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i

Knowledge and Ideology

Ideology critique generally seeks to undermine selected theories and

beliefs by demonstrating their partisan origins and their insidious social
functions. This approach rightly reveals the socially implicated nature of
much purported knowledge, but it thereby tends to bracket or bypass the
cognitive dimension of thought. In contrast, Michael Morris argues that
it is possible to integrate the social and epistemic dimensions of belief in
a way that preserves the cognitive and adjudicatory capacities of reason,
while acknowledging that reason itself is inevitably social, historical, and
interested. Drawing upon insights from Hegel, Lukács, Mannheim, and
Habermas, he interprets and reconstructs Marx’s critique of ideology as a
positive theory of knowledge, one that reconciles the inherently interested
and inextricably situated nature of thought with more traditional concep-
tions of rational adjudication, normativity, and truth. His wide-ranging
examination of the social and epistemic dimensions of ideology will in-
terest readers in political philosophy and political theory.

Mi c h a e l Morri s is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University

of South Florida. He has published articles in journals including the
International Yearbook of German Idealism, the European Journal of
Philosophy, and Intellectual History Review.
iii

Knowledge and Ideology

The Epistemology of Social and Political
Critique

M i c h a el Mo r r is
University of South Florida
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107177093
© Michael Morris 2016
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2016
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-107-17709-3 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
v

For Dolores
vii

Contents

Acknowledgments page xi

Introduction 1
1. The Tangled History of Ideology Critique 1
2. The Functional Critique of Ideology 5
3. The Epistemic Critique of Ideology 8
4. The Neo-Kantian Variation of Epistemic
Ideology Critique 15
5. The Neo-Hegelian Variation of Epistemic
Ideology Critique 18
6. The Core Arguments of This Study 22
7. Methodological Strategies 24

Part I The Dialectic of Ideology 33

1 In and of This World: The Dual Status of Thought 36
1.1 The Noncognitive Dimensions of Thought 36
1.2 The Birth of Modern Epistemology 46
1.3 Bridging the Gap between Effects and Function 51
1.4 Discretely Relating the Dual Dimensions of Belief 57
1.5 Synthesizing the Dual Dimensions of Belief 60
2 The Immanent Destruction of Functional Ideology
Critique: Nietzsche, Foucault, Althusser 65
2.1 The Self-destruction of Radical Critique 66
2.2 The Symbiosis of Positivism and Functional
Ideology Critique 69
2.3 The Positivistic, Baconian, and Misleading Rhetoric
of Karl Marx 73
2.4 Functional Ideology Critique and the Primacy
of Power 75
2.5 Functional Ideology Critique and the Loss of
the Victim 83

vii
viii Contents

Part II On Ideology and Violence 95

3 Jean Jacques Rousseau: Economic Oppression, the Gaze
of the Other, and the Allure of Naturalized Violence 99
3.1 The Pre-Marxist Origins of Functional Ideology
Critique 99
3.2 The Ideological Deployment of Luxury,
Amour-propre, and the State 100
3.3 The Allure of Naturalized Violence 107
3.4 Rousseau’s Unwitting Progeny 115
4 Max Stirner: The Bohemian Left and the Violent
Self-loathing of the Bourgeoisie 125
4.1 The German Ideologist Par Excellence 125
4.2 Dividing the Weak from the Strong 126
4.3 Instruments of Voluntary Servitude 132
4.4 Capitalism and the Conflicted Nature
of Bohemian Experience 145
4.5 Capitalism and the Misery of Proletarian Existence 158
5 Marx Contra Stirner: The Parting of Ways 161
5.1 An Existential Analysis of Marxism 161
5.2 A Socioanalytic Critique of Stirner’s Existentialism 166
5.3 The Monotony of Pure Difference 169
5.4 The Bohemian Left and the Ideological Dream
of Revolution 171

Part III A Marxist Theory of Knowledge 179

6 German Visions of the French Revolution:
On the Interpretation of Dreams 183
6.1 Ideological Inversion as Cognitive Sublimation 184
6.2 German Idealism as the Paradigm for Ideology 191
6.3 Confronting the Heritage of German Idealism 198
6.4 Marx’s Practice of Socioanalytic Reading 202
6.5 Marx’s Theory of Socioanalytic Reading 207
7 The Social Crisis and the Vocation of Reason:
Mannheim as Epistemologist 213
7.1 Diagnosing the Crisis 213
7.2 Ideology Critique and the End of the Weimar
Republic 216
7.3 Mannheim’s Reckless Gambit 218
7.4 Restoring Mannheim’s German Heritage 225
ix

Contents ix

7.5 Precluding Pragmatic Misinterpretations 229

7.6 Mannheim’s Meta-epistemological Insight 234
8 Practice, Reflection, Sublimation, Critique: Social
Ontology and Social Knowledge 240
8.1 Interested Knowledge and the Possibility
of Rational Consensus 240
8.2 Interests That Are Knowledge-intrinsic 248
8.3 Knowledge-intrinsic Interests That Are Social 249
8.4 Knowledge-intrinsic, Social Interests
That Are Universal 251
8.5 Universal, Knowledge-intrinsic, Social Interests
That Are Transcendental 258
8.6 Transcendental Philosophy and the Limits
of Rational Adjudication 265
8.7 From Transcendental Philosophy to Dialectical
Hermeneutics 268
8.8 Practice as Ontological and Epistemic Category 276

Bibliography 291
Index 299
xi

Acknowledgments

The thoughts developed in this study go back to the intellectually

rewarding time I spent at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena,
where I had the privilege to serve three years as a research fellow in the
SFB 482, “Ereignis Weimar-Jena: Kultur um 1800.” This experience
transformed my understanding of the relationship between canonical
philosophical texts and their sociopolitical context, and I owe a great
debt to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinshaft for their financial sup-
port during this time. I also want to thank my colleagues in Jena, par-
ticularly Christoph Halbig, Timo-Peter Ertz, Tim Henning, and Tilman
Reitz for many helpful discussions and much intellectual camaraderie.
In the final stages of this project, I received invaluable guidance and
encouragement from Lee Braver and Roger Ariew, my colleagues at
the University of South Florida (USF). Without their help, this man-
uscript would surely have met the world under less auspicious cir-
cumstances. All my colleagues at USF have been highly supportive.
I want to thank Colin Heydt, Richard Manning, Martin Schönfield,
and Stephen Turner for their willingness to read and discuss my work,
and I want to thank Doug Jesseph, Alex Levine, Joshua Rayman, and
Thomas Williams for their encouragement along the way.
I want to thank my wife, Dolores G. Morris, for her tireless encour-
agement, her willingness to read and discuss countless drafts, and her
skilled service as a proofreader. Finally, looking back to my mentors
from graduate school, from whom I continue to profit, I want to thank
Fred Rush for his always insightful comments, and I particularly want
to thank Karl Ameriks for his continued generosity and his remarkable
ability to encourage and guide my hunches, enthusiasms, and intellec-
tual idiosyncrasies, even as these gradually led me beyond the mea-
sured boundaries of Kantian modesty and into the tempestuous seas
of Hegelian dialectic and Marxist polemic.

xi
1

Introduction

1. The Tangled History of Ideology Critique

In the more than 160 years since Marx and Engels penned The German
Ideology, the existing definitions and theories of ideology have prolif-
erated beyond any readily manageable extent, forcing the more sys-
tematically minded authors, who address this topic, to preface their
discussions with complex and often mutually conflicting systems of
classification.1 What should we make of this diversity, this seemingly
uncontrolled proliferation of meanings? In particular, what does it
tell us about the proximate origins of the theory of ideology, that is,
about the elaborations of this concept in Marx’s work? Does it reveal
the supreme fecundity of Marx’s insights on this particular topic, or,
rather, does it bespeak his confusion, his ambivalence, and his lack of
conceptual rigor?2 More importantly, how should we now approach
this unwieldy proliferation? Does the historical development and pro-
liferation of ideology display any evident logic, any marked points of
rupture or decision, any particularly decisive branches in the concep-
tual tree that maps the range of possibilities? In other words, can we,
amidst the vast array presented by the currently extant theories of ide-
ology, identify the conceptually significant fault lines that divide them,
the central divisions that raise the most salient philosophical issues?
In his helpful study, Ideology: An Introduction, Terry Eagleton
provides a basic framework for addressing these questions, roughly
dividing the myriad conceptions of ideology into two dominant but
divergent intellectual strands. He begins the first chapter, appropriately

1
For a sense of the prodigious variety of recent classificatory schemes, see
Boudon, 1989, pp. 17–68; Eagleton, 1994, pp. 1–31; Geuss, 2001, pp. 4–44;
Mannheim, 1995, pp. 49–94; Plamenatz, 1970, pp. 15–31; Rosen, 1996a,
pp. 30–53; and Rossi-Landi, 1990, pp. 17–48.
2
The charge of equivocation is common. See Eagleton, 1994, pp. 83–84; Rosen,
1996a, p. 168.

1
2 Introduction

entitled, “What Is Ideology,” with an introductory catalogue of sixteen

existing definitions, a catalogue that ranges from the predictable to the
exotic, from “a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group
or class” to “semiotic closure,” from “ideas which help to legitimate
a dominant political power” to “that which offers a position for a
subject.”3 After documenting this wide range of definitions, Eagleton
then offers the following observation:

We can note that some of these formulations involve epistemological

questions – questions concerned with our knowledge of the world – while
others are silent on this score . . . This distinction, as we shall see, is an
important bone of contention in the theory of ideology, and reflects a dis-
sonance between two of the mainstream traditions we find inscribed within
the term. Roughly speaking, one central lineage, from Hegel and Marx to
Georg Lukács and some later Marxist thinkers, has been much preoccupied
with ideas of true and false cognition, with ideology as illusion, distortion,
mystification; whereas an alternative tradition of thought has been less epis-
temological than sociological, concerned more with the function of ideas
within social life than with their reality or unreality. The Marxist heritage
has itself straddled these two intellectual currents, and that both of them
have something to tell us will be one of the contentions of this book.4

Eagleton here distinguishes between two broad “intellectual currents”

or “mainstream traditions,” that is, between the epistemic and the so-
ciological or functional conceptions of ideology.5 Though Eagleton
never treats these traditions as mutually exclusive or fully incompat-
ible, he notes their historical divergence and increasing dissonance. On
the one hand, the proponents of the majority tradition, the theoreti-
cians and practitioners of functional ideology critique, have come to
consider increasing swaths of our intellectual life in largely sociological
terms, focusing on the instrumental relations between thought forma-
tions and social oppression. They thus tend to reinterpret and subsume
the normative concerns of traditional epistemology within the creep-
ing boundaries of a political or partisan sociology. On the other hand,
the minority tradition attempts to integrate selected domains of social

3
Eagleton, 1994, pp. 1–2.
4
Eagleton, 1994, pp. 2–3.
5
Drucker also emphasizes this distinction between the epistemic and functional
conceptions of ideology. See Drucker, 1974, p. 15.
3

Introduction 3

theory within the scope of its more or less radical transformation of

traditional epistemology.
As alternative claimants to the same crucial terms and classical
texts, these divergent traditions have generated significant concep-
tual confusion. Eagleton traces this equivocation and confusion back
to Marx’s inaugural discussions of ideology. After examining the
canonical Marxist texts and considering the development of this theme
through the era of the Second International, Eagleton concludes:

The situation, in short, is now thoroughly confused. Ideology would now

seem to denote simultaneously false consciousness (Engels), all socially con-
ditioned thought (Plekhanov), the political crusade of socialism (Bernstein
and sometimes Lenin), and the scientific theory of socialism. It is not hard to
see how these confusions come about. They stem in effect from the equivo-
cation we noted in the work of Marx between ideology as illusion, and ide-
ology as an intellectual armoury of a social class. Or, to put it another way,
they reflect a conflict between the epistemological and political meanings of
the term. In the second sense of the word, what matters is not the character
of the beliefs in question, but their function and perhaps their origin; and
there is no reason why these beliefs should necessarily be false.6

Marx variously discusses ideology as cognitively distorted thought

and as the intellectual weaponry of a particular class. He alternatively
treats it in epistemic and in sociological terms. In the latter case, he
focuses principally on questions of “function,” though sometimes also
on matters of “origin.” While the exact relationship between the func-
tional and genetic questions is itself complex, we shall here follow
Eagleton’s usage, employing the phrase “functional-ideology critique”
as shorthand for a form of criticism that principally focuses upon the
effects or functions of beliefs, though it sometimes also considers the
origins, associations, and distributive tendencies of these functional
beliefs.
If Marx’s discussions of ideology variously focus on epistemic and
social properties of beliefs, we face three basic interpretative possibili-
ties. First, noting the apparent logical or relative conceptual separabil-
ity of the epistemic, functional, and genetic properties of belief, we
might follow Eagleton and accuse Marx of equivocation. At the very

6
Eagleton, 1994, p. 90.
4 Introduction

least, Eagleton’s equivocation thesis adequately reflects the later devel-

opment of ideology critique. Marx’s followers have frequently tended
to pursue one dimension to the relative exclusion of the other, focus-
ing upon either sociofunctional or epistemic considerations, such that
the term “ideology” has in fact acquired an ambiguous and equivo-
cal status. However, we needn’t attribute this equivocation to Marx.
Adopting a second interpretative strategy, we might assume that Marx
treats certain epistemic, functional, and genetic properties as equally
necessary and only conjointly sufficient conditions for the existence
of ideology. While recognizing the conceptual disjunctions between
different types of consideration, we might conclude that a theory or
belief is ideological if and only if it is defective along all three dimen-
sions. There is yet a third alternative: We might attribute to Marx
some distinctive and essentially integrated conception of social real-
ity and epistemology. We might argue that he develops a theory of
knowledge that conceives rational inquiry and knowing as necessarily
and legitimately constituted by certain social aims and social (or class)
positions. Though Eagleton accepts the first interpretation and accuses
Marx of equivocation, he nonetheless adopts a sanguine approach to
the developments of these alternative traditions, insisting that, “both
of them have something to tell us.” He maintains that, after some
appropriate disambiguation, these alternative traditions both have an
important role to play in contemporary Marxism and in other related
forms of radical political theory.
While I appreciate and accept the basic distinction that guides
Eagleton’s history of ideology, my interpretation of Marx and my
assessment of these traditions differ significantly. In the present study,
I argue that although the functional tradition of ideology critique can
teach us much, that tradition derives largely from non-Marxist texts
and concerns. I further argue that this tradition undermines the cog-
nitive commitments of traditional Marxism, and that it fosters dan-
gerous forms of skepticism, political indifference, doxastic apathy,
cynicism, nihilism, and violence. I defend Marx against the charge of
irremediable equivocation, arguing that his theory and critique of ide-
ology fundamentally integrate certain types of functional and genetic
considerations within his innovative transformation of traditional
epistemology. Additionally, I argue that some strands within the epi-
stemic tradition recognize, adopt, and develop Marx’s epistemological
innovations, thereby providing an important response to the numerous
5

Introduction 5

epistemic and political challenges posed by the strictly functional or

sociological tradition.
Before elaborating these guiding theses and sketching my basic
arguments, I must first provide schematic but illustrative accounts of
the respective positions advocated by the functional and the epistemic
traditions of ideology critique. While these accounts present somewhat
generalized or idealized types, they provide us with an initial guide to
the tangled conceptual landscape formed by the extant discussions of
ideology. With this distinction in place, we should then be in a better
position to trace the complex histories of ideology, to ascertain their
relationship to Marx’s textual pronouncements, and to discern the still
latent promises and unexpected dangers partially concealed within
these complex currents of thought.

2. The Functional Critique of Ideology

In the functional tradition, the critique of ideology examines the social
dimensions of beliefs and theories in a manner that largely brackets or
bypasses their cognitive properties. It employs categories and explan-
atory methods drawn from the empirical study of other noncognitive
entities in the social and natural world. In its treatment and criticism
of beliefs, it focuses upon their social distributions, probabilistic asso-
ciations, causes, modes of transmission, and functions. We might say
that this sociological or functional study of ideology treats beliefs as
mundane entities in the world, while at least temporally disregarding
the sense in which beliefs also purport to be about the world. In other
words, it assumes that beliefs can be studied and criticized without
consideration of their epistemic properties, without considering their
intentional relation to the world, their representational content, their
truth-value, their logical consistency, and their justification.7
The functional critique of ideology distinguishes itself from more
general sociological treatments of belief through its guiding concern
with the functional role that beliefs play in the perpetuation of social

7
Often, this goes along with the assumption that ideological beliefs emerge
from noncognitive processes. Seliger presents this point succinctly, noting that,
“ideology, unlike philosophy and science, denotes a set of ideas not primarily
conceived for cognitive purposes.” More specifically, he goes on to say that
ideological ideas are forged in and for political action. See Seliger, 1976, p. 14.
See also Arendt, 1976, p. 159.
6 Introduction

oppression. Emphasizing this point, Michael Rosen thus claims that

the theory of ideology seeks “to explain the persistence of unequal
(and unjust) societies.”8 According to Rosen, the theory of ideology
emerges from the fundamental assumption that, in most or all socie-
ties, the people vastly outnumber the rulers, and that they can there-
fore command preponderant force.9 Additionally, the theory assumes
that the rulers employ their position, in large measure, to further their
own personal or class interests, not to promote the interests of society
as a whole. Thus, in most or all societies, the ruled majority both can
and should – at least from the standpoint of self-interest, if not from
some higher standpoint of justice – establish a new social and polit-
ical order, one that more adequately serves their interests and perhaps
also accords with the demands of justice. Despite such purported facts,
revolutionary change is rare. According to Rosen’s apt characteriza-
tion, the (functional) theory of ideology seeks to explain and change
this fact.
In light of the superior numbers and strength of the oppressed, the
tradition of functional ideology critique seeks to reveal how certain
widespread beliefs serve to perpetuate social oppression, the domi-
nance of the inherently weak over the innately strong. Since open con-
flict and direct force favor the oppressed, the oppressors must maintain
their dominance through subtle or indirect forms of power. We might
therefore describe the functional critique of ideology as an attempt to
unmask various soft, deceptive, and frequently internalized forms of
power. The functional theory of ideology treats ideas as weapons or
instruments of struggle. However, unlike fists and guns, ideological
beliefs conceal their hostile purpose. Ideological beliefs thus represent
a form of soft or covert power.
Conceived as the critique of subtle or internalized forms of power,
functional treatments of ideology naturally and rightly extend the
scope of their study beyond the domain of ideas, beliefs, and theories,
focusing upon the sociopolitical implications of a broad range of non-
cognitive phenomena, including desires, ceremonies, habits, forms of
address, fashions, etc. If we ignore or bracket the distinctly epistemic
properties of beliefs and theories, focusing solely upon their causal
efficacy vis-à-vis oppression and social conflict, then it becomes

8
Rosen, 1996a, p. 30.
9
Rosen, 1996b, p. 209.
7

Introduction 7

natural to extend our study to include this broad range of largely

noncognitive but socially significant phenomena. Much like ideologi-
cal beliefs, we find that various desires, habits, and fashions spread
through populations and tend to serve as subtle instruments of social
conflict. Therefore, if we are principally concerned with the more sub-
tle or nonevident instruments of oppression and social conflict, then it
seems both natural and right to extend the domain of ideology beyond
the relatively truncated sphere of ideas, beliefs, and theories. Indeed,
in Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony; in Herbert Marcuse’s cri-
tiques of technology, mass media, and consumption; and in Michel
Foucault’s analyses of power, we observe exactly this form of appar-
ently warranted extension.
If ideology critique deals with covert or internalized forms of power,
then ideology involves a kind of deception. We might thus stipu-
late that ideological forms of control do not announce themselves
as instruments of coercive power, and they only attain their effect
through a process of acceptance and internalization. For instance, if
the authorities shape public, penal, or industrial space in such a way as
to preclude the gathering and mingling of large groups of people, this
may well serve as a form of soft or nonviolent power. However, this
spatial organization would not count as a form of ideological control,
given that its efficacy does not depend upon any kind of deception.
Even if the populace, the prisoners, or the workers understand the true
aims of those that order the space they occupy, this recognition itself
does not automatically thwart those aims. By contrast, the oppres-
sive effects of ideological beliefs and desires depend largely upon their
innocuous appearance. They must hide their relation to oppression,
and they must thereby find access into the psyche of those they would
control. They thus generate a kind of “voluntary servitude,” where
people become the unwitting agents of their own oppression.
This emphasis upon deception introduces an epistemic dimension
into the functional critique of ideology, though this dimension remains
circumscribed. Here we might borrow Tommie Shelby’s helpful dis-
tinction between the characterizations of ideology as an “illusion”
and as a form of “false-consciousness.” According to Shelby, when we
call some belief an ideological illusion, we designate “some cognitive
defect” in its “discursive content.”10 As an illusion, the representational

10
Shelby, 2003, p. 165.
8 Introduction

content of an ideological belief distorts the true nature of the world. By

contrast, Shelby takes the term “false-consciousness” to describe the
relationship between the believer and the belief. False-consciousness
“has to do with the way in which the agents hold their belief, not
with the cognitive status of the discursive content of these beliefs.”11
Borrowing these distinctions, we might say that, as characterized here,
the functional critique of ideology uncovers the deception of false con-
sciousness, not the more basic cognitive deception or error involved
in illusions. The functional critique of ideology seeks to uncover con-
fusion about the source or effect of some belief. This circumscribed
epistemic focus does not directly consider the epistemic merits of the
belief or theory, but rather it considers confusions or distortions in the
believer’s beliefs about the belief. The basic belief itself thus remains
an entity to be explained in social terms, not a claim to be directly
engaged in epistemic discussion.

3. The Epistemic Critique of Ideology

We can identify at least three distinctive subvariations within the tradi-
tion of epistemic ideology critique. We might respectively refer to these
as the propaedeutical, the neo-Kantian, and the neo-Hegelian varia-
tions. On the first variation, the epistemic critique of ideology merely
provides a useful propaedeutic to epistemology proper. According to
this variation, the critique of ideology seeks to reveal the epistemic
errors that arise from social, political, or psychological interferences
in the cognitive process. It thus helps us to identify, understand, and
avoid some common errors, and it thereby clears the way for the
proper acquisition and justification of knowledge. In this sense, social
theory does not become an inherent dimension of epistemology itself,
but it does serve an important preparatory function, clearing away
possible sources of error. A classic statement of this variation can be
found in Jon Elster’s Sour Grapes, a book aptly subtitled, “Studies in
the Subversion of Rationality.” In accordance with this subtitle, Elster
defines ideology as “a set of beliefs or values that can be explained
through the position or (noncognitive) interest of some social group.”
Elster makes it plain that these “explanations” are not justifications.
On the contrary, these explanations reveal the absence of proper

11
Shelby, 2003, p. 170.
9

Introduction 9

justification. They reveal the ultimately noncognitive sources of certain

beliefs, “the ways in which mental processes can be undermined by ir-
relevant causal influence.”12
Obviously, the difference between this variation of epistemic ide-
ology critique and the functional critique of ideology is primarily a
matter of emphasis. Both conceptions study the noncognitive relations
between beliefs and the social world, though they do so with some-
what different intents, and these distinct interests guide their partially
divergent emphasis. Given its principle focus upon the epistemic status
of belief, Elster’s treatment of ideology focuses upon the social and
psychological causes of beliefs, not upon their functions or effects.
Even if revelations concerning the cause or source of a belief can
never establish the falsity of that belief, they can undermine our mis-
taken sense of justification. They can show that some beliefs rest upon
cognitively irrelevant grounds, upon some psychological interest or
dubious source of authority, not upon well-formed reasons or justified
epistemic trust. By contrast, a study of the social effects or functions
of a belief has an even more indirect relation to epistemic questions.
If a belief has dubious social effects, this may lead us to reconsider
our reasons for accepting it, but it does not automatically vitiate these
reasons. In contrast to Elster’s emphasis upon questions of origin, the
functional critique of ideology places a principle emphasis upon effect
or function, since it seeks to explain and eradicate various forms of so-
cial oppression. With regard to oppression, the effects and functions of
beliefs are more important than their causes, though these might still
be relevant and related in significant ways. Despite these moderate dif-
ferences, however, these two types of ideology critique are very similar,
and they might readily comingle.
The stronger variations of epistemic ideology critique, those respec-
tively indebted to the Kantian and Hegelian traditions, construe ide-
ology critique as a necessary and inherent dimension of epistemology
itself. Raymond Geuss aptly describes the assumption that guides these
variations of epistemic ideology in the “Introduction” to The Idea of a
Critical Theory. For the tradition advocated by Jürgen Habermas and
the Frankfurt School, Geuss rightly suggests that “the greatest signif-
icance of his [Marx’s] work lies in its implications for epistemology.”
This tradition insists that Marx’s critique of ideology “requires drastic

12
Elster, 1987, p. 141.
10 Introduction

revisions in traditional views about the nature of knowledge.”13 In

some very general sense, the strong versions of epistemic ideology cri-
tique approach at least certain types of cognition as inherently and
appropriately constituted by social interests and/or the social position
of the knower. These variations reject any rigid division between social
theory and epistemology, emphasizing the sociological dimensions of
epistemology and (sometimes) the normative-epistemic dimensions of
sociology. Like merely functional theories of ideology, they examine
the social origins and functions of belief. Unlike functional theories,
they claim these concerns have a direct and ineradicable bearing upon
epistemology.
In his discussion of Habermas and Critical Theory, Geuss highlights
the now familiar dimensions – i.e., the causal-genetic, the functional,
and the epistemic – that intermingle within the theory of ideology,
and he distinguishes Critical Theory for its attempt to synthesize these
dimensions, to conceive them in their inherent interrelations:

It is extremely important to determine which of these three modes of criti-

cism is basic to a theory of ideology – does the theory start with an epis-
temology, with a theory of the proper functioning of society and of which
forms of social organization are reprehensible, or with a theory of which
“origins” of forms of consciousness are acceptable and which unaccept-
able. Still, although one or another of these three modes of criticism may be
basic, interesting theories of ideology will be ones which assert some con-
nection between two or more of the three modes. One of the senses in which
the Critical Theory is said by its proponents to be “dialectical” (and hence
superior to its rivals) is just in that it explicitly connects questions about the
“inherent” truth or falsity of a form of consciousness with questions about
its history, origin, and function in society.14

Geuss highlights the central perplexity and potential source of con-

fusion that often mar the theory of ideology. Moreover, he helpfully
characterizes certain contributions to Critical Theory in terms of their
distinctive attempt to resolve this perplexity through a fundamental
synthesis of certain sociological and epistemic issues.
As noted by Eagleton, Marx’s occasional comments on ideology
intermingle a perplexing array of genetic, functional, and epistemic

13
Geuss, 1981, p. 1.
14
Geuss, 1981, pp. 21–22.
11

Introduction 11

considerations. This treatment forces some important questions:

why does Marx include these apparently disparate issues within the
purview of a single theory or form of critique? Which dimension is
basic? How do they fit together? According to the strong variations of
epistemic ideology critique, Marx treats the epistemic dimensions
or concerns as basic, but he reconceives these concerns in inherently
social terms, thereby integrating the genetic and functional dimensions
of thought within his theory of knowledge.
Of course, according to standard conceptions of knowledge and so-
cial reality, these three dimensions remain logically independent. The
oppressive effects or functions of a particular belief or theory do not
necessarily entail its cognitive distortion, and they do not necessarily
reveal anything about the formation or source of the belief. Similarly,
the origins of a belief do not necessarily entail any inherent cognitive
deficiency in the belief, though they may reveal a cognitive deficiency
in the believer. They may undermine our rational confidence in the be-
lief, but they cannot provide rational grounds that establish its falsity.
Likewise, the origins of a belief do not stand in any necessary relation
to the effects or functions of the belief: Just because some desire or
interest shapes the formation or acceptance of a belief, this does not
mean that the belief will tend to facilitate the satisfaction of this desire
or the attainment of this interest.15 Finally, the cognitive distortion of
a given belief or theory has no necessary implications regarding the
origins or functions of the belief.
While recognizing the logical distinction and frequent divergence
between these three levels of consideration, we need not follow
Eagleton and accuse Marx of equivocation. Instead, we might simply
claim that a theory or belief counts as ideological if and only if it is
functionally, genetically, and epistemically problematic. In “Ideology,
Racism, and Critical Social Theory,” Tommie Shelby elaborates and
defends this position as an analytical reconstruction or systematic
proposal. Before considering the systematic merits of this proposal,
we should note that it offers little hope in our quest to provide a con-
sistent interpretation of Marx’s textual pronouncements. Marx clearly
does not present certain functional, genetic, and cognitive character-
istics as equally necessary and only conjointly sufficient conditions
of ideology. In The German Ideology itself, Marx generally uses the

15
Elster, 1987, p. 164.
12 Introduction

term “ideology” to designate cognitively distorted but socially inert

forms of thought. While denying the social relevance and efficacy of
the systems developed by the Young Hegelians and the True Socialists,
Marx nonetheless describes these purportedly distorted or fantastical
constructions as “ideological.” The relationship between source and
function also proves complex. At times, Marx suggests that the class
interests that generate or foster an ideology will be those that are
served by the ideology, though he also considers many cases where
this relation breaks down. In The Class Struggles in France, 1848–
1850, Marx suggests that the republican ideology, itself the product
of bourgeois aspirations, actually prevented the bourgeoisie from rec-
ognizing the divergent interests of the working class. The bourgeoisie
truly believed in the universal and class-transcendent nature of their
political, economic, and legal aims, and they therefore failed to antici-
pate the fierce opposition they met from their presumed allies in the
working class.16 The republican ideology derived from the interests or
aims of one class, but it actually tended, at least in this case, to thwart
those aims, thereby indirectly serving the aims of a different class.
Marx’s analysis of religion displays a more forceful and persistent
case of disjunction between the class-interests that form an ideology
and the class-interests that an ideology serves. For Marx, religion is
not simply or even primarily a conspiracy of the priests and the ruling
class. Nor does the persistence of religion primarily depend upon the
support it receives from the ruling class, from those who have grasped
and promoted its – potentially – stabilizing or pacifying tendencies.
Most importantly, it seems, religion derives from the thwarted longings
of the oppressed themselves. Of course, Marx maintains that religion
is the opiate of the people. It does serve a stabilizing social function.
However, it generally emerges from the oppressed. It is the very “sigh
of the oppressed,” “the expression of true misery,” even “a protestation
against the real misery” of the world. More telling still, Marx describes
religion as the “fantastic realization of the human essence.”17 In other
words, religion emerges from the frustrated striving of the oppressed,
as their criticism of the world, and as their distorted or sublimated
attempt to envision redemption and fulfillment. Religion thus arises
from one class, but it often serves another.

16
Marx, 1981, vol. 7, p. 31.
17
Marx, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 378–379.
13

Introduction 13

Of course, these interpretative issues need not trouble Shelby. Perhaps

Marx’s pronouncements on ideology are simply confused, conflicted, or
equivocal. In any case, Shelby clearly presents his account of ideology
as a constructive proposal, not as a historical interpretation. Even in
these terms, however, I think Shelby’s proposal has two shortcomings.
The first is relatively minor, but it bears some mention. This reconstruc-
tion transforms the theory of ideology into a relatively unmotivated ag-
gregate of disparate concerns. As Geuss suggests, “interesting theories
of ideology will be ones which assert some connection between two or
more of the three modes.” Without some reason to think that these dif-
ferent types of distortion track some relatively unified complex in our
social world, it seems sensible to divide the theory of ideology into two
or three different branches of important but distinctive inquiry.
The second and potentially more serious problem leads to a cen-
tral argument that frames this study. In short, I believe that Shelby’s
balanced reconstruction of ideology critique cannot readily withstand
the devastating skeptical and anticognitivist implications that emerge
from its functional and genetic elements. Without the dramatic social
reconceptualization of epistemology, our increasing awareness of the
functional and genetic properties of thought must diminish the prac-
tical importance of traditional epistemological concerns, attenuating
or voiding its traditional norms, even rendering these norms highly
suspect. Through sustained emphasis upon the social genesis and func-
tion of belief, the functional critique of ideology has largely under-
mined our confidence in the epistemic standing of thought. Along with
other related trends, the practice and diffusion of functional ideology
critique has revealed the deeply interested and functionally oriented
nature of all but perhaps the most rarified domains of scientific and
mathematical thought. Similarly, the critical examination of belief for-
mation and dissemination has revealed the dominant and epistemi-
cally troubling role that social location and group identity play in the
formation of thought. If even our more paradigmatic cases of proper
epistemic practice reveal the pervasive influence of social interest and
group or class identity, then, at best, the norms and ideals of proper
epistemic practice come to seem unattainable and thus practically
irrelevant. Taking a more radical line, we might be tempted to see these
largely noninstantiated norms as hopelessly attenuated and vacuous,
as vague aspirations without anchor or example in the domain of
actual cognitive practice.
14 Introduction

Shelby clearly sees these dangers, and he rightly warns against

them. He insists that “any useful critical conception of ideology” must
reject “global relativism” and “subjectivism,” though he acknowledges
that this reliance upon more traditional epistemic notions must render
his position “suspicious” to those “with a more postmodern or post-
structuralist orientation.”18 In opposition to any merely functional-
ist critique of ideology, Shelby insists that ideology critique must also
consider the epistemic status of belief. He remains committed to the
primacy of rationality, even when rationality and political expedi-
ency diverge. He insists: “Even in those cases where a form of social
consciousness clearly serves to bring about or reinforce structures of
oppression, we cannot rationally reject the form of consciousness itself
if it’s not cognitively defective, that is, if it accurately represents real-
ity or provides a genuine justification.”19 Shelby returns to this point
frequently, acknowledging the need to demarcate his conception of
ideology critique from certain neighboring accounts of thought, those
that allow social struggle and the function of beliefs to efface all epis-
temic considerations:

For according to our account, we should reject a form of social conscious-

ness, not simply because it supports the interests of the dominant class, but
because it serves their interests by means of social illusion. Ideology-critique
should target those forms of consciousness that distort or misrepresent the
reality of social oppression. It should not mindlessly dismiss all ideas that
favor preserving elements of the prevailing social order.20

I share Shelby’s basic aim, his desire to temper the functional treatment
of beliefs with a healthy regard for more traditional epistemic consid-
erations. I also seek to defend the value and coherence of rational in-
quiry and discussion against any view that would treat our intellectual
life as nothing but the continuation of social struggle in a different
register. In contrast with Shelby, however, I think the functional and
genetic insights of ideology critique forcefully suggest the need for a
new approach to epistemology, one that acknowledges the constitutive
and legitimate role of social roots and functions in the formation of

18
Shelby, 2003, p. 168.
19
Shelby, 2003, p. 173.
20
Shelby, 2003, p. 181.
15

Introduction 15

most type of knowledge, without thereby undermining the difference

between knowledge and error.

4. The Neo-Kantian Variation of Epistemic

Ideology Critique
Construed as a new theory of knowledge, the epistemic critique of ide-
ology might be developed along either neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian
lines.21 The works of Jürgen Habermas present the most sophisticated
development of the neo-Kantian variation. In terms that recall but go
beyond the concerns raised by Shelby, Habermas also warns against
the creeping and corrosive tendencies of the merely functional form
of ideology critique. In Knowledge and Human Interest and The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, he warns against the dangers
of “an ideology critique turned against itself,” one that sees every-
where only “a binding of reason and domination, power and validity,”
one that thus ultimately “consumes the critical impulse.”22 If knowl-
edge claims and norms everywhere and always reveal their suspicious
origins and insidious functions, then the positive doctrines and libera-
tional demands that guide critique must ultimately fall victim to the
skepticism, cynicism, and mistrust that critique itself awakens.
Habermas identifies Nietzsche as the first thinker to grasp and
articulate the self-undermining tendencies of a merely functional ide-
ology critique, one that everywhere unveils the all-too-social origins

21
Standpoint feminism might be taken to represent a third strand of epistemic
ideology critique, one that develops Lukács in a different direction from the
one defended here. I largely agree with Fredric Jameson’s remark that, “the
most authentic descendency of Lukács’s thinking is to be found, not among
the Marxists, but within a certain feminism, where the unique conceptual
move of History and Class Consciousness has been appropriated for a whole
program, now renamed (after Lukács’s own usage) standpoint theory” (2004,
p. 144). In particular, standpoint theory rightly acknowledges the distinctive
epistemological suggestions raised by Lukács’s work. However, standpoint
feminism largely jettisons the neo-Hegelian social ontology that at least
potentially allows more traditional Marxist appropriations of Lukács’s project
to avoid the threat of relativism, the permanent fracturing of intellectual life
into divergent and nonadjudicable “knowledges.” For helpful discussions
of how standpoint feminism relates to Marxism in general and to Lukacs’s
conception of Marxism in particular, see Nancy Hartsock, 1983, chapter 10,
and Alison M. Jaggar, 1983, chapter 11.
22
Habermas, 1996a, pp. 120–121.
16 Introduction

and functions of “knowledge.” Gesturing toward the epistemic theory

of ideology, Habermas praises Nietzsche for recognizing the ubiqui-
tous interpenetration of interest and knowledge, but he simultaneously
criticizes him for retaining the traditional conception of cognition and
thus for treating the relationship between interest and knowledge in
strictly psychologistic or anticognitive terms. According to Habermas,
Nietzsche discerned “the connection of knowledge and interest, but
psychologized it, thus making it the basis of a metacritical dissolu-
tion of knowledge as such.”23 Indeed, if interests shape, condition, or
ground all knowledge claims, then we must either reject the cognitive
pretentions of belief, affecting the “dissolution of knowledge as such,”
or else we must radically reconceive knowledge in some way that
overcomes the once sharp distinction between knowledge and interest,
between the cognitive and the purportedly noncognitive dimensions
of belief.
In Knowledge and Human Interest, Habermas elaborates this new
contribution to epistemology in broadly neo-Kantian terms, suggest-
ing that three distinct types of interest structure all possible forms of
human cognition:

The specific viewpoints from which, with transcendental necessity, we

apprehend reality ground three categories of possible knowledge: informa-
tion that expands our power of technological control; interpretations that
make possible the orientation of action within common traditions; and anal-
yses that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers.
These viewpoints originate in the structure of a species that is linked in its
roots to definite means of social organization: work, language, and power.24

As social and largely postinstinctual creatures, we have unavoidable

interests in (a) the technical manipulation of nature, (b) the forms of
linguistic communication that guide cooperation and facilitate the
social transmission of learned techniques, and (c) the cultural regimen-
tation of antisocial urges. At some point, we began to differentiate our-
selves from other animals through our noninstinctual transformation
of the natural environment, through our reliance upon language, and
through forms of social formation and self-denial that make advanced

23
Habermas, 2002a, p. 290.
24
Habermas, 2002a, p. 313.
17

Introduction 17

cooperation and the deferral of satisfaction possible. We are now inex-

tricably social creatures who cannot avoid these basic practices and the
aims that inform them. Likewise, we cannot avoid the distinct types
of knowledge that emerge from these practices. In this way, Habermas
provides an account of certain knowledge-constitutive categories that
are necessary but naturalistically derived, that are socially interested
but normatively binding.
Despite this social and naturalistic turn, Habermas’s project remains
deeply Kantian in many respects. For instance, Habermas rejects all
ontological pretensions of human knowledge, arguing that the interest-
structured categories of human thought provide necessary conditions
for our cognition of the world, not for the world as it is in itself.25
This traditional Kantian assumption has enormous implications. If the
unity and inherent structure of the world does not underwrite the pos-
sibility of rational and cognitive consensus, then this possibility must
rest entirely upon the universality of the interests and categories that
structure human thought. If interests always structure cognition, and if
we do not share a range of generic interests that practically and episte-
mically override all particular interests, then the possibility of rational
consensus dissolves before a host of varied and differentially interested
“knowledges.”
Habermas rejects the pretensions of ontology and embraces
Kant’s “Copernican revolution.” I argue that he thereby jettisons the
resources necessary for mounting an adequate response to the cor-
rosive skepticism that attends the development of all strictly func-
tional forms of ideology critique. As we have seen, Habermas grants
the insight he attributes to Nietzsche: the social, psychological, and
historical study of thought reveals the ubiquitous interpenetration of
interest and knowledge. It shows how even our most cherished and
pristine paradigms of knowledge remain inextricably bound to their
practical origins and aims. More importantly still, this study manifests
the particular, contingent, parochial, and highly partisan nature of the
practices and interests that inform cognition. Faced with such rampant
particularity, Habermas’s neo-Kantian epistemology fairs little better
than traditional epistemology.
Even if the innermost content of our cherished models of cognition
reveals the pervasive influence of human interest, the defender of pure

25
Habermas, 2002a, p. 317.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 (Ähnliche an den Füssen). Diese auffallend geformten Haare beobachtete ich
1
zuerst an der Schnauze von Nyctinomus sarasinorum, aber ich fand sie dann
auch bei anderen Molossiden. Da sie bisher keineswegs die Berücksichtigung
gefunden haben, die sie ihrer Eigenartigkeit wegen zweifellos verdienen, so bat ich
Hrn. Dr. J. J a b l o n o w s k i , Assistenten am Museum, sie einer näheren
Untersuchung zu unterziehen, welcher Aufgabe er im Anhange zu dieser
Abhandlung („Die löffelförmigen Haare der Molossiden.“ Mit 2 Tafeln) in
dankenswertester Weise gerecht geworden ist. ↑
2 Ähnliche an den Füssen. Siehe Anhang. ↑
[Inhalt]
Insectivora
 Soricidae

[Inhalt]

22. Crocidura fuliginosa (Blyth)

Tomohon,
a–m. Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 1894.

Bekanntlich ist die Gattung Crocidura (wie die verwandten)

systematisch noch nicht durchgearbeitet, man kann daher ohne
grösseres Vergleichsmaterial eine sichere Bestimmung nur nach den
Beschreibungen nicht erzielen. So nennt A n d e r s o n (Cat. Mam.
Ind. Mus. I, 197 1881) die Farbe der Haare von C. fuliginosa „dark
slaty at the base, the root fuliginous brown with inconspicuous, dull,
long tips; under part scarcely, if at all, paler, with silvery reflections“
(Tenasserim); B l a n f o r d (Fauna Br. Ind. Mam. 1888–91, 242)
„deep rich reddish brown above, ashy brown to ashy grey below,
basal half of fur throughout slaty“ (Eastern Himalayas, Assam,
Tenasserim); H o s e (Mam. Borneo 1893, 36) „bluey slate above
and below“ (Kinabalu). Zudem sind in den letzten Jahren 10 neue
Crocidura-Arten aus dem Ostindischen Archipele beschrieben
worden (D o b s o n Ann. Mus. Gen. XXIV, 566, 1886, J e n t i n k
NLM. X, 161 1888 und Webers Zool. Erg. I, 123 1890, D o b s o n
AMNH. 6. s. VI, 494 1890, T h o m a s ib. 7. s. II, 247 1898).

J e n t i n k (Aardr. Weekbl. 2. Jg. Nr. 44 p. 291 1881 und NLM. X,

161 1888) führte Sorex myosurus Pall. — Pachyura murina (L.) —
von Celébes auf; sonst ist, meines Wissens, keine Spitzmaus bis
jetzt von dort registrirt, aber wohl in Museen vorhanden.
[Inhalt]
Carnivora
 Viverridae

[Inhalt]

23. Viverra tangalunga Gray

5 Felle
a–e. mit Schädeln in Spiritus, dazu 4 Skelette. IX 1895.
2 mar. und 2 fem. aus Wäldern bei Gowa, im Süden von
Makassar, Süd Celébes, wo sie in Schlingen gefangen,
und von wo 3 lebend nach Makassar gebracht wurden; 1
fem. von Makassar.

[Inhalt]

24. Paradoxurus hermaphroditus (Schreb.)

juv., Rurukan,
a. Minahassa, Nord Celébes, IV 95.

Das Dresdner Museum besitzt ein Exemplar vom Pik von Bonthain,
Süd Celébes. W e b e r (Zool. Erg. I, 109 1890) fand die Art (P.
musanga) auf Saleyer. Weder B l a n f o r d in seiner Monographie
(PZS. 1885, 797), noch L y d e k k e r (Allen’s Nat.’s Libr., Carnivora I,
235 [1895]), noch T r o u e s s a r t (Cat. Mam. 329 1897) erwähnen
Celébes als Fundort.
[Inhalt]

25. Paradoxurus musschenbroeki Schl.

7 Exemplare
a–g. (3 mar., 4 fem.) von der Minahassa, Nord
Celébes: Tomohon, IV 94, Rurukan und Masarangkette.
Mir lagen davon 5 Skelette, sowie 2 Häute dazu und 2
ganze Thiere in Spiritus vor, 3 trockene, zu den Skeletten
gehörige Bälge wurden jedoch auch conservirt.

Vgl. meine Bemerkungen Abh. Ber. 1896/7 Nr. 6 p. 10. Ausserhalb

der Minahassa ist die Art bis jetzt noch nicht gefunden worden. [21]
[Inhalt]
Rodentia
 Sciuridae

[Inhalt]

26. Sciurus leucomus Müll. Schl.

Bälge
a, b.mit Schädel, mares, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord
Celébes, III 94.
mas, c.
in Spiritus, Tomohon, III 94.
fem.,d.in Spiritus, Kattabuna an der Grenze der
Minahassa, I 94.
fem. e.
juv., Balg mit Schädel, aus der Minahassa, 1893.

Vgl. Abh. Ber. 1896/7 Nr. 6 p. 25, Taf. X Fig. 2 und 1898/9 Nr. 4 p. 2.

[Inhalt]

27. Sciurus leucomus occidentalis A. B. M.

Abh. Ber. Mus. Dresden 1898/9 Nr. 4 p. 2 (1898)

mas,a.
in Spiritus, zwischen Bolang Mongondo und
Kottabangon, Nord Celébes, c 250 m hoch, 3. XII 93.
mas,b.
in Spiritus, von der Nordseite der Matinangkette,
Nord Celébes, c 1000 m hoch, VIII 94.
[Inhalt]

28. Sciurus sarasinorum A. B. M.

Tafel V

Abh. Ber. Mus. Dresden 1898/9 Nr. 4 p. 1 1898

mas,a.
Balg mit Schädel, Ussu an der Nordostecke des
Bonigolfes, Central Celébes, 18. II 96.
mas,b.
Balg mit Schädel (aus Spiritus), Mapane am
Südufer des Tominigolfes, Central Celébes, II 95.

Figur 1 stellt das Exemplar von Ussu in natürlicher Grösse dar, Figur
2 das von Mapane in ½ natürlicher Grösse. Siehe l. c. über die
Differenzen der beiden.

[Inhalt]

29. Sciurus murinus Müll. Schl.

1839–44
M ü l l e r & S c h l e g e l Verh. Nat. Gesch. Zool. 87
Te1853m m i n c k Esq. Zool. 252
A 1878
n d e r s o n Zool. Res. Yunnan 256
J e1883
n t i n k NLM. V, 126 und 175
id.1887
Cat. MPB. IX, 190
id.1888
ibid. XII, 22
H 1889
i c k s o n Nat. N. Cel. 84
W1894
e b e r Zool. Erg. III, 474
T r1897
o u e s s a r t Cat. Mam. (II) 418.
 Balg a.
mit Schädel, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes,
III 94.
Balg b.
mit Schädel, mas, Tomohon, 20. V 94.
mas, c.in Spiritus, dgl. 8. IV 94.
fem.,d.in Spiritus, Bonethal c 200 m, Nord Celébes, 8. I 94.
fem.,e.in Spiritus, Pinogo im Bonethal, 240 m, 10. I 94.
mas, f.in Spiritus, Matinangkette, Südseite, c 1000 m, Nord
Celébes, IX 94.

Die Art ist nur von Nord Celébes bekannt, von der Nordspitze der
Minahassa (Main) an bis zur Matinangkette, westlich vom
Gorontaloschen, aber westlich und südlich von da wurde sie noch
nicht erbeutet, wenigstens ist Nichts darüber verlautbart. H i c k s o n
fand sie auf der Insel Talisse im Norden und das Dresdner Museum
erhielt sie von der Insel Lembeh, im Osten von der Minahassa (5
Exemplare), wo sie nicht abzuweichen scheint. E. & Ch. H o s e
erbeuteten sie im October 1895 3500 Fuss hoch auf dem Masarang
(Mus. Dresd.), und sonst ist sie aus der Minahassa registrirt von
Manado, Langowan, Amurang (Mus. Leiden), Rurukan und Main
(Mus. Dresd.); dazu noch der obige Fundort Tomohon. Jenseit der
Minahassa: [22]im Bonethal, östlich von Gorontalo, bei Gorontalo und
auf der Matinangkette, westlich vom Gorontaloschen. Bei der
Kleinheit des Thieres ist es wohl möglich, dass es sich auch noch
ausserhalb seines bis jetzt bekannten Verbreitungsgebietes anfindet.

Der inländisch-maleische Name in der Minahassa ist bunto kitjil.

Die Art ist noch nicht abgebildet worden.

[Inhalt]
30. Sciurus rubriventer Müll. Schl.

1839–44
M ü l l e r & S c h l e g e l Verh. Nat. Gesch. Zool. 86
J.1867
E. G r a y AMNH. (3) XX, 283
A 1878
n d e r s o n Zool. Res. Yunnan 216 (unter Sc. bicolor)
J e1883
n t i n k NLM. V, 128 und 175
ib.1887
Cat. MPB. IX, 190
id.1888
ibid. XII, 23
W1894
e b e r Zool. Erg. III, 474
T r1897
o u e s s a r t Cat. Mam. (III) 417.
6 Exemplare,
a–f. 2 in Spiritus, 2 Bälge mit Schädeln, 2
Skelette, alle von Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes,
IV–VII und IX 94.

Schon J e n t i n k (NLM. 1883, 128) zeigte, dass es ein Irrthum von

A n d e r s o n war, diese Art zu Sc. bicolor zu ziehen. Auch sie ist,
wie Sc. murinus, bis jetzt nur von Nord Celébes nachgewiesen, und
zwar von der Minahassa und aus dem Gorontaloschen. Die
bekannten Fundorte in der Minahassa sind: Manado (Mus. Leid.),
Lotta, Kakaskassan (Mus. Dresd.) und Tomohon (Sarasins); im
Gorontaloschen: Tulabello und Modelido (Mus. Leid.). Es ist dies
immerhin auffallend, da ein relativ so grosses und prachtvoll
gefärbtes Thier dem Jäger weniger leicht entgehen kann, als der
unscheinbare und kleine Sc. murinus, und man meinen sollte, ihm
stünden keine Hindernisse im Weg, um sich über die ganze Insel zu
verbreiten.

Der inländische Name in der Minahassa ist talu.

Abgebildet ist die Art noch nicht.

[Inhalt]
 Muridae

[Inhalt]

31. Mus rattus L.

mas,a. in Spiritus, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 2.

III 94.

Ein typisches Exemplar, wie das Dresdner Museum noch mehrere

von Nord Celébes besitzt. J e n t i n k (Webers Zool. Erg. I, 119 1890)
registrirt die Art auch von Makassar, Süd Celébes. M. rattus von
Celébes hat vielleicht einen etwas weniger behaarten Schwanz als
deutsche Exemplare.

Mus rattus var. celebensis Hoffmann (Abh. Ber. 1886/7 Nr. 3 p. 18)
stelle ich zu M. neglectus (s. den folgenden Artikel).

[Inhalt]

32. Mus neglectus Jent. (?)

Mus rattus var. celebensis B. Hoffm. Abh. Ber. Mus. Dresd.

1886/7 Nr. 3 p. 18, Taf., Fig. 4 (Schädel)
J e1880
n t i n k NLM. II, 14
id.1887
Cat. MPB. IX, 211
id.1888
ibid. XII, 65
T 1894
h o m a s AMNH. (6) XIV, 453
 id.1895
ibid. XVI, 163
id.1896
ibid. XVIII, 246 „(?)“; H a r t e r t NZ. III, 150
T r1897
o u e s s a r t Cat. Mam. (III) 478
T 1898
h o m a s TZS. XIV, 402 und 403.
Balg a.mit Schädel, fem., Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord
Celébes, 1. IV 95.
mares,
b, c. in Spiritus, Tomohon, III und 5. VII 94.

[23]

Die Art ist ursprünglich von Bórneo und Batjan von J e n t i n k

beschrieben worden, was schon auf eine weitere Verbreitung
deutete; darauf hat T h o m a s sie ebenfalls von Bórneo von
verschiedenen Fundorten, ferner von Mantanani, Balabac und Nord
Luzon aufgeführt, neuerlich auch von Celébes mit (?). Solche
Celébes-Exemplare, von T h o m a s bestimmt, liegen mir ebenfalls
vor, und darum ziehe ich dazu auch die S a r a s i n schen — mit
demselben Vorbehalte wie T h o m a s —, denn J e n t i n k s
Beschreibung ist nicht ausreichend, und es fehlen mir Bórneo- und
Batjan-Exemplare zum Vergleiche. Letzthin (TZS. XIV, 403) hat
T h o m a s sich dahin ausgesprochen, dass er auch die Bórneo-
Exemplare nur provisorisch zu neglectus stelle, nachdem er früher
(AMNH. XIV, 453) schon gesagt hatte, dass er die Exemplare aus
den Niederungen dazu rechne, ohne aber über die Verwandtschaft
mit solchen ausserhalb Bórneos eine Meinung äussern zu wollen. Es
handelt sich jedenfalls um eine weiter verbreitete Form, deren
genaue Kenntniss nach Localitäten noch aussteht. Das Dresdner
Museum besitzt auch Exemplare von der Insel Banka im Norden von
Celébes, ferner von Talaut und Timorlaut, die ich ebenfalls dazu
stelle.

Die Fundorte auf Celébes sind in der Minahassa: Main, Lotta,

Rurukan 3500 Fuss hoch, Berg Masarang 3000 Fuss hoch (Mus.
Dresd.), Tomohon (Sarasins); Gorontalo (Mus. Dresd.); im Süden:
Pik von Bonthain unter 5000 Fuss (Everett apud Hartert), Indrulaman
2300 Fuss hoch (Mus. Dresd.).

Als H o f f m a n n M. rattus var. celebensis aufstellte, lag ihm M.

neglectus nicht vor und J e n t i n k s Beschreibung allein genügte zur
Identificirung nicht.

Die Art ist noch nicht abgebildet.

[Inhalt]

33. Mus ephippium Jent.

J e1880
n t i n k NLM. II, 15
H 1887
o f f m a n n Abh. Ber. Dresd. 1886/7 Nr. 3 p. 17;
J e n t i n k Cat. MPB. IX, 211
id.1888
ibid. XII, 64
T 1889
h o m a s PZS. 235
H 1893
o s e Mam. Borneo 59
T 1894
h o m a s AMNH. (6) XIV, 453
id.1895
ibid. XVI, 163
id.1896
ibid. XVIII, 246
T r1897
o u e s s a r t Cat. Mam. 479.
fem.a–c.
mit 2 juv., in Spiritus, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord
Celébes, 2. V 94. Aus einem Neste, das aus Blättern und
Reisig gebaut war. Es waren 3 Junge darin.
fem.,d.in Spiritus, Tomohon, 94.
fem.,e.in Spiritus, Kottabangan, Bolang Mongondo, Nord
Celébes, XII 94.
 2 juv.,
f, g.in Spiritus, Posso See, Central Celébes, 13. II 95.
mas,
h–k. 2 juv., Loka, Pik von Bonthain, Süd Celébes, Ende
1895.
juv., inl. Spiritus, Pik von Bonthain, Ostseite 1350 m hoch,
X 95.

Eine von Sumátra, Bórneo, Palawan, Luzon und Celébes registrirte

Art. Eine Hochlandform, die vielleicht in M. concolor Blyth übergehe,
hat T h o m a s (TZS. XIV, 403) von Negros (6600 Fuss hoch) und
Nord Luzon (Monte Data, 8000 Fuss hoch) als M. ephippium
negrinus abgetrennt.

Als Fundorte in Celébes kennt man bis jetzt: Im Norden Lotta,

Rurukan (Mus. Dresd.), Tomohon und Kottabangan; im Centrum
Posso See; im Süden Pik von Bonthain (Sarasins).

Die Art ist noch nicht abgebildet.

[Inhalt]

34. Mus musschenbroeki Jent.

Tafel VI Fig. 1. Nat. Grösse 1

J e1879
n t i n k T. Ned. D. Ver. p. LV („2o“) und LVI („1o“); id.
NLM. I, 10
H 1887
o f f m a n n Abh. Ber. Dresd. 1886/7 Nr. 3 p. 8, 14, 23,
Taf. Fig. 3 a–f (Zähne); J e n t i n k Cat. MPB. IX, 212 [24]
J e1888
n t i n k Cat. MPB. XII, 66
T 1889
h o m a s PZS. 1889, 235
C.1893
H o s e Mam. Borneo 59
 W1894
e b e r Zool. Erg. III, 474
T 1896
h o m a s AMNH. (6) XVIII, 246
T r1897
o u e s s a r t Cat. Mam. 497 (Acomys)
Balg a.mit Schädel, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes,
IV 94.
6 Exemplare
b–g. in Spiritus, 1 mas, 5 fem. Tomohon II, III, VI
94.

Ausser von Nord Celébes von Bórneo aufgeführt (Kinabalu bis 3000
Fuss, Berg Dulit 2000 Fuss hoch, Penrisen Hügel). Mir sind bis jetzt
keine Exemplare von Bórneo zu Gesichte gekommen.

Als Fundorte in der Minahassa sind bis jetzt registrirt: Manado-

Langowan (Mus. Leid.), Amurang (Mus. Dresd.).

Einige Autoren schrieben den Artnamen musschenbroeki irrthümlich

mit ck.

[Inhalt]

35. Mus callitrichus Jent.

Tafel VII Fig. 1. Nat. Grösse 2

Mus callitrichus J e n t i n k 1879 T. Ned. D. Ver. IV p. LV („6o“)

und LVI („5o“ err., = meyeri); id. 1879 NLM. I, 12; T h o m a s
1896 AMNH. (6) XVIII, 246; T r o u e s s a r t 1897 Cat. Mam.
479.
Mus callithrichus (th laps. aut em. err.) J e n t i n k 1887 Cat.
MPB. IX 212; id. 1888 ib. XII, 65; id. 1890 Webers Zool. Erg. I,