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Great Powers and US Foreign
Policy towards Africa

Stephen M. Magu
Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa
 Stephen M. Magu

Great Powers and

US Foreign Policy
towards Africa
Stephen M. Magu
Political Science
Hampton University
Hampton, VA, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-94095-3 ISBN 978-3-319-94096-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94096-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018949040

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
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Cover image (globe): Ted Grajeda via the Noun Project

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Cover design by Emma Hardy

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This book is dedicated to Mary Wanjiku, my mom, for always having my back,
prayers, being the rock, the foundation; and for keeping me grounded.

To Gideon, Lydiah, Grace and all your children (all my children).

You rock.
To my many nephews and nieces, for the joy you have wrought, even through
my prolonged absences; and my many cousins, especially Muhindi Kariuki
and Wambui Kariuki; and to all those that
Mr. James Magu calls his children.

To Hon. Kwenya wa Thuku. For being a true “Servant Leader.” And to all
that hope for and aspire to better relations between Africa and its friends
(and sometimes foes) abroad.
 Preface

Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa stemmed from a doc-
toral class project at Old Dominion University, under the tutelage of one
of the brightest minds and most accomplished scholars in international
studies (foreign policy) I have ever met, Dr. Simon Serfaty. Although
the project did not ultimately result in a dissertation, and was shelved
for a few more semesters, when I returned to re-read it, much after the
several unilateral and multilateral foreign policy, such as the debacle
of the ill-advised NATO actions in Libya, it was with some hindsight.
The resurgence in my interest in the project was not solely informed by
the actions of NATO and the outcomes in Libya: Kenya had, by now,
embarked on its own mis/adventure in the neighboring Somalia. Surely,
somewhere in the halls of Kenya’s State House, there was some foreign
policy guru, churning through tomes of Kissinger and Kennanesque wis-
dom. That they were crafting Kenya’s well-thought out foreign policy
for Somalia, complete with plans for intervention, goals, projected out-
comes, expenses, public polls to gauge support (or opposition to), car-
rying out a cost-benefit analysis and ultimately deciding on the unrivaled
wisdom of intervention.
This gave some direction to the more visible power on the horizon:
the United States, its foreign policy for Somalia (is there one?), the start-
stops in its dealings with the region, which further evoked memories of
wars (Ogaden, Shifta) etc. It occurred to me that there is perhaps no
US foreign policy for Somalia, or Kenya, or the other 51 countries (save

vii
viii    Preface

for Egypt, which benefits from US military largesse, given the 1978
Camp David accords and its peace treaty with Israel). So, there was
Archimedes, and the Eureka moment: what is the US foreign policy for
Africa? Is there a US foreign policy for Africa? If not, why? This led to a
second question; more pertinent: what is China doing in Africa? Are the
Chinese the new imperialists, or are they development partners, stepping
into the development-funding gap that has been gaping ever since the
Kenya-Uganda Railway, the so aptly-named “Lunatic Express”, complete
with its Man Eaters of Tsavo, reached the shores of Lake Victoria?
Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa is a non-fiction
work, easy to read, and easy to arrive at the absence of a coherent for-
eign policy for Africa. This absence is not only to be found in US foreign
policy. Many current and former Great Powers (which now do, or have
in the past included Russia, USSR, Great Britain/United Kingdom,
France, The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal) have no clue what to do with,
or about, Africa. This is particularly true of that part that resembles the
horn, jutting towards the Red Sea and Arabia; the now-failed state of
Somalia, which has brought back to life the proposition represented in
the Johnny Depp movies, Pirates of ~.
Because the United States is a superpower, a hyperpower, a hegemon,
the book focuses quite a bit on US foreign policy and general rela-
tionship, and historical connections between the land of the free, that
enslaved millions of Africans, later freed them as (African) Americans and
attempted to ship (at least some of them) back to Liberia. It also banned
all the other Africans from entering the country most of the twentieth
century, and then suddenly discovered that there was a continent, com-
prising of 22% of the world’s land mass, that was about to become free
from colonialism. Also, that the much disliked communists who lived in
the land of bears and ice, Soviets, were interested in that continent of
Africa (they weren’t, at any extent outside of thwarting western expan-
sion), and that the United States needed to prevent them, so the Peace
Corps program was born, sending a bunch of mostly urban, graduating
kids to teach African farmers how to farm… Then the volunteers got
asked about that whole concept of “separate but equal” that looked sus-
piciously like the conditions of colonialism, and way down south, like
apartheid…
In one moment of absolute brilliance, wiping away Africa’s 500
year, terrible, horrible, no-good history with the United States, those
Americans elected Obama, the first Kenyan president of the United
 Preface    ix

States, who then shunned Kenya for a while, until he could not. Then
they elected another president who called Africa/ns and Haiti “shithole
countries” because they were not Norwegians, and all that left all those
Africans feeling as though the United States had no interest in, nor for-
eign policy strategy towards Africa. Neither did the other major powers,
including those former colonists, Brazil, India, China or Indonesia.

Hampton, USA Stephen M. Magu

 Acknowledgements

Dr. Simon Serfaty’s teaching and scholarship was especially ­instrumental,

and pushed this research to become more than it was ever going to be.
Dr. David Earnest mentored me through the competing ideas for the dis-
sertation, and was always an outstanding mentor. Dr. Omar E. Hawthorne
has always been such a keen thinker, and has helped me conspire to
aspire to contribute to the question of Africa’s foreign policy, to excel,
to write books and teach. Dr. Karp and Prof. Karp: your assistance from
across the water, during those drop-in sessions, training, support (and
some venting); your assistance is acknowledged. My colleagues and stu-
dents at ODU, at Regent and at Hampton University: Your contribu-
tions, discussions, insight and critiques are invaluable. I also thank Katelyn
Zingg, Editorial Assistant at Palgrave, for working tirelessly, with dedica-
tion, through challenging circumstances while I was in Kenya, on ensur-
ing that the manuscript met the very highest standards of Palgrave and
the Academy, and to hopefully work with her someday in the future on
another book.

xi
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Order (and Disorder) in World Order 13

3 Great Powers, International Order and Stability:

Transformation? 33

4 A Brief History of US–Africa Relations: To 1990 55

5 Post-Colonialism, Europe and Africa: Changing

Policyscapes 87

6 Detour: The BRICs and New Directions in Africa

Foreign Policy 113

7 Tunnel’s End: A Light, or an Oncoming Train?

US-Africa Foreign Policy Since 2000 143

8 Great Powers and US Foreign Policy Towards Africa 171

Index 187

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the collapse of
the Union of Soviet, Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States’
ascendancy into a hegemon began. For some, this heralded the unipo-
lar moment by the now-sole global superpower, almost unrivaled in its
preponderance of power and influence and the capacity to do the utmost
good—or in some instances, to do nothing good. Of course, there was
the question of a few thousand nuclear weapons soon to be inherited
by Russia, and a few other nuclear-armed states around the globe, but
none with the economic or cultural clout the US wielded. After the col-
lapse, the United States set about to establish a new pecking order; the
first instance of this was by cobbling together a coalition that reinforced
global rules-based norms that became the First Gulf War. As the former
Soviet Union gradually declined, Russia was grappling with the possible
future where it was ascendant. The new hegemon found itself almost
required to deal with the perceived diminished international threats—per-
ceived, for they would soon be hydra-headed. Over the next 25 years, it
would need to successfully confront these threats, which called for the
adoption of a different tact, different strategies, in its new role.
The early years of the post-Cold War period saw a trend toward multi-
lateralism, and optimism that peace could be achieved, that the last great
war and its aftermath were behind human history. Much like the end of
the Cold War caught practically every major actor in the international
system and politics by surprise, this period however, coincided with the
rise of a new phenomenon in the context of statehood: state failure.

© The Author(s) 2019 1

S. M. Magu, Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94096-0_1
2 S. M. MAGU

Somalia’s government collapsed, and despite the sporadic, several dozen

attempts at reconstituting a central government, the task remains but
a mirage. Yugoslavia quickly followed suit, beginning a most torturous
break up into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Former
Yugoslav) Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. The
former Czechoslovakia also subsequently split into the Czech and Slovak
Republics. This was perhaps the only neat split in hitherto unitary poli-
ties, except for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the fif-
teen successor republics that issued from the USSR.
The “fragmentation” of the binary bipolar world order, led on the
one hand by the United States and the USSR on the other, had other
far-reaching consequences. Former client states freed themselves of, or
found themselves without global superpower sponsors, and adrift in
a new world order. The western powers’ emphasis on democratization
resulted in the rise of contested spaces in government and governance,
with old regimes holding on, and the multiparty democratic experi-
ment (or challenge) disintegrating unitary states. Other newer phenom-
ena gained significance: non-state actors such as NGOs found a voice
in a more liberal world order. Violent non-state actors (VNSAs), whose
impact and influence was still significantly constrained by the bipolar
system, began to assert themselves, and the instances of global terror-
ism grew in scope and severity. State failure characterized countries such
as Somalia after 1991, and terrorists (and pirates) and found support
in autocratic regimes, fragile, failing and failed states, for example, the
Taliban (Osama bin Laden) in Sudan and in Afghanistan.
Critically, the United States has largely applied a Cold War mentality to
its interactions and relationship with most of the African continent, even
where evidence suggests other approaches might be more valuable. The
monograph concludes that new approaches such as rethinking the milita-
rization of US foreign policy, contemplating a nonzero-sum approach, and
constructive engagement, may be the way forward for US foreign policy
toward the Horn of Africa and most of the rest of Africa. This is especially
so, given the concepts of “the next billion” in Africa, the rapid rise of China
and its growing engagement that approaches near dominance in Africa.

Great Powers and Foreign Policy Approaches

Great Powers have not fundamentally changed their approach to
power and security despite “the privlege of place” of literature arguing that
such changes have occurred, alternately in history, or especially in the
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

immediate post-Cold War era. The Cold War, despite being a relatively
shorter period as major global epochs go, witnessed a few key events
­previously mentioned; the fall of the Berlin Wall end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its competing ideology, a more
globalized, interconnected world; bipolarity giving way to the rise of
hegemony/interpolarity/multipolarity and regionalism, the gradual rise,
strengthening and deepening of regional and intergovernmental organ-
izations and institutions such as the EU, NATO and the UN. States
­continue to use the tools of foreign policy of a bygone era to address
multiple new opportunities—and challenges.
Over history’s long arc, these tools have included diplomacy, pre-
ponderant military and economic capabilities, building and leveraging
of alliances, and pursuit of other power variables, nowadays thought
to include “soft power” and “smart power.” This approach has neither
reflected, nor addressed the unintended consequences of the end of
post-World War era of bipolarity. The parallel process of increasing num-
bers of nation-states has produced a medley of nontraditional security
threats. These include former and new client-states’ failure, increased
inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts, demographic pressures due to refu-
gees, humanitarian issues with internally displaced persons, rise of new
security challenges such as international and domestic terrorism, rise of
non-state actors competing against the Weberian state and the potential
of nuclear proliferation, small-arms proliferation, low-intensity regional
wars and a fragmented international order. Great Powers have generally
not formulated strategic and cohesive foreign policy options to confront
these changes and challenges, while the United States appears to stum-
ble from crisis to the next with frequent leadership changes crafting new,
improved, panacea-type solutions to the issues that bedevil the world.
The potential benefits of the end of the Cold War and its attendant
consequences failed to produce the world that the United States had
envisioned. At the same time, levels of cooperation, trade, technologi-
cal development, communication and collaboration through institutions
and regimes has increased. The retreat of communism to just a few hold-
out countries has not produced democracy, or “liberal states”; non-state
actors have increasingly been able to affect the direction of international
relations, and as seen in the current pressing global issues, such as “the
war on terror”, the low-to-high intensity conflicts arising from the Arab
Spring and the perennial conflict in the Great Lakes region in Africa.
To understand how states have dealt with the changes in world order,
this monograph briefly examines Great Power politics, summarizing the
4 S. M. MAGU

postwar world order. It then delves into the post-Cold War geopoliti-
cal situation and examines how the end of the era of bipolarity affected
global geopolitics. Specifically, it addresses the issue of the rise of fragile,
failing and failed states, the implications of failing states and the dangers
these pose to world order and the Foreign Policy tools and options that
the sole post-Cold War current hegemon has used to meet the challenges
of failed states.
Among other things, this monograph broadly examines US foreign
policy toward much of the African continent, with special attention to
the greater East African and Horn of Africa region. It investigates how
the United States has dealt with the growing existential threats emanat-
ing from the Horn of Africa, and especially the state failure phenome-
non. For good measure, it studies the comparative foreign policy of
other great powers, especially the European Union, and the now-rising
BRICS. The United States, in its conduct of foreign policy, and despite
the knowledge of the end of bipolarity, rise of state failure and contes-
tation to state and global authority, has continually applied the tradi-
tional tools of diplomacy, power and influence to the new challenges and
opportunities, rather than crafting appropriate responses to emergent
conditions.
The latter is especially true of the postcolonial states of Africa, which
joined an already existing system that generally marginalized them, and their
attempts and processes to fit into this new world order. The monograph
discusses potentially new, effective, nontraditional foreign policy strategies
that have better prospects of addressing global changes in the twenty-first
century, especially toward Africa, but more precisely, the Horn of Africa. It
­further argues that the success of such new strategies can provide the United
States a template, a blueprint, for the future of its foreign policy strate-
gies for the rest of the continent and parts of the world that have similar
characteristics.

Post-Cold War: Oceans of Changes

Significant geopolitical events since the early 1990s can be divided into
political/ideological, economic and technological categories. In the
political arena, they included the fall of the Berlin Wall and the even-
tual reunification of Germany, the “end” of the Cold War the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States,
the collapse of several communist-leaning states including Romania,
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the breakup of the latter two. On the
economic arena, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade heralded
the movement toward free trade, aided by the rise to supremacy of the
Bretton Woods Institutions and increasing interdependence and globali-
zation. The levels and complexity of global trade, occurring at a time of
deepening political integration and economic expansion of Europe east-
ward affirmed an American-led future, one that then prized the free trade
rules imputed by the World Trade Organization. On a less promising
track, there was an increase in the number of state and non-state actors in
the international system, including the ominous rise in and the power
of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and their brand of interstate rela-
tions such as terrorism. Although liberal democracy didn’t quite take hold
everywhere, more countries were embracing tenets of democracy, which also
brought about a change issues states would confront in the new century—
including changes in the concepts of sovereignty, global governance, the
cyber environment as a new frontier for conflict, human rights and climate
change.
These changes have impacted—if not shifted—states’ security priorities
and agendas, in ways that embrace traditional world order concerns such
as the balance of power, anarchy and possibility of conventional war, states’
capabilities and alliances and outcomes of global trade; yet, they are con-
fronting new challenges and threats including constraints in war, rebuilding
states defeated in conflict, and the effects of environmental changes on their
security (coastal lands flooding, necessitating populations moving, naval
bases that may be relocated, etc.). The new expanded agenda also includes
issues somewhat related to traditional security challenges: they include (in)
security arising from inter/intra and ethnic conflicts, small weapons, weap-
ons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons prolif-
eration, role diffusion and division in traditional state functions amongst
several state and non-state actors, terrorism, effects of globalization, trade
and trade wars, challenging economies threatening the global capitalist sys-
tem, and the rise in the number of failed states.
The changes are thought to have altered the traditional security
agenda so that it now includes humanitarian issues, a greater focus on
terrorism and terrorist-client states, weapons proliferation, refugees,
migration and demographic pressures, economic crimes such as drugs,
counterfeiting and trafficking in persons, state failure and its conse-
quences, all which are evident in failed states. Some of these changes
are illustrated by the United Nations Security Council’s deliberations in
2008, on rape as a weapon of war.1 Scholars suggest that Great Powers’
6 S. M. MAGU

foreign policy and security agenda should change to reflect the changing
scope; for example, Richard Haass suggests that the US adopt a policy
of “regulation”, forming and working with coalitions when needed, and
unilaterally when it suits the US interests.2 Other scholars suggest that
states remain the primary actors in the international system; that anar-
chy is still the predominant ordering principle of international relations,
and that even the challenges to states by other actors—Multi-National
Corporations and VNSAs—still occur within the framework of the state
as the organizing principle.3 Still, others suggest a range of policies such
as the doctrine of preemptive intervention, humanitarian intervention,
state-building, institutionalism, isolationism and traditional power pur-
suit among others.
To confront the morphing changes in world order, Great Powers
have largely maintained, improved on or modified a (pre)-Cold War for-
eign policy, with national security built around the overriding national
interest. This approach emphasizes constraining the rise of other pow-
ers, expanding their own power and reach, order and security in Europe,
strengthening their capabilities, dealing with issues of nuclear prolifer-
ation and general insecurity—and strengthening their economies—to
confront the challenges arising. The end of the Cold War and the fall of
the Soviet Empire have barely affected the way states perceive security.
For example, mercantilism suggests that Great Powers should resolve the
threat to commerce posed by piracy originating from the failed state of
Somalia, and the use of juridical territories of Somalia, Sudan, Yemen,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan as a haven for terrorists, an enhanced post-
Cold War security challenge.
Great Powers have frequently fought “limited wars”4 where narrow
objectives such as the change of government, elimination of (perceived)
threats or other interests, such as annexation, have (generally) been fol-
lowed by a withdrawal and role change to focus on peacekeeping, recon-
struction and state-building. Where intervention has occurred, it has
done so to safeguard the intervening state’s national interest, to assert
hegemony, to maintain international order (e.g. Balkans in the 1990s, or
Iraq/Kuwait in 1990/1) or retain strategic influence through human-
itarian assistance, for instance the US involvement in Somalia and in
Haiti in the early 1990s. Even where the cost of addressing state fail-
ure and its consequences to Great Powers can increase exponentially,
they have displayed little inclination to address precipitating factors that
would prevent and/or mitigate state failure, and therefore assure their
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

security, such as not invading Somalia, and allowing terrorism and piracy
to take root. Almost universally, Great Powers lack comprehensive, risk-
free foreign policy strategies to address state failure and other challenges.
At best, policy options are limited to managing the traditional security
threats despite a potentially changed nature of security threats.

Monograph Outline
The volume begins with an introductory chapter that outlines the organ-
ization, discussing some of the traditional approaches to foreign policy
preferences by Great Powers, despite the changes that have occurred
since the end of the Cold War. The second chapter, titled Order (and
Disorder) in World Order, defines what international relations schol-
ars consider to be ordered in the system of states. It examines the con-
cepts of power, systems, anarchy, hierarchy and states’ interactions in
the absence of a government above other governments and considers
how great powers and their interactions have shaped the contemporary
world, including the hypotheses of conflicts, hegemonic war and sta-
bility. It reflects on a two-century history of world order, the different
periods that denoted different systems—such as the European balance
of power in the 1800s, the major wars of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the interwar “cooling off” period, the Cold War period and
the post-Cold War period, with the multiple systems hypothesized to be
manifesting: Zones of Chaos, interpolar, multipolar and/or hegemonic
dominance by the United States. The chapter also considers the place
of the Global South in world order, finding that the Global South came
into an already established system and had little chance of influencing it,
other than through, for example, state failure and the primacy of (vio-
lent) non-state actors, but highlighting how world order is still in flux.
Chapter 3 is titled Great Powers, International Order and Stability:
Transformation? This chapter examines the rise of great/global powers,
by considering their definition, and the conditions that have facilitated
their rise. It delves into the new world order that arose from the ashes of
the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire, and the fall of the European
colonial empires after World War II, at the same time heralding the start
of the Cold War period. It postulates the dissonance between the great
powers (of which, at this time, there were two: the United States and
the USSR), and their master puppetry and manipulation of other coun-
tries into NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances respectively, and the rise
8 S. M. MAGU

of the Non-Aligned Movement, mostly encompassing former colonies. It

touches on a new sort of disorder: fragile, failing and failed states, their
definitions, features and characteristics, and initial thoughts on the global
actions to assist in saving, ultimately rebuilding failed states.
Chapter 4 is titled A Brief History of US–Africa Relations: To 1990. It
introduces the United States as a great power, and specifically examines
the relationship between the United States and Africa. The rationale for
this is that the United States is currently the (almost) unrivaled super-
power, while Africa is home to most of countries that have failed to con-
form to international norms in terms of fragile, failing and failed states:
an anomaly to the system. It examines the history of exploitative—lead-
ing to strained—relations between the United States and Africa: from
slavery to the support of European colonialism against Africa, to the
exclusion of African immigrants to the United States for most of the first
half of the twentieth century, the treatment of African Americans and
the US support of apartheid, to the lack of preparedness of the United
States for African independence. The strained history is also informed
by the constraints that US domestic politics imposed in its relationships
with a continent rapidly becoming independent, and how US race-
relations vis-a-vis its Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union cost
it the leadership of the free world at a time when the ideological con-
test was most intense. It examines US actions with respect to Rhodesia,
Ghana and South Africa, and the beginning of the ambivalence of US
foreign policy toward Africa, particularly during the Nixon, Ford and
Reagan presidencies, when arguably, most of the countries were inde-
pendent. It also examines US’ post-Cold War (dis)engagement and its
overall policy towards Africa, the economic challenges and propositions,
and missed opportunities in places such as Somalia and Rwanda.
Chapter 5, titled Post-Colonialism, Europe and Africa: Changing
Policyscapes, aims to revisit the relationship between Africa and its former
colonizers, the Europeans, especially after the continent becomes inde-
pendent and begins to set its course within the international arena. It
has been argued that the United States generally left the management
of African affairs to its allies, the Europeans, but how effective were
these Europeans in improving African affairs, given that the Europeans
were, in the estimation of Walter Rodney, of “under-developing Africa”?
The chapter examines European–Africa relations, arguing that with
the progressive European focus on crafting the ECSC, the EEC and
finally the European Union, Africa became a sideshow, a past quickly
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

best forgotten—even though European influence continued, some in

the form of trading and military partnerships (France and the UK) and
others through direct colonialism (Portugal and Spain). Africa was a
template, the setting for Cold War proxy wars with two insufficiently
committed actors (United States and USSR).
The chapter examines the European example of colonial statehoods
and argues that Africa had the worst examples of how to build state-
hood, given the ethnic fracturing further magnified by Europeans, to
support the colonial enterprise. It examines the gradual development
of a European (Union) foreign policy toward Africa, gradually mov-
ing to an institutional level (EU vs. AU) even as the major European
powers continue to periodically intervene in countries such as Mali, the
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, among
others. It further examines the two regional intergovernmental institu-
tions comparatively, and why the EU could formulate clear foreign policy
guidelines as opposed to the OAU/AU. The chapter examines the spe-
cific case of EU foreign policy toward Somalia, including the consensus
actions, particularly in confronting the piracy issue.
Chapter 6 is entitled Detour: The BRICs and New Directions in Africa
Foreign Policy. Deriving its rationale from the hegemonic stability the-
ory and the hegemonic war theory, this chapter examines the so-called
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (South Africa is
excluded as the goal of this book is to examine other (major powers’)
policies toward countries in Africa and is often not considered as part of
the BRIC countries) and their engagement with Africa, as they rise in
power and influence, to challenge the established Great Powers. In turn,
the chapter examines each of the countries—Brazil’s actions in Africa, its
opportunities and constraints for influence (including language, politi-
cal stability, relatively weaker economy, limitations of physical geography
and proximity, history of support of Portugal’s colonialism in Africa and
the challenge by a more assertive China). It moves on to Russia, arguing
that both during, and post-Cold War, the USSR/Russia have remained
on the periphery of African affairs, disinterested in the continent, except
as an anti-US strategy. Interestingly no significant effort has been made
to engage Africa even when the goal is to challenge US (or Chinese)
hegemony. It also examines India’s long-term history of engagement
with the African continent, from pre-European arrival days, but notes
that India’s colonization by the British stalled India’s ability to have a
significant impact on Africa, and even today, continues to face Chinese
10 S. M. MAGU

competition. The chapter then examines China’s growing engagement

and influence with Africa, and how it differs from that of the United
States and western countries, including the establishment of a China–
Africa forum.
Chapter 7, titled Tunnel’s End: A Light, or an Oncoming Train? US-
Africa Policy Since 2000 is more narrowly focused on the US foreign pol-
icy towards Africa since 2000, particularly focusing on the foreign policy
choices of US presidents and administrations since 2000. The immediate
post-Cold War gave the United States an opportunity to determine its future
foreign policy; yet, there were no significant changes to US foreign policy
toward Africa. After the September 2001 attacks, the United States began
to increase its level of attention to Africa; George Bush visited the continent
twice, but the underlying national security motive did not change, although
the US focused more on Africa’s development and illnesses, but occasionally
took out terrorists in Somalia and the Maghreb. The Obama Administration
faced major expectations to have an Africa focus, but given domestic con-
straints, and the fact that Obama was an anti-war, multilateralist, pro-
democracy and good governance, not-the-black president, Africa’s hopes
were quickly dashed. In the context of the United States itself, Obama’s
presidency was challenged by different issues: economic downturn, nee
the economic recession of 2008, the Arab Spring, an aggressive Russia and
“all the regular crises” and several terrorist attacks. Thus, despite expecta-
tions, Obama’s foreign policy for Africa was more of a stationary train at the
end of the tunnel, rather than perhaps a transformative high-speed train. The
final part of the chapter examines the future of United States–Africa relations
under the Trump presidency, accurately projecting that given Trump’s disin-
terest in Africa, its populations and non-Euro Americans, Africa will return
squarely to the periphery of American foreign policymaking.
Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, is titled: Great Powers’ and US
Foreign Policy for Africa; it examines not only the US foreign policy
toward’ Africa (with specific emphasis on the Horn of Africa, which is
the most volatile region, at least in terms of international relations,
after the MENA region), but also what (other) great powers can do to
more robustly engage Africa, in part to improve the economic devel-
opment prospects, but more presciently, to help fix fragile, failing and
failed states. The latter is especially important: 70% of failed states are
to be found in Africa, in each given category (7 of the top 10; 70% of
the top 20, and nearly all of Africa’s countries (at least 47 out of 54)
are in the top 100 failed states. Thus, Great Powers’ most significant
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

challenge—whether these are the USA, EU, BRICS or any combina-

tion of these—is the issue of failed states. For state failure breeds ungov-
erned spaces, which then host VNSAs and in the case of Iraq/Syria,
state capture by the same, into terrorist-controlled territory. The chapter
focuses on what these great powers can do to rebuild the failing states
into modern states, examining both the possibilities and limits of military
power, and alternatives such as the United States becoming a “reluctant
sheriff”. In this model of fixing the failing states, the United States can
continue to try Haass’ proposition: regulation, unilateral intervention-
ism, or demilitarization of its foreign policy toward Africa. It might also
try by not wholesale insulting the 1.2 billion-plus Africans.

Notes
1. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1820 (2008). 19 June 2008.
S/RES/1820 (2008). Full Text: https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/
sc9364.doc.htm. Accessed 4/27/2018.
2. Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 49–97.
3. See: Anthony Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (New York:
Oxford University Press 1999), 39; John Hulsman and A. Wess Mitchell,
The Godfather Doctrine: A Foreign Policy Parable (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2009), 21–85; Charles W. Kegley, World Politics: Trend
and Transformation (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009); Charles W. Kegley
and Gregory A. Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to
World Politics (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2006); and Timothy J. Sinclair,
Global Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2004), 289–91.
4. On ‘limited war’, see Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of
War; a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York,
Macmillan, 1973), 382–416. See also, J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War,
1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian
Revolutions on War and Its Conduct (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1961), 15–18.

Bibliography
Arend, Anthony. Legal Rules and International Society. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
12 S. M. MAGU

Fuller, J.F.C. The Conduct of War, 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the
French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1961.
Haass, Richard. The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War.
Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, 49–97.
Hulsman, John, and A. Wess Mitchell. The Godfather Doctrine: A Foreign Policy
Parable. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Kegley, Charles W. World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2009.
Kegley, Charles W., and Gregory A. Raymond. The Global Future: A Brief
Introduction to World Politics. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2006.
Sinclair, Timothy J. Global Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2004.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1820 (2008). 19 June 2008. S/
RES/1820 (2008). Full Text: https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9364.
doc.htm. Accessed 4/27/2018.
Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1973, 382–416.
 CHAPTER 2

Order (and Disorder) in World Order

Some IR scholars and theorists argue that the structure of the

­international system, rather than specific characteristics of states, cause
instability in the system.1 Others hold that the structure of the system,
absent an overarching global authority mechanism, such as a world gov-
ernment, increases the probability of conflict and ultimately war, since
states can only rely on themselves for security and self-help, the condi-
tion of anarchy.2 In their interactions, choices, which turn into prefer-
ences and thus foreign policy behavior, have outcomes, consequences,
including changing the capabilities and therefore role and primacy of
states in the international system. States’ perceived and intended rational
choices reflect the intended outcomes: Some states thus become “Great
Powers” and these have dominated the system for close to a half mil-
lennium, beginning the 1500s. At the same time, the determination of
which states were, or are, Great Powers, changed. Other states can be
thought of as Middle (“medium) Powers”, and the rest are small pow-
ers. It is the Great Powers and their foreign policy choices, particularly
toward small and rising powers, that this treatise explores.
Power, in the context of international relations, is generally perceived
to be the ability of one actor to get a second actor to do what the first
actor wants, at a cost that is acceptable to the second actor.3 The concept
of “Great Powers” has been used extensively to describe states with cer-
tain political, military and economic attributes, which generally exceed
those of other states, sometimes by overwhelming levels. Thus, Great
Powers have the capacity to influence other states (state and non-state

© The Author(s) 2019 13

S. M. Magu, Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94096-0_2
14 S. M. MAGU

actors) to do what they want, economically, militarily, politically, and

more recently, in terms of “attraction” (soft power). To define attributes
of Great Power, Zakaria uses Mandelbaum’s argument on what Great
Powers do: “they expand. They send their soldiers, ships and public
and private agents abroad. They fight wars, guard borders and adminis-
ter territories and people of different languages, customs, and beliefs far
from their own capitals. They exert influence on foreigners in a variety of
ways…”4
Paul Kennedy, in the seminal work The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,
attributes the scholastic application of the term to the Prussian historian
Leopold von Ranke’s 1933 work, “die grossen Machten.”5 On his part,
it is clear which states, over the course of time since medieval empires,
through the 30 years’ war and the subsequent Peace of Westphalia,
through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries European Wars, during
World War I, World War II and interwar periods and the latter half of
the twentieth century, constitute “Great Powers”. Kennedy’s definition
of Great Powers informs the debate on the same here.
Kennedy argues that “Europe had always been politically fragmented,
despite even the best efforts of the Romans, who had not managed to
conquer much farther north than the Rhine and the Danube.”6 Kennedy
attributes the political fragmentation of Europe in part to a favorable
geography, “having no enormous plains over which an empire of horse-
men could impose its swift dominion, nor were there broad and fertile
river zones such those around the Ganges, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates,
Yellow and Yangtze…”7 This would have facilitated “providing food for
the masses of toiling and easily conquerable peasants.”8 Europe’s geog­
raphy, and a host of other factors such as climate, internal conflict that
fragmented the continent into numerous principalities, and growing
ethnic nationalism, patterns of landholding and their changes, the high
­number of princes and royalty, a Christian expansionist and crusading
­history, among others, played a role in the eventual rise of Great Powers
and political arrangements that enabled Europe to conquer of most of the
world.9
Great Powers go through periods of “introspection,” during which
they restructure their internal political systems and external relationships
and often emerge stronger; since there is only so much territory and
population, others simultaneously lose wars and territory, suffer inter-
­
nal instability, and their leadership positions to other emerging states.
Examples of these internal restructuring periods are the United States
 2 ORDER (AND DISORDER) IN WORLD ORDER 15

during the Civil War (1861–1865), prior to its reluctant intervention

in World War I, the quick return to a policy of isolation and the almost
ambivalent assumption of global leadership after World War II. Other
examples of periods of change that resulted in the loss of positions of lead-
ership include the collapse of the colonial empires by the European pow-
ers at the end of, and after World War II. The postwar rise of Japan and
Germany as economic powers and the post-1976 China’s10 rise to become
the world’s second leading economic power followed periods where exter-
nal involvement in world affairs was paramount over internal growth.
Here, China might be the one outlier: The 100-year century of weak-
ness, invasion, internal conflict, instability and humiliation by Japan and
European powers was followed by internal reforms under communism—
through the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolutions, and other
internal edification activities, with little involvement abroad—outside of
the Korean War and the post-American Vietnamese consolidation.
Contrary to theoretical suggestions that states seek power and hegemony
for its sake, two variants of reasons for pursuit of state power seem to arise.
States actively seek power through trade, arms build-up, technological devel-
opment and the use of such advances to conquer territories actively, either for
economic advantage or for geopolitical and strategic positioning. For exam-
ple, Legro postulates that “ideas interact with other factors in specific ways to
cause outcomes,” such as the change in foreign policy, or the fall of one ide-
ology and the supremacy of another.11 Some Great Powers often default into
a position of power and leadership through the improvement of their internal
processes, including political systems (e.g. democracy), which provide oppor-
tunity for a more negotiated domestic politics debate, but also security that
spurs investment, trade, manufacturing, technological innovation, pursuit of
pragmatic economic policies and general socio-economic development.
What this volume articulates as the “Great Power by default paradigm”
is applicable to the United States, whose divine providence provided
favorable factors for its rise, and few challenges therein. In addition, its
isolation by geography, democratic constitutional order and lack of via-
ble competition and/or opposition, coupled with technological back-
wardness and the advantages of geography—thousands of miles of
difficult-to-marshal-a-whole-navy geography, allowed unimpeded consol-
idation and subsequent rise.12 Similarly, the United States was a rather
reluctant participant in global hegemonic power quests, and demon-
strated its reluctance to global involvement by declining colonies, even
after attending the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, and the isolation-
ism after World War I. Countries like the United States benefitted from
16 S. M. MAGU

their isolationism: It provided impetus and resources to invest in military

spending and national security, infrastructure and other areas of devel-
opment, thereby placing it onto the path of a Great Power. Kennedy
demonstrates the significant difficulties that states encountered in an
attempt to expand—and in some cases, extend their hegemonic control.
Often, states’ success/failure depended on the actions of other states,
the alliances they form and material assistance to other nations to avoid
being drawn into wars, and win them once they are drawn in.
International relations scholars have considered and theorized on some
of the major factors that determine a state’s power: these include military
capabilities, traditional pursuit for power (military, economic), ideology,
building and sustaining alliances, influence in international institutions,
nationalism and national cohesion, a state’s domestic institutions and sys-
tems which have some bearing on the support the domestic audiences
accord the country’s leadership, geographic location, strategic and national
interest, among other factors. Nontraditional dimensions of power are on
the rise, complimenting traditional power; the new dimensions include soft
power, international, regional, multilateral and bilateral trade agreements,
regional influence, rise of non-traditional powers with diluted levels of
capabilities and global realignments. Most recently, some non-state actors
have shown the ability to act like states, hold territory, conduct (guerilla)
war/terrorist attacks, levy taxes and develop p ­ seudo-states based on non-
traditional state formation basis, such as religion.
The economic dimension that states pursue, to become key players in
global politics, provides opportunity for a robust research agenda, given
the direction of the postwar “stable” international system. Here, stabil-
ity refers to the absence of major interstate war after 1945. Similarly,
the rise of postwar powerful states by means of, and the zealous pursuit
economic development, for instance, Japan and Germany. Also included
here is most of European (former) Great Powers; despite their loss of
colonies and empire, they provide opportunity to analyze the impact of
the economic dimension on international relations and world order. A
more recent “rising power” gives further credence to this supposition:
China’s rapid rise has occurred without any political or spatial conquests,
and with an almost reluctant pursuit of power, particularly the military
dimension.
The process of the rise of the “Great Powers” is not the subject of this
treatise; neither is the post-World War II global order, which was char-
acterized by a generally stable bipolar period and two of the greatest
 2 ORDER (AND DISORDER) IN WORLD ORDER 17

empires exercising influence over world affairs. Theories espoused by

different scholars regarding the key characteristics and conditions of the
rise of Great Powers will be assumed to accurately be reflected by exist-
ing scholarship, discussed earlier. Whatever their path to “Great Power”
status, exercising supremacy and/or hegemony is important since it
affects the interaction with other states—this is evident in the foreign
policy preferences of nations, as exercised toward certain other states.
Under the security umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the international system dominated by the Great Powers has
gained and maintained global stability since the 1945: The consolidation
of this position was enhanced by the collapse of the Soviet empire and
the communist ideology in the Warsaw Pact countries in 1990–1991.
This brief treatise examines the overall manifestation and practical
application of the United States’ foreign policy toward Africa, honing in
on the troubled Horn of Africa region; it demonstrates US foreign policy
toward (or absence thereof) specific issues (colonialism, apartheid, state
failure) and the specific regions (Horn of Africa, Great Lakes region),
the actions of other powers (European, BRICs) both in historical and
contemporary times. It questions US failures and successes (or not) in
handling of the security threats emerging from fragile, failing and failed
states after the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. It
studies how the United States has used its power, geostrategic position, alli-
ances, military, culture and ideology to confront this emerging threat—yet
these are the traditional tools of international relations, which are being
used to confront a host of new threats (among them VNSAs, globaliza-
tion, proliferation, state failure and terrorism). It examines US foreign pol-
icy in Africa through different presidencies, and the levels of commitment
to a continent that portents the future in terms of human capital, economic
resources, markets and growth, and as a source of threats to states.

Origins of World Order and Disorder: A Two-Century

History
It is all well to consider that there is a different—if new—world order,
but when did this world order come into being? According to Johnston,
the contemporary world order begins about 1500, with the European
interaction with the New World.13 While this is a propitious age to
begin conceiving of activities and events that would later lead to the
18 S. M. MAGU

development of modern society, the changes in international politics that

culminated with, for example, the Treaty of Westphalia, were already
happening: The Ottomans would lay siege to Vienna in 1529, while pil-
grims fleeing religious persecution would board the Mayflower and other
ships, ultimately establishing colonies in the New World. Not only did
they establish colonies; they built new whole countries whose structures
have held for hundreds of years—albeit without regard for the preexist-
ing nations in this New World.
This view finds much support among historians, and scholars in the
international relations discipline. Ikenberry holds that especially in the
past 200 years, liberal democracies have risen to dominate the globe. It
is relatively easy to critique this view; liberalism, and democratic norms
as one would think of them in the modern era were not especially pres-
ent in today’s major liberal democracies—the United States was a nation
in which some held others in slavery less than one and a half centuries
ago and did not treat the freed slaves as full citizens and humans until
1964, while the British, in their rule of places as disparate as India,
Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, and the Germans in Tanzania,
Namibia and elsewhere, atrocities on the scale of genocide were com-
mitted by colonial authorities, who mostly endured no punitive conse-
quences. Still, Ikenberry argues that the liberal “ascendancy has involved
the extraordinary growth of western democracies-from weakness in the
late eighteenth century to wealth and predominance in the late twentieth
century.”14
Notwithstanding the im/morality of what these soon-to-be Great
Powers did during this rise, the past 500 years have indeed, been a
boon for states, for the Leviathan, for the organization, consolidation
and international recognition of order and ways in which the otherwise
“state of nature” has been tamed. Kissinger, while arguing that there has
never been truly a global order, simultaneously shows that beginning
with Westphalia, a system of recognition of sovereigns (in this context,
used to denote (the) (a) state(s)), came into effect, and has contin-
ued to endure. The Treaty of Westphalia put paid to the prevalence of
intrigue, the petty sources of conflict and competing centers of power,
and perhaps even reduced the public administration burden and sources
of conflict, if one thinks of, for example, the consolidation of the Holy
Roman Empire’s (Germany’s) 39 principalities by the conclusion of
the treaty. The order was so robust and has remained so fundamentally
unchallenged that even countries that would later join the international
 2 ORDER (AND DISORDER) IN WORLD ORDER 19

order would be bound by the structures that Westphalia designed in

1648. This system, which has not changed much, characterizes the pre-
vailing world order, which can be thought of as one that is based on a
system of rules, norms and expectations; one that is relatively open and
progressive.15

World Order and Disorder: Two-Centuries

of Progress (?)

Most scholarship attempts to distinguish different, discernible peri-

ods of world order and ways in which countries related to each other,
beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia, a consolidation period preced-
ing the Napoleonic Wars, the Balance of Power era of the 1815–1870
years, a 35-year period prior to World War I that was rather ill-defined
but one that saw a war that upset the existing Balance of Power and
an arms race between the leading European powers of the day, the war
years (World War I), the interwar years between 1919–1939, World
War II, the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era. Going back to the
post-Westphalia period, power plays to determine the pecking order in
the international system continued largely unresolved but remained
indisputably a European affair. Indeed, the Global South, the dark con-
tinent and other unexplored “new lands,” before independence, were
part of the power plays—European explorers, trading companies and
conquerors, later colonial powers, were frequently established over van-
quished foes’ colonies after wars. They also fought wars among them-
selves, including, for example, the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s,
the Crimean War of 1856, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 the
Spanish–American War of 1898 and ultimately the Great Wars—World
War I and World War II, always seeking to foster advantages and hope-
fully, become the global hegemon. As such, even though there was a
“hierarchy”—one that excluded the Global South’s largely fractionalized
ethnic communities, there was also “disorder” within the world order
that was becoming established. How did the disorder manifest itself?
Although most of the western states that have appropriated the Great
Powers’ label have often been characterized by the “illusion of liberal-
ism16;” they not only fought each other quite regularly for power and
control of people and resources, but also over commerce, territory, alli-
ances and ideologies. Thus, some of the manifestations of the “disorder”
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Mailta ja
vesiltä
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
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laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: Mailta ja vesiltä

Author: A. Th. Böök

Release date: November 2, 2023 [eBook #72012]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Porvoo: WSOY, 1926

Credits: Juhani Kärkkäinen and Tapio Riikonen

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
This book was printed in 1735 and this etext is a careful reproduction of that
original text. No spelling and very few punctuation corrections have been made
in order to preserve the historical value of the original work.
All dates are Julian calendar dates; a new year begins on March 25th. When a
year is given for a date between January 1st and March 24th it is shown in this
etext as 1720/1 or 1721/2 or 1722/3.
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 Lately Publish’d,

In a neat Pocket Volume, Price 3s.

The Navy Surgeon: Or, A Practical System of Surgery. Illustrated
with Observations on such remarkable Cases as have occurred to
the Author’s Practice in the Royal Navy. To which is added, A
Treatise on the Venereal Disease, the Causes, Symptoms, and
Method of Cure by Mercury: An Enquiry into the Origin of that
Distemper; in which the Dispute between Dr. Dover, and Dr. Turner,
concerning Crude Mercury, is fully consider’d; with Useful Remarks
thereon. Also an Appendix, containing Physical Observations on the
Heat, Moisture, and Density of the Air on the Coast of Guinea, the
Colour of the Natives; the Sicknesses which they and the Europeans
trading thither are subject to; with a Method of Cure. By John
Atkins, Surgeon.
Printed for Ward and Chandler, at the Ship, between the Temple-Gates in Fleet-Street;
and Sold at their Shop in scarborough.
 A

V O YA G E
TO
Guinea, Brasil, and the
West-Indies;
In His Majesty’s Ships, the S w a l l o w
and W e y m o u t h .
Describing the several Islands and Settlements, viz—Madeira, the Canaries, Cape
de Verd, Sierraleon, Sesthos, Cape Apollonia, Cabo Corso, and others on the
Guinea Coast; Barbadoes, Jamaica, &c. in the West-Indies.
The Colour, Diet, Languages, Habits, Manners, Customs, and Religions of the
respective Natives, and Inhabitants.
With Remarks on the Gold, Ivory, and Slave-Trade; and on the Winds, Tides
and Currents of the several Coasts.

By J O H N A T K I N S ,
Surgeon in the Royal Navy.

Illi Robur & Æs triplex

Circa Pectus erat, qui fragilem truci
Commisit Pelago Ratem
Primus——
Horat.
 L O N D O N;
Printed for C æ s a r W a r d and R i c h a r d C h a n d l e r , at the Ship,
between the Temple-Gates in Fleet-Street; And Sold at their Shop in
S c a r b o r o u g h . M.DCC.XXXV.
 P R E FA C E
The Publishing of this Voyage, is from a Supposition that it contains
something useful to those following in the same Track, and that it will
be no unprofitable Amusement to others who do not. I shall therefore
wave all Apology, and instead, proceed to a Reflection or two, on the
Life and Element we occupy.
And first, The Man whose Means of Subsistence irreversibly
depends on the Sea, is unhappy because he forsakes his proper
Element, his Wife, Children, Country, and Friends, all that can be
called pleasant (and of Necessity, not Choice) to tempt unknown
Dangers, on that deceitful, trackless Path; Lee Shores, Tempests,
Wants of some kind or other, bad Winds, or the rougher Passions of
our selves, are continually molesting; and if common Danger under
one adopted Parent (Neptune) does not always unite us, yet we are
still cooped like Fowls, to the same Diet and Associates.
“Till chang’d at length and to the Place conform’d
In Temper and in Nature we receive
Familiar the fierce Heat.”
Milton. B. II.

Tophet[1] with Stink of Suffolk Vaporous

Obscures the Glim; that visive and olfactive Nerves
 In us feel dreadful Change.
And to compleat our ill Luck, while we are thus contending with
sinister Fate, the Rogues at home perhaps are stealing away the
Hearts of our Mistresses and Wives. Are not these a hapless Race
thus doomed!
A Sea-Life absolutely considered, had so much of Hardship and
Danger, that in King John’s Time a national Synod ordained, no
married Persons should go beyond Sea without publishing their
mutual Consent; which, I apprehend, proceeded from this
Foundation: That it should not be in the power of one to thrust
himself on Difficulties and Hazard, that would make the other equally
unhappy. The Saxons before, made a Law, that if a Merchant
crossed the wide Sea three times, he should be honoured with the
Title of Thane, (Rapin, p. 15.) and the Monarchs of the East shew
their Approbation, by still leaving the rough Dominion of it to
Christians. There are Circumstances notwithstanding, which may
abate the Infelicity, and give real Pleasure: Such chiefly in the Navy,
are a Defence of one’s Country, a Livelihood, being better manned
and provided against Dangers than Trading Ships; Good-natur’d
Officers, a mutual good Treatment, seeing the Wonders of the Deep,
and at last, maimed or decrepid, a Retreat to Superannuation, or that
noble Foundation of Greenwich-Hospital; to which of late Years must
be added, the Satisfaction Officers receive from that generous
Contribution for supporting their Widows, and consequently the
Children they may leave behind them.
This charitable Project is governed by the following Articles,
established by His present Majesty.

I.
That Widows of Commission and Warrant Officers of the Royal
Navy, shall be reputed proper Objects of the Charity, whose Annual
Incomes arising from their Real and Personal Estates, or otherwise,
do not amount to the following Sums, viz.
l. s. d.
The Widow of a Captain or Commander, 45 0 0
 The Widow of a Lieutenant or Master, 30 0 0
The Widow of a Boatswain, }
Gunner, Carpenter, }
Purser, Surgeon, }
Second Master of } 20 0 0
a Yacht, or Master of a }
Naval Vessel warranted }
by the Navy Board, }
And that where any such Widow is possessed of, or interested in any
Sum of Money, the Annual Income and Produce thereof, shall be
computed and deemed, as annually yielding Three Pounds per
Centum, and no more.

II.
That to avoid Partiality and Favour in the Distribution of the
Charity, Widows of Officers of the same Rank shall have an equal
Allowance, the Proportion of which shall be fixed Annually by the
Court of Assistants, according to their Discretion; and that in order
thereunto, the said Court may distribute Annually such Part of the
Monies, arising by the said Charity, among the Widows, as they think
proper; and to lay out such other Part thereof in South-Sea
Annuities, or other Government Securities, as to them shall seem
meet, for raising a Capital Stock for the general Benefit of the
Charity, where the Application is not particularly directed by the
Donors.

III.
That in the Distribution of Allowances to poor Widows, the same
be proportionate to one another, with respect to the Sum each is to
receive, according to the following Division, viz.
The Widow of a Captain or Commander shall receive a Sum One
Third more than the Widow of a Lieutenant or Master.
The Widow of a Lieutenant or Master shall receive a Sum One
Third more than the Widow of a Boatswain, Gunner, Carpenter,
Purser, Surgeon, Second Master of a Yacht, or Master of a Naval
Vessel Warranted by the Navy Board.

IV.
That Widows admitted to an Annual Allowance from the Charity,
shall begin to enjoy it from the First Day of the Month following the
Decease of their Husbands, provided they apply within Twelve
Months for the same; otherwise, from the Time of their Application.

V.
That if any Widow, admitted to the Charity, marries again, her
Allowance from thenceforth shall cease.

VI.
That in order to prevent Abuses, no Widow shall be admitted to
the Benefit of the Charity, who has not been married for the Space of
Twelve Months to the Officer by whose Right she claims the same,
unless the said Officer was killed or drowned in the Sea Service. And
if any Officer marries after the Age of Seventy Years, his Widow shall
be deemed unqualified to receive the Charity.

VII.
That if the Widow of an Officer lives in the Neighbourhood of any
of His Majesty’s Dock-Yards, the Commissioner of the Navy residing
there, and some of the Principal Officers of the Yard, or the said
Officers of the Yard, where there is no Commissioner, shall inform
themselves thoroughly of the Circumstances of the Deceased; and
being satisfied that the Widow comes within the Rules of the Charity,
shall sign and give her the following Certificate gratis, viz.
These are to certify the Court of Assistants for managing the
Charity for Relief of Poor Widows of Commission and Warrant
Officers of the Royal Navy, That A. B. died on the _________ and
has left the Bearer C. B. a Widow; and according to the best
Information we can get from others, and do really believe ourselves,
is not possessed of a clear annual Income to the Value of
___________ and therefore she appears to us to be entituled to the
Benefit of the said Charity under their Direction.
Besides which, the Widow is to make Affidavit, that her Annual
Income is not better than is expressed in the said Certificate, and
that she was legally married (naming the Time when, and the Place
where) to the Officer, in whose Right she claims the Benefit of the
Charity.

VIII.
That if the Widow resides in any other Part of his Majesty’s
Dominions, a Certificate of the like Nature is to be signed by the
Minister of the Parish, a Justice of the Peace, and two or more
Officers of the Navy, who are best acquainted with her
Circumstances; and she is to make such Affidavit as is before
mentioned.

IX.
That all Widows applying for the Benefit of the Charity, are to
make Affidavit, that they are unmarried.

X.
That Widows admitted to the Charity shall once in every Year, at
the Time that shall be appointed, bring to the Court of Assistants
their Affidavits, containing a particular State of their Circumstances,
and that they continue unmarried.

XI.
That Widows of Masters and Surgeons are to apply to the Navy
Office, and receive from thence a Certificate of the Quality of their
Husbands in the Navy, which shall be given them Gratis, before they
apply to the Court of Assistants, to be admitted to the Charity.

XII.
That no Officer or Servant employed in the Business or Service of
this Charity, shall receive any Salary, Reward, or other Gratuity, for
his Pains or Service in the Affairs of the said Charity, but that the
whole Business thereof shall be transacted Gratis.

Secondly, Of the different Seas we traverse.

The Mediterranean, from the Climate, Fertility, and Beauty of the
Countries bordering on it, claims the Preference, I think, of all Seas;
and recompenses more largely the Fatigues of a Voyage. What is
peculiar, and makes them more than others pleasant, is, First, the
Temperature of their Air, neither too hot nor cold, but a pleasant
Mediocrity, that is, Spring or Summer all the Year. Secondly, Being of
a moderate Compass: A Man by a little conversing with Maps, fixes
an Idea of his Distances, his Stages from Place to Place, and may
measure them over in his Head with the same Facility he would a
Journey from London to York. Thirdly, Thus acquainted with the daily
Progress, our Approaches please in a Proportion to the Danger and
Wants we go from, and the Remedy and Port we go to. Leghorn,
Genoa, Naples, &c. have their different Beauties. Fourthly, The
confining Lands on the European and African Side being
mountainous, and the Sea interspersed with Islands, gives these
Priorities to main Oceans, viz. that you cannot be long out of sight of
some Land or other, and those flowing with Milk and Honey, no
ordinary Comfort, excepting when they are Lee Shores. Secondly, If
the Hills be to Windward, they take off the Force of strong Winds,
and make a smooth Sea. And thirdly, The same Hills to Leeward, do
by their Height give a Check to Storms; the Air stagnating by their
Interposition, I have observed frequently in shore, to become a
gentle Gale.
Lastly, The greatest Pleasure of those Seas, is visiting Towns and
Countrys that have been worthy History; the most famous do
somewhere or other border there, and have given birth to the
greatest Men and greatest Actions. Greece, that was the Mother of
Arts and Sciences, the Oracle of the World, that brought forth a
Homer, Socrates, Alexander, &c. and was one of the four great
Empires, stands to those Seas (though changed now to European
Turky, by a Progress as wonderful) so does Italy, the Seat of the last
universal Empire. That Rome, which subjected almost all the Kings
and Kingdoms of the known World, gave Britain Laws, and left every
where eternal Monuments of their Power and Magnificence: Here
lived Virgil, Horace, Cæsar——Hither some say St. Paul made his
Voyage, having coasted along Crete, and suffered Shipwreck at
Malta, Islands famous here, the one being the Birth-place of Jupiter,
the other for a renowned Order of Knights, the professed Defenders
of Christianity against the Turk.
Volcanos, Catacombs, Triumphal Arches, and Pillars, Baths,
Aqueducts, and Amphitheatres, are peculiar Curiosities of Italy.
There is scarcely a Spot in that delicious Country, but is recorded for
some remarkable Occurrence; is memorable for High-ways, Grottos,
Lakes, Statues, Monuments, some Victory gained, or Battle lost, the
Birth or Death of Cæsar or his Friends. On the African Side, stands
or did stand, Carthage, Troy, Tyre, Nice, Ephesus, Antioch, Smyrna;
and on that shore was once Christianity firmly planted (no less than
300 Bishops being expelled thence;) but alas how all things change!
neither Greatness nor Virtue can exempt from Mortality: Towns,
Countries, and Religions, have their Periods.
Thebes, Nineveh, &c. are now no more.
Oppida posse mori,
Si quæras Helicen & Burin, Achaidas Urbes,
Invenies sub Aquis.
They have a determined Time to flourish, decay, and die in. Corn
grows where Troy stood: Carthage is blotted out. Greece and her
Republicks (Athens, Sparta, Corinth,) with other fam’d Asian and
African Cities the Turkish Monarchy has overturned. Their
Magnificence, Wealth, Learning, and Worship, is changed into
Poverty and Ignorance; and Rome, the Mother of all, overrun with
Superstition. Who, on the one hand, but feels an inexpressible
Pleasure in treading over that Ground, he supposes such Men
inhabited, whose Learning and Virtues have been the Emulation of
all succeeding Ages? And who again but must mourn such a
melancholly Transposition of the Scene, and spend a few funeral
Reflections over such extraordinary Exequiæ: Perhaps the
Revolution of as many Ages, as has sunk their Glory, may raise it
again, or carry it to the Negroes and Hottentots, and the present
Possessors be debased.
The next pleasant Sailing to the Mediterranean, is that part of the
Atlantick, Southern, Pacifick, South, or Indian Seas, that are within
the Limits of a Trade-Wind; because such Winds are next to
invariable, of such moderate Strength as not to raise heavy Seas, or
strain a Ship; no Storms at Distance from Land; and equal Days and
Nights.
The Atlantick, and Southern Ocean, without the Limits of this
Trade-Wind, that is, from 30 to 60°° of Latitude, are far the worst for
Navigation; wide, rough, and boisterous Seas, more subject to
Clouds, Storm, and Tempest, variable Weather; long, dark, cold
Nights, and less delightful Countries and Climates out of Europe.
Lastly, Beyond 60 Degrees of Latitude we have little Commerce,
and the Seas less frequented; the Countries growing more and more
inhospitable, as Latitude and Cold increases towards the Pole;
however, Men who have used Greenland, tell me, those inclement
Skies contain no other Vapors, than Mist, Sleet, and Snow; the Sea
less ruffled with Winds, which blow for the most part Northerly,
towards the Sun, i. e. towards a more rarified Air, seen in those Drifts
of Ice from thence, that are found far to the Southward, both on the
European and American side. Another Advantage to cheer the
Winter’s Melancholy of Northern Regions, is the Moon’s shining a
Length proportioned to the Absence of the Sun; so that where he is
entirely lost, she[2] never sets, but with reflected and resplendent
Light on Ice and Snow, keeps up their Consolation.
In all Seas are met numerous Incidents and Appearances, worthy
our Reflection. I have therefore gone on to Observations more
instructive and amusing. If the Solutions are not every where
Standard, they may strike out Hints to better Capacities; among
those, I can perceive two more liable to Objection.
First, The Pythagorean Soliloquy I set out with (p. 18.) which may
be deemed too foreign for the Subject: To which I answer——A
Voyage to Sea is a Type of that dark and unknown one we are to
make in Death: Wherefore it is not unnatural with a Departure from
the Land’s End of England, shooting into an Abyss of Waters, to
consider a little on that Life, which lost is a Departure from the
World’s End, and to launch into a greater Abyss, Eternity;—The
Principle, in what is material of us, I think, highly consonant to
Reason, and continues still the Doctrine of the Eastern Sages.
Diversæ autem corpora formæ non sunt nisi diversæ modificationes
ejusdem materiæ, &c.
(Keil de legibus naturæ.)
E. G. Vapors condensed to Rain, we see descend on Earth; and
both enter and pass into the Seeds and Forms of all Plants. From
them, either taken alone, or amassed in animal Food, is what
constitutes and repairs by a daily Eating, our own Bodies; which if
there be any Trust to Sense or Reason, moulds, decays, and turns
again to Dust and Air, in order for Regeneration.
What only can destroy this Philosophy (as I observe at that place)
and maintain a Resurrection of the same Body, is Revelation, and
the Immortality of the Soul; for Sameness, or Identity then, will not
consist in the same individual Particles being united, that makes our
Bodies here, (which we are sure are continually fluctuating, and
changing while we live;) but on that Consciousness which the
immaterial Part will give, though joined to Matter, taken from the Top
of Olympus.
Secondly, The Denial of Canibals against the Authority of grave
Authors, has proceeded from a Persuasion, that the Charge carries
the highest Reproach on Humanity, and the Creator of it. My Aim,
therefore, was to shew in the best manner I could, that the
Accusation every where has probably proceeded from Fear in some,
to magnify the Miracle of escaping an inhospitable and strange
Country, and from Design in others, to justify Dispossession, and
arm Colonies with Union and Courage against the supposed
Enemies of Mankind. Conquest and Cruelty, by that means go on
with pleasure on the People’s side, who are persuaded they are only
subduing of brutish Nature, and exchanging, for their mutual Good,
Spiritual for Temporal Inheritances. By particular and private
Men, this may have been fixed on a People, to allay some base or
villainous Actions of their own, that could not any other way be
excused, or bear the Light: And for this, I appeal to the discerning
part of our Traders, acquainted with Guinea, whether they do not
think the Reports of Cape St. Mary’s Inhabitants, Cape Mont,
Montzerado, Drewin, and Callabar, down-right Falsities, and
impolitick ones; for the multiplying of Places, like Plots, in a great
measure destroys the Use of them.
At the Caribbees again, it is full as preposterous; for on small
Islands, had their Women bred like Rabbits, they must have been
desolated Ages before the Europeans Arrival; unless we can
suppose human Flesh was eat only on their Feast-Days; or that they
just commenced Monsters upon our Discovery.——La Hontan, or
some other French Translation I have read, talking of Canibals
bordering on Canada, flies into a strange Gallicism, and makes them
commend the Flesh of a Frenchman (sad Partiality) in Eating, as of
finer Taste than that of an Englishman.
These, with Europeans neglecting to charge the East-Indians thus,
who have more Power than simple Americans or Negroes to resent
the Indignity and Reproach, makes me disbelieve the whole of what I
have hitherto heard; and that the true Anthropophagi are only the
diverse Insects infesting us in diverse Countries; the Pediculose Kind
do not live in hot Climates; instead thereof, they are assaulted with a
ravenous Fly called Muskito; Legions that live wild in the Woods, and
seize with every Opportunity, human Flesh, like Lions.

As there is a strict Regard to Truth observed throughout the whole,

it is apprehended the following Sheets will be not only amusing, but
useful.
 A

V O YA G E
TO

Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies;

In His Majesty’s Ships, the Swallow,
and Weymouth, &c.
We took in eight Months Provisions each, at Portsmouth; Stores,
Careening-Geer, and Necessaries requisite to continue us a double
Voyage down the Coast of Guinea, for meeting, if possible, with the
Pyrates; who did then very much infest those Parts, and destroy our
Trade and Factories. Accordingly the Company’s Governors for
Gambia and other Places, embark’d under our Convoy, and were to
have what Support we could give them, in restoring the Credit of the
Royal African Company; which begun now to take new life under the
Influence of the Duke of Chandois.
For this Purpose we set sail from Spithead February 5th, 1720/1.
It is a Pleasure we have beyond the Merchant-Service in sailing,
that we are forbid Commerce. When Men of War have no other
Lading than Provisions and Necessaries, the Duty of Sailors is
eased, and their Conveniencies better; whereas Cargoes, besides
dishonouring the Commission, and unfitting the King’s Ships for
Action, stifle and sicken a Ship’s Company in warm Climates,
impose hard Services, and spoil the Trade of the Merchant they are
designed to encourage, and expect a Gratuity from; because Labour
and Freight free, they can afford to undersel.