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I N T E R N AT I O N A L PA P E R S I N P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y
Series Editors
Philip Arestis
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Malcolm Sawyer
University of Leeds
Leeds, United Kingdom
This is the fourteenth volume of the series International Papers in Political
Economy (IPPE). This series consists of an annual volume with a single
theme. The objective of the IPPE is the publication of papers dealing
with important topics within the broad framework of Political Economy.
The original series of International Papers in Political Economy started
in 1993, until the new series began in 2005, and was published in the
form of three issues a year with each issue containing a single extensive
paper. Information on the old series and back copies can be obtained
from the editors: Philip Arestis (pa267@cam.ac.uk) and Malcolm Sawyer
(e-mail: m.c.sawyer@lubs.leeds.ac.uk).
Economic Policies
since the Global
Financial Crisis
Editors
Philip Arestis Malcolm Sawyer
University of Cambridge University of Leeds
Cambridge, United Kingdom Leeds, United Kingdom
v
vi Preface
Index 357
Notes on Authors
Chapter 2
Fig. 1 Cyclically adjusted budget deficits as % GDP: euro area
(Source: Based on statistics given in OECD Economic
Outlook, various issues) 76
Fig. 2 Unemployment and the NAIRU (Source: OECD Economic
Outlook, various issues) 79
Chapter 4
Fig. 1 Adjusted wage share, selected OECD countries, 1970–2015
(per cent of GDP at factor costs). (Note: The adjusted wage
share is defined as compensation per employee as a share of
GDP at factor costs per person employed. It thus includes
the labour income of both dependent and self-employed
workers, and GDP excludes taxes but includes subsidies;
Source: European Commission (2016), our presentations) 131
Fig. 2 Top 1 per cent income share; selected OECD countries,
1970–2015 (per cent of pre-tax fiscal income without
capital gains). (Note: For France, Germany, Spain, Sweden
and the USA, shares relate to tax units; in the case of the UK,
data covering the years 1970 until 1989 comprise married
couples and single adults and from 1990 until 2012 adults;
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database (2016),
our presentation) 132
xv
xvi List of Figures
Chapter 6
Fig. 1 Foray’s (2013) guiding principles for identifying
and prioritising ‘smart specialisation’ activities 238
Chapter 7
Fig. 1 Evolution of real GDP (per cent), employment (per cent)
and unemployment rates (percentage points) in the EU
countries in the episodes of employment decline between
2008 and 2015 (Source: Own calculations based on
Eurostat, National Accounts (ESA 2010), and Eurostat,
Employment and Unemployment (Labour Force Survey)) 283
Fig. 2 Evolution of real GDP (per cent), employment (per cent)
and unemployment rates (percentage points) in the EU
countries in the episodes of creation of employment
between 2008 and 2015 (Source: Our calculations based
on Eurostat, National Accounts (ESA 2010), and Eurostat,
Employment and Unemployment (Labour Force Survey)) 284
Fig. 3 Employment destruction (percentage), rise in
unemployment rates (percentage points) and EPL index
in 2008 (Source: Our calculations based on Eurostat,
Employment and Unemployment (Labour Force Survey)
and OECD Employment Protection Database) 299
Fig. 4 Changes in total employment (percentage) and changes
in EPL indicators in the period 2008–2012 (Source:
Our calculations based on Eurostat, Employment and
Unemployment (Labour Force Survey) and OECD
Employment Protection Database) 304
List of Figures
xvii
Chapter 8
Fig. 1 A stylized representation of low-carbon investment financing 316
Fig. 2 New global investment in renewable energy (FS-UNEP
and BNEF 2016) 319
List of Tables
Chapter 2
Table 1 Projections and outturns of economic activity 49
Table 2 Fiscal positions 2007–2010 51
Table 3 Budget positions (per cent of GDP) 57
Table 4 Evolution of budget positions 58
Chapter 3
Table 1 Tax paid as per cent of gross income: UK 100
Table 2 Buybacks in the USA ($ billion), for the decade
2003–2012107
Chapter 4
Table 1 Financialisation and the gross profit share—a
Kaleckian perspective 139
Table 2 Distribution trends and effects of financialisation
on these trends before and after the financial and
economic crisis of 2007–9 164
Chapter 5
Table 1 ICT investment impacts on unemployment. OLS
Estimation. Dependent variable—long-term
unemployment 2000–2010, 17 countries 206
xix
xx List of Tables
Chapter 7
Table 1 Unemployment rates in EU countries (per cent), and
change in the real GDP (per cent), employment
(per cent) and unemployment rates (percentage points)
between 2007 and 2015 275
Table 2 OLS estimation results 279
Table 3 Growth of total employment and temporary employment
during the periods of employment adjustment in the EU
countries (percentage of employment existing the
previous year) 290
Table 4 OECD EPL indicators (version 3) 295
Table 5 OLS estimation results 301
Monetary Policy Since the Global
Financial Crisis
Philip Arestis
P. Arestis (*)
Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge,
19, Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EP, UK
University of the Basque Country, Spain
1 Introduction1
The focus of this chapter is on monetary policies since the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC), and the subsequent Great Recession (GR). Since then,
monetary policy makers have in effect abandoned the main policy instru-
ment of manipulating the rate of interest to achieve price stability. This
is so in view of the rate of interest reduced to nearly zero, and below zero
in some countries, along with Quantitative Easing (QE), to still achieve
an Inflation Target (IT). In addition to these new ‘unconventional’ poli-
cies, financial stability has also been introduced, both microprudential
(concerned with individual financial institutions) and macroprudential
(concerned with the entire financial system) type of policies.
It is the case, though, that “bank lending to the private sector and the
broad money supply have stagnated and the recovery has been weak”
(Goodhart 2015, p. 20).2 The initial introduction of these unprecedented
‘unorthodox’ measures, along with direct bailouts of banks and other
financial institutions, though, were helpful in avoiding a more serious
financial crisis; they helped to enhance the liquidity and reduce the risk
premium of the banking sector. It all helped to avoid the collapse of
the financial sectors in the relevant countries. However, the subsequent
rounds of the QE, and the near-zero/negative interest rates, proved to be
less effective in terms of producing a robust recovery. Relevant proposals
to achieve financial stability are in place. We discuss these developments
in the cases of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU).
1
I am grateful to Malcolm Sawyer for helpful comments.
2
Not only because of poor output growth expectations but also because of the imposition of lower
leverage ratios, which means that banks could not provide more credit in view of the significant
increase in their regulatory capital ratios. Reduction of capital requirements would have been more
helpful (Goodhart 2015).
Monetary Policy Since the Global Financial Crisis 3
2 Inflation Targeting
This section concentrates on the theoretical aspects of IT to begin with,
followed by a discussion of some of its main problems.
sufficient for economic stability more generally. Low and stable inflation
did not prevent a banking crisis” (p. 4; see, also, King 2016).
Fiscal policy should only rely on automatic stabilisers, but more
importantly, it should be concerned with broadly balancing govern-
ment expenditure and taxation. This downgrades fiscal policy as an
active instrument of economic policy, a proposition based on the
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. Consequently, fiscal policy is ineffec-
tive as a stabilisation instrument. However, there are critiques of this
theorem. Arestis and Sawyer (2003, 2004a), for example, criticise it and
offer a strong and supportive view of the effectiveness of fiscal policy
(see, also, Bernheim 1987). There is also empirical evidence that sup-
ports the contention that a significant proportion of consumers and
firms are actually non-Ricardian in that they are not forward-looking or
their behaviour is constrained. The presence of non-Ricardian house-
holds is crucial in that fiscal policy is effective under such circumstances
(Coenen et al. 2012).
An important assumption is the existence of short-run nominal rigidi-
ties in the form of sticky wages and prices. It follows from this assump-
tion that the independent central bank by manipulating the nominal rate
of interest is able to influence the real interest rate and hence real spend-
ing in the short run. The role of ‘expected inflation’ is also important. The
inflation target itself and the forecasts of the central bank are thought of
providing a strong steer to the perception of expected inflation. Given
the lags in the transmission mechanism of the rate of interest to infla-
tion, and the imperfect control of inflation, inflation forecasts become
the intermediate target of monetary policy in this framework (Svensson
1997, 1999). The target and forecasts add an element of transparency
seen as a paramount ingredient of IT. Central banks decide on changes
in interest rates in view of forecasts of future inflation as it deviates from
its target along with output as it deviates from potential output. But such
forecasts are not easily available, and large margins of error are evident
in forecasting inflation (see, also, Goodhart 2005). The reputation and
credibility of central banks can easily be damaged under these condi-
tions. The centrality of inflation forecasts in the conduct of this type of
monetary policy represents a major challenge to countries that pursue IT.
Monetary Policy Since the Global Financial Crisis 5
3
Financial frictions, namely stickiness in making transactions, though, have been introduced into
the NCM model more recently. King (2012), however, argues that ‘no one of these frictions seems
large enough to play a part in a macroeconomic model of financial stability. So it is not surprising
that it has proved hard to find examples of frictions that generate quantitatively interesting trade-
offs between price and financial stability … overwhelmingly the most important objective remains
stabilisation of inflation’.
6 P. Arestis
In the real world, many economic agents are liquidity constrained. They
do not have sufficient assets to sell or the ability to borrow. Their expenditures
are limited to their current income and few assets. The perfect capital mar-
ket assumption, implicit in the NCM, in effect implies no credit rationing,
thereby concluding that the only effect of monetary policy would be a ‘price
effect’ as the rate of interest is changed. Consequently, the parts of the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy, which involve credit rationing and
changes in the non-price terms upon which credit is supplied, are excluded by
assumption. A further problem has been highlighted by King (2016) in that
IT in view of its design “to mimic the behaviour of a competitive market econ-
omy” (p. 171), cannot account for ‘radical uncertainty’, namely the uncer-
tainty that statistical analysis cannot tackle. This, then, produces accumulated
occasional ‘mistakes’ on the part of households and business agents, which
would require the central bank to account and target “the real equilibrium
of the economy and not just price stability” (p. 172). There is also the ques-
tion relating to risk and uncertainty and the assumption of a single interest
rate (Goodhart 2007). The perceived riskiness of borrowers and uncertainty
clearly imply that a single interest rate cannot capture reality. IT also does
not pay enough attention to asset bubbles, the consequences of which can
be severe as shown by the emergence of the GFC.
Countries that do not pursue IT policies, and do not have independent
central banks in most cases, have done as well as the IT countries in terms
of inflation and locking-in inflation expectations at low levels (Angeriz and
Arestis 2007, 2008); in fact, and in some cases, they have done a great deal
better than the IT countries. Angeriz and Arestis (op. cit.) also show that low
inflation and price stability do not always lead to macroeconomic stability.
The GFC provides ample evidence of this conclusion. But even prior to the
GFC steady output growth and stable inflation were associated with growing
imbalances, essentially in the balance sheets of households, firms and finan-
cial institutions. All these imbalances proved to have been very costly indeed
in view of the GFC. Furthermore, Angeriz and Arestis (2007) argue that the
NCM pays insufficient attention to the exchange rate. Nevertheless, the real
exchange rate affects the demand for imports and exports, and thereby the
level of demand, economic activity and inflation; but it is not included in
the monetary policy rule of the IT model. Furthermore, there is insufficient
evidence that the available empirical evidence (Arestis and Sawyer 2004b,
2008) validates the NCM theoretical propositions.
Monetary Policy Since the Global Financial Crisis 7
Despite all these problems with the NCM and its economic policy, sup-
port for it and its empirical equivalent, the Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) type of models,4 used widely by both academics
and central bankers, is still very much in place and not abandoned.5 New
policies have emerged in view of the GFC but the focus on IT is still there
as shown below.
In early August 2007, when the US subprime crisis began to spread out-
side mortgage and real estate finance, there was a widespread collapse of
confidence in the banking system especially so in the interbank market.
The money markets became dysfunctional, which disrupted the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy. That led to an unprecedented
and synchronised downturn in business and consumer confidence; a sig-
nificant drop in aggregate demand thereby ensued. A fully-fledged credit
crunch emerged, as interbank lending was effectively frozen on the fear
that no bank was safe anymore. By early October 2008, the crisis spread
to Europe and to the emerging countries as the global interbank market
stopped functioning.6 The GR thereby emerged.
4
King (2016) suggests that the DSGE models, which are employed by central banks, ‘afford little
role for money or banks, a property that has been a source of embarrassment, both intellectual and
practical’ (p. 305).
5
See, also, Arestis and González Martinez 2015, for a discussion of further problems with the
NCM theoretical framework and its IT policy implications.
6
A number of Asian countries managed to avoid the most serious aspects of the crisis. Precautionary
measures after the 1997 Asian crisis, in the form of buildup of large foreign reserves, reduced expo-
8 P. Arestis
The intervention in the United States began in March 2008 with the rescue
of the investment bank, Bear Stearns, by JP Morgan with funds from the
Fed, was only the beginning. The rescue was justified on the argument that
their exposure was so extensive to third parties that a worse crisis would have
developed without the bail out. In July 2008, the Fed and the Treasury fol-
lowed it by bailing out and partially nationalising Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, in that they were crucial to the functioning of the mortgage market.
In September 2008, the Fed and the Treasury allowed the investment bank
Lehman Brothers to collapse in an attempt to prevent moral hazard by
sure to foreign borrowing, and tighter controls over their banking systems, helped greatly. Some of
the Latin American countries also managed similarly.
Monetary Policy Since the Global Financial Crisis 9
discouraging the belief that all insolvent institutions would be saved. The
argument put forward to justify the collapse was that Lehman Brothers was
in a very bad shape, and less exposed than Bear Stearns. Shortly afterwards
the insurance US giant American International Group (AIG) was bailed
out and nationalised in an attempt to avoid the impact on insurance-
security contracts if it were allowed to fail. The Lehman Brothers incident
turned the liquidity crisis into a confidence crisis, thereby causing panic in
capital markets and a virtual freeze in global trade.7
The Treasury introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Programme
(TARP) in October 2008, and used $700 billion to buy ‘toxic’ securi-
ties in an attempt to restore bank lending; and from late 2008 to early
2009, through its TARP, added $250 billion cash injection. The Fed after
reducing the federal funds rate from 5.24% to 0–0.25% by December
2008, started purchasing long-term Treasury securities, mortgage-backed
securities, and swaps of short-term Treasuries for longer-term Treasuries
(what is called ‘Qualitative Easing’; see Farmer and Zabczyk 2016) in
an attempt to enhance the liquidity of the financial markets—what was
QE1. By June 2010, it reached a peak of $2.1 trillion, and the Fed halted
further purchases as the economy started to improve, but resumed in
August 2010 when the Fed decided the economy was not growing sat-
isfactorily. In November 2010, the Fed announced a second round of
quantitative easing, QE2, buying $600 billion of Treasury securities by
the end of the second quarter of 2011. A third round of quantitative
easing, QE3, was announced on 13 September 2012, which amounted
to a $40 billion per month, open-ended bond purchasing programme
of agency mortgage-backed securities. On 12 December 2012, the Fed
increased it from $40 billion to $85 billion per month. The QE ended
on 29 October 2014 after accumulating $4.5 trillion assets. The Fed
also increased the federal funds rate in December 2015 from 0.20% to
0.50%, in December 2016 from 0.50% to 0.75% and in March 2017
from 0.75% to 1.0%. The Fed reiterated after its March 2017 meeting
that further rate increases would be gradual.
7
The bailout of Citigroup in the US over the weekend of 22–23 November 2008 left a ‘sour taste’
to those who recalled that this financial institution was a prime protagonist in the 1999 repeal of
the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act (Eichengreen 2015).
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