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Discourse Contextualism

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Discourse Contextualism
A Framework for Contextualist
Semantics and Pragmatics

Alex Silk

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3
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Contents
Acknowledgments ix

. Introduction: CR-Expressions and Discourse Contextualism 

Part I. Discourse Contextualism: An Application

to Epistemic Modals
. Accommodation and Negotiation with Context-Sensitive Expressions 
. Epistemic Modals and Discourse Disagreement 
. Insufficient Replies 
.. The Varieties of Linguistic Denial. Metacontextual Negotiation 
.. Epistemic Modals in a Language Game 
.. Recap 
. Accommodation and Negotiation with Paradigm Context-Sensitive Expressions 
. A Way Forward 
. Managing the Context: Toward Discourse Contextualism 
. Discourse Contextualism I: Epistemic Modals in Discourse 
. Components  and : From Formal Semantics to Interpretive Constraints 
. Component : Using Epistemic Modals. The Basic Account 
. Features 
.. Justified Use 
.. Locus of Disagreement 
.. Discourse-Oriented Effects 
.. Expressing States of Mind 
.. Expressive vs. Intuitively Contextualist Uses 
.. Anaphoric Properties. Contextual Underspecification 
.. Recap 
. More Data: Retraction and Eavesdroppers 
.. Retraction 
.. Eavesdroppers and Inter-Conversational Disagreement 
. Aside: Presupposition and Epistemic Modals 
.. “Assuming” Values for Variables? 
.. Presupposition and Non-Monotonic Updates 
.. A Presupposition of Commonality? 
. Truth 
. Recap 
. Discourse Contextualism II: How to Embed an Epistemic Modal 
. Embedding Problems 

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vi contents

.. First-Order States of Mind 

.. Obligatory Shifting 
.. Epistemic Contradictions 
.. Inferences 
.. Factive Attitudes 
. Embedding Solutions 
.. First-Order States of Mind 
.. Obligatory Shifting 
.. Epistemic Contradictions 
.. Inferences 
.. Factive Attitudes 
.. Recap 
. Aside: Contextualism and Relativist Content 
. A Challenge Revisited: Epistemic Modals and Paradigm Context-Sensitive
Expressions 
. Recap 

Part II. Discourse Contextualism: Extensions

. Extension I: Deontic Modals 
. Introduction 
. Deontic Modals in Discourse 
.. Contextualism about Deontic Modals 
.. Agreeing and Disagreeing with Normative Language 
.. A Discourse Contextualist Account 
.. Features 
.. Uncertainty and Indecision in Normative Inquiry 
.. Recap 
. Embedded Contexts and Normative Thought 
.. Attitudes and Attitude Ascriptions 
.. CR-Contradictions? 
. Realism and Normative Truth 
. Recap 
. Information-Sensitivity 
. Extension II: Gradable Adjectives and Degree Vagueness 
. Introduction 
. Gradable Adjectives in Discourse 
.. Standards and Scoreboards 
.. Discourse Dynamics 
.. Attitude Ascriptions 
.. Recap 
. Vagueness as Contextual Indecision 
.. The Sorites 
.. Vagueness, Meaning, and Use 

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contents vii

.. Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Vagueness 

.. Vagueness in Language and Thought 
. Conclusion 
.. Beyond Gradable Adjectives 
.. Higher-Order Vagueness 
.. Vagueness and Degree Semantics 
. Extension III: Predicates of Personal Taste and Evaluation 
. Three Sources of Context-Sensitivity 
. Matters of Taste in Discourse and Thought 
. Vagueness with PPTs 
. Adjectives of Normative and Epistemic Evaluation 
. Taste and Normative Evaluation 
. ‘Find’ and “Subjectivity” 
. Recap 

Appendix: Taxonomy 

Bibliography 
Index 

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Acknowledgments

I began developing the ideas in this book in fall . In working out these ideas
I was greatly assisted by participants in various workshops and conferences. For
helpful discussion, thanks to Justin Clarke-Doane, Kai von Fintel, Nick Jones, Daniel
Rothschild, Paolo Santorio, Bernhard Sallow, Scott Sturgeon, and audiences at the
Eidyn Conference on Normativity and Modality at the University of Edinburgh, nd
Logic and Language Conference at the Institute of Philosophy–London, Workshop on
Semantic Content and Conversational Dynamics at the University of Barcelona, Yale
Workshop in Metaethics and Philosophy of Law, Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar,
Tilburg University, University College London, University of Birmingham, University
of Glasgow, and University of Leeds. I am also grateful to two readers for Oxford
University Press for valuable feedback on a penultimate draft. The book was completed
under the support of an AHRC Early Career Research Grant. Thanks to the editor,
Peter Momtchiloff, for his patience and assistance throughout the process.
Portions of Chapter  appeared in Silk (a). Thanks to Truman Capote’s literary
executor for permission to include the epigraph to Chapter .

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It’s puzzling work, talking is.

(Mr. Tulliver, in George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss, bk , Ch. )

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
Introduction
CR-Expressions and Discourse Contextualism

“We have not missed, you and I, contextualism: that many-splendored thing” is not
how the movie ends. But it might have.
An important function of language is to share and coordinate our attitudes in
communication. In inquiry we manage our beliefs about how things are, how they
might be, and how possibilities may hang together. We also take a stance and socially
orient ourselves toward possible acts, attitudes, and states of affairs. We evaluate
possibilities as desirable, appropriate, horrible, trivial, permissible, wonderful. We
make demands and grant permissions, emphasize commonality and breed antipathy.
In communication we shape our identities as thinkers and feelers in a social world; we
coordinate on what to believe, how to act, how to feel, and whom to be.
Language affords a variety of expressive resources for doing so. For instance, our
evaluation of (), to take a not-quite-momentous (?) example, depends on what our
tastes are like.
() This ice cream is delicious.
() can seem acceptable if you like the ice cream, but unacceptable if you don’t. In using
‘delicious’ speakers can express their experiences and coordinate their sensibilities—
sometimes in agreement, as in (), sometimes in disagreement, as in ().
() Me: This ice cream is delicious.
You: Yeah it is. Let’s get some more.
() Me: This ice cream is delicious.
You: No way. It’s way too sweet.
Such discourse-oriented uses of language (let us call them) are commonplace. How to
capture them is not.
One approach is to treat the interpretation of (e.g.) ‘delicious’ as, in some
sense, depending on context. Whether () is true or false can vary across con-
texts, on this approach, even if everything else in the world—e.g. the facts about
the ice cream’s microphysical properties—remains fixed. Contextualism treats this
context-dependence as a dependence of semantic (conventional) content on features
of the context of utterance. We are all contextualists about pure indexicals whose

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 discourse contextualism

contents are determined by specific linguistic rules. ‘I’, for instance, invariably refers to
the speaker of the context. But not all expressions whose interpretation is intuitively
sensitive to context lend themselves to so straightforward an analysis. There are Perry’s
(: –) intentional indexicals whose content is, plausibly, determined in part by
pragmatic factors, like speaker intentions. Demonstratives, quantifiers, and even ‘here’
and ‘now’ likely fall in this camp. Such “impure indexicals” raise many questions about
how context affects interpretation. But, details of the semantics and metasemantic
aside, we all grant that the contents of these expressions depends in some sense
on features of the context of utterance. In addition there is a range of expressions
whose interpretation is intuitively sensitive to context, but which are such that no
particular way of spelling out their context-sensitivity seems capable of capturing
all our intuitions. It is these expressions that are the locus of—and, depending on
one’s taste, to blame for—recent contextualism-relativism debates. These expressions
include predicates of personal taste, like ‘delicious’, as well as epistemic vocabulary,
normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague gradable adjectives, among others.
Call these expressions ‘CR-expressions’.1
Contextualism treats CR-expressions as context-sensitive in the same kind of way as
paradigm context-sensitive expressions. Assimilating the apparent context-sensitivity
of CR-expressions to that of paradigm context-sensitive expressions might seem to
afford an initially attractive diagnosis of discourse-oriented uses like those in ()–
(). Yet serious objections have been raised. A contextualist about a CR-expression
must provide a general account of what information, standard, tastes, etc. (depending
on the item in question) is supplied as a function of the context of utterance and
figures in the derivation of semantic content. There are two main classes of data
that have been thought problematic: first, discourse phenomena involving agreement
and disagreement; second, the interpretation of CR-expressions in various complex
linguistic environments, such as in attitude ascriptions and conditionals. Which is

1 The literature is vast. Some references:

On predicates of personal taste: Wright , Kölbel , Lasersohn , Glanzberg ,
Nouwen , Stephenson b,c, Stojanovic , Richard , Cappelen & Hawthorne ,
Egan , Schaffer , MacFarlane .
On epistemic vocabulary: Price , DeRose , Veltman , Field , , Egan et al.
, Egan , von Fintel & Gillies , , , Stephenson b,c, Wright , Yalcin
, , , Dowell , MacFarlane , , Schaffer , Swanson a, a, Braun
, Rothschild , Moss , , Willer , Stalnaker .
On indicative conditionals: Veltman , Stephenson a, Yalcin , a,c, Gillies ,
, Weatherson , MacFarlane , Stalnaker , Moss .
On ‘know’: Cohen , DeRose , , Lewis , Hawthorne , Richard , Stanley
, Cappelen & Lepore , MacFarlane a, Chrisman , Ludlow , Blome-Tillmann
, Moss .
On normative language: Harman , , Wong , , Dreier , , Gibbard , ,
Wright , Kölbel , , Brogaard b, Kolodny & MacFarlane , Silk c, b,
Yalcin a, Velleman , MacFarlane .
On vague language: Kamp , Bosch , Raffman , , Soames , Fara , Barker
, Richard , Shapiro , Kennedy , Kölbel , Ludlow .

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introduction 

to say: CR-expressions seem happy ( = contextualist-friendly) neither embedded nor

unembedded. The general consensus is that CR-expressions’ distinctive discourse
properties and embedding behavior cannot be captured by a standard contextualist
semantics and general pragmatic principles.2 Many theorists use the putatively prob-
lematic data to motivate revising the compositional semantics (as by adding additional
parameters to the index or circumstance of evaluation) or postsemantics (as by
relativizing the definition of truth-in-a-context to a posited “context of assessment”).
Though the resulting theories differ in their details, they agree in distinguishing
the context-sensitivity of CR-expressions from that of paradigm context-sensitive
expressions. Even those who wish to maintain a contextualist semantics often do so
only by resorting to ad hoc pragmatic principles.
Some readers may have the impression that the debates between contextualist and
non-contextualist theories have come to a standstill. If you were tired of these debates,
I wouldn’t be unsympathetic. But I think there is progress to be made.

In this book I argue that we can capture the seemingly problematic discourse proper-
ties and embedding behavior of CR-expressions with an ordinary static contextualist
semantics along with general, independently motivated principles of interpretation
and pragmatic reasoning. I call the proposed account Discourse Contextualism. My
introducing the new label shouldn’t mislead. The project is to develop a standard, no
semantic bells or pragmatic whistles contextualist theory, and to defend it against some
of contextualism’s most pressing objections. No novel semantic apparatus or pragmatic
mechanisms are required.
I begin in Chapter  by examining discourse agreement and disagreement. I show
that the disagreement phenomena that have been thought problematic for contex-
tualists about CR-expressions can arise with paradigm context-sensitive expressions.
The cases I provide motivate a more unified treatment of paradigm context-sensitive
expressions and the expressions that have figured in recent contextualism-relativism
debates. I close this chapter by suggesting ways the dialectic may proceed, and I raise
corresponding challenges for relativism and contextualism. The depth of the problem
for contextualism raised by disagreement phenomena has not been adequately appre-
ciated by contextualists. The central challenge is to explain the systematic differences in
linguistic behavior between CR-expressions, on the one hand, and paradigm context-
sensitive expressions, on the other, given that they have the same general kind of
semantics. The subsequent chapters take up the task of responding to various instances
of this general challenge.
Taking my cue from the new data I provide, I motivate and develop an improved
framework for developing a contextualist semantics and pragmatics, which I call
Discourse Contextualism. The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the
distinctive linguistic behavior of a given CR-expression from a particular contextualist

2 Cf. Egan et al. : ; MacFarlane : , ; : –.

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 discourse contextualism

interpretation of an independently motivated formal semantics, along with general

principles of interpretation and pragmatic reasoning. In using CR-expressions,
speakers can exploit their mutual grammatical and world knowledge, and general
pragmatic reasoning skills, to coordinate their attitudes and manage their assumptions
about the context itself. Discourse Contextualism affords an independently attractive
account of the meaning of CR-expressions, their distinctive roles in communication,
and the role of context in their interpretation. The development of Discourse
Contextualism in this book sheds light on interesting general issues concerning
the varieties of context-sensitivity in natural language; the nature and origins of
presupposition; the role of presupposition in collaborative action and discourse; the
interactions between context and content throughout the process of interpretation;
the interpretation of context-sensitive expressions in embedded contexts; the relations
among logic, semantics, pragmatics, and metasemantics; the role of truth and
truth-value intuitions in semantic theorizing; and the substantive normative and
metaphysical assumptions of natural language.
The structure of the remaining chapters is as follows. Chapters – develop the
Discourse Contextualist framework by applying it to the case of epistemic modals.
These chapters constitute the core of the book. I argue that Discourse Contextual-
ism can successfully respond to both central classes of challenges to contextualist
semantics about epistemic modals. Chapter  focuses on capturing various discourse
phenomena with epistemic modals in unembedded uses. Chapter  extends the
account to capture various embedding phenomena with epistemic modals in attitude
ascriptions, conditionals, and inferences.
Chapters – apply the Discourse Contextualist framework to several other types
of CR-expressions: deontic modals, vague gradable adjectives, and (what I will call)
evaluational adjectives, including predicates of personal taste, normative adjectives,
and epistemic adjectives. These expressions exhibit many of the same kinds of
distinctive phenomena motivating a Discourse Contextualist account. However, we
will see important differences among them, in both meaning and use. How to apply
the general Discourse Contextualist framework in each case is non-trivial. The appli-
cations in these chapters motivate attractive accounts of (e.g.) the sorites paradox and
information-sensitivity, and provide perspicuous frameworks for broader theorizing
about vagueness and normativity in language and thought. Discourse Contextualist
semantics and pragmatics provide the basis for more comprehensive philosophical
theories.
Finally, an Appendix lays out my preferred taxonomy for a range of invariantist,
contextualist, and relativist views.

My primary aims in this book are twofold. First, most work on CR-expressions has
been piecemeal, addressed to a particular class of expressions.3 Proceeding in this way

3 A notable exception is John MacFarlane’s work (see his  for a collection of applications).

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introduction 

runs the risk of drawing hasty generalizations, missing out on others, and producing
a theory that is ill-equipped to capture the broader spectrum of examples. It isn’t for
no reason that similar moves have been made in the literatures on epistemic modals,
predicates of personal taste, gradable adjectives, etc. These expressions exhibit many of
the same distinctive linguistic properties which have led to these parallel dialectics—
hence my introducing the label ‘CR-expression’. However, my use of this label shouldn’t
mislead: it doesn’t presuppose that the expressions ultimately comprise a distinctive
lexical class. We should insist on a unified account of CR-expressions—or, better put,
an account which captures as much commonality among them as the data allow. But
first we need a better understanding of what exactly the relevant data are. We need
a more systematic investigation of the range of CR-expressions. A central aim of the
present project is to take up such an investigation. Taking on this more demanding
goal provides a richer set of data for adjudicating among theories. This includes
data concerning similarities and differences among CR-expressions, as well as among
context-sensitive expressions more generally. The investigation of CR-expressions in
this book can thus be seen as part of the larger body of recent research—not only in
philosophy of language but also various subfields of linguistics and computer science—
on the varieties of context-sensitive language and the role of context in interpretation.
That said, I won’t be able to consider every construction which has been subject
to recent contextualism/relativism debates here. For instance, there are also indica-
tive conditionals and ‘knows’. These connect naturally with epistemic modals, but I
won’t examine these connections here. And though I consider certain categories of
epistemic, normative, and vague language, I ignore others. I leave further applications
and generalizations of the the accounts offered here for elsewhere.
Canvassing the wider array of data can help clarify precisely what the relevant
challenges for different views are, and thereby delineate better motivated paths for
the dialectic to take. The second aim of the book is to begin the task of advancing
the dialectic so conceived. I won’t be arguing that no alternative contextualist or non-
contextualist theory can get the data right—although ways in which the proposed
Discourse Contextualist account improves upon its rivals will be indicated as points
of contrast are made salient. My primary aim is constructive. It is to develop a
contextualist theory which improves in overall empirical coverage and explanatory
power, and to begin to investigate the theory’s prospects. This inquiry can help
delineate the advantages and burdens of contextualism going forward and provide a
more appropriate basis for theory comparison.
I will argue that Discourse Contextualism meets various challenges often thought
devastating for contextualism, and does so utilizing only independently attested
aspects of conventional meaning and general principles of interpretation and prag-
matic reasoning. This should be of interest to theorists who are compelled by the
thought that the interpretation of CR-expressions depends, in some sense, on con-
text, but who also have reservations about the revisions introduced by relativist,
expressivist, and dynamic accounts. (I suspect that many (most?) theorists fall into

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 discourse contextualism

this camp.) Though I find some of the commonly cited reservations to be misplaced,
alternative accounts do face non-trivial burdens—for instance, for the invariantist, to
provide positive evidence for thinking that it is part of the conventional meanings of
CR-expressions that the world of evaluation determines a particular information state,
standard, etc.; for the relativist and expressivist, to provide accounts of propositions,
assertion, belief, and truth, and to justify the revisionary logics often generated by their
semantics. Some of these burdens have begun to be addressed, but accounts are often
admittedly incomplete.
In sum, Discourse Contextualism promises an empirically adequate and theoreti-
cally attractive account of the meaning and use of (at least some) CR-expressions. The
account sheds light on more general features of meaning and communication, and
provides a fruitful framework for theorizing about broader philosophical issues, as
in philosophy of language, metaphysics, normative and metanormative theory, logic,
and philosophy of mind. I leave additional developments and theory comparisons for
future research.

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PA RT I
Discourse Contextualism
An Application to Epistemic Modals

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
Accommodation and Negotiation
with Context-Sensitive Expressions

I noted in Chapter  that there are two central classes of data often thought prob-
lematic for contextualism: data concerning the behavior of CR-expressions in dis-
course disagreements, and data concerning the interpretation of CR-expressions in
various embedded contexts. This chapter begins our investigation of CR-expressions
in discourse by examining the former class of data. For concreteness I couch the
discussion in terms of epistemic modals, i.e. epistemic uses of modal verbs such
as ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘must’. Other types of CR-expressions will be considered in later
chapters.
§. presents a standard version of the objection from discourse disagreement—
contextualism’s “Achilles’ heel” (MacFarlane : ), according to some. §.
considers several strategies of reply common in the literature, but argues that they
are insufficient. The depth of the problem raised by disagreement phenomena
has not been adequately appreciated by contextualists. As a way toward a more
adequate solution, §. provides new data illustrating that the same sort of seemingly
problematic disagreement phenomena found with CR-expressions can also arise with
paradigm context-sensitive expressions. §. assesses the dialectical import of the
cases I provide for developments of contextualism. §. motivates a diagnosis of the
broader spectrum of discourse disagreement examples. This elucidates the structure
of a more successful contextualist account. Developing this account forms the task of
the remainder of the book.

. Epistemic Modals and Discourse Disagreement

Epistemic modals are interpreted—in some sense sense to be further specified—with
respect to a body of information (evidence, beliefs, knowledge, etc.; differences in
which epistemic relation is relevant won’t matter in what follows). Sometimes this
body of information is made linguistically explicit, like in ().
() In view of Sally’s evidence, the butler might be the killer.
The phrase ‘in view of Sally’s evidence’ specifies that it is Sally’s evidence that figures in
the interpretation of ‘might’. Roughly, () says that Sally’s evidence is compatible with

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 discourse contextualism

the butler’s being the killer. Other times no particular body of information is explicitly
specified, like in ().
() The butler might be the killer.
Following common usage, call sentences like () bare epistemic modal sentences; and
call epistemic modals that occur in such sentences bare epistemic modals. It is bare
epistemic modals that will be the focus of the following chapters. Unless otherwise
noted, by ‘epistemic modal’ I will mean “bare epistemic modal,” and by ‘epistemic
modal sentence (utterance, assertion, claim)’ I will mean “bare epistemic modal
sentence (utterance, assertion, claim).”
Our evaluations of epistemic modal sentences depend on what our epistemic state
is like. () can seem acceptable if you don’t know whether the butler is the killer
but unacceptable if you know that he isn’t. Contextualists and relativists, in contrast
to invariantists, claim that this dependence of our evaluation of epistemic modal
sentences on our epistemic state derives from a dependence of the interpretation of
epistemic modals on a contextually relevant body of information. They agree that the
truth value of an epistemic modal sentence can vary across parameters of interpreta-
tion (contexts of utterance, circumstances of evaluation, contexts of assessment) even
if everything else in the world remains constant.
Contextualists claim that this context-dependence, broadly construed, is to be
understood as a dependence of the semantic (conventional) content of an epistemic
modal sentence on features of the context of utterance, those features that determine
some contextually relevant body of information. Contextualism treats () as context-
sensitive in the same kind of way as sentences with paradigm context-sensitive
expressions. What information is conveyed by () depends on which female is most
salient in the discourse context.
() She won a medal.
In a context where Anna is most salient, () communicates that Anna won a medal;
but in a context where Betty is most salient, () communicates that Betty won a medal.
Likewise, according to contextualism, in a context where Annette’s information iA
is relevant, () communicates (roughly) that iA is compatible with the butler’s being
the killer; but in a context where Ben’s information iB is relevant, () communicates
(roughly) that iB is compatible with the butler’s being the killer. What () convention-
ally communicates, and whether it is true or false, depends on what information is
relevant in the discourse context.1
1 I will use terms like ‘conversation’, ‘discourse’, ‘utterance’, etc. broadly, so as to include uses of language
in texts and in individual deliberation, and not simply in spoken dialogue. For the moment I gloss over
differences between sentences-in-context and utterances, and between truth conditions and information
conventionally conveyed. We will return to the importance of these distinctions in the following chapters
(see esp. §§., .). For now, my talk about the semantic properties of utterances can be understood as short
for talk about the semantic properties of the sentences uttered in the contexts of those utterances. Following
Yalcin , there may be reasons to avoid using ‘(semantic) content’ as a label for a compositional semantic

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accommodation and negotiation 

Contextualism treats a particular body of information determined by the context

of utterance as figuring in the truth conditions of an epistemic modal sentence. So, to
give a proper account of the meanings of epistemic modals in context, the contextualist
must provide a general account of what body of information is supplied as a function
of the context of utterance and figures in deriving semantic content. The putative
problem is that there doesn’t seem to be any way of specifying the contextually relevant
information that explains both (a) how we’re in a position to make the epistemic
modal claims that we seem licensed in making (call it the justified use condition), and
(b) how we can reasonably disagree with one another’s epistemic modal claims (call it
the disagreement condition).2
Suppose a class test is coming up. Alice is unsure when it is, so she decides to ask
Bert. The following dialogue ensues:
() Alice: When is the test?
Bert: I’m not sure. The test may be on Monday.
Alice: No, the test can’t be on Monday. The teacher never gives tests right after
the weekend. It must be later in the week.
What body or bodies of information should the contextualist say figures in the contents
of Bert’s use of epistemic ‘may’ and Alice’s use of epistemic ‘can’t’ and ‘must’?
Suppose, first, that Bert’s utterance of () is just about his own information.
() The test may be on Monday.
Assuming Bert is in a position to make a claim about his epistemic state, this captures
how Bert is justified in making his epistemic modal utterance. But it becomes unclear

value in context. My use of ‘content’ for this type of semantic object makes no assumptions about its potential
broader theoretical role. See also the Appendix.
By ‘contextualism’ I will mean “Utterance Contextualism” in the sense of the Appendix—also called
‘indexical relativism’ (Wright , Kölbel , Dreier ), ‘revisionism’ (Kölbel ), and
‘indexical contextualism’ (MacFarlane b). To a first approximation, by ‘relativism’ I mean the view
that no particular body of information figures in the semantic content of an epistemic modal sentence, and
that epistemic modal sentences in context (or token epistemic modal utterances) can have different truth
values relative to different assessors in the same world. I characterize a more precise typology of views in
the Appendix (see also §§., .). See Ch.  n.  for references.
In the literature on pragmatic enrichment, ‘contextualism’ refers to the view that context affects asserted
content in ways that go beyond supplying values for free variables and other semantically context-sensitive
material in the syntax (e.g. Recanati , , Bach , Sperber & Wilson , Travis ,
Bezuidenhout , Carston , Soames ; see Stanley  for the classic critique). Since such
views would assimilate the context-sensitivity of CR-expressions to an alleged radically general context-
sensitivity in language, I won’t be considering them in this book (cf. also Ludlow ). I use ‘contextualism’
to refer to the more circumscribed view described in the main text.
2 For discussion of this style of objection in the broader literature, see e.g. Gibbard , , Wright
, , , Kölbel , , DeRose , Richard , , , Egan et al. ,
Lasersohn , Stanley , Egan , , Glanzberg , MacFarlane a, , ,
Stephenson b, von Fintel & Gillies , Dreier , Swanson a, Yablo , Stalnaker
. For prescient early discussion in the case of normative language, see Moore : ch. , Stevenson
, a.

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 discourse contextualism

how Alice can reasonably disagree with him. And it becomes unclear how in uttering
() Alice is disagreeing with Bert, given that they are making claims about their
respective information.
() No, the test can’t be on Monday.
Let m be the proposition that the test is Monday. Alice and Bert can agree about
whether m is compatible with their respective information states while disagreeing
with what one another says. Alice’s linguistic denial in () is felicitous, whereas B’s in
() is not.

() A: In view of Bert’s evidence, the test may be on Monday.

B: #No, in view of Alice’s evidence, the test can’t be on Monday.

This puts pressure on the claim that () and () explicitly specify the semantic contents
of () and (), respectively.

() In view of Bert’s evidence, the test may be on Monday.

() In view of Alice’s evidence, the test can’t be on Monday.

Suppose instead that we treat epistemic modal claims as claims about the pooled
information of a relevant group. Then we can capture how Alice and Bert make incon-
sistent claims. But it becomes unclear how Bert is in a position to make a claim about
whether the test may be on Monday, which, intuitively, he is. It can be appropriate for
Bert to utter () even if he doesn’t know whether Alice is uncertain about m.
In sum, the objection from disagreement is that if we treat epistemic modal
utterances as about the speaker’s information (“speaker contextualism”), we capture
the justified use condition but leave the disagreement condition unexplained; but
if we treat epistemic modal utterances as about the pooled information of a larger
group (“group contextualism”), we capture the disagreement condition but leave the
justified use unexplained. There seems to be no general way of specifying what body of
information is relevant as a function of context that captures all our intuitions. In using
epistemic modals speakers express their states of mind and manage which possibilities
are treated as live. A contextualist semantics seems ill-suited to capture this. Or so the
objection goes.
Before proceeding I would like to make several clarificatory remarks on the scope of
the present discussion of agreement and disagreement. First, following the consensus
I assume that there is a disagreement between the speakers in dialogues such as
(), and moreover that there is some aspect of the disagreement that needs to be
explained by a linguistic theory. This isn’t to say that a linguistic theory needs to give a
general philosophical account of the nature of disagreement. We won’t be attempting
to provide any such thing. Of course not all disagreements are verbally expressed
in linguistic exchanges. (Inter-conversational disagreements will be considered in
§...) But for our purposes we can focus on a certain discourse phenomenon:

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accommodation and negotiation 

the licensing of expressions of linguistic denial (in English, ‘no’, ‘nope’, ‘nu-uh’, etc.)
in discourses such as (). These expressions signal the speaker’s discourse move of
rejecting (denying, objecting to) some aspect of the previous utterance. Not all cases
in which speakers intuitively disagree can be marked in this way. B’s “disagreement in
attitude” with A in () couldn’t typically be signaled with a linguistic denial.
() A: I like Mexican food.
B: #No, I don’t. I like Thai.
Our task is to generate a representation of discourses like () that correctly predicts
the felicity of expressions of linguistic denial and the discourse moves they mark.
Second, in calling discourses like () ‘disagreements’ I am not making any theoreti-
cal assumptions about at what level the disagreement ought to be explained. My usage
is compatible with semantic or pragmatic explanations. A common way to explain
why linguistic denial is licensed is to posit that the semantic or asserted contents of the
speakers’ utterances are incompatible. Indeed, such a view was implicit in the standard
worry for speaker contextualism described above. However, no such specific account
of disagreement is built into the data to be explained. Alternative explanations are
possible, at least in principle (and, I will argue, not merely in principle).
Third, many authors have expressed the intuition that discourse disagreements like
() are in some sense “faultless.” Saying that Alice and Bert disagree doesn’t itself
imply that one of them must be making a cognitive mistake. Yet nothing in our
characterization of the objection to contextualism, or in the discussion to follow,
requires taking a stand on this issue one way or the other.3

. Insufficient Replies

The epicycles from here are involved. I will spare the reader many of the details (see
n. ). For now I simply would like to consider two possible lines of reply. I mention
these specifically because I think there is something importantly right about them,
though they are insufficiently explanatory as they stand. The positive contextualist
account to be developed in this book can be understood as attempting to capture the
intuitions driving these responses in a more rigorous, explanatory way.

.. The Varieties of Linguistic Denial. Metacontextual Negotiation

A common contextualist strategy is to try to explain disagreement phenomena prag-
matically, in terms of non-conventional aspects of the use of epistemic modals. Many
contextualists note that denials can target various non-truth-conditional aspects of

3 For general discussion of the notion of faultless disagreement and its role (for better or worse) in
contextualism-relativism debates, see e.g. Wright , Kölbel , , MacFarlane a, ,
von Fintel & Gillies , Richard , Cappelen & Hawthorne , Dreier .

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 discourse contextualism

utterances—e.g. presuppositions, implicatures, aspects of linguistic form, salient or

topical propositions, or non-linguistic changes in the conversational situation.4 B’s
denial in () targets a presupposition of A’s utterance, and B’s denial in () targets
a scalar implicature.
() A: The king of France was at the awards ceremony.
B: No, there is no king of France.
() A: Sally won two medals.
B: No, she won three.
So, the speaker contextualist might say that the proposition targeted by Bert’s denial in
() isn’t Alice’s “autobiographical report”—the semantic content of her utterance—but
rather “the proposition that he would have asserted by uttering the same sentence”
(Björnsson & Finlay : ). One might say that even though, semantically, Bert’s
utterance in () just makes a claim about his own information, the primary implication
he intends to convey is a pragmatically related proposition to which Alice is licensed
in objecting. (We can bracket what type of implication this might be, e.g. implicature,
presupposition, etc.) One candidate is an implication that Alice’s information state
ought to be as Bert’s is. It is this implication, the reply continues, which is felicitously
targeted by Alice’s denial. In uttering () and (), Alice and Bert “pragmatically
advocate” (Plunkett & Sundell a) for their respective information.
Contextualists have been right to emphasize that incompatibility of conventionally
asserted content isn’t necessary for discourse disagreement. I am sympathetic with the
informal impression that in dialogues like () the interlocutors are disagreeing about
what sort of context to be in—specifically, about what possibilities to treat as live in
the conversation. Intuitively, Alice and Bert are disagreeing, not about whether the
test’s being Monday is compatible with such-and-such body of information, but rather
about what the operative body of information is to be. Simply noting this, however, is
insufficient. The question isn’t whether such “metacontextual” or “discourse-oriented”
negotiations are possible. The challenge is to explain why they are so systematic with
epistemic modals, given that a contextualist semantics is correct. The force of this
challenge has gone underappreciated by contextualists.5
The above contextualist reply turns on positing that the implications systematically
targeted by linguistic denials—and affirmations, for that matter—in discourses with

4 For discussion see Lasersohn : –; von Fintel & Gillies : –; Dietz : –;
Björnsson & Finlay : –; Sundell : –; Plunkett & Sundell a: –, b: –
. For general discussion of linguistic denial, see Horn , van der Sandt , Geurts a, Carston
, van Leusen .
5 See Cappelen , Björnsson & Finlay , Sundell , Huvenes , Plunkett & Sundell
a,b, Finlay a,b, Stalnaker : chs. – (cf. Recanati : –, Schaffer : ); see
also n. . For appeals to this function of epistemic modals in managing the set of live possibilities in
arguments for non-contextualist theories, see esp. Richard , , Swanson b, a; see also
Price , Veltman , Portner a, Stephenson b, Yalcin , , a, MacFarlane
, Swanson a, Yablo .

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accommodation and negotiation 

epistemic modals are implications other than the utterances’ semantic contents.
However, surprisingly little attention has been given to what specific mechanisms
are responsible for this, or how these mechanisms are linguistically constrained (see
n. )—i.e. how (dis)agreement phenomena can be derived from the specific semantic
contents, general conversational principles, and general features of contexts of use.
This raises the question, first, why the alleged (non-semantic) implications follow so
systematically. When an utterance of ‘φ’ systematically triggers the specific implication
that ψ, we typically expect this implication to be derivable from some aspect of the
conventional meaning of ‘φ’ (perhaps along with general features of contexts of use).
It is unclear which aspect this would be with epistemic modals, given that they make
ordinary descriptive claims about the information of the speaker or a relevant group.
‘I’m hungry’ doesn’t (systematically) trigger an implication that the addressee ought
to be hungry.
Second, it is puzzling why the putative implications associated with epistemic modal
utterances should be specifically normative in nature. According to contextualism,
epistemic modal sentences have ordinary representational contents; they have a mind-
to-world direction of fit. Even if we find examples of ordinary descriptive claims
sometimes having normative implications—consider ‘It’s cold in here’  ‘You should
shut the window’—it’s not as if they systematically carry those particular normative
implications across uses. Why, then, should descriptive claims about one’s information
systematically communicate normative claims about what information to accept?
Simply appealing to linguistically unconstrained pragmatic mechanisms
obscures the contrasts between epistemic modals and paradigm context-sensitive
expressions (more on which shortly). When speakers use paradigm context-sensitive
expressions with different intended asserted contents, the norm isn’t disagreement,
but talking past. Denials like B’s in ()–() are typically infelicitous.

() A: I’m hungry.

B: #No, I’m not hungry.
() A: That is a cute baby. [said demonstrating b]
B: #No, that isn’t a cute a baby. [said demonstrating b ]

‘I’m hungry’ doesn’t systematically trigger an implication that the addressee ought to
be hungry. ‘That [demonstrating b] is a cute baby’ doesn’t systematically trigger an
implication that the addressee ought to be demonstrating b. One is left wondering why
the assumed pragmatic mechanisms which license linguistic denials with epistemic
modals couldn’t (and systematically don’t) also apply with paradigm context-sensitive
expressions. Why would the semantic contents of epistemic modal utterances, unlike
other utterances, typically not have main point status? Why, with epistemic modals,
would speakers systematically assert propositions they don’t have a “fundamental
interest” in (Finlay b: ; cf. a: –, –, –)? The distinctiveness
of epistemic modals’ behavior in discourse still needs to be explained.

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 discourse contextualism

.. Epistemic Modals in a Language Game

This section describes a contextualist response inspired by Keith DeRose’s (, )
“Single Scoreboard Semantics,” which is itself inspired by David Lewis’s (b) notion
of the “score” of a conversation (cf. Zeevat ).
In his seminal “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” David Lewis proposed that a
conversational context and its evolution over time can be modeled on analogy with
a sports game. There are facts about a conversation that bear on the interpretation
and felicity of utterances, facts which are themselves affected by utterances and other
changes in the context. These facts can be represented by an abstract structure, or
“scoreboard,” which includes various contextual parameters. Just as sections on a
scoreboard change as the game progresses, contextual parameters take on different
values over the course of the conversation. Changes in these parameter values can be
used to model the evolution of the conversation.
One important component of the conversational score is the common ground—
roughly, the set of propositions that the conversational participants take for granted
for the purposes of the conversation (Stalnaker , , Clark ). A related
notion is the context set, the set of possible worlds in which all the propositions in the
common ground are true. This represents the “live possibilities” in the conversation,
the possibilities among which the participants intend to distinguish. Including the
common ground in the score captures a crucial goal of conversation: to share infor-
mation, to figure out how the world is. We winnow down the context set as we share
information and settle on a more complete picture of the world.
Interpretation is often a joint project. This point is nicely highlighted by the
scoreboard model. Though each conversational participant may have a particular
view of what ought to be accepted in the conversation, there is, at any point in
the discourse, a single scoreboard that represents the information that is treated as
relevant in the conversation. A not implausible move is to treat epistemic modals as
interpreted with respect to this discourse-level body of information. Bracketing for the
moment how this context-sensitivity is encoded in the syntax and semantics, we might
represent the truth-conditional contents of Bert’s and Alice’s respective utterances
as in (), where CG is the common ground and m is the proposition that the test
is Monday.
() a. CG is compatible with m
b. CG is incompatible with m
So, since CG figures in the contents of both Alice’s and Bert’s utterances, Alice denies
what Bert says (cf. DeRose : ).
This is a tidy reply, perhaps too tidy. The scoreboard model is just that—a model. It
must be given an interpretation. On a contextualist interpretation of the scoreboard
model, the value of the common ground parameter helps determine the semantic

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Another random document with
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 Those who failed to be elected felt, of course, various degrees of
disappointment and envy. Some proposed forming a scrub team of
the left-overs. Others were afraid that this would show the “team”
that they were jealous of them; whereas, they had been putting on a
brave front by saying to their classmates that they would not have
accepted a position on the team even if they had been elected.
The entire school grounds occupied about half a city block. This
space had to be shared with the boys and girls in all the other grades.
It naturally followed that there was little space to be used by each
room.
Miss Darnell’s eighth grade ball team girls were anxious to bring
fame to themselves as champion players. Mr. Warren’s thrilling
speech still rang in their ears. His slogan, “We’ll beat ’em!” was
passed from lip to lip. As a result of this enthusiasm, this special
team wished to play ball at every intermission and before and after
school. When they played, the rest of the girls in Miss Darnell’s room
were obliged to keep off the ground allotted to that room. The girls
who rebelled against being nothing but “fans” were called “disloyal to
their own team” or “green with jealousy.” The play periods were no
longer enjoyed by all, but distinct factions arose, consisting of team
and “fans,” and as the team grew more and more determined to use
the grounds at every available minute the “fans” became less and less
enthusiastic in their support.

CONSTRUCTIVE TREATMENT

Mr. Warren did wrong to deprive any pupil of a right use of the
playground or gymnasium.
When teams are formed, limit the time they may use the field and
apparatus so as to accommodate those who are not on the teams at
some time during the day.

COMMENTS

Mr. Warren’s prime motive in asking to have ball teams elected

was to have the girls take delight in vigorous, outdoor sport. In that
respect his plan was ideal, but he failed to take into account in any
way whatsoever those children who were not on the team. Children
are quick to feel an injustice. Their usual mode of reaction is either to
resent the teacher’s action or to be jealous of the favored ones. No
plan should be advocated or even tolerated that does not give
reasonable consideration to the rights and welfare of all the pupils.

ILLUSTRATION (EIGHTH GRADE)

A new gymnasium had just been erected Sharing Dances

at Horton and the principal, Mr. Bergen,
was anxious to have all get the benefit of it. The eighth grade girls
under Miss Vance were especially pleased with this fine play room.
One of their number, Stella Day, had been taking lessons in dancing
and promised to teach her special friends the new steps. It so turned
out that Miss Vance herself was interested in these new dances and
enjoyed watching the lessons. But the majority of the girls in her
room cared nothing about dancing and indeed if they had cared the
“lessons” were not at all open to them, since only eight of the twenty-
one girls were invited to take any part in this exercise.
Mr. Bergen had carefully arranged the gymnasium program so that
each room might use it every day. The first time he watched Miss
Vance’s pupils at “gym” work he was surprised to find so few taking
the exercises and furthermore to see that the onlookers were not
even enjoying the watching of the dancers. This led him to surmise
that they did not take turns in their exercises, otherwise the dejected
look would not have been seen on the faces of the observers.
Mr. Bergen made a mental note of those who were dancing and
returned the next day to see if the same girls were occupying the
whole of the teacher’s attention. Finding that such was the case he
explained to Miss Vance that all of her pupils must be really
interested in watching or actually engaged in every game during the
exercise period. Following his advice, Miss Vance changed the
exercise to games in which all could take part, thus making a
legitimate use of the gymnasium period.
CASE 128 (HIGH SCHOOL)

Elizabeth Dyer seemed to be naturally Taking the Best

selfish. When the classes were sent to do
blackboard work she invariably chose the place where the light was
the best. When the crayons were passed she took the unused one.
One of the new erasers was always in her hand. When the class was
called she always took the recitation bench nearest the teacher, etc.,
etc.
Little Susan Dillman said to a group of girls on the way home from
school one evening,
“Girls, I’m going to tell Bess Dyer what I think of her.”
“Oh, no, you don’t dare,” said the other girls.
“You’ll see,” said Susan.
That night Susan thought out her plan. She invited three of her
closest friends to her home the next evening and disclosed her plan.
She had composed this bit of rhyme:

“Just guess if you can

What girl in our class
Appropriates always the best,
Be it crayon or book,
By hook or by crook
She’ll beat to it all of the rest.”

“Now girls, here in the library is Sam’s typewriter. Let’s each write
a part of this so we can all say we didn’t write it and lay it on
Elizabeth’s desk tomorrow.” All were agreed, so one after another
took a turn at writing. After many copies were spoiled they finally
wrote one that pleased them. Each took a turn at addressing the
envelope. When it was sealed they said, “E-ne me-ne mi-ne mo,” etc.,
to find out who was to place this on Elizabeth’s desk. The lot fell to
Lulu Miller, but she would do it only on condition that Sue go with
her and help her place it. The next morning the girls went to school
as soon as the doors were opened. They found nobody in the
assembly room, so they opened Elizabeth’s geometry text at that
day’s lesson. Each took hold of one corner of the envelope and placed
it in the book. Then they returned the book to the desk and went into
the history room where they diligently studied the maps until school
opened.
After opening exercises the four guilty girls watched from a corner
of their eyes to see Elizabeth get her missive. Susan saw her take out
the letter, open it and blush scarlet, while she wiped away tears of
vexation. Soon Elizabeth with letter in hand walked up to Mr.
Davidson’s desk and talked to him a few minutes. When she came
away again she didn’t have the letter.
The girls had not counted upon this turn of affairs.
Before school closed Mr. Davidson asked who put the note in
Elizabeth’s geometry. Nobody answered. He then questioned
everybody one at a time and each answered “No” to the question.
“Did you put it there?” Susan and Lulu tried to think they told the
truth because they neither of them did it alone.
Mr. Davidson said, “All right, we’ll stay right here till we find out
the guilty party.” Some laughed, others pouted and a few who drove
to school from the country looked worried. Mr. Davidson said,
“Somebody in this room knows who did that. I’m sorry to think
anybody is mean enough to keep all of his schoolmates in because he
will not tell the truth.”
Still nobody confessed. Mr. Davidson waited and scolded by turns
until dusk, all to no purpose. The girls’ fear of exposure, to say
nothing of confession, grew greater with every speech he made. He
finally dismissed the school, after saying that he would find the
culprit and suspend him.
Daily Mr. Davidson referred publicly to the note and made threats
as to what he would do with the guilty one. These frequent references
to the affair helped Elizabeth to remember her fault and practically
cured her of it. But the guilty ones were never found out and Mr.
Davidson had four pupils whose joy and efficiency in school work
were greatly diminished.

CONSTRUCTIVE TREATMENT

When you see that a pupil is truly selfish begin at once to treat
him. First find out, if possible, how this trait was developed and then
begin to correct the false notions. Say to the selfish one, “I want you
to study the pupils of this room this week, and tell me of all the
unselfish deeds done that you can make note of, and why you think
them unselfish.” Of course, other pupils will be given similar topics
and the reports, as well as the original requests, will be made in
public. These character studies may be connected with literature in
place of the fictitious personalities which are often studied.
When wishing to find the writer of a note go to work at it privately.
Having once made a threat do not lightly disregard it. Do not give
over to your pupils matters of discipline which you should attend to
yourself.

COMMENTS

Mr. Davidson doubtless knew that Elizabeth was selfish, but took
no measures to correct the fault. Some teachers say they are not
employed as character builders but only as instructors in secular
matters. The truth is, however, that they cannot escape instructing in
morals. Elizabeth was growing more selfish. The question as to
whether character grows during school life is settled. Pupils do
change in character. The teacher has no choice. He either confirms or
breaks up bad habits. The principle of substitution enables the selfish
pupil to grow less selfish by the study and admiration of unselfish
pupils and adults. It is in order to call forth this admiration that the
student is asked to tell why he names certain acts unselfish.
Teachers make mistakes often by publicly announcing a
misdemeanor about which there would otherwise be little known.
Cases where immediate danger does not threaten should not be
made public. Private inquiry is always much more fruitful of good
results. Public confession is especially hard. Furthermore, the
sidetracking of legitimate school interests by much discussion of
misdemeanors can be minimized by letting as few persons as
possible know about the wrong deed.
Threats that are not carried out weaken the teacher’s control.
Patient study and planning will show the teacher a way to cure
selfishness. By judicious observation a teacher can discover attitudes
taken toward a pupil by his schoolmates and these will be of great
value to him in any attempt at corrective measures.
It is doubtless true that the schoolmates often develop a wise and
effective cure for some wrong trait or attitude. In such cases they
may be permitted to carry out their program, without the connivance
of the teacher. But a close examination of the conditions is needful,
so that neglect of unformed characters may not be appropriately
charged against a teacher.

ILLUSTRATION (HIGH SCHOOL)

Earl Foley was fifteen years old when he entered high school and
came under the control of its principal, Mr. Mullendore.
Earl was large, with a round face, thick lips, a big mouth and a too
ready smile. He was very active and learned easily, but was
unmannerly and above all, selfish. He invariably selected the best for
himself, stood between others and the teacher, gave his views
unsought, and in many little ways annoyed his teachers and
companions.
Mr. Mullendore discovered that the boy Selfish Manners
simply needed teaching, so he decided that
in his private talks with Earl he would use illustrations easily
understood. He asked Earl one day what famous person he admired
above all others. Finding the man to be Lincoln, Mr. Mullendore
talked of Lincoln’s unselfishness and humility and even asked Earl
what kind of pencil he thought Lincoln would have taken if passed a
box containing one good pencil, and the others second grade, Lincoln
knowing, meanwhile, that all would be used by his classmates. Mr.
Mullendore talked of Earl’s work on the farm and asked him to recall
the practice of pigs, cattle and fowls in getting their share of food. He
asked Earl to study out the cause for the development of
unselfishness in the human race.
All this was said without a single reference to Earl’s own traits. It
seemed a part of the study of Lincoln. Earl was not slow to apply the
suggestions of the lesson, however, and before many months had
passed he was one of the most unselfish pupils in the high school.
 (2) Jealousy. Some one has truly said, “In jealousy there is more
self-love than love.” It is an attitude which develops early, however.
Even very young children will sometimes destroy an object rather
than have it fall into the hands of another. As a rule the smaller the
number of individuals in competition and the narrower the range of
their interests the more intense will be the jealousy between them.
The teacher’s problems are complicated by jealousies in two ways:
(1) by a spirit of unkindly rivalry among patrons of the school, a
feeling which is sure to be reflected in the attitudes of the pupils
toward each other, and (2) by a spirit of jealousy arising among and
limited to the pupils themselves.
The first type has been treated incidentally in other parts of
Practical School Discipline and need not be further dealt with here.
The second type, fortunately, is not a very common cause of trouble
in the well ordered school-room, but it is a fault so harmful to the
child himself and in adult life, so harmful to all who come within its
blighting influence, that it can not be too carefully watched and
checked in its early development.
During adolescence and afterwards, jealous attitudes arise mainly
out of sports and out of competition for sex recognition and
appreciation. Jealousy breeds an angry resentment toward a person
who holds or seems likely to acquire one’s property or personal
privilege. It embraces a feeling of fear and a sense of helplessness in
the face of the aggressor. It develops an enlarged appreciation of the
treasures involved and a disposition to care for them by violence, or
if defence is useless, to destroy them.
Jealousy, envy, rivalry and covetousness are only varying forms of
the same anti-social attitude of selfishness. Tact and patience on the
part of parent and teacher and the judicious application of the Five
Fundamental Principles will uproot them all in time.

CASE 129 (THIRD GRADE)

Julia Jenkins was a beautiful child with a sunny disposition and an

inclination toward sociability. Her voice was well modulated for a
child, and her manners were charming. She loved everybody. Her
dresses were fashionable, dainty and immaculate, her curls always
becomingly arranged. Altogether she was such a child as one delights
to see, one who brought a smile to the faces of almost all whom she
met, strangers as well as friends. As she entered the third grade
school-room for the first time, Miss Elliot, the teacher, exclaimed,
“What a darling!”
Among other pupils in the room was Caroline Hillis, a timid little
girl with a solemn, little old-looking face. Her language was crude,
her manner unpolished and her dresses ill-fitting, coarse and faded.
She was the eldest of four children and long before she reached the
third grade was considered by her mother too big to be kissed and
petted.
How Caroline watched Julia! at first with Jealous of
admiration only. But as the days went by Playmate
her attitude gradually changed to jealousy. Julia always knew her
lessons. Julia’s language was always correct. Julia never slammed
doors or walked noisily, and oh, most enviable privilege of all, Julia
often stood near Miss Elliot as she sat at her desk and put her arm
around the teacher’s neck. At such times Miss Elliot smiled at Julia
in an intimate way. How much Caroline would give to be able to
stand there thus and show her love for Miss Elliot in the same way
but she simply could not. Little did Miss Elliot think that Caroline
had planned to do just that very thing. As Caroline lay in bed before
she went to sleep she thought, “Now, tomorrow I’ll ask Miss Elliot
how to work a problem and I’ll stand by her and put my arm around
her neck, just as Julia does and Miss Elliot will look at me just as she
does at Julia.”
But alas! just as Caroline tremblingly approached Miss Elliot,
thinking to carry out her plan, the teacher arose to discover the
location of a mild disturbance in the back of the room and Caroline
in confusion told her errand and went back to her seat where she
shyly brushed aside a few stray tears. With heroic courage she
decided to try it again and this time she found Miss Elliot seated, but
before Caroline reached her she said hurriedly, “What is it,
Caroline?” with no smile and in such a matter-of-fact voice that
Caroline stammered her question before she really reached Miss
Elliot’s side. It was of no use. She didn’t believe Miss Elliot liked her
as well as she did Julia. Whereas Miss Elliot soliloquized, “What an
awkward, timid, unlovable child Caroline is today, she seemed afraid
of me. I know the rest of the children like me. I can’t pet her in order
to win her confidence. I’ve got to treat them all alike.” Because
Caroline regarded her teacher with such sad eyes, the idea grew in
Miss Elliot’s mind that Caroline disliked her.
In Caroline’s mind the thought persisted that Julia was favored by
everybody. She began to think of Julia’s faults. As she sought them
earnestly she found them: Julia always talked too much, she liked too
well to speak of her brother Eugene who was in college, she talked of
Miss Elliot as if she owned her.
One day a little girl spoke of her doll, another of a doll’s party and
soon Julia said, “Oh, girls, let’s all bring a doll tomorrow and have a
dolls’ party at recess! Wouldn’t that be fun?” All agreed but Caroline,
who was on the edge of the group. Her downcast face was unnoticed.
The truth is that Caroline’s only doll was badly soiled and somewhat
dismembered.
Julia easily gained the encouragement of Miss Elliot in her plan for
the next day. Some of the girls went early with their dolls. Julia’s was
a cunning little character doll. Caroline brought none. She imagined
that she could hear Miss Elliot say, “How cunning!” as she looked at
Julia’s doll, and then Julia and the teacher would exchange that
intimate smile; Caroline would be the only one who had no doll. She
never could have Miss Elliot’s approval.
While Caroline was feeling rather than thinking all this Julia said,
“Let’s lay all our dolls on Miss Elliot’s desk and then when she comes
have her guess which one belongs to which girl.”
“That will be fun,” said the others, so it was quickly done. Caroline
stood at a little distance feeling left out of the fun.
“Let’s go and meet Miss Elliot,” said Julia, “and tell her about it.
Soon all the girls but Caroline were out of the room and starting
down the street.
Caroline presently said to herself, “I’ll hide her doll and then I
guess Miss Elliot can’t brag about it.”
She cast her eyes about the room for a hiding place. There stood
the piano! Mrs. Fitzhugh had said yesterday that she kept her ring in
the piano. Hastily grabbing up Julia’s doll Caroline stood upon the
piano bench and lifting the lid of the upright piano, laid the doll
inside upon the hammers, closed the lid and jumped down to the
floor just in time to gain a place by the window before the girls and
Miss Elliot came in.
They led Miss Elliot to her desk, having already told her what they
wanted her to do. Almost immediately they noticed that Julia’s doll
was gone. Caroline, now remorseful and silent, was questioned. She
said she knew nothing about it. The girls sought everywhere for the
doll until school time, Caroline helping them look into desks and on
closet shelves.
Caroline, growing more and more remorseful as one girl after
another pitied Julia, resolved to return to the room at noon time,
when everybody was out of the room, and put the doll on Julia’s
desk.
Imagine Caroline’s dismay when the piano was found out of order
by Miss Elliot as soon as she started to play the opening song.
Miss Elliot opened the piano lid and gave a little start. There was
the lost doll! Julia rushed for it and cuddled it. Molly said aloud,
“How did it get there?” Caroline hung her head and Miss Elliot
looked very grave.
“Caroline, come here,” she said. “Why did you put Julia’s doll into
the piano?”
“I don’t know,” said Caroline, with a degree of truth.
“It is a marvel that it isn’t broken. I’ll have to whip you for that.”
Taking a strap kept for the purpose Miss Elliot explained to
Caroline that she had lied as well as concealed the doll with a
probable hope of stealing it later. She then gave the child a severe
whipping. Caroline dumbly felt that she was misjudged and yet could
not explain why, even to herself.

CONSTRUCTIVE TREATMENT

Miss Elliot should have satisfied herself fully as to the motive

underlying Caroline’s action before punishing her. Always delay a
punishment until you have found the real cause of the misdemeanor.
When a child shows a tendency to withdraw from group activities
take special pains to draw him into the play circle. Take the timid
child by the hand rather than the one who rushes to you. Say to the
child who shrinks back into her corner, “We need one more little girl
here.” Hold out your hand toward her as you speak. The gesture will
reinforce the words, and be to the child a suggestion of welcome into
the group.

COMMENTS

There is no more faulty method of discipline than that of severely

punishing a child for some outbreak against moral or school law
before a hearing has been given him; not merely giving a chance to
confess his wrong, but going to the bottom of the matter and finding,
if possible, the underlying motive or instinct which led up to the
outbreak. Skillful questioning ought to bring this out.
Very often the slow and timid child is longing for your friendship
but does not know how to show his desire. Whether or not he is
conscious of needing your aid, he, nevertheless, does need it.

ILLUSTRATION (SIXTH GRADE)

June Dacey was a frail city girl whose health was such that her
parents feared to send her to the public schools in New York. One
September morning June’s father said to her: “June, how would you
like to spend a year in the country and attend school with your
cousins?”
June thought it would be, “Just fine!” and Mr. Dacey was not long
in arranging with his brother in Massachusetts to receive June into
his home and to see her well started in the country school.
All went well until June’s cousin Carrie Dacey began to show signs
of jealousy toward June. The two girls were just of an age, but Carrie
was an unusually vigorous, strong, healthy girl with double the
amount of endurance possessed by June. As a consequence the two
girls received very different treatment by their elders and even in a
half unconscious way by the other children who were, indeed,
somewhat overawed by June’s pretty clothes and refined manners.
“O, yes! of course June can have everything and I can’t have
anything,” said Carrie one day in a fit of petulance. “She has all the
nice clothes and I have to wear this old thing. She can ride to the
picnic while I have to walk. The teacher is always doing things for her
and nobody ever does anything for me. At home it’s just the same
way, June gets all the attention.”
Miss Scott, the teacher, happened to overhear the remark,
although it was not intended for her, and was thereby made
conscious of the ill-will that was springing up between the two girls.
She had had no desire to show partiality in any way toward June but
only to protect the frail girl from too fatiguing sport. Now she said to
herself, “This won’t do! We shall have a tragedy here soon! I must
think out some plan to overcome this feeling between the two
cousins.”
It so happened that the children had for their reading lesson “The
Story of the Twins.” The story was full of activity and fun and
mischief and the children liked it. Miss Scott had promised the class
that when they could read it very well they might dramatize it some
day.
“You two girls who are just of an age must be our twins,” said Miss
Scott, “the other children may take the other parts. Mary and Jane,
come help me make this crepe paper into costumes for ‘the twins.’
They must dress just alike.”
The children caught the idea, and, just as Miss Scott intended they
should do, immediately nicknamed the two girls “The Twins.” Miss
Scott strengthened the tendency still further by saying occasionally,
in a playful way, “Will the twins pass the paint boxes for us?” “Will
the twins collect the pencils?”
Carrie was soon quite cured of her jealous complainings. Through
suggestion, the feeling of coöperation and comradeship had been
substituted for the selfish emotion of jealousy, and in thus being
linked together in school duties and sports, in a way, too, that
emphasized the relation of equality, the two children soon became
firm friends.

CASE 130 (EIGHTH GRADE)

Wendell Smith was a son of Dr. Smith, one of the most influential
men in the village. He was handsome, well-dressed, well-mannered
and very intelligent. He had delightful books, mechanical and
constructive toys, a bicycle, a watch, and now a few days after he
entered the fourth grade his father gave him a pony and carriage for
a birthday present.
Mark Hazard was in the same grade at Jealous of “Rich
school. Their teacher was Miss Hosiner. Boy”
Mark was a wide-awake boy who was often in mischief. He was
coarse in his speech and manners. He criticized adversely every one
of Wendell’s possessions and was always glad when for any reason
Wendell failed to recite well. When the boys played, Mark would say:
“Don’t ask Wendell to come, he might get his clothes dirty.” When
Wendell missed the word “giraffe” Mark whispered sibilantly, “He
can spell ‘pony’; that’s all the animal he knows.”
Miss Hosiner knew that Mark disliked Wendell and felt sure that
jealousy was at the bottom of his sneers and coarse remarks, but she
didn’t know how to bring about a change.
There was a pool of muddy water near the back door after every
rain. This was spanned by a plank over which the children walked to
the playground.
One day Mark and Wendell were both on the plank when Mark
deftly tripped Wendell, who fell splash into the muddy water. Had
Mark used common courtesy Wendell would doubtless have laughed
at his own plight, but when he looked up to see Mark’s sneer as he
said sarcastically, “Now you’re some dolled up ain’t you?” he said,
“Mark Hazard, you’ve got to smart for this.”
Miss Hosiner had seen it all from the window and understood the
situation perfectly. She went to the door and said, “Wendell, you may
go home and change your clothes; Mark, you may go in and take your
seat and you may have all of your intermissions alone for a week. As
soon as you come in the morning, and at noon, you may take your
seat at once. I will allow you a separate time for your recess from that
of pupils who know how to behave toward each other. Since you can’t
act decently toward other boys, you may play by yourself.”
As the group separated Mark shook his fist at Miss Hosiner’s
retreating back and openly made an ugly face at Wendell.
Not only during the week of his punishment but throughout the
year he showed insolence toward Miss Hosiner and distinct dislike
for Wendell.

CONSTRUCTIVE TREATMENT

Go privately to the boy of whom one or more of the pupils are

jealous and tell him how to treat the jealous ones. In the above
instance say to Wendell as soon as you first observe that Mark is
jealous of him, “I have observed that Mark is not friendly with you. I
know you would be much happier to have his friendship. He is not
sure that you want to be friends and since you have more to give him
by becoming friends than he can give you I can’t blame him much for
wanting you to make the start.
“If one man had $1,000 to put into business and another $10,000,
you couldn’t expect the man with the $1,000 to have audacity
enough to ask the $10,000 man to go into partnership with him, but
how glad he’d be if the richer man should invite him to become a
partner in his business.
“Now, that’s just the way it is with you and Mark. You’ll have to
make him see that you really want to be friends before he can believe
that it is so. I heard one of the boys say that you are going to give
them all a ride in turn in your new pony carriage. If I were you I
would ask Mark to be the first one. I’d ask him first to share all of my
good things, because he suffers most for the things that you have.
That’s what makes him feel out of sorts because he can’t have them.
“It takes more skill to be a gracious receiver than to be a gracious
giver, so don’t feel offended if Mark doesn’t know how to act at first.
Keep on trying to show him that you like him until you succeed.”

COMMENTS

The question of inequality so pitifully and constantly understood

by many sensitive children is often the cause of jealousy that grows
until it becomes a menace to peace in a school. This feeling should be
checked as soon as it appears. Punishing the one who is jealous only
makes him entertain a feeling of resentment toward both the teacher
and the one who is envied by him. The right interchange of feeling
can be secured only by assisting the more favored pupil to show
genuine friendship for the one who is jealous.

ILLUSTRATION (FOURTH GRADE)

Emeline Carlisle was a little girl who talked about the maid, the
cook and the nurse at their house, of the company they had, the
vacations they spent and the clerks in “father’s store.”
Jessie Dodge was a child of a poor but refined widow who, with
extreme difficulty, was able to provide sufficient clothing and food
for her.
Miss Dunlap, the teacher in the fourth Jealous of “Rich
grade, saw that Jessie was destined to Girl”
become jealous of Emeline. So she pointed out to Emeline from time
to time the superior gifts and traits of Jessie. She would say:
“Jessie Dodge is such a refined girl. She knows how to reply
whenever she is spoken to. I think the girls who are her special
friends are fortunate.”
She appointed these two girls to do tasks together, saying, “Jessie
and Emeline may work together on the fifth problem, Emeline writes
well and Jesse thinks well. They will make good companions for this
work.”
By such handling of the situation, Emeline and Jessie became good
friends.

CASE 131 (HIGH SCHOOL)

A western college gave a high school tournament every spring.

Surrounding high schools were invited to assemble with their
competing candidates for athletic contests in the afternoon, followed
by reading and oratorical contests that night. Prizes were given to the
winners either by the college or individuals in the college town.
This tournament was one of the big Jealousy
events of the year for the high schools. They Between Schools
trained for it from September till May. The victors were lionized in
the typically enthusiastic high school manner, while the citizens of
the towns in which the schools were located talked of the event for
weeks and knew and honored not only the schools but the
individuals who had won the prizes.
For two years Eastman pupils had won in athletics, and now (1915)
they were reputed to have an excellent reader who was going up to
the oratorical contest. The slogan in more than one school had been
“Beat Eastman.”
The meet occurred on Friday. On Thursday evening Principal
MacKenzie of Dwight said to his contestants, “I believe we’ll win
tomorrow. I believe we have the kind of muscles and brains that will
‘Beat Eastman.’”
“Hurra-a-a!” sang out the boys—all but one, John Nealy.
An inscrutable look had come into his eyes when Mr. MacKenzie
uttered the words, “Beat Eastman,” and he had been too intently
following up some idea to join in the shout.
On the way to the college town the next morning he said to his
colleagues, “Boys, I’ve thought of a way to beat Eastman.”
“How?” they said, eagerly.
“We’ll take the boys to a ‘feed’ at noon. We’ll order everything
eatable for their runner and jumper and we’ll get them so filled up
that they can’t make good.”
“But will they go with us?”
“Sure, they’ll go. Their runner, Fernald, is a good friend of mine.”
“We won’t dare overeat.”
“Can’t we just pretend we’re eating everything?”
The details were arranged.
Now, Harmon Walsh, one of the Dwight boys, had a fine, upright
character and he could not be party to this foolish scheme of John’s.
He finally decided to tell Mr. MacKenzie about it.
The latter, astonished, took the Dwight boys under his special care,
forbade their inviting anybody to lunch with them, and never left
them until they were on the athletic field.
That year Eastman came out second and Dwight third.
 When they returned to Dwight, Mr. MacKenzie called John into
his office and inquired why he had proposed his “lunch scheme” on
the way to the meet.
“I’m sick and tired of hearing Eastman’s praises,” said John. “I’d
do anything to beat them.”
Thereupon Prof. MacKenzie talked so harshly to John on the
subject of jealousy that he quit school, as he had begged to do before.
So he missed getting his high school education because his teacher
was not able to cultivate in him a spirit of competition without
jealousy and unfortunately was unable to handle properly a case of
jealousy when it appeared.

CONSTRUCTIVE TREATMENT

In dealing with inter-high school competitive programs talk much

about the good qualities of your school’s opponents. Secure personal
favorable items of interest concerning opposing debaters and ball
team members. After a game or debate, talk of the good qualities or
traits of character exhibited by the opponents. Talk on such themes
as, “I’d rather be right than be president.”

COMMENTS

The dividing line between legitimate ambition to win for one’s

school and jealousy of a winning opponent is hard to fix ofttimes.
High school students should be drilled against personal antagonism
and mean advantage by the principal, who should always laud the
clean, fair, open game.

ILLUSTRATION 1 (HIGH SCHOOL)

The big, final basket ball game between Danvers and Winfield high
schools would determine which was the best team in the state. Prof.
Beatty of Danvers wrote to Prof. Ryland of Winfield and said, among
other things:
 “Kindly write me a few words about each Appreciating
boy on your team to read to our boys. Are Opponents
they country or town boys? What is the favorite study of each? What
does each expect to do when he gets out of high school? What do you
consider the finest trait of each?
When the answer to this letter came, the Danvers boys read it
eagerly and later met the Winfield boys as friends. Not a hint of
jealousy was shown by Danvers when Winfield won.

ILLUSTRATION 2 (HIGH SCHOOL)

Occasionally, a student overworks in the effort to secure the

highest place in the teacher’s appreciation. In a certain high school
the history teacher had two boys in her class in modern history who
were rivals for first place.
One belonged to a wealthy family and had Jealous of
every help and encouragement; the other Scholarship
was away from home and working his way through school. It was the
latter boy who worried his teacher. He was up early in the morning
and late at night attending to furnaces in winter, gardening and
cleaning in the spring; and after these exertions he read carefully all
the references given, lest Charles Schofield should do better work
than he. Of course this soon told on his health, but he kept doggedly
at his heavy tasks. When he grew so listless that he had to rouse
himself with a visible effort to recite, Miss Van Leer kept him one day
after class for a talk.
“You mustn’t think of trying to keep up with Charles Schofield,”
she said firmly. “Why, he has nothing to do but eat and sleep and
take a little exercise and study.”
“I know that. But you said last term that he did the best work in
the class, and I resolved that he shouldn’t do the best this term, just
because he has a big library at home and all the time in the world.
You know I want to show you what I can do, Miss Van Leer.”
“I want you now, Ben, to show me how much common sense you
have. You are simply allowing a foolish pride to run away with your
good judgment. Promise me you’ll merely read through the text
assignment for a fortnight.”
 “And hear him rattle off reams from Adams and all the rest of
them? Not I! You would think me a piker, for all you say.”
“Will you do it for me—as a personal favor?” Miss Van Leer was
forced finally to put her wish on a personal basis. This succeeded
where all appeal to self-interest had failed.
(3) Cliques and snobbishness. One phase of this subject, that of the
ringleader, will be treated under the heading “Regulative Instincts.”
At the present time the gregarious aspect, or the tendency of young
people to join together in little bands, will be noticed chiefly. Such a
tendency is, of course, only indirectly harmful. It is both social and
anti-social—social because of the impulse toward companionship,
anti-social because of the selfishness that excludes from the social
group all except a few chosen favorites.

CASE 132 (SIXTH GRADE)

In the town of Fairfield Center, there was a little group of girls,

four in number, who considered themselves superior to the other
girls in school. Miss Baldwin was repeatedly annoyed by their
aloofness, but the other children in her room felt it most.
At recess time, when a game of “I spy” Aping the High
was suggested, this little clique would School
withdraw from the crowd and walk, instead. This habit became so
influential that many of the other girls stopped playing at recess.
Unwholesome gossip was the result. It remained for Miss Sayre, who
took charge of the room the next year, to break down the barriers.
She, too, failed, but for another reason.
Miss Sayre called these four girls to her one day after school, when
they were in a hurry to go home, and gave them some good advice.
“You girls seem to run off by yourselves and not to play with the
others. I want to know why.”
“O, we don’t like their games. They always play such silly games.
The girls in high school don’t do things like that.”
“But you aren’t high school girls—you are just little girls of the
sixth grade. Drop that nonsense. I want you to break up this cliquing
and moping around and act like girls. Now, do you understand?”
 “Yes,” in a chorus. But nothing came of it.

CONSTRUCTIVE TREATMENT

Instead of a direct attack, draw these girls into activities that

require them to act in close coöperation with other girls. Try
committee work.
“Gladys is sick with pneumonia. She can’t come to school for two
weeks yet. I want to appoint a committee of two to call on her and
take her some flowers. I’m going to appoint Eva and Annette for this
work.”
Be sure to make combinations that promise enough congeniality to
provide at least a temporary friendship. Repeat the process very
frequently, yet avoid disclosing a purpose to disrupt the friendship of
chums, for that will excite antagonism and so spoil the whole plan.
Children are very jealous of their friendship, and delicate handling
is needed in order that no real injustice may be done them. Close
friendship is usually of great value and the growth of attachments
between children of the same sex is to be fostered.
The danger is in settling into grooves of thought that cramp the
mind and improverish it for lack of wide association. It is very clear
that the more human beings a person knows, the broader will be his
personality and the richer his information. Hence, teachers are
everywhere duty bound to democratize the life of their charges.

ILLUSTRATION (FIFTH AND SIXTH GRADES)

Misses Phelps and Bender took a wise course in curing the fifth
and sixth graders under their charge, of snobbishness. They
combined forces and went into flower gardening on a small scale. A
plot of ground was procured and the children grouped by pairs
according to an inflexible rule adopted at the very start. There were
several motives behind this project, but we need consider only this
one point.
To insure a genuinely democratic spirit, Gardening in
two pairs were assigned each day for work Pairs