ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:

• Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines was born in Tarlac
on the year 1960 of Filipino parents and 1935 constitution is the law applicable at
that time.
• However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship under CA 63 for
rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.
• Then, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630 and ran and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 elections over petitioner Bengson.
• petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House
of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
• HRET dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. Natural-
born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization under CA 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove
that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided by law to become
a Filipino citizen.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
 Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As
a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In this case, Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630. Having taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
 DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
Facts:

• Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract

worker then he converted into Islam and married petitioner Djumantan in
accordance with the Islamic rites and returned to Philippines.
• petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the "guests" of
Banez and made it appear that he was merely repaying the hospitability extended
to him during his stay in Indonesia.
• Then, Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his guests and
the petitioner and her children lived in the house of Banez and were admitted to
the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of
1940.
• In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage" but was dismissed for lack of
merit.
• In 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor
to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14,
1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
• Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who
subsequently referred the letter to the CID and petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell, then later on was released after posting cash bond and moved for
the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married
to a Filipino citizen but was dismissed on the ground that the marriage is irregular
and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from
temporary to permanent resident legal.
Ruling:
No. There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into
the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation. Never was the marriage of
petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary
visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the
nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
 There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted,
much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien
to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not
ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID
to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has
no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status
and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for
permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the
country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married
to Filipino citizens.
 BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. BEATO GO CALLANO, MANUEL GO CALLANO, GONZALO
GO CALLANO, JULIO GO CALLANO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:

• Petitioners, Go Callano brothers, are illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a

Filipino citizen, with her common-law husband — a Chinese citizen. All
were born in Leyte Philippines.
• In 1946, they, together with their parents, went to Amoy, China. In 1961, they
applied with the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for entry into the
Philippines as Filipino citizens.
• The Consulate made thereafter the appropriate investigation, and on the
basis of evidence presented issued a certificate of registration and identity to the
effect that the applicant had submitted sufficient evidence of their citizenship and
identity and had been allowed to register in the Consulates Filipino citizens and to
travel directly to the Philippines. On December 26 of the same year 1961, they
arrived in Manila.
• Board of Immigration Commissioners issued, without any previous notice and
hearing, an order reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated
January 4, 1962, admitting Beato and his three brothers for entry as citizens;
ordering their exclusion as aliens not properly documented for admission pursuant
to Section 27 (a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and
ordering that they be returned to the port whence they came or to the country of
which they were nationals, upon the ground that they had been able to enter this
country and gain admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulently secured
authorization.
• The GO Callano brothers subsequently filed an action for injunction to restrain
the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of
Immigration from executing the exclusion order. CFI issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the respondents from deporting the petitioners.
NOTWITHSTANDING, the Court held that the petitioners are citizens of the
Republic of China on the ground: (1) because petitioners stayed in China for a
period of fifteen years before returning to the Philippines, they must be
considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) as petitioners were recognized
by their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the
Chinese law of nationality.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners lost their Filipino citizenship by staying in China for a period of
fifteen years, and because they were recognized by their common-law father.
Ruling:
No. The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth
subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by
reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the
Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved by a Philippine court without encroaching
on the legal system of China. The petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and
their status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with Article
15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows: "Laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine
Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law,"
which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be
determined by no other than the Philippine law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides
that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
of a foreign country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent authority
that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by
marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his
nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing
Philippine citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their
former status by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship
which closely bears on the petitioners is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in
support of the conclusion that petition lost their Philippine citizenship because the law requires an
express renunciation which means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language,
as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
 TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.
Facts:

• The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
• On 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
• The petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
• The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown in La Union in the 2007 elections.
She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the 2010 elections this
time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May
13, 2010.
• The private respondents all registered voters of La Union, filed separate petitions
for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective
post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
• The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since 2006, she ceased
to be an Australian citizen and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
• The trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to
renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
Ruling:
Yes. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic. the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
 However, a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation
of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under
oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
in Jacot v. Dal, when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to
run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:
Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take
the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective
public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing
by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation
of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No.
9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The fact that petitioner won the elections cannot cure the defect of her candidacy.
Garnering the greatest number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all
those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether
they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run
for public office.
The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law,
rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless
she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and
hold any elective office in the Philippines.
 CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
Facts:

• Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence

of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225, before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and on the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
• Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor and respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Lanao Del Norte.
• COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. COMELEC dismissed
the petition filed by Balua for its failure to present evidence with his contention that
Arnado is disqualified in running for mayor.
• Then petitioner Maquiling, contends that that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed
as the winner.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts
to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
Ruling:
Yes. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does
not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for
any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier
renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen,
to hold any public office.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment
to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.