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Math 7410 Lie Combinatorics and Hyperplane Arrangements

Marcelo Aguiar
https://textbookfull.com/product/math-7410-lie-combinatorics-and-
hyperplane-arrangements-marcelo-aguiar-2/
Math 108 notes Combinatorics Kannan Soundararajan
https://textbookfull.com/product/math-108-notes-combinatorics-
kannan-soundararajan/
Notes for Math 184A Combinatorics Steven V. Sam
https://textbookfull.com/product/notes-for-
math-184a-combinatorics-steven-v-sam/
Math 845 Notes on Lie Groups Mark Reeder
https://textbookfull.com/product/math-845-notes-on-lie-groups-
mark-reeder/
University of Waterloo MATH 239 Course Notes, Fall
2016: Intro to Combinatorics Department Of
Combinatorics And Optimization
https://textbookfull.com/product/university-of-waterloo-
math-239-course-notes-fall-2016-intro-to-combinatorics-
department-of-combinatorics-and-optimization/
Fire Pump Arrangements at Industrial Facilities Nolan
https://textbookfull.com/product/fire-pump-arrangements-at-
industrial-facilities-nolan/
Combinatorics, Second Edition Nicholas Loehr
https://textbookfull.com/product/combinatorics-second-edition-
nicholas-loehr/
Theory of Groups and Symmetries Finite groups Lie

groups and Lie Algebras 1st Edition Alexey P. Isaev
https://textbookfull.com/product/theory-of-groups-and-symmetries-
finite-groups-lie-groups-and-lie-algebras-1st-edition-alexey-p-
isaev/
Introduction to Combinatorics Walter D. Wallis
https://textbookfull.com/product/introduction-to-combinatorics-
walter-d-wallis/
Math 7410: Lie Combinatorics and
Hyperplane Arrangements
Taught by Marcelo Aguiar
Notes by David Mehrle

dmehrle@math.cornell.edu
Cornell University
Fall 2016
Last updated January 9, 2017.

The latest version is online here.
Contents
1 Species and Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Monoids in Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Free Monoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Comonoids in Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Monoidal Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Convolution Monoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Braided Monoidal Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

4.1 Monoids and Comonoids in Braided Categories . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Hopf Monoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Hopf Monoids in Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

5.1 Linearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Vector Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3 Braidings on Spk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.4 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.5 Connected Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.6 Antipode Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.7 Convolution Monoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6 Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1 Lagrange Inversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.2 Formal Diffeomorphisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.3 Sewing and Ripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.4 Invariants from Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7 Combinatorial Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.1 The antipode of E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.2 The antipode of L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.3 The Coxeter Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.4 The Tits Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.5 The Partition Lattice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.6 Higher Hopf Monoid Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.7 The action of Σ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8 Generalized Permutahedra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.1 The Coxeter complex as a fan of cones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.2 Polytopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1
8.3 Permutahedra and Generalized Permutahedra . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.4 The species of generalized permutahedra . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9 Hyperplane Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.1 Faces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
9.2 Flats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
9.3 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.4 Signed Sequence of a Face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
10 Species relative to a hyperplane arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

10.1 From modules to bimonoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
10.2 From bimonoids to modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.3 Incidence algebras and Möbius functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.4 The algebra of a lattice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
10.5 Zaslavsky’s Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.6 Contraction and Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
11 Properties of Σ-modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

11.1 Characters of the Tits Monoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
11.2 Primitive Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11.3 An analysis of Lie = P(kL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11.4 Dynkin Idempotents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
11.5 Application: another Zaslavsky’s formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
11.6 The radical of kΣ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12 The Joyal-Klyachoko-Stanley isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

12.1 Homology of Posets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
12.2 Orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
12.3 Cohomology of Posets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
13 Connections to classical algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

13.1 The Schur functor of a species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
13.2 Schur-Weyl Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
13.3 Fock Functor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
14 Additional (Category Theory) Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

14.1 Monoidal Functors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
14.2 Monoidal properties of the Schur Functor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
14.3 Simplicial Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
14.4 The Eckmann-Hilton argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
14.5 2-monoidal categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
14.6 Double monoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2
Contents by Lecture
Lecture 01 on August 23, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Lecture 04 on September 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Lecture 05 on September 6, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Lecture 07 on September 13, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Lecture 13 on October 04, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Lecture 20 on November 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Lecture 23 on November 10, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3
Lecture 27 on December 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4
Lecture 01: Species and Enumeration August 23, 2016
Administrative
There is a website with an indefinite schedule and some information.
For the first few weeks I will focus on combinatorics, but an algebraic
approach to it. This is the topic of species. There won’t be any prerequisites to
this portion for a few weeks. Later, we will discuss hyperplane arrangements,
which involves discrete geometry.
1 Species and Enumeration

Definition 1.1. A species is a functor set× to Set, where set× is the category
of finite sets and bijections and Set is the category of all sets and all maps. A
morphism of species is a natural transformation of functors.
Let P be a species. For each finite set I, we have a set P[I]. For each bijection
σ τ
σ : I → J, we have a map σ∗ : P[I] → P[J]. Give I − →J− → K, we have
σ∗
P[I] P[J]
(τσ)∗ τ∗
P[K]
Also, idI∗ = idP[I] . Note that each σ∗ is invertible, and (σ∗ )−1 = (σ−1 )∗ .
It also follows that each set P[m] (see Remark 1.2) is acted upon by the
symmetric group Sm . The action is σ · x = σ∗ (x), for σ ∈ Sm , x ∈ P[m]. In
particular, σ∗ (x) ∈ P[m].
Remark 1.2 (Convention). [m] := {1, 2, 3, . . . , m}. We write P[m] = P[{1, 2, . . . , m}].
This action of the symmetric group allows us to reinterpret a species as a
collection {P[m]}m≥0 of Sm -sets. This uniquely determines P.
A morphism of species f : P → Q consists of maps fI : P[I] → Q[I], one for
each finite set I, such that for any bijection σ : I → J,
σ∗ fI (x) = fJ (σ∗ (x))
for all x ∈ P[I]. That is, the diagram below commutes.
fI
P[I] Q[I]
σ∗ σ∗
fJ
P[J] Q[J]
So in the end, a species is not actually that much. It’s just a collection of
Sm -sets. We want to use it to do some enumeration, and some algebra as well,
just as we use finite groups to encode combinatorial information.
5
Definition 1.3. The species L of linear orders is defined on a set I as the set of
all linear orders on I.
L[I] = {linear orders on I}.
Example 1.4. For example,
L[a, b, c] = {abc, bac, acb, bcacab, cba}.

a b c
If we have the bijection σ = , then
y z x

abc bac acb bca cab cba
σ∗ = .
yzx zyx yxz ...
Definition 1.5. A partition X of a set I is a collection of disjoint nonempty

subsets of I whose union is I. The notation X ` I means X is a partition of I.
Definition 1.6. The species Π of set partitions is the species determined by
Π[I] = {partitions X of I}
Definition 1.7. A composition F of a set I is a totally ordered partition of I.
Definition 1.8. The sepcies Σ of set compositions is the species determined by
Σ[I] = {compositions F of I}.
Example 1.9. If I = {a, b, c, d}, with a partition X = {{a, c}, {b}, {d}}, the following
two composition aren’t the same but have the same underlying partition X.
({a, c}, {b}, {d}) 6= ({b}, {a, c}, {d})
There are morphisms

L → Σ → Π,
where the first morphism is viewing a linear order as a composition into single-
tons and the second just forgets the order.
In fact, we have
L Σ
E Π
where E is the exponential species, defined by E[I] = {∗I }. That is, E[I] always
has a single element, denoted ∗I .
Remark 1.10. In combinatorics, one is interested in the cardinality of a set.

When we talk about species, we get a generating function instead.
6
Definition 1.11. Given a species P, it’s generating function is

X xm
P(x) = #P[m] ∈ Q[[x]].
m!
n≥0
This says that species are a categorification of power series where we replace
numbers by sets.
Example 1.12.
X xn X xn X 1
L(x) = #L[n] = n! = xn =
n! n! 1−x
n≥0 n≥0 n≥0
X xn X xn
E(x) = #E[n] = = ex
n! n!
n≥0 n≥0
Π(x) is the generating function for the number of set partitions and Σ(x) is the
generating function for the number of ordered set partitions.
Definition 1.13. Given species P and Q, their Cauchy Product P · Q is the

species defined by a
(P · Q)[I] = P[S] × Q[T ]
I=StT
where the disjoint union is taken over all ordered decompositions of I (order of
S and T matters) such that S and T partition I.
On bijections (which are arrows in set× ), the Cauchy product acts as follows.
Given σ : I → J,
(P · Q)[I] ⊇ P[S] × Q[T ]
∗ )×(σ )∗
σ∗ (σS T
(P · Q)[J] ⊇ P[σ(S)] × P[σ(T )]
Example 1.14. E · E is the species of subsets.

a
(E · E)[I] = ∼ {S : S ⊆ I}
E[S] × E[T ] =
I=StT
Example 1.15. E·k is the k-fold Cauchy product. This is the species of functions
to [k].
(E·k )[I] = {f : I → [k] | ffunction}
a
(E·k )[I] = E[S1 ] × . . . × E[Sk ]
I=S1 t...tSk
To see that these two are the same, notice that Si = f−1 (i) for each i ∈ [k].
7
Proposition 1.16. The generating series for the Cauchy product is the product
of power series in Q[[x]].
(P · Q)(x) = P(x)Q(x)
Proof. First, notice that

 
a X
#(P · Q)[n] = #  P[i] × Q[j] = #P[i]#Q[j]
i+j=n i+j=n
Therefore,
X xn
(P · Q)(x) = #(P · Q)[n]
n!
n≥0
X X xn
= #P[i]#Q[j]
n!
n≥0 i+j=n
  
X xn X xn
= #P[n]  #Q[n]  = P(x)Q(x)
n! n!
n≥0 n≥0
Example 1.17.
X xn
(E · E)(x) = E(x)E(x) = e2x = 2n .
n!
n≥0
This is a proof of the fact that a set with n elements has 2n subsets, since E · E is
the species of subsets, so now we know that #(E · E)[n] = 2n .
Example 1.18.
(E·k )(x) = ekx
This proves that the number of functions [m] → [k] is km .
Definition 1.19. Let B be the species of bijections from a set I to itself, and D
the species of derrangements of I. (A derrangement is a bijection without fixed
points).
Claim 1.20. B = E · D
Proof. We have a
∼
B[I] = E[S] × D[T ],
I=StT
where the map is σ 7→ (S = Fix(σ), σ|T ), where T = I \ S.
8
Lecture 01: Substitution August 23, 2016
Now using the fact that the Cauchy product corresponds to the product of
generating functions, we get that B(x) = E(x)D(x), and therefore
1 e−x
= ex D(x) =⇒ D(x) =
1−x 1−x
So we have derived the generating function for derrangements.
X
m
(−1)i
#D[m] = m! .
i!
i=0
Remark 1.21. We can see that
#L[m] = m! = #B[m].
This begs the question: is L isomorphic to B? The answer is no; they are not
isomorphic because there is no canonical way to identify bijections on I with
orders on I unless the set I comes with a order already. Here is a proof of this
fact.
Proof. Let Sn act on L[I] by relabelling. This action has only one orbit.
Let Sn act on B[I] by relabelling. The number of orbits is the same as the
number of cycle types of the bijections, which is the number of partitions of #I.
So L and B are not the same species.
1.1 Substitution
Definition 1.22. Given species P and Q, with Q[∅] = ∅, their substitution
P ◦ Q is defined by
a Y
!
(P ◦ Q)[I] = P[X] × Q[S]
X`I S∈X
This looks strange, but it has a nice consequence for generating functions.
Proposition 1.23. When Q(0) = 0,
(P ◦ Q)(x) = P(Q(x)).
Proof. Exercise.
The point of the next definition is to make species we have amenable to

substitutions.
9
Lecture 02: Substitution August 25, 2016
Definition 1.24. Given a species P, let P+ be the species defined by

P[I] I 6= ∅
P+ [I] =
∅ I=∅
Example 1.25.
∼Π
E ◦ E+ =
This gives us the generating function for Π.
x −1
Π(x) = ee
Example 1.26.
∼Σ
L ◦ E+ =
This gives us the generating function for Σ.
1
Σ(x) =
2 − ex
Definition 1.27. Let A be the species of rooted trees,
A[I] = {rooted trees with vertex set I}.
Recall that a rooted tree is a connected acyclic graph with a chosen vertex.
Let A~ be the species of planar rooted trees (that is, rooted trees with a linear
order on the set of children of each node).
Exercise 1.28. Prove that

~ = X · (L ◦ A)
(a) A = X · (E ◦ A) and A ~
~
(b) A(x) = xeA(x) and A(x) = x
~
1−A(x)
√
~ 1− 1−4x ~
(c) A(x) = 2 and A[m] = m!Cm−1
where X is the species defined by

{∗} #I = 1
X[I] =
∅ otherwise
(Note that X(x) = x) and Cn is the n-th Catalan number

1 2n
Cn = .
n+1 n
10
Lecture 02: Monoids in Species August 25, 2016
2 Monoids in Species
Remark 2.1 (Idea). A species M is a monoid if it carries an operation which is
associative and unital. If M were a set, this would be the definition of a usual
monoid.
Definition 2.2. A monoid in the category of species is a species M with an

associative, unital operation.
By an operation, we mean a morphism of species µ : M · M → M. This
is a collection of maps (M · M)[I] → M[I] for each finite set I. So we have a
collection of maps a
µ: M[S] × M[T ] → M[I].
I=StT
The map µ has components µST : M[S] × M[T ] → M[I]. For x ∈ M[S] and
y ∈ M[T ], we write µST (x, y) = x · y.
Now, associativity simply means that whenever we have a set I with a
partition into three pieces I = R t S t T and x ∈ M[R], y ∈ M[S], z ∈ M[T ], then
x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z.
We can also describe what it means to be unital. There is 1 ∈ M[∅] such that
1 · x = x = x · 1 for every x ∈ M[I] for every I.
We need one more condition. For any bijection σ : I → J, with I = S t T ,
x ∈ M[S] and y ∈ M[T ], we must have σ∗ (x · y) = σ|S ∗ (x)σ|∗ (y).
T
Definition 2.3. A monoid is commutative if x · y = y · x for all x ∈ M[S],

y ∈ M[T ], I = S t T .
Definition 2.4. A morphism of monoids f : M → N is a morphism of species if
(a) fI (x cot y) = fS (x) · fT (y)
(b) f∅ (1) = 1.
Example 2.5. Recall that we had the species
L Σ
(1)
E Π
These are all monoids, and all of these morphisms are morphisms of monoids.
L, Σ are noncommutative and E, Π are commutative.
How is L a monoid? Well, we define
µS,T : L[S] × L[T ] → L[I]

(`1 , `2 ) 7→ `1 `2
11
Lecture 02: Free Monoids August 25, 2016
by concatenating the two orders. For example, if I = {a, b, c, d, e}, and `1 = adc
and `2 = be, then `1 `2 = adcbe.
We make E into a monoid in the only possibly way
µS,T : E[S] × E[T ] → E[I]

(∗S , ∗T ) 7→ ∗ST
We make Σ into a monoid by
µS,T : Σ[S] × Σ[T ] → E[I]

(F, G) 7→ F · G
where F is a composition of S and G is a composition of T , and F · G is the

concatenation of compositions. If F = (S1 , . . . , Sk ) and G = (T1 , . . . , Th ), then
F · G = (S1 , . . . , Sk , T1 , . . . , Th ).
We make Π into a monoid by
µS,T : Π[S] × Π[T ] → Π[I]

(X, Y) 7→ X ∪ Y
If X is a partition of S and Y a partition of T , then we get a partition of I by

taking the union of the two partitions.
The arrows in the diagram (1) are now morphisms of monoids.
2.1 Free Monoids

Definition 2.6. A species is positive if Q[∅] = ∅.
Definition 2.7. Given a positive species Q, let T (Q) := L ◦ Q. (This is the

substitution operation we defined last time.) This will be the free monoid on
Q.
What does this look like? We have

a Y
!
T (Q)[I] = L[X] × Q[S]
X`I S∈X
= (F, x) F ∈ Σ[I], F = (S1 , . . . , Sk ), x = (x1 , . . . , xk ), xi ∈ Q[Si ] .
We make T (Q) into a monoid by
T (Q)[S] × T (Q)[T ] → T (Q)[I]

((F, x), (G, y)) 7→ (F · G, (x, y))
where we concatenate the two compositions and the two tuples x and y. By
(x, y) we mean (x1 , . . . , xk , y1 , . . . , yh ).
12
Lecture 02: Free Monoids August 25, 2016
The unit is ((), ()), where the first () is the empty composition of ∅ and the
second () is the empty sequence of Q-structures.
There is a morphism of species Q → T (Q) given by
Q[I] → T (Q)[I]
x 7→ ((I), x)
where (I) is the composition of I with one block.
Proposition 2.8. Given a monoid M and a morphism of species f : Q → M, there
is a unique morphism of monoids fb: T (Q) → M such that
f
Q M
fb
T (Q)
b So for a set I, define fbI : T (Q)[I] → M[I] by
Proof. We only need to define f.
(F, x) 7→ fS1 (x1 ) · · · · · fSk (xk ).
Note that each fSi (xi ) ∈ M[Si ], and associativity allows us to omit the paren-
theses.
Exercise 2.9. Let Q be as before, let S (Q) := E ◦ Q.
S (Q)[I] = (X, x) X ∈ Π[I], x = (xS )S∈X , xS ∈ Q[S] .
Show that S (Q) is the free commutative monoid on Q.

Exercise 2.10. What is the generating function for the free monoid T (Q) on Q?
What about S (Q).
Example 2.11. ∼ T (E+ ) = L ◦ E+
• Σ=
∼ S (E+ ).
• Π=
• L = T (X), where X is the species concentrated on singletons,

{∗} if I is a singleton
X[I] =
∅ otherwise
• E = S (X) = E ◦ X.
∼P=
Exercise 2.12. If X is the species concentrated on singletons, then P ◦ X = ∼
X ◦ P for any species P.
This means that L is the free monoid on X, and E is the free commutative
monoid on X. Compare with the free monoid on one element, which is N. This
is also the free commutative monoid on one generator, but this is not the case in
the category of species.
13
Lecture 02: Comonoids in Species August 25, 2016
2.2 Comonoids in Species

Next time, we will investigate monoids and comonoids in monoidal categories
and see what the underlying thread is. We are trying right now to do things by
hand, but this may be confusing at the moment. That’s okay. It will all make
sense soon.
Definition 2.13. A comonoid is a species C together with maps
∆ST : C[I] → C[S] × C[T ]

z 7→ (z|S , z/S )
for each I and for each I = S t T .
Terminology: z|S is the restriction of z to S and z/S is the contraction of S
from z.
The maps ∆ST must be coassociative: whenever I = R t S t T , and z ∈ C[I],
(z|RtS )|R = z|R ∈ C[R]
(z|RtS )/R = (z/R )|S ∈ C[S]

(z/R )/S = z/RtS ∈ C[T ]
The structure should also be counital: for any z ∈ C[I],
z|I = z = z/φ .
Finally, the naturality of the map ∆ST is captures in the following. For any
σ : I → J a bijection, and any z ∈ C[I], then
σ∗ (z)|σ(S) = σS
∗
(z|S )
σ∗ (z)/σ(S) = σ|T∗ (z/S )

Definition 2.14. A comonoid is cocommutative (in the category of species) if
z|S = z/T whenever z ∈ C[I] and I = S t T .
Definition 2.15. A morphism of comonoids is a morphism of species f : C → D
such that
(a) fI (z)|S = fS (z|S )
(b) fI (z)/S = fT (z/S ).

Remark 2.16 (Motivation). Associativity of monoid operations can be expressed
in terms of the commutativity of the following diagram.
id×µS,T
M[R] × M[S] × M[T ] M[R] × M[S t T ]
µR,S ×id µR,StT
µRtS ,T
M[R t S] × M[T ] M[I]
14
Lecture 03: Comonoids in Species August 30, 2016
Coassociativity can be expressed by turning all of the arrows in the above

diagram around.
∆R,StT
C[I] C[R] × C[S t T ]
∆RtS,T id×∆S,T
∆R,S ×id
C[R t S] × C[T ] C[R] × C[S] × C[T ]
Similarly, we an write commutativity as

switch
M[S] × M[T ] M[T ] × M[S]
µS,T µT ,S
M[I]
and cocommuativity as
switch
C[S] × C[T ] C[T ] × C[S]
∆S,T ∆T ,S
C[I]
Example 2.17. L, Σ, E, Π are all cocommutative comonoids, with operations

∆S,T
L[I] −−−→ L[S] × L[T ]
` 7→ (`|S , `|T )
with `|S , `|T induced by ` on S.
∆S,T
E[I] −−−→ E[S] × E[T ]
∗I 7→ (∗S , ∗T )
∆S,T
Σ[I] −−−→ Σ[S] × Σ[T ]
F 7→ (F|S , F|T )
If F = (S1 , . . . , Sk ), then F|S = (S1 ∩ S, . . . , Sk ∩ S) with empty intersections
removed.
Remark 2.18. We have the dual notions of monoids and comonoids in species.
Monoids in the category of species are an elaboration on the idea of monoids in
sets. But what are comonoids in the category of sets?
This is a set C with a map ∆ : C → C × C. This must be coassociative and
counital. Counital means that π1 ∆(x) = x and π2 ∆(x) = x, where π1 and π2
are the projections C × C → C. This means that in Set, each object has a unique
comonoid structure that is given by the diagonal, so they’re not that interesting
to study.
15
Lecture 03: Monoidal Categories August 30, 2016
Let B be a species that is both a monoid and a comonoid. This means that it
has multiplication and comultiplication maps (where I = S t T ).
µS,T : B[S] × B[T ] → B[I]

(x, y) 7→ x · y
∆S,T : B[I] → B[S] × B[T ]

z 7→ (z|S , z/S )
Definition 2.19. We say that B is a bimonoid if the following holds for any
I = S t T = S 0 t T 0 . Let A, B, C, D denote the resulting intersections A = S ∩ S 0 ,
B = S ∩ T 0, C = T ∩ S 0, D = T ∩ T 0.
S A B
S0 T0
T C D
Then we should have that for any x ∈ B[S], y ∈ B[T ],
(x · y)|S 0 = x|A · y|C (x · y)/S 0 = x/A · y/C
Example 2.20. Recall that we have
L Σ
E Π
These are all bimonoids, and moreover they are cocommutative. Given `1 ∈ L[S],
`2 ∈ L[T ], we can check that
(`1 · `2 )|S 0 = `1 |A · `2 |C
3 Monoidal Categories
We’re going to set aside species for now and talk about monoidal categories.
This framework will make it easier to talk about species and give a general
definition of monoids, comonoids, and bimonoids.
Remark 3.1 (Idea). A monoidal category is a category with an operation that is

associative and unital up to coherent isomorphism.
Definition 3.2. A monoical category consists of the following data:
16
• A category C,
• A functor • : C × C → C, called the tensor product or monoidal product,
• an object I of C called the unit object.
• natural isomorphisms α, λ, ρ
∼
αA,B,C : (A • B) • C −→ A • (B • C)
∼
λA : A −→ I • A
∼
ρA : A −→ A • I
that satisfy the axioms
(A • B) • (C • D)
αA•B,C,D αA,B,C•D
((A • B) • C) • D A • (B • (C • D))
αA•B•C •idD idA •αB,C,D
αA,B•C,D
(A • (B • C)) • D A • ((B • C) • D)
αA,I,B
(A • I) • B A • (I • B)
ρA •idB idA •λB

A•B
What if we have 5 objects? There are then 24 ways to parenthesize them,
so we’d then need to draw a diagram that is an associahedron and check that
it commutes. But it turns out that the two axioms above suffice. This is the
statement of the Coherence Theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (Coherence Theorem). All diagrams built from only α, λ, ρ and id
in a “free” monoidal category commute.
In practice, this means for us that we can pretend that the monoidal product
is associative and has a unit I. We will mostly ignore appearances of α, λ, and ρ.
Example 3.4.
(1) C = Set. The monoidal structure is the Cartesian product of sets, X × Y.
We pick a particular one-element set {∗} to be the monoidal unit.
17
(2) C = Veck , the category of vector spaces over a field k. Then the monoidal
structure is the tensor product over k, V ⊗k W. The unit object is k itself.
Here, α : (U ⊗ V) ⊗ W → U ⊗ (V ⊗ W) is the canonical isomorphism.
(3) Let G be a group and k a field. Fix a normalized 3-cocycle φ : G3 → k× .

This means that φ satisfies the equations
φ(g2 , g3 , g4 )φ(g1 , g2 g3 , g4 )φ(g1 , g2 , g3 ) = φ(g1 g2 , g3 , g4 )φ(g1 , g2 , g3 g4 )
φ(1, g, h) = φ(g, 1, h) = φ(g, h, 1) = 1

for all g1 , g2 , g3 , g4 , g, h ∈ G.
Let C be the category of G-graded vector spaces. The objects of C are col-
lections V = (Vg )g∈G where each Vg is a k-vector space. The morphisms
f : V → W are collections f = (fg )g∈G where each fg : Vg → Wg is a linear
transformation.
The monoidal product of two objects V, W of C is given in components by
M
(V • W)g = (Vx ⊗k Wy ) .
g=xy
The monoidal unit I is

k if g = 1
I=
0 otherwise
The associativity constraint αU,V,W : (U • V) • W → U • (V • W) has com-

ponents
(αU,V,W )g
((U • V) • W)g (U • (V • W))g
⊗ Vy ⊗ Wz ) ⊗ Vy ⊗ Wz )
L L
g=xyz (Ux g=xyz (UX
Ux ⊗ Vy ⊗ Wz Ux ⊗ Vy ⊗ Wz
∈
∈
u⊗v⊗w φ(x, y, z)u ⊗ v ⊗ w
Definition 3.5. Let C be a monoidal category with monoidal unit I and monoidal
structure •. A triple (M, µ, ι) is a called a monoid in C if
(a) M is an object in C,
18
(b) µ : M • M → M is a morphism in C
(c) ι : I → M is a morphism in C.
such that the following diagrams commute.
µ•idM ι•idM idM •ι

M•M•M M•M I•M M•M M•I
idM •µ µ µ
λ ρ
µ
M•M M M
Definition 3.6. A morphism of monoids f : M → N is a morphism in C such

that
f•f f
M•M N•N M N
µM µN
ιM ιN
f
M N I
Example 3.7.
(1) In Set, with monoidal structure ×, the monoids are ordinary monoids.
(2) In Veck , monoids are k-algebras.
(3) When C is the category of G-graded vector spaces, as above, and the
cocycle φ is trivial (meaning φ(g, h, k) = 1), then the monoids are G-
graded k-algebras. If G = Z2 , then these are called superalgebras.
Definition 3.8. A triple (C, ∆, ε) is a comonoid in C if
(a) C is an object of C
(b) ∆ : C → C • C is a morphism of C
(c) ε : C → I is a morphism of C
these must satisfy the dual axioms to Definition 3.5.
∆ ε•idC idC •ε
C C•C I•C C•C C•I
∆ ∆•idC ∆
λ ρ
idC •C
C•C C•C•C C
Likewise, a morphism of comonoids is defined dually to Definition 3.6.
Example 3.9.
19
Lecture 03: Convolution Monoids August 30, 2016
(1) In (Set, ×), every object has a unique comonoid structure. What is this
structure? Well, we have ∆ : C → C × C and ε : C → {∗}. Write ∆(x) =
(∆1 (x), ∆2 (x)) for functions ∆1 , ∆2 : C → C. The counit axiom says that
x = (ε × id)(∆(x)) = (∗, ∆2 (x)),
so it must be that ∆2 (x) = x, and likewise ∆1 (x) = x. So ∆ must be the

diagonal map.
(2) In (Veck , ⊗), comonoids are by definition k-coalgebras.
(3) In G-graded vector spaces, comonoids are G-graded coalgebras when φ is

a trivial cocycle.
3.1 Convolution Monoids

Definition 3.10. Let C be a monoidal category and M a monoid in C, C a
comonoid in C. Then given f, g ∈ HomC (C, M), define the convolution product
f ∗ g ∈ HomC (C, M) by
∆ f•g µ
→ C • C −−→ M • M −
f ∗ G: C − → M.
Further, define u ∈ HomC (C, M) by

ε ι
→I→
u: C − − M.
Proposition 3.11. HomC (C, M) is an ordinary monoid under convolution.

Proof. First, we want to check that the convolution product ∗ is associative. Take
f, g, h ∈ HomC (C, M); we want to know if f ∗ (g ∗ h) is equal to (f ∗ g) ∗ h. This
follows from the commutativity of the following diagram.
(f∗g)∗h
∆
C C•C
∆ ∆•id
id•∆ (f∗g)•h
C•C C•C•C
f•g•h
f•(g∗h) µ•id
M•M•M M•M
id•µ µ
µ
f∗(g∗h) M•M M
20
Similarly, we can check that u is a unit for this monoid.
Lecture 04: Braided Monoidal Categories September 1, 2016
Definition 3.12. Given monoids M, N and comonoids C, D, and a morphism of

monoids φ : M → N, let
φ# : HomC (C, M) → HomC (C, N)

f 7→ φ ◦ f
Similarly, given a morphism of comonoids ψ : C → D, let
ψ# : HomC (D, M) → HomC (C, M)

f 7→ f ◦ ψ
Proposition 3.13. φ# and ψ# are morphisms of monoids.
Proof. Observe that the following diagram commutes. This shows that φ# (f ∗
g) = φ# (f) ∗ φ# (g)
f∗g
M•M µ M
f•g
∆
C C•C φ•φ φ
(φ◦f)•(φ◦g)
µ
N•N N
φ# (f)∗φ# (g)
4 Braided Monoidal Categories

To talk about bimonoids in general, we need to work in the slightly more specific
setting of Braided monoidal categories. This is also the setting in which we can
talk about commutative monoids and cocommutative comonoids. The braiding
is an extra structure on monoidal categories that lets us switch the two tensor
factors. Essentially, a braided monoidal category is a monoidal category that is
commutative up to the coherence axiom.
Definition 4.1. A braided monoidal category consists of
(a) A monoidal category (C, •, I)
(b) A natural isomorphism β, called the braiding
βA,B : A • B → B • A.
21
These data must satisfy the following axioms.
βA,B•C
A•B•C B•C•A
βA,B •idC idB •βA,C

B•A•C
βA•B,C
A•B•C C•A•B
idA •βB,C βA,C •idB

A•C•B
Definition 4.2. A symmetric monoidal category is a braided monoidal cate-

gory such that βB,A ◦ βA, B = idA•B .
Proposition 4.3. In a braided monoidal category, the following diagrams com-

mute.
βA,I βI,A
A•I I•A I•A A•I
ρA λA λA ρA
A A
A•B•C
βA,B •idC idA •βB,C
B•A•C A•C•B
idB •βA,C βA,C •idB
B•C•A C•A•B
βB,C •idA idC •βA,B

C•B•A
Proof. The first two aren’t hard; we will only show the hexagon to illustrate how
to apply naturality of β.
A•B•C
βA,B •idC idA •βB,C
B•A•C βA,B•C
A•C•B
idB •βA,C βA,C •idB
βA,C•B
B•C•A C•A•B
βB,C •idA idC •βA,B

C•B•A
22
Adding in the two arrows βA,B•C and βA,C•B , we see that the two triangles are
the axioms that are satisfied by the braiding and the larger square is naturality
of β.
We may interpret βA,B as a decorated braid, that looks like
A B B A
βA,B = β−1
A,B =
B A A B
Theorem 4.4 (Coherence). A diagram constructed out of β, id, α, λ, ρ and the

monoidal product • commutes if and only if each side of the diagram defines
the same element of the braid group.
Example 4.5. Let’s draw the hexagon from Proposition 4.3. We have that
A B C A B C
B A C A C B
=
B C A C A B
C B A C B A
because these have the same braids in the braid group B3 .
Moreover, these have the same underlying permutation in S3 , namely (13).

Hence, this guarantees commutativity of the given diagram in a symmetric
monoidal category as well.
Example 4.6.
(1) (Set, ×) is a symmetric monoidal category under βX,Y : X × Y → Y × X

given by (x, y) 7→ (y, x).
23
Lecture 04: Monoids and Comonoids in Braided Categories September 1, 2016
(2) (Veck , ⊗) is symmetric under βV,W : V ⊗ W → W ⊗ V, v ⊗ w 7→ w ⊗ v.
(3) Let G be an abelian group. Fix γ : G × G → k× that is bimultiplicative,

that is
γ(xy, z) = γ(x, z)γ(y, z)

γ(x, yz) = γ(x, y)γ(x, z)
(Note that these laws imply γ(x, 1) = 1 = γ(1, x)). Let C be the category
of G-graded vector spaces. View it as a monoidal category under • with
trivial associativity constraint α.
Define βV,W : V • W → W • V as follows. It’s components are
(V • W)g (W • V)g
⊗ Wy ⊗ Vy 0
L L
xy=g Vx x 0 y 0 =g Wx 0
Vx ⊗ Wy Wy ⊗ Vx
∈
∈
v⊗w γ(x, y)w ⊗ v
Given x, y ∈ G such that xy = g, G abelian means that yx = g as well. So

we may choose x 0 = y, y 0 = x.
A specific instance of this is G = Zn , with q ∈ k× such that kn = 1. Then
define γ : Zn × Zn → k× by (i, j) 7→ qij .
4.1 Monoids and Comonoids in Braided Categories

Let (C, •, I, β) be a braided monoidal category.
Proposition 4.7. Let A and B be monoids in C. Then A • B is again a monoid

under
id•βB,A •id µ •µ
µA•B : (A • B) • (A • A) −−−−−−−→ A • A • B • B −−A−−−→
B
A•B
ι •ι
−−→ A • B
A B
ιA•B : I = I • I −−
Example 4.8. In (Set, ×), if A and B are monoids, then so is A × B via (a, b) ·
(a 0 , b 0 ) = (aa 0 , bb 0 ).
24
Lecture 04: Monoids and Comonoids in Braided Categories September 1, 2016
Proposition 4.9. If C, D are comonoids, then so is C • D, with

∆ •∆ id•β•id
→ C • C • D • D −−−−−→ (C • D) • (C • D)
∆C•D : C • D −−C−−−D
ε •ε
→ I • I = I.
εC•D : C • D −−C−−−D
Definition 4.10. A monoid (A, µ, ι) is commutative if
βA,A
A•A A•A
µA µA
A
commutes. Dually, a comonoid (C, ∆, ε) is cocommutative if
βC,C
C•C C•C
∆ ∆
C
commutes.
Proposition 4.11. Let B be both a monoid and a comonoid in C, a braided
monoidal category. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) ∆ : B → B • B and ε • B → I are morphisms of monoids.
(ii) µ : B • B → B and ι : I → B are morphisms of comonoids.
(iii) The following diagrams commute:
µ ∆
B•B B B•B
∆•∆ µ•µ
id•βB,B •id
B•B•B•B B•B•B•B
ε•ε ι ι
B•B I•I I•I B•B I B
µ ∆ ε
id
ε ι
B I I B I
Definition 4.12. If any of the equivalent conditions in Proposition 4.11 is satis-
fied, then we call B a bimonoid.
Definition 4.13. We say that f : B → B 0 is a morphism of bimonoids if it is both
a morphism of monoids and comonoids. We say that f : H → H 0 is a morphism
of Hopf monoids if it is a morphism of bimonoids such that
S
H H
f f
S
H0 H0
25
Lecture 04: Hopf Monoids September 1, 2016
4.2 Hopf Monoids

Let (B, µ, ι, ∆, ε) be a bimonoid in the braided monoidal category (C, •, I, β).
Consider the set HomC (B, B); as noted before, this is a monoid in Set under the
ε ι
convolution product, with unit u : B − →I→ − B. Note that the unit is not the
identity map idB : B → B, since ι ◦ ε 6= idB . But we can ask for it to be invertible.
Definition 4.14. We say that H is a Hopf monoid if idH is convolution-invertible
in HomC (H, H). When it is, the convolution inverse is denoted by S and called
the antipode of H.
S•id
H•H H•H
∆ µ
ε ι
H I H
∆ µ
id•S
H•H H•H
Remark 4.15. Let’s organize everything we’ve defined so far. Given a braided
monoidal category (C, •, I, β), we have
objects
monoids comonoids
bimonoids
Hopf monoids
Going down in the diagram adds more structure.

Example 4.16. What does this diagram look like in (Set, ×)?
objects = sets
monoids = ordinary monoids comonoids = sets
bimonoids = ordinary monoids
Hopf monoids = groups
26
Lecture 05: Hopf Monoids September 6, 2016
So in the category of sets, comonoids are just sets because each set has a unique
comonoid structure given by the diagonal. We also see that every monoid is a
bimonoid, and it turns out that Hopf monoids are groups.
Why is a Hopf monoid in Set a group? Suppose that H is a Hopf monoid in
Set, with antipode S. We have that S ∗ id = u = id ∗ S. What does this mean?
Well, we have
∆ S×id µ
S ∗ id : B B×B B×B B
∈
∈
∈
∈
x (x, x) (S(x), x) S(x) · x
But we also have

ε ι
µ: B I B
∈
∈
∈
x ∗ 1
So S ∗ id = u ⇐⇒ S(x) · x = 1 for all x ∈ B, and similarly, we see that
x · S(x) = 1 for all x ∈ B. Hence, H is a group.
Recall that if G and G 0 are groups and f : G → G 0 preserves products and

units, then f(x−1 ) = f(x)−1 .
Proposition 4.17. If H and H 0 are Hopf monoids and φ : H → H 0 is a morphism

of bimonoids, then φ preserves antipodes (that is, φ is a morphism of Hopf
monoids).
Proof. φ is a morphism of monoids, so φ# : Hom(H 0 , H 0 ) → Hom(H, H 0 ) is a

morphism of monoids.
φ is a morphism of comonoids, so φ# : Hom(H, H) → Hom(H, H 0 ) is a
morphism of monoids.
We want to show that φ ◦ SH = SH 0 ◦ φ, or equivalently, φ# (SH ) = φ# (SH 0 ).
Since φ# and φ# are morphisms of monoids then they preserve inverses. So
φ# (idH ) is the convolution inverse of φ# (SH ), and φ# (idH 0 ) is the convolution
inverse of φ# (SH 0 ). But these are both just φ.
φ ◦ SH = φ# (SH ) = inverse of φ# (idH )

SH 0 ◦ φ = φ# (SH 0 ) = inverse of φ# (idH 0 )
But then φ# (idH 0 ) = φ = φ# (idH ).
Proposition 4.18. The antipode of a Hopf monoid reverses products and co-
27
Lecture 05: Linearization September 6, 2016
products. That is, the following diagrams commute.

S•S S
H•H H•H H H
β ∆
µ H•H H•H ∆ (2)
µ β
S S•S
H H H•H H•H
Example 4.19. In (Set, ×), H is a group, and this proposition easily verified.
(x, y) (x−1 , y−1 )
x·y (y−1 , x−1 )
(x · y)−1 y−1 · x−1
Proposition 4.20. Antipode preserves units and counits. That is, the following
diagrams commute.
S S
H H H H
ι ι ε ε
I I
Proposition 4.21. If H is commutative or cocommutative, then S2 = id.

Proof. The statements are formally dual, so if one holds, then the other one
does as well if we apply it in the opposite category. We will prove that if H
is commutative. This tells us that S is a morphism of monoids (we know that
µ ◦ β = µ, see (2)), so there is a map
S# : HomC (H, H) −→ HomC (H, H)
f 7−→ S ◦ f
Hence, S# (S) is the convolution-inverse of S# (id) = S, but S is the convolution
inverse of id and convolution inversion is involutive. Hence, S ◦ S = id.
5 Hopf Monoids in Species

5.1 Linearization
Definition 5.1. Given a set X and a field k, let kX denote the vector space
consisting of formal linear combinations of elements of X with coefficients in k.
28
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real standard;—in short, the utter absence of the partiality of
friendship, the blind enthusiasm of affection, or the delicacy of
common decency, that whether they ‘hew you as a carcase fit for
hounds, or carve you as a dish fit for the gods,’ the operation on your
feelings and your sense of obligation is just the same; and, whether
they are demons or angels in themselves, you wish them equally at
the devil!
Other persons of worth and sense give way to mere violence of
temperament (with which the understanding has nothing to do)—are
burnt up with a perpetual fury—repel and throw you to a distance by
their restless, whirling motion—so that you dare not go near them, or
feel as uneasy in their company as if you stood on the edge of a
volcano. They have their tempora mollia fandi; but then what a stir
may you not expect the next moment! Nothing is less inviting or less
comfortable than this state of uncertainty and apprehension. Then
there are those who never approach you without the most alarming
advice or information, telling you that you are in a dying way, or that
your affairs are on the point of ruin, by way of disburthening their
consciences; and others, who give you to understand much the same
thing as a good joke, out of sheer impertinence, constitutional
vivacity, and want of something to say. All these, it must be
confessed, are disagreeable people; and you repay their overanxiety
or total forgetfulness of you, by a determination to cut them as
speedily as possible. We meet with instances of persons who
overpower you by a sort of boisterous mirth and rude animal spirits,
with whose ordinary state of excitement it is as impossible to keep up
as with that of any one really intoxicated; and with others who seem
scarce alive—who take no pleasure or interest in any thing—who are
born to exemplify the maxim,
‘Not to admire is all the art I know
To make men happy, or to keep them so,—
and whose mawkish insensibility or sullen scorn are equally

annoying. In general, all people brought up in remote country places,
where life is crude and harsh—all sectaries—all partisans of a losing
cause, are discontented and disagreeable. Commend me above all to
the Westminster School of Reform, whose blood runs as cold in their
veins as the torpedo’s, and whose touch jars like it. Catholics are,
upon the whole, more amiable than Protestants—foreigners than
English people. Among ourselves, the Scotch, as a nation, are
particularly disagreeable. They hate every appearance of comfort
themselves, and refuse it to others. Their climate, their religion, and
their habits are equally averse to pleasure. Their manners are either
distinguished by a fawning sycophancy (to gain their own ends, and
conceal their natural defects), that makes one sick; or by a morose
unbending callousness, that makes one shudder. I had forgot to
mention two other descriptions of persons who fall under the scope
of this essay:—those who take up a subject, and run on with it
interminably, without knowing whether their hearers care one word
about it, or in the least minding what reception their oratory meets
with—these are pretty generally voted bores (mostly German ones);
—and others, who may be designated as practical paradox-mongers—
who discard the ‘milk of human kindness,’ and an attention to
common observances, from all their actions, as effeminate and
puling—who wear a white hat as a mark of superior understanding,
and carry home a handkerchief-full of mushrooms in the top of it as
an original discovery—who give you craw-fish for supper instead of
lobsters; seek their company in a garret, and over a gin-bottle, to
avoid the imputation of affecting genteel society; and discard them
after a term of years, and warn others against them, as being honest
fellows, which is thought a vulgar prejudice. This is carrying the
harsh and repulsive even beyond the disagreeable—to the hateful.
Such persons are generally people of common-place understandings,
obtuse feelings, and inordinate vanity. They are formidable if they
get you in their power—otherwise, they are only to be laughed at.
There are a vast number who are disagreeable from meanness of
spirit, from downright insolence, from slovenliness of dress or
disgusting tricks, from folly or ignorance: but these causes are
positive moral or physical defects, and I only meant to speak of that
repulsiveness of manners which arises from want of tact and
sympathy with others. So far of friendship: a word, if I durst, of love.
Gallantry to women (the sure road to their favour) is nothing but the
appearance of extreme devotion to all their wants and wishes—a
delight in their satisfaction, and a confidence in yourself, as being
able to contribute towards it. The slightest indifference with regard
to them, or distrust of yourself, are equally fatal. The amiable is the
voluptuous in looks, manner, or words. No face that exhibits this
kind of expression—whether lively or serious, obvious or suppressed,
will be thought ugly—no address, awkward—no lover who
approaches every woman he meets as his mistress, will be
unsuccessful. Diffidence and awkwardness are the two antidotes to
love.
To please universally, we must be pleased with ourselves and
others. There should be a tinge of the coxcomb, an oil of self-
complacency, an anticipation of success—there should be no gloom,
no moroseness no shyness—in short, there should be very little of an
Englishman, and a good deal of a Frenchman. But though, I believe,
this is the receipt, we are none the nearer making use of it. It is
impossible for those who are naturally disagreeable ever to become
otherwise. This is some consolation, as it may save a world of useless
pains and anxiety. ‘Desire to please, and you will infallibly please,’ is
a true maxim; but it does not follow that it is in the power of all to
practise it. A vain man, who thinks he is endeavouring to please, is
only endeavouring to shine, and is still farther from the mark. An
irritable man, who puts a check upon himself, only grows dull, and
loses spirit to be any thing. Good temper and a happy spirit (which
are the indispensable requisites) can no more be commanded than
good health or good looks; and though the plain and sickly need not
distort their features, and may abstain from success, this is all they
can do. The utmost a disagreeable person can do is to hope to be less
disagreeable than with care and study he might become, and to pass
unnoticed in society. With this negative character he should be
contented, and may build his fame and happiness on other things.
I will conclude with a character of men who neither please nor
aspire to please anybody, and who can come in nowhere so properly
as at the fag-end of an essay:—I mean that class of discontented but
amusing persons, who are infatuated with their own ill success, and
reduced to despair by a lucky turn in their favour. While all goes well,
they are like fish out of water. They have no reliance on or sympathy
with their good fortune, and look upon it as a momentary delusion.
Let a doubt be thrown on the question, and they begin to be full of
lively apprehensions again: let all their hopes vanish, and they feel
themselves on firm ground once more. From want of spirit or of
habit, their imaginations cannot rise above the low ground of
humility—cannot reflect the gay, flaunting tints of the fancy—flag
and droop into despondency—and can neither indulge the
expectation, nor employ the means of success. Even when it is within
their reach, they dare not lay hands upon it; and shrink from
unlooked-for bursts of prosperity, as something of which they are
both ashamed and unworthy. The class of croakers here spoken of
are less delighted at other people’s misfortunes than their own. Their
neighbours may have some pretensions—they have none. Querulous
complaints and anticipations of discomfort are the food on which
they live; and they at last acquire a passion for that which is the
favourite theme of their thoughts, and can no more do without it
than without the pinch of snuff with which they season their
conversation, and enliven the pauses of their daily prognostics.
ON MEANS AND ENDS
The Monthly Magazine.]

[September, 1827.
‘We work by wit, and not by witchcraft.’—Iago.
It is impossible to have things done without doing them. This

seems a truism; and yet what is more common than to suppose that
we shall find things done, merely by wishing it? To put the will for
the deed is as usual in practice as it is contrary to common sense.
There is, in fact, no absurdity, no contradiction, of which the mind is
not capable. This weakness is, I think, more remarkable in the
English than in any other people, in whom (to judge by what I
discover in myself) the will bears great and disproportioned sway.
We desire a thing: we contemplate the end intently, and think it
done, neglecting the necessary means to accomplish it. The strong
tendency of the mind towards it, the internal effort it makes to give
birth to the object of its idolatry, seems an adequate cause to produce
the wished-for effect, and is in a manner identified with it. This is
more particularly the case in what relates to the Fine Arts, and will
account for some phenomena in the national character.
The English style is distinguished by what are called ébauches[38]—
rude sketches, or violent attempts at effect, with a total inattention to
the details or delicacy of finishing. Now this, I apprehend, proceeds
not exactly from grossness of perception, but from the wilfulness of
our characters, our determination to have every thing our own way
without any trouble, or delay, or distraction of mind. An object
strikes us: we see and feel the whole effect at once. We wish to
produce a likeness of it; but we wish to transfer the impression to the
canvas as it is conveyed to us, simultaneously and intuitively—that is,
to stamp it there at a blow—or, otherwise, we turn away with
impatience and disgust, as if the means were an obstacle to the end,
and every attention to the mechanical process were a deviation from
our original purpose. We thus degenerate, by repeated failures, into a
slovenly style of art; and that which was at first an undisciplined and
irregular impulse, becomes a habit, and then a theory. It seems a
little strange that the zealous devotion to the end should produce
aversion to the means; but so it is: neither is it, however irrational,
altogether unnatural. That which we are struck with, which we are
enamoured of, is the general appearance or result; and it would
certainly be most desirable to produce the effect we aim at by a word
or wish, if it were possible, without being taken up with the
mechanical drudgery or pettiness of detail, or dexterity of execution,
which, though they are essential and component parts of the work,
do not enter into our thoughts, or form any part of our
contemplation. In a word, the hand does not keep pace with the eye;
and it is the desire that it should, that causes all the contradiction
and confusion. We would have a face to start out from the canvas at
once—not feature by feature, or touch by touch; we would be glad to
convey an attitude or a divine expression to the spectator by a stroke
of the pencil, as it is conveyed by a glance of the eye, or by the magic
of feeling, independently of measurements, and distances, and
foreshortening, and numberless minute particulars, and all the
instrumentality of the art. We may find it necessary, on a cool
calculation, to go through and make ourselves masters of these; but,
in so doing, we submit only to necessity, and they are still a diversion
to, and a suspension of, our favourite purpose for the time—at least
unless practice has given that facility which almost identifies the two
together, and makes the process an unconscious one. The end thus
devours up the means; or our eagerness for the one, where it is
strong and unchecked, renders us in proportion impatient of the
other. So we view an object at a distance, which excites in us an
inclination to visit it: this, after many tedious steps and intricate
windings, we do; but, if we could fly, we should never consent to go
on foot. The mind, however, has wings, though the body has not;
and, wherever the imagination can come into play, our desires
outrun their accomplishment. Persons of this extravagant humour
should addict themselves to eloquence or poetry, where the thought
‘leaps at once to its effect,’ and is wafted, in a metaphor or an
apostrophe, ‘from Indus to the Pole;’ though even there we should
find enough, in the preparatory and mechanical parts of those arts,
to try our patience and mortify our vanity! The first and strongest
impulse of the mind is to achieve any object, on which it is set, at
once, and by the shortest and most decisive means; but, as this
cannot always be done, we ought not to neglect other more indirect
and subordinate aids; nor should we be tempted to do so, but that
the delusions of the will interfere with the convictions of the
understanding, and what we ardently wish, we fancy to be both
possible and true. Let us take the instance of copying a fine picture.
We are full of the effect we intend to produce; and so powerfully does
this prepossession affect us, that we imagine we have produced it, in
spite of the evidence of our senses and the suggestions of friends. In
truth, after a number of violent and anxious efforts to strike off a
resemblance which we passionately long for, it seems an injustice not
to have succeeded; it is too late to retrace our steps, and begin over
again in a different method; we prefer even failure to arriving at our
end by petty, mechanical tricks and rules; we have copied Titian or
Rubens in the spirit in which they ought to be copied; though the
likeness may not be perfect, there is a look, a tone, a something,
which we chiefly aimed at, and which we persuade ourselves, seeing
the copy only through the dazzled, hectic flush of feverish
imagination, we have really given; and thus we persist, and make
fifty excuses, sooner than own our error, which would imply its
abandonment; or, if the light breaks in upon us, through all the
disguises of sophistry and self-love, it is so painful that we shut our
eyes to it. The more evident our failure, the more desperate the
struggles we make to conceal it from ourselves, to stick to our
original determination, and end where we began.
What makes me think that this is the real stumbling-block in our
way, and not mere rusticity or want of discrimination, is that you will
see an English artist admiring and thrown into downright raptures
by the tucker of Titian’s Mistress, made up of an infinite number of
little delicate folds; and, if he attempts to copy it, he proceeds
deliberately to omit all these details, and dash it off by a single smear
of his brush. This is not ignorance, or even laziness, I conceive, so
much as what is called jumping at a conclusion. It is, in a word, an
overweening presumption. ‘A wilful man must have his way.’ He sees
the details, the varieties, and their effect: he sees and is charmed
with all this; but he would reproduce it with the same rapidity and
unembarrassed freedom that he sees it—or not at all. He scorns the
slow but sure method, to which others conform, as tedious and
inanimate. The mixing his colours, the laying in the ground, the
giving all his attention to a minute break or nice gradation in the
several lights and shades, is a mechanical and endless operation,
very different from the delight he feels in studying the effect of all
these, when properly and ably executed. Quam nihil ad tuum,
Papiniane, ingenium! Such fooleries are foreign to his refined taste
and lofty enthusiasm; and a doubt crosses his mind, in the midst of
his warmest raptures, how Titian could resolve upon the drudgery of
going through them, or whether it was not rather owing to extreme
facility of hand, and a sort of trick in laying on the colours, abridging
the mechanical labour! No one wrote or talked more eloquently
about Titian’s harmony and clearness of colouring than the late Mr.
Barry—discoursing of his greens, his blues, his yellows, ‘the little red
and white of which he composed his flesh-colour,’ con amore; yet his
own colouring was dead and dingy, and, if he had copied a Titian, he
would have made it a mere daub, leaving out all that caused his
wonder or admiration, or that induced him to copy it after the
English or Irish fashion. We not only grudge the labour of beginning,
but we stop short, for the same reason, when we are near touching
the goal of success, and, to save a few last touches, leave a work
unfinished and an object unattained. The immediate steps, the daily
gradual improvement, the successive completion of parts, give us no
pleasure; we strain at the final result; we wish to have the whole
done, and, in our anxiety to get it off our hands, say it will do, and
lose the benefit of all our pains by stinting a little more, and being
unable to command a little patience. In a day or two, we will
suppose, a copy of a fine Titian would be as like as we could make it:
the prospect of this so enchants us, that we skip the intervening
space, see no great use in going on with it, fancy that we may spoil it,
and, in order to put an end to the question, take it home with us,
where we immediately see our error, and spend the rest of our lives
in regretting that we did not finish it properly when we were about it.
We can execute only a part; we see the whole of nature or of a picture
at once. Hinc illæ lachrymæ. The English grasp at this whole—
nothing less interests or contents them; and, in aiming at too much,
they miss their object altogether.
A French artist, on the contrary, has none of this uneasy, anxious
feeling—of this desire to master the whole of his subject, and
anticipate his good fortune at a blow—of this massing and
concentrating principle. He takes the thing more easy and rationally.
He has none of the mental qualms, the nervous agitation, the wild,
desperate plunges and convulsive throes of the English artist. He
does not set off headlong without knowing where he is going, and
find himself up to the neck in all sorts of difficulties and absurdities,
from impatience to begin and have the matter off his mind (as if it
were an evil conscience); but takes time to consider, arranges his
plans, gets in his outline and his distances, and lays a foundation
before he attempts a superstructure which he may have to pull in
pieces again, or let it remain—a monument of his folly. He looks
before he leaps, which is contrary to the true blindfold English rule;
and I should think that we had invented this proverb from seeing so
many fatal examples of the violation of it. Suppose he undertakes to
make a copy of a picture: he first looks at it, and sees what it is. He
does not make his sketch all black or all white, because one part of it
is so, and because he cannot alter an idea he has once got into his
head and must always run into extremes, but varies his tints (strange
as it may seem) from green to red, from orange-tawny to yellow,
from grey to brown, according as they vary in the original. He sees no
inconsistency, no forfeiture of a principle, in this (any more than Mr.
Southey in the change of the colours of his coat), but a great deal of
right reason, and indeed an absolute necessity for it, if he wishes to
succeed in what he is about. This is the last thing in an Englishman’s
thoughts: he only wishes to have his own way, though it ends in
defeat and ruin—strives hard to do what he is sensible he cannot—or,
if he finds he can, gives over and leaves the matter short of a
triumphant conclusion, which is too flattering an idea for him to
indulge in. The French artist proceeds with due deliberation, and bit
by bit. He takes some one part—a hand, an eye, a piece of drapery, an
object in the back-ground—and finishes it carefully; then another,
and so on to the end. When he has gone through every part, his
picture is done: there is nothing more that he can add to it; it is a
numerical calculation, and there are only so many items in the
account. An Englishman may go on slobbering his over for the
hundredth time, and be no nearer than when he began. As he tries to
finish the whole at once, and as this is not possible, he always leaves
his work in an imperfect state, or as if he had begun on a new canvas
—like a man who is determined to leap to the top of a tower, instead
of scaling it step by step, and who is necessarily thrown on his back
every time he repeats the experiment. Again, the French student
does not, from a childish impatience, when he is near the end,
destroy the effect of the whole, by leaving some one part eminently
deficient, an eye-sore to the rest; nor does he fly from what he is
about, to any thing else that happens to catch his eye, neglecting the
one and spoiling the other. He is, in our old poet’s phrase,
‘constrained by mastery,’ by the mastery of common sense and
pleasurable feeling. He is in no hurry to get to the end; for he has a
satisfaction in the work, and touches and retouches perhaps a single
head, day after day and week after week, without repining,
uneasiness, or apparent progress. The very lightness and buoyancy of
his feeling renders him (where the necessity of this is pointed out)
patient and laborious. An Englishman, whatever he undertakes, is as
if he was carrying a heavy load that oppresses both his body and
mind, and that he is anxious to throw down as soon as possible. The
Frenchman’s hopes and fears are not excited to a pitch of intolerable
agony, so that he is compelled, in mere compassion to himself, to
bring the question to a speedy issue, even to the loss of his object. He
is calm, easy, collected, and takes his time and improves his
advantages as they occur, with vigilance and alacrity. Pleased with
himself, he is pleased with whatever occupies his attention nearly
alike. He is never taken at a disadvantage. Whether he paints an
angel or a joint-stool, it is much the same to him: whether it is
landscape or history, still it is he who paints it. Nothing puts him out
of his way, for nothing puts him out of conceit with himself. This self-
complacency forms an admirable ground-work for moderation and
docility in certain particulars, though not in others.
I remember an absurd instance enough of this deliberate mode of
setting to work in a young French artist, who was copying the Titian’s
Mistress in the Louvre, some twenty years ago. After getting in his
chalk-outline, one would think he might have been attracted to the
face—that heaven of beauty (as it appears to some), clear,
transparent, open, breathing freshness, that ‘makes a sunshine in the
shady place’; or to the lustre of the golden hair; or some part of the
poetry of the picture (for, with all its materiality, this picture has a
poetry about it); instead of which he began to finish a square he had
marked out in the right-hand corner of the picture, containing a
piece of board and a bottle of some kind of ointment. He set to work
like a cabinet-maker or an engraver, and appeared to have no
sympathy with the soul of the picture. On a Frenchman (generally
speaking), the distinction between the great and the little, the
exquisite and the indifferent, is in a great measure lost: his self-
satisfied egotism supplies whatever is wanting up to a certain point,
and neutralizes whatever goes beyond it. Another young man, at the
time I speak of, was for eleven weeks daily employed in making a
black-lead pencil drawing of a small Leonardo: he sat with his legs
balanced across a rail to do it, kept his hat on, every now and then
consulted with his friends about his progress, rose up, went to the
fire to warm himself, talked of the styles of the different masters—
praising Titian pour les coloris, Raphael pour l’expression, Poussin
pour la composition—all being alike to him, provided they had each
something to help him on in his harangue (for that was all he
thought about),—and then returned to perfectionate (as he called it)
his copy. This would drive an Englishman out of his senses,
supposing him to be ever so stupid. The perseverance and the
interruptions, the labour without impulse, the attention to the parts
in succession, and disregard of the whole together, are to him utterly
incomprehensible. He wants to do something striking, and bends all
his thoughts and energies to one mighty effort. A Frenchman has no
notion of this summary proceeding, exists mostly in his present
sensations, and, if he is left at liberty to enjoy or trifle with these,
cares about nothing farther, looking neither backwards nor forwards.
They forgot the reign of terror under Robespierre in a month; they
forgot that they had ever been called the great nation under
Buonaparte in a week. They sat in chairs on the Boulevards (just as
they do at other times), when the shots were firing into the next
street, and were only persuaded to quit them when their own soldiers
were seen pouring down all the avenues from the heights of
Montmartre, crying ‘Sauve qui peut!’ They then went home and
dressed themselves to see the Allies enter Paris, as a fine sight, just
as they would witness a procession at a theatre. This is carrying the
instinct of levity as far as it will go. With all their affectation and
want of sincerity, there is, on the principle here stated, a kind of
simplicity and nature about them after all. They lend themselves to
the impression of the moment with good humour and good will,
making it not much better nor worse than it is: the English
constantly over-do or under-do every thing, and are either mad with
enthusiasm or in despair. The extreme slowness and regularity of the
French school have then arisen, as a natural consequence, out of
their very fickleness and frivolity (their severally supposed national
characteristics); for, owing to the last, their studious exactness costs
them nothing; and, again, they have no headstrong impulses or
ardent longings that urge them on to the violation of rules, or hurry
them away with a subject or with the interest belonging to it. All is
foreseen and settled beforehand, so as to assist the fluttering and
feeble hold they have of things. When they venture beyond the literal
and formal, and (mistaking pedantry and bombast for genius)
attempt the grand and the impressive style, as in David’s and
Girodet’s pictures, the Lord deliver us from sublimity engrafted on
insipidity and petit maître-ism! You see a solitary French artist in
the Louvre copying a Raphael or a Rubens, standing on one leg, not
quite sure of what he is about: you see them collected in groupes
about David’s, elbowing each other, thinking them even finer than
Raphael, more truly themselves, a more perfect combination of all
that can be taught by the Greek sculptor and the French posture-
master! Is this patriotism, or want of taste? If the former, it is
excusable, and why not, if the latter?
Even should a French artist fail, he is not disconcerted—there is
something else he excels in: ‘for one unkind and cruel fair, another
still consoles him.’ He studies in a more graceful posture, or pays
greater attention to his dress; or he has a friend, who has beaucoup
du talent, and conceit enough for them both. His self-love has always
a salvo, and comes upon its legs again, like a cat or a monkey. Not so
with Bruin the Bear. If an Englishman (God help the mark!) fails in
one thing, it is all over with him; he is enraged at the mention of any
thing else he can do, and at every consolation offered him on that
score; he banishes all other thoughts, but of his disappointment and
discomfiture, from his breast—neither eats nor sleeps (it is well if he
does not swallow down double ‘potations, pottle-deep,’ to drown
remembrance)—will not own, even to himself, any other thing in
which he takes an interest or feels a pride; and is in the horrors till he
recovers his good opinion of himself in the only point on which he
now sets a value, and for which his anxiety and disorder of mind
incapacitate him as effectually as if he were drunk with strong liquor
instead of spleen and passion. I have here drawn the character of an
Englishman, I am sure; for it is a portrait of myself, and, I am sorry
to add, an unexaggerated one. I intend these Essays as studies of
human nature; and as, in the prosecution of this design, I do not
spare others, I see no reason why I should spare myself. I lately tried
to make a copy of a portrait by Titian (after several years’ want of
practice), with a view to give a friend in England some notion of the
picture, which is equally remarkable and fine. I failed, and
floundered on for some days, as might be expected. I must say the
effect on me was painful and excessive. My sky was suddenly
overcast. Every thing seemed of the colour of the paints I used.
Nature in my eyes became dark and gloomy. I had no sense or feeling
left, but of the unforeseen want of power, and of the tormenting
struggle to do what I could not. I was ashamed ever to have written
or spoken on art: it seemed a piece of vanity and affectation in me to
do so—all whose reasonings and refinements on the subject ended in
an execrable daub. Why did I think of attempting such a thing
without weighing the consequences of exposing my presumption and
incapacity so unnecessarily? It was blotting from my mind, covering
with a thick veil all that I remembered of these pictures formerly—
my hopes when young, my regrets since, one of the few consolations
of my life and of my declining years. I was even afraid to walk out of
an evening by the barrier of Neuilly, or to recall the yearnings and
associations that once hung upon the beatings of my heart. All was
turned to bitterness and gall. To feel any thing but the consciousness
of my own helplessness and folly, appeared a want of sincerity, a
mockery, and an insult to my mortified pride! The only relief I had
was in the excess of pain I felt: this was at least some distinction. I
was not insensible on that side. No French artist, I thought, would
regret not copying a Titian so much as I did, nor so far shew the same
value for it, however he might have the advantage of me in drawing
or mechanical dexterity. Besides, I had copied this very picture very
well formerly. If ever I got out of my present scrape, I had at any rate
received a lesson not to run the same risk of vexation, or commit
myself gratuitously again upon any occasion whatever. Oh! happy
ought they to be, I said, who can do any thing, when I feel the misery,
the agony, the dull, gnawing pain of being unable to do what I wish
in this single instance! When I copied this picture before, I had no
other resource, no other language. My tongue then stuck to the roof
of my mouth: now it is unlocked, and I have done what I then
despaired of doing in another way. Ought I not to be grateful and
contented? Oh, yes!—and think how many there are who have
nothing to which they can turn themselves, and fail in every object
they undertake. Well, then, Let bygones be bygones (as the Scotch
proverb has it); give up the attempt, and think no more of Titian, or
of the portrait of a Man in black in the Louvre. This would be very
well for any one else; but for me, who had nearly exhausted the
subject on paper, that I should take it into my head to paint a libel of
what I had composed so many and such fine panegyrics upon—it was
a fatality, a judgment upon me for my vapouring and conceit. I must
be as shy of the subject for the future as a damned author is of the
title of his play or the name of his hero ever after. Yet the picture
would look the same as ever. I could hardly bear to think so: it would
be hid or defaced to me as ‘in a phantasma or a hideous dream.’ I
must turn my thoughts from it, or they would lead to madness! The
copy went on better afterwards, and the affair ended less tragically
than I apprehended. I did not cut a hole in the canvas, or commit any
other extravagance: it is now hanging up very quietly facing me; and
I have considerable satisfaction in occasionally looking at it, as I
write this paragraph.
Such are the agonies into which we throw ourselves about trifles—
our rage and disappointment at want of success in any favourite
pursuit, and, our neglect of the means to ensure it. A Frenchman,
under the penalty of half the chagrin at failure, would take just twice
the pains and consideration to avoid it: but our morbid eagerness
and blundering impetuosity, together with a certain concreteness of
imagination which prevents our dividing any operation into steps
and stages, defeat the very end we have in view. The worst of these
wilful mischiefs of our own making is, that they admit of no relief or
intermission. Natural calamities or great griefs, as we do not bring
them upon ourselves, so they find a seasonable respite in tears or
resignation, or in some alleviating contrast or reflection: but pride
scorns all alliance with natural frailty or indulgence; our wilful
purposes regard every relaxation or moment’s ease as a compromise
of their very essence, which consists in violence and effort: they turn
away from whatever might afford diversion or solace, and goad us on
to exertions as painful as they are unavailable, and with no other
companion than remorse,—the most intolerable of all inmates of the
breast; for it is constantly urging us to retrieve our peace of mind by
an impossibility—the undoing of what is past. One of the chief traits
of sublimity in Milton’s character of Satan is this dreadful display of
unrelenting pride and self-will—the sense of suffering joined with the
sense of power and ‘courage never to submit or yield’—and the
aggravation of the original purpose of lofty ambition and opposition
to the Almighty, with the total overthrow and signal punishment,—
which ought to be reasons for its relinquishment. ‘His thoughts burn
like a hell within him!’ but he gives them ‘neither truce nor rest,’ and
will not even sue for mercy. This kind of sublimity must be thrown
away upon the French critic, who would only think Satan a very
ridiculous old gentleman for adhering so obstinately to his original
pretensions, and not making the most of circumstances, and giving
in his resignation to the ruling party! When Buonaparte fell, an
English editor (of virulent memory) exhausted a great number of the
finest passages in Paradise Lost, in applying them to his ill-fated
ambition. This was an equal compliment to the poet and the
conqueror: to the last, for having realized a conception of himself in
the mind of his enemies on a par with the most stupendous creations
of imagination; to the first, for having embodied in fiction what bore
so strong a resemblance to, and was constantly brought to mind by,
the fearful and imposing reality! But to return to our subject.
It is the same with us in love and literature. An Englishman makes
love without thinking of the chances of success, his own
disadvantages, or the character of his mistress—that is, without the
adaptation of means to ends, consulting only his own humour or
fancy;[39] and he writes a book of history or travels, without
acquainting himself with geography, or appealing to documents or
dates; substituting his own will or opinion in the room of these
technical helps or hindrances, as he considers them. It is not right. In
business it is not by any means the same; which looks as if, where
interest was the moving principle, and acted as a counterpoise to
caprice and will, our headstrong propensity gave way, though it
sometimes leads us into extravagant and ruinous speculations. Nor is
it a disadvantage to us in war; for there the spirit of contradiction
does every thing, and an Englishman will go to the devil sooner than
yield to any odds. Courage is nothing but will, defying consequences;
and this the English have in perfection. Burns somewhere calls out
lustily, inspired by rhyme and usquebaugh,—
‘Set but a Scotsman on a hill;
Say such is royal George’s will,
And there’s the foe:-
His only thought is how to kill
Twa at a blow.’
I apprehend, with his own countrymen or ours, all the love and
loyalty would come to little, but for their hatred of the army opposed
to them. It is the resistance, ‘the two to kill at a blow,’ that is the
charm, and makes our fingers’-ends tingle. The Greek cause makes
no progress with us for this reason: it is one of pure sympathy, but
our sympathies must arise out of our antipathies; they were devoted
to the Queen to spite the King. We had a wonderful affection for the
Spaniards—the secret of which was that we detested the French. Our
love must begin with hate. It is so far well that the French are
opposed to us in almost every way; for the spirit of contradiction
alone to foreign fopperies and absurdities keeps us within some
bounds of decency and order. When an English lady of quality
introduces a favourite by saying, ‘This is his lordship’s physician, and
my atheist,’ the humour might become epidemic; but we can stop it
at once by saying, ‘That is so like a Frenchwoman!’—The English
excel in the practical and mechanic arts, where mere plodding and
industry are expected and required; but they do not combine
business and pleasure well together. Thus, in the Fine Arts, which
unite the mechanical with the sentimental, they will probably never
succeed; for the one spoils and diverts them from the other. An
Englishman can attend but to one thing at a time. He hates music at
dinner. He can go through any labour or pain with prodigious
fortitude; but he cannot make a pleasure of it, or persuade himself he
is doing a fine thing, when he is not. Again, they are great in original
discoveries, which come upon them by surprise, and which they
leave to others to perfect. It is a question whether, if they foresaw
they were about to make the discovery, at the very point of projection
as it were, they would not turn their backs upon it, and leave it to
shift for itself; or obstinately refuse to take the last step, or give up
the pursuit, in mere dread and nervous apprehension lest they
should not succeed. Poetry is also their undeniable element; for the
essence of poetry is will and passion, ‘and it alone is highly
fantastical.’ French poetry is verbiage or dry detail.
I have thus endeavoured to shew why it is the English fail as a
people in the Fine Arts, because the idea of the end absorbs that of
the means. Hogarth was an exception to this rule; but then every
stroke of his pencil was instinct with genius. As it has been well said,
that ‘we read his works,’ so it might be said he wrote them. Barry is
an instance more to my purpose. No one could argue better about
gusto in painting, and yet no one ever painted with less. His pictures
were dry, coarse, and wanted all that his descriptions of those of
others indicate. For example, he speaks of ‘the dull, dead, watery
look’ of the Medusa’s head of Leonardo, in a manner that conveys an
absolute idea of the character: had he copied it, you would never
have suspected any thing of the kind. His pen grows almost wanton
in praise of Titian’s nymph-like figures. What drabs he has made of
his own sea-nymphs, floating in the Thames, with Dr. Burney at their
head, with his wig on! He is like a person admiring the grace of an
accomplished rope-dancer; place him on the rope himself, and his
head turns;—or he is like Luther’s comparison of Reason to a
drunken man on horseback—‘set him up on one side, and he tumbles
over on the other.’ Why is this? His mind was essentially ardent and
discursive, not sensitive or observant; and though the immediate
object acted as a stimulus to his imagination, it was only as it does to
the poet’s—that is, as a link in the chain of association, as implying
other strong feelings and ideas, and not for its intrinsic beauty or
individual details. He had not the painter’s eye, though he had the
painter’s general knowledge. There is as great a difference in this
respect between our views of things as between the telescope and
microscope. People in general see objects only to distinguish them in
practice and by name—to know that a hat is black, that a chair is not
a table, that John is not James; and there are painters, particularly of
history in England, who look very little farther. They cannot finish
any thing, or go over a head twice: the first coup-d’œil is all they ever
arrive at, nor can they refine on their impressions, soften them down,
or reduce them to their component parts, without losing their spirit.
The inevitable result of this is grossness, and also want of force and
solidity; for, in reality, the parts cannot be separated without injury
from the whole. Such people have no pleasure in the art as such: it is
merely to astonish or to thrive that they follow it; or, if thrown out of
it by accident, they regret it only as a bankrupt tradesman does a
business which was a handsome subsistence to him. Barry did not
live, like Titian, on the taste of colours (there was here, perhaps—and
I will not disguise it—in English painters in general, a defect of
organic susceptibility); they were not a pabulum to his senses; he did
not hold green, blue, red, and yellow for ‘the darlings of his precious
eye.’ They did not, therefore, sink into his mind with all their hidden
harmonies, nor nourish and enrich it with material beauty, though
he knew enough of them to furnish hints for other ideas and to
suggest topics of discourse. If he had had the most enchanting object
in nature before him in his painting-room at the Adelphi, he would
have turned from it, after a moment’s burst of admiration, to talk of
the subject of his next composition, and to scrawl in some new and
vast design, illustrating a series of great events in history, or some
vague moral theory. The art itself was nothing to him, though he
made it the stalking-horse to his ambition and display of intellectual
power in general; and, therefore, he neglected its essential qualities
to daub in huge allegories, or carry on cabals with the Academy, in
which the violence of his will and the extent of his views found
proper food and scope. As a painter, he was tolerable merely as a
draftsman, or in that part of the art which may be best reduced to
rules and precepts, or to positive measurements. There is neither
colouring, nor expression, nor delicacy, nor striking effect in his
pictures at the Adelphi. The group of youths and horses, in the
representation of the Olympic Games, is the best part of them, and
has more of the grace and spirit of a Greek bas-relief than any thing
of the same kind in the French school of painting. Barry was, all his
life, a thorn in the side of Sir Joshua, who was irritated by the temper
and disconcerted by the powers of the man; and who, conscious of
his own superiority in the exercise of his profession, yet looked
askance at Barry’s loftier pretensions and more gigantic scale of art.
But he had no more occasion to be really jealous of him than of an
Irish porter or orator. It was like Imogen’s mistaking the dead body
of Cloten for her lord’s—‘the jovial thigh, the brawns of Hercules’: the
head, which would have detected the cheat, was missing!
I might have gone more into the subject of our apparent
indifference to the pleasure of mere imitation, if I had had to run a
parallel between English and Italian or even Flemish art; but really,
though I find a great deal of what is finical, I find nothing of the
pleasurable in the details of French more than of English art. The
English artist, it is an old and just complaint, can with difficulty be
prevailed upon to finish any part of a picture but the face, even if he
does that any tolerable justice: the French artist bestows equal and
elaborate pains on every part of his picture—the dress, the carpet,
&c.; and it has been objected to the latter method, that it has the
effect of making the face look unfinished; for as this is variable and
in motion, it can never admit of the same minuteness of imitation as
objects of still-life, and must suffer in the comparison, if these have
the utmost possible degree of attention bestowed on them, and do
not fall into their relative place in the composition from their natural
insignificance. But does not this distinction shew generally that the
English have no pleasure in art, unless there is an additional interest
beyond what is borrowed from the eye, and that the French have the
same pleasure in it, provided the mechanical operation is the same—
like the fly that settles equally on the face or dress, and runs over the
whole surface with the same lightness and indifference? The collar of
a coat is out of drawing: this may be and is wrong. But I cannot say
that it gives me the same disturbance as if the nose was awry. A
Frenchman thinks that both are equally out of drawing, and sets
about correcting them both with equal gravity and perseverance. A
part of the back-ground of a picture is left in an unfinished state: this
is a sad eye-sore to the French artist or connoisseur. We English care
little about it: if the head and character are well given, we pass it over
as of small consequence; and if they are failures, it is of even less. A
French painter, after having made you look like a baboon, would go
on finishing the cravat or the buttons of your coat with all the nicety
of a man milliner or button-maker, and the most perfect satisfaction
with himself and his art. This with us would be quite impossible.
‘They are careful after many things: with us, there is one thing
needful’—which is effect. We certainly throw our impressions more
into masses (they are not taken off by pattern, every part alike): there
may be a slowness and repugnance at first; but, afterwards, there is
an impulse, a momentum acquired—one interest absorbing and
being strengthened by several others; and if we gain our principal
object, we can overlook the rest, or at least cannot find time to attend
to them till we have secured this. We have nothing of the petit
maître, of the martinet style about us: we run into the opposite fault.
If we had time, if we had power, there could be no objection to giving
every part with the utmost perfection, as it is given in a looking-glass.
But if we have only a month to do a portrait in, is it not better to give
three weeks to the face and one to the dress, than one week to the
face and three to the dress. How often do we look at the face
compared to the dress? ‘On a good foundation,’ says Sancho Panza, ‘a
good house may be built’; so a good picture should have a good back-
ground, and be finished in every part. It is entitled to this mark of
respect, which is like providing a frame for it, and hanging it in a
good light. I can easily understand how Rubens or Vandyke finished
the back grounds and drapery of their pictures:—they were worth the
trouble; and, besides, it cost them nothing. It was to them no more
than blowing a bubble in the air. One would no doubt have every
thing right—a feather in a cap, or a plant in the foreground—if a
thought or a touch would do it. But to labour on for ever, and labour
to no purpose, is beyond mortal or English patience. Our clumsiness
is one cause of our negligence. Depend upon it, people do with
readiness what they can do well. I rather wonder, therefore, that
Raphael took such pains in finishing his draperies and back grounds,
which he did so indifferently. The expression is like an emanation of
the soul, or like a lamp shining within and illuminating the whole
face and body; and every part, charged with so sacred a trust as the
conveying of this expression (even to the hands and feet), would be
wrought up to the highest perfection. But his inanimate objects must
have cost him some trouble; and yet he laboured them too. In what
he could not do well, he was still determined to do his best; and that
nothing should be wanting in decorum and respect to an art that he
had consecrated to virtue, and to that genius that burnt like a flame
upon its altars! We have nothing that for myself I can compare with
this high and heroic pursuit of art for its own sake. The French fancy
their own pedantic abortions equal to it, thrust them into the Louvre,
‘and with their darkness dare affront that light!’—thus proving
themselves without the germ or the possibility of excellence—the
feeling of it in others. We at least claim some interest in art, by
looking up to its loftiest monuments—retire to a distance, and
reverence the sanctuary, if we cannot enter it.
‘They also serve who only stare and wait.’[40]

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Math 7410 Lie Combinatorics and

Hyperplane Arrangements Marcelo

Math 7410 Lie Combinatorics and Hyperplane Arrangements

Math 108 notes Combinatorics Kannan Soundararajan

Notes for Math 184A Combinatorics Steven V. Sam

Math 845 Notes on Lie Groups Mark Reeder

Fire Pump Arrangements at Industrial Facilities Nolan

Combinatorics, Second Edition Nicholas Loehr

Theory of Groups and Symmetries Finite groups Lie

Introduction to Combinatorics Walter D. Wallis

Taught by Marcelo Aguiar

Notes by David Mehrle

Last updated January 9, 2017.

4 Braided Monoidal Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

5 Hopf Monoids in Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10 Species relative to a hyperplane arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

11 Properties of Σ-modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

12 The Joyal-Klyachoko-Stanley isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

13 Connections to classical algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

14 Additional (Category Theory) Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Lecture 02 on August 25, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Lecture 03 on August 30, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Lecture 04 on September 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Lecture 05 on September 6, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Lecture 06 on September 8, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Lecture 07 on September 13, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Lecture 08 on September 15, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Lecture 09 on September 20, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Lecture 10 on September 22, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Lecture 11 on September 27, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Lecture 12 on September 29, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Lecture 13 on October 04, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Lecture 14 on October 06, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Lecture 15 on October 13, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Lecture 16 on October 18, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Lecture 17 on October 20, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Lecture 18 on October 25, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Lecture 19 on October 27, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Lecture 20 on November 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Lecture 21 on November 3, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Lecture 22 on November 8, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Lecture 23 on November 10, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Lecture 25 on November 22, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Lecture 26 on November 29, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Lecture 27 on December 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

1 Species and Enumeration

Example 1.4. For example,

L[a, b, c] = {abc, bac, acb, bcacab, cba}.

Definition 1.5. A partition X of a set I is a collection of disjoint nonempty

Definition 1.6. The species Π of set partitions is the species determined by

Definition 1.7. A composition F of a set I is a totally ordered partition of I.

Definition 1.8. The sepcies Σ of set compositions is the species determined by

Σ[I] = {compositions F of I}.

({a, c}, {b}, {d}) 6= ({b}, {a, c}, {d})

There are morphisms

Remark 1.10. In combinatorics, one is interested in the cardinality of a set.

Definition 1.11. Given a species P, it’s generating function is

Definition 1.13. Given species P and Q, their Cauchy Product P · Q is the

(P · Q)[J] ⊇ P[σ(S)] × P[σ(T )]

Example 1.14. E · E is the species of subsets.

Proof. First, notice that

where the map is σ 7→ (S = Fix(σ), σ|T ), where T = I \ S.

Remark 1.21. We can see that