Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2

1.1 General.......................................................................................................................... 2

1.2 Driving Factors for Rising Water Demand in Pakistan ................................................ 2

2. Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) ............................................................... 2

2.1 Location ........................................................................................................................ 2

2.2 Background ................................................................................................................... 3

2.3 Salient Features ........................................................................................................ 3

2.4 Geology of the Project Area ......................................................................................... 4

3. Parties of Project .................................................................................................................... 4

3.1 The Client ..................................................................................................................... 4

3.2 The Contractor .............................................................................................................. 4

3.3 The Consultants ............................................................................................................ 4

4. Funding of the Project ..................................................................................................... 4

5. Components of the Project .............................................................................................. 5

5.1 Nauseri Dam ................................................................................................................. 5

5.2 Main Power Tunnel ...................................................................................................... 6

5.3 Power House ................................................................................................................. 6

6. Reasons of Delay in the Project ...................................................................................... 7

7. Impact of India's Kishanganga Project ............................................................................ 8

8. References ....................................................................................................................... 9

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 1. Introduction
1.1 General
Pakistan is facing severe energy crisis due to increase in demand and reduction in storage
capacity of hydropower producing reservoirs. After the construction of Tarbela Dam in 1974,
no large scale project could be initiated over the passed 35 years except Ghazi Brotha Hydral
Power Project in 2003. Due to lack of planning and mismanagement day by day, the demand
remained increasing and no cheap electricity project could be started. Few expensive options
were adopted by the Government with installing thermal Power Projects. Ultimately, the
Government issued vision 2025 program in 2000, wherein the stress was to exploit indigenous
resources such as Hydropower and coal. Hence, Neelum Jhelum Hydropower project
commenced since 2009 to over come the power shortage.
1.2 Driving Factors for Rising Water Demand in Pakistan
The main factors driving water demand in Pakistan are agriculture, hydroelectricity and storage
capacity. Water is essential for power generation and 29 – 32 percent of total power in Pakistan
is generated through hydropower. Pakistan faced an electricity deficit of 3,500 MW in 2009. It
currently has a hydro-electric generation capacity of 6,555MW - generated by its 3 large
hydropower dams (Tarbela, a raised Mangla and Chasma) - but its total hydro-electric potential
is estimated at 40,000MW. Pakistan is pushing to increase its total installed hydropower
capacity to 27,000MW by 2025.
WAPDA has recently embarked on a series of new hydropower projects in the Province of
Kashmir, many of them in collaboration with Chinese contractors – among these are the 969
MW Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) and the 4,500MW Diamer Bhasha project.
It should be noted that out of the 40,000MW hydropower potential, 15,000MW (38%) are in
the Northern Areas alone.

2. Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP)

The project is being called an engineering marvel with 90% of the plant being underground in
the high mountainous areas. It also consists of three main components which are a dam, water-
way system with 52 km long tunnels, and an underground power house. The project provides
low-cost hydel electricity, with annual benefits of the project estimated at Rs50 billion.

2.1 Location
Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) is a run of the river hydroelectric generation
project that is located in the vicinity of Muzaffarabad in the territory of Azad Jammu and
Kashmir (AJ&K). It is composed of a diversion dam at Neelum River, 33 km long tunnel and
a power house at Jhelum River. It has an installed capacity of 969 MW.

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Figure 1: Location map of Neelum Jhelum Hydro Power Project indicating Dam Site, Tunnel
Route and Power House
2.2 Background
After being approved in 1989, the design was improved, increasing the tunnel length and
generation capacity. The project was intended to begin in 2002 and be completed in 2008 but
this time-frame experienced significant delays due to problems meeting rising costs.
Additionally, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake which devastated the region, required a redesign of
the project to conform to more stringent seismic standards. Construction on the project began
in 2008 after a Chinese consortium was awarded the construction contract in July 2007. After
delay of many years, the entire project was completed in August 2018 when the fourth and last
unit was synchronized with the national grid on 13 August and attained its maximum generation
capacity of 969 MW on August 14, 2018.
At its appraisal in 1989, it was to cost $167 million USD and after another redesign in 2005,
that cost rose to $935 million USD. In Mar 2017, it was reported that the cost of the dam had
escalated to PKR 500 Billion thus the cost of electricity from Neelum Jhelum will be Pakistani
Rupees 20 per unit.
2.3 Salient Features
Dam Type Composite Dam (Gravity + Rockfill)
Height of Dam 60 meters
Tunnel Length Twin Tunnel, Length 19.6 km
Single Tunnel, Length 8.94 km
Tailrace Tunnel, Length 3.54 km
Gross Head 420 m

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 Design Discharge 280 cumecs
No. of Units 4 Turbines of 242.25 MW each
Gross Storage Capacity 10.0 million m3
Live Storage Capacity 2.8 million m3
Installed Capacity 969 MW
Commencement Date January 2008
Completion Date August 2018
Table 1: Salient Features of Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project

2.4 Geology of the Project Area

The geology of the project area is predominantly composed of Murree Formation.
Geologically the project area can be divided into two zones. The dam site and intake reservoir
nearby the village of Nauseri is the only area where two formations are exposed. On the right
side of Neelum River and intake reservoir Punjal Formation is exposed which is lithologically
composed of volcanic elastic rocks. In the rest of whole Project area the tunnel and the power
house, only one formation is exposed i.e., Murree Formation.

3. Parties of Project
3.1 The Client
The Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was the implementation
agency for the Project on behalf of the government of Pakistan.
3.2 The Contractor
The NJHPC awarded the construction contract of this project to CGGC CMEC Consortium of
China on July 7, 2007. The Contractor has set up its field offices at Nauseri (C-1), Thotha (C-
2) and Chatter Kalas (C-3) in AJK.
3.3 The Consultants
The NJHC had employed Neelum Jhelum Consultants (NJC) (a consortium of five consultants-
Joint venture) for supervision services with effect from 15th May 2008.The consortium was
made up of MWH, NORPLAN, NESPAK, ACE and NDC.
MWH led the consortium. A site office is located at Muzaffarabad. The Chief Resident
Engineers at Nauseri (C-1), Thotha (C-2) and Chatter Kalas (C-3) provide overall supervision
for dam, tunnel and powerhouse construction.

4. Funding of the Project

The funding for Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project is collected from a range of sources,
including the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Asian

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Development Bank and by taxes and tariffs collected from the people of Pakistan through their
electricity bills.

5. Components of the Project

Water is diverted at Nauseri, 41km East of Muzaffarabad from the Neelum River into a 28.5km
long headrace tunnel through a mountain range. A power station is constructed at the end of
the headrace tunnel at Chatter Kalas, 22km South of Muzaffarabad, underground. After passing
through the power station, the water is released into Jhelum River about 4km South of Chatter
Kalas, through a 3.5km tailrace tunnel.

Figure 2: Location of Twin tunnels and Single tunnel

5.1 Nauseri Dam
The concrete dam, 135 m long, is located at Nauseri on Neelum River. The river bed is at
Elevation 971 m above sea level. The dam height is 41.6 m above the river bed. The dam has
4 bays. Each bay has a control gate to hold back the flow. The bay floor has been protected
from erosion by ‘Block out Concrete’. The radial gates are sized at 12 m (W) x 8 m (H) and
can discharge 7000 m2/s. The dam also provides an upper gate to release floatable debris. A
road deck has been provided on the dam at Elevation 1015 m which is 2.4 m above the crest of
the dam.

Figure 3: Location of Nauseri Dam

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5.2 Main Power Tunnel
The main power tunnel from Nauseri to the power house site is 28.556 km long. This is
made up of 13.165 km of tunnel from Nauseri toward Jhelum as twin tunnel each of 52 m2
cross section area. The tunnels are shotcrete lined. Full lining was done under exceptional
circumstances. The first 13.165 km of the tunnel are on a mild slope of 1:500.
The tunnel crosses under Jhelum River at El 400 m which is approximately 380m below the
Jhelum River bed at Thotha. This depth is required because of the rock mechanics
requirements for unlined pressure tunnel. The tunnel rises again on steep slope and then
returns to mild slope of 1:500.

Figure 4: A satellite image of the area where the major tunnel entrance is being constructed.
5.3 Power House
The power station facility is underground. The underground cavern is 131m long, 21.2 m wide
and about 40 m high from the turbine floor. The power station has 4 units with a total maximum
capacity of about 969 MW. Twelve single phase transformers units are installed, each 98.33
MVA. The transformers are placed in separate hall which are 125m long, 16.4 m wide and 15.5
m high. The main access tunnel to the power house is 785 m long and has a cross-section of
58m2. This tunnel serves as access to the transformer hall and routing of high voltage cables to
the switchyard. The outdoor switchyard is located at Agar Nullah just outside the cable tunnel
portal. The outdoor switchyard is 131 m x 262 m.

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 Figure 5: Model of the Power Station Complex

6. Reasons of Delay in the Project

Some of the reasons for delay in project and causes of increase in project cost are mentioned
below:
1. Due to the lack of adequate facilities in the remote area that this project is situated in, very
few ex-patriot experts were willing to travel and live there. Those that are, demand very
high salaries, special insurance policies and extra protection.
2. There were approximately 200 policemen for this project for the total of 232 consultant
staff that were at the project sites and design offices. Each foreigner travelled with a
gunman guard for any sort of travelling on this project. This protocol created a large time
delay for any project work.
3. It is estimated that 10% of the delay to the project was due to incapable workers,
inefficiency of project teams and corruption.
4. During the project, there was an unscheduled change of the Prime Minister of Azad Jammu
Kashmir. This change initiated a change to the facilitators of the NJHP, who were selected
by political reference and not technical capability or experience. These people had been
unhelpful and added project cost and delay.
5. As part of the contract, the contractor was required to ensure that local labor is hired in
order to increase the number of jobs available for local residents but the Chinese contractor
brought both skilled and unskilled workers from China. Also, the Chinese contractor paid
different rates to the local labor and the Chinese labor, with the rates being in favor of the
Chinese labor.
6. When the contractor brought tunneling equipment to Pakistan, he assumed that stable and
continuous power supply would be provided. This was not the case, as could be observed
at Adit Tunnel A5, where the supply of power was inconsistent, the voltage was lower than
required and the supply experienced fluctuation. WAPDA was to supply the required

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 power, but was unable to do so due to the lack of adequate infrastructure. WAPDA
suggested that generators be used for the tunneling equipment, but refused to pay for the
diesel costs when the Chinese contractor bought them. The Chinese contractor decided to
not use the tunneling equipment and instead used a manual drill and blast method with slow
progress. Ideally, the contractor should be tunneling about 4 to 5 running meters per day.
The result of using the manual drill and blast method resulted in progress of only 3 running
meters per day. After reviewing the slow progress, WAPDA decided to pay for the diesel
generator running costs.
7. During floods in 2010, the access between Muzaffarabad city and C1 were damaged and
no access was available for staff between July and August. The cost of the project was
estimated as approx. USD$1 Million per day according to MWH and Norplan consultant
executives, given a 93 month construction period in the contract and a USD$2.9 Billion
cost for the total project. This two month delay created inconsistency in the work and
resulted in the contractor sending Chinese labor workers back to China. The returning labor
workers were different personnel with varying degrees of skills and required retraining.
This added cost and time delay to the project as well.
8. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) paid the local government of
Azad Jammu Kashmir in full payment for the purchase of project land and compensation
for local residents. Acquisition of the land had taken too long due to various reasons,
resulting in the design team of the Nauseri Dam changing the design location of the dam
to be within the purchased land area. This had significant impacts on the design work.
9. Due to the nature of the project, the location is in a mountainous region with steep gradients
and recurrent seismic activity. This consequence is frequent landslides resulting in
broken/unusable roads and bridges in the area. The National Highway Authority (NHA)
that is funded by the World Bank is responsible for the maintenance and development of
these road and bridges. However, due to the landslides being so frequent, development was
not prioritized and maintenance was inadequate. This creates an impact on the project’s
time and performance.

7. Impact of India's Kishanganga Project

In 2007, India began construction on a run-of-the-river power station on the Kishanganga
(Neelum) River upstream of the Neelum–Jhelum Dam. The Kishanganga Hydroelectric
Plant operates in a similar sense as the Neelum–Jhelum, using a dam to divert the Kishanganga
(Neelum) River to a power station before it is discharged into Wular Lake which is fed by the
Jhelum River. The Kishanganga Project will divert a portion of the Neelum River from Pakistan
which will reduce power generation at the Neelum–Jhelum Hydropower Plant. India states the

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project will divert 10 percent of the river's flow while other estimates stand as high as 33
percent. Nevertheless, water flow below the Neelum–Jhelum Dam, in Pakistan's Neelum
Valley, is expected to be minimal as both projects are diverting water to the Jhelum River. This
has the potential to have adverse impacts in the Neelum Valley.
In 2010, Pakistan appealed to the Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration (CoA), complaining
that the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Plant violates the Indus River Treaty by increasing the
catchment of the Jhelum River and depriving Pakistan of its water rights. In June 2011, the CoA
visited both the Kishanganga and Neelum–Jhelum Projects. In August 2011, they ordered India
to submit more technical data on the project. India had previously reduced the height of the
dam from 98 m to 37 m. After their application was first rejected, the court asked India late
September to stop constructing any permanent works that would inhibit restoration of the river.
While India could not construct the dam, they continued work on the tunnel and power plant.
In February 2013 the Hague ruled that India could divert a minimum of water for the
Kishanganga Hydroelectric Plant. After the completion of Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project,
30% loss in power generation is expected.

8. References
[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neelum%E2%80%93Jhelum_Hydropower_Plant
[2]http://www.wapda.gov.pk/index.php/projects/hydro-power/o-m/neelum-jhelum
[3]https://www.dawn.com/news/1426837
[4]https://tribune.com.pk/story/1780780/2-neelum-jhelum-project-attains-full-generation-
capacity-969mw/
[5]https://tribune.com.pk/story/1681621/1-energy-needs-neelum-jhelum-project-starts-
generation/
[6]https://eprints.qut.edu.au/79325/1/Saad_Khan_Thesis.pdf

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