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 m icha e l h u e me r

PARADOX LOST

Logical Solutions to Ten Puzzles of Philosophy

Paradox Lost
 Michael Huemer

Paradox Lost
Logical Solutions to Ten Puzzles
of Philosophy
Michael Huemer
Philosophy Department
University of Colorado Boulder
Boulder, CO, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-90489-4    ISBN 978-3-319-90490-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90490-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018942225

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
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are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
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For those to whom this book is dedicated
 Preface

I wrote this book because I like paradoxes … but even more than para-
doxes, I like solutions. If you like such things too, then you might enjoy
this book. I have offered my solutions to ten of what I found to be par-
ticularly fascinating and mind-boggling philosophical paradoxes. I hope
that when you read the paradoxes, you feel puzzled and challenged, and
that when you read the solutions, you feel a sense of things falling into
place. In some cases, I hope you also come away with philosophically
significant lessons.
I have written this book in such a way that, I hope, the generally edu-
cated reader can follow it. That is, although I assume you are generally
smart and educated, I do not assume that you have read any of the litera-
ture on the paradoxes, nor any other specialized literature. Thus, I explain
each paradox as if you don’t know what it is. When I want to address an
idea that other philosophers have advanced, I explain that idea. I have
made my explanations as clear and concise as I knew how to do, hoping
neither to confuse you nor to waste your time. Complications and quali-
fications, as well as references to the literature, appear in footnotes.
At the same time, I have tried to write something of interest to profes-
sional philosophers. In many cases, my take on a paradox is distinctive
and unorthodox. (If not for this, I would not have been motivated to
write the book.) This is true particularly for chapters 2, 3, 6, 8, and 10.

vii
viii Preface

Academic authors routinely overestimate their audiences – whatever

our topic, we tend to vastly overestimate both the number of people
interested in it, and the level of background knowledge people have about
it. I think we overestimate the knowledge and interest even of other aca-
demics. (This involves a certain failure of reflection – we know, or should
know, that our own knowledge of almost every other subject is minimal,
yet we fail to consider that almost everyone else has about the same level
of knowledge of our area of specialization.) Thus, there are many books
that can only be usefully read by a handful of people in the world. I wrote
this book in the way that I did because I wanted to make an intellectually
valuable contribution, without adding to the stock of nearly-unread aca-
demic volumes. That is why it is as complex as it is, and why it is not
more complex.
Now I would like to thank several other thinkers for discussion of
some of the ideas in this book, including Iskra Fileva, Randall
McCutcheon, Roy Sorensen, Eddy Chen, Christian Lee, Sam Director,
David Barnett, Ari Armstrong, an anonymous referee for Palgrave, and
the philosophers at the University of Vermont (to whom I presented
chapter 3). Without their help, this book would be worse than it is.
Naturally, none of these people can be blamed for any errors that remain.
In the preface to my last book, I laid the blame for any errors on my PhD
advisor, Peter Klein. I now realize that this was unfair and highly inap-
propriate. So I want to be clear that Peter is not to blame for the errors in
this book. Of course, the blame for any errors falls entirely on my research
assistant, Jasmine Carter, and my former student Matt Skene. I specifi-
cally instructed them to correct all errors in the manuscript. I thank them
for their comments, and I will graciously accept their apology for my
mistakes.
Fortunately, however, if the sentence you are now reading is true, then
there are no errors in this book.

Boulder, CO, USA Michael Huemer

 Contents

1 Introduction   1

Part I Semantic Paradoxes   15

2 The Liar  17
3 The Sorites  45

Part II Paradoxes of Rational Choice   89

4 The Self-Torturer  91
5 Newcomb’s Problem 107
6 The Surprise Quiz 133
7 The Two Envelopes 149

Part III Paradoxes of Probability 159

8 The Principle of Indifference 161
9 The Ravens 203
10 The Shooting Room 209
11 Self-Locating Beliefs 219
12 Concluding Remarks 245

Index 255

ix
 Analytical Contents

1 Introduction 1
1.1 What Is a Paradox? 1
Paradoxes are robust, widespread intellectual illusions
in which seemingly compelling reasoning generates an
absurd or contradictory conclusion.
1.2 What Is a Solution? 5
A solution should dispel the illusion, so that the
paradoxical reasoning no longer seems compelling.
1.3 How to Seek Solutions 7
We should not expect a common approach to apply
to all paradoxes – but self-evident principles such
as those of classical logic must always apply.
1.4 Why Paradoxes? 10
Paradoxes are charming, fun, and may reveal deep
confusions about important philosophical matters.
1.5 Paradoxes Not Covered 11
I address only philosophical paradoxes that do
not depend on controversial views and that I have
not previously addressed.

xi
xii Analytical Contents

2 The Liar 17
2.1 The Paradox 17
The liar sentence, “This sentence is false”, is apparently
both true and false.
2.2 A Third Truth-Value 18
Some say the liar sentence is “indeterminate”.
But what about the sentence, “This sentence is false or
indeterminate”?
2.3 True Contradictions 19
The view that there are true contradictions is confused.
2.4 Meaninglessness 22
Perhaps the liar sentence is meaningless for one
of the following reasons.
2.4.1 Self-Reference 23
Due to self-reference? But there are benign cases
of self-reference.
2.4.2 False Presupposition 24
Due to containing a false presupposition?
But we can easily remove the putative
presupposition.
2.4.3 Lack of Communicative Use 25
Because it cannot be sincerely asserted? But other
paradoxical sentences can be sincerely asserted.
Because it cannot be used to convey information?
But very similar sentences can be so used.
2.5 Putting the Blame on Truth 26
Some say that there is something wrong with the general
concept of truth. But this approach is self-undermining
and rules out too many innocent sentences.
2.6 A Solution 29
2.6.1 An Inconsistent Language 29
Our language contains inconsistent rules for
how to interpret certain sentences, which results
in sentences with no propositional content.
2.6.2 Meaning Deficiency 32
 Analytical Contents
   xiii

The liar sentence is not meaningless; it merely

has a defective meaning that fails to pick out a
proposition.
2.6.3 The Truth-Teller 33
“This sentence is true” also fails to express
a proposition.
2.6.4 “The Liar Sentence Is Not True” Is True 34
It is permissible for a sentence other than L
itself to say that L is not true.
2.6.5 This Sentence Is False or Meaning-Deficient 36
“This sentence is false or meaning-deficient”
also fails to express a proposition.
2.6.6 Liar Cycles 36
In cases where a group of sentences generate
a liar-like paradox, all the members of the group
fail to express propositions.
2.6.7 Prohibiting Liars 38
There is no need to devise new syntactic rules
for identifying liar-like sentences or ruling them
“ungrammatical”.
2.7 Curry’s Paradox 40
Given a sentence, “This sentence is false, or p”,
we can seemingly prove that p must be true. Again,
the sentence fails to express a proposition.
2.8 The Paradox of Non-Self-Applicability 41
The property of “not applying to oneself ” seemingly
must apply to itself if and only if it does not apply
to itself. Solution: there is no such property.
2.9 Russell’s Paradox 42
The set of all sets that don’t contain themselves must
contain itself if and only if it doesn’t contain itself.
Solution: there is no such set.
xiv Analytical Contents

3 The Sorites 45
3.1 The Paradox 45
Removing a single grain from a heap of sand does not
convert the heap to a non-heap. This principle entails
that if a million grains of sand make a heap, then
one grain of sand makes a heap.
3.2 Deviant Logic 47
Some respond with theories of indeterminacy or
degrees of truth. These views have trouble explaining
second-order vagueness. Degrees of truth introduce
more precision than is plausibly present. Also,
classical logic is self-evident.
3.3 Supervaluationism 52
Some say that a sentence is true provided that it would
be true on any acceptable way of making the vague
terms precise. This view has trouble with second-order
vagueness. It also violates classical logic, conflicts with
the T-schema, and implies that a statement of the
theorist’s own view is false.
3.4 Epistemicism 55
Some say vague terms have precise boundaries that
we merely fail to know. This is implausible since there
is nothing that could make a particular boundary the
correct one.
3.5 A Moderate Nihilist Solution 59
3.5.1 Fit Determines Content 59
Mental states can be satisfied to varying degrees
by different possible states of the world. The
idea of the “propositional content” of a mental
state is only a rough description of a mental
state’s meaning, as if the state were always fully
satisfied or fully unsatisfied.
3.5.2 When Thoughts Are Vague 63
Thoughts are vague when they have inter-
mediate degrees of satisfaction in some possible
situations. There are degrees of vagueness.
 Analytical Contents
   xv

3.5.3 Uncertainty About Vagueness 65

We can be introspectively uncertain whether a
thought is vague.
3.5.4 Vague Thoughts Make for Vague Language,
and Vice Versa 66
The vagueness of thought makes language vague,
and vice versa.
3.5.5 An Argument that Vague Statements
Do Not Express Propositions 69
Vague sentences and thoughts do not express
precise propositions, and there are no vague
propositions, so vague sentences and thoughts
don’t express propositions at all.
3.5.6 Arguments by Analogy 72
In other cases of semantic indecision, we accept
that sentences fail to express propositions.
3.5.7 Logic Is Classical 74
This view of vagueness preserves the law
of excluded middle and bivalence, properly
understood.
3.5.8 How to Almost Say Something 76
Vague sentences often come close to expressing
propositions.
3.5.9 Almost Is Good Enough 77
It is common and appropriate to use language
approximately.
3.5.10 Applying Logic to Vague Sentences 79
We can apply our logical faculties to sentences
even when they fail to express propositions.
3.5.11 Interpreting ‘Truth’: Strict Truth vs. Loose Truth 81
It is unsettled whether “is true”, as applied to
sentences, means “expresses a true proposi-
tion” or instead means “expresses a thought
that the world satisfies to a high degree”.
3.5.12 Why Is There Second-Order Vagueness? 84
First- and second-order vagueness both arise from
the same features of mental states described above.
xvi Analytical Contents

3.6 Conclusion 85
The sorites argument fails since none of its sentences
express propositions. The premises almost express truths
and the inference form is valid, but this does not
guarantee a true or nearly true conclusion.

4 The Self-Torturer 91
4.1 The Paradox 91
The self-torturer repeatedly increases his torture level
by undetectable increments, each time receiving a large
financial reward. Seemingly rational individual
choices lead to an intolerable end result.
4.2 Quinn’s Solution 93
Quinn holds that it is not always rational to choose
the best option available at the time, and that rational
choice is not always forward-looking.
4.3 An Orthodox Solution 95
4.3.1 In Defense of Undetectable Changes 95
The case actually shows that there can
be unnoticeable changes in subjective
experience.
4.3.2 Indeterminacy 97
It cannot be indeterminate how bad a pain is.
4.3.3 In Defense of an Optimal Setting 99
Since pain has constant marginal disutility,
while money has diminishing marginal utility,
there is an optimal point for the self-torturer
to stop.
4.3.4 Detectable and Undetectable Values 103
It is not so strange that an undetectable bad
can outweigh a detectable good. Undetectable
quantities can often be larger than detectable ones.
4.3.5 Advantages of This Solution 105
My solution to the problem preserves classical
logic and decision theory, without positing
anything particularly strange.
 Analytical Contents
   xvii

5 Newcomb’s Problem 107

5.1 The Paradox 107
You are asked to choose between taking box A and
taking both A and B, where B contains $1000, and A
contains either $1 million (if a reliable predictor
thought you would take only A) or $0 (if the predictor
thought you would take both). Dominance reasoning
supports taking both, but expected utility
maximization seemingly supports taking only A.
5.2 Objections to the Scenario 110
The scenario can be made more realistic without
eliminating the paradox.
5.3 The Right Expected Utility Principle 112
5.3.1 The Right Way to Make Good Things
More Likely 112
Rational agents seek to “make more likely”
the achievement of their goals in a causal
sense, not an evidential sense.
5.3.2 Two-boxing Maximizes Expected Utility:
Doing the Math 115
When we incorporate the above insight into
the notion of expected utility, Dominance and
Expected Utility principles agree.
5.3.3 Why This Is the Best Solution 119
The causal decision theorist’s solution preserves
central intuitions about rational choice.
5.4 The Case of Perfect Reliability 119
What if the predictor is 100% reliable? This requires
either backward causation (making one-boxing
rational) or determinism (ruling out free choice).
5.5 Rationality and Long-Run Benefit 122
One-boxers say that rationality must be tied to how
much one benefits in the long run. They then appeal
to one of the following claims.
xviii Analytical Contents

5.5.1 One-Boxers as a Group Do Better 122

But the wellbeing of the group one belongs
to is irrelevant in rational choice theory.
5.5.2 One-Boxers Tend to Do Better in any
Given Case 124
But this rests on a mistaken interpretation
of the probabilities used in rational
choice theory.
5.5.3 One-Boxers Do Better in Repeated Games 124
But this changes the scenario in a way
that may also change the causal decision
theorist’s answer.
5.5.4 Being a One-Boxer Is Predictably Advantageous 125
But this only shows that there are scenarios
that systematically reward irrationality.
This applies to any paradigmatic form
of irrationality.
5.6 Uncertainty About Decision Theory 128
In decision-making, it can be rational to give some
weight to each of two conflicting theories of
rational choice.

6 The Surprise Quiz 133

6.1 The Paradox 133
The teacher announces a surprise quiz next week. It
can seemingly be shown that there is no day on
which the quiz can occur.
6.2 Rejecting the Assumptions 134
The scenario uses idealized assumptions about the
students’ reasoning. But these assumptions can be
relaxed without detriment to the paradox.
6.3 What Is Surprise? 136
We may assume that there is a threshold level of
antecedent credence in an event that renders the
event non-surprising.
 Analytical Contents
   xix

6.4 Quiz Comes if and only if Surprising 138

In one version of the story, we assume that the professor
has no interest in giving a quiz unless it will be a surprise.
6.4.1 Self-Undermining Beliefs with a Vague
Surprise Threshold 139
If the quiz has not come by Thursday, the
students should adopt a credence that would
make a Friday quiz a borderline case
of a surprise.
6.4.2 Self-Undermining Beliefs with
a Precise Threshold 140
Or they should adopt a credence such that
they will merely not know whether the Friday
quiz would count as a surprise.
6.4.3 The Rest of the Week 142
Thursday and earlier quizzes will then
count as surprising.
6.5 Quiz Comes, with or without Surprise 143
In another version of the story, we assume the
professor will give a quiz whether or not it will surprise.
6.5.1 No Friday Surprise 144
In this version, a Friday quiz would
not surprise.
6.5.2 Borderline Thursday Surprise 144
A quiz on Thursday would be a borderline
case of a surprise, or it would be unknown
whether it counted as a surprise.
6.5.3 The Rest of the Week 145
A quiz on any earlier day would be a surprise.
6.6 Surprising as Not-Most-Expected 146
If a quiz counts as “surprising” only when it was not
antecedently considered most likely to occur on that
day, then a surprise quiz cannot be given.
xx Analytical Contents

7 The Two Envelopes 149

7.1 The Paradox 149
There are two indistinguishable envelopes containing
money, one with twice as much as the other. It can
be argued that each envelope has a higher
expected value than the other.
7.2 The Use of Probability in the Paradox 151
7.2.1 An Objection 151
Some think the paradoxical reasoning misuses
the concept of probability.
7.2.2 Three Interpretations of Probability 152
Probability can be interpreted epistemically,
subjectively, or physically.
7.2.3 Rational Choice Uses Epistemic Probabilities 153
Epistemic probability is the correct
interpretation for rational choice theory.
The paradox thus does not misuse the concept
of probability.
7.2.4 Probabilities in Causal Decision Theory 154
This does not conflict with our earlier
defense of causal decision theory.
7.3 The Use of Variables in the Paradox 155
The paradoxical reasoning confuses variables
with constants.
7.4 The Correct Analysis 156
A correct analysis would assign a coherent probability
distribution to each possible way of distributing money
across the two envelopes. This leads to both envelopes
having the same expected value.

8 The Principle of Indifference 161

8.1 The Principle of Indifference 161
The PI holds that, given no reason for preferring any
of a set of alternatives over any other, all are
equally probable.
 Analytical Contents
   xxi

8.2 The Paradoxes of the Principle of Indifference 162

There are cases in which the PI can seemingly be used
to justify incompatible probability assignments.
8.2.1 The Colored Book 162
Given that a book is red, green, or blue,
what is the probability that it is red?
8.2.2 France and England 163
Given that England is a proper part of
the U.K., what is the probability that England
is smaller than France? That the U.K. is
smaller than France?
8.2.3 The Car Ride 163
Given a 100-mile car trip with duration
between 1 and 2 hours, what is the probability
of a duration between 1 and 1.5 hours? What
about a velocity between 66.7 and 100 mph?
8.2.4 The Cube Factory 165
Given that a cube is between 0 and 2 inches on
a side, what is the probability of a side between
0 and 1 inch? What about a volume between
0 and 1 cubic inch?
8.2.5 The Circle and Chord 165
Given a circle with an equilateral triangle
inscribed inside, what is the probability of a
random chord being longer than a side of the
triangle?
8.3 Wherefore Indifference? 168
8.3.1 Theories Rejecting the PI 168
Empiricists say we can have no probabilities
prior to empirical evidence. Subjectivists say
any coherent initial probabilities
are permissible. These views reject the PI.
8.3.2 The PI Is Intuitive 169
The PI is extremely intuitive in many cases.
xxii Analytical Contents

8.3.3 The PI Is an Analytic Truth 170

The PI seems to follow from the meaning of
epistemic probability. Without a priori
probabilities, there are no epistemic
probabilities at all.
8.3.4 The PI Underlies the Least Controversial
Probability Assessments 172
Probability assessments based on randomization
or statistical evidence also depend on the PI.
8.4 Interpreting the Principle of Indifference:
The Explanatory Priority Proviso 174
The PI should be applied to the most explanatorily
basic set of possibilities.
8.5 Solutions 175
8.5.1 The Colored Book 175
A uniform probability density should be
assigned over the color solid.
8.5.2 France and England 177
Equal probabilities should be assigned to each
possible complete set of “larger than” relations
involving England, France, and the U.K.
8.5.3 The Car Ride 178
Velocity is privileged over time since velocity
causally determines duration, given
a fixed distance.
8.5.4 The Cube Factory 179
Quantity of material is privileged over width
or volume since quantity of material causally
determines size.
8.5.5 The Circle and the Chord 180
The PI should be applied by averaging over
all known methods of random selection
of a chord.
 Analytical Contents
   xxiii

8.6 A Philosophical Application: The Problem of Induction 183

8.6.1 The Traditional Problem 183
Skeptics say that there is no reason to believe
the course of nature is uniform, and hence no
justification for relying on induction.
8.6.2 A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem 184
Skepticism can be defended by applying the
PI to all possible sequences of observations.
8.6.3 A Solution 186
We should instead apply the PI to all possible
values of the objective chance of a given event.
8.6.4 The Mathematics of the Inductivist Solution 188
This can be used to derive Laplace’s Rule
of Succession.
8.7 Another Application: The Mystery of Entropy 189
8.7.1 Why Entropy Increases 189
There is a probabilistic argument for why,
starting from a low-entropy state, the
entropy of a physical system should spon-
taneously increase.
8.7.2 The Reverse Entropy Law 191
A time-reversed version of that argument
can be used to conclude that any given low-
entropy state was probably preceded by a
higher-entropy state.
8.7.3 Reverse Entropy Is Crazy 193
This has all sorts of ridiculous implications.
8.7.4 The Reverse Argument Misuses the Principle
of Indifference 196
The argument for Reverse Entropy seems
to ignore that the past is explanatorily prior
to the present.
8.7.5 The Isolated Box 199
The diagnosis of the preceding subsection may
prove too much. It is only plausible in a certain
range of cases.
xxiv Analytical Contents

9 The Ravens 203

9.1 A Paradox of Confirmation 203
It seems that, in general, the observation of an A that
is B supports “All A’s are B.” Therefore, observation
of a purple shoe supports “All non-black things are
non-ravens.” This is logically equivalent to
“All ravens are black.” So purple shoes provide
evidence that all ravens are black.
9.2 Solution 204
Whether an observation of a purple shoe supports
“All ravens are black” or not depends upon how the
observation was gathered – e.g., whether it was gathered
by selecting randomly from the class of non-ravens, or
selecting randomly from the class of non-black things.
10 The Shooting Room 209
10.1 The Paradox 209
The Shooting Room is set up such that
(i) it is guaranteed that at least 90% of people who
ever enter it are shot, but (ii) for any given person,
whether they are shot or not depends on the flip
of a fair coin. Q: Given that V is called into the
room, what is the probability that V is shot?
10.2 Solution 211
10.2.1 Solving the Finite Case 211
In any finite version of the shooting
room scenario, the correct probability
comes to 50%.
10.2.2 The Impossibility of the Infinite Case 217
The paradox depends on metaphysically
impossible assumptions about an infinite
population of potential victims, and
infinite speed or elapsed time.
11 Self-Locating Beliefs 219
11.1 The Sleeping Beauty Paradox 219
Beauty is put to sleep and woken up either once or
twice, depending on the flip of a coin; after each
 Analytical Contents
   xxv

waking, she will fall asleep and forget having woken.

Upon waking, what should be her credence that the
coin came up heads? Some say 1/2; others say 1/3.
11.2 The Fine Tuning Argument 221
The apparent fine tuning of the universe’s physical
parameters, which is required for life to exist,
might be evidence that there are many universes.
11.3 The Doomsday Argument 224
The number of people who have existed before you
might constitute evidence that not many more
will exist after you.
11.4 The Multiverse: Pro and Con 227
11.4.1 The “This Universe” Objection 227
Some object that the fine tuning evidence
does not support multiple universes, because
the existence of other universes would not
explain anything about this universe.
11.4.2 In Defense of the Multiverse 229
The “this universe” objection seems parallel
to some incorrect objections in other cases.
11.4.3 Four Cases Resolved 231
Evidence supports a theory (for you) when
your having that qualitative evidence would
be more likely if the theory were true than
if it were false. This view gives the right
verdicts in four cases of interest.
11.4.4 Personal Identity and the Multiverse Theory 234
Conclusion: the fine tuning evidence supports
multiple universes, if and only if it would be
possible for you to exist in another universe.
11.5 Against Doomsday 236
The Doomsday Argument fails since, given the
impossibility of backward causation, no hypothesis
about humanity’s future affects the probability
of your now having the evidence that you have.
xxvi Analytical Contents

11.6 Sleeping Beauty: For a Third 239

Upon waking, Beauty should update on the evidence,
“I am awake now”. This results in a credence of 1/3
that the coin came up heads.

12 Concluding Remarks 245

12.1 Seven Varieties of Error 245
The preceding paradoxes exhibit several kinds
of problem that also beset human thinking in more
ordinary cases. These include: hidden assumptions,
neglect of the small, confusion, binary thinking,
oversimplification, inappropriate idealization,
and inference from partial data.
12.2 Against Radical Revision 251
We should not give up extremely obvious principles,
such as those of classical logic, to avoid paradox.
We should prefer to qualify principles rather than
rejecting them outright. Our mistakes are likely to
be subtle, not blatant.
12.3 Reality Is Intelligible, with Difficulty 252
The world is not inconsistent or incomprehensible.
Human reason is highly fallible but correctable
with effort.
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Zeno’s paradox 2

Fig. 2.1 Classical concept of negation 20
Fig. 2.2 A non-classical conception of negation 21
Fig. 3.1 Satisfaction profile of a desire 61
Fig. 3.2 Simplified desire profile 62
Fig. 3.3 Profile of belief that H is a heap 63
Fig. 3.4 Degrees of vagueness 77
Fig. 3.5 A vague belief 85
Fig. 4.1 Optimal stopping point for the self-torturer 101
Fig. 4.2 A case with constant disvalue of pain and no optimal
stopping point 101
Fig. 4.3 A case with diminishing disvalue of pain and no optimal
stopping point 102
Fig. 6.1 Optimal credence with a vague surprise threshold 140
Fig. 6.2 Credences with a precise surprise threshold 141
Fig. 8.1 Mapping between time and velocity 164
Fig. 8.2 Bertrand’s Paradox: (a) solution 1, (b) solution 2, (c) solution 3 166
Fig. 8.3 Two-Way Entropy Law 193
Fig. 8.4 Migrant from Indonesia to the Netherlands 199
Fig. 9.1 Ways of collecting an observation of a non-black non-raven 205
Fig. 11.1 Sleeping Beauty problem 220
Fig. 11.2 The multiverse 223

xxvii
 1
Introduction

1.1 What Is a Paradox?

First, some words about what a paradox isn’t. Some people understand the
word “paradox” to refer to a case in which reality is contradictory, that is,
a situation that you would correctly describe by contradicting yourself. I
do not use the word this way, because I find it inconvenient. If we use
“paradox” to denote a situation containing a true contradiction, then we
will have to say that, by definition, there are no paradoxes, since contradic-
tions are necessarily false – thus apparently depriving this book of its sub-
ject matter. I should then have to say that this is a book about “apparent
paradoxes”, that the next chapter is about “the Liar Pseudo-paradox”, and
so on. This would be tedious. So I won’t understand “paradox” that way.
Some people use “paradox” simply to refer to a contradictory state-
ment, or apparently contradictory statement, such as “Nobody goes to
that restaurant anymore because it is too crowded.” That also is not what
I mean by “paradox”. Such statements are either false, or simply have an
alternate meaning that is different from the most superficial interpreta-
tion (as in the statement, “I am nobody”, which really just means “I am
unimportant”). In either case, there is no real puzzle.

© The Author(s) 2018 1

M. Huemer, Paradox Lost, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90490-0_1
2 M. Huemer

Fig. 1.1 Zeno’s paradox

I understand a paradox, roughly, as a situation in which we have seem-

ingly compelling reasoning for a contradictory or otherwise absurd con-
clusion.1 We feel that we cannot accept the conclusion, but nor can we
readily identify a flaw in the reasoning. For example, consider Zeno’s
famous paradox of motion (figure 1.1):

In order for an object to move from point A to point B, the object must
first travel half the distance. Then it will have to travel half the remaining
distance. Then half the remaining distance again. And so on. This is an
infinite series. An infinite series has no end; hence, it is impossible to com-
plete an infinite series. Therefore, it is impossible for the object to reach
point B. Thus, no object can move anywhere.

The conclusion is absurd, so the reasoning must be wrong. Nevertheless,

the reasoning has a certain obvious, intuitive force, and it is difficult to
say exactly what is wrong with it.
To count as “paradoxical”, the reasoning for the absurd conclusion
must have widespread appeal – that is, the reasoning must be of a sort
that would seem compelling to typical human reasoners; an idiosyncratic
error that I personally can’t seem to shake does not qualify. Thus, if I
make a calculation error in multiplying a string of numbers, which results
in my deriving a logically impossible conclusion, this will not count as a
paradox – not even if I personally cannot find the error after many tries.
To count as “paradoxical”, a piece of erroneous reasoning must also have
a certain sort of robustness: paradoxes bear extended contemplation and
discussion. Paradoxes can have solutions and attempted solutions, but the
correctness of a given solution will be a matter of debate, at least for some

1
Similarly, Sainsbury (2009, p. 1) defines a paradox as “an apparently unacceptable conclusion
derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises”. But see below in
the text for further conditions on paradoxicality.
 Introduction 3

time, even among the experts. A paradox is not merely a problem whose
solution, though known to experts, is unknown to most non-experts.
Thus, for example, I do not consider the Monty Hall Problem to be a
paradox. The Monty Hall Problem goes like this:

You are a contestant on the game show Let’s Make a Deal, with host Monty
Hall. You know how the game works: at a certain point in the game, Monty
shows the contestant three closed doors. One of the doors has a nice prize
behind it (say, a new car); the other two have goats behind them (assume
that no one wants a goat). The contestant is allowed to choose one of the
doors, and will be allowed to have whatever is behind it. After the contes-
tant chooses, but before he reveals what is behind the chosen door, Monty
opens one of the other two doors and shows the contestant a goat.2 He
never opens the door with the car behind it; he always shows the contestant
a goat.3 Monty then asks if the contestant would like to change their choice,
that is, to switch to the other closed door. Thus, suppose you initially

2
This is not exactly how the real game worked, but pretend the game works this way for purposes
of the problem. In the real game, Monty was not required to show the contestant a goat or offer the
chance to switch, and usually he did not do so (Tierney 1991).
3
The stipulation that Monty always opens a door with a goat behind it is sometimes erroneously
omitted from the statement of the problem, as in vos Savant (1990–91) (vos Savant makes the
assumption in her solution, but the original problem statement did not contain it). Without this
stipulation, the correct probability is ½. That is, suppose we assume that Monty, rather than delib-
erately avoiding the door with the prize, simply chooses randomly which door to open, from the
two doors that the contestant didn’t pick. Let h1 = [The car is behind door 1], h2 = [The car is
behind door 2], h3 = [The car is behind door 3], and e = [Monty opens door 3 and there is a goat
behind it]. After you have chosen door 1 but before Monty opens door 3, you should have the fol-
lowing credences: P(h1) = P(h2) = P(h3) = ⅓; P(e|h1) = ½; P(e|h2) = ½; P(e|h3) = 0. Then the prob-
ability of door 1 having the prize behind it, given that Monty opens door 3 and reveals a goat, is
given by Bayes’ Theorem as follows:

P ( h1 ) P ( e|h1 )
P ( h1|e ) =
P ( h1 ) P ( e|h1 ) + P ( h2 ) P ( e|h2 ) + P ( h3 ) P ( e|h3 )

=
(1 / 3)(1 / 2 ) 1
= .
(1 / 3)(1 / 2 ) + (1 / 3)(1 / 2 ) + (1 / 3)(0 ) 2

The key is that in this version of the problem, P(e|h2) = ½. In the standard version (where Monty
always avoids opening the door with the prize), P(e|h2) = 1. Substituting 1 for P(e|h2) in the above
equation changes the final answer to ⅓, the standard answer.
4 M. Huemer

choose door #1. Monty then opens, say, door #3 and shows you a goat
behind it. He then asks if you would like to change your choice from door
#1 to door #2. Should you switch?

Most people have a strong intuition that it doesn’t matter whether you
switch to door #2 or stick with door #1; that’s because most people think
that the prize is now 50% likely to be behind door #1 and 50% likely to
be behind door #2. The correct answer, however, is that you should defi-
nitely switch to door #2: door #1 has a 1/3 probability of having the real
prize behind it, and door #2 now (after you saw the goat behind door #3)
has a 2/3 probability of having the real prize.
It can be difficult to convince people of this. In fact, almost everyone,
on first hearing the problem, gives the wrong answer, and persists in that
answer until bludgeoned for a while with probability calculations or
experiments.4 In this case, there are compelling arguments (discussed
below and in fn. 3) for a highly counter-intuitive answer. Nevertheless, I
do not consider this a paradox. One reason is that this problem is not
robust enough to bear debate among experts. The Monty Hall Problem
has a well-known, objectively correct solution that can be shown to be so
in a fairly brief span of time; it does not, for example, bear years of
reflection.
Why does the prize have a 2/3 probability of being behind door B?
This is beside my present point (which, remember, was just to define
“paradox”); however, in case you can’t sleep until you know, an explana-
tion follows. (You can also do a calculation employing Bayes’ Theorem,
but the following is probably going to be more satisfying.)
Suppose Monty runs the game 300 times. Each time, the location of
the good prize is randomly selected from among the three doors. We
would expect that in about 100 of these games, the contestant’s initial
guess is correct, that is, the first door they pick has the prize behind it.
The other 200 times, the initial guess is wrong. Therefore, if the contes-
tants always stick with their initial guess, then 100 of the 300 will win the
real prize, and 200 will receive goats. (The 200 who initially selected a
goat door can’t possibly improve their result by sticking with that choice!)

4
See the responses to Marilyn vos Savant’s famous column on the problem (vos Savant 1990–91).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
184.

Il bel verde, sottil marmo caristo,

L’agata, il tasio e la gentil corniola,
Non han qui luogo, e di restarne escluso
Lagnasi ancora il serpentin più raro:
Sol qui fan pompa e il porporin granito
Porfido di Numidia e il marmo frigio
Cui d’Ati il sangue colorì la vena;
E i più preziosi di Sidonia e Tiro.
Per ornamento delle porte, appena
S’ammette il verde di Laconia unito
Al sinadico marmo in lunghe strisce,
Onde si forma un color misto e vago.
De’ chiari vetri al vario raggio opposte
Splendon le stanze e gli archi d’or fregiati,
E di chi parte od entra in essi i volti
Stupido il foco stesso in tante avvolto
Lucide spoglie men superbo impera;
Il sole allor che l’ampia casa investe
Sè stesso adorna e fa più chiaro il giorno,
E nel passar fra queste fiamme ardenti
Acquista forza, e ’l proprio foco accresce.
Nulla v’è di plebeo, nè qui si vide
Faticar l’arte in liquefar metalli.
Son d’argento i canali, ove felice
Ha l’onda il corso e son d’argento i vasi
Ov’ella cade, e di sè stessa amante
Si specchia in essi e di partir ricusa.
Trad. dell’ab. Fr. Maria Biacca.

185.

Chi di Neron peggiore?

E quale di sue terme opra migliore?
Trad. Magenta.

186.

Di Tigellin nei bagni, o in quei si pone

D’Agrippa o Tito?

187. Roma. Amstelodami apud Io. Wolters 1689, p. 491.

188. Diz. delle antich. Greche e Rom. Vol. 2 p. 342.

189. «Che mai convenga provvedere nelle pubbliche terme e ne’ ninfei per
l’abbondanza de’ cittadini.» — Impp. Theodos. et Valent. Cod. II. 42. 5 e
al n. 6: «Amiam meglio che l’acquedotto del nostro palazzo abbia a
servire alle commodità delle pubbliche terme e de’ ninfei.»

190. «Se diligentemente alcuno avesse a tener conto delle copiose acque
pubbliche nei bagni, nelle piscine, nelle case, negli sbocchi, nelle ville
suburbane, e la grandezza degli archi costruiti per condurre, i monti
scavati, le convalli appianate, confessar dovrebbe nulla esservi di più
maraviglioso nell’universo.»

191. «Agrippa, nella sua edilità, annessa l’Acqua Vergine, le altre regolate ed
emendate, fece 700 laghi (grandi serbatoj), oltre 105 salti, 130 castelli e
molte altre cose magnifiche di manutenzione. Alle opere impose 300
statue tra di bronzo e di marmo e 400 colonne marmoree e tutte queste
cose nel solo spazio di un anno.»

192. «E il soprintendente delle acque debbe pertanto essere non solo diretto
dalla scienza del periti, ma eziandio dalla propria esperienza, e non
deve servirsi dei soliti architetti che s’impiegano in quella tal parte, ma
ancora consultare non meno la fedeltà che l’acutezza dell’ingegno di
altri per conoscere quali cose domandino un pronto riparo, quali
ammettano dilazione; quali opere debbansi compire dagli appaltatori,
quali si abbiano a far eseguire dagli artefici delle famiglie.»
Frontin. De Aquæduct. CXIX. Tr. di Baldassare Orsini.

193. Pompejanarum Antiquitatem Historia Curante, J. Fiorelli edita. Neapoli

1860. I. 8.

194. «Nelle Terme di Marco Frugio, da bagni di acqua marina e di acqua

dolce, Gennaro Liberto.»

195. «Per la dedicazione delle terme, a spesa di Cneo Allejo Nigidio Majo, vi
saranno caccia, atleti, spargimento di profumi e velario. Viva Majo
principe della Colonia!»

196.

Per finirla, tu re, mentre ne andrai

Al bagno d’un quattrin. [197]
Trad. Gargallo.
197. Quadrante più propriamente, ed era una piccola moneta di rame pari in
valore di un asse.

198.

Dopo i torridi bagni vi tuffate

Nell’onda algente, onde così col gelo
La calda cute più in vigor rendiate
Carm. IX.

Petronio afferma la stessa cosa.

199. «Marco Nigidio Vaccula con denaro proprio.»

200. «Gneo Melisseo Apro; figlio di Gneo, e Marco Stajo Rufo, figlio di Marco,
Duumviri incaricati di nuovo della giustizia, hanno per decreto de’
decurioni e con pecunia publica fatto fare questo bacino che costa
settecentocinquanta sesterzi.» [201]

201. Circa 160 lire Italiane.

202. Era una stanza ove apprendevano i giovani i primi rudimenti degli
esercizi ginnastici.

203. Forse luogo dove giuocavasi alla palla. Alcuni lo vorrebbero destinato
agli esercizi ginnastici per le fanciulle.

204. Ho già spiegato altrove il valore di questa parola: indicava cioè il luogo
ove stava la polvere di cui servivansi i lottatori onde detergere il sudore
e involgere l’avversario per poterlo meglio abbrancare.

205. Era la stanza delle unzioni. Vi si conservavano a tal uopo olj ed

unguenti, sia per ungersi prima della lotta e rendere così le membra
sfuggevoli; sia dopo la lotta a ristoro delle membra scalfitte, sia come
cura prima di entrare nel bagno. Il P. Ilario Casarotti, dotto e purgato
scrittore e mio maestro nel milanese Collegio Calchi-Taeggi, solevami
dire essere da questa antica consuetudine originata l’unzione della
cresima cristiana, quasi a simbolo della lotta coll’avversario eterno.

206. Forse sinonimo di hypocausis, più latinamente præfurnium, luogo della

fornace per riscaldare le stanze e i bagni.

207. Ricordo che lo stadio denota una lunghezza di 125 passi; ma vale altresì
come luogo atto agli esercizi atletici e per gli spettatori dei medesimi.
208. Non isfuggirà al lettore che Vitruvio usa della parola sisto per esprimere
l’opposto del suo valore primitivo greco. Infatti i latini chiamarono sisto
un luogo scoperto mentre per i greci significava un luogo coperto.

209. De Architect. L. V. c. XI. Trad. Galiani.

210. «Cajo Vulio figlio di Cajo, Publio Aninio figlio di Cajo, duumviri, incaricati
della giustizia, han fatto eseguire un laconico e un districtario e rifare i
portici e la palestra col denaro che, per decreto dei decurioni, dovevano
spendere in giuochi od in monumento, e i decurioni hanno approvato.»
Pompejan. Antiqu. Hist. V. 648. È testuale l’error grammaticale
nell’iscrizione pequnia quod invece di pecunia quam; ma non è il primo,
nè forse sarà l’ultimo che avrò a notare.

211. «Mi pare ora, ancorchè non sieno di moda italiana, dovere spiegare la
forma della palestra, e dimostrare come la costruiscano i Greci.» De
Arch. c. XI.

212. «Mario Atinio figlio di Mario, questore, fece fare per decreto
dell’Assemblea col denaro prodotto dalle multe.»

213. «All’imperatore Cesare Augusto, figlio del divo Cesare, comandante per
la tredicesima, tribuno per la decimaquinta, padre della patria, console
per l’undicesima volta.» [214]

214. Il XV tribunato e l’XI consolato d’Augusto corrispondono all’anno di

Roma 755 e 2 dell’Era Volgare.

215.

. . . : Va recami, garzone,
Le stregghie al bagno di Crispin.
Sat. V. v. 126. Trad. di Vinc. Monti.

216.

Il Sarno ondoso i pingui colti irriga

E col placido corso al mar sospira.
Jacobi Sannazzarii Poemata. Patavii 1751.
Trajano Cabanilio Salices.

217. «Verna co’ suoi discepoli vi prega di eleggere Cajo Capella duumviro di
giustizia.»

218. Pompejan. Antiqu. Hist. Vol. III, 169.

219. «Valentino e i suoi scolari invocano Sabino e Rufo edili degni della
Republica.»

220. Epist. Lib. II, I. 70.

221.

E ancor noi finalmente abbiam sottratto

La mano alle spalmate.

222. Lib. VII. c. 3.

223. Del Commercio dei Romani, Cap. III.

224. Hist. Nat. Lib. VI. c. 60.

225. Vedi Cicero, De Oratore, 37.

226. Cic. Pro Flacco. 15. Dionis. Alicarnas. VII. 70.

227. Plin. Nat. Hist. XIII. 13. «Abbruciati, perchè fossero scritti di filosofia.»

228. Epist. II. 1.

229.

Questi Greci, ravvolti in lor mantello,

Colla testa coperta, intorno vanno:
Son carichi di libri e ne’ panieri
Hanno i rilievi della mensa: or questi
Disertor’ ch’hanno l’aria di trattare
Fra lor di cose gravi, ora s’arrestano,
Ora vanno, sputando lor sentenze;
Ma poi li trovi sempre al termopolio [230]
Che trincan e così, coperto il capo,
Bevono caldo quel ch’hanno rubato,
Poi tristi e brilli incedono.
Curculio. Atto II. Sc. 3. Mia trad.

230. Venditorio di bevande calde, come vedremo nel capitolo venturo delle
Tabernæ.

231. «Essere i nostri uomini simili agli schiavi siri, che quanto son più periti
del greco, tanto sono più nequitosi.»
232.

Chi loda il carme salïar di Numa

E dotto ei solo in quel, che meco ignora,
Vuolsi ostentar, non favorisce, e applaude
Gli estinti ingegni; ma nostr’opre impugna,
Le cose nostre, e noi livido adonta.
Che se stata odïosa a’ Greci fosse
Novità, quanto a noi, che avrian di antico?
Degli uomini a ciascuno il public’uso
Or che darebbe a logorar, leggendo?
Epist. lib. II. Epist. I.

233. Divina Comm. Inf. c. IV.

234. In Bruto.

235.

Voi su greci esemplar’ la man stancate

La notte, voi le man stancate il giorno.
De Arte Poetica. Tr. id.

236. Lib. 11.

237. Satira I.

238. Epigr. Lib. 2.

239. Lib. 3, epist. 5.

240. Lib. 1, cap. 9.

241.

Medico fosti, gladiator se’ omai;

E medico facevi
Appunto quel che gladiatore or fai.
Epigr. VIII. Lib. 74. — Tr. Magenta.

242. Primum e medicis venisse Romam Peloponneso Archagatum Lysaniæ

filium anno urbis DXXXV... Vulnerarium eum fuisse e re dictum, etc. Hist.
Nat. lib. XX. c. 6.
 Tum primum artis medicæ nomen auditum Romæ agnitumque est. Tit.
Liv. Lib. XXV. 2.

243. «Giurarono fra loro i Barbari (chiamavano i Romani barbari i forestieri) di

uccider tutti colla medicina. E questo fanno, ripetendo per sopraggiunta
la mercede, onde acquistar maggior credenza e più agevolmente
sperdere. Vanno inoltre dicendo noi barbari e più sporcamente con
siffatta appellazione noi insozzano che non gli altri Opici. In quanto a
me, mi sono interdetto i medici.» Hist. Nat. XXIX. 1.

244. I libri superstiti sono dal VI al XIV e sono una compilazione per via
d’estratti, di cui avanza tuttavia una parte sulla medicina e la chirurgia;
abbracciava molte scienze, come la giurisprudenza, la filosofia, la
rettorica, l’economia, l’arte militare. Sono scritti con purità di stile e sono
di gran pregio segnatamente le istruzioni dietetiche e la parte che ha
riferimento alla chirurgia.

245.

E ormai da un pezzo
Tua vota zucca le ventose invoca.
Sat. XIV. v. 58, trad. Gargallo.

246. Celsus, lib. 11.

247. Storia degli Italiani, I. 1, c. XLI.

248. «Udite per tanto, ma non ascoltate come fareste d’un farmacista.
Imperocchè le parole di costui si odono, ma nessuno che malato sia gli
si commette in cura.» Gell. Notti Att. 1. 15.

249. Vedi tutta l’ultima Ode degli Epodi di Orazio, che è appunto rivolta a
Canidia.

250. Pompei, pag. 350.

251. «I nostri maggiori così lodavano l’uomo dabbene, chiamandolo buon

agricoltore, buon colono, e stimavasi essere amplissimamente lodato
colui che così chiamavasi.»

252. Lib. III. 22:

Terra più ch’alla offesa, all’armi adatta.

253. «Razza d’uomini agreste, senza legge e comando, libero e
indipendente.»

254. «Ire incontro ai nemici, e coprire dagli avversi attacchi la libertà, la

patria, ed i parenti.» Catilin. 6.

255. Epoca Prima. Capitolo I.

256. «Il valor militare va innanzi a tutte l’altre virtù: esso procacciò eterna
gloria al popolo romano ed a codesta città.» Or. pro Murena.

257. «Rimase chiusa in casa e filò la lana.»

258. Lib. III. c. 22. 23. 24.

259. Zonara. Lib. VIII. c. 6.

260. Or. Pro Lege Manilia.

261. Freret le assegna 13,549 piedi geometrici di circonferenza, che sarebbe

maggiore di quella dell’odierna Parigi. Jacob vuole che avesse solo
1,200,000 abitanti; ma altri eruditi pretesero ampiezza e popolazione
maggiori e com’io scrissi.

262.

Mandaci o Nil, le messi tue copiose,

Da noi ricevi le fragranti rose.

263.

Degli Etiopi le selve, ove la lana

Morbida cresce.

264. «In tutta guisa estorcono denaro e molestano; ma per quanta libidine
spieghino, non giungono ad esaurire mai la ricchezza loro.» De Bello
Catilin.

265. «Pessima cosa è il coltivarsi i campi da gente d’ergastolo, perchè tutto vi

si fa da uomini che non hanno speranza alcuna.» Hist. Natur. Ho già
altrove detto che gli schiavi assegnati alla coltura delle terre si tenessero
duramente e incatenati negli ergastoli.

266.
 Gli arditi rivenduglioli
Avean già tutte le contrade invase,
E sin gli usci turavano alle case.
Tu, di sgombrar, Germanico,
Quegli spazii ordinasti, e in larga via
Si cangiarono i vicoli di pria.
Da incatenate bombole
Or più nessun pilastro interno è stretto;
Nè più il pretor nel fango è agir costretto.
Fra densa moltitudine
Non più il cieco rasojo alzasi, e tutti
Da bettole non sono i calli ostrutti.
Ebbe il barbier suoi limiti,
L’oste, il cuoco, il beccajo: in Roma or stanzi:
In una gran taverna eri poc’anzi.
Epig. Lib. VII 61. Trad. Magenta.

267. Pœnulus. 4. 2. 13:

E si mangia e si bee come in popina.

268.

Siccome il pan dal panattier cerchiamo,

Dall’enopolio il vino, e se il denaro
Loro si dà, cedon la merce.
Act. 1. x. 3.

269. «Qui dimora la felicità.»

270. Paris, Michel Lévy Frères, 1872.

271. Cic. Philip. XII, 9, De Senectute 23. — T. Liv. 28.

272. Cic. Philip. II, 28; Plaut. Pœnulus, att. IV, sc. 2.

273. Descrizione delle Rovine di Pompei, dell’arch. Gaspare Vinci. Terza

edizione, Napoli, pag. 68.

274. «Sittio riparò l’Elefante.» Nell’iscrizione è scorrettamente ommessa la

lettera H in capo alla parola elephantum. Qui poi mal si comprende se
Sittio sia stato il proprietario dell’Albergo o il pittore che ne ristorasse
l’insegna. Par più probabile la prima ipotesi.
275. «Albergo: qui si dà in affitto un triclinio con tre letti e colle relative
commodità.»

276. «Marco Furio Pila invita Marco Tullio.» Altri legge tvtillvm.

277.

PSEUDOLO

V’hanno dolci bevande ad abbondanza?

CARINO

E tu il domandi? Havvi del vin mirrato,

Del vin cotto, idromele e d’ogni miele:
Anzi, già un dì fin nel suo cuore aveva
Un termopolio aperto.
Pseudolus Act. II Sc. IV.

278. Pallad. 1. 42.

279. «Nè di giorno soltanto, ma quasi tutta l’intera notte con non interrotto
volger di macchine producevano continua farina.» Apulej. Metam. Lib.
IX.

280. Così ce li descrive Apulejo. Metam. Lib. I. X.

281.

LIBANO

Forse mi meni là dove una pietra

Stritola l’altra pietra?

DEMENETO

Or che è codesto?
Dove è mai questo luogo in su la terra?

LIBANO

Dove piangon quegli uomini infelici,

Che di polenta cibansi.
Asinaria At. I. 4. 1. V. 16-18.
282. «Plauto fu pistore, avendo locato la propria opera a gran mole a mano.
Perocchè codesto pestamento e fatica di stritolar grani fosse la più
grave di tutte, e si dicesse il pistrino un luogo pieno di fatica e travaglio e
che distruggeva le forze.»

283. Pur ne’ tempi moderni v’ebbero e v’hanno re, che attesero a mestieri
volgari. Si sa di Luigi XVI abilissimo nell’orologeria e fabbro
espertissimo; e il Principe ereditario dell’attuale imperatore di Germania
si perfezionò ne’ rudi lavori fabbrili, e i giornali di questi giorni recarono
che il di lui fratello minore s’applicò all’arte di legare i libri.

284. Nuova serie, n. 3 ottobre 1868, colonna 57.

285. «Talamo cliente invoca P. Paquio Proculo duumviro incaricato della

Giustizia.»

286. Anche nelle Metamorfosi d’Ovidio, così vien immaginata dal Poeta la
sua Bibli nell’atto che medita la propria lettera a Cauno:

Dextra tenet ferrum, vacuam tenet altera ceram.

Lib. IX v. 520.

287. Metam. Lib. X.

288. Giornale degli Scavi, 1861, p. 106.

289. «Tutti i fruttivendoli con Elvio Vestale supplicano Marco Olconio Prisco
duumviro di Giustizia.»

290. Lib. XIII. 55, Svet. in Augustum, 4.

291. Storia della Prostituzione, Cap. XXI.

292.

Perchè, per fede mia, olezza bene

La donna allor che di niente olezza.
Però che quelle vecchie che sè stesse
Vanno d’unguenti ognor impiastricciando,
Decrepite, sdentate e di lor corpo,
Col belletto occultando i rei difetti,
Quando il sudor sen mischia, incontanente
Putono al par d’intingolo malvagio
In cui confuse molte salse il cuoco.
Di che odoran non sai, se non di questo
 Che di pessimo odor puton, comprendi.
Atto I, Sc. 3, v. 116 e segg.

293.

Numi immortali, almen trovassi in casa

Perifane, mi son quasi disfatto
A cercarlo per tutta la città:
Nelle botteghe mediche ed in quelle
Del barbier, nel ginnasio, in tutto il foro,
Da’ profumieri, da beccai, dappresso
I banchieri e, col chiederne, la voce
Ho fatta rauca.
Atto II. Sc. 2, 12 e segg.

294.

Tu conoscesti la barbiera nostra,

Sura, ch’ora soggiorna appresso a quelle
Case.
Atto II, Sc. 4, v. 51.

295.

. . . . ma non mai
Tal barbiera, Ammian, rade. — Mi svela
Che fa ella dunque se non rade? — Pela.
Mart. Epigr. lib. II, ep. 17. Tr. Magenta.

296.

Pria che la man d’Eutrapelo sia giunta

Le guance e il mento di Luperco a radere,
In volto a questo un’altra barba spunta.
Id., ibid.

297. Pompei, étude sur l’art antique.

298. Bucolica VII, 32.

299. Vellej. Paterc. II, 82.

300. Philip. III, 6.

301. Philip. XIII, 13.

302. Nat. Hist. IX, 56.

303. Sen. Fra. III, 18. Cic. Decr. II, 5, 33.

304. «Quelli che tingono la lana d’altro colore: gli offectores quelli che la
ritingono dello stesso colore.» — Insomma i primi lo mutano, i secondi lo
conservano.

305. P. 278, n. 170 e 171.

306.

Sì puzzolente è Taide,
Che putir non suol tanto
Di tintor gretto un vecchio
vaso dïanzi infranto.
Trad. di Magenta.

Ora, in talun luogo si usufrutta delle orine per ragione di ingrasso. Già
Vittor Hugo nei Miserabili mostrò di quanta utilità sarebbe il trar profitto
in Parigi degli égouts: in Milano si è stabilita una società con tale intento
sotto la denominazione di Vespasiano, dall’Imperatore di tal nome, che
primo impose la tassa sugli orinatoi. Vedi Svetonio nella vita di questo
Cesare.

307. Metam. L. IX, Plin. XXXV, 57.

308. Pompeja, Pag. 279.

309. Magenta tradusse:

Il nostral rosso ti versar le botti.

Ma come facilmente vedrà il lettore, il traduttore assegnò al vino il colore

che il Poeta assegna al cadus; onde più fedelmente sarebbesi detto:

non peregrini
Il rosso caratel diffonde i vini.
Epig. Lib. IV, 66.

310.

E il flavo mele da rubiconda

Fiala versare.
Epig. Lib. I, 56, trad. Magenta.
311. Petron. Satyricon, 34.

312. V. 31.

Anfora a far s’imprende; ond’è che poi

Gira la ruota, e n’esce orciuol?
Trad. Gargallo.

313. Ruines de Pompei, 4 vol. in folio. Parigi presso Firmin Didot. Il 4 volume
fu compilato da L. Barré.

314. Museo Borbonico, 1 vol. in 4 ogni anno con tavole a bulino.

315. Ercolano e Pompei, Venezia 1841, Tip. Antonelli.

316. Vi furono dotti che congetturarono che le vôlte della Cloaca Massima
facessero parte di canali coperti di un’antica città, forse Pallantea, sulle
cui ruine si pretese fabbricata Roma; ma se così fosse Tarquinio non
avrebbe fatto altro che restaurare quanto rimaneva dei vecchi
acquedotti. Infatti le rendite del suo piccolo regno non avrebbero per
avventura bastato a tanta opera. I lavori di essa ingranditi
successivamente in diverse epoche, furono poi così spinti da Agricola,
genero di Augusto, che, al dir di Plinio, formò, per così esprimersi, sotto
il recinto di Roma una città navigabile.

317. Storia dell’Architettura di Tommaso Hope, pag. 25. Milano, 1840. Tip.
Lampato.

318. Le Drame de Vésuve, chap. Herculanum.

319. Non voglio defraudare i lettori de’ venturi anni di conoscere l’autore di
questa teorica, che lascia addietro ed eclissa ogni economista: essa
appartiene al piemontese Quintino Sella, ministro più volte del Regno
Subalpino e d’Italia.

320. Pompei qual era e qual è. Per Gustavo Luzzati. — Napoli, 1872.

321. Æneid., Lib. VI, v. 847 — 853.

Abbinsi gli altri de l’altre arti il vanto;

Avvivino i colori e i bronzi e i marmi;
Muovano con la lingua i tribunali;
Mostrin con l’astrolabio e col quadrante
Meglio del ciel le stelle e i moti loro;
Chè ciò meglio saprem forse di voi.
 Ma voi, Romani miei, reggete il mondo
Con l’imperio e con l’armi, e l’arti vostre
Sien l’esser giusti in pace, invitti in guerra;
Perdonare a’ soggetti, accor gli umili,
Debellare i superbi.
Trad. di Annibal Caro.

322. Epist. Lib. II, ep. 1, 32.

Tutto sorte ci diè; pittor, cantori,

Lottator siam degli unti Achei più dotti.
Trad. Gargallo.

323. Id. Ibid. 94-98:

Grecia, scinta dall’arme, ove agli ameni

Studj si volse, e l’aura di fortuna
Nel vizio a dar la spinse; or di corsieri
Infiammossi, or di atleti, i marmi, i bronzi,
Gli sculti avori amò; talor dipinta
Tavola gli occhi le rapiva e il core.
Trad. Gargallo.

324. «Era presso di Ejo un larario antichissimo, lasciato dai maggiori e

guardato nella casa con assai dignità, nel quale si trovavano quattro
splendidissime statue, condotte con mirabile artificio e con somma
nobiltà; le quali non solo costui (Verre) ingegnoso e intelligente, ma
anche chiunque di noi ch’egli chiama idioti, vi si potesse deliziare: una di
marmo raffigurante Cupido di Prassitele, perocchè molti nomi di artefici,
appresi in codesta mia investigazione... Eranvi due statue di bronzo non
grandissime, ma in ricambio di una esimia venustà, in abito e veste
verginali, che sostenevano colle mani in aria levate sovra il capo certi
sacri arredi, secondo il costume delle fanciulle ateniesi. Canefore queste
si chiamavano: ma chi era l’artefice di essi? chi mai? si domanderà
giustamente. Dicevano che fossero di Policleto.» In Verrem, Lib. IV, De
Signis.

325. Vedi Plin. Nat. Hist. XXXV, 7, che enumera questi colori e li dice alieno
parietibus genere, cioè stranieri alle muraglie... udoque illini recusant, e
rifiutano di appigliarsi agli intonachi umidi.

326. Dizion. delle Antichità.

327. Pompeja, Pag. 425, nota 2.

328. Opere, Ediz. Silvestri di Milano vol. secondo, p. 305.

329. «Aver l’effigie di Epicuro non nelle tavole (quadri) soltanto, ma ne’
bicchieri eziandio e negli anelli.» Fin. 5. 1. extr.

330. «Le tavole ben dipinte collocare in buona luce.» In. Brut. 75.

331. Natur. Hist. XXXV, 2.

332. «Nerone principe aveva ordinato lo si pingesse colossalmente della

grandezza di 120 piedi sopra tela, genere fin allora sconosciuto; ma
appena ultimata, una folgore piombata negli orti di Maja, la incendiò in
un colla parte migliore degli orti.» Id. Ibid. 7.

333. Nat. Hist. XXXV, 135.

334. Pompéi et les Pompéiens. Paris 1867, p. 207.

335. Vedi Beulé, pag. 301, e La Peinture de genre, di M. Gebhart.

336. «Io in questo sol uomo trovo accogliersi qualunque vizio che immaginar
si possa in uom perduto e scellerato: non v’è alcun tratto, io ritengo, di
libidine, di scelleratezza e di audacia che voi non possiate vedere nella
vita di questo solo.»

337. Sen. In Suasoriis. Lib. 1; in Lactan. Lib. 2, c. 4.

338. «Nerone ebbe non mediocre abilità tanto nel pingere che nello scolpire.»

339. «Opere da anteporsi a tutte l’altre sì di pittura che di scultura.»

340. Così chiamata perchè il 3 novembre 1753 vi si scoprirono 1756 volumi,

o papiri, che, comunque in apparenza ridotti allo stato di carbone,
poterono tuttavia essere svolti e letti, come già dissi a suo luogo.

341. Vol. I, pag. 267.

342. «I pavimenti di pietruzze passarono dal suolo alle camere e si fecero di

vetro: è questa nuova invenzione. Agrippa (del tempo d’Augusto),
certamente nelle Terme da lui fabbricate in Roma, dipinse all’encausto
quant’era di terra cotta, nelle altre opere si valse degli stucchi: ma egli
indubbiamente avrebbe fatto le camere co’ musaici di vetro, se il
musaico allora fosse stato conosciuto, od anche dalle pareti della scena
del teatro di Scauro sarebbero passati alle camere.» Histor. Natur. Lib.
XXXVI, 25.
343. Senofonte, Ciropedia IV, 7.

344. Idem, VII, 3, 7.

345. Napoli, novembre 1831.

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