NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and HADJI ABDUL CARIM

ABDULLAH, et.al.
G.R. No. 124378. March 8, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:

By virtue of Memorandum Order No. 398, National Power Corp. (NPC) built the Agus
Regulation Dam at the mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur and operated the same. The
group of private respondents Hadji Abdul Carim Abdullah were owners of fishponds sited
along the Lake Lanao shore. In 1986, all the improvements of these fishponds were washed
away when the water level of the lake escalated and the subject lakeshore area was
flooded. The private respondents sought for damages against NPC. RTC ruled in favor of the
private respondents and affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC was legally answerable for the damages endured by the
fishpond owners.

RULING: Yes.
The court ruled that with respect to its job to maintain the normal maximum level of
the lake at 702 meters, water level rises due to the rainy season, the NPC ought to release
more water to the Agus River to avoid flooding and prevent the water from going over the
maximum level. In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have
explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer
that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the
water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation. An
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore.

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi- delict.” Hence, negligence was present on the part of NPC which directly
caused the damage to the fishponds. 

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JOANITA CAPILI vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA, et.al.
G.R. 157906, November 2, 2006
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS: 

Jasmin Cardañ a was walking along the San Roque Elementary School when a branch
of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous
death.  Her parents ,Dominador and Rosalita Cardañ a filed a case for damages against the
school principal, Joaquinita Capili, knowing that the tree was dead and rotting did not
dispose of it. Due to insufficiency of evidence, RTC dismissed the case but was reversed by
CA

ISSUE:

Whether or not Capili can be held liable for damages for the death of Cardañ
under Res ipsa loquitur.
 

RULING: Yes.

A negligent act, which is an inadvertent(unintentional) act, may be merely carelessly

done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving
an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third
person, an animal, or a force of nature. An ordinary prudent person in the actor's position,
in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.

In the present case, the probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree
could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable.  As school principal, she
was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises.  Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of
the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. Once respondents
made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference. However, under the circumstances, the court concedes that
Capili was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis-a-vis respondents' daughter's death.
The award of moral damages is therefore not proper in this case.

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MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. RODELIO ALBERTO
G.R. No. 194320, February 01, 2012
Velasco Jr., J.

FACTS:

An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving
four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit; (2) an Isuzu Tanker;
(3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant. Based on the Police Report, all three
(3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo
Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left
portion of the Nissan Bus.  Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved
forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right
portion of the Isuzu Tanker.

The Mitsubishi Galant was insured against third party liability, own damage and
theft, among others by Malayan Insurance. Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the
rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment, Malayan
Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico
Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo
Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured.  A claimed for damages
was filed. RTC ruled in favor of Malayan insurance but was reversed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not negligence can be presumed based on the application of the doctrine
on res ipsa loquitor.

RULING: Yes.

The requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the
exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the
blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded.
Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant.
Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of
respondents.

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OSACAR DEL CARMEN JR. vs. GERONIMO BACOY, et.al.
G.R. No. 17738770, April 25, 2012
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney driven
by a certain Allan Maglasang (Maglasang) and owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr (Del Carmen).
Aside from criminal claim, in behalf of the minor Monsalud, the father of Mrs. Monsalud,
Gernonimo Bacoy (Bacoy) filed an independent civil action against the owner of the vehicle.
Del Carmen defended that the vehicle was stolen and it was the brother of Maglasang drove
the vehicle. RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle
that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries
or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries
caused.

RULING: Yes.

The SC held the Del Carmen is liable for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep’s use, as
all requisites under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing
vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of petitioner as its owner. When
Del Carmen entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo (Allan’s friend), he had the power to
instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep’s use, including who or who
may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has
the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims
was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.

The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a

presumption of negligence against the petitioner, which he could have overcome by
evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his
jeep. Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen
which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, the petitioner cannot escape his
civil liability on this present case.

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CRESENCIO LIBI vs. IAC and FELIPE GOTIONG, et.al.
GR No. 70890, September 18, 1992
Regalado, J.

FACTS:
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
were sweethearts until when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she
supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Julie Ann and Wendell died, each
from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of
the crime inside the residence of private respondents. The parents of Julie Ann filed Civil
Case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability. The court below rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for
insufficiency of the evidence but was reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by
their minor son tenable.

RULING: No.

Petitioners in this appeal should be held civilly liable for the crime committed by
their minor son. Preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from
committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely
accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still
under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime
had been committed.”

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, court cites
Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents
for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,” followed by an
extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary
liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two
paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.
The court believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children,
as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary.

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MARIA TERESA CUADRA vs. ALFONSO MONFORT
G.R. NO. L-24101, September 30, 1970
Makalintal, J.

FACTS:

Maria Teresa Cuadra (MT Cuadra) and Maria Teresa Monfort (MT Monfort) were
both classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. While their teacher assigned
the class to weed the school premises MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly
shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye.
MT Cuadra’s eye got infected and were attempted to be surgically repaired but she
nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT
Monfort’s dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort
should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

RULING: No.

Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother,
is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference
that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180.

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso
Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in
any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage,
or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to
send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.

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PEDRO ELCANO, et.al. vs. REGINALD HILL, et.al.
G.R. NO. L-24803, May 26, 1977
Barredo, J.

FACTS:

Reginald Hill (Reginald), a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, was living
with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill (Atty. Marvin). Reginald was prosecuted criminally for the
killing of Agapito Elcano (plaintiffs' son). After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. The
plaintiffs Elcano filed civil. case complaint against Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill.
The Hill’s filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against defendant Atty. Marvin, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant
through emancipation by marriage of Reginald.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already
legally married.

RULING: Yes.

Article 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by

marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to that of his son. While it
is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child and
emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor (child), it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute.

Under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company. In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

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ROLITO CALANG, et.al vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 190696, August 3, 2010
Brion, J.

FACTS:

Rolito Calang was driving a bus owned by Philtranco and met an accident with s jeep
coming from an opposite direction. The accident caused the death of Jose Mabansag (a by
stander) and two passengers of the jeep, Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman. At
RTC, Calang was guilty of with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence and was ordered, together with Philtranco to
be jointly and severally liable for damages to the victims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA is correct that Philtranco is jointly and severally liable with
Calang

RULING: No.

Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the
CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-
delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has
committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
Philtranco's liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability , Articles 102 and
103, are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in
the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Nonetheless, before the employers’ subsidiary liability
is enforced, adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the
employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3)
the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the
execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of
these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability,
criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

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FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION  vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 118889, March 23, 1998
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:

A two-car collision at dawn at EDSA, Mandaluyong City. The owned by Lydia F.

Soriano (Soriano) was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone,
while the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by
Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon
approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right
hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not
possess a Philippine driver's license. As a consequence, FGU Insurance Corporation, in view
of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation,  it
sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance
Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was
no longer staying. RTC and CA dismissed the case on the ground that only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not for damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-
delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or
negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle.

RULING: No.

FGU failed to prove the existence fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because
only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR.
It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by
the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was
driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-
Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability.
Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of

negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them
from causing damage. 7 Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly
applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under
consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the
owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them

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as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the
negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.

EQUITABLE LEASING CORP. vs. LUCITA SUYOM, et.al.

G.R. No. 143360 September 5, 2002
Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

A Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of
Myrna Tamayo causing the death of latter’s son, and injury of the daughter of one Felix
Oledan. Said tractor was found to be registered to Equitable Leasing Corporation
(Equitable) leased to Edwin Lim. A complaint for damages was filed against Equitable and
RTC and CA ruled against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Equitable is liable for damages.

RULING: Yes.

Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an action predicated
on quasi delict may be instituted against the employer for an employee’s act or omission.
The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, but is
subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
The enforcement of the judgment against the employer for an action based on Article 2176
does not require the employee to be insolvent, since the liability of the former is solidary—
the latter being statutorily considered a joint tortfeasor. To sustain a claim based on quasi
delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These two
causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to the caveat that
the offended party cannot “recover damages twice for the same act or omission” or under
both causes. Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the
failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other.

Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape
primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the
other has already been superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third persons.

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HERMANA R. CEREZO vs. DAVID TUAZON
G.R. NO. 141538, March 23, 2004
Carpio, J.

FACTS:

A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle driven by David Tuazon
(Tuazon). As a pauper, Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as the
owner of the bus line, her husband Atty. Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo Foronda
alleging that during the time of the incident, plaintiff Tuazon was in his proper lane while
defendant Foronda negligently operated the bus without due regard of the “Slow Down”
sign near the incident. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render
judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda.Mrs. Cerezo points out that
there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right
to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cerezo is liable for damages against Tuazon.

RULING: Yes.

An action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer
for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved
party must initiate a criminal action where the employees delict and corresponding
primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial
court jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the
quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.

We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to decide the case in
favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs.
Cerezo’s contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not
even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted
to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for
her own civil negligence.

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MERCURY DRUG CORP vs. LIBUNAO
G.R. NO. 144458, July 14, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:

Atty. Rodrigo Libunao (Atty. Libunao) filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of
Quezon City against the Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) for the alleged illegal
and harmful acts committed by Remigio Sido (Sido) while assigned as a security guard at
their Robinson’s Galleria store. Sido and the store manager, Vilma Santos, testified that Sido
was an employee of Black Shield Security Services Corporation (BSSSC), and not of Mercury
Drug. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Atty. Libunao holding Mercury Durg as jointly and
severally with Sido.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages to the respondent for the tortious
and delictual acts of Sido.

RULING: No.

Employers are liable for the tortious and delictual acts of their employees under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court, citing Soliman, Jr. vs. Tuazon, held that
where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security
guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not the
client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client.
Therefore, liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to
the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.

Clearly, in this case, Atty. Libunao should have sued Sido and the BSSSC for damages,
conformably to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

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MARCELO MACALINAO, et.al. vs. EDDIE ONG, et.al.
G.R. NO. 146635, December 14, 2005
Puno, J.

FACTS:
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver of an Isuzu Elf truck of
Genetron International Marketing (Genetron) by Genovevo Sebastian (Sebastian). On
transit to deliver a machinery to Bulacan, they bumped a private jeepney causing the
injuries of the passengers and grave injury and subsequent death of Macalinao. A, actiona
for damages was filed by the family of Macalinao against Ong and Sebastain, being an
employer. RTC ruled in favor of heirs of Macalinao having Sebastian as jointly and severally
liable with Ong; but was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove the presence of negligence.

Issues:
Whether or not, Sebastian is jointly and severally liable with Ong.
Ruling: Yes.
Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in relation to
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof
that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.
In this case, Sebastian's statements are not sufficient to prove that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of Ong. His testimony is self-serving
and devoid of corroboration as he did not bother to support the same with document
evidence. Sebastian's claims fall short of what is required by law to overcome the
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of his employee. The trial court
therefore correctly held him solidarily liable with Ong to the heirs of Macalinao.

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YHT REALTY CORPORAPTION, et.al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE
McLOUGHLIN
G.R. NO. 126780, February 17, 2005
Tinga, J.

FACTS:

McLoughlin was an Australian businessman-philanthropist who stayed in a Suites

owned by the YHT Realty Corporation (YHT Realty). He rented a safety deposit box in his
suite and was asked to sign a waiver by the hotel. Later, while McLoughlin was sleeping, his
companion (Ms. Tan) assisted by a hotel staff got some money from the safety deposit box.
McLoughlin filed a complaint against the hotel but the later used the signed waiver as an
evidence to exonerate them from liability. The RTC ruled against the hotel and affirmed by
CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not YHT committed Gross Negligence for the stolen property of
McLoughlin.

RULING: Yes.

The evidence reveals that two keys are required to open the safety deposit boxes of
Tropicana. One key is assigned to the guest while the other remains in the possession of the
management. If the guest desires to open his safety deposit box, he must request the
management for the other key to open the same. In other words, the guest alone cannot
open the safety deposit box without the assistance of the management or its employees.
With more reason that access to the safety deposit box should be denied if the one
requesting for the opening of the safety deposit box is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of
any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the
management had at least a hand in the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for
the loss is force majeure.

Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their
obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden
of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions. Also, the Court has ruled that if an employee is found
negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising
him for it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer. Thus, given the
fact that the loss of McLoughlin’s money was consummated through the negligence of
Tropicana’s employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guest’s

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consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and
operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.

UNIIVERSAL AQUARIUS INC vs. QC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, INC.

G.R. NO. 155990, Sept. 12, 2007
Ausria-Martinez, J.

FACTS:

Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation (Q.C. HRM) is engaged in supplying

manpower to Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal). Conchita Tan (Tan), owner of Marman
Trading with depot adjoining the Universal. On December 19, 2000, a Rodolfo Capocyan
and other 36 union officers of Obrero Pilipino picketed, barricaded and obstructed the
entry and exit of Universal’s Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal’s
delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations, including Marman’s. Universal
and Tan filed a complaint for damages against the strikers and QC HRM due to the
disruption of their respective business operations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Q.C. Human Resources is liable to damages against Universal and
Tan.

RULING: Yes as to Universal. No as to Tan.

Universal had a contract of employment of temporary workers with QC HRM and

that the latter violated said contract by supplying it with unfit, maladjusted individuals who
staged a strike and disrupted its business operations.

But with regard to damages against Tan, the Court finds that she has no cause of
action against QC HRM. A thorough reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that
Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike effected by the employees of QC
HRM. It is settled that an employer’s liability for acts of its employees attaches only when
the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The
question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in
the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. An employer
incurs no liability when an employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of
employment. Unquestionably, when QC HRM employees staged a strike, they were acting
on their own, beyond the range of their employment. Thus, QC HRM cannot be held liable
for damages to Tan caused by the strike staged by its employees.

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SPOUSES MOSES and BRIGIDA PALISOC vs. ANTONIO BRILLANTESet.al.
G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971
Teehankee, J.

FACTS:

Dominador Palisoc, a minor son of Sps. Palisoc died at the hand of a fellow student
Virgilio L. Daffon (Daffon) during a fistfight that occurred at the laboratory room of Manila
Technical Institute. At that time the classes were in recess. The trial court found Daffon
liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. However, absolved from
liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute alleging that
the clause “so long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. There is no
evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant
officials of the school.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants-school officials be absolved from liability instead of

holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with Daffon.

RULING: Yes.

Under the provisions of Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, the president of a
vocational school and the instructor of the student of the school who caused the death of
his classmate are jointly and severally liable for damages to the parents of the deceased
who was fatally injured at the school’s laboratory room. No liability attaches, however, to a
defendant who was sued as a mere member of the school’s board of directors nor to the
school itself which was not impleaded as a party-defendant.

The phrase used in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code “so long as they (the students)
remain in their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school and includes recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court. Hence, the defendants-
school officials must not be absolved from liability in this case.

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JOSE AMADORA, et.al vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-47745, April 15, 1988
CRUZ, J.

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, went to his school to comply with a requirement for graduation. While in
the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the
former’s death.  The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages
against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the
physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Daffon was convicted, but the
school was absolved from liability.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

RULING: No.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student.  Though the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the
custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when
the incident happened.  It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics requirement.  What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. 
On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision.  Each
was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.  In the absence of a
teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.  Though it was
clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the
shooting incident. 

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ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO, et.al.
G.R. NO. 82465, February 25, 1991
PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, was a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to
join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon; but was not allowed by his parents
but only allowed him to deliver some food to the teachers and was instructed to return at
once. Due to the persuasion of some teachers, Ferdinand stayed. However, one of the
teachers was drowned and Ferdinand was among the rescuers, but the latter died due to
drowning. His parents filed a complaint against the school and the teachers. RTC ruled
against the teachers and absolved the school. However, it was reversed by CA making the
school jointly liable with the teachers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable
to the case at bar

RULING: No.

Applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is clear that before an employer may be
held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or
prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned
tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It
is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class
of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit
from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.

Mere knowledge by principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students
and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to
the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and
neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of
respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of

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being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if
such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

BENJAMIN SALVOSA, et.al. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70458. October 5, 1988
Padilla, J.

FACTS:

Jimmy B. Abon (Abon) shot Napoleon Castro (Castro), a student of the University of
Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC
Unit of the Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF). Abon is armorer of the ROTC Unit of BCF, not
an employee, and he received his salary from AFP. The heirs of Castro sued for damages
against Abon and the officials of BCF with Benjamin Salvosa as the president. RTC and IAC
ruled in favor of the heirs of Castro.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

RULING: No.

Under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis
and called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.”

In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not “at attendance in the school” cannot be
in “recess” thereat. A “recess”, as the concept is embraced in the phrase “at attendance in
the school,” contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where
the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature
does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute “attending school” or being in the
“protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as contemplated in the law.

The cannot hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at
attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily

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liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, a school which offers both academic and technical vocational courses cannot be held
liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic program; however,
considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon
Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue.

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, et.al. vs. JAYSON MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010
Nachura, J.

FACTS:
During the experiment class under the subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo (Tabugo),
in her meantime absence, an accident occurred causing the damage to the left of one
student Jayson Val Miranda (Miranda). The parents of Miranda demanded from St. Joseph
College’s (SJC) to pay for the hospital and medical expenses but the latter denied on the
reason that it was the student who was at fault of the accident for failure to heed the
teacher’s instructions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the school is liable for failure to observe the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries of its students.

RULING: Yes.

The proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of the school to
prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. Under
Article 2180 in relation to Article 218 of the Family Code, the Court ruled that “all of the are
equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for
exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students. The individual petitioners are persons charged with the
teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their
well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these petitioners were remiss in
their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.

The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by St. Joseph College
will not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of
inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening
process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. The school is still liable for the
wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature

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of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
injury to students.

SPOUSES JOSE and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA vs. HON. INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN, et.al.
G.R. NO. L-55963, December 1, 1989
Paras, J.

FACTS:

Sometime on August 21, 1976, a pickup owned and operated by National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), driven officially by Hugo Garcia (Garcia), an employee of said agency
as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Restituto Deligo (Deligo) and Francisco
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners spouses. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla
and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for
treatment. But Fontanilla failed to survive and died.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NIA can be held liable on the act of its employee.

RULING: Yes.

In this particular case, NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and
as such, it becomes answerable for damages under paragraph 6 of Art. 2180 of the new
Civil Code. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of
negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence
of supervision. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the
point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they
were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group,
Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed
limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their
desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and recklessness on the part
of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.

Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence
in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the

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employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the
employer would still be liable.

CHINA AIR LINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PAGSIBINGAN, et.al.
G.R. NO. 45985, May 18, 1990
Regalado, J.

FACTS:

Jose Pagsibigan purchased a plane ticket thru an agency Transaire Travel Agency and the
latter contacted Philippine Airlines (PAL) which at that time was a sales and
ticketing agent of China Airlines (CAL). However, Pagsibingan’s flight was rescheduled
without him knowing. PAL arranged another flight for him which he availed. Months later,
Pagsibingan sued Robert Espiritu, ticketing agent, and PAL for damages. PAL averred that
CAL did not informed them on the rescheduled of flight which was contested by the latter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Espiritu and PAL is liable.
 

HELD: Yes.

As a general proposition, an agent who duly acts as such is not personally liable to

third persons. However, there are admitted exceptions, as in this case where the agent is
being sued for damages arising from a tort committed by his employee. In an action
premised on the employee’s negligence, whereby Pagsibigan seeks recovery for the
damages from both PAL and Espiritu without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is
the direct and primary liability of PAL as an employer. When an injury is caused by
the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the employer. This presumption, however, may be rebutted by
clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. PAL failed to
overcome such presumption.

As found by the court, PAL was duly informed of CAL’s revised schedule, and in fact,

PAL had been issuing and selling ticket based on said revised time schedule. For his
negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable to Pagisbigan under Article 2176 of the CC. For the
failure of PAL to rebut the legal presumption of negligence, it is also primarily liable under

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Article 2180 of Civil Code. Under Article 2180, all that is required is that the employee, by
his negligence, committed a quasi-delict which caused damage to another, and this suffices
to hold the employer primarily and solidarily liable for the tortious act of the employee.
PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of the amount which it will have
to pay the offended party’s claim.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT and LEONARDO

DIONESIO
G.R. NO. L-65295, March 10, 1987
Feliciano, J.

FACTS:

Leonardo Dionisio (Dionesio) was on his way home from cocktails and dinner
meeting with his boss bumped into a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. He suffered some
physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionisio filed an action for damages against
Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident
to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and
headlights, and while intoxicated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable.

RULING: Yes.

The court agreed with the lower courts that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of Carbonel. The collision of
Dionisio’s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk,
the truck driver must be held responsible. In one of the case, a defendant who blocks the
sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to
the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway
without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into
it. In this case, the court held that Dionisio’s negligence was only contributory, that the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury remained the truck driver’s lack of due care

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and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts.

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