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Economic Thought and Institutional Change in France and Italy, 1789-1914: A Comparative Study 1st Edition Riccardo Soliani (Eds.)
Economic Thought and Institutional Change in France and Italy, 1789-1914: A Comparative Study 1st Edition Riccardo Soliani (Eds.)
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Riccardo Soliani Editor
Economic Thought
and Institutional
Change in France
and Italy,
1789–1914
A Comparative Study
Economic Thought and Institutional Change
in France and Italy, 1789–1914
Riccardo Soliani
Editor
Economic Thought
and Institutional Change
in France and Italy,
1789–1914
A Comparative Study
123
Editor
Riccardo Soliani
Department of Political Science
University of Genoa
Genoa
Italy
The book you are about to read examines the relations between economic thought,
proposals of reform of political institutions and civil society in the Italian and
French tradition during the “long” nineteenth century, from the ascent to power of
Napoleone Bonaparte to the eve of the First World War. In Italy, this time span
covers the long process of setting the foundations for the Italian state
(Risorgimento, with the considerable French support provided to Italy during this
process), its subsequent rise on the international stage leading up to the role played
by the state in the Great War 1914–1918. At the same time, in France, we have the
long-lasting post-revolutionary struggle of republican, progressive social forces
against the conservative monarchism, with the ascent of the bourgeoisie in the era
of Louis-Philippe and Napoleon III, the dramatic events that accompanied the war
against Prussia and the birth of the Third Republic. Together with the institutional
establishment, or evolution, of the two States, we have the budding development of
economic thought: namely, liberalism, socialism, industrial utopia, egalitarianism in
France; and, in Italy, considerations on the link between liberalism, public
administration and republicanism, and the evolution of the Catholic social doctrine.
Italian Liberalism developed alongside the pursuit of independence and the
establishment of the new State. At the same time, the nineteenth century marks the
rise of Socialism in Italy, from the humanitarian solidarity of the republican
instances to the birth of organized groups of workers following the unity and the
end of the State of the Church. When Rome became capital of Italy (1870–71), the
Catholic Church exerted a strong opposition to the new State, as expressed in the
official decree Non expedit, which prohibited Catholics from participating in
political life. However, the Church continued to be deeply involved in civil society
through the provision of education and social care in favour of the poor. Popular
claims for equity and justice were addressed through the gradual establishment
of the new Catholic social doctrine, which would give rise to Catholic Corporatism.
In France, the first half of the period sees the transition from monarchy to
republic. We have the monarchy censitaire of Louis XVIII and Charles X during
the Restauration, which «restored» public finances, and the July constitutional
monarchy between 1830 and 1848, with its policy aimed at economic development,
v
vi Preface
aforementioned concepts from the point of view of the pursuit of social equity
through the reforms propounded during the unification of Italy.
The intellectual and political conflict between the social vision of Liberalism and
Socialism in some of their various forms is the main topic of the four papers of the
third section, in which different streams of Socialism are discussed. Particular
reference is made to Saint-Simon and his followers. An alternative approach to the
French utopian socialism is examined in a paper that modifies the interpretation
provided by Sombart and Durkheim. Finally, the almost unknown economic
thought of a group of prominent French intellectuals between the end of the
nineteenth century and the First World War is examined, highlighting the link
between the attitude towards economy and the political choices of Halévy, Alain
and Maurois.
ix
x Contents
1 Introduction
E. Ciech
Department of Economics, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
e-mail: edoardociech@gmail.com
R. Soliani (&)
Department of Political Science, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
e-mail: riccardo.soliani@unige.it
economics would have meant for him to “step into a field where almost everything
had to be redone”, to get into “a task that he described as enormous.”1
Sacchi’s testimony has twofold significance: on the one hand, as confirmation
that Romagnosi began to professionally deal with political economy only around
1827, when he first contributed to the Annali; on the other, as anticipation of his
judgment of prior and contemporary economic doctrines.
For Romagnosi, political economy as a discipline had emerged in such recent
times that it could be considered still in its “infancy.”2
It was still in that particular period that characterises the evolution of any sci-
ence, where the focus is on “details”, before rising to the “governing principles”.
One of the mistakes made by “current economists” lies indeed in their attempt to
reduce “economics to serve blind emulations, and to demand privileged protection
for their sector of preference, to the detriment of the others and the Public.” In its
evolution, political economy has first theorised a prominent position for commercial
activities, then agricultural activities, and finally industrial activities. Romagnosi
views it as proof that “the doctrine is not accomplished and demonstrated”, as he
believes that any economic activity fulfils its unique function in a well organised
society.
Individuals, or groups with a common interest, are dominated by “the individual
instinct, which tends to absorb everything in itself, thus sacrificing the utility and
rights of others”. In the manifestation of this instinct lies the “driving force” of
human society, but its dominance over the rights of others carries the seed of its
disruption. Romagnosi openly condemns any doctrine, past or present, that ended
up being an expression of this particular instinct, including classical theory, which
he blamed for relying on this very “individual selfishness” and theorising the effects
of its manifestation. In view of this, there is no doubt that “the reasonings and
deductions are consistent”. However, this is not the point: “the question is whether
this individual selfishness may be assumed as governing principle in the social
order of wealth”.3 In his own words, “one thing is the material history of the
consumption goods produced and used in a general sense by man, and another is its
political economy.” Economists took the wrong road: they believed that economics
should only study the “naked and indefinite production and reproduction of wealth”
and that their task was limited to the study “of purely economic events isolated from
practical theory.”
Serious consequences have resulted from this mistake. “The narrow-minded
self-interest of a speculator wishing to become enriched was considered and cal-
culated in its various movements for the production, distribution and consumption
of wealth, without considering actual social relations at a higher level. The whole
1
G. Sacchi, “Gian Domenico Romagnosi”, in Annali Universali di Statistica, Milano, 1835, Vol.
XLV. See on these points (Barucci 2009).
2
“Definizioni in economia politica, ecc.” (1827). In Opere edite ed inedite, riordinate ed illustrate
da A. De Giorgi, Milano, 1845, vol. VI, p. 18.
3
“Criterio di verità col quale si deve ragionare in politica economica” (1831), Opere, VI,
pp. 87–88.
Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi 5
moral aspect and that of the eminent common interest that redounds to the greater
advantage of individuals were forgotten; so much so that such material, cold and
dull selfishness breathes from the bottom of those modern doctrines.” Economists
had only studied “the abstract mechanism of the production, distribution, and
consumption of wealth”, without wondering whether their role should be different
than that of the observer and resemble more that of the edifier.
No foreign economist has avoided these mistakes. Smith is undoubtedly a good
reference point, though only for the “mechanical part of economics”.4 Only Italian
economists have “seized on the good party”: they did not “dictate the philosophy of
greed, teaching the few to become enriched by abusing and subjugating the many,
as in English doctrines,” but rather “proclaimed the doctrine and the art of the
equitable distribution of consumption goods whence come the common property
and the increased power of both the rich and the poor”.
Whilst Romagnosi possibly misunderstood the very essence of classical doc-
trine, by not separating it from moral philosophy, the reasons behind his intendedly
polemic attitude towards it are rather clear: on the one hand, the attempt to
investigate the laws governing the production and distribution of wealth; on the
other hand, the deliberate intention to be guided by the “views of the family man,
longing to see all his children employed” and to contribute to this end.
How did Romagnosi become preoccupied with such concerns? Is it the result of a
wider philosophical concept, or rather of a method that primarily learns from his-
torical experience? In the author’s view, it is the result of both.
Romagnosi states that man is characterised by an “absolutely peculiar quality”,
that is “perfectibility”. As a result, “man becomes civilized, inventor of the arts, and
extends his empire over nature”. However, human perfectibility may not be real-
ized, unless “by means of the whole society and in society itself”. Romagnosi
argues, that “philosophy and experience demonstrate [this] in such irrefutable
manner, that the existence of no other phenomenon in natural history is better
proven”.5
Romagnosi finds confirmation of his theses in the period of “feudal dissolution”:
when human contacts and the “certainty of expectations” vanished, the spirit of
emulation disappeared and all economic activities languished. At that time, society
had almost disappeared, but not the spirit of sociality, which is an attribute of man
and is always realised in a social form, possibly in the mere “pairing of the sexes, in
family”, which is the “first and true state provided by nature alone in a manner
4
“Della necessità di unire lo studio della politica economia con quello della civile giurisprudenza”
(1832), Opere, VI, p. 79.
5
“Introduzione allo studio del Diritto pubblico universale”, in Opere, III, pp. 182–183.
6 E. Ciech and R. Soliani
common to the brutes”. Society, meant as the organic tissue of human relations, is
in fact a “phenomenon produced by nature itself”. Man as an individual exists no
more: he is born, grows and works within a community, becomes a “social man”,
both a constitutive element and by-product of civil society. He creates and develops
his work not only by reason of his intellectual abilities, but also in respect of the
ideal heritage rooted in his own generation (with which he is in contact through
language, which is another by-product of society) and inherited from past gener-
ations. As result of the spirit of sociality so rooted in man, society is man’s “natural
condition”, a “necessary” condition since it represents the possibility for human
“perfectibility” to become true. However, if the emergence of the activity of the
individual is strictly conditioned by the existence of society, then the problem arises
that the “doing” of the individual be in accordance with the existence of society,
rather than lead to its dissolution.
“The principle of love of wealth, the sole mainspring of human actions”, which
man seeks to “enjoy as much as he can with as little inconvenience and trouble as
possible,” may occur under any condition. However,
every single human being is unable to reach a certain point of comfort solely with his own
strength, nor to generally and constantly defend his possession or to overcome a disaster
without the aid of his peers; still, the improvement of the economic state of the individual
must be considered as the cumulative result of the work of both the individual and the
whole society.6
This “improvement of the economic state” of the individual is thus not only due
to his individual work, but is rather the result of a complex set of human activities
and social institutions that directly or indirectly contribute to attaining this result,
thus acquiring a specific economic meaning. This consideration might pose ethical
or moral problems about the distribution of the wealth produced; nonetheless, such
problems assume a different meaning in consideration of the fact that the “sociality
of wealth” is a necessary condition for the existence of civil society.
Though thus far neglected, this is a particularly significant concept in the
thinking of Romagnosi: the survival of the human attribute of sociality is linked to
the actual emergence of sociality itself in legal and economic terms. It implies both
a fair recognition of the individual’s rights and a particular condition of equality, to
be seen in a concrete sense rather than abstract, as will be discussed below.
“Everybody knows—Romagnosi argues—that when the laws of that moral
balance that can fairly satisfy the parties are violated, no human habit or institution
usually survives”.7
From this comes Romagnosi’s attempt to demonstrate that any effort to pursue
the individual interest is meant to damage the whole society in the long-term. Only
the achievement of the “true social interest” may lead to the “maximum possible
personal benefit”.
8
“Quesito: Il modo usato da alcuni scrittori d’oggidi nel trattare le dottrine economiche è forse
plausibile?” (1827), Opere, VI. pp. 12–13.
9
“Memoria riguardante il punto di vista degli articoli economici e statistici” (1834), Opere, VI,
pp. 5–6.
10
“Lettere a Giovanni Valeri sull’ordinamento della scienza della cosa pubblica” (1826), Opere,
III, p. 11.
8 E. Ciech and R. Soliani
11
C. Cattaneo “Statua marmorea per pubblica soscrizione di Giovanni Locke. Alcune parole ai
nuovi Scettici Calunniatori di Locke e di Romagnosi (1836)”, in C. Cattaneo, Scritti filosofici
letterari e vari, F. Alessio (ed.), Firenze 1957, p. 19.
12
“Memoria”, Opere, VI, pp. 9–10.
Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi 9
The need to “balance wealth among individuals, through the inviolate and safe
operation of common freedom” creates the “governing and practical rule of
jurisprudence”, which is by now embodied “in all the articles of the good Codes of
truly civilised nations”.
Then, if economics is a moment of the realisation of “fair justice”, does it belong
to jurisprudence? When comparing their “respective conclusions”, Romagnosi
states that the science of “law eminently encloses that of political economy”, since,
“if in the relations of mere fairness no interesting sanction was seen thus far, besides
that of the religious conscience”, “it now turns out that the dictates of the Law are
recommended and sanctioned by the force of material and well-ordered interests”.
However, it is so only in this sense, because whilst the Law seeks “the fairness of
the action, without worrying about the reasons, objectives, and needs of the actor,
by contrast economics teaches how in civil consortium the means to satisfy the
needs of life may be procured, ensured and distributed by way of cooperation
between the efforts of the individual and those of his fellows”. Hence, while the task
of economics is different, the social order of wealth is the ultimate goal for both
economics and jurisprudence, the real “essence” of a problem that can be
approached from difference perspectives.
Based on these considerations, it is thus clear that “economics, considered as a
science, influences the efforts of men in the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of wealth”, and seeks to identify the ways in which human activities may
attain such “social order of wealth”. Even in the more general definition of “eco-
nomics” as “orderly distribution of any one thing”, Romagnosi had noted that “in
this sense economics is part of the art”, where by ‘art’ he means “the way to reach a
certain purpose”.
Against this background, we can easily understand the reason behind the
polemic pages that Romagnosi wrote against Dunoyer, who had denied the “op-
erating” character of economics. By censoring Sismondi, the French economist had
observed that
governing is not up to sciences. Rather, they observe phenomena without governing them.
They study the nature of things without any claim to regulate them. True economics should
not claim in any way to preside over the production of wealth. It should be limited to the
investigation of how such wealth is produced and which circumstances are favourable or
unfavourable to its increase and fair distribution.13
First of all, Romagnosi notes that, “if Dunoyer’s arguments were correct”, then
sciences would shrink to the “search for a spectacle of mere curiosity” and “it
would not be worthwhile to engage so much in them, as man would not be able to
make nature work to his advantage”.
This is not the case, though: actually, quoting Bacon’s line that “a man can do as
much as he knows how to do”, the human ability to reach the desired purpose in
relation to the existing natural forces is the result of the knowledge of the laws of
such forces. Hence, “governing is the immediate or mediated subject of sciences. It
insistence of a “law of opportunity” which must guide the statesman and the
economist in the choice of measures.
Romagnosi is deeply and consistently convinced of the great significance of
nature and history in man’s actions. As discussed above, perfectibility is a char-
acteristic of human society, but the pinnacle towards which it strives is related to
both the natural abilities that society can utilize, and time, which is understood as an
instrument for measuring the evolution of a State. Nature and time: two great
powers to which, in this occasion, Romagnosi attaches great importance. Man is
affected by them: he may not hope to industrialize a society without resources, nor
civilize a society in “barbaric” conditions. The road to civilisation must be walked
step by step, slowly, and be promoted by way of organic measures, historically
suited to the State’s current stage.
In view of this, Romagnosi criticizes the universality of economic choices. These
cannot in fact be universal, as they cannot be equally valid in both a civil and
uncivilized society. Rather, their ability to attain the desired purpose is rooted in the
actual conditions that differ from people to people. Hence, economic choices must
be subject to the so-called “law of opportunity”, which is “the law of necessity in
time and for time”.
Hence, considering a complicated art like economics as being “without space,
without time and without an actual position is the same as assuming an abstract,
completely speculative profile of a doctrine which requires the knowledge of all the
powers and driving forces contributing to the composite phenomena of civil life”.
In economics, any “absolutism” is a contradiction.
Since the regime of the child, the expert, the old necessarily differ, just like the habitual
system of a good economic temperament differs from that of a faulty one, it appears that
economic dictates must necessarily vary according to the different stages of the moral and
political economic civilization of peoples.15
15
“Se sia più saggio il sistema degli antichi di avere un tesoro ovvero quello dei moderni di fare
degl’imprestiti per sovvenire ai pubblici bisogni” (1829), Opere, VI, p. 516.
16
“Questioni sopra l’ordinamento delle statistiche civili” (1827–1830), Opere, VI, p. 1157.
12 E. Ciech and R. Soliani
Romagnosi observes civilization from two different perspectives: “in the sense
of gradual progress towards a satisfactory and cultivated civil life”, and as “pos-
session of the best and most cultivated coexistence attained by a given State”.
As for the former, once the laws of this “progress” are discovered, the ways to
promote it must be identified; civilization is thus an “art” or, better, “humanity’s
highest art, general and perpetual”. In the latter sense, the characteristic features of
an “ideal state” must be defined in relation to the environmental and cultural
conditions of a people, so as to make this “state”—to be meant as a situation of fact
—the “normative and theoretical criterion” against which to contrast the real
conditions of that people. Civilization corresponds here to this ideal state, thus
becoming a unit of measure, an abstract term of comparison and, at the same time, a
goal to be achieved. In this case, civilization is a synonym for “civilized state”.
This second aspect is of particular interest in reconstructing Romagnosi’s eco-
nomic thought, because economics seeks to achieve a purpose that is necessarily
consistent with the state of civilization. Civilization as economic, moral and
political improvement is indeed a complex and composite state, where all the
conditions for a “satisfactory, cultivated and regulated” coexistence must emerge at
the same time. If any of these is missing, there is no civilization.
Besides the economic “part”, which Romagnosi identifies in the implementation
of the “fair distribution” of wealth, there are “two further branches, one of which
concerns moral education, and the other the fair regime of the State”.17
Which of the two is more important, then? Without a doubt, Romagnosi gives
the leading role to the “economic part”, not as functional primacy, but because it is
a prerequisite for moral and political improvement. In his writings, he never tires of
repeating that “from orderly material interests arises the possibility to order moral
and political interests”, and that when the former are “ill-posed or diverted, moral
interests are either stifled or corrupt”. The individual’s need for education—which
is also crucial to the establishment of the “moral order” and to prevent that “the
ignorant is forced to place his trust in the deceiver”—may not “work in general
unless after having satisfied the order of subsistence, just like that of friendliness
towards others may not develop until after having met the needs of the
individual”.18
In order to promote the “process” of civilization—which ultimately is the main
effect of the “state” of civilization—the first problem to be solved consists in
“spreading wealth to as many as possible, so that thieves and slaves disappear or at
least are reduced to a minimum”.
Complexity of issues and prominence of the “economic part” are therefore the
two main characteristics of civilization. It is not a “native, but rather dative” state,
which does not sprout spontaneously, but is achieved by man through proper use of
the means available.
17
“Abbozzo storico delle dottrine alle quali fu dato il nome di Industrialismo, vale a dire delle
dottrine che fondano la società su l’industria” (1827), Opere, VI, p. 144.
18
“Sopra lo stato odierno delle scienze in Inghilterra” (1831), Opere, VI, pp. 617–618.
Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi 13
To achieve this ideal state, the first problem encountered is to identify the stage
that a State has reached in the “curve” of the process of civilization. This is the duty
of statistics.
For Romagnosi, ‘statistics’ arises from the word ‘State’, not meant as a “mere
situation, but rather as the very collective person of a given society which inhabits a
given territory and primarily lives on agriculture and trade”.19
Since this “collective person” knows the threefold “improvement”, statistics
must be able to detect every aspect of this improvement, thus becoming, in a very
general definition, the “exposition of the ways of being and of the interesting
productions of goods and persons within a given people”. At least at first glance, the
meaning of ‘ways of being’ is rather obscure. In his seminal essay on Romagnosi as
statistician, Ferrara views them as “the permanent circumstances that constitute a
nation in such and such a way”, thus seeing in Romagnosi the intention to move
away from Say’s attempts to limit statistics to the recognition of “variable data”
only. However, this might not be the case. Romagnosi himself explains that “the
phrase ‘ways of being’ includes the absolute and relative state, that is an abstraction
made up of both the single positive actions and their causes”. In line with his more
general efforts, Romagnosi’s intention was thus to designate all the complex
inter-individual, social and economic characteristics which—together with the
objective situation of a people moving towards an ideal state of civilization—
determine the distance from this very ideal state.
In the history of statistics, Romagnosi’s is undoubtedly a vigorous attempt at
moving away from the discussions of the statisticians of his time, and rather
assuming a completely personal position. While amidst controversy, Say, Dupin,
Gioia and Padovani had eventually agreed on one point: statistics was to identify
facts which can be assessed “objectively and quantitatively”. Their opinions only
differed with regard to the identification of a criterion to choose the phenomena to
be identified, in relation to the different purposes assigned to statistics.
According to Romagnosi, the purpose of statistics is no longer the identification
of an objective fact, but rather, as mentioned before, a state of fact with a great
variety of characteristics. The task is just as different, as it consists in assessing the
relative condition of this “state” and evaluating it in the context of the entire
potential process of civilization.
Statistical investigation thus becomes historical investigation. Like the historian
focusing on a moment or a problem should research its origins in previous years
and its consequences in the following, the statistician must extend his investigation
to the factors that determine the evolution or involution of the present moment, so
as to project his conclusions in a future perspective. However, statistics does not
correspond to the “positive history” of a people, at least not at the same time as it
unfolds. While “positive history” is the reconstruction of the “particular events
occurred around a given moment”, statistics is the knowledge of the “circumstances
of fact characterising both man and the productions which lead to the well-being or
The following citations can be found in “Questioni”, Opere, VI, pp. 1148–1153.
19
14 E. Ciech and R. Soliani
his work; however, he failed. “One cannot resist the eloquence of facts, and there is
no answer to the expression of digits”, he loved to say, as if to indicate his ideal
ambition to translate abstract, imprecise constructs, easily criticized and misun-
derstood, into something unquestionable and unassailable. His ambition and his
taste for philosophical speculation, though, remained very much apart. In this way,
the notion of “ideal state” ended up corresponding to that of “state of civilization”
in the sense explained above, i.e. a logical instrument of comparison, though
insufficient for operational purposes.
Nevertheless, Romagnosi tried to make a few steps forward and, in the author’s
view, quite successfully, by identifying in the order of the “universal and free social
competition” the first and irreplaceable condition for the construction of the “order
of subsistence” seen as the first aspect of this “ideal model”.
Imagine a good economic system with free and legitimate competition; you will see,
growing and springing like branches from a single trunk, morality, hard work and
friendliness on the one side; sciences, literature and all arts on the other; dignity and power
on the one side, honour and glory on the other. Enlightened minds, good hearts, powerful
actions emerge spontaneously, unified, connected, inseparable, as long as no protections,
interferences, nor artificial stimuli occur.20
Real economic freedom, then, may not arise in a state of “unbridled competi-
tion”, but rather in that of “universal free competition”, which can be achieved
under specific “conditions” typical of civil societies.
The first of these conditions has a political nature, which Romagnosi observes
from a dual perspective, i.e. as principle and as need for a legal system guaranteeing
such principle. It is the condition of the “equalization of legal powers”, meant first
of all as guarantee of perfect equality of each individual before the law, and then as
protection of “said equalization” by way of enactment of an organic body of law
and fair administration of justice.
As fundamental as it is, this condition may only exert its fullest effect if it is
concretely realised, thus also concerning consumption goods.
Romagnosi notes that “in economic life it is always better to compute all powers,
functions and effects” and that such “effects are nothing but the result of these very
powers exerted by all encouraging and disheartening causes”. The study of eco-
nomic problems shall start from these very “powers producing wealth”.
What does Romagnosi mean by this phrase? For him, these “powers” are to be
found in two different areas, i.e. one natural and one human. Nature is the funda-
mental source of “powers”, meant both as set of elements capable of affecting man,
and as set of resources aimed at drawing his attention. “Active” powers are however
within man, who is thus placed at the centre of each productive phenomenon and
whose ability is connected to his “knowledge, will, and strength”. In order to
contribute to achieving a “perfectible conservation”, these powers must be sur-
rounded by a certain social and institutional context. A sound economic activity
needs, for example, “certainty of expectations”. The presence of an organic body of
laws and a balanced atmosphere of coexistence among individuals thus become
necessary, which can only be the result of a wise government. Romagnosi argues
that economic powers “are created and exerted by the simultaneous concurrence of
the individual, society and the government, so as to be in agreement with such
concurrence”.
Having defined the complex nature of “powers”, an ever more complicated
remains, since Romagnosi identifies the “order of powers” as the “first” condition
for the emergence of universal free competition.
What does Romagnosi mean by ‘order of powers’? A clear answer to this
question is not to be found in his entire body of work. It is certain, though, that for
the “equalization of legal powers” to become a concretely working condition, it
must result in equality of all before the law, but also in a fair distribution of
“material powers”.
A political and legal order envisaging serfdom, considering the Prince as sole
owner of all the land, following the principle of “territorial pretension”, or main-
taining primogeniture would constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the smooth
functioning of the principle of free competition. For example, in the last example
land would be in the hands of “too few”, with too many “competitors” holding
none. Universal free competition is not to be meant only as “the right to operate
unhindered over a given good”, but also as situation of “order of reason”, which
“involves the supposed existence of powers and their respective freedom”.
18 E. Ciech and R. Soliani
Both conditions must therefore exist for there to be universal free competition.
“Imagine the spectacle of competing in a horse race. If a jockey is deprived of his
strength or is restrained with violence—notes Romagnosi—would he ever be able
to compete against the others?” Further, lacking this equality of “forces” among
individuals, free competition becomes detrimental to the State, and a “sanctification
of deprivation” perpetrated against those who lack such forces.
Hence, our understanding of Romagnosi’s imperative for the “order of powers”
is confirmed in his constant battle against any hereditary entails and in his theory of
a natural cycle preventing the accumulation of “material means”—i.e. the “capi-
tal”—or the establishment of large estates.
A sound legal and political system thus gives rise to a natural cycle of rotation of
individuals in the different economic activities, where “agriculture is the basis from
which individuals and generations start, to which they return, and on which they
rest”.
Industrial and “trading profits” do not accumulate in the branches where they are
produced; rather, they are “used by universal, spontaneous, and unfailing instinct to
animate and advance agriculture”.
Agriculture thus represents an investment that may bring about peace and cer-
tainty for those who led “a painful industrial life of any kind”.
The individual, or some generations following him, fully know “the great eco-
nomic curve, travelled under the law of the encouraging necessity or the braking
inertia”; that very law pushes the individual to give up agriculture on a property
which has become divided and insufficient following a series of hereditary divi-
sions, while inertia induces industrial or commercial entrepreneurs to return to “rest
on a stable property”. The “wheel of fortune”, as Romagnosi calls it, is thus
alternating: while at a given time it leads to “division and subdivision, impover-
ishment of petty landowners, it also leads to the rise of traders, who gain as long as
they can and then rest”.
“Order of powers” as first condition of universal free competition thus means
“equal distribution”, as natural result of a legal order which allows for the principle
of hereditary division and of a political order which both ensures the individual’s
fair security towards things and actions, and recognizes no territorial privileges to
any caste. Romagnosi’s eurhythmic scheme is thus grounded on a traditional legal
principle conceived as capable of dynamically influencing land property, which is
for Romagnosi at the basis of each economic organization. “Dynamically”, because
the subdivision of land property is the reason for the impoverishment of certain
classes, which explains their abandoning agriculture and, ultimately, the rotation of
the cycle. This cycle is almost biological, as individuals and generations succeed
one another, experiencing the same evolutions and involutions. Time passes
without leaving any “remainder” for these individuals, who are reduced to mere
instruments, all alike, of a complex mechanism. They have no intelligence or soul,
no ambition or fault; Siamese twins from a big mother who knows no differences.
At a precise moment, some are at the top, others at the bottom of the curve; it is just
a matter of time and space, though, before their positions reverse.
Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi 19
“Opening shelters for the sick or the exposed children; fighting famines and
establishing workhouses and home delivery” are examples of this “public and
necessary relief”.
“Public” intervention in the economy should not go beyond these limits;
Romagnosi thus reminds us that “public assistance, be it enabling or relieving”
should not in any way include any “interference in the legitimate exercise of the
operations related to agriculture, industry, trade and consumption of goods”.
Having fulfilled these general requirements, “industry and trade must be left free
to operate, as if it were none of our business”. “Excellent is the state of a country—
Romagnosi continues—where in proportion the government has fewer businesses
and the population more”.
Once “the powers are ordered” and “functions regulated”, the social order of
wealth arises spontaneously, automatically.
While the “indefinite yearning of the individual to become enriched is tempered
without being weakened by the incessant action of a civil society” well organized,
the “conflict of the clashing individual forces” produces “social equity” and fair
participation of all in wealth.
It is “nature” that rather seeks to order “social economy”; it is the universal and
eternal forces guiding man that manage to achieve a goal that not only meets the
“views of the shopkeeper or banker, but those of the family man longing to see all
his children employed”. Nature’s doing is not marked by sectoral purposes, but
rather general; if the will of the individual can be realized freely, this “naturally”
leads to the composition of the interests of the individual and the achievement of an
end that transcends them.
It should not come as a surprise that Romagnosi blindly trusts this “provident
nature”, as this trust is the result of a matured philosophical belief that the “careers”
of a society are marked by “Providence” and makes him say “God is with us!”
whenever he witnesses a “properly designed” system.
This belief has great consequences on Romagnosi’s economic thought. If it is
true—he thinks—that “in nature things are balanced spontaneously with free
competition and highly protected justice”, then it is also true that the “average
transaction” that results from the conflict of demand and supply is “impossible for
any positive law to foresee and establish and amend conveniently”.
In other words, economic functions follow such a complex course of actions and
reactions with such a great, mutual influence that they do not lend themselves to be
observed and reconstructed analytically. Nature is thus an “inscrutable teaching”;
“it is a mistake to believe that exhausting studies are necessary for the order of
material interests. Nature’s supreme Providence only demands but protection and
justice, thus bringing about goodness, security, wealth and power”.
Trying to reproduce reality by way of “fictions” is therefore impossible, as
nature is so jealous of its doing that it does not allow man to study its underlying
laws. Hence, theorizing economy is impossible and “the only good result of good
theories consists and will consist eternally” in showing that “the whole thing with
civil life is in the hands of a not upset nature”.
Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi 21
This is the case, though, of a “normal state”, where “powers are ordered”. What
about a regime with “unsettled powers”, marked by anarchy of functions?
In this case, Romagnosi is rather explicit: the tasks of the government must
change and become “active”. Still, they must “never” affect the economic sphere,
but only the legal, by restoring the general conditions of universal free competition.
“The imperative interference—Romagnosi clearly states—lies in introducing fair
legal reforms, rather than in the great economic circulation”.
This is the very heart of Romagnosi’s economic thought. Having discussed most
of his complex system of notions, we can now grasp the inner contradictions of a
philosophy—trained and exercised for a long time in philosophical speculations,
legal discussions and juridical efforts—which he tried to reconvert at an old age to
economic problems, though without detaching not so much from a well-established
thought (which would be impossible), but rather from a certain way of interpreting
social reality, where the legal organization of a civil society was alone in the
foreground.
It is the lawyer’s mentality that leads Romagnosi to engage in economic dis-
cussions. He is deeply convinced that every human action is limited by the net of a
wise legal order, a safety factor and thus incentive for each individual. Romagnosi’s
economic ideas are populated by equal individuals, stripped of any discriminating
power of hereditary origin or acquired illegally, moving within a sphere of action
that the law can easily regulate.
However, there is no room for economic problems in this system—they have no
air nor lifeblood. The economic problem is rooted in the quicksand of a fideistic
naturalism that not only leaves no alternatives to economic choices, but is realised
“inscrutably”, so that not even these economic laws, natural and immutable, can be
known. In addition, if the need for a political economy going beyond pure “con-
templation” is recognised, then the “imperative interference” is reduced to the legal
sphere only.
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Már nem tudom biztosan, hogyan akadtam akkor össze az ódon
kikötővárosban, a «Barlang»-ban Peninával és társaival. Amaz üres
éjjelek egyikén volt, amelyek sivárságban és vágyódásban és
végeszakadatlan, értelem és cél nélkül való nyugtalan ide-
odajárkálásban telhetnek el és amelyeket mindenki ismer, aki
idegenben ifjú évei tanácstalansága miatt szenvedett. Hogy
ifjúságunk magárahagyatottsága áldássá váljék, erő kell hozzá és
valami cél, a fejlődés tervtelen éveiben ez a magárahagyatottság a
legjobbak közül is nem egyre nézve végzetessé vált.
Kis Penina, virág az utca porában, nem foglak elfeledni, tündöklő
ékesség lelkem ruháján. Kedves a nap, amelyen megtaláltalak és
elhagytalak, hogy többé el ne veszítselek. Emlékezetem kertjében
tovább virulsz, pedig nem ápollak, nem is gondozlak. Sőt megtörtént,
hogy hosszú időre elvesztél emlékezetemből, jó napokban vagy
veszedelmes jólétben, amelyet mulandó dolgok adhatnak nekünk.
De hideg szélben, vészes és zord úton megnyugtatásomul,
békességemül ismét érzem illatodat a lelkemben. Vannak a léleknek
virágai, amelyek csak akkor nőnek, virulnak és illatoznak, ha a szél
és a fény áthatol az összetépett kabát rongyain, selyem és prém
alatt elhervadnak és ha ápolt kéz gondozza őket, elszárad a kelyhük.
Ilyen virágok kedvéért rohantam mindig újra a vándorlás
bizonytalanságába és békétlenségébe. A magányosság
elégedetlenségében lakozik a legtisztább remény, az egyik a
csendből hallja ki Isten szavát, a másik inkább a viharból, sőt van
ember, aki csak külső viharban leli meg belső nyugalmát. Sokaknak
a jelenségek értelmébe való hosszú szemlélődő elmerülés után
villan meg valamelyik életigazságuk fénye, másoknak ellenben
hirtelen egész lényük megrázkodtatásában nyilvánul meg, itt szelid
mosolynak enged az akadály, amott könnyek árja omlik és az
eltakart fenékről elmossa a zavarodottságot és lényünk szerint az
enyhe fény vagy az égő áram csábit bennünket. De nem mindig a
megismerés a végső cél? Ha másképpen tudjátok, oktassatok ki. Én
úgy láttam, hogy a világon minden nemes harc a megismerésért
folyik, mert ez ad erőt nagy áldozatra és biztositja az egyetértést.
A késő éjben messziről halvány fényt láttam az utcán. Feléje
tartottam, mert magához csalogatott, de egyszersmind bizonyos
kellemetlen érzést is okozott. Akkoriban egy timármesternél
dolgoztam, aki nem mintha valóban szüksége lett volna reám,
hanem inkább szánalomból időnként alkalmazott, hogy végre némi
rendet teremtsen könyvei és irományai közt. Időközben meg kellett
látogatnom üzletfeleit, különböző megbizásokat végeztem és
bevásároltam a számára. Még nem voltam húsz éves.
Az a társaság, amelyet éjjel a «Barlang»-ban, ebben a legutolsó
lebujban találtam, sokáig lekötötte érdeklődésemet és ez betöltötte
életemet. Külsőleg kevéssé különbözhettem azoktól a fickóktól, akik
közé keveredtem, bár volt még valami pénzem, de a ruhám eléggé
szegényes volt. Minden akadékoskodás nélkül fogadtak maguk
közé, mint ahogyan azok az emberek szokták, akik egészen jól
tudják, hogy nem egykönnyen akad ember, akinek még nagyobb
elnézésre van szükségük, mint maguknak. Köztük ült Penina,
vérvörös kartonbluz volt rajta, világos haján színtelen kendő és
különös szeme szürke volt és kissé ferde. Nagy szája a sóvárgás és
szomorúság szenvedő kifejezésével, az ajak minden ivelése nélkül,
széles volt és egyenes, mintha erős ecsetvonással festették volna és
csaknem színtelenül illeszkedett bele keskeny állába. Arca, mint
egész lénye egyszerre megragadta az érzékeket és fájdalmas
édességében mégis valami elpusztított fönség volt, valami távoli,
világos ég tükröződött benne.
Félreismerhetetlen hajlandósággal az odaadásra ült, csaknem
feküdt egy karcsú legény mellett, akiről nem tudtam levenni a
szememet, bár gúnyosan lekicsinylő tekintete elárulta, hogy nem
akar rólam tudni és már rövid idő mulva leplezetlenül kimutatta
megvetését. De arca annyira tele volt gonosz, kemény élettel, olyan
komor, szép és hetyke egyszersmind, hogy majd gonosztevőnek tünt
föl, majd fiatal uralkodónak, aki itt romlásnak és megalázásnak tette
ki a méltóságát. Kubas volt a neve.
Egészen pontosan nem tudtam fölismerni, kikkel volt
tulajdonképpen dolgom ebben a társaságban, egyet azonban hamar
megláttam: könnyen vették az életet. Ámbár csupa fiatalember volt
együtt, a korán tapasztalatot szerzett emberek dacos fölsőbbségével
viselkedtek, szemtelen biztosságot mutattak, hallgatások ravasz volt
és öntudatos, egykedvűen vették gonoszságukat és vakmerőségük
tele volt megvetéssel a polgári társaság jogai iránt, amelyet
gyűlöltek. Mert az utca korán edz és érlel, nevelése senkit sem
kényeztet el és zavaros hullámaiban gyakorlottabb úszók vannak,
mint a biztosított életviszonyok csöndes árjában. Fiatalságában
tetterősebbnek, vakmerőbbnek és életrevalóbbnak bizonyult nem
egy ezek közül az elzüllött legények közül, mint sokan, akik hasznos
óvatosságuk szegénysége miatt sohasem lettek emberek, akik nem
mennek ugyan tönkre, de nem is állnak meg a maguk erejéből.
Néhány nap mulva, amikor egymagamban ültem, Kubas odajött
hozzám és ezt kérdezte:
– Mit akarsz itt nálunk?
– Nem tudom.
– Nekem mondod? Peninát akarod.
Rettenetesen megijedtem, de Kubas megrendíthetetlenül
nyugodt volt. Becsmérlőleg nevetett és kiváncsian nézett reám.
– Nem akarom őt, – feleltem.
– Dehogy nem akarod. Meg is kaphatod, de ne ajánljál neki
pénzt, nagyon érzékeny. A pénzt nekem adhatod.
Érzelmeimet nem tudtam rendezni, megrohantak, mint
vadászkutyák a vadat. Szeme észrevette legtitkosabb óhajaimat,
amelyeket magamnak sem mertem bevallani és megláttam benne,
hogy gyalázatosan visszaél velük és bepiszkolva
megszentségteleníti őket. Szeme egyszersmind fenyegetődzött,
csak az a kivánság lelkesítette, hogy beleegyezésemet hallja. Ez a
követelés volt a leghatalmasabb e pillanatban, nekem támadt és
védekeztem ellene, amikor ezt mondtam:
– Penina téged szeret.
És hirtelen hatása alatt mindannak, amit szemem a legutóbbi
napokban forró csodálattal, szánalommal és haraggal látott,
folytattam:
– Tiéd ő egész szívével, lelke legmélyéből. Ha beszélsz, reszket
a figyelemtől, ha elmégy, elhal és föllélekzik, visszatér beléje az élet,
ha visszajösz. Az árnyékod ő, betakar a szeretetével, amely
áhitatosabb bármely imádságnál. Amikor egyszer megütötted,
reszketett meghatottságában, mert durvaságodban csak azt látta,
hogy törődsz vele … és most… azt mondod nekem…
Kubas kiváncsian vizsgált. Halvány, gonosz arcán semmi
elfogultság nem látszott. Ez az ember valóban gonosz volt,
gonosznak született, az volt hiúság és megbánás nélkül. Gonosz volt
legbelsőbb hajlamánál fogva csak magáért a gonoszságáért, nem
bánatból vagy bosszúérzetből, nem is csalódásból vagy
elkeseredésből, csak legsajátosabb énjének engedelmeskedett és a
gonoszságban egyszerű volt és erős. Megértettem, hogy Penina az
élettől való félelemtől megborzadva egészen odaadta magát neki.
Ezt a félelmet csak az ifjúság ismeri, amely még azt hiszi, hogy a lét
elemei valami titkos igazságosztás jóakaratától függnek. Most
értettem meg először a gonoszságot, amely eredetére és értelmére
nézve a napi jelenségek hiábavalóságától egészen a vallás
miszteriumáig örökre titok marad nekünk embereknek.
Kubas gondolkodott.
– Te bolond, hiszen ha nem úgy volna, ahogyan mondod, nem
ajánlhatnám föl neked. Azt hiszed különben, hogy valami ujság ez
neki? Utólag fizethetsz. Nos?
Az után, amit mondtam, biztos volt ellenszolgáltatásomról, mert a
gonoszok sokkal tisztábban ismerik föl az érzés őszinteségét vagy
hamisságát, mint ahogyan az érző emberek a gonoszság örvényeit
egész mélységükben csak megérteni merészelhetnék is.
Mivel hallgattam, Kubas hirtelen és anélkül, hogy megkötöttük
volna az üzletet, fölkelt. Amikor az ivószobából távoztam, láttam,
hogy szép, kemény, élesráncú arcával egy darab papirosra hajolva a
gázláng szegényes vilgításánál firkálgat valamit. Penina nem volt ott,
a sötét kapualjban a kijáratnál találkoztam vele.
– Gyere velem, – mondtam, – csak egy pillanatra.
– Benn van Kubas? – kérdezte alt hangján.
Kisebbnek láttam, mint máskor, az utcai halvány fény ráesett
szánandó gyermekvállára és úgy látszott, hogy fázott nyomorúságos
ruhájában, amely izgatóan mutatta testének formáit. Ősz is volt már
és az alkonyatban falevelet és papirdarabokat kergetett az utcán a
szél.
– Később is ott lesz még. Kérlek, gyere, kérlek.
Habozva jött velem, minden együttérzés nélkül. Egy lámpánál
megállott és kérdő tekintettel nézett föl reám. Összeszedtem
magamat:
– Penina, szegény kis Penina… ez a Kubas…
– Hallgass!
Szava ütött és úgy talált, mint valami kéz a sötét levegőből. Én
ostoba, aki szánalmat mertem mutatni a szeretetnek és megvetést a
tárgyának. Egyetlen szót sem tudtam többé mondani, se szegényt,
se gazdagot, megrendülve és tehetetlenül állottam az utcai szélben
és nem volt gondolatom. Csak az az egy tudat gyötört a
kínszenvedésig: nem fogom legyőzni az életet, nem fogok rajta
uralkodni.
Penina vizsgálódva, csaknem kutató szomorúsággal rám nézett
és hirtelen, mintha valami régen elvesztettet fedezett volna föl
arcvonásaimban, elfordította a fejét és lerázva a kezemet válláról,
homlokával nekidőlt a vas lámpaoszlopnak és sírt. Arcát nem takarta
el a kezével, sírt, mint ahogyan sötét felhőből zápor zuhog a földre.
– Hát így van, – mondta lassan, amikor lecsillapodott. – Ne gyere
többé közénk. Hallod? A te utad a világosságba vigyen.
Elfutott és eltűnt a szemem elől a régi kapú sötét torkában, a
melyen korcsmacégér fölött kicsiny, vöröses fényű lámpa égett.
Soha sem láttam többé.
De míg mi el vagyunk telve becsületességünk látszólagos
gazdagságával, addig talán a világ örök lelkiismerete kimondta az
irgalom megváltó szavát Peninára, akinek tisztasága elvesztett
egéért omlott égő könnye minden bűnt kimosott lelke ruhájából.
Csak sokkal később életem folyamán, amikor megkezdődött
gondolataim harca az egyetlen, a nagy megváltás szóért, állott
Penina ismét mellém és könnyeit, mint valami fénylő követ,
odanyujtotta kétkedésem sötétségébe.
NEGYEDIK FEJEZET.
Az első vacsora.