomial proof. In
this context, a polynomial ideal basis is seen as a rewriting system that reduces
polynomial in some sense, generalizing the notion of polynomial division. In [13],
the concept of polynomial proof is introduced, as a data structure the contains
explicitly all the components of a sequence of polynomial reductions. It turns
out that the correctness properties of the Buchberger algorithm can be described
as properties of certain functions that transform polynomial proofs.
4 A Dag–Based Quadratic Unification Algorithm

A unification algorithm [1] receives as input a pair of first-order terms and re-
turns, whenever it exists, a most general substitution of its variables for terms,
such that when applied to both terms, they become equal. Unification is a key
component in automated reasoning and in logic programming, for example.
A naive implementation of unification may have exponential complexity in
worst cases. Nevertheless, using more sophisticated data structures and algo-
rithms, it is possible to implement unification quadratic in time and linear in
space complexity. In [15], the ACL2 implementation and formal verification of
4 J.-L. Ruiz-Reina
such an efficient algorithm is reported. The key idea is to use a data structure
based on directed acyclic graphs (dags), which allows structure sharing. This
implementation can be executed in ACL2 at a speed comparable to a similar C
implementation, but in addition its correctness properties are formally verified.
Two main issues where encountered in this formalization project:
• For the execution efficiency of the implementation, it is fundamental that

the substitution computed by the algorithm is built by iteratively applying
destructive updates to the dag representing the terms to unify. In principle,
as said before, ACL2 is an applicative programming language, so destructive
updates are not allowed. Nevertheless, ACL2 provides single-threaded objects
(stobjs) [3], which are data structures with a syntactically restricted use, so
that only one instance of the object needs ever exist. This means that when
executing an algorithm that uses a stobj, its fields can be updated by destruc-
tive assignments, while maintaining the applicative semantics for reasoning
about it. In this case, using a stobj to store the input terms as a dag (imple-
menting structure sharing by means of pointers), allows to clearly separate
reasoning about the logic of the unification process (which is independent
of how terms are represented) from the details related to the efficient data
structures used.
• In ACL2, functions are total, and before being admitted in the logic, their
termination for every possible input has to be proved. Thus, in principle,
this unification algorithm cannot be defined in the ACL2 logic, because a
possible input could be, for example, a stobj storing a cyclic graph, which
could lead the algorithm to a non-terminating execution. Nevertheless, we
know that the intended inputs to the algorithm will always be an acyclic
graph and that for those intended inputs, it can be proved that the algo-
rithm terminates. Thus, to accept the definition of the algorithm in the logic,
we need to introduce in its logical definition a condition checking that the
structure stored in the stobj is acyclic and that it represents well-formed
terms. Nevertheless, from the efficiency point of view this is unacceptable,
since this expensive check would be evaluated in every iteration of the algo-
rithm. Fortunately, the combination of the defexec feature [6], together with
the guard verification mechanism allows to safely skip this expensive check
when executing, provided that the function has received a well-formed input
and taking into account that it is previously proved that in every iteration
the well-formedness condition is preserved.
5 The Eilenberg-Zilber Theorem
The Eilenberg–Zilber theorem [12] is a fundamental theorem in Simplicial Alge-

braic Topology, establishing a bridge between a geometrical concept (cartesian
product) and a algebraic concept (tensor product). Concretely, it states homo-
logical equivalence between the cartesian product and the tensor product of two
chain complexes. The Eilenberg-Zilber theorem, expressed as a reduction, has a
Proving and Computing 5
correspondent algorithm that it is a central component of the computer algebra

system Kenzo [5], devoted to computing in Algebraic Topology.
Since Kenzo is implemented in Common Lisp, it seems that ACL2 is a good
choice to verify some of its components, as it is in this case of the Eilenberg-Zilber
algorithm. Although Kenzo is far from being implemented using only applicative
features, we can formally verify an ACL2 version of the algorithm, and use it as
a verified checker for the results obtained using Kenzo.
In [11], it is reported a complete ACL2 formal proof of the Eilenberg-Zilber
theorem. In fact, the formalization presented was developed reusing part of a
previous formal proof of a normalization theorem needed as a preprocessor jus-
tifying the way Kenzo works [10].
The formal proof of the Eilenberg-Zilber theorem is not trivial at all. The first
issue encountered was that the existing (informal) proofs were not suitable for
being formalized in a first–order logic, so a new informal proof had to be carried
out by hand, and then formalized in ACL2. In this proof, the key component is a
new structure called simplicial polynomial, which represent linear combinations
of composition of simplicial operators. Although those linear combinations of
functions are in principle second–order objects, it turns out that they can be
represented as a first-order object. Moreover, the set of simplicial polynomials,
together with addition and composition operations, has a ring structure. It turns
out that the new proof developed is carried out mainly by establishing a number
of lemmas that, although being non-trivial, can be proved by induction and
simplification using the ring properties and the properties given by the simplicial
identities (the identities that define simplicial sets). Induction and simplification
is the kind of reasoning that is suitable for the ACL2 theorem prover.
References
1. Baader, F., Snyder, W.: Unification Theory. In: Handbook of Automated

Reasoning. Elsevier Science Publishers (2001)
2. Baader, F., Nipkow, T.: Term Rewriting and All That. Cambridge University Press
(1998)
3. Boyer, R., Moore, J S.: Single-Threaded objects in ACL2 (1999),
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/moore/publications/stobj/main.pdf
4. Buchberger, B.: Bruno Buchberger’s PhD thesis 1965: An algorithm for finding
the basis elements of the residue class ring of a zero dimensional polynomial ideal.
Journal of Symbolic Computation 41(3-4), 475–511 (2006)
5. Dousson, X., Rubio, J., Sergeraert, F., Siret, Y.: The Kenzo Program, Institut
Fourier (1999), http://www-fourier.ujf-grenoble.fr/~ sergerar/Kenzo/
6. Greve, D., Kaufmann, M., Manolios, P., Moore, J S., Ray, S., Ruiz-Reina, J.-L.,
Sumners, R., Vroon, D., Wilding, M.: Efficient execution in an automated reasoning
environment. Journal of Functional Programming 1, 15–46 (2008)
7. Kaufmann, M., Moore, J S.: ACL2 home page. University of Texas at Austin
(2014), http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/moore/acl2
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Approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000)
6 J.-L. Ruiz-Reina
9. Kaufmann, M., Moore, J S.: Structured Theory Development for a Mechanized

Logic. Journal of Automated Reasoning 26(2), 161–203 (2001)
10. Lambán, L., Martı́n-Mateos, F.-J., Rubio, J., Ruiz-Reina, J.-L.: Formalization of a
normalization theorem in simplicial topology. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence 64, 1–37 (2012)
11. Lambán, L., Martı́n-Mateos, F.-J., Rubio, J., Ruiz-Reina, J.-L.: Verifying the
bridge between simplicial topology and algebra: the Eilenberg-Zilber algorithm.
Logic Journal of the IGPL 22(1), 39–65 (2014)
12. May, J.P.: Simplicial objects in Algebraic Topology. Van Nostrand (1967)
13. Medina–Bulo, I., Palomo–Lozano, F., Ruiz–Reina, J.-L.: A verified Common Lisp
implementation of Buchberger’s algorithm in ACL2. Journal of Symbolic Compu-
tation 45(1), 96–123 (2010)
14. Ruiz-Reina, J.L., Alonso, J.A., Hidalgo, M.J., Martı́n-Mateos, F.J.: Formal proofs
about rewriting using ACL2. Ann. Math. and Artificial Intelligence 36(3), 239–262
(2002)
15. Ruiz-Reina, J.-L., Alonso, J.-A., Hidalgo, M.-J., Martı́n-Mateos, F.J.: Formal cor-
rectness of a quadratic unification algorithm. Journal of Automated Reasoning
37(1-2), 67–92 (2006)
Combining Systems for Mathematical Creativity
(Invited Talk)
Volker Sorge
School of Computer Science

University of Birmingham
V.Sorge@cs.bham.ac.uk
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~ vxs
Abstract. We present work on the generation of novel mathematical

results by means of integrating heterogeneous reasoning systems.
The combination of reasoning systems has become quite routine in recent

years. Most integrations are of a bilateral nature, where one reasoning system
draws on the strength of another by incorporating results, delegating subtasks or
replaying proofs. This is mostly aimed at supporting standard theorem proving
tasks, such as software or hardware verification or the formalisation of existing
mathematics.
In this talk we highlight some of our work over the last decade that follows a
different approach at system combination: Systems are only loosely integrated
and collaboratively perform creative mathematical tasks leading to novel, non-
trivial results and theorems. We present a number of techniques developed in
the context of problems that are intractable for humans due to large numbers
of cases that need to be considered. We describe
– embedding of machine learning into automated theorem proving technology
to learn invariants that can uniquely distinguish algebraic entities [5,6],
– the generation of classification theorems in finite algebra both of a quanti-
tative and qualitative nature, i.e., by enumerating equivalence classes and
unambiguously describing their elements, using combinations of automated
reasoning, SAT solving, machine learning and computer algebra [4,2,7,3],
– and the application of these technologies to support human reasoning for
solving problems via infinite case analyses in topology [1].
The work demonstrates not only how the combination of systems can lead to
reasoning technology that is more powerful than the sum of its parts, but also
that a lightweight approach to combination allows the integration of a plethora of
different systems that can efficiently obtain novel mathematical results without
foregoing correctness. It also emphasises that the computational component is
not a purely ancillary means to achieve a mathematical end, but that there can be
a symbiotic relationship, in that the mathematical endeavour leads to advances in
automated reasoning technology, while the need to push the scope of automation
further can lead to novel mathematical techniques that are interesting results in
their own right.

8 V. Sorge
References
1. Al-Hassani, O., Mahesar, Q.A., Coen, C.S., Sorge, V.: A Term Rewriting System for
Kuratowski’s Closure-Complement Problem. In: Proceedings of RTA 2012. Leibniz
International Proceedings in Informatics, vol. 15. Schloss Dagstuhl (2012)
2. Colton, S., Meier, A., Sorge, V., McCasland, R.: Automatic Generation of Classifi-
cation Theorems for Finite Algebras. In: Basin, D., Rusinowitch, M. (eds.) IJCAR
2004. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3097, pp. 400–414. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
3. Distler, A., Shah, M., Sorge, V.: Enumeration of AG-Groupoids. In: Davenport,
J.H., Farmer, W.M., Urban, J., Rabe, F. (eds.) Calculemus/MKM 2011. LNCS,
vol. 6824, pp. 1–14. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
4. Meier, A., Pollet, M., Sorge, V.: Comparing Approaches to the Exploration of the
Domain of Residue Classes. Journal of Symbolic Computation 34(4), 287–306 (2002)
5. Meier, A., Sorge, V., Colton, S.: Employing Theory Formation to Guide Proof Plan-
ning. In: Calmet, J., Benhamou, B., Caprotti, O., Hénocque, L., Sorge, V. (eds.)
AISC-Calculemus 2002. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 2385, pp. 275–289. Springer, Heidelberg
(2002)
6. Sorge, V., Meier, A., McCasland, R., Colton, S.: Automatic Construction and Ver-
ification of Isotopy Invariants. Journal of Automated Reasoning 40(2-3), 221–243
(2008)
7. Sorge, V., Meier, A., McCasland, R., Colton, S.: Classification Results in Quasi-
group and Loop Theory via a Combination of Automated Reasoning Tools. Comm.
Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae 49(2-3), 319–340 (2008)
Models for Logics and Conditional Constraints
in Automated Proofs of Termination
Salvador Lucas1,2 and José Meseguer2

1
DSIC, Universitat Politècnica de València, Spain
2
CS Dept. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
Abstract. Reasoning about termination of declarative programs, which

are described by means of a computational logic, requires the definition of
appropriate abstractions as semantic models of the logic, and also han-
dling the conditional constraints which are often obtained. The formal
treatment of such constraints in automated proofs, often using numeric
interpretations and (arithmetic) constraint solving, can greatly benefit
from appropriate techniques to deal with the conditional (in)equations at
stake. Existing results from linear algebra or real algebraic geometry are
useful to deal with them but have received only scant attention to date.
We investigate the definition and use of numeric models for logics and
the resolution of linear and algebraic conditional constraints as unifying
techniques for proving termination of declarative programs.
Keywords: Conditional constraints, program analysis, termination.
1 Introduction
The operational semantics of sophisticated rule-based programming languages
such as CafeOBJ [7], Maude [3], or Haskell [8] is often formalized in a proof-
theoretic style by means of a computational logic, and the corresponding lan-
guage interpreters better understood as inference machines [15]. The notion of
operational termination [11] was introduced to give an account of the termina-
tion behavior of programs of such languages [12]. An interpreter for a logic L
(for instance the logic for Conditional Term Rewriting Systems (CTRSs) with
inference system in Figure 1) is an inference machine that, given a theory S
(e.g., the CTRS R in Example 1) and a goal formula ϕ (e.g., a one-step rewrit-
ing s → t for terms s and t) tries to incrementally build a proof tree for ϕ by
using (instances of) the inference rules B1 ,...,B
A
n
∈ I(L) of the inference system
I(L) of L. Then, S is operationally terminating if for any ϕ the interpreter ei-
ther finds a proof, or fails in all possible attempts (always in finite time). In this
setting, practical methods for proving operational termination involve two main
issues (see [13] and also [17] for CTRSs): (1) the simulation of the (one-step)
rewrite relations → and →∗ associated to a CTRS R and defined by means of the
inference system in Figure 1; and (2) the use of (automatically generated) well-
founded relations to abstract rewrite computations and guarantee the absence

Developed during a sabbatical year at UIUC. Supported by projects NSF CNS
13-19109, MINECO TIN2010-21062-C02-02 and TIN 2013-45732-C4-1-P, and GV
BEST/2014/026 and PROMETEO/2011/052.

10 S. Lucas and J. Meseguer
si → ti
(Refl) t →∗ t (Cong) f (s1 , . . . , si , . . . , sk ) → f (s1 , . . . , ti , . . . , sk )
for all k-ary symbols f and 1 ≤ i ≤ k
s→u u →∗ t s1 →∗ t1 . . . sn →∗ tn
∗
(Tran) s→ t (Repl) →r
for each rule → r ⇐ s1 → t1 · · · sn → tn
Fig. 1. Inference rules for the CTRS logic (all variables are universally quantified)
of infinite ones. Here, (1) amounts at dealing with abstractions for sentences like
∀x(B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn ⇒ A) which simulate the use of the aforementioned inference
rules; and (2) often involves the comparison of expressions s and t using , pro-
vided that a number of semantic conditions (e.g., rewriting steps si →∗R ti for
some terms si and ti ) hold. Abstractions can be formalized as semantic models
M = (D, FD , ΠD ) of L (see Section 2), where D is a domain and FD and ΠD are
interpretations of the function symbols F and predicates Π of L, respectively.
For instance, relations → and →∗ (which are predicates in the corresponding
logic) are typically interpreted as orderings on D, often a numeric domain like N
or [0, +∞). In this paper we introduce the idea of using conditional expressions
to restrict such domains in logical models (Section 3). This is often useful.
Example 1. Consider the following CTRS R:

or(0, x) → x (1) or(not(x), x) → 1 (6) and(x, not(x)) → 0 (11)
or(x, 0) → x (2) and(0, x) → 0 (7) and(not(x), x) → 0 (12)
or(1, x) → 1 (3) and(x, 0) → 0 (8) not(1) → 0 (13)
or(x, 1) → 1 (4) and(1, x) → x (9) not(0) → 1 (14)
or(x, not(x)) → 1 (5) and(x, 1) → x (10)
implies(x, y) → 1 ⇐ not(x) → 1 (15)
implies(x, y) → 1 ⇐ y → 1 (16)
implies(x, y) → 0 ⇐ x → 1, y → 0 (17)
f (x) → f (0) ⇐ implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0) → 1 (18)
We failed to prove operational termination of R by using the ordering-based

techniques introduced in [13] and also with the more advanced techniques in
[14]. However, below we provide a very simple proof of operational termination
based on the use (within [13]!) of a bounded domain [0, 1] which can be easily
implemented by using conditional constraints.
As an interesting specialization of this general idea, Section 4 introduces convex
matrix interpretations as a new, twofold extension of the framework introduced
by Endrullis et al. [5] for TRSs, where rather than using vectors x of natural num-
bers (or non-negative numbers, as in [2]), we use convex sets satisfying a matrix
inequality Ax ≥ b. Section 5 discusses existing approaches to deal with the ob-
tained numeric conditional constraints: Farkas’ Lemma and results from Algebraic
Geometry. Section 6 compares with related work. Section 7 concludes.
Models for Logics and Conditional Constraints in Automated Proofs 11
2 Models of Logics for Proofs of Termination

In this paper, X denotes a set of variables and F denotes a signature: a set of
function symbols {f, g, . . .}, each with a fixed arity given by a mapping ar : F →
N. The set of terms built from F and X is T (F , X ). A CTRS R = (F , R) consist
of a signature F and a set R of rules → r ⇐ s1 → t1 , · · · , sn → tn , where
l, r, s1 , t1 , · · · , sn , tn ∈ T (F , X ). For s, t ∈ T (F , X ), we write s →R t (s →∗R t)
if there is a proof for s → t (s →∗ t) with the inference system in Figure 1.
Given a (first order) logic signature Σ = (F , Π) where F is a signature of
function symbols and Π is a signature of predicate symbols, the formulas ϕ of a
(first order) logic L over Σ are built up from atoms P (t1 , . . . , tk ) with P ∈ Π
and t1 , . . . , tk ∈ T (F , X ), logic connectives (e.g., ∧, ¬, ⇒) and quantifiers (∀, ∃)
in the usual way; Form Σ is the set of such formulas. A theory S of L is a set
of formulas, S ⊆ Form Σ , and its theorems are the formulas ϕ ∈ Form Σ for
which we can derive a proof using the inference system I(L) of L in the usual
way (written S ϕ). Given a logic L describing computations in a (declarative)
programming language, programs are viewed as theories S of L.
Example 2. In the logic of CTRSs, with binary predicates → and →∗ , the theory
for a CTRS R = (F , R) is obtained from the inference rules in Figure 1 after
specializing them as (Cong)f,i for each f ∈ F and i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ar(f ) and (Repl )ρ
for all ρ : → r ⇐ c ∈ R. Then, inference rules B1 ,...,B
A
n
become implications
B1 ∧· · ·∧Bn ⇒ A. For instance, for (Tran), (Cong )not , (Repl )(1) , and (Repl )(15) :
∀s, t, u (s → u ∧ u →∗ t ⇒ s →∗ t) (19)
∀s, t (s → t ⇒ not(s) → not(t)) (20)
∀x (or(0, x) → x) (21)
∀x, y (not(x) →∗ 1 ⇒ implies(x, y) → 1) (22)
For analysis and verification purposes we often need to abstract L into a numeric
setting (e.g., arithmetics, linear algebra, or algebraic geometry) where appropri-
ate techniques are available to prove properties of interest. This amounts at
giving a (numeric) model of L that satisfies S.
An F -algebra is a pair A = (D, FD ), where D is a set and FD is a set of
mappings fA : Dk → D for each f ∈ F where k = ar(f ). A Σ-model is a triple
M = (D, FD , ΠD ) where (D, FD ) is an F -algebra, and for each k-ary P ∈ Π,
PM ∈ ΠD is a k-ary relation PM ⊆ Dk . Given a valuation mapping α : X → D,
the evaluation mapping [ ]A M
α : T (F , X ) → D (also [ ]α if A is part of M) is the
M
unique homomorphism extending α. Finally, [ ]α : FormΣ → Bool is given by:
1. [P (t1 , . . . , tk )]M M M
α = true if and only if ([t1 ]α , . . . , [tk ]α ) ∈ PA ;
M M M
2. [ϕ ∧ ψ]α = true if and only if [ϕ]α = true and [ψ]α = true;
3. [ϕ ⇒ ψ]M M
α = true if and only if [ϕ]α = false or [ψ]α = true;
M
4. [¬ϕ]Mα = true if and only if [ϕ] M

α = false;
5. [∃x ϕ]M M
α = true if and only if there is a ∈ D such that [ϕ]α[x→a] = true;
M M
6. [∀x ϕ]α = true if and only if for all a ∈ D, [ϕ]α[x→a] = true;
We say that M satisfies ϕ ∈ Form Σ if there is α ∈ X → D such that [ϕ]M α = true.

If [ϕ]M
α = true for all valuations α, we write M |= ϕ. A closed formula, i.e., a
formula whose variables are all universally or existentially quantified, is called a
sentence. We say that M is a model of a set of sentences S ⊆ Form Σ (written
M |= S) if for all ϕ ∈ S, M |= ϕ. And, given a sentence ϕ, we write S |= ϕ if
and only if for all models M of S, M |= ϕ. Sound logics guarantee that every
provable sentence ϕ is true in every model of S, i.e., S ϕ implies S |= ϕ.
In practice, F -algebras A can be obtained if we first consider a new set of
terms T (G, X ) where the new symbols g ∈ G have ‘intended’ (often arithmetic)
interpretations over an (arithmetic) domain D as mappings g from D into D. The
use of the same name for the syntactic and semantic objects stresses that they
have an intended meaning. We associate an expression ef ∈ T (G, {x1 , . . . , xk }) to
each k-ary symbol f ∈ F , where x1 , . . . , xk ∈ X are different variables: we write
[f ](x1 , . . . , xk ) = ef ; and homomorphically extend it to [ ] : T (F , X ) → T (G, X ).
Then, for all a1 , . . . , ak ∈ D, we let fA (a1 , . . . , ak ) = [ef ]αa , for αa given by
αa (xi ) = ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Example 3. For R in Example 1, F = {0, 1, or, and, not, implies, f}, where
ar(0) = ar(1) = 0, ar(f) = 1, and ar(or) = ar(and) = ar(implies) = 2. Let
G = {0, 1, max, min, − } with ar(0) = ar(1) = 0 and ar(max) = ar(min) =
ar( − ) = 2. We define an F -algebra over the reals R as follows:
[0] = 0 [and](x, y) = min(x, y) [or](x, y) = max(x, y) [f](x) = 0
[1] = 1 [not](x) = 1 − x [implies](x, y) = max(1 − x, y)
We define a model M = (D, FD , ΠD ) if each P ∈ Π is interpreted as a predicate
PM ∈ ΠD , and each ϕ ∈ Form Σ as a formula ϕM , where ϕM = PM ([t1 ], . . . , [tk ])
if ϕ = P (t1 , . . . , tk ); ϕM = ϕM ⊕ ψA if ϕ = χ ⊕ ψ for ⊕ ∈ {∧, ⇒} and ϕM =
χM if ϕ = χ for ∈ {¬, ∀, ∃}. The goal is proving that M |= S holds.
Example 4. We can interpret both → and →∗ as ‘=’ (intended to be the equality
among real numbers). Then, the sentences in Example 2 become
∀s, t, u ∈ R (s = u ∧ u = t ⇒ s = t) (23)
∀s, t ∈ R (s = t ⇒ 1 − s = 1 − t) (24)
∀x ∈ R (max(0, x) = x) (25)
∀x, y ∈ R (1 − x = 1 ⇒ max(1 − x, y) = 1) (26)
Unfortunately, (25) and (26) do not hold in the intended model due to the (big)
algebraic domain R. For instance, max(0, −1) = 0 = −1, i.e., (25) is not true.
Example 4 shows that the appropriate definition of the domain of a model is
crucial to satisfy a set of formulas. The next section investigates this problem.
3 Domains for Algebras and Models Revisited

In proofs of termination, domains D for numeric F -algebras A usually are infinite
(subsets of) n-dimensional open intervals which are bounded from below: Nn or
[0, +∞)n for some n ≥ 1. Furthermore, considered orderings often make the
corresponding ordered sets total (like [0, +∞) ordered by ≥R ), or nontotal but
with subsets B ⊆ D bounded by some value xB ∈ D (like [0, +∞)n ordered
by the pointwise extension of the usual ordering ≥R over the reals, which is a
complete lattice). More general domains can be often useful, though.
Example 5. (Continuing Example 4) Although (23) and (24) always hold
(under the intended interpretation of ‘=’ as the equality), satisfiability of other
sentences may depend on the considered domain of values: if D = [0, 1], then
(25) and (26) hold; if D = N, then only (25) holds. The use of D = [0, 1] can be
made explicit in (25) and (26) by adding further constraints:
∀x ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ⇒ max(0, x) = x) (27)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ⇒ max(1 − x, y) = 1) (28)
Thus, we need to deal with conditional constraints for using such more general
domains. Also to handle max expressions [6,16].
Example 6. We can expand the definition of max in (27) and (28) into:
∀x ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ 0 ≥ x ⇒ 0 = x) (29)
∀x ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ x ≥ 0 ⇒ x = x) (30)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ∧ 1 − x ≥ y ⇒ 1 − x = 1) (31)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ∧ y > 1 − x ⇒ y = 1) (32)
where (30) clearly holds true and we do not longer care about it.
3.1 Conditional Domains for Term Algebras and Models

Given a set D and a predicate χ over D, we let Dχ = {x ∈ D | χ(x)} be the
restriction of D by χ. An F -algebra A = (D, FD ) yields a restricted F -algebra
Aχ = (Dχ , FDχ ), where for each f ∈ F, fAχ is the restriction of fA to Dkχ , if for
all k-ary symbols f ∈ F , this algebraicity or closedness condition holds:
⎛⎛ ⎞ ⎞

∀x1 , . . . , xk ⎝⎝ χ(xi )⎠ ⇒ χ(fA (x1 , . . . , xk ))⎠ (33)
i≤i≤k
guaranteeing that if fA is given inputs in Dχ , the outcome belongs to Dχ as well.
Remark 1. Algebraicity is a standard requirement for algebraic interpretations.

Most times, however, the imposition of simple requirements on the shape of the
numeric expressions ef used to define fA (see Section 2) makes this task easy
and often avoids any checking. A well-known example is taking D = [0, +∞)
and requiring ef to be a polynomial whose coefficients are all non-negative.
The relations PM ⊆ Dk interpreting k-ary predicates P ∈ Π can be restricted
to PMχ = PM ∩ Dkχ to yield a new interpretation of P in Mχ = (Dχ , FDχ , ΠDχ ).
For practical purposes, in this paper we only consider simple restrictions of F -
algebras and models, where D is obtained as the solution of linear constraints.
Definition 1 (Convex Polytopic Domain). Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n , and

b ∈ Rm , the set of solutions of the inequality Ax ≥ b is a convex polytope
D(A, b) = {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≥ b}. We call D(A, b) a convex polytopic domain.
Example 7. For A = (−1, 1)T and b = (−1, 0), we have D(A, b) = [0, 1]. If
A = (1) and b = (0), then D(A, b) = [0, +∞).
Example 8. Continuing Example 3, we obtain an F -algebra A[0,1] =
([0, 1], F[0,1]) as the restriction to [0, 1] of the F -algebra over R defined there.
The constraints (25) and (26) are written in the restricted model as follows
∀x ∈ [0, 1] (max(0, x) = x) (34)
∀x, y ∈ [0, 1] (1 − x = 1 ⇒ max(1 − x, y) = 1) (35)
After encoding memberships like x ∈ [0, 1] as inequalities x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x and
expanding the definition of max, we obtain (29) − (32).
In sharp contrast with Example 4, restricting the model at hand to [0, 1] leads to
a model for R in Example 1 which is useful to prove its operational termination.
Example 9. According to [13], R in Example 1 is operationally terminat-

ing if there is a relation on terms such that →∗ ⊆ , and a well-
founded ordering satisfying ◦ ⊆ such that, for all substitutions σ, if
σ(implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0)) →∗R σ(1) holds, then σ(F(x)) σ(F(0)) for
the rule (dependency pair 1 ) F(x) → F(0) ⇐ implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0) →

1 (where F is a fresh symbol). Let M = ([0, 1], F[0,1] , Π[0,1] ) where F = F ∪{F },

F[0,1] is F[0,1] as in Example 8 extended with [F](x) = x, and Π[0,1] given by
→[0,1] =→∗[0,1] = (=[0,1] ) (i.e., the equality on [0, 1]). M is a model of R; by sound-
ness, if s →∗ t holds for s, t ∈ T (F , X ), we have [s] =[0,1] [t]. Let be as follows:
for all s, t ∈ T (F , X ), s t holds if and only if [s] =[0,1] [t]. Then, →∗ ⊆ , as
desired.
Now, consider the ordering >1 over R given by x >1 y if and only if x − y ≥ 1;
it is a well-founded relation on [0, 1] (see [10]). We let be the (well-founded)
relation on T (F , X ) induced by >1 as before. Again, for all substitutions σ, if
σ(implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0)) →∗R σ(1) holds, then, by soundness,
[σ(implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0))] =[0,1] [σ(1)] (36)
holds as well. We also have
∀x ∈ [0, 1]([implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0)] =[0,1] [1] ⇒ [F(x)] >1 [F(0)]) (37)
because, for all x ≥ 0,
[implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0)] = max(1 − max(1 − x, max(1 − x, 0)), 0)
= max(1 − max(1 − x, 1 − x), 0)
= max(1 − (1 − x), 0)
= max(x, 0)
=x
1
For the purpose of this paper, the procedure to obtain this new rule is not relevant.
The interested reader can find the details in [13].
and hence [implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0)] =[0,1] [1] holds only if x = 1 =
[1]. Combining (36) and (37), we conclude that, for all substitutions σ, if
σ(implies(implies(x, implies(x, 0)), 0)) →∗R σ(1) holds, then [F(x)]M = 1 >1 0 =
[F(0)]M , as desired. This proves operational termination of R in Example 1.
In the following section we discuss an interesting application of convex poly-
topic domains to improve the well-known matrix interpretations [5,2].
4 Convex Matrix Interpretations

A convex matrix intepretation for a k-ary symbol f is a linear expression F1 x1 +
· · · + Fk xk + F0 , where F1 , . . . , Fk ∈ Rn×n are (square) matrices, F0 ∈ Rn and
x1 , . . . , xk ∈ Rn , which is closed on D(A, b), i.e., that satisfies
k

∀x1 , . . . xk ∈ R n
Axi ≥ b ⇒ A(F1 x1 + · · · + Fk xk + F0 ) ≥ b (38)
i=1
An F -algebra A = (D, FD ) is obtained if D = D(A, b), and each k-ary symbol

f ∈ F is given fA (x1 , . . . , xk ) = F1 x1 + · · · + Fk xk + F0 that satisfies (38).
The following ordering ≥ is considered: x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) ≥ (y1 , . . . , yn ) = y if
xi ≥ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Given δ > 0, the (strict) ordering >δ is also used: x =
(x1 , . . . , xn ) >δ (y1 , . . . , yn ) = y if x1 − y1 ≥ δ and (x2 , . . . , xn ) ≥ (y2 , . . . , yn ).
Remark 2. Convex matrix interpretations include the usual matrix interpreta-
tions in [5,2] if A = In×n and b = 0 ∈ Rn .
In contrast to (N, ≥) and ([0, +∞), ≥), that are total orders, and also to (Nn , ≥)
and ([0, +∞)n , ≥), that are not total, but are complete lattices, (D(A, b), ≥) does
not need to be total or a complete lattice. This has some interesting advantages.
Example 10. Consider the CTRS R [17, Example 7.2.45]:
a → a ⇐ b → x, c → x (39) c → d ⇐ d → x, e → x (41)
b → d ⇐ d → x, e → x (40)
According to [13], R is operationally terminating if there is a relation such
that →∗ ⊆ , and is a well-founded ordering such that ◦ ⊆ and for
the dependency pair a → a ⇐ b → x, c → x (for a a new symbol), we have
∗ ∗
⎤ substitutions σ, if b → σ(x) and c → σ(x), then a a . With

that,⎡for all
11
A = ⎣ 1 0 ⎦ and b = (1, 0, 0)T , together with:
01

1 1 0
[a] = [a ] = [b] = [d] = [c] = [e] =
0 0 1
we have [a], [a ], [b], [c], [d], [e] ∈ D(A, b), as required by (38). It can be proved
that (D(A, b), FD(A,b) , ΠD(A,b) ), where →, →∗ ∈ Π are both interpreted (in
ΠD(A,b) ) as ≥ is a model of R. For s, t ∈ T (F , X ), we let s t if and only

if [s] ≥ [t]. Thus, →∗ ⊆ holds. The ordering >1 on D(A, b) is well-founded
because [0, +∞) is bounded from below (see [10]). Thus, for s, t ∈ T (F , X ), we
define s t if and only if [s] >1 [t]. Now, since →∗ ⊆ , we only have to prove
that [b] ≥ [x] ∧ [c] ≥ [x] ⇒ [a ] >1 [a ], i.e.,
⎛⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎞
1 1 1
x 1 x 0 x 1 1
∀x1 , x2 ∈ R⎝⎣ 1 0⎦ ≥ ⎣ 0 ⎦∧ ⎠ (42)
1 1 1
≥ ∧ ≥ ⇒ >1
x2 0 x2 1 x2 0 0
0 1 0
which can be written as a universally quantified conjunction of two formulas:

x1 + x2 ≥ 1 ∧ x1 ≥ 0 ∧ x2 ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x1 ∧ 0 ≥ x2 ∧ 0 ≥ x1 ∧ 1 ≥ x2 ⇒ 1 >1 1 (43)
x1 + x2 ≥ 1 ∧ x1 ≥ 0 ∧ x2 ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x1 ∧ 0 ≥ x2 ∧ 0 ≥ x1 ∧ 1 ≥ x2 ⇒ 0 ≥ 0 (44)
The crucial point is that the conditional part of the implications does not hold
because no x ∈ D(A, b) satisfies (1, 0)T ≥ x and (0, 1)T ≥ x (see Example 11).
The following sections discuss existing mathematical techniques that can be

used to automatically deal with the conditional constraints obtained so far.
5 Conditional Polynomial Constraints

In this section, we explore well-known results from linear algebra [20] and alge-
braic geometry [18] to deal with conditional polynomial constraints.
5.1 Conditional Constraints with Linear Polynomials

Farkas’ Lemma provides a (universal) quantifier elimination result for linear
(conditional) sentences (cf. [20]).
Theorem 1 (Affine form of Farkas’ Lemma). Let Ax ≥ b be a linear system

of k inequalities and n unknowns over the real numbers with non-empty solution
set S and let c ∈ Rn and β ∈ R. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
1. cT x ≥ β for all x ∈ S,
2. ∃λ ∈ Rk0 such that c = AT λ and λT b ≥ β.
By condition (1) in Theorem 1 proving ∀x (Ax ≥ b ⇒ cT x ≥ β) can be recast

as the constraint solving problem of finding a nonnegative vector λ such that c
is a linear nonnegative combination of the rows of A and β is smaller than the
corresponding linear combination of the components of b. Note that if Ax ≥ b
has no solution, i.e., S in Theorem 1 is empty, the conditional sentence trivially
holds. Thus, we do not need to check S for emptiness when using Farkas’ result.
Example 11. Sentences (43) and (44) can be proved using Theorem 1. This
proves operational termination of R in Example 10.
Example 12. After encoding the equality as the conjunction of ≥ and ≤, we

transform sentences (29), (31) and (32) into:
∀x ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ 0 ≥ x ⇒ 0 ≥ x) (45)
∀x ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ 0 ≥ x ⇒ x ≥ 0) (46)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ∧ 1 − x ≥ y ⇒ 1 − x ≥ 1) (47)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ∧ 1 − x ≥ y ⇒ 1 ≥ 1 − x) (48)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ∧ y > 1 − x ⇒ y ≥ 1) (49)
∀x, y ∈ R ( x ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ x ∧ y ≥ 0 ∧ 1 ≥ y ∧ 1 − x = 1 ∧ y > 1 − x ⇒ 1 ≥ y) (50)
which are conditional linear sentences provable using Farkas’ Lemma.
5.2 Conditional Constraints with Arbitrary Polynomials
Given polynomials h1 , . . . , hm ∈ R[X1 , . . . , Xn ], the semialgebraic set defined by

h1 , . . . , hm is WR (h) = WR (h1 , . . . , hm ) = {x ∈ Rn | h1 (x) ≥ 0∧· · ·∧hm (x) ≥ 0}.
A well-known representation theorem establishes that a polynomial which is
positive for all tuples (x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ WR (h) can be written as a linear combina-
tion of h1 , . . . , hm with ‘coefficients’ s that are sums of squares of polynomials
(s ∈ R[X]2 ) [18, Theorem 5.3.8]. If we can write a polynomial f as a linear
combination of h1 , . . . , hm with ‘coefficients’ that are sums of squares, this pro-
vides a certificate of non-negativeness of f on WR (h1 , . . . , hm ): sums of squares
are non-negative, all hi are non-negative on values in WR (h1 , . . . , hm ) and the
product and addition of non-negative numbers is non-negative. Explicitly:
Theorem 2. Let R[X] := R[X1 , . . . , Xn ], h1 , . . . , hm ∈ R[X], WR (h) =
WR (h1 , . . . , hm ) and S ⊆ R such that WR (h1 , . . . , hm ) ⊆ S n . Let si ∈ R[X]2
m
for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m. If for all x1 , . . . , xn ∈ S, f ≥ s0 + i=1 si · hi , then, for all
(x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ WR (h1 , . . . , hm ), f (x1 , . . . , xn ) ≥ 0.
Example 13. Consider the constraint X1 ≥ X22 ∧ X2 ≥ X32 ⇒ X1 ≥ X34 from

[16, page 51]. With s0 = (X32 − X2 )2 , s1 = 1 and s2 = 2X32 , we have:
X1 − X34 = (X32 − X2 )2 + (X1 − X22 ) + 2X32 · (X2 − X32 )
witnessing that the constraint holds.
6 Related Work
The material in Section 2 can be thought of as a generalization and extension

of the intepretation method for proving termination of Term Rewriting Systems
(see, e.g., [17, Section 5]). The interpretation method uses ordered algebras which
are algebras A with domain D including one or more ordering relations D , D ,
etc., satisfying a number of properties (stability, monotonicity, etc.). Such rela-
tions are used to induce relations , on terms which are then used to compare
the left- and right-hand sides and r of rewrite rules → r. The targeted rules
in such comparisons and the conclusions we may reach depend on the considered
approach for proving termination (see [17, Sections 5.2 and 5.4], for instance).
In our setting, orderings are introduced as interpretations of computational re-
lations (e.g., → and →∗ ), and we do not require anything special about them
beyond their ability to provide a model of the theory at hand. For instance, where
the interpretation method requires monotonicity, we just expect the relation to
provide a model of rules (Cong ), which encode the monotonicity of the rewrite
relation. The advantage is that we do not need reformulations of the framework
when other logics are considered; in contrast, the interpretation method requires
explicit adaptations. For instance, in Context-Sensitive Rewriting [9] rewritings
are propagated to selected arguments of function symbols only. Thus, (Cong)
may have no specialization for some arguments i of some symbols f . Whereas
this requires specific adaptations of the interpretation method (see, e.g., [21]),
we can apply our methods without any change. Furthermore, although our prac-
tical examples involve CTRSs, our development does not really depend on that
and applies to arbitrary declarative languages.
With regard to existing approaches to deal with conditional constraints in
proofs of termination, the following result formalizes the transformational ap-
proach to deal with polynomial conditional constraints in [6,16].
Proposition 1. [16, Proposition 3] Let prem and conc be two polynomials with
natural coefficients, where conc is not a constant. Let p1 , . . . , pm+1 , q1 , . . . , qm+1
be arbitrary polynomials with natural coefficients. If
conc(pm+1 ) − conc(qm+1 ) − prem(p1 , . . . , pm ) + prem(q1 , . . . , qm ) ≥ 0
is valid over the natural numbers, then p1 ≥ q1 ∧ · · · ∧ pm ≥ qm ⇒ pm+1 ≥ qm+1

is also valid over the natural numbers.
This result holds if prem and conc have non-negative real coefficients, and
variables range over nonnegative real numbers. When linear polynomials are
used this technique is subsumed by Farkas’ lemma.
Proposition 2. Let C ∈ R≥0 [Y ] and P ∈ R≥0 [Y1 , . . . , Ym ] be linear applications
m
with C nonconstant, i.e., C = γY with γ > 0 and P = i=1 πi Yi . Let pi , qi ∈
R≥0 [X1 , . . . , Xn ] be linear polynomials for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1, i.e., pi =
n n
pi0 + j=1 pij Xj and qi = qi0 + j=1 qij Xj . Let A = (pij − qij )m,n , b =
(q10 − p10 , . . . qm0 − pm0 )T , c = (pm+1,1 − qm+1,1 , . . . , pm+1,n − qm+1,n )T and β =
qm+1,0 −pm+1,0 . If for all X1 , . . . , Xm ≥ 0, C(pm+1 )−C(qm+1 )−P (p1 , . . . , pm )+
P (q1 , . . . , qm ) ≥ 0, then there is λ ∈ Rm
0 such that c ≥ A λ and β ≤ λ b.
T T
Remark 3. Regarding mechanization, Nguyen et al.’s technique n has a drawback

with respect to those in Section 5. Given a rule → r ⇐ i=1 si → ti , Nguyen et
al.’s technique requires that both [si ] and [ti ] are polynomials with non-negative
coefficients only. This is because [si ] and [ti ] are handled separately by poly-
nomials conc and prem. But in an implementation, [si ] and [ti ] are parametric
polynomials where the coefficients are parameters rather than numbers (see [4,10]
for instance). Thus, we need to constrain them to be non-negative in order to

use the technique. In contrast, we do not restrict the coefficients of polynomials
in any way. Hence, the coefficients of the parametric polynomials could be neg-
ative numbers without any problem. For instance, this is crucial to synthesize
D(A, b) = [0, 1] used in the examples above, where A and b require negative
numbers.
Farkas’ Lemma is used in proofs of termination of imperative programs in [19].
7 Conclusion
We have provided a generic, logic-oriented approach to abstraction in proofs of
termination of programs in declarative languages, which is based on defining ap-
propriate models for logics. We have used numeric domains defined as restrictions
of ‘big’ numeric sets by means of predicates that can be handled as conditional
constraints. We have introduced convex domains and used them to extend the
powerful matrix interpretation method for proving termination of TRSs in two
directions: the use of convex domains and the application to other logics (e.g.,
CTRSs). We have shown the usefulness of these general purpose ideas by ap-
plying them to prove operational termination of CTRSs: R in Example 1 could
not be handled within the recently introduced 2D DP framework for proving
operational termination of CTRSs [13] or its extensions [14]; but the weakness
was not in the framework itself, but in the available algebraic interpretations: we
can prove R operationally terminating now due to the use of a convex domain
like [0, 1]. And powerful tools like AProVE do not find a proof of operational
termination of R in Example 10 by using transformations. In contrast, we found
a simple proof with convex matrix interpretations and the techniques in [13].
We have shown that existing, powerful techniques to deal with numeric con-
straints provide an appropriate framework for implementing the previous tech-
niques. We have implemented most of these techniques as part of our tool
mu-term [1]. In particular, the use of Farkas’ Lemma for dealing with linear con-
ditional constraints obtained from linear polynomial interpretations and matrix
interpretations plays a central role in the implementation of the 2D DP frame-
work for operational termination of CTRSs [13] which is presented in [14]. In [10,
Example 13], we advocate the use of negative coefficients in proofs of termina-
tion of CSR using polynomial interpretations. The implementation, though, was
tricky (see [10, Sections 6.1.3 and 7]). This paper is a step forward because: (1)
our treatment is valid for arbitrary polynomials. We do not need to provide spe-
cial results as [10, Observation 1] to deal with polynomials of some specific form
(quadratic, cubic, ...); (2) we avoid the introduction of disjunctive constraints
which lead to an exponential blowup and to an expensive constraint solving pro-
cess; and (3) we admit negative numbers everywhere. They are treated as any
other number and there is no need to ‘assert’ which of the coefficients could be
negative in order to handle them apart (see [10, Section 7] and [10, Example 20]).
However, much work is necessary to make fully general use of these techniques
in practical applications. We plan to address these issues in the near future.
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violent contraste entre l’idéal qui est écrit sur les drapeaux et
l’horrible action. Ce qui est convier chacun à un sévère examen de
conscience, le laissant juge, ou laissant Dieu juge, ce qui est une
autre manière de dire. Car où est notre pouvoir de choisir les
coupables, quand la faute est de presque tous ? Qui n’a pas cédé à
l’ivresse de plaire, de flatter, de menacer ? Faute de tous, et punition
de tous par le jeu des effets, sévère, mais sans reproche. Et c’est ce
que le Pape veut appeler la justice de Dieu. Doctrine non
développée, mais en elle-même forte.
XLIII
LA TRINITÉ
Considéré, autant que faire se peut, selon la rigueur de

l’entendement, le christianisme offre un ensemble de vérités sans
reproche. Ce dieu nouveau, qui enfin est homme, termine un long
tâtonnement d’idolâtrie errante, assuré enfin dans son vrai chemin
par le dieu grec, à la fois athlétique et politique. Mais on n’en pouvait
rester à cette forme extérieure ni à cette société extérieure. Le plus
divin, en ce dieu homme, c’est la conscience ; et la conscience,
élevée aussitôt jusqu’à l’esprit, propose une autre société et une
autre vie. Voilà donc l’Esprit. Mais pourquoi le Fils et le Père ?
D’abord, pourquoi le Fils, dit aussi Fils de l’Homme ? Cela signifie
que la forme humaine faible, souffrante et séparée, est divine
encore. Entendez que la condition de l’esprit en cette forme ne doit
point être exigée d’abord. Un ignorant, un méchant, un fou exigent
encore respect par la seule forme extérieure. Ainsi le culte cherche
l’esprit et l’espère, comme l’enfant dieu le signifie assez. Il me
semble aussi que le bœuf et l’âne ne sont point hors de place dans
cette puissante image ; ils figurent les dieux de l’Inde et de l’Égypte,
déchus, mais encore participants.
Mais que signifie le rapport du Père et du Fils ? Le Dieu des
anciens dieux fut toujours le Destin ou la Nécessité, ce qui revient à
dire le Monde en son inexplicable existence, puissant par là
absolument, mais aussi en ses raisonnables, explicables,
irréprochables connexions qui font suivre l’effet de la cause selon
une sorte de justice implacable. En cet être nous baignons de toutes
parts ; nous vivons de lui et sommes nés de lui ; dépendants en ce
sens, et sans remède. Car, si haut que l’esprit nous élève jamais, il
faudra d’abord vivre, c’est-à-dire d’abord obéir, et encore mieux
bénir cette obéissance qui nous donne pouvoir. Ainsi le plus ancien
des dieux est encore immensité, puissance et sagesse. Cette idée
ne doit pas être oubliée, ni l’autre, ni non plus l’autre. Et que les trois
ne fassent qu’une, c’est ce que l’esprit termine, retrouvant ses
propres lois en cet univers. Tel est le sommaire de nos pensées, et
ceux qui ne le développeront pas ne développeront rien. Tout
homme qui connaît, si peu que ce soit, connaît selon ces relations
souveraines.
Peut-on adorer les images ? Mais que peut-on adorer, sinon des
images ? Le géomètre lui-même ne se passe point de ces tracés
grossiers qui disposent son corps comme pour accompagner
l’attention intellectuelle. Mais bien plus justes encore, bien plus
puissantes pour nous délivrer de ce mouvement étranglé des
passions, plus justes et plus puissantes sont ces images si
exactement propres à soutenir nos pensées, et ainsi à réconcilier le
corps et l’esprit. Ces métaphores parlées ou chantées, maçonnées,
sculptées ou peintes, sont la première preuve, et encore la dernière.
Elles préparent, par cette atteinte du beau, corporelle certainement,
mais spirituelle aussi. Car le beau n’a jamais rien coûté à
l’intelligence, ni jamais exigé d’elle aucun reniement, et c’est ce
qu’annonce la belle image. Mais le beau est encore ce qui termine
nos pensées et les rassemble. Éveil à la fois et sommeil de nos
pensées, comme la musique, ouvrant et fermant sans cesse la porte
d’inquiétude, le représente si bien. Toutefois ce n’est pas assez de
chanter au lutrin ; et c’est le mouvement même de la religion
humaine qui nous rappelle que l’esprit est aussi quelque chose.
XLIV
PASCAL
Pascal plaît à presque tous, aussi bien à ceux qui refusent

l’église. Non pas seulement par cette prose à surprises, rompue,
éclatante, mais par l’esprit même, qui s’y voit indomptable. Car des
belles apparences, et encore bien composées, qu’en laisse-t-il ? Et
des majestés, qu’en laisse-t-il ? Débarbouillant l’acteur, au lieu d’en
rire. La guerre jugée, la justice jugée, les rois jugés ; sans aucune
précaution ; jugés aussi ceux qui jugent, car le trait rebondit. « Il n’est
pas nécessaire, parce que vous êtes duc, que je vous estime, mais il
est nécessaire que je vous salue. » Méchant salut ; mais il faut le
rendre ; et le sot guéri en reste sot. Tout est défait, refait et
ressemblant. Le duc enfin sait de quoi il est fier.
Voilà le modèle du janséniste, si bien assuré de mépris qu’il
n’estime que ce qu’il veut et n’épargne que ce qu’il veut.
Dangereuse amitié, turbulent citoyen. Mais la plus libre pensée est
de mordre ; car de céder à l’objet il n’en est point question ; si l’objet
s’égalait au penseur, l’objet serait trop fort ; si l’idée s’égalait au
penseur, l’idée serait trop forte. D’où, pour l’honneur de penser, ce
travail de pointe, qui fait voler un éclat puis un autre. Peu ou
beaucoup ; il faut entamer cette dure matière ; ce jeu n’est pas un
jeu ; la pensée se compte toujours aux débris. Pascal fait opposition
continuellement, essentiellement ; hérétique orthodoxe.
Si les raisons de croire s’avisaient d’être plus fortes que l’homme,
le coup alors serait plus rude, car il faut que toute preuve s’émiette.
La pensée ne respecte rien qu’elle-même ; même la contrainte,
même la coutume, il faut les choisir et refaire, non pas les subir.
« Soumission parfaite », mais redoutable liberté. Telle est la messe
de Pascal.
Le doute est partout ; un doute actif et fort, par quoi tout se tient
debout. D’où vient la puissance d’attaque, et même d’offense, de
ces terribles pensées ; même quand elles posent, elles déposent
déjà. Chacune va toujours au-delà d’elle-même ; elle en cache
d’autres, et aussitôt les découvre, toutes rompues dans l’âme ; ainsi
elles ont toutes un avenir violent. N’importe quel penseur, et même
l’apprenti, s’y fait une puissance et aussitôt l’essaye ; car qui a fait la
preuve la peut défaire.
Quoi donc ? Le chapelet ? La religion des bonnes femmes ? Mais
cela est pour le corps ; ce sont des politesses, sans importance que
celle qu’on leur donne. Mais, pour l’esprit, quel aliment ? Lui-même.
Tout de libre consentement. Tout gratuit. Tout généreux. On ne peut
crocheter le ciel. D’où ce rabaissement des œuvres et des mérites
devant la grâce ; d’où l’humilité, l’inquiétude et le paradoxe de la
prédestination, qui est pour enlever l’assurance. Ces mythes font un
objet insupportable ; mais prenez-les comme signes ; ils
représentent assez bien la situation du penseur, dès qu’il se risque ;
car il n’a jamais assurance sans en être aussitôt puni ; l’infatuation
est l’enfer de l’esprit. Et les œuvres ne sauvent jamais l’esprit,
comme mille lignes écrites n’assurent pas la ligne qui suivra ; car
telle est la sévère condition de ce qui est libre, c’est qu’il n’y a point
de condition. Celui qui réfléchit ne gagne pas le pain du lendemain,
ni même celui de la journée. Qui peut se promettre une pensée ?
L’attention est donc une belle prière. Ainsi tant que l’invention sera la
plus grande affaire humaine, Pascal sonnera comme il faut à l’oreille
de l’homme.
XLV
ENCORE PASCAL
On ne lit plus les Provinciales, mais on lit certainement les

Pensées. Je ne songe pas ici au professeur ni à l’étudiant, qui lisent
par état, mais bien au Liseur, animal non apprivoisé et dont les
mœurs sont mal connues. Le libraire témoigne là-dessus
indirectement ; vous trouvez partout une édition des Pensées de
Pascal, conforme aux plus récents travaux, et délivrée de ces notes
qui nous remettent à l’école. Mais qui se plaît à cette brutale
philosophie ? Quelque catholique qui a peur de l’enfer ? Cela je ne le
crois point du tout. Bien plutôt ce genre de catholique qui est
commun chez nous, et que je veux appeler libre Penseur. Avec ou
sans la messe. Cette foule de solitaires couvre une grande étendue
de pays.
Au juste, quoi ? Une pensée intrépide. Un mépris assuré de
toutes les Importances. Un jugement dernier sur tout, où les rois
sont aussi nus qu’à leur naissance. Le jésuite ne souffre point cette
manière, et il est plaisant d’apercevoir que la querelle des
Provinciales, que l’on croit oubliée, revient ici par le dessous. Il ne
manque pas de jésuites sans messe ; et le fond du jésuite est en
ceci qu’il y a des choses qu’il ne faut point dire, et que le mieux est
donc de n’y point penser. Le jésuite sans messe fait sa prière aux
hommes compétents, ornant le préfet, l’académicien, le général et le
ministre de cette suave perfection que l’on revêt en même temps
que le costume. D’où un échange d’académiques sourires. Ah ! qu’il
est doux d’être jésuite ! Sur ce propos somnifère, Pascal entre au jeu
et vous réveille tous ces gens-là. « Je tirerai, dit-il, mon bonnet à
toutes les puissances, comme vous faites. Mais comprenons
pourquoi. Je veux bien être esclave, mais je ne veux pas être sot. Il
faut un médecin pour mourir ; et si je ne choisis pas de médecin à
diplôme, me voilà livré aux guérisseurs et sorciers, qui se battront
autour de ma carcasse. Comme en politique, où il y a moins à
craindre d’un sot, qui règne par droit de naissance, que d’un millier
de demi-habiles qui se battraient pour la couronne. En ce sens ce
qui est établi est juste, et je salue ce qui est établi. Mais sans
respect. Mon bonnet, oui ; mon respect, non. »
Jésuites consternés. On ne peut point mettre en prison un
homme qui obéit. Pourquoi dire ces vérités amères ? Puisqu’il faut
saluer, n’est-il pas plus simple de respecter ? La politesse fait tous
les jours ce miracle de faire entrer le respect par l’ouverture du
geste, et de le pousser jusqu’au derrière de la tête. Prière, c’est
politesse. Abêtissez-vous, oui ; mais ne le dites pas, et d’abord ne le
pensez pas, toute l’expérience vise là. Ce Pascal est impie et
sacrilège ; profondément impie et sacrilège. Voyez comme sa
pensée prend force en son derrière de tête. Mais cela même il ne
faut point le dire, car on lirait ce nouveau Lucifer, bien nommé Porte-
Lumière, Éteignons-nous et administrons.
J’ai rencontré de ces demi-jésuites qui pensent encore trop, et
qui veulent, pour le Roi accusé, plaider la sottise. « C’est un pauvre
homme, vanité seulement. Que voulez-vous qu’il ait fait ? » Mais,
mon cher demi-jésuite, il ne faut pas le dire, car aucun homme ne
s’arrange d’une moitié de pensée. Et lui, aussitôt, travaille à
s’éteindre, et cherche le jeu de cartes. Cette lâcheté est le seul mal
humain peut-être. Le seul qui soit de conséquence. J’aime ces
prolétaires qui veulent donner aux choses leur vrai nom. Remarquez
qu’il y a des jésuites par là aussi, et surtout un bon nombre de demi-
jésuites qui voudraient s’enfermer en leur demi-pensée. Mais, qui
pense seulement une chose, il pense tout. Et quant aux extrêmes
jugeurs, on ne m’ôtera point de l’esprit qu’ils seraient invincibles, s’ils
prenaient le parti d’obéir ; au lieu qu’en la révolte je vois revenir
l’ordre invincible, et le chapeau sur un bâton qu’il faut adorer. Nous
tournons sur place, et Pascal est loin en avant.
XLVI
DANTE ET VIRGILE
La commémoration a ramené l’attention universelle sur le visage

de Dante, qui exprime si bien la sévérité et le malheur. Réfléchissant
à mon tour sur cette Épopée qui nous élève à son ciel ascétique en
partant des profondeurs, je voulais comprendre pourquoi, dès les
premiers tercets, nous partons d’un pas assuré, comme en une forêt
la puissance des arbres annonce le sol ferme et le dos vierge de la
terre. Il n’y a plus ici de convention ; nature intacte. Loin de la ville
raisonnable et perfide. Ici c’est le courage qui fait la route ; et ce
rythme l’annonce assez, qui fait trois pas et regarde. Je veux suivre
ce guide sûr, ce mulet aux jambes sèches.
Ce que je vois ? L’humain et moi-même ; le pire et le meilleur, et
le passable aussi, de ce monde humain, sans aucun de ces
convenables arrangements qui font horreur. Mais cet enfer donne
espérance, par le juste spectacle ; déjà purgatoire, et reflet du ciel
des pensées, par le juste spectacle ; ce que ce rythme fort nous
promet. Ne t’arrête qu’un moment, dit-il ; ce n’est ici qu’un chemin et
passage. Qui se regarde se juge ; qui se juge se sauve. Tout
examen de conscience est ici enfermé. Descendre pour remonter.
Tout ce qui m’est si près, tout ce qui est moi, en spectacle et comme
reculé et séparé. Par le secours du poète. Dante suit Virgile, et je les
suis l’un et l’autre, comme la chèvre suit la chanson du chevrier.
Ce monde des enfers et des ombres fut toujours l’image fidèle
des pensées humaines, et des passions sans consistance qui
semblent d’abord les porter. Ulysse, à ce festin qu’il offre aux âmes,
ne voyait accourir que des ombres maigres et affamées. C’était le
temps où l’homme passionné se déchargeait un peu de fureur et de
crainte par la fiction du dieu extérieur, tantôt loin, tantôt près, et
voyageant sur les nuages. Immense progrès déjà. Car le peuple
enfant et fétichiste est doux, pieux, dévoué, inhumain, bestial selon
l’humeur et l’occasion, sans aucun jugement sur soi ; aussi ne se
souvient-il point à proprement parler, mais plutôt il recommence. Au
lieu que les dieux d’Homère, aux formes brillantes, étalent assez
bien au regard ces apparences sans corps qui sont Jalousie,
Vengeance et Gloire. L’ombre d’Achille ainsi considère sa vie
comme un vain mélange des éléments. « J’aimerais mieux être un
valet de ferme sur la terre, qu’être Achille parmi les ombres. » Telle
est la première Éthique, un peu au-dessus du désespoir, quoique
sans espérance ; car le vrai désespoir est sans aucune réflexion. Ici
la Fatalité règne encore ; elle est du moins jugée.
Quand Virgile descend aux enfers à son tour, tenant en main le
rameau d’or, et conduit par la Sybille Italique, les Ombres, passions
mortes, sont déjà autrement rangées. Politiquement, à la Romaine.
D’après un avenir de conquêtes ; d’après le lien des causes et des
effets. Non plus caprice extérieur, selon les intrigues des dieux ; mais
inflexible détermination, où l’espérance de chaque être se trouve
prise et d’avance écrasée. Quelle revue que celle de ces armées
romaines non encore existantes, et déjà mortes ! Et ce Marcellus,
espoir de l’empire, mort prématurément ; déjà mort en sa fleur, avant
même d’être né. « Tu seras Marcellus ; à mains pleines jetez des
lis. » C’est le plus haut tragique, à ce moment de la réflexion où, la
Fatalité capricieuse étant vaincue, l’inflexible Nécessité se montre.
Ainsi Virgile peignait ses fresques immobiles.
La troisième Épopée est de Jugement et de Liberté. Non
publique, mais privée. Non de Destin, mais de crime, châtiment,
purification et salut. C’est le moment de la faute, du remords et du
repentir. Tous les dieux aux enfers, l’humain sur les pentes, la
lumière sur les cimes. Lumière, seule justice. Chacun jugé par soi,
comme Platon avait osé dire ; mais la foi Platonicienne se jouait ; et
Socrate mourant n’était assuré que de lui-même. Le mouvement
épique ne tirait pas encore les foules vers cette Justice qui n’est que
lumière. L’Épopée Dantesque nous trouve assis et rêvant sur les
marches de quelque temple de Minerve. Trop heureux de ne plus
croire à rien. Mais ce mouvement humain ne peut pas s’arrêter là.
Aussi le premier appel du guide à l’anguleux visage nous met
aussitôt debout.
XLVII
DU PEUPLE JUIF
Les Grecs composaient et conciliaient, par cette prudence

politique qui ressort de tous leurs écrits. Même dans l’existence
Homérique ils se trouvent séparés du destin par un peuple de dieux
intermédiaires, d’où un retard dans l’accomplissement, qui laisse
respiration. Et ces fictions représentent assez bien notre pratique ;
car que faisons-nous jamais, que gagner du temps sur les
nécessités extérieures, qui finiront par vaincre ? Cette sagesse
s’exprime presque chrétiennement dans la résignation stoïcienne qui
compose le devoir quotidien et l’étroit et suffisant passage pour nos
actions avec une fatalité invincible.
La liberté, de sa nature infinie et miraculeuse, s’est trouvée
posée au milieu même du peuple Juif, parce que le destin y était
immédiat et comme irrespirable. Je conseille de lire la Bible d’un
seul trait, en vue de contempler une existence impossible. Depuis la
Genèse ce n’est toujours qu’une création sublime, violente,
absolument arbitraire au regard de l’existence humaine, qui est
chétive et comme néant. Je n’y vois point d’espérance, ni aucun
essai d’industrie ou de vraie politique, mais seulement une prompte
obéissance, qui n’arrive pourtant pas à courir aussi vite que le
châtiment. Toutes les fautes sont égales au regard de l’Absolue
Volonté. Les enfants de la faute sont maudits avant de naître. La
lettre règne. La guerre y est métaphysique. Chacun des combattants
accomplit la volonté de Dieu pour sa part. C’est ce qu’annonce le
sacrifice d’Abraham ; mais je trouve dans l’Exode une plus forte
image de la nécessité : « Lorsque Moïse élevait sa main, Israël était
le plus fort ; et lorsqu’il baissait sa main, Amalek était le plus fort. Les
mains de Moïse étant fatiguées, ils prirent une pierre qu’ils placèrent
sous lui, et il s’assit dessus. Aaron et Hur soutenaient ses mains, l’un
d’un côté, l’autre de l’autre ; et ses mains restèrent fermes jusqu’au
coucher du soleil. » Ces hommes ont contemplé l’Éternel. Aussi la
plainte de Job ne cesse pas d’adorer.
Voltaire n’a pu surmonter cette idée écrasante, qui est pourtant
vraie, car tel est bien notre destin à tous, dès que nous l’acceptons.
Et dès qu’un homme croit fermement qu’il ne peut plus marcher,
comment ferait-il un seul pas ? D’où devait naître, en ce peuple
couché, l’idée antagoniste : « Prends ton lit, lève-toi, et marche. »
Les miracles furent possibles cette fois-là, par l’excès du désespoir.
Et, parce que la volonté de l’homme était frappée en son centre,
étant privée absolument, systématiquement de cette foi en elle-
même sans laquelle elle n’essaie même pas, ici devait se faire la
résurrection, par la foi elle-même. Idée infinie ; car celui qui pense à
la limite ne se pense plus libre, et perd tout. Donc un autre absolu,
d’autres possibles, d’autres relations, une autre vie. Par rapport à
quoi l’Immense Existence devait paraître enfin ce qu’elle est,
inexplicable en soi, inexorable, mais aussi sans aucune volonté
mauvaise ou bonne, sans aucun décret mauvais ou bon. Les
miracles de la foi mettaient le terme aux miracles de la nature ; le
destin était déchu de son rang. Ces idées se dessinent ; on les
trouvera en clair dans Descartes : mais il s’en faut de beaucoup
qu’elles gouvernent en la plupart des hommes. Bien plutôt, dès que
la nécessité montre un visage humain, comme dans la guerre et
dans tout ce qui s’y rapporte, les hommes reviennent aisément à
l’ancien Dieu. Abraham lie tristement son fils. Aaron et Hur
soutiennent les mains de Moïse.
XLVIII
L’ESPRIT CHRÉTIEN
L’esprit chrétien n’est pas encore développé, même en ses

premiers replis ; nous n’apercevons pas le moment où l’idée même
du jugement intérieur appellera son opposé, c’est à savoir une forme
politique purifiée, dont nous n’avons presque aucune idée. Selon les
vues profondes de Hegel, qu’il faut elles-mêmes développer
hardiment, la religion n’est jamais que la première réflexion sur les
monuments, parmi lesquels je compte les légendes ; et la
philosophie elle-même n’est qu’une réflexion sur la religion. C’est
pourquoi je dis que la Libre Pensée n’est et ne sera autre chose que
le Christianisme développé. Je dis développé ; non point réconcilié
avec l’ancien ordre politique ; non point interprété d’après l’ancienne
logique ; mais lui-même devenant logique et finalement politique.
Je prendrai en exemple le salut individuel, où Comte lui-même, si
attentif à recueillir l’héritage humain, n’a pourtant reconnu que
l’égoïsme renaissant. Il est clair qu’il faut coopérer d’abord, et coûte
que coûte sauver les autres en même temps que soi, et ne point
quitter femme, amis et compagnons pour soigner sa propre âme.
Rien n’est plus évident ; mais il y a beaucoup de choses évidentes et
qui ne s’accordent point. Il faut coopérer pour la paix ; très bien. Mais
le moindre essai dans ce sens-là fait paraître une autre guerre. La
grande guerre a porté cette contradiction et nous la jette maintenant
en discours irréfutables. Suivons l’autre idée, si jeune encore ; il est
assez clair que l’élément de la guerre est cette colère intérieure en
chacun, si aisément parée en indignation. Le monde des hommes
est agité en tous sens de ces généreuses colères, saluées sous le
nom de courage. Mais nous ne poussons point au-delà. Autour de
cette idée nous voyons se reformer les légions de César.
Où donc le salut, sinon dans une retraite à l’intérieur de soi-
même en vue de se bien gouverner ? Chacun reconnaît
promptement, d’après ses premiers essais, qu’il est difficile d’aider
les autres ; mais c’est encore trop peu savoir. Il faut comprendre, par
jugement irrévocable, que les moyens de force, et même
d’apparence douce et persuasive, sont nécessairement soumis aux
lois de la force. Cette vue prise, et ce monde une fois exilé de nous,
une autre idée se montre, qui est que la paix de chacun avec soi
sera nécessairement la paix universelle. Ainsi c’est par
gouvernement de moi-même que j’aide les autres, et seulement
ainsi. En toutes choses ; car si je ne convoite point, j’établis la justice
autant qu’il est en moi ; si je ne violente point, j’établis la liberté
autant qu’il est en moi. Ce que traduit exactement et sans la moindre
erreur cette poétique doctrine d’après laquelle celui qui a sauvé son
âme intercède et prie pour tous les autres. Mais ce n’est pas assez
de croire ; il faut savoir. Cela est ainsi. Tous les maux humains
viennent de ce que je me jette à sauver les autres d’esclavage,
d’injustice et de violence, au lieu de me sauver moi-même. Dans le
Juste, toutes les fois qu’on le rencontre, on reconnaît non sans
étonnement un certain refus d’aimer et même d’aider, par un regard
à l’ordre invisible et immédiatement universel où le sage gouverne
absolument. Mais cela est encore plus admiré que compris. On
s’étourdit à chercher une loi civile qui préserverait les hommes d’être
violents, injustes, esclaves. Au lieu que c’est parce qu’ils ne se
sauvent point chacun de violence, d’injustice et d’esclavage, que la
loi civile est corrompue par ce mélange d’amour et de vengeance.
XLIX
LE GRAND PROGRAMME
Catholique veut dire Universel. Ce mot arrête tout net la critique.

Que voulons-nous tous penser, à nos meilleurs moments, si ce n’est
l’Universel ? Ce fut donc un grand moment de l’histoire humaine,
lorsque le catéchisme eut la prétention d’enseigner la même doctrine
à tous et partout. C’était élever n’importe quel esprit à la hauteur de
l’arbitre, et déjà excommunier cette partie de l’homme qui juge du
vrai d’après le lieu, l’occasion et l’intérêt. Par cette vue un riche et
même un roi, aussi bien qu’un esclave, était invité à faire deux parts
de sa vie ; l’une, animale, et occupée à faire au corps humain son lit
et sa place, et à lui assurer pitance ; l’autre, vraiment humaine et
soucieuse de l’Universel, soit dans son savoir, soit dans ses
maximes de pratique, soit même dans ses sentiments. Remarquez
que c’est toujours par cette vaste contemplation que l’esprit se
délivre, et qu’au contraire il s’enchaîne et, bien plus, se déshonore
lorsqu’il pense selon ses passions. Deux pouvoirs se montraient,
comme Comte l’a vu, et pour la première fois séparés. L’Esprit,
toujours cherchant la communion universelle, jugeait les individus,
les rois, et les nations, petits et grands animaux, toujours exerçant et
nourrissant leur puissance. Il faut convenir qu’avant la révolution
chrétienne et l’organisation catholique, l’esprit en venait toujours à
adorer la puissance ; et c’est toujours là qu’il revient lors qu’il a perdu
le sens catholique. L’athlète lui-même est comme un cyclone dans
l’exécution s’il ne sait par moments suspendre et juger sa propre
force, tout à fait comme un pape jugeait un roi. La doctrine était donc
fortement dessinée, et selon la loi de nos pensées, c’est-à-dire
d’abord circonscrite abstraitement comme le dessin par la ligne.
Autrement dit c’était et c’est encore le Grand Programme.
On pourrait bien dire que tout savant est catholique et que tout
sage est catholique. Mais, là-dessus, le sévère programme est
encore bon à consulter. Car toute science est tirée de deux côtés.
D’un côté, et autant qu’elle cherche l’Universel, je la vois exigeante
sur les preuves ; mais, de l’autre, autant qu’elle cherche la
puissance, je la vois prenant le succès comme la meilleure preuve,
et disant même que le succès est la seule preuve, et que, du
moment que l’avion s’élève, il ne faut point se soucier de savoir
comment cela se fait. Ce mépris de la théorie est assez commun, et
va souvent à la colère ; au fond c’est colère de roi. Par où l’on peut
remarquer que beaucoup, qui se disent catholiques, ne le sont point
du tout. Ce beau mot ne se laisse point déformer.
Je remarque la même chose dans les sages. Car il y a une
sagesse toute de prudence, pour ne pas dire de peur, et qui montre
seulement ses fruits. C’est par ce détour qu’un avare est parmi les
plus sages des hommes, éloigné de tout amour ruineux, de toute
gourmandise et de tout emportement, par une prudente garde de
ses frontières de chair. Tel encore le bienfaiteur, s’il donne pour
recevoir, ou seulement pour conserver. Tel encore le vaniteux, qui
loue afin d’être loué. C’est par ce jeu des passions enchaînées que
toute puissance a grandi et s’est maintenue. Mais, selon le sens
catholique, ces prétendues vertus sont de nulle valeur ; l’homme se
doit d’agir et de sentir humainement, et non point animalement,
c’est-à-dire de suivre encore ici le modèle universel, ce qui suppose
d’abord que l’esprit sache se retirer et mépriser les basses œuvres.
Mais, ce Grand Programme blesse les rois, j’entends tous les
gourmands de puissance. Et, regardant qui s’irrite, et qui rougit de
fureur, et qui invoque comme de saintes et de vénérables lois les
plus animales nécessités, par exemple de défense commune, vous
déciderez encore une fois que, parmi ceux qui ont l’ambition de se
dire catholiques, il y en a beaucoup qui ne sont nullement
catholiques.
L
POUR LE MATÉRIALISME
Le Congrès des Religions a flétri le matérialisme. Une bonne

définition aurait mieux valu ; car il y a un Spiritualisme sans discipline
qui n’est pas sain non plus. « Tout est plein de dieux », disait un
ancien. Quand Pascal écrit : « le silence éternel de ces espaces
infinis m’effraie », c’est tout à fait la même pensée, car cela veut
dire : « les dieux ne répondent point ». Lucrèce louait son maître
Épicure, pour avoir apporté aux hommes cette idée libératrice qu’il
n’y a point de volontés cachées dans la tempête et le tonnerre, et
qu’il n’y a pas plus de mystère dans une éclipse que dans mon
ombre par terre. Idée nette, virile, bienfaisante, du mécanisme des
phénomènes, car tous les dieux sont souillés de sang humain, et ce
n’étaient que les plus redoutables passions, sauvagement adorées.
La peur faisait les sorciers, et puis les brûlait. La colère inventait
quelque dieu vengeur, et puis faisait la guerre en son nom. Le fou
est ainsi ; ses passions font preuve ; il leur donne la forme d’objet, et
il agit d’après cela. De même toujours, dans cette sombre histoire
des superstitions, chacun fit des dieux selon ses passions et se fit
gloire de leur obéir. Sincèrement, et c’était bien là le pis. Quand nos
passions prennent figure de vérités, de réalités dans le monde,
d’oracles et de volontés surhumaines dans le monde, tout est dit. Le
fanatisme est le plus redoutable des maux humains.
C’était donc une grande idée, la plus grande et la plus féconde
peut-être, que celle des atomes dansants, petits corps sans pensée
aucune, n’ayant que dureté et forme, les uns ronds, les autres
crochus, formant par leur mécanique tous ces spectacles autour de
nous, et nos corps mêmes, et jusqu’à nos passions. Car le grand
Descartes, et Spinoza après lui, et encore mieux, sont allés jusqu’à
cette réflexion décisive que, même en nous, même ramenées à
nous, nos passions sont comme les orages, c’est-à-dire des flux,
des tourbillons, des remous d’atomes gravitant et croulant, ce qui
ruinait leurs brillantes preuves. Et telle est la seconde étape de la
sagesse matérialiste. Après avoir nié le « Dieu le veut » et le présage
ou signe dans les cieux, l’homme en colère arrive à nier le « je le
veux », et à se dire : « ce n’est que fièvre et chaleur de sang, ou
force sans emploi ; douchons-nous, ou manions des poids. »
Mais qui ne voit, dans ces hardies suppositions et dans ces
perceptions nettes, la plus belle victoire de l’esprit ? Pratiquement
nul n’en doute. Penser, réduire l’erreur, calmer les passions, c’est
justement vouloir, et vaincre l’aveugle nécessité en même temps
qu’on la définit. Je sais qu’il y a plus d’un piège ; et il arrive que celui
qui a reçu l’idée matérialiste, sans l’avoir assez faite et créée par sa
propre volonté, est souvent écrasé à son tour et mécanisé par cette
autre théologie, disant qu’on ne peut rien contre rien, et que tout est
égal, sans bien ni mal, sans progrès possible ; c’est comme un
maçon qui murerait la porte avant de sortir. Mais ce danger est plus
théorique que réel. Dans le fait, je vois que le spiritualiste à
l’ancienne mode tombe neuf fois sur dix dans l’adoration des
passions et dans le fanatisme guerrier, ce qui revient à accepter les
forces matérielles ; au lieu que c’est le hardi matérialiste, neuf fois
sur dix, qui ose vouloir la Justice et annoncer les forces morales.

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Artificial Intelligence and Symbolic

Computation 12th International

Hybrid Artificial Intelligence Systems 9th

Artificial Intelligence Methodology Systems and

Theory and Practice of Natural Computing Third

Reversible Computation 6th International Conference RC

Applied Cryptography and Network Security 12th

Formal Concept Analysis 12th International Conference

Multi disciplinary Trends in Artificial Intelligence

Algorithms and Computation 8th International Workshop

Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science

LNAI Series Editors

LNAI Founding Series Editor

ISSN 0302-9743 e-ISSN 1611-3349

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014955464

LNCS Sublibrary: SL 7 – Artiﬁcial Intelligence

This volume is devoted to the proceedings of the 12th International Confer-

October 2014 Gonzalo A. Aranda-Corral

Manuel Ojeda-Aciego University of Malaga, Spain

Combining Systems for Mathematical Creativity

Using Representation Theorems for Proving Polynomials

A Rule–Based Expert System for Vaginal Cytology Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . 34

Obtaining an ACL2 Speciﬁcation from an Isabelle/HOL Theory . . . . . . . 49

A Direct Propagation Method in Singly Connected Causal Belief

From Declarative Set Constraint Models to “Good” SAT Instances . . . . . 76

A Mathematical Hierarchy of Sudoku Puzzles and Its Computation by

A Simple GUI for Developing Applications That Use Mathematical

Conformant Planning as a Case Study of Incremental QBF Solving . . . . . 120

Dynamic Symmetry Breaking in Itemset Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

A Distance-Based Decision in the Credal Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Multivalued Elementary Functions in Computer-Algebra Systems . . . . . . 157

Rational Conchoid and Oﬀset Constructions: Algorithms and

Algorithmic Aspects of Theory Blending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Decomposition of Some Jacobian Varieties of Dimension 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Computational Logic Group

Abstract. The application of automated reasoning to the formal veri-

2 The ACL2 System

ACL2 is both a programming language, a logic for reasoning about programs

3 Gröbner Basis Computation

4 A Dag–Based Quadratic Uniﬁcation Algorithm

• For the execution eﬃciency of the implementation, it is fundamental that

5 The Eilenberg-Zilber Theorem

The Eilenberg–Zilber theorem [12] is a fundamental theorem in Simplicial Alge-

correspondent algorithm that it is a central component of the computer algebra

1. Baader, F., Snyder, W.: Uniﬁcation Theory. In: Handbook of Automated

9. Kaufmann, M., Moore, J S.: Structured Theory Development for a Mechanized

School of Computer Science

Abstract. We present work on the generation of novel mathematical

The combination of reasoning systems has become quite routine in recent

Salvador Lucas1,2 and José Meseguer2

Abstract. Reasoning about termination of declarative programs, which

Keywords: Conditional constraints, program analysis, termination.

Example 1. Consider the following CTRS R:

We failed to prove operational termination of R by using the ordering-based

2 Models of Logics for Proofs of Termination

4. [¬ϕ]Mα = true if and only if [ϕ] M

We say that M satisﬁes ϕ ∈ Form Σ if there is α ∈ X → D such that [ϕ]M α = true.

3 Domains for Algebras and Models Revisited

3.1 Conditional Domains for Term Algebras and Models

guaranteeing that if fA is given inputs in Dχ , the outcome belongs to Dχ as well.

Remark 1. Algebraicity is a standard requirement for algebraic interpretations.

Deﬁnition 1 (Convex Polytopic Domain). Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n , and

Example 9. According to [13], R in Example 1 is operationally terminat-

Remark 3. Regarding mechanization, Nguyen et al.’s technique n has a drawback