G.R. No.

167979 March 15, 2006

WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased

JOSE K. C. UY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON, As Presiding
Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, sitting at
Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K. H. UY, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the August 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72678,1 affirming the January 22, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52
of Bacolod City in Special Proceedings No. 97-241,2 as well as the April 29, 2005
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.3

The facts of the case show that Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate on August 20,
1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian
S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner).

On February 18, 1997, Special Proceedings No. 97-241 was instituted and Lilia Hofileña
was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased. Petitioner moved
to reconsider the order appointing Lilia Hofileña as special administrator with prayer that
letters of administration be issued to him instead.4

On June 9, 1998, Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña’s appointment as

special administrator and denied her petition to be appointed as regular administrator.
Meanwhile, letters of administration were granted to petitioner, who took his oath of
office as administrator on June 23, 1998.

On February 17, 1999, Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to

intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu of
petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the deceased, and has
knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate.

The trial court initially denied private respondent’s motion to intervene,5 but on March
16, 2000,6 it reconsidered its earlier order and appointed private respondent as co-
administrator of the estate. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner then moved that private respondent bring into the estate properties belonging
to the deceased, which motion was granted by the trial court. Not satisfied with the
compliance of private respondent, petitioner reiterated his motion for removal of the
former as co-administrator, but the same was denied.

1
The trial court found that private respondent substantially complied with the order
directing him to bring into the estate properties owned by or registered in the name of
the deceased not subject of any adverse claim or controversy when he listed the
alleged properties suspected to be concealed, embezzled or conveyed away by the
persons named therein. Thus, it found no cogent reason to remove private respondent
as co-administrator.7

Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari
which however, dismissed the petition.

The Court of Appeals held that the refusal of the trial court to remove private respondent
as co-administrator of the estate is neither an error of jurisdiction nor a grave abuse of
discretion; that the appointment of private respondent was justified; that the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators; that the institution of a case for annulment of title and
reconveyance against respondent does not justify private respondent’s removal as co-
administrator.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition on the following
grounds:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE RESPONDENT

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN GRAVE
ABUSE OF THEIR DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION (sic),
IN VIOLATION [OF] THE ESTABLISHED AND ACCEPTED RULE OF LAW AND IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND EQUITY IN
APPOINTING A CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE (IN THE PROCESS OF
SETTLEMENT) WHERE THERE IS AN INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATOR WHOSE
APPOINTMENT IS FIRM, FINAL, IMPLEMENTED AND INAPPEALABLE, AND WHICH
(sic) APPOINTMENT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED, RECALLED, REVOKED OR
RESCINDED BY APPOINTING, AT THAT, A PERSON

(a)

ALIEN TO THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, WITH VARIOUS SERIOUS

INTERESTS (ACTUAL JUDICIAL CONTROVERSIES) IN CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF
THE ESTATE, AND

(B)

WITH NO PROPER INTEREST IN THE ESTATE AND WHO IS PERSONALLY UNFIT,

UNSUITABLE, UNWORTHY, UNDESERVING OF THE TRUST INHERENT IN THE
POSITION OF CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, AND UNACCEPTABLE AND
REPULSIVE TO THE FAMILY OF THE LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED; AND
THEN REFUSING TO REMOVE HIM AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR AFTER IT WAS

2
SHOWN THAT HIS REPRESENTATIONS ON WHICH HE WAS APPOINTED CO-
ADMINISTRATOR WERE EMPTY AND FALSE; AND

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DENIED

PETITIONER HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS
RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES BY
NOT ADDRESSING AND RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT TO IT BY THE
PETITIONER, MORE ESPECIFICALLY THE ISSUES OF

(1)

RES JUDICATA AND STABILITY OF THE JUDGMENT APPOINTING THE

PETITIONER HEREIN AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE IN
QUESTION, AND

(2)

DECIDING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE

RULES SET DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT ON THE MATTER.8

The main issues for resolution are: (1) whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing private respondent as co-administrator to the estate of the
deceased; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals deprived petitioner of his constitutional
right to due process and his right to petition the government for redress of grievances by
not addressing the issues raised before it.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final,

unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no authority to re-open the issue
of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator;
that private respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of interest with
it; that the trial court’s appointment of private respondent as co-administrator constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular administrator of the estate
of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9, 1998. However, private respondent in his
motion to intervene sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother
of the decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter’s properties. Thus,
the trial court, while retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed private respondent
as co-administrator of the estate.

The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased
persons either summarily or through the process of administration.9 In the case at bar,
the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to private

3
respondent as co-administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the
preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are as follows:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named

in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.

The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the

attendant facts and circumstances.10 In Sioca v. Garcia,11 this Court set aside the order
of preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the
estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights
is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a
person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not
be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in
error.

x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to

those immediately interested in the estate. x x x.12 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court.
Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-
administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time
attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate
under his administration. In its March 16, 2000 Order,13 the trial court found thus:

Going over all the arguments of the parties, after hearing has been set relative thereto,
this Court has observed that indeed the judicial administrator had not submitted to the

4
Court any report about the Estate under his administration except those involving the
cases he filed and/or intervened in other branches. This may be due to his being
inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him from the
administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However, considering that
the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to have
enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it
is the feeling of this Court that it will be very beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed
co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of the
Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the alleged enormous
properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedent’s Estate pending before this
Court.14

A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of
a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration.15 The practice of
appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v. Court
of Appeals,16 this Court reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-
administrators under certain circumstances, to wit:

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-

administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;
and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the
appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is
erroneous. In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in
modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the
same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are
made by the interested parties.18 In the instant case, the estate of the deceased has not
yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court.

The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised by petitioner. We see
no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the Court of Appeals, because its findings
of fact is conclusive and binding on the parties and not subject to review by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule. 19

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72678 affirming the January 22, 2002 Order of the Regional
Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 97-241, as well as the April 29, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net

5
G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati,
Metro Manila and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.

Andres V. Maglipon for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 15 January 1985, cancelling the
appointment of the petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix in Special
Proceedings No. 021 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales
Vda. de Favis," Branch 143, RTC, Makati, Metro Manila; and the Order of 15 May 1985
denying reconsideration of the same.

The facts are:

Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate
proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de
Favis. Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only heirs, namely,
Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.

On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and
private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.

On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States
accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country,
private respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to
the interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of said motion was served upon
petitioner's then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had
been suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law throughout the
Philippines. 1

After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge Zoilo
Aguinaldo issued an Order dated 4 December 1984 which required Beatriz F. Gonzales

6
and the other parties to file their opposition, if any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed
the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the latter was still in the
United States attending to her ailing husband.

In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of

administration granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the
administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales. The Court, in explaining its
action, stated:

. . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the
best interest of the estate if two administrators who are the children of the
deceased would jointly administer the same. Unfortunately, as events
have shown, the two administrators have not seen eye to eye with each
other and most of the time they have been at loggerheads with each other
to the prejudice of the estate. Beatriz F. Gonzales has been absent from
the country since October, 1984 as she is in the United States as stated in
the motion and opposition of Asterio Favis dated December 11, 1984, and
she has not returned even up to this date so that Teresa F. Olbes has
been left alone to administer the estate. Under these circumstances, and
in order that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient
manner, the court believes that there should be now only one
administrator of the estate. 2

Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. Her motion was opposed
separately by private respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia Gomez. In
her manifestation and opposition to petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Cecilia
Gomez stated that it would be pointless to re-appoint Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix of Teresa Olbes, as the former would be leaving soon for the United
States to attend to unfinished business. Moreover, she expressed satisfaction with the
manner respondent Teresa Olbes had been managing and administering the estate.

In his Order dated 7 May 1986, a part of which is hereunder quoted, respondent Judge
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. He said:

xxx xxx xxx

After a consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the oppositions

thereto, the court believes and so holds that it should be denied. The court
in its discretion has issued its order dated January 15, 1985 cancelling the
appointment and the letters of administration issued to Beatriz F.
Gonzales and it reiterates the same for the best interest of the estate of
the deceased. It is noteworthy that of the four heirs of the deceased, one
of them being the movant Beatriz F. Gonzales, two of them, namely,
Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes, opposed the motion. The other
heir Asterio Favis, did not file or make any comment to the motion. As can
be gathered from the oppositions of Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F.

7
 Olbes, the reappointment of Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix
would not be conducive to the efficient and orderly administration of the
estate of the deceased Ramona Gonzales vda. de Favis. 3

Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15 January
1985 should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was
not shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under
Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or

administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal — If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .

While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the
probate court in the matter of removal of an administrator, 4 we find, in the case at bar,
sufficient cause to reverse the order of the probate court removing petitioner as co-
administratrix of the estate.

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the
court must appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased 5 who shall act as
representative not only of the court appointing him but also of the heirs and the creditors
of the estate. 6 In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two
or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented. 7

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. 8 This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for
the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other
hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 9

Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause. 10 Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an
administrator. 11

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a

8
removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator
not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems
sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a
determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-
administratrix on any of the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of the
petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the charges brought
against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the removal of the petitioner on
the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have
existed between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have
prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that petitioner had been absent from
the country since October 1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned
order.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with
harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between
such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. 12 Conflicts of
opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with
different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-
administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate
and its heirs.

We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a quo failed to find
hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-
administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of
incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate
according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her
continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the
estate. Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the
other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly administered and conserved for
the benefit of the heirs; and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has prejudiced
or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant the probate court into removing petitioner as
co-administratrix.

Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the

estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the country since October
1984 and had not returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order,
leaving respondent Olbes alone to administer the estate.

In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985, petitioner
explained to the court a quo that her absence from the country was due to the fact that
she had to accompany her ailing husband to the United States for medical
treatment. 13 It appears too that petitioner's absence from the country was known to
respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually
maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the

9
estate during the petitioner's absence from the country. 14 As a matter of fact, petitioner,
while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank
of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests
accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the
payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration. 15

The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-
administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties.
Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence
outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is
not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

. . . It seems quite clear that a temporary absence from the state on

account of ill health, or on account of business or for purposes of travel or
pleasure, would not necessarily establish the fact that an executor "has
removed" from the estate, within the intent of the statute. The learned
surrogate was evidently satisfied that the sojourn of these executors in
New Jersey was nothing more than a departure from the state for the
benefit of relatives, not designed to constitute a permanent change of
abode, and contemplating a return to New York as soon as the purpose of
their absence should be accomplished. In this view, I am inclined to think
that he was right in refusing to hold that he was constrained to revoke the
letters by the provisions of the Code to which I have referred. I therefore
advise an affirmance of the order. 16

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other
three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez)
have opposed the retention or re-appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the
estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the
court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. In re William's Adm'r., the
court held:

A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as expressly

authorized by Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of decedent had lost their
right of precedence, could not remove the appointee merely because of
the request of relatives and the belief upon the part of the court that the
best interest of deceased would be thereby subserved, since the
administrator had such an interest as entitled him to protection from
removal without cause. 17

As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory

cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in

10
removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without
just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated 15
January 1985 removing petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix in Special
Proceedings No. 021, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ramona
Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of the same Court dated 15 May 1985 denying
reconsideration of said Order, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter
Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent

Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters
of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties,
and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate
of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents.

11
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses
Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio
II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and
Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic
relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was
eventually acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among
others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I
and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial Hospital.
Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of
the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at the
time of the marriage:

xxxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of
plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this
very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that
plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for
visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court.
The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour
a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately
stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her
and her siblings stress and anxiety.5

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the

12
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2)
as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded
preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before
the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated
to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the
petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the
hands of usurpers is untrue.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that
Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of
the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay
v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a
voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code,
were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage
the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing
Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-

Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the
estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same,
or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the
court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters
of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject
estate:

13
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch
78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the
intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor
upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving
weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and

Isabel, we considered that:

1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined
and unliquidated; and

4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of
his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole
administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks
to administer.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of
preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the
Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests
and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.

Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir
of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no
interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations
since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically demonstrate
the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and
(4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be
represented."

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering
merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of
this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.

14
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is
the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator
for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate,
but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a
decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or
community property forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community
property.

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator

of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an
exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states
that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In
addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x
x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."

In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the
benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the office of

15
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
of appointment.14

Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the
best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office.18

In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-administrators
during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate
thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and
executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the administration thereof.
Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory
heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents
thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.19

Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as petitioner-
wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband,
to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be
unfair to her proprietary interests."20

Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we allowed
the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-
administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while
the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin"
has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in
the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between
next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,
as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated
preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are
Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or
Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the appointment of
an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the
legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of
the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found unsuitable.
Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as

16
administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate.

In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the
estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as
special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent
and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court
pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early part
of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de
Dayrit, we clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals,
and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases
do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases
constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or
more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such
prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances
other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In
Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's
status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to be a
"special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since
the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator,
we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive
status in the selection of another special administrator.

In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in
her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest
from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was
not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken
into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the
appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."

Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-
administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half
of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of
any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her
proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have
more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she
possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent
but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate
may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court
of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular
administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there
must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."

17
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based
upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not
necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on the
order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of
letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next

of kin," thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to
the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine
and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon
this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the estate
should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate
is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.

In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate
and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the
foregoing survey of cases.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso
facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the
heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section
6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator
of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion
of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.

18
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand,
and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive,
which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to
Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;

2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously
as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying
settlement thereof; and

3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has not
looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate
makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to
be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s
appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
following:

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted
in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels
of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal
properties, contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of the
decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to
said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent
did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her
estate.37

In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the following
imputations of Isabel that:

1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;

2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;

3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or persons;
several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and

4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents;38

Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the
functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:

1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her
pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office,

19
 arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments
authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;"

2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous objections to
Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the
Court of Appeals;

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one
of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it
cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a
possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.

While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an
inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of
the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that
Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew
existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his
failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he
actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of
Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list
of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully
discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs,
if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become
even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his
interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the
inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our
1awp++i1

mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their
grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other
witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their
grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More
importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III)
who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent
Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to facilitate
the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to
protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped out as
among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the
estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:

xxxx

20
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to
complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"

5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"

6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before
it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the
estate; and

7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for
the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.44

In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon
death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and
settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to
resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with
him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable
person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the
question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil
Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
administer the estate of the decedent.

Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:

The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and
the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after
the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which

21
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III
asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and
void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the
petition filed by him:

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from the
Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the
Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division
acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila.47

For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different division
created by the Supreme Court.

The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice
Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
provides:

Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions

and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and
incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members
of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself
or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced
through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only
one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has
retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from
acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by
a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed
as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall
replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other
Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution
are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the

22
motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the Division
to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the
participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the Supreme
Court's summer session held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No.
183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment
of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE

GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL,
JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1 respondent Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the
lower court in Special Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the appointment
of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of the estate of the late Domingo
Gabriel.

Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that decision of respondent
court, hence the need to examine the chronology of antecedent facts, as found by respondent court
and detailed hereunder, pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now before us.

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of
administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate,
engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the
decedent. 2

23
On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of the petition on June 29,
1988, on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be
granted. The court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed despite
such publication of the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex
parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private
respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of
P30,000.00. 4

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was
published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private
respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging
that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she
thereby had an interest in said estate. 5

On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and
Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident
was set for hearing on January 16, 1989. 6

On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed
Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as
the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein
petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and on order of the court, petitioners filed an "Opposition to the
Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989, alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal
notice of the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter,
should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse
interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of the
properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to
petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered by private
respondent. 8

On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any
circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that
she is a legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed administrator is unworthy,
incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances. 9 The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated December 22, 1989. 10

From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
on the following grounds:

1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are null and void,
being contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on the matter;

2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders, gravely acted with abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction, hence said orders are null
and void ab initio; and

3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to perform the duties of

an administrator as he would give prior preference to the claims of his mother against
the estate itself. 11

24
As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition
for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there
was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due process as such service is not a
jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of
the order of preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by
appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari. 12

In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private
respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia.
Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be
appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner
Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an
illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of
preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in not following the order of preference because the same is not absolute and the choice
of who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact that
petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for appointment despite the lapse
of more than nine (9) months from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the
probate court to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several
properties of the deceased have already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would
have no interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent submits that it
has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from being appointed or serving as
administrator.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is

named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.)

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of
letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the

25
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the
order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption
behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. 13

This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the
preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because
she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the law,
the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On
this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel,
has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one
who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. 16

Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed
administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from
the death of her husband, as required under the rules.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or
next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of
administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion
that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her
husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration. 17

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is
not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the
permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an
alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests,
to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said
judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in
error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as
would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82
provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal.
There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or

26
in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant
the removal of the administrator. 20 In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the
deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the
removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on
the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may
also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail
to apply therefor within a given time. 21

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the
estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is
both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only
one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit:
"When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a
recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services
rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been
upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to
have different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; 25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to
have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a
co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private
respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to
have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and
illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested
persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and
supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the

validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and
ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special
Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO
VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS,
CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO,
GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,

27
namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE
R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ,
JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA
PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-
MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and
set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de
facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence,
Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s
and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of
the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If
Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was
a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate
estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and

28
his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of
the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage
in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband
and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the
contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa
Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more
than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married.
To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in
the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form
526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo
J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado
in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to
Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

29
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma,
Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as
one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo
Rustia as her parent/guardian.20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in
1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat
he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr.,
Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following:
(1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-
Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their
illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she
was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the
oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground
that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly
threshed out upon submission of evidence.

30
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late
Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila
on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of
the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper
and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right
to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the
estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed
administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in
question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her
actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the
parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the
continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

31
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by
the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution
dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of
the private respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila,
Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion
for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of
the amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been
legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of
Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-
appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma
S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all

32
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the
bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June
15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the
shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the
said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted
to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and
presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,

but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and
wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the
contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

33
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here,
the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to
her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married
to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public
documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to
support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado
and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but
strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest
who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had
no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In
this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things
in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation
of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive

presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even
in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with
Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida
de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to
Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-
blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado,51 were her natural children.52

34
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be
natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the
same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to
allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a
parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis
the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference
when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different
persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters
should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the
portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood,
they shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each
other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters
(nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake
of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of
her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The
records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with
Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of
the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and
no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument

35
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of
an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As

such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had
no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which
granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first
recognized or acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any
of the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth
until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through
the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation:
the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil

36
Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was
Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in
the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing
contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the
newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it
never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in
this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an
absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the
person claiming its existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs
of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting
of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

37
 (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the
one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of
kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila,
Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado
who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who
may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s
grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial
court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be
inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective
shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived
Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from
among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing
of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992

ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed LINDAIN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES APOLINIA VALIENTE and FEDERICO
ILA, respondents.

Maria Rosario B. Ragasa and Oscar L. Lindain for petitioners.

38
Jose C. Felimon for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 8, 1990 of the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the complaint for annulment of a sale of registered land, thereby reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City.

The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows:

When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-63540 (Exh. D-1). On
November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then already a widow and
acting as guardian of her minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the defendants spouses Apolonia
Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT No. NT-66311 was
issued to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila.

The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the
mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale (Exh. B for the plaintiffs and
Exh. 2 for the defendants) and although at first they were reluctant to buy the
property as the sale would not be legal, the registered owners thereof being all
minors, upon advice of their counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the
counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized the documents,
that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court, considering
that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it registered in
their names under Certificate of Title No. 66311 (Exhibit C for the plaintiffs).

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants
is null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval.

The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of
the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the
youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to
rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching
the age of majority, has already prescribed.

On May 25, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City rendered a decision for the plaintiffs
(now petitioners), the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the following:

(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by the guardian Dolores Luluquisin in favor
of the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila over the property of
the minors covered by the TCT No. NT-66311 to be null and void;

(2) Ordering defendants Spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila to surrender to
the Register of Deeds of San Jose City Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66311;

39
 (3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of San Jose City to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 66311 in the names of Spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila;

(4) Ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in lieu
of what was ordered cancelled in the names of plaintiffs, namely: Elena, Oscar,
Celia, Teresita and Virgilio, all surnamed Lindain;

(5) Ordering the defendants to vacate the lot covered by TCT No. NT-66311 and
deliver the possession of the same to the plaintiffs subject however to the rights of
the defendants as buyers, possessors and builders in good faith;

(6) Without cost. (pp. 41,42, Rollo.)

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed and another one was entered
dismissing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling
of this Court in Ortañez vs. Dela Cruz, O.G., Vol. 60, No. 24, pp. 3434, 3438-3439, that:

A father or mother acting as legal administrator of the property of the child under
parental authority cannot, therefore, dispose of the child's property without judicial
authority if it is worth more than P2,000.00, notwithstanding the bond that he has
filed for the protection of the child's property. But when the value of such property is
less than P2,000.00, the permission of the court for its alienation or disposition may
be dispensed with. The father or mother, as the case may be, is allowed by law to
alienate or dispose of the same freely, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the
scruples of conscience. (p. 64, Rollo.)

It upheld the sale and dismissed the complaint of the heirs who thereupon filed this petition for
review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and in ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in total disregard of the findings of facts of
the trial court and contrary to the provisions of law on contracts and guardianship.

The principal issue before us is whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors'
property by their mother.

We find merit in the petition for review.

Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed transaction occurred,
provides:

Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance.

Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of
the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the
property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled,
"General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and
management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her

40
minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority
and approval.

In the case of Visaya, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., G.R. No. L-8300, November 18, 1955, we held that:

It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil Code the mother, Juana Visaya, was the
legal administrator of the property of her minor children. But as such legal
administrator she had no power to compromise their claims, for compromise has
always been deemed equivalent to an alienation (transigere est alienare), and is an
act of strict ownership that goes beyond mere administration. Hence, Art. 2032 of the
new Civil Code provides:

The Court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by

guardians, parents, absentee's representatives and administrators or
executors of decedent's estates. (Emphasis supplied.)

This restriction on the power of parents to compromise claims affecting their children
is in contrast to the terms of Art. 1810 of the old Civil Code that empowered parents
to enter into such compromises, without requiring court approval unless the amount
involved was in excess of 2000 pesetas. At present, the Court['s] approval is
indispensable regardless of the amount involved. (Emphasis ours.)

In the recent case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407, 409, this Court stated.

Surviving widow has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to
the vendees the undivided share of her minor children in the property, as her powers
as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the
power of disposition, and she should have first secured court approval before
alienation of the property.

The above ruling was a reiteration of Inton vs. Quintana, 81 Phil. 97.

The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not credible for they
knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without court approval could
not validly convey to them the property of her minor children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to
enter into the transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith when they went ahead and
bought the land from her anyway.

One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title of his vendor
cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good faith as against the owner of the property or for an
interest therein (Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706).

The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over immovables
prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in 1966, the action to
recover the property had not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that
of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City dated May 25, 1989, being correct, is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.

41
G.R. No. 146989 February 7, 2007

MELENCIO GABRIEL, represented by surviving spouse, FLORDELIZA V. GABRIEL, Petitioner,

vs.
NELSON BILON, ANGEL BRAZIL AND ERNESTO PAGAYGAY, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, respectively dated August 4, 2000 and February 7, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52001 entitled
"Nelson Bilon, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al."

The challenged decision reversed and set aside the decision2 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dismissing respondents’ complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions,
and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal but not of
illegal deductions subject to the modification that respondents be immediately reinstated to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges instead of being paid separation pay.

Petitioner, represented by his surviving spouse, Flordeliza V. Gabriel, was the owner-operator of a
public transport business, "Gabriel Jeepney," with a fleet of 54 jeepneys plying the Baclaran-
Divisoria-Tondo route. Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which included respondents, operating under
a "boundary system" of ₱400 per day.

The facts3 are as follows:

On November 15, 1995, respondents filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal
deductions, and separation pay against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). These were consolidated and docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-07420-95.4

On December 15, 1995, the complaint was amended, impleading as party respondent the Bacoor
Transport Service Cooperative, Inc., as both parties are members of the cooperative.

Respondents alleged the following:

1) That they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney, driving their respective units bearing
Plate Nos. PHW 553, NXU 155, and NWW 557, under a boundary system of ₱400 per day,
plying Baclaran to Divisoria via Tondo, and vice versa, since December 1990, November
1984 and November 1991, respectively, up to April 30, 1995,5 driving five days a week, with
average daily earnings of ₱400;

2) That they were required/forced to pay additional ₱55.00 per day for the following: a)
₱20.00 police protection; b) ₱20.00 washing; c) ₱10.00 deposit; and [d)] ₱5.00 garage fees;

3) That there is no law providing the operator to require the drivers to pay police protection,
deposit, washing, and garage fees.

4) That on April 30, 1995, petitioner told them not to drive anymore, and when they went to
the garage to report for work the next day, they were not given a unit to drive; and

42
 5) That the boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered regular employees of the
jeepney operators. Being such, they are entitled to security of tenure. Petitioner, however,
dismissed them without factual and legal basis, and without due process.

On his part, petitioner contended that:

1) He does not remember if the respondents were ever under his employ as drivers of his
passenger jeepneys. Certain, however, is the fact that neither the respondents nor other
drivers who worked for him were ever dismissed by him. As a matter of fact, some of his
former drivers just stopped reporting for work, either because they found some other
employment or drove for other operators, and like the respondents, the next time he heard
from them was when they started fabricating unfounded complaints against him;

2) He made sure that none of the jeepneys would stay idle even for a day so he could collect
his earnings; hence, it had been his practice to establish a pool of drivers. Had respondents
manifested their desire to drive his units, it would have been immaterial whether they were
his former drivers or not. As long as they obtained the necessary licenses and references,
they would have been accommodated and placed on schedule;

3) While he was penalized or made to pay a certain amount in connection with similar
complaints by other drivers in a previous case before this, it was not because his culpability
was established, but due to technicalities involving oversight and negligence on his part by
not participating in any stage of the investigation thereof; and

4) Respondents’ claim that certain amounts, as enumerated in the complaint, were deducted
from their day’s earnings is preposterous. Indeed, there were times when deductions were
made from the day’s earnings of some drivers, but such were installment payments for the
amount previously advanced to them. Most drivers, when they got involved in accidents or
violations of traffic regulations, managed to settle them, and in the process they had to spend
some money, but most of the time they did not have the needed amount so they secured
cash advances from him, with the understanding that the same should be paid back by
installments through deductions from their daily earnings or boundary.

On the other hand, Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc. (BTSCI) declared that it should not
be made a party to the case because: 1) [I]t has nothing to do with the employment of its member-
drivers. The matter is between the member-operator and their respective member-drivers. The
member-drivers’ tenure of employment, compensation, work conditions, and other aspects of
employment are matters of arrangement between them and the member-operators concerned, and
the BTSCI has nothing to do with it, as can be inferred from the Management Agreement between
BTSCI and the member-operators; and 2) [T]he amount allegedly deducted from respondents and
the purpose for which they were applied were matters that the cooperative was not aware of, and
much less imposed on them.

On September 17, 1996, respondents filed a motion to re-raffle the case for the reason that the
Labor Arbiter (Hon. Roberto I. Santos) failed "to render his decision within thirty (30) calendar days,
without extension, after the submission of the case for decision."

On September 18, 1996, said Labor Arbiter inhibited himself from further handling the case due to
"personal reasons."

43
On November 8, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora, to whom the case was re-raffled, ordered the
parties to file their respective memoranda within ten days, after which the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.

On March 17, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (Hon. Ricardo C. Nora) handed down his decision, the
dispositive portion of which is worded as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of

[respondents’] dismissal and ordering [petitioner] Melencio Gabriel to pay the [respondents] the total
amount of ONE MILLION THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS [₱1,034,000,] representing
[respondents’] backwages and separation pay as follows:

1. Nelson Bilon

Backwages ₱ 284,800

Separation Pay 26,400 ₱ 321,200

2. Angel Brazil

Backwages ₱ 294,800

Separation Pay 96,800 391,600

3. Ernesto Pagaygay

Backwages ₱ 294,800

Separation Pay 26,400 321,200

₱ 1,034,000

[Petitioner] Melencio Gabriel is likewise ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to five percent
(5%) of the judgment award or the amount of ₱51,700 within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision.

All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

Incidentally, on April 4, 1997, petitioner passed away. On April 18, 1997, a copy of the above
decision was delivered personally to petitioner’s house. According to respondents, petitioner’s
surviving spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, and their daughter, after reading the contents of the decision
and after they had spoken to their counsel, refused to receive the same. Nevertheless, Bailiff Alfredo
V. Estonactoc left a copy of the decision with petitioner’s wife and her daughter but they both refused
to sign and acknowledge receipt of the decision.7

The labor arbiter’s decision was subsequently served by registered mail at petitioner’s residence and
the same was received on May 28, 1997.

44
On May 16, 1997, counsel for petitioner filed an entry of appearance with motion to dismiss the case
for the reason that petitioner passed away last April 4, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner appealed the labor arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission, First Division, contending that the labor arbiter erred:

1. In holding that [petitioner] Gabriel dismissed the complainants, Arb. Nora committed a
serious error in the findings of fact which, if not corrected, would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to [petitioner] Gabriel;

2. In holding that ‘strained relations’ already exist between the parties, justifying an award of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, Arb. Nora not only committed a serious error in the
findings of fact, but he also abused his discretion;

3. In computing the amount of backwages allegedly due [respondents] from 30 April 1995 to
15 March 1997, Arb. Nora abused his discretion, considering that the case had been
submitted for decision as early as 1 March 1996 and that the same should have been
decided as early as 31 March 1996;

4. In using ‘₱400.00’ and ‘22 days’ as factors in computing the amount of backwages
allegedly due [respondents], Arb. Nora abused his discretion and committed a serious error
in the findings of fact, considering that there was no factual or evidentiary basis therefor;

5. In using ‘33.5 months’ as factor in the computation of the amount of backwages allegedly
due [respondents], Arb. Nora committed a serious error in the findings of fact[,] because
even if it is assumed that backwages are due from 30 April 1995 to 15 March 1997, the
period between the two dates is only 22½ months, and not 33½ months as stated in the
appealed decision; and

6. In not dismissing the case[,] despite notice of the death of [petitioner] Gabriel before final
judgment, Arb. Nora abused his discretion and committed a serious error of law.8

On July 3, 1997, respondents filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the
"surety bond is defective" and the appeal was "filed out of time," which move was opposed by
petitioner.

Subsequently, on April 28, 1998, the NLRC promulgated its first decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside. The
above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of employer-employee relationship.

SO ORDERED.9

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that the decision did not discuss the
issue of the timeliness of the appeal. The lack of employer-employee relationship was mentioned in
the dispositive portion, which issue was not raised before the labor arbiter or discussed in the body
of the questioned decision. In view of the issues raised by respondents in their motion, the NLRC
rendered its second decision on October 29, 1998. The pertinent portions are hereby quoted thus:

45
… In the case at bar, [petitioner] Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the
pendency of the case. A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while
Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997 without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime.
The decision was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same.
His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents.
Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive
them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the party’s residence is not applicable in the instant case
because this presupposes that the party is still living and is just not available to receive the decision.

The preceding considered, the decision of the labor arbiter has not become final because there was
no proper service of copy thereof to [petitioner] ….

Undoubtedly, this case is for recovery of money which does not survive, and considering that the
decision has not become final, the case should have been dismissed and the appeal no longer
entertained….

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of April 28, 1998 is set aside and vacated.
Furthermore, the instant case is dismissed and complainants are directed to pursue their claim
against the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Melencio Gabriel.

SO ORDERED.10

Aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
by way of a petition for certiorari. On August 4, 2000, the CA reversed the decisions of the NLRC:

Article 223 of the Labor Code categorically mandates that "an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash bond or surety bond x x x." It is beyond peradventure then
that the non-compliance with the above conditio sine qua non, plus the fact that the appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period, should have been enough reasons to dismiss the appeal.

In any event, even conceding ex gratia that such procedural infirmity [were] inexistent, this petition
would still be tenable based on substantive aspects.

The public respondent’s decision, dated April 28, 1998, is egregiously wrong insofar as it was
anchored on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. Well-settled is the rule that the
boundary system used in jeepney and (taxi) operations presupposes an employer-employee
relationship (National Labor Union v. Dinglasan, 98 Phil. 649) ….

The NLRC ostensibly tried to redeem itself by vacating the decision April 28, 1998…. By so doing,
however, it did not actually resolve the matter definitively. It merely relieved itself of such burden by
suggesting that the petitioners "pursue their claim against the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Melencio Gabriel…."

In the instant case, the decision (dated March 17, 1997) of the Labor Arbiter became final and
executory on account of the failure of the private respondent to perfect his appeal on time….

Thus, we disagree with the ratiocination of the NLRC that the death of the private respondent on
April 4, 1997 ipso facto negates recovery of the money claim against the successors-in-interest ….

46
Rather, this situation comes within the aegis of Section 3, Rule III of the NLRC Manual on Execution
of Judgment, which provides:

SECTION 3. Execution in Case of Death of Party. – Where a party dies after the finality of the
decision/entry of judgment of order, execution thereon may issue or one already issued may be
enforced in the following cases:

a) x x x ;

b) In case of death of the losing party, against his successor-in-interest, executor or

administrator;

c) In case of death of the losing party after execution is actually levied upon any of his
property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the sheriff making the sale
shall account to his successor-in-interest, executor or administrator for any surplus in his
hands.

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition though, We are not entirely in accord with the labor
arbiter’s decision awarding separation pay in favor of the petitioners. In this regard, it [is] worth
mentioning that in Kiamco v. NLRC,11 citing Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC,12 the
Supreme Court qualified the application of the "strained relations" principle when it held --

"If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for the non-application of the
above-cited provision (Art. 279, Labor Code) this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and
employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer, and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere
of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity
of the employee concerned x x x Obviously, the principle of ‘strained relations’ cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid legal act of asserting one’s right; otherwise[,]
an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service by merely paying
his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained."

Anent the award of backwages, the Labor Arbiter erred in computing the same from the date the
petitioners were illegally dismissed (i.e. April 30, 1995) up to March 15, 1997, that is two (2) days
prior to the rendition of his decision (i.e. March 17, 1997).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, hereby REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the assailed decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated April 28, 1998 ans
October 29, 1998. Consequently, the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated March 17, 1997, is hereby
REINSTATED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the private respondent is ORDERED to
immediately REINSTATE petitioners Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and Ernesto Pagaygay to their

47
former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, with full backwages from the date of
their dismissal until their actual reinstatement. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a resolution dated
February 7, 2001.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:14

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S APPEAL TO THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED DEFECTS IN

PETITIONER’S APPEAL BOND WERE OF SUCH GRAVITY AS TO PREVENT THE APPEAL
FROM BEING PERFECTED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME ASSAILED A DECISION WHICH HAD BEEN
VACATED IN FAVOR OF A NEW ONE WHICH, IN TURN, HAS SOLID LEGAL BASIS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 3, RULE III, OF THE MANUAL ON
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WHICH, BY
ITS OWN EXPRESS TERMS, IS NOT APPLICABLE.

A resolution of the case requires a brief discussion of two issues which touch upon the procedural
and substantial aspects of the case thus: a) whether petitioner’s appeal was filed out of time; and b)
whether the claim survives.

As regards the first issue, the Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter
to have been validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As
correctly pointed out by petitioner’s wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been
validly effected on April 18, 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997.

Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. – (a) Notices or summons and copies of orders,
resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or
authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided,
That where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on
such counsel or authorized representative; Provided further, That in cases of decision and final
awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel ….

48
For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such
decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.

(b) The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his
return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, the
names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately attached and
shall form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected, the serving officer shall state
the reason therefore in the return.

Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of Procedure states
that: "[s]ervice of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his
counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no
person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy,
between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s
residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein."

The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the
delivery of a copy of the tribunal’s decision. In the present case, however, petitioner died before a
copy of the labor arbiter’s decision was served upon him. Hence, the above provisions do not apply.
As aptly stated by the NLRC:

… In the case at bar, respondent Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the
pendency of the case. A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while
Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997, without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime.
The decision was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same.
His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents.
Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive
them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the party’s residence is not applicable in the instant case
because this presupposes that the party is still living and is not just available to receive the decision.

The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not become final because there was
no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent….15

Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997 after receipt of a copy of the
decision via registered mail on May 28, 1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed
under Section 223 of the Labor Code.

On the question whether petitioner’s surety bond was defective, Section 6, Rule VI of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

SEC. 6. Bond. – In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter … involves monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent
to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety
bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.

The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of
the bond. (As amended on Nov. 5, 1993).

49
The Court believes that petitioner was able to comply substantially with the requirements of the
above Rule. As correctly pointed out by the NLRC:

While we agree with complainants-appellees that the posting of the surety bond is jurisdictional, We
do not believe that the "defects" imputed to the surety bond posted for and in behalf of respondent-
appellant Gabriel are of such character as to affect the jurisdiction of this Commission to entertain
the instant appeal.

It matters not that, by the terms of the bond posted, the "Liability of the surety herein shall expire on
June 5, 1998 and this bond shall be automatically cancelled ten (10) days after the expiration." After
all, the bond is accompanied by the joint declaration under oath of respondent-appellant’s surviving
spouse and counsel attesting that the surety bond is genuine and shall be in effect until the final
disposition of the case.

Anent complainants-appellees contention that the surety bond posted is defective for being in the
name of BTSCI which did not appeal and for having been entered into by Mrs. Gabriel without
BTSCI’s authority, the same has been rendered moot and academic by the certification issued by Gil
CJ. San Juan, Vice-President of the bonding company to the effect that "Eastern Assurance and
Surety Corporation Bond No. 2749 was posted for and on behalf appellant Melencio Gabriel and/or
his heirs" and that "(T)he name "Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc." was indicated in said
bond due merely in (sic) advertence."

At any rate, the Supreme Court has time and again ruled that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended requiring a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from for the appeal to be perfected, may be considered a jurisdictional
requirement, nevertheless, adhering to the principle that substantial justice is better served by
allowing the appeal on the merits threshed out by this Honorable Commission, the foregoing
requirement of the law should be given a liberal interpretation (Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Sison, 149 SCRA 238; C.W. Tan Mfg. v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 240; YBL v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 160;
Rada v. NLRC, 205 SCRA 69; Star Angel Handicraft v. NLRC, 236 SCRA 580).16

On the other hand, with regard to the substantive aspect of the case, the Court agrees with the CA
that an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents. In Martinez v.
National Labor Relations Commission,17 citing National Labor Union v. Dinglasan,18 the Court ruled
that:

[T]he relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary
system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee because in the lease of chattels the
lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the
use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney
owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercises supervision and control over the latter.
The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called
"boundary" [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between
them from that of employer and employee. Thus, private respondents were employees … because
they had been engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer.19

The same principle was reiterated in the case of Paguio Transport Corporation v. NLRC.20

The Court also agrees with the labor arbiter and the CA that respondents were illegally dismissed by
petitioner. Respondents were not accorded due process.21 Moreover, petitioner failed to show that
the cause for termination falls under any of the grounds enumerated in Article 282

50
(then Article 283)22 of the Labor Code.23 Consequently, respondents are entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to their full backwages computed from the
date of dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement in accordance with Article 279 of the
Labor Code.

Reinstatement is obtainable in this case because it has not been shown that there is an ensuing
"strained relations" between petitioner and respondents. This is pursuant to the principle laid down
in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC24 as quoted earlier in the CA decision.

With regard to respondents’ monetary claim, the same shall be governed by Section 20 (then
Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides: 1awphi1.net

SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. – When the action is for recovery of money arising
from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court
in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person. (21a)

In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred ; exceptions. – All claims for
money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants….

Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of respondents must be filed against
the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 4, 2000 and February 7, 2001, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52001 are AFFIRMED but
with the MODIFICATION that the money claims of respondents should be filed against the estate of
Melencio Gabriel, within such reasonable time from the finality of this Decision as the estate court
may fix.

G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

Asurety company’s liability under the performance bond it issues is solidary. The death of the
principal obligor does not, as a rule, extinguish the obligation and the solidary nature of that liability.

51
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the March
13, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41630. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Order dated January 28, 1993 issued by the lower court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the records of the instant case be REMANDED to the lower court for the reception
of evidence of all parties."3

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:

"On May 24, 1989, [respondent] Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Republic-Asahi) entered into a
contract with x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction
of roadways and a drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig
City, where [respondent] was to pay x x x JDS five million three hundred thousand pesos
(P5,300,000.00) inclusive of value added tax for said construction, which was supposed to be
completed within a period of two hundred forty (240) days beginning May 8, 1989. In order ‘to
guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings’ x x x JDS, shall post a
performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P795,000.00). x x x JDS executed,
jointly and severally with [petitioner] Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond No.
SICI-25849/g(13)9769.

"On May 23, 1989, [respondent] paid to x x x JDS seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos
(P795,000.00) by way of downpayment.

"Two progress billings dated August 14, 1989 and September 15, 1989, for the total amount of two
hundred seventy four thousand six hundred twenty one pesos and one centavo (P274,621.01) were
submitted by x x x JDS to [respondent], which the latter paid. According to [respondent], these two
progress billings accounted for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be undertaken by x x x JDS
under the terms of the contract.

"Several times prior to November of 1989, [respondent’s] engineers called the attention of x x x JDS
to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the
construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went
unheeded by x x x JDS.

"On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by x x x JDS,
[respondent] Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said
contract, and wrote a letter to x x x JDS informing the latter of such rescission. Such rescission,
according to Article XV of the contract shall not be construed as a waiver of [respondent’s] right to
recover damages from x x x JDS and the latter’s sureties.

"[Respondent] alleged that, as a result of x x x JDS’s failure to comply with the provisions of the
contract, which resulted in the said contract’s rescission, it had to hire another contractor to finish the
project, for which it incurred an additional expense of three million two hundred fifty six thousand,
eight hundred seventy four pesos (P3,256,874.00).

52
"On January 6, 1990, [respondent] sent a letter to [petitioner] SICI filing its claim under the bond for
not less than P795,000.00. On March 22, 1991, [respondent] again sent another letter reiterating its
demand for payment under the aforementioned bond. Both letters allegedly went unheeded.

"[Respondent] then filed [a] complaint against x x x JDS and SICI. It sought from x x x JDS payment
of P3,256,874.00 representing the additional expenses incurred by [respondent] for the completion
of the project using another contractor, and from x x x JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment
of P750,000.00 as damages in accordance with the performance bond; exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of at least P100,000.00.

"According to the Sheriff’s Return dated June 14, 1991, submitted to the lower court by Deputy
Sheriff Rene R. Salvador, summons were duly served on defendant-appellee SICI. However, x x x
Jose D. Santos, Jr. died the previous year (1990), and x x x JDS Construction was no longer at its
address at 2nd Floor, Room 208-A, San Buena Bldg. Cor. Pioneer St., Pasig, Metro Manila, and its
whereabouts were unknown.

"On July 10, 1991, [petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the [respondent’s] money claims
against [petitioner and JDS] have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this
were not the case, [petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under the performance bond
because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement, pursuant to
procedural due process, of herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was no
ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. At
this point in time, said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who as such can
no longer participate in any liquidation. The unilateral liquidation on the party (sic) of [respondent] of
the work accomplishments did not bind SICI for being violative of procedural due process. The claim
of [respondent] for the forfeiture of the performance bond in the amount of P795,000.00 had no
factual and legal basis, as payment of said bond was conditioned on the payment of damages which
[respondent] may sustain in the event x x x JDS failed to complete the contracted works.
[Respondent] can no longer prove its claim for damages in view of the death of Santos. SICI was not
informed by [respondent] of the death of Santos. SICI was not informed by [respondent] of the
unilateral rescission of its contract with JDS, thus SICI was deprived of its right to protect its interests
as surety under the performance bond, and therefore it was released from all liability. SICI was
likewise denied due process when it was not notified of plaintiff-appellant’s process of determining
and fixing the amount to be spent in the completion of the unfinished project. The procedure
contained in Article XV of the contract is against public policy in that it denies SICI the right to
procedural due process. Finally, SICI alleged that [respondent] deviated from the terms and
conditions of the contract without the written consent of SICI, thus the latter was released from all
liability. SICI also prayed for the award of P59,750.00 as attorney’s fees, and P5,000.00 as litigation
expenses.

"On August 16, 1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint of [respondent]
against x x x JDS and SICI, on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its
sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr. The dispositive portion of the [O]rder reads as follows:

‘ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against the defendants Jose D. Santos, Jr., doing business under
trade and style, ‘JDS Construction’ and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. is ordered
DISMISSED.

‘SO ORDERED.’

"On September 4, 1991, [respondent] filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of
the lower court’s August 16, 1991 order dismissing its complaint. [Petitioner] SICI field its ‘Comment

53
and/or Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.’ On October 15, 1991, the lower court issued
an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby given due course.
The Order dated 16 August 1991 for the dismissal of the case against Stronghold Insurance
Company, Inc., is reconsidered and hereby reinstated (sic). However, the case against defendant
Jose D. Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains undisturbed.

‘Motion for Preliminary hearing and Manifestation with Motion filed by [Stronghold] Insurance
Company Inc., are set for hearing on November 7, 1991 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

‘SO ORDERED.’

"On June 4, 1992, [petitioner] SICI filed its ‘Memorandum for Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re: Effect
of Death of defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr.)’ reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of [respondent’s]
complaint.

"On January 28, 1993, the lower court issued the assailed Order reconsidering its Order dated
October 15, 1991, and ordered the case, insofar as SICI is concerned, dismissed. [Respondent] filed
its motion for reconsideration which was opposed by [petitioner] SICI. On April 16, 1993, the lower
court denied [respondent’s] motion for reconsideration. x x x."4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that SICI’s obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the death of
Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.

The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing that the performance of
the Contract in question had become impossible by respondent’s act of rescission. The Contract was
rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of work and pursuant to
Article XIII of its Contract with JDS.

The CA ruled that "[p]erformance of the [C]ontract was impossible, not because of [respondent’s]
fault, but because of the fault of JDS Construction and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part to
make satisfactory progress on the project, which amounted to non-performance of the same. x x x
[P]ursuant to the [S]urety [C]ontract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of said [C]ontract on the
part of JDS Construction."5

Hence, this Petition.6

Issue

Petitioner states the issue for the Court’s consideration in the following manner:

"Death is a defense of Santos’ heirs which Stronghold could also adopt as its defense against
obligee’s claim."7

More precisely, the issue is whether petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was
automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal.

The Court’s Ruling

54
The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:

Effect of Death on the Surety’s Liability

Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under the
surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the bond.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by
the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.9 Only obligations that are
personal10 or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.11

Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising
from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished.13 What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is
not then acting as a probate court.14

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his
death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on
to his estate.15 Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations
under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its
monetary obligation under its performance bond.

The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond worded as
follows:

"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

"That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building, contractor, of Shaw Blvd., Pasig,
MM Philippines, as principal and the STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. a corporation
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with head office at
Makati, as Surety, are held and firmly bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION
and to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the principal with labor
or materials in the penal sum of SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00),
Philippine Currency, for the payment of which sum, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our
heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these
presents.

"The CONDITIONS OF THIS OBLIGATION are as follows;

"WHEREAS the above bounden principal on the ___ day of __________, 19__ entered into a
contract with the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION represented by _________________,
to fully and faithfully. Comply with the site preparation works road and drainage system of Philippine
Float Plant at Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila.

"WHEREAS, the liability of the Surety Company under this bond shall in no case exceed the sum of
PESOS SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00) Philippine Currency,

55
inclusive of interest, attorney’s fee, and other damages, and shall not be liable for any advances of
the obligee to the principal.

"WHEREAS, said contract requires the said principal to give a good and sufficient bond in the
above-stated sum to secure the full and faithfull performance on its part of said contract, and the
satisfaction of obligations for materials used and labor employed upon the work;

"NOW THEREFORE, if the principal shall perform well and truly and fulfill all the undertakings,
covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract during the original term of said
contract and any extension thereof that may be granted by the obligee, with notice to the surety and
during the life of any guaranty required under the contract, and shall also perform well and truly and
fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of any and all duly
authorized modifications of said contract that may hereinafter be made, without notice to the surety
except when such modifications increase the contract price; and such principal contractor or his or
its sub-contractors shall promptly make payment to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or
association supplying the principal of its sub-contractors with labor and materials in the prosecution
of the work provided for in the said contract, then, this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise it
shall remain in full force and effect. Any extension of the period of time which may be granted by the
obligee to the contractor shall be considered as given, and any modifications of said contract shall
be considered as authorized, with the express consent of the Surety.

"The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the contractor with
labor or materials for the prosecution of the work hereinbefore stated, to institute action on the penal
bond, pursuant to the provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby acknowledge and confirmed."16

As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code, which
provides as follows:

"Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.

"If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4,17 Chapter 3,
Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship."

xxxxxxxxx

"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."

Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appeals18 stated thus:

"x x x. The surety’s obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but
merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although
the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the
creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is
directly and equally bound with the principal. x x x."19

Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor
and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal
debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor.

56
Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in
accordance with the solidary nature of the latter’s liability under the performance bond.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-7940 March 27, 1913

In the matter of the estate of TELESFORO DE DIOS. TOMAS OSMEÑA, appellant.

Vicente Urgello, for appellant.

Celestino Rodriguez, for the administratrix.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, refusing to extend the time
within which claims could be presented to commissioners in the abovenamed estate.

The facts that Tomas Osmeña claims to have had a claim against the estate of Telesforo de Dios,
but did not present the same within the six moths specified by the court for the presentation of claims
to the commissioners. The time having expired within which the claims should have been presented,
the claimant made a motion to the court asking for an extension of the time within which he could
present said claim. Said motion was founded upon a statement alleging as the only foundation for
the motion that said claimant "had not had an opportunity to formulate his claim during the period of
six months fixed by the court." Later the statement was amended and amplified so as to been
presented was, "that during said time one of the heirs of said estate was making propositions to said
Tomas Osmeña to pay on his own account the debt which he had against the property of said
estate; that said Tomas Osmeña, under the belief that the said heir would pay the said debt, and in
the hope that the proposed settlement would terminate satisfactorily, could not duly formulate his
claim before the commission during said period of six months; that said heir did not pay the debt or
any part thereof to said Tomas Osmeña as he had at first offered to do."

The Court, Honorable Adolph Wislizenus presiding, denied the motion to extend the time, saying:

The power of the court to extend the time for certain purposes is defined in article 690 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and from a reading of said article it appears that a condition
precedent to the exercise of such power is a just cause. The court does not find in said
motion any allegation which it can call a just cause. The only allegation in relation to the
matter is that he has not had opportunity to present his claim against the estate within the six
months fixed by the court, without stating any details or facts relative to such failure of
opportunity. The applicant is a merchant of much experience, a resident of the municipality of
Cebu, where he has lived and where the deceased, Telesforo de Dios, died, who was also a
person weel-known in Cebu. It is impossible that Tomas Osmeña was not informed and did
not know the death of said Telesforo de Dios, and Mr. Osmeña is a person who has many
suits in this court, both special proceedings and civil actions. The object of the administration
of estates under the Code of Civil Procedure is to give an opportunity to the creditors to
present their claims and a determination of the condition of the property left by the deceased
and to prevent the presentation of claims after certain dates. It is in the interest of the law
and of the spirit of the Code of Civil Procedure that the claims be presented within the period

57
 fixed by the law and that the time for presentation be not extended without just cause. As the
present motion is in no manner founded on facts which we may consider just cause, the
court for that reason denies the motion.

A motion was later made for a rehearing before the Honorable George N. Hurd, which was denied.
An appeal is taken from such order. The appellant makes the following assignments of error:

(1) The court erred in denying the motion of the 29th of February basing the same on the
order of the same court of the 24th of February of the same year; (2) the court erred in
denying the motion of the 29th of February notwithstanding the fact that said motion was
based upon reasons justifying the same; (3) the court erred in denying the motion
notwithstanding the fact that it was presented within twelve months after the appointment of
commissioners.

The only question presented on this appeal is whether or not the court erred in refusing to extend the
period for the presentation of claims against the estate of Telesforo de Dios upon the facts
presented by the appellant.

The court below correctly said that there must be cause shown before it would be authorized to
extend the time within which claims may be presented against the estate. The object of the law in
fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the
affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate into the hands of the
persons entitled to receive it. As we said in the case of Jose McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng (21 Phil.
Rep., 211), "it is the policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of
property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most
urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which
underlie these reasons effective;" and, "it is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that
one has the instant right to occupy that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of
the strongest and most urgent nature that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose
which underlines it." It is distinctly against the interests of justice and in direct opposition to the policy
of the law to extend unduly the time within which estates should be administered and thereby to
keep the property from the possession and use of those who are entitled to it. Before the time in
which claimants must present their claims against an estate is extended the person asking the
privilege must present sound reasons therefor. Whether or not those reasons are sufficient and
whether as a result of their presentation the time ought or ought not to be extended rests in the
sound discretion of the court. This being so, a decision as to whether or not the time shall be
extended will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of
that discretion. It is a doctrine followed by this court as by all others that, where a court has
discretion, the exercise thereof will not be interfered with except in case of abuse. The general
doctrine (as stated in 3 Cyc., 325) is to the effect that, "in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion,
to the complaining party's prejudice, matters purely within the discretion of the trial court are not
reviewable on appeal." Moreover, the doctrine is also stated in the same volume (p. 327) that, "it will
be presumed on appeal, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the discretionary powers
of the lower court have been exercised without abuse. The burden of showing abuse is upon the
party complaining."

In the case at bar the appellant failed to show that the court below abused the discretion given it by
law. In the first place, the appellant has not shown that he has a meritorious claim against the estate.
There appears nothing in the record demonstrating what the nature of the claim is, how it was
constracted, or when. There is simply a naked allegation that appellant has a claim. In the second
place, the appellant, admitting full knowledge of the time within which he should have presented his
claim and the date on which the time for presentation expired, presents no sufficient explanation for

58
failure to present the claim within that period. His only excuse is that during the running of the period
he was maintaining negotiations with one of the heirs for the payment of the claim. Even if that were
true, it furnishes no reason why the claim was not presented. Although the negotiations may have
been pending, the claim could have been presented nevertheless and, on payment thereof by the
heir, further proceedings could have been prevented.

Under these circumstances the court committed no error in refusing to extend the time within which
the claim could be presented. (In re estate of Ceballos, 13 Phil. Rep., 315.)

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-12302 April 13, 1959

RIO Y COMPANIA (Successor to RIO Y OLABARRIETA), plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ELVIRA MASLOG, ETC., ET AL. defendants-appellees.

Jose G. Flores for the plaintiff-appellant.

Perfecto de los Reyes for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The facts of this case may be summarized as follows: On January 15, 1939, Rio y Olabarrieta
(predecessor-in-interest of appellant Rio y Compania)and the late Anastacio Manalo, father of the
defendant-appellee Elvira Maslog, entered into a "Contrato de Servicios Personales" wherein the
personal services of Anastacio Manalo were engaged by the plaintiff-appellant for the administration
and exploitation of its forest concession. Under the contract, plaintiff-appellant was to extend to
agent Manalo a credit not exceeding P5,000.00 with interest at 9% per annum. On May 30, 1941,
Anastacio Manalo died intestate at Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Elvira Maslog carried on the account
of her late father and, made payments thereon up to December 31, 1941. As of December 31, 1941,
the balance of the account stood at P18,614.58 due and owing to plaintiff-appellant. On January 29,
1954, plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Palawan for the recovery
of said amount from Elvira Maslog (joined with her husband) in her capacity as her father's only heir,
because through an affidavit of extrajudicial settlement of November 19, 1953 she had adjudicated
to herself all the properties of the late Anastacio Manalo. Before the case was set for hearing,
defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the cause of action
has already prescribed. The trial court rendered a decision, holding that the complaint was filed late
and consequently dismissed the same. Whereupon the creditor plaintiff appealed to this Court.

We find it unnecessary to discuss in detail the various errors assigned by plaintiff-appellant for it is
apparent that this action has become barred through the laches of appellant company.

It is admitted that Anastacio Manalo died intestate, and at the time of his death at Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, on May 30, 1941, he had an outstanding obligation in plaintiff-appellant's favor in the total
sum of P18,614.58. This claim, being for money and arising from contract, did no survive and should
have been filed promptly against the estate of the deceased debtor(Secs. 2 and 5, Rules 87).
Plaintiff-appellant was aware of the death of Anastacio Manalo on said date, and it is not claimed
that Rio y Compania(successor to the original creditor) did not know the existence of Manalo's
obligation. As a creditor, it was appellant's duty to present its claim within a reasonable time after

59
Anastacio Manalo's death in the estate proceedings, and if none were had to file a petition for letters
of administration, as authorized by sec. 6(b) of Rule 79. But in spite of the creditor's knowledge of
the debtor's death on May 30, 1941 and its awareness of the existence of the obligation, it did not
take steps to institute administration proceedings, or collect the debt in question until January 29,
1954, more than 12 years from the death of the decedent.

The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute
the residue. In the case of Tan Se Guan vs. Ga Siu San, 47 Phil., 96, this Court held:

The purpose of the rule is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that the residue
may be delivered top the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon
to respond in actions for claims, which under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet
prescribed.

The purpose of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims against an estate of the
deceased person must be presented is to insure a speedy settlement of the estate and the
early distribution of the estate of deceased persons should not be unnecessarily delayed by
the lethargy and negligence of those who have a direct interest in the same. (In re Estate of
Tangco 39 Phil., 967-968.)

In consonance with this policy, it has been held that —

Where a creditor, knowing of a debtor's death and the fact that no administrator is appointed
allows three years to elapse without asking for the appointment of an administrator or
institute intestate proceedings in the competent court he is guilty of laches and his claim
prescribes. (Sikat vs. Villanueva, 57 Phil., 486; Chuakay & Co. vs. Oh Tiong Keng's Heirs, 62
Phil., 883; Magbanua vs. Akol, 72 Phil., 567).

To hold otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to
keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either testate or intestate
proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs and legatees. (Sikat
vs. Vda. de Villanueva, supra.)

The fact that the obligation arose from a written contract, with a prescriptive period of ten years is
irrelevant to the policy of speedy liquidation of decedent's estates. Chief Justice Moran, has noted
that Sec. 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, constitutes a special limitation that overrides the ordinary
rules of prescription:

Under this provision, not only claims due, but also claims not due or contingent, should be
filed otherwise they are barred forever. So that even where a claim arises upon a written
contract and, therefore its period of limitation is ten years, if the debtor dies, such claim
should be presented in the estate or intestate proceeding of the deceased debtor within the
time fixed by the court, otherwise it is barred. . . . (Moran, Commentaries on the Rules of
Court Vol. II, 1952 ed., p. 436).

Nor does the moratorium constitute a good excuse for delaying the filing of this appellant's claim,
and the consequent speedy settlement of the debtor's estate and delivery of the net residue "to
persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called to respond in actions for claims which,
under the ordinary statute of limitations have not yet prescribed. (Moran, Commentaries on the
Rules of Court, Vol. II [3rd Ed] p. 400.) We have heretofore ruled that —

60
 The general objectives of the meritorium law, which is rehabilitation of debtors, must give
way to the more urgent necessity of setting the estate of the decedent and distributing its
residue among his heirs as soon as possible thereby minimizing if not avoiding altogether,
expenses of administration. (Jison vs. Warner, Barnes & Co. Ltd., 89 Phil., 239; 48 Off. Gaz.
No. 9, p. 3873.)

It appearing that more than 12 years had elapsed from the death of Anastacio Manalo before a
complaint was filed to recover the indebtedness of the deceased and without the filing of any
intestate proceedings in the court, the plaintiff-appellant's action is now barred and was correctly
dismissed by the court below.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

61