Координований щорічний огляд оборони (CARD) є ще однією важливою частиною

платформи оборонного співробітництва ЄС. Держави-члени діляться своїми планами витрат

на оборону, щоб виявити недоліки, підвищити узгодженість і отримати вигоду від значного
потенційного підвищення ефективності та економії коштів. А створення Європейського
оборонного фонду (EDF) дозволяє співфінансувати спільні дослідження та розвиток
військового потенціалу. Загалом, Європа є другим у світі за обсягом військових витрат. Нові
домовленості допоможуть розвинути більш ефективний спільний потенціал і використовувати
його для ефективнішого використання .
Військова мобільність є ще одним досягненням, заснованим на співпраці між державами-
членами ЄС, а також із союзниками по НАТО. Мобільність збройних сил держав-членів ЄС
має вирішальне значення для поєднання їхніх сил та виконання завдань, будь то для
військових навчань, спільного навчання чи підготовки до розгортання в третіх країнах.
ЄС також вживає конкретних заходів для посилення стійкості шляхом покращення своїх
можливостей усвідомлювати, аналізувати та реагувати на гібридні загрози через Центр
передового досвіду з протидії гібридним загрозам або шляхом створення системи швидкого
сповіщення для протидії дезінформації
ЄС стоїть на засадах стійкого глобального порядку, ключовим принципом якого є
багатосторонність. Тому співробітництво та координація є основою підходу ЄС. Саме тому
ЄС посилює співпрацю з іншими міжнародними партнерами, такими як НАТО, ООН чи
Африканський Союз.
Зокрема , співпраця між ЄС і НАТО становить важливу частину роботи ЄС, спрямованої
на зміцнення європейської безпеки та оборони, як частину реалізації Глобальної стратегії
ЄС. Було підписано дві спільні декларації та схвалено спільні пакети пропозицій Радами ЄС
і НАТО.
Ще один аспект, на яки слід звернути увагу – це кібербезпека. Стратегія ЄС щодо
безпечного інформаційного суспільства, прийнята у 2006 році і стосується злочинів в
Інтернеті. Проте напади проти приватних чи державних ІТ-систем у країнах-членах ЄС надали
цьому напрямку новий вимір, який слід розглядати як потенційно нову економічну, політичну
та бойову зброю. Потрібна додаткова робота в цій сфері, слід підвищувати рівень обізнаності
та посилювати міжнародне співробітництво.

Література:

1. 15.000 weitere ukrainische Soldaten sollen in der EU ausgebildet werden. 01.02.2023.

http://surl.li/fabnu
2. Україна: ЄС запускає Місію військової допомоги. Рада ЄС. прес-реліз. 15 листопада
2022 р. http://surl.li/fabnt

Rad’ P.V.
Student of the Faculty of International Relations,
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv,
Lviv, Ukraine
Scientific advisor: Zubareva A.Y.
PhD, Associate Professor of the International Law Department,
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv,
Lviv, Ukraine

CYBER ATTACK AS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UN CHARTER

Today it is hardly possible to imagine modern world without cyber technologies which are
applied not only to our day-to-day life but to more complex and sophisticated structures as banking
systems or systems of governance. Over the past two decades, there has been a growing awareness
of the threat caused by increasing reliance on cyberspace and the risks to national security it brings.
Cyber attacks can be launched by a variety of actors with different aims, such as intelligence
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collection, data or intellectual property theft, espionage, or just to threaten national security by
offensively crippling a military asset or critical infrastructure. Whatever the motivation, the damage
from a cyber-attack can be serious putting national security at risk [1, p. 613]. In this regard, in the
light of current events, the goal of this paper is to analyze whether cyber attacks can constitute a
breach of peace under international law.
It is worth starting with the United Nations Charter, or to be more precise with Article 2(4),
which reads that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” [2]. The Charter contains only two exceptions
to general prohibition – use of force authorized by the Security Council pursuant to Article 42 and
self-defense in accordance with Article 51. There is no doubt that cyber operations, as well as kinetic
hostilities, cause damage. The interpretive dilemma, however, lies in application of the norm to cyber
operations which mostly do not cause physical damage or injuries but produce severe non-physical
consequences [3, p. 279].
It is clear now that in the context of cyber attack the question of interpretation of Article 2(4)
arises. There are several approaches to this issue. According to the first one, the notion of “force” in
Article 2(4) is limited to armed force or armed violence. This is a dominant view which has been
supported in the United States and among its allies. The plain meaning of the text of this article
supports this view, as do other structural aspects of the UN Charter. Article 51 of the UN Charter
which is interconnected with Article 2(4) of the Charter has even more rigid formulation having more
specific limit to “armed attacks” [2].
An alternative view of Article 2(4) looks not at instrument used but its purpose and general
effects prohibiting coercion. Kinetic military force is the easiest example to be observed. As Matthew
Waxman points out, at various times some states – usually those of the developing world, during the
Cold War – have pushed the notion that “force” includes other forms of pressure, such as political
and economic coercion that threatens state autonomy [4, p. 46].
A third possible approach toward interpreting Article 2(4) and related principles focuses on the
violation and defense of rights; specifically, that it protects states’ rights to freedom from interference.
Such an interpretation focuses rather on the understanding that any actions aimed at intrusion of the
internal affairs are prohibited rather than a narrow set of means [4, p. 46]. However, some states may
resort to wide interpretation of any actions taken by other means following their pragmatic interests.
In order to solve this classification impasse, Michael Schmitt delimits economic and political
coercion from the use of armed force by reference to six criteria: severity, immediacy, directness,
invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy. This technique may be useful in accessing
the nature of the act’s reasonably foreseeable consequences to determine whether they resemble those
of an armed attack. If the consequences resemble those of an armed attack, it is possible to classify
such an act as a breach of peace under Article 2(4). If not, it is possible to determine wrongfulness of
such acts under international law by resorting to prescriptions other than those prohibiting force. What
should be understood is that if a cyber attack achieves the same result that could have been achieved
with arms causing physical harm and death, it will be treated as a use of force [5, p. 448].
Despite the fact that usually it is pretty difficult to give a clear answer weather a cyber attack
constitutes a use of force, there are circumstances under which cyber attacks will still come into the
purview of its restrictive meaning even without widening the scope of the meaning of Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter. For instance, cyber communication used as a means of making threats to an enemy
would fall under the scope of article 2(4), in which the “threat of force may be defined as “an explicit
or implicit promise, through statements or actions, of a future and unlawful use of armed force against
one or more states, the realization of which depends on the threatening entity’s will” [6, p. 235].
In this regard, it is also worth paying attention to the Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual). This study was published in 2013 and it was authored
by an International Group of Experts (Group of Experts) led by Michael Schmitt [7, p. 94]. On the
central questions relating to the law on the use of force – whether the use of cyber attacks is prohibited,
and if so, when the use of cyber attacks is prohibited – the Tallinn Manual provides that: “A cyber
operation that constitutes a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or that is in any other manner inconsistent with purposes of the United
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Nations, is unlawful.” However, the Group of Experts stated that “not all cyber interference violates
the international law prohibition on intervention” continuing that “the cyber espionage and cyber
exploitation operations lacking coercive element do not per se violate the non-intervention principle”
[8, p. 44].
It is seen that the Group of Experts took the position that cyber attacks can constitute a use of
force and be considered unlawful under existing law on the use of force. When it comes to the
question of whether any cyber attack actually constitutes a use of force, the Group of Experts stated
that: “A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-
cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”
In conclusion it is worth saying that there are several possible approaches to the question of
whether cyber attacks violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter which are based on different
types of interpretation of this article. However, to our mind, the most precise ideas were presented by
the Group of Experts showing that international law is capable of regulating cyber attacks with
material effects but has limited capacities in relation to cyber attacks without material effects.

References:

1. Sandra Hodgkinson. Crossing the Line: The Law of War and Cyber Engagement - Applying the
Existing Body of Law to this New National Security Threat. The International Lawyer. 2018. Vol. 51,
no. 3. P. 613–628. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27009647?read-
now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (date of access: 08.02.2023).
2. United Nations Charter : Statute of 26.06.1945. URL: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-
charter/full-text (date of access: 08.02.2023).
3. Michael Schmitt. THE LAW OF CYBER WARFARE: QUO VADIS?. STANFORD LAW &
POLICY REVIEW. 2014. Vol. 25. P. 269–299. URL: https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/schmitt.pdf (date of access: 08.02.2023).
4. Matthew Waxman. Cyber A Cyber Attacks as "F ttacks as "Force" Under UN Char " Under UN
Charter Article 2(4) ticle 2(4). 87 INT'L L. STUD. 43. 2011. P. 43–54.
URL: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1882&context=faculty
_scholarship (date of access: 08.02.2023).
5. Matthew Hoisington. Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-
Defense. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review. 2009. Vol. 32. P. 439–454.
URL: https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=06010011608600602811508708709706507600
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86127101126094082050028023029000002125002112077009082021110005097115080125126106
077110007016121114120009123106027085066091008018028009&EXT=pdf&INDEX=
TRUE (date of access: 08.02.2023).
6. Marco Roscini. THREATS OF ARMED FORCE AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW. Netherlands International Law Review. 2007. Vol. 54, no. 2. P. 229–277.
URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161117126.pdf (date of access: 08.02.2023).
7. Haataja Samuli. Cyber Attacks and International Law on the Use of Force: an Informational
Approach : Thesis (PhD Doctorate). Brisbane, 2017. 238 p. URL: https://research-
repository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/365740/Haataja_2017_01Thesis.pdf?sequence=1
&isAllowed=y (date of access: 08.02.2023).
8. Michael Schmitt. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. 2nd ed.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013. 263 p. URL: https://www.onlinelibrary.iihl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/05/2017-Tallinn-Manual-2.0.pdf (date of access: 08.02.2023).

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