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John Creedy
Wellington School of Business and Government, Victoria
University of Wellington, New Zealand
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EEP BoX
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Chapter Outlines 1
4 Inequality-Preserving Changes 75
4.1 The Gini Measure 77
4.1.1 Distributions with Equal Means 78
v
vi CONTENTS
Bibliography 257
Index 271
Acknowledgements
ix
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book is concerned with two main features of income distribution compar-
isons. The rst ve chapters (Chapters 2 to 6) examine a range of technical
aspects of inequality measurement, including less well-known properties of
inequality indices, and the decomposition of inequality changes into compo-
nent contributions. The next ve chapters (Chapters 7 to 11) are concerned
with various aspects of the graphical display and measurement of income mo-
bility. There is no attempt to offer a comprehensive treatment, or indeed the
kind of systematic treatment that would be required of a textbook. Instead
it brings together, in much revised form, a number of contributions made
over recent years. The book may in some ways be regarded as a sequel to
three earlier volumes – Creedy (1985, 1992, 1998) – which also concentrate
on the statics and dynamics of income distribution. While the main focus
is on methods, illustrative examples are provided using New Zealand data.
The remainder of this introduction briey summarises each of the chapters
in turn.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Zealand income data for individual income taxpayers showed that income dy-
namics were especially pro-poor during the period 2006 to 2010, with much
faster income growth for those on the lowest incomes than those higher up
the income distribution. For example, a mobility index based on cumulative
income growth rates for those with the lowest ve per cent of 2006 incomes,
is on average around ten times higher than the equivalent index for all tax-
payers combined. For the lowest twenty- ve per cent the equivalent index
is around four times higher than mobility across all taxpayers. On poverty
persistence, average income growth rates within each percentile of the distri-
bution suggest relatively little movement into poverty, but somewhat more
movement out of poverty. However, considering all individuals within each
percentile (around 330 individuals per percentile in this case) revealed a rel-
atively mobile population overall, with some individuals observed within all
percentiles that are above the 2006 poverty threshold moving into poverty
over the ve year period examined.
Chapter 2
Alternative Distributions and
Metrics
This aim of this chapter is to explore the use of alternative distributions, and
the implications of using different summary measures of inequality, to assess
the contribution of the tax and transfer system in reducing inequality. Stress
is placed on the role of a range of value judgements, the need to be explicit
about them and, for rational policy analysis, the importance of considering
the implications of a range of alternative values. The present chapter does
not offer new theoretical insights, but it provides an illustration of the need
to consider alternative distributions and measures, showing that unequivocal
results are seldom available.
The context is one – not unusual in economics – in which there is some-
thing of a dichotomy between theory and empirical analysis. While consider-
able attention has been given to inequality in recently policy debates, those
reporting empirical evidence often provide only a limited range of results
and do not always clarify either the nature of the income concept (including,
where relevant, the adult equivalence scales used) or the unit of analysis. In
the latter case, the individual is most often used without comment, although
it turns out that a number of familiar results regarding comparisons may not
necessarily be appropriate: for example, widely used welfare functions can in
some circumstances be ‘inequality preferring’.
9
10 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS AND METRICS
Further insight was provided by Atkinson (1970), who pointed out that
the intuitive judgement that distribution A is unequivocally less unequal than
distribution B is consistent with the value judgement expressed by the ‘prin-
ciple of transfers’.3 This principle is the inequality-disliking value judgement
which takes the view (again in the context of homogeneous units) that an in-
come transfer from a richer to a poorer unit, which leaves their relative rank
unchanged, reduces inequality. That is, it is possible to move from distrib-
ution B to distribution A by a series of transfers, each of which satis es the
principle of transfers. Faced with the desire to compare relative inequality, it
is therefore useful to begin simply by examining Lorenz curves to see if this
kind of dominance applies. However, in practice – and certainly in the case
of the distributions compared in this chapter – such dominance results are
rarely available, and it is necessary to make additional value judgements.
One way that distributions can be more widely evaluated involves the use
3 The
choice of metric and unit, prerequisites for drawing the Lorenz curve, also
involve value judgements, as discussed further below.
2.1. VALUE JUDGEMENTS AND LORENZ CURVES 13
the proportion of total income and the arithmetic mean income against the
corresponding proportion of people. Thus, the vertical axis of the Lorenz
curve is ‘stretched’ by an amount depending on the arithmetic mean. It is
possible to nd that distribution A is more equal than B, but B is preferred
to A if B’s Generalised Lorenz curve is everywhere above that of A.
As with the Lorenz curve, dominance results are seldom available, so that
more structure needs to be given to the welfare function; that is, more speci c
value judgements need to be speci ed, leading to particular inequality and
welfare measures. These are discussed in the following Section. When mak-
ing comparisons between pre-tax and post-tax and transfer incomes in any
period, only inequality measures are relevant, but when comparing distribu-
tions over time, where mean incomes are expected to change, both inequality
and welfare measures are of concern.
1
P
= =1 log . The equally distributed equivalent, , is that income
level which, if obtained by every unit, gives the same ‘total welfare’ as the
actual distribution; hence is the power mean:
à !1(1−)
1 X 1−
= (2.2)
=1
{̄ (1 − )}1− (1 − ). This reects exactly the same ‘trade-off’ between
equality, (1 − ), and mean income as itself. Hence, the welfare function
associated with the Atkinson measure can be expressed in ‘abbreviated’ form
as = ̄ (1 − ).7 The nature of the trade-off is an important implication
of the basic value judgements underlying the use of the Atkinson measure.
Any distribution that is concerned with market income and includes non-
workers (and those without other income sources) can have income units with
zero income. In these cases, care must be taken in using and interpreting
Atkinson inequality measures. To illustrate a difficulty in the presence of
zero values, suppose there are individuals with incomes of [0 1 1 1], so
there is only one unit with a zero value and the rest have equal incomes of
6 It is obviously possible to modify the form of () to allow, for example, for
constant absolute inequality aversion rather than constant relative aversion, but
for convenience the latter speci cation is used here.
7 Instead of writing , as in (2.1), in terms of all individual incomes, the ab-
breviated form is expressed in terms of summary measures of the distribution; see
Lambert (1993). The abbreviated form is also convenient to avoid negative values
of in cases where 1.
16 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS AND METRICS
1 unit, and let = 05. The equally distributed equivalent income is thus
¡ ¢2
= −1
. The arithmetic mean is ̄ = −1
, so that 05 = 1. Hence
for large inequality is zero. However, for all ≥ 1, inequality is 1. Zero
values thus need to be omitted.
In comparing results for different values of relative inequality aversion,
it is useful to consider the hypothetical ‘leaky bucket’ experiment suggested
by Atkinson when proposing his measure. Consider taking a small amount
from person 2, with income of 2 , and transferring part of this to person 1,
with 1 2 , so that the effective ‘tax-transfer’ is equalising. The transfer
is thought to involve the use of a leaky bucket, so that some income is lost
in the process. A judge’s aversion to inequality is reected in the tolerance
of leaks. Totally differentiating in (2.1) with respect to 1 and 2 gives:
= − −
1 1 + 2 2 (2.4)
Convert changes to discrete form, and consider taking 1 unit from the richer
person, so that ∆2 = −1. The minimum amount that must be given to
person 1 is thus: µ ¶
1
∆1 = (2.6)
2
Hence, the judge would tolerate a leaking bucket up to a maximum leak of
³ ´
1 − 21 . The tolerance thus depends on the initial relative incomes of the
two individuals and the value of . Figure 2.2 illustrates the leakage from a
‘tax’ of 1 unit that would be tolerated by a judge with varying values, for
three different ratios of 1 to 2 .
The values involved in using the Atkinson measure may be compared with
the Gini inequality measure. Geometrically, this can be regarded as a ‘dis-
tance measure’ of the difference between the Lorenz curve of the distribution
2.2. INEQUALITY MEASURES 17
from the line of equality in Figure 2.1. A commonly used expression for the
Gini inequality measure, , for 1 2 3 , is:
2 X
1
=1+ − 2 ( + 1 − ) (2.7)
̄ =1
Clearly for the distribution, [0 1 1 1], tends to zero as increases, and a
Gini value of 1 results from [0 0 0 0 1]. The value judgements associated
with the use of the Gini measure are very different from those underlying the
Atkinson measure. However, an interpretation in terms of value judgements
is discussed below. First, further insight into the Gini can be obtained by
de ning ̄ as an ‘reverse-order-rank-weighted mean’ of , given by:
P
=1 ( + 1 − )
̄ = P (2.8)
=1 ( + 1 − )
That is, each value is given a weight given by its ‘reverse rank’ (that is, its
rank when in descending order – ordered from rich to poor, rather than poor
18 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS AND METRICS
P
to rich). Using =1 = ( + 1) 2, it can be seen that:
1 + ( + 1) ³ ̄ ´
= − (2.9)
2 ̄
For large samples this reduces to:
̄
=1− (2.10)
̄
Hence the Gini has some super cial similarities with the Atkinson measure:
both measures can be expressed as the proportional difference between the
arithmetic mean income and another type of average, or measure of location.
A further similarity arises when the value judgements underlying the Gini
measure are considered although, as shown by Sen (1973), they are very
different from those associated with the Atkinson measure. Suppose the
contribution to , the evaluation function of the independent judge, for any
pair of individual incomes is equal to the smallest income of the pair. It can
be shown that the average welfare across all pairs of individuals is ̄ (1 − ),
which is of course a welfare function expressed in abbreviated form. Hence
the values implicit in the use of the Gini measure contain a ‘maxi-min’ kind
of idea, that only the lowest income matters in all pairwise comparisons.
The similarity in terms of abbreviated welfare functions means that, for
both Atkinson and Gini measures, the form of the trade-off between average
income and its inequality is similar for each case, although of course the
magnitudes can differ substantially. Consider a ‘social indifference curve’,
showing combinations of ̄ and inequality, , for which is constant. By
differentiating the abbreviated forms, the slope of such an indifference curve
is given for each measure by:
¯
̄̄ ¯¯
¯ = (2.11)
1 −
This shows that, implicit in the values behind the use of these measures, a
proportional change in inequality of ∆ is viewed as being equivalent to
a proportional change in ̄ of ∆ (1 − ).
2.3. THIRTEEN DISTRIBUTIONS 19
suitable comparisons can be made. This is where difficulties arise, not only
because of the role of value judgements but because comparisons can involve
arti cial income concepts (such as income per adult equivalent person) and
arti cial units (such as the adult equivalent income unit). These aspects are
examined in the following two subsections.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the sequence for compiling the various distributions,
moving from the distribution of individual market incomes to household in-
comes and their transformation. The numbers in square brackets within each
box refer to the distribution numbers in Table 2.1. For example, [1 to 2] indi-
cates that comparisons involve the movement from pre-tax household income
to post tax and transfer household incomes. Distribution 13, which allocates
items of government expenditure to individuals, is not included in the gure
in view of the complex nature of the allocation, explained in Section 2.4.
22 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS AND METRICS
where and are parameters reecting the relative ‘cost’ of a child and
economies of scale respectively. This form was introduced by Cutler and
2.3. THIRTEEN DISTRIBUTIONS 23
Katz (1992) and investigated by, for example, Banks and Johnson (1994) and
Jenkins and Cowell (1994). Creedy and Sleeman (2005) found that, despite
its simplicity, it provided a close t to 29 alternative sets of equivalence scales.
Having obtained the adult equivalent size of each household, it is a simple
matter to calculate the total income per adult equivalent person.
arti cial income unit is thus combined with its corresponding arti cial income
measure, income per adult equivalent. In this case there are not necessarily
integer numbers of equivalent adults (except for single-adult households).
Thus the distributions cannot be written simply as vectors. The equivalent
adult size must be treated as a household weight in obtaining inequality or
other measures.
The use of the arti cial equivalent adult as the unit of analysis means
that the income unit and the income concept are treated consistently. Each
individual’s contribution to inequality depends on the demographic structure
of the household to which that individual belongs. Thus an adult in a one-
person household ‘counts for one’. But an adult counts for ‘less than one’
(has a weight less than 1) when placed in a multi-person household. The
use of this income unit is consistent with the principle of transfers. This can
be useful because of the general results discussed above linking this value
judgement to Lorenz curves.
Importantly, reliance on the strong results regarding Lorenz curves can
be made only in the case of comparisons using the equivalent person as the
unit of analysis. It cannot be assumed that comparisons are insensitive to
the choice of income unit. Indeed, it is quite possible for a tax reform to be
judged differently, changing inequality and welfare comparisons in opposite
directions, when using the individual and the equivalent adult as income
units, as shown below. Further examples are given in Decoster and Ooghe
(2003) and Creedy and Scutella (2004).
Hence the rst adult is given a weight of 1, while all other adults are given a
weight of 0.5 and all children are given a weight of 0.3. This type of explicit
income-sharing rule is naturally associated with the use of the individual as
the income unit. The use of this sharing rule gives rise to distributions 11
and 12 of Table 2.1.12
In addition to comparisons involving market and disposable incomes, ‘ s-
cal incidence’ studies go further and attempt to allocate some components of
government expenditure to individuals. In particular, health expenditure can
be allocated based on age, gender and summary information about individ-
uals’ use of publicly nanced health services. Similarly primary, secondary
and tertiary education expenditure can be allocated to individuals based on
age.13 This gives distribution 13 in Table 2.1.
The discussion has so far been in terms of distributions of market and
disposable incomes. Some household surveys contain detailed information
about household expenditures, and this can be used to compute an addi-
10 In the empirical analysis reported below, when this sharing rule is applied,
sharing is actually restricted to family members within a household.
11 This formulation actually corresponds to the modi ed OECD equivalent scale,
which does not allow for economies of scale within households.
12 Distribution 11 shares market income. An additional alternative distribution
would be to consider individual market incomes as in distribution 9 but with an
additional − zero values. Comparisons with distribution 12 would then
combine the effects of sharing and taxes and transfers.
13 For details of an attribution process, see Aziz et al. (2015).
26 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS AND METRICS
tional metric, that of disposable income after the deduction of indirect taxes.
However, if – as in New Zealand – there is a broad-based goods and services
tax applied at a uniform rate, combined with limited excises (for example, on
tobacco, alcohol and petrol), the allocation is straightforward and involves
an approximately proportional change. Hence, indirect taxes are ignored in
the comparisons reported here.14
Table 2.3. These percentage reductions are substantial, but again they vary
considerably depending on the comparisons used: for example in 2007 the
Gini measure for the comparison between distributions 9 and 10 shows a re-
duction of 20.9 per cent, whereas the Atkinson measure, for = 08, falls by
75.3 per cent when comparing distributions 3 and 4. Any comments about
the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers must therefore be clear about
the precise nature of the comparisons being made. The changes for 2010 are
generally slightly higher than for 2007, although otherwise similar.
It is also of interest to examine the percentage changes in inequality be-
tween the two years. These are shown in Table 2.4. With just two exceptions
– for the distribution of individual market income after sharing (number 11)
and the Atkinson measure for = 05 and = 08 – it could be said that in-
equality fell from 2007 to 2010. Despite this large degree of agreement among
measures and metrics, the extent of the reduction varies substantially. Dis-
posable incomes have generally shown the largest inequality reductions com-
pared with market incomes.
15%. For further discussion of the tax mix change, see Creedy and Mellish
(2011).
A range of bene t abatement thresholds, such as Domestic Purposes Ben-
e t (DPB), Invalid’s Bene t (IB), Widow’s Bene t (WB) were changed from
$80 and $180 per week to $100 and $200 per week, with abatement rates of
30% and 70% continuing to apply. The New Zealand Superannuation Non
Qualifying Spouse bene t (NZS NQS) threshold was changed from $80 to
$100 per week, with the abatement rate of 70% remaining unchanged. In
addition, in 2006/07 there was a Low Income Rebate (a 4.5% tax rebate
until $9500 per year where a 1.5% abatement begins). In 2010 an Indepen-
dent Earner Tax Credit applied, involving a $520 tax credit for income over
$24000, abated at 13% after $44000 per year. The Accident Compensation
Corporation (ACC) Levy was 1.3% in 2006/07, and 2.04% in October 2010.17
Table 2.5 shows the percentage change over the period for each of the met-
rics and inequality measures (although distribution number 13 could not be
considered for 2011). Unlike comparisons between 2007 and 2010, the direc-
tion of change is more ambiguous. The Gini measures show small percentage
increases for all distributions except for the disposable income distributions
in numbers 10 and 12.
There is more ambiguity among the Atkinson measures. Measured in-
equality in any period is higher, the higher is the degree of relative inequality
aversion. But of relevance here is the change in the Atkinson measure be-
tween two time periods. It is not necessarily the case that judges will agree
about the direction of changes in inequality. If there are equalising changes
in the lower ranges of the distribution, more importance will be attached
17 Changes to Portfolio Investment Entities (PIEs) could not be incorporated
into the analysis. There was a temporary additional payment to some bene t
categories to compensate for price rises due to the GST increase. This was paid
from October until April 2011 when bene ts would next be indexed by the CPI.
As a compromise, bene t payments were modelled according to the Taxwell tax
year, thus including only half the temporary payment.
34 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS AND METRICS
to these by a judge with high inequality aversion, who attaches less impor-
tance to high-income changes. Alternatively a judge with lower aversion is
more concerned with the changes taking place in higher-income groups. From
the evaluation function, , associated with the Atkinson measure, given in
equation (2.1):
= −
(2.14)
Hence, the increase in associated with an increase in is not only lower
for higher incomes, but is lower for higher values of , for a given income.
This has the potential to lead to the counter-intuitive result, depending on
the precise nature of the distributional changes, whereby a higher aversion
implies a decrease in inequality over time, whereas a low aversion implies an
increase.
Interestingly, in the present context, a judge with a higher degree of aver-
sion to inequality takes the view that there has been a reduction in inequality
from 2007 to 2011 for all disposable income distributions (except for individ-
ual market incomes in distribution 9, which shows an increase of about 1 per
cent). However, a lower implies a reduction in the cases of distributions of
disposable incomes 2, 10 and 12, but an increase for distributions 4, 6 and 8.
Both the direction and extent of the measured change in inequality depend
on the particular combination of the welfare metric, the unit of analysis and
the inequality measure being considered.
It is also of interest to consider whether, for each social welfare function,
the value of increases over the period. That is, in those cases where
inequality is seen to increase, is this compensated by an increase in real
incomes (in the view of the independent judge’s evaluation function)? This
question is answered by comparing values of = ̄ (1 − ), discussed above,
where ̄ is suitably adjusted for ination over the period. Table 2.6 reports
percentage changes in the (abbreviated) social welfare function from 2007
to 2011. Generally the changes are positive. Hence, the increase in real
Another random document with
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Baum, du heißt Sangalasi (Freude), du sollst mir jenes Mädchen
holen; zum Zeichen aber, daß dem so sein soll, schließe ich meine
Worte in dich hinein.“ Damit nimmt er die Öffnung der Knotenschleife
vor den Mund, steckt die Zunge durch sie hindurch und zieht die
Schleife zu. Die Rinde mit dem Knoten trägt er dann als
Unterarmband.
Der von Akundonde geschilderte Vorgang ist an sich einfach und
harmlos, aber er eröffnet den Ausblick auf ein ganzes, großes
Kapitel der Völkerpsychologie. Die Knüpfung eines Knotens
bedeutet in der Tat in vielen Schichten der Menschheit etwas
Magisches; die bindende Kraft des Knotens wird leicht auf
bestimmte Personen übertragen, und wie der Knoten in sich
unauflöslich ist, so ist auch jene andere Person, sofern ich den
Knoten nach bestimmten Regeln und unter Befolgung bestimmter
Zeremonien geknüpft habe, unauflöslich an mich gefesselt.
So sehr mich diese Sachen interessieren und so gern ich noch
mehr von ihnen gerade aus dem Munde des Dreigestirns: Knudsen,
Akundonde und Akumapanje gehört hätte, so sehr drängt es mich
doch, einstweilen mehr von dem vielbesprochenen Unyago zu
vernehmen. Ich bringe die Rede darauf, aber die beiden Neger
weichen geschickt aus. Da fange ich einen Blick des alten, kranken
Häuptlings auf, wie er suchend unseren Arbeitsraum durchmustert.
Der Mann hat Durst, denke ich halblaut, und schon fährt mir die
Erinnerung an die letzte Dedikation des schwarzen Pastors Daudi
durch den Sinn. Dieser hat uns vor einigen Tagen einen der üblichen
riesigen Töpfe mit Pombe geschickt, aber diese Pombe ist nichts für
unsere verwöhnten Zungen; sie schmeckt gar zu muffig. „Für die
beiden alten Sünder wird sie wohl noch gut genug sein“, sage ich zu
Knudsen. Den Norweger müssen wohl ähnliche Gedanken bewegt
haben, denn er faßt meine Idee sofort auf, holt aus seinem Zelt ein
gewaltiges Blechgefäß, taucht es tief in die gelbe, gärende
Flüssigkeit und kredenzt es Akundonde. Dieser nimmt den Becher,
trinkt aber nicht, sondern reicht ihn seinem Begleiter. „Ist das ein
höflicher König!“ denke ich bei diesem Anblick; als ich aber im
gleichen Augenblick sehen muß, wie vorsichtig Akumapanje seine
Lippen in die Pombe taucht, da wird mir’s klar: es ist eine
altüberkommene Sitte, hervorgegangen aus dem angeborenen
Mißtrauen des Negers, der zwar nicht überall Gift, wohl aber überall
Zauberei wittert und fürchtet. Jetzt soll sich der mögliche Zauber auf
das Haupt des Dieners entladen.
Akumapanje hat, nachdem er ein weniges gekostet, den Becher
an Akundonde zurückgereicht; mit einem Zuge hat dieser das
umfangreiche Gefäß geleert. Wenige Sekunden später befindet es
sich bereits wieder am Munde des „Ministers“. Ein riesenlanger Zug;
auch er hat es seinem Meister nachgetan; das Gefäß ist leer. In
diesem Tempo gehen Trunk und Gegentrunk eine Weile weiter; mit
einem aus Neid und Bewunderung gemischten Gefühl verfolgen wir
beiden Europäer diese Leistungsfähigkeit. Doch mir fällt wieder
unser ethnologisches Endziel ein; und siehe da, was vorher
unmöglich schien, jetzt geht es spielend. Mit geläufiger Zunge
berichten die beiden, einander gegenseitig ergänzend, über die
allgemeinen Züge des Knaben-Unyago, über die Einrichtung, daß
das Fest wechsele, was mir durchaus nichts Neues mehr ist; sodann
über das Einleitungsfest, bei dem für die zu beschneidenden Knaben
eigens Hütten um den Festplatz herum errichtet werden, und wie die
Knaben nach diesen Vorbereitungen schließlich in eine im tiefen
Walde gelegene besondere Hütte geführt werden, um dort der
Operation unterzogen zu werden. Über dies alles bin ich schon
durch Knudsen einigermaßen unterrichtet, der sich im Laufe seines
vieljährigen Aufenthaltes unter den Wayao eine bewunderungswerte
Kenntnis ihres Volkstums angeeignet hat und den ich in jeder freien
Minute mit einer Beharrlichkeit auspresse, daß der gute Nils schon
oftmals mich oder sich ganz wo anders hingewünscht hat, als wo wir
beide uns augenblicklich befinden.
Jetzt endlich kommen die beiden immer redseliger gewordenen
Männer, die bei ihrem Eilzugtempo des Ganzentrinkens schon tief in
das Pombefaß hinuntertauchen müssen, auf ein Gebiet, über das
Knudsen sehr wenig unterrichtet ist, das aber mich am allermeisten
fesselt. Es ist der mehrmonatige Unterricht der Knaben in jener
Waldhütte durch ihre Anamungwi, die Mentoren, von denen jeder
Knabe des Landes von seiner Mannbarkeitsperiode an einen besitzt.
Diese Mentoren sind unstreitig eine der sympathischsten
Einrichtungen des ganzen hiesigen Volkstums; sie halten ihre Hand
über ihren Schützling in jeder Lebenslage, geleiten ihn durch die
Schmerzenswochen des Unyago hindurch, unterrichten ihn dort über
Schickliches und Unschickliches, und sie bleiben für das
Wohlverhalten ihres jungen Freundes auch weit über dessen
Jugendstadium hinaus verantwortlich. Mir kam es an jenem
denkwürdigen Nachmittage vor allem darauf an, den wesentlichen
Inhalt des Moralunterrichts in jenem Waldhause zu erfahren. Ganz
ist das große Werk nicht gelungen; doch daß ich wenigstens das
Fragment aus der Rede eines solchen Mentors wortgetreu habe
niederlegen können, erfüllt mich schon mit großer Freude und
Genugtuung.
Einige besonders wohlgefüllte Becher haben die letzten
Bedenken der beiden trinkfreudigen Gewährsmänner behoben; ein
letztes Anspornen durch Nils Knudsen, dann hebt Akundonde mit
lehrhaftem Tone an:
„Mwe mari, sambano mumbēle. Atati na achikuluwēno
mnyōgopĕ. Nyumba kasamyinyira tinyisimana chimtumbánăgá.
Wakoongwe mkasa yogopa; mkagononau, mesi akayasináu.
Imālagắ akamtī́kĭté; imālagắ akamila muchisiĕ́ : masakam.
Munyitikisie: marhaba. Mkuona mwesi sumyṓgopé, ngakawa
kuulala. Kusimana timchiŭá. Miasi jere kogoya. Jerueli winyi.“
In deutscher Übersetzung:
„Du, mein Lehrling (Schüler), jetzt bist du beschnitten. Deinen
Vater und deine Mutter, ehre sie. Ins Haus gehe nicht unangemeldet;
du möchtest sie sonst treffen in zärtlicher Umarmung. Vor Mädchen
mußt du keine Angst haben; schlaft zusammen; badet zusammen.
Wenn du fertig bist, soll sie dich kneten; wenn du fertig bist, soll sie
dich grüßen: masakam. Dann antwortest du: marhaba. Bei Neumond
nimm dich in acht; dann würdest du leicht krank werden. Vor
Kohabitation während der Regel hüte dich (du würdest sonst
sterben); die Regel ist gefährlich; (sie bringt) Krankheiten viele.“
So schön und vollständig wie hier auf dem Papier sah nun meine
Niederschrift im ersten Augenblick keineswegs aus; dem Neger ist
es schon in nüchternem Zustande nicht gegeben, seine Sätze
sozusagen auseinander zu pflücken und stückweise zu diktieren,
hier bei den fidelen beiden alten Sündern aber war es ein Problem.
Dennoch haben wir es gelöst bis zur unabwendbaren Katastrophe.
Zwischen je zwei Sätzen haben die beiden sich unentwegt
gestärkt; sie sind dabei gerade bis zu den Wirkungen der weiblichen
Menses auf das andere Geschlecht gekommen. Etwas unsicher
taucht Akumapanje den Becher der Lust wieder tief in den Bauch
des Riesentopfes hinunter. Was muß er hören? Ein kratzendes
Geräusch. Seine Hand fährt in anderer Richtung durch den Raum
des Fasses dahin; dieselbe Wirkung. Mit unsäglich dummem
Gesicht hebt Seine Exzellenz den Becher zum Licht; er ist fast leer;
er kann auch nicht mehr gefüllt sein, denn die beiden Jubelgreise
haben in ihrer Begeisterung das ganze riesige Quantum von wohl
über 20 Liter auf einen Sitz ausgetrunken. Mit der wunderbaren
Logik des Bezechten halten sie sich aber zu weiteren Ansprüchen
berechtigt; sie sind daher über den Mangel weiteren Stoffes sehr
entrüstet. Unter keinen Umständen sind sie zur Fortsetzung ihres
Unyagokollegs zu bewegen, sondern ziehen beleidigt ab. Das hat
man also von seiner übergroßen Gastfreundschaft.
Die hier wiedergegebene Ansprache, die ich unter Mithilfe von
Knudsen, Daudi, Matola und einigen anderen Intelligenzen ins
Deutsche übertragen habe, soll für alle Unyagofeierlichkeiten nach
Inhalt und Form feststehen. Dies wird schon richtig sein, denn ich
wüßte nicht, was mehr aus dem Herzen des Negers
herausgesprochen sein könnte als gerade diese Vorschriften. Sie
sind eine seltsame Mischung von hygienischen Regeln und
moralischen Unterweisungen; zugleich steckt in ihnen ein gut Stück
uralten, aber noch immer geübten Volkstums. Damit meine ich das
Verbot für den Jüngling, nach der Aufnahme in die Schar der
Erwachsenen noch das mütterliche Haus unangemeldet zu betreten.
Wir leben hier in Ostafrika ganz im Gebiet des Mutterrechts; da gilt
der Vater nichts; er ist sozusagen nur angeheiratet. Er ist zwar der
Vater seiner Kinder, doch kaum ihr Verwandter; er gehört eben einer
anderen Sippe an. Diese Sippe ist, wie dies innerhalb der Welt der
Naturvölker so außerordentlich oft wiederkehrt, exogamisch, d. h. ein
Jüngling kann ohne weitere Schwierigkeiten ein Mädchen aus jeder
andern Sippe seines Stammes heiraten, nur nicht aus seiner
eigenen. Dieses Eheverbot geht sogar so weit, daß der junge Yao
die Nähe seiner nächsten Sippengenossinnen möglichst zu meiden
hat; es sind dies eben seine nächsten Verwandten in Gestalt seiner
Mutter und seiner Schwestern. Daher die Vorschrift, sich bei der
Annäherung an das mütterliche Haus zum mindesten erst zu
melden.
Außerordentlich sympathisch muß uns wohlerzogene Europäer
die auch hier wiederkehrende Betonung des Respekts vor Vater und
Mutter berühren. Diese Achtung vor den Eltern und vor allen
Erwachsenen überhaupt ist, wie man mir immer wieder erzählt hat,
der Haupt- und eigentliche Grundzug der hiesigen Volkspädagogik;
ihre allgemeine Durchführung seitens der Jugend soll nach Knudsen
auch der hervorstechendste Zug im Verkehr der Jungen mit den
Alten sein. Wir Europäer könnten in dieser Beziehung sehr wohl von
den Negern lernen, meint Nils, der zu einem Urteil zweifellos
berechtigt ist.
Aber um meine Unyagorede bin ich trotz aller guten Eindrücke
von den Erziehungsmaximen der Neger nun doch gekommen, und
daran ist der allzu große Pombetopf des guten Daudi schuld. Es wird
schon nicht anders gehen: wenn der Berg nicht zu Mohammed
kommt, muß Mohammed zum Berge gehen. Akundonde hat erklärt,
er müsse heim, um neue Daua auf seinen Fuß zu legen, er könne
unmöglich wiederkommen; so werden wir wohl oder übel den alten
Herrn in seiner eigenen Residenz aufsuchen müssen.
Yao-Masewe in Mtua.
Elefantenherde nach Zeichnung von Barnabas, einem gebildeten Muera in Lindi
(s. S. 448).
Elftes Kapitel.
Weitere Ergebnisse.
Chingulungulu, Ende August 1906.